Sale Of Vessel; Ownership passes upon delivery of property.

Fernando A. Froilan, v. Pan Oriental Shipping Company,

G.R. No. L-11897  October 31, 1964
BARRERA, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Art. 1477, new Civil Code which states that The ownership of the
thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery
thereof.
FACTS
The parties involved were Fernando A. Froilan, as the Plaintiff Appellee, Pan Oriental
Shipping Company as defendant-appellant and the State, and Compania Maritima as
intervenors-appellees.
This case is an appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila by the
above-mentioned parties. The lower court upheld Froilan's (and Compañia Maritima's)
right to the ownership and possession of the FS-197. It was ruled that Froilan's violations
of the conditions of the contract of sale in his favor did not automatically deprive him of
his right of ownership of the vessel, which passed to him upon execution of the contract,
but merely gave rise to the Shipping Administration's right either to foreclose the
mortgage or rescind the contract by court action. As the Shipping Administration failed to
avail itself of any of these remedies, Froilan's right of ownership remained unaffected.
The court also dismissed (1) defendant's counterclaims against plaintiff Froilan and
intervenor Compañia Maritima, on the ground that it (defendant) was a possessor in bad
faith, and consequently, not entitled to damages; (2) plaintiff's counterclaims against
defendant, for the reason that the same should have been directed against intervenor
Republic of the Philippines; and (3) defendant's counterclaims said intervenor Republic,
on the ground that the order dismissing the complaint in intervention had already become
final and it was materially impossible for the latter to secure possession of the vessel.
From this decision, Pan Oriental brought the instant appeal.
Issue:
Did the lower court erred in its decision deciding in favor of Froilan?
Ruling:
1. No. The ruling of the lower court that under the contract of sale with mortgage,
ownership of the vessel passed to Froilan, upon delivery of the property to the
latter, must be sustained. It is to be noted that unlike in the charter contract where
it was specifically prescribed that ownership of the vessel shall be transferred to

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

the vendee only upon full payment of the purchase price, no similar provision
appears in the contract of sale in favor of Froilan.Under Article 1477 - The
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.

In the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of the thing sold passes
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof (Art. 1477, new
Civil Code). It is for this reason that Froilan was able to constitute a mortgage on
the vessel in favor of the Administration, to secure payment of the unpaid balance
of the purchase

There is no gainsaying the fact that there was continuous violation by Froilan of
the terms of said contract of sale. The records conclusively show that
notwithstanding the numerous opportunities given him, Froilan had been remiss in
the fulfillment of his obligations thereunder. Nevertheless, the lower court upheld
his allegation that the Administration may not legally rescind the contract without
filing the corresponding complaint in court.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
De la Rama Steamship Co., INC., v Hon. Buenvenido Tan and National
Development Company
G.R. No. L-8784 May 21, 1956
STREET, J.:

DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Art. 1431, which provides that through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
FACTS
The parties involved were De la Rama Steamship Co. Inc., as the Plaintiff Appellee, National
Development Company as defendant-appellant.

This case is an appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila by the
above-mentioned parties. The lower court upheld Froilan's (and Compañia Maritima's)
right to the ownership and possession of the FS-197. It was ruled that Froilan's violations
of the conditions of the contract of sale in his favor did not automatically deprive him of
his right of ownership of the vessel, which passed to him upon execution of the contract,
but merely gave rise to the Shipping Administration's right either to foreclose the
mortgage or rescind the contract by court action. As the Shipping Administration failed to
avail itself of any of these remedies, Froilan's right of ownership remained unaffected.
The court also dismissed (1) defendant's counterclaims against plaintiff Froilan and
intervenor Compañia Maritima, on the ground that it (defendant) was a possessor in bad
faith, and consequently, not entitled to damages; (2) plaintiff's counterclaims against
defendant, for the reason that the same should have been directed against intervenor
Republic of the Philippines; and (3) defendant's counterclaims said intervenor Republic,
on the ground that the order dismissing the complaint in intervention had already become
final and it was materially impossible for the latter to secure possession of the vessel.
From this decision, Pan Oriental brought the instant appeal.
Issue:
Did the lower court erred in its decision deciding in favor of Froilan?
Ruling:
1. No. The ruling of the lower court that under the contract of sale with mortgage,
ownership of the vessel passed to Froilan, upon delivery of the property to the
latter, must be sustained. It is to be noted that unlike in the charter contract where

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

it was specifically prescribed that ownership of the vessel shall be transferred to
the vendee only upon full payment of the purchase price, no similar provision
appears in the contract of sale in favor of Froilan.Under Article 1477 - The
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.

In the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of the thing sold passes
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof (Art. 1477, new
Civil Code). It is for this reason that Froilan was able to constitute a mortgage on
the vessel in favor of the Administration, to secure payment of the unpaid balance
of the purchase

There is no gainsaying the fact that there was continuous violation by Froilan of
the terms of said contract of sale. The records conclusively show that
notwithstanding the numerous opportunities given him, Froilan had been remiss in
the fulfillment of his obligations thereunder. Nevertheless, the lower court upheld
his allegation that the Administration may not legally rescind the contract without
filing the corresponding complaint in court.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
Hugo Apundar v. DALMACIO ANDRIN and FLAVIANA PILAPIL
G.R. No. L-16220 November 19, 1921
STREET, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based a case decided by the Supreme Court in Medel v. Militante which
provides that when the tenant denies his landlord's title this gives rise to a right of action
on the part of the landlord to recover immediate possession of the demised premises; and
it follows as a necessary corollary from this proposition that if the landlord acquires
possession peacefully, as in this case, by the mere act of reentry, the tenant cannot
maintain an action to put the landlord out. The existence of an affirmative right of action
on the part of the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to the maintenance of any action by
the tenant.
FACTS
The parties involved were Hugo Apundar as the plaintiff-appellant, James Anthony
Hughes who is a natural born US citizen, Lenita Mabunay Hughes who is a naturalized
Filipino Citizen who filed a joint petition and the Solicitor General as the petitioner.
This case is a review of the case decided by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
which granted the joint petition of Spouses Hughes which granted the petition for
adoption of Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria who are nephews and niece of Lenita Mabunay
Hughes.
The Office of the Solicitor General assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent
trial court. It assailed that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption of
spouses James Anthony Hughes and Lenita Mabunay Hughes because they are not
qualified to adopt under Philippine Law specifically under EO 209 Art. 8 and did not
comply with the requirement of the law on inter-country adoption.
Issue:
Is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court proper when it granted the adoption where the
adopter is an alien?
Ruling:
1. No. The court erred in affirming the grant of adoption and theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings.
The court ruled that adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate
paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from
adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties. The
Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses
the necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental
authority, can aptly find governance.
"Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate
child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance
with this Code."
Hence, the adoption is no proper, the RTC erred in its decision in allowing the petition by
Sps. Huhges.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Adoption of a child born out of wedlock shall comply with R.A. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act)
Rosario Mata Castro And Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro, A.K.A. "Maria
Socorro M. Castro" and "Jayrose M. Castro v Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio
and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552 which requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children.
FACTS
The parties involved were Atty. Jose G. Castro as the adopter, Joanne Benedicta and
Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), daughters of Jose Castro herein appellants assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals which decided in favor of Castro.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals of Batac, Ilocos Norte,
dismissing the petition instituted by the children of Castro moving for the annulment of
the decision of the adoption case involving the illegitimate children of Castro.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of
NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are
not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry
who were married at the time of their birth.
Issue:
1. Can an adoption take place even without the consent of the wife and it’s children?
Ruling:
No, as a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent
of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt. The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law.
It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights. Since the
trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it
never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Hence, the decision of the RTC granting adoption in this case is null and void for the
reason that adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

The relationship established by the adoption does not extend to their other relatives,
except as expressly provided by law. 
In The Matter of the Adoption of the Minor, Edwin Villa Y Mendoza, Luis E.
Santos, Jr. And Edipola V. Santos v Republic Of The Philippines
G.R. No. L-22523,  September 29, 1967
ANGELES, J..:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Article 338 of the Civil Code which allows the adoption of a
natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father
or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother.
In adoption, the relationship established is limited only to the adopting parents and the
adopted child.
FACTS
The parties involved were Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos as appellants in a
Special Proceeding, Edwin Villa y Mendoza as the adopted minor and the state as the
oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in
Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R.
Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner's) son by adoption. Petitioners do not have a child of their own blood. Neither
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or
natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza
who are the common parents of Edipola Santos (appellant)
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people who are
related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or dual relationship
should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from
adopting one another.
Issue:
2. Can an elder sister adopt a younger brother?
3. Will the adoption create dual relationship between the adopter and the adoptee?

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Ruling:
1. Yes. a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption
of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the relation of parent and
child already exists by nature.
To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related
to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption
among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might
be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can
properly rear and educate them
Hence, Petitioner-Appellant, can adopt her minor brother.

2. No, the relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. The adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter
Hence, there can be no dual relationship between the parties.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Husband and wife must jointly adopt except in cases enumerated under the law.
Republic Of The Philippines v Honorable Rodolfo Toledano
G.R. No. 94147,  June 8, 1994
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Article 184 par. 3 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child.
FACTS
The parties involved were spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse as adoptees, Solomon
Joseph Alcala the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse and the Office
of the Solicitor General representing the state.
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I.
The private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino who became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America in Guam.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned found that private respondents
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the
adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor.
OSG appealed the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
1. Can private respondents who are aliens adopt under the Philippine Law?

Ruling:
1. No. Alvin Clouse is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the
United States of America and that Evelyn Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She
lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Article 184 par. 3 of the Family Code expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation.
There is only room for application.
Joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly.
Note:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife
are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her
own right. However, the alien spouse must comply with the requirements of the law
including the residency requirement of 3 years.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

A person who has an illegitimate spurious child or an adopted child can still adopt.
In The Matter of the Adoption of the Minor Santiago Señeres, Dr. Fernando P.
Hofileña, and Corazon De Guia-Hofileña v. Republic Of The Philippines
G.R. No. L-26476. August 31, 1970
DIZON, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Article 335 of the Civil Code which enumerates individuals who
may not adopt which read as follows: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction
FACTS
The parties involved were spouses Fernando P. Hofileña, and Corazon De Guia-Hofileña
as petitioners in a Special Proceeding, Santiago Señeres as the adopted minor and the
state as the oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila in Special Proceedings No. G-00100 dismissing the petition filed by the therein
petitioners — hereinafter referred to as appellants — for the adoption of the minor
Santiago Señeres.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on On March 23,
1966, the lower court rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition upon the
ground that the provisions of Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code prohibits the
intended adoption because appellants had already previously adopted the two minors
mentioned heretofore. In the present appeal, therefore, the sole question to be resolved is
whether or not a person who already has an adopted child may still legally adopt another.
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people who are
related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or dual relationship
should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from
adopting one another.
Issue:
1. Does the law prohibit a person who previously adopted, adopt another?

Ruling:
1. No. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

interpretation. The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code in enumerating the
persons who "cannot adopt" appear to be clear and unambiguous and have a clearly
defined meaning in law.
In this case "adopted children" do not fall within the meaning of anyone of the above
kinds of descendants seems to be clear. Spouses Hofilena may have a prior adoption of
Reynaldo Yusay but it does not in any manner prohibit the Spouses from adopting
another, which in this case is Santiago Seneres.
Therefore, the spouses Hofileña are not disqualified by law to adopt. The appealed
decision is reversed and set aside as a result, judgment is rendered allowing appellants to
adopt the minor Santiago Señeres.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

The relationship established by the adoption does not extend to their other relatives,
except as expressly provided by law. 
In Re petition for Adoption of Nora Divino and Aurora Paulino, both surnamed
Belen. Socorro S. Paulino V. Nicasio A. Belen And Walfrido P. Belen
G.R. No. L-22523,  January 30, 1971
BARREDO, J.:
DOCTRINE
The ruling is based on Article 338 of the Civil Code which allows the adoption of a
natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father
or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother.
In adoption, the relationship established is limited only to the adopting parents and the
adopted child.
FACTS
The parties involved were Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos as appellants in a
Special Proceeding, Edwin Villa y Mendoza as the adopted minor and the state as the
oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in
Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R.
Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner's) son by adoption. Petitioners do not have a child of their own blood. Neither
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or
natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza
who are the common parents of Edipola Santos (appellant)
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people who are
related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or dual relationship
should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from
adopting one another.
Issue:
2. Can an elder sister adopt a younger brother?
3. Will the adoption create dual relationship between the adopter and the adoptee?

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes

Ruling:
1. Yes. a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption
of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the relation of parent and
child already exists by nature.
To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related
to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption
among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might
be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can
properly rear and educate them
Hence, Petitioner-Appellant, can adopt her minor brother.

2. No, the relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. The adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter
Hence, there can be no dual relationship between the parties.

Karl Marxcuz R. Reyes