MODULE 3 1. No.
The marriage between Pepito and Norma did not fall on an
CIVIL LAW REVIEW – ATTY. RABUYA
1. Ninal v. Bayadog (2011) - ALULOD
Facts:
         Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones oin
1974. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito. After 20 months, Pepito
married respondent Norma Badayag without a valid marriage
license. Instead, they executed an Affidavit stating that they
had lived as husband and wife for at least 5 years, exempting
them from getting a marriage license.
         In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. The heirs of
Pepito filed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license.
         RTC Judge in Cebu City dismissed he petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the issues on this case. Thus, the lower
court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family
Code
2. Yes. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons
Issue:
1. Whether the marriage of Pepito and Norma is valid.
2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Ruling:
instance that exempts them from getting a valid marriage
license. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. In this case, at the time of
Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of
a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
 
who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical.
Voidable Marriage Void Marriage
annulable is valid is considered as having never Only the parties to Any proper interested party
until otherwise to have taken place and cannot a voidable marriage may attack
declared by the be the source of rights can assail it
court
the property regime have no legal effects except
generally ratified or Can never be ratified governing voidable those declared by law
confirmed by free marriages is concerning the properties of the
cohabitation or generally conjugal alleged spouses, regarding co-
prescription partnership and the ownership or ownership
children conceived through actual joint
before its contribution,  and its effect on
cannot be assailed can be attacked collaterally annulment are the children born to such void
collaterally except legitimate. marriages as provided in
in a direct Article 50 in relation to Article
proceeding   43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code
can be assailed only can be questioned even after
during the lifetime the death of either party  
of the parties and
not after death of Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
either, in which judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
case the parties and marriage.  "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
their offspring will to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
be left as if the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
marriage had been absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
perfectly valid society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 
Action prescribes the action or defense for nullity "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
is imprescriptible so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.  But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage  and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect.  For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
2. De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro (2008) - ARANAS
FACTS:
In 1991, petitioner and respondent became sweethearts.
They applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first
sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. In order to push through with the plan they executed
an affidavit dated stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least 5years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Bernabe of the MTC of Pasig City.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent
went back to their respective homes and did not live together as
husband and wife.
 In November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named
Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent
has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
 In June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the RTC, alleging that petitioner has “reneged
on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her “as
his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.”
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage
was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to
save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able
to get parental advice from his parents before he got married.
He also averred that they never lived together as husband and
wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
  RTC ruled that the marriage is not valid as it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to
give her support.
CA denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court
declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, CA frowned upon
petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the
paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with
certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not
be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible.” Moreover, CA noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
 CA also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it
was improper for the RTC to declare the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between
the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to
show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a
matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity,
and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the
trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner
and respondent.
ISSUES:
1. whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support
2. whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
 
RULING:
1. The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000),
we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
In Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 351 SCRA 127
(2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the
main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal,
we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a marriage an absolute nullity.
 Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they
had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit
when she was asked during cross examination, thus—ATTY.
CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been
living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct? AYes, sir.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In
the instant case, there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever;
it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
 2. Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
3. Cariño v. Yee Cariño (2001) – CAMPOS
Facts: During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S Carino he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan NICDAO-CARINO, with whom he had two
children, and the second was on Novermber 10, 1992, with
respodent Susan YEE-CARINO with whom he had no children
in their ten year cohabitation way back in 1982.
In 1988 SP04 Santiago S Carino became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculoses and
eventually passed away on Novermber 13, 1992 under the care
of Susan YEE.
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOCOLM and Pag-inig
while Susan Yea received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS
Life, Burial and SSS.
On December 14, 1993 respodent Susan Yee filed a case for
collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao. Petitioner
failed to file her answer and was declared in default.

Susan Yee admitted that her marriage with the deceased took
place during the subsistence of the marriage between petitioner
and deceased and with judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. But she claims that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and only became aware of it at the funeral of
the deceased where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To support her claim she presented
a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila:
“This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO and SUSAN
NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20,
1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve.”
RTC: Rule in favor of Susan YEE.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC
Petitioner argues that the doctrine in Vda. De Conseugra vs
GSIS is applicable to the case at bar.
Issues: W/N the Supreme Court may upon the validity of the
two marriages- Yes
W/N Susan Yee is entitled to the death benefits of SP04
Carino- No
Ruling: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this
case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage,and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, he Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage
was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community
or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
“Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By
intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the
legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence
of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads –
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall
be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto
3. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (2013)
Facts:  of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
1. Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo) was filed by herein respondents
who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter.
2. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
3. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon
(Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
4. Eliseo died intestate on December 12, 1992.
5. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City.
1. Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other.
2. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of
the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito).
3. Elise showed her Certificate of Live Birth
signed by Eliseo as her father as proof.
4. Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.
b. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly
laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.
1. Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not
2. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
3. Averred that there are no factual and legal bases
for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseo’s estate.
RTC: Directed issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
CA: Affirmed decision.
Issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT
OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY
FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
Ruling:
1) Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las Pinas at the time of his
death.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be
filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records
that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.
2) No GAOD.
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling. 
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and
the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or
not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence
of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that
such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab
initio.
3) In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to
be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to
be an interested party.
 With the overwhelming evidence on record produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of
the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
 Right of Elise founded on her right as a compulsory
heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate
after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.
5. Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental (2009) CHAVEZ  present action.
FACTS:
            Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married on Jan. 4,
1978. They had three children namely Josef, Janelle and
Gian.However Pablo died on April 2002 in a vehicular accident
in Indonesia. During his wake, the respondent Lucille
introduced her son Patrick as Pablo’s child. Naturally Ma.
Cristina inquired as to the veracity of Lucille’s claim. She
acquired a copy of Patrick’s birth certificate from the Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects that the child was
born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was registered late a year after. It has
an annotation wherein Pablo acknowledge the child as his, and
that the child was legitimated by a subsequent marriage of his
parents on April 1998. Because of her findings, she filed a
petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick  with
RTC of Himamaylan Negros Occidental.
Her contention is that Patrick could not have been legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of Lucille and Pablo because such
is bigamous (their marriage was subsisting at that time). She
prayed for the correction of Patrick’s legitimation,
acknowledgment of the father, and use of Braza as last name.
She also asked that Patrick be submitted to DNA testing and to
declare Lucilleand Pablo’s marriage as bigamous. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case
special proceeding for correction of entry and the court does
not have jurisdiction to annul her marriage, impugn legitimacy
and order DNA testing because the court is not acting as a
family court.Thus it  should instead be ventilated in an ordinary
action. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied so they filed this
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul the
marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of respondent’s
child in a petition to correct entries in the local civil register?
RULING:
            The petitioners in this case aver the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage and legitimacy of child in an
action to correct entries in civil registrar. As basis, they cited
Cariño v. Carino, Lee v. CA and Republic v. Kho, alleging that
even substantial errors,such as those sought to be corrected in
the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule
108.  August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
However, the Supreme Court held the contrary. In a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.Under these rules, only correction of
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry may be allowed.  A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that
is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent.  Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
Moreover, the petitioners seek to nullify the marriage of
respondent and Pablo and impugn their child’s filiation and to
subject him to DNA testing. They contend that these are merely
incidental to the main petition which is correction of entry
under Rule 108. However the court held that the applicable rule
is under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Art. 171 of the Family Code,
the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
provided in said Code. Finally, the court lso ruled that validity
of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as what the
petitioners strive for in this case.
6. Juliano-Llave v. Republic (2011) - GARCIA
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13,
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner
Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal
A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then,
Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano
married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in
1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes.  January 23, 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083.
Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab
initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage
to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides
that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But
Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
7. Fujiki v. Marinay (2013) - LIM
Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who
marrie drespodent Maria Paz Marinay in the Philippines on
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides.
         In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Sinichi
Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved Marinay
and Maekara were married on May 15, 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
         Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On January 14,
2011 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgement ( Decree of Absoulute
Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that:
1. The Japanese Family court judgment be recognized
2. that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void  ab initio
3. for the RTC to direct the ;ocal Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japane Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage bwteen Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the NSO
RTC:  Dismissed the petition. Cited Sec. 2 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC
(a) Who may file – A petition for declaration of abosolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
Petitioner argued that A.Mo. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
in a petition for recognition of Foreign judgment which seeks
to establlish a status, a right or a particular fact.
He further argued that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the
civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments
of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.
Comment of the OSG:  The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party
who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited
Juliano-Llave v. Republic which held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. And Ninal
vs Bayadog which declared that:
“the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”
Issues:
1.W/N the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable.
2.W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullfying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.
3.W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
1. No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office. 
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,the service of summons,the
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-
trial,the trial and the judgment of the trial court.
2 and 3. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy
to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted
by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."  reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1.Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus,
the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City is not
applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate
a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws.
However, this safegaurds do not apply in a petition for
correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity"
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only
decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code. 
8. Vitangcol v. People (2016);  - ALULOD
Facts:
         Alice Eduardo married petitioner Norberto Vitangcol at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros in 1994. After some time,
Alice began hearing rumors that Norberto was previously
married to another woman, named Gina Gaerlan. This was
evidence by a marriage contract registered with the NSO in
1987. Alice filed the criminal complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.
     Norberto claimed that Alice knew about the first marriage.
This was only a retaliation of Alice since he found that she was
having an affair with another man.
         Both the RTC and CA convicted Norberto of the crime
of bigamy.
Issue:
Ruling:
         Norberto was convicted of the crime of bigamy. All the
requisites of the crime of bigamy were present in this case.
         For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the
prosecution must prove all of the following elements: [first,]
that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; [third,] that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and [lastly,] that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
         Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he
married Alice. The marriage with Gina was one solemnized
under the provisions of the Civil Code. Article 53 of the Civil
Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any
of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
  To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, “the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. The Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does
not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does
not exist.
         Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his
signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and
his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract between petitioner
and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of
petitioner’s first marriage. This should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to the absence of
any record of the marriage.
9. Republic v. CA and Castro (1994); - ARANAS
Facts: On June 24, 1970 Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.
Cardenas were married in a civol ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s
parents.
       Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage
including the procurement of the marriage license.
       The couple did not immediately live together as
husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s
parents. Thus, it was only March 1871, when Castro discovered
she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation last only 4 months. They parted
ways.
       On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was
adopted by Catro’s brother.
       The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to
follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the US. She thus consulted a lawyer,
Atty. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage.
       They discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
       As proof Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Registrar of Pasig:
“This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the
Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in
the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.” Issued
upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
       TRIAL COURT: Denied the petition. The certification
is inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a
marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage bwteen
the parties.
       COURT OF APPEALS: REVERSED. It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the the subject
marriage contract.
Issues:   The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by
Whether or not the evidence presented by proavte respondent is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued.
Ruling: Yes the evidence is sufficient.
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar
of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is
not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in
court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Sec. 29.Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed
by an officer having custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly
known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown
to the parents of the former. 

10. Sevilla v.Cardenas (2006); - CAMPOS
FACTS:
Jaime O. Sevilla filed a complaint before the RTC, claiming
that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and
the latter’s father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the AFP, he
and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he
never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage
to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer. “That although marriage
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May
19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license.” Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that “no marriage license no. 2770792
was ever issued by said office.”
On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time
in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City,
where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. “F”) with
the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated.
Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and
reception were jointly shared by his and defendant’s parents.
After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his
house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was
born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for
his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship
turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he
being a medical student at that time. They started living apart
in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they
eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when
defendant’s second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a
judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
 
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969.
Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married
to her for 25 years.
(Chika from RTC decision: A model, Carmelita, according to
her, was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she
loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to
follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila,
she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter’s home in Brixton Hills
where plaintiff’s mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all
Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial
but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of support on and off, while defendant worked as an English
everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in
her father. On May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.)
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969,
they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone  
prepared and arranged, since defendant’s mother just came
from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding  
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after RTC: declared marriage null and void for lack of the requisite
two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. marriage license.
Escudero, plaintiff’s physician and one of their wedding
CA:  disagreed with RTC --- “In People v. De Guzman (G.R.
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since
No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
that: “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of
perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
called “intrafemural sex,” while real sex between them was far
conclusive.” In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
they “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
defendant attributed to plaintiff’s drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-
2770792 is registered,” for the reason that “the employee
98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
handling is already retired.” With said testimony We cannot
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, “speed” drugs that kept
parties’ marriage contract was not issued for in the end the
him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers,
failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to
like “mogadon.” Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff
produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to
away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him.
the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather,
They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly
because it “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license
no. 2770792 is registered.” Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it
would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties
was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
RULING:
No. SC agreed with CA. The certification to be issued by the
Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry
could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.  be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that
“hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.” It could be easily implied
from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine
the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its
“loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of
the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was
deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured.
This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect
that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook
where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered,
the presumption of regularity of performance of official
function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section
3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed is among the
disputable presumptions. The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the
first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof
of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept
that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.
The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric;
hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x
x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married.
11. Kho v. Republic (2016); - CATIPON
Facts:
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of
Oras, Eastern Samar:
 Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's
parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now
deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal
treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1,
1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
 Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place
at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on
account that there was a public dance held in the town
plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church
whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only
finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning
of June 1, 1972;
 Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local
Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had
not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
 Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is
a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither
record nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be
outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action
  There is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that
their marriage was celebrated without the requisite
marriage license
 On the contrary, both petitioner and respondent
personally appeared before the local civil registrar and
secured a marriage license which they presented before
their marriage was solemnized.
RTC: Petitioner’s evidence sufficiently established the absence
of the requisite marriage license when the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was celebrated. Marriage null and
void ab initio.
CA: Reversed. Marriage valid and subsisting
 Presumption that marriage license was issued for that
purpose and petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption
Issue: Whether or not CA failed to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of
marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's
marriage was solemnized.
Ruling: The Court finds for the petitioner.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on
June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.12
Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly,
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites
of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
These marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death
during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places;
(3) consular marriages;
(4) ratification of marital cohabitation;
(5) religious ratification of a civil marriage;
(6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and
(7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G.
Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." Thus, on the basis of
such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes
the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as
it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of
any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total
absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect
the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and
the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.
Dispositive Portion: Petition granted.
12. Geronimo v. CA (1993) and - CHAVEZ
Facts:
·        On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming
as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A Esman and describing
the latter as ‘husband of the deceased’.
·        On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner
naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and
now describing the latter as the live-in partner of the deceased’
after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the
decedent was a ‘nullity for want of a marriage license.
·        decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no
descendants nor ascendants.
·        She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo, her
nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A.
Esman.
·        However, the husband’s capacity to inherit and administer
the property of the decedent is now being questioned in view of
the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between
oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage
license.
Issue: whether or not the marriage between Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was valid.
Ruling:
Yes.
         Judgment of the trial court by public respondent stated
that the non-indication of the number could only serve to prove
that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as
convincing proof of non issuance of the required marriage
license. The issue of validity of the marriage in question
because there is nothing in the law requires that the marriage
license number would be indicated in the marriage contract
itself
 
Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained
by the spouses Esman because the copies of the marriage
contract he presented did not state the marriage license number.
The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this
was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the
marriage contract on file with the National Archives and
Records Section where the marriage license number (No.
5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to
assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit “V,” a
certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1
October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina
Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of
Appeals thus:
“It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed
accountable forms of the Government like the Marriage
License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National
Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These
forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the
city/municipal treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers
printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used
in the succeeding years when thesame forms are again printed
for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-
numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.
This is exactly what happened to Marriage License
No.5038770 which the appellant refused to acknowledge.
Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was
requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on
October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by
Exhibits “1” and “2”) and later used by Antonio A. Esman and
Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07,
1955,another marriage license bearing the same number (No.
5038770)was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in
October, 1959(Exhibit “L-1”).
 
13. Diaz-Salgado v. Anson (2016) - GARCIA
FACTS: Luis Anson filed a Complaint  against Jo-Ann Diaz-
Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina
De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of
the late Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of
their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria
Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s
daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several
real properties, because there was no marriage settlement
between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain
to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of
Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties. When
Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating
herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the
properties.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was
divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of
his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses
in defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect
prior the effectively of the family code for lack of marriage
license.
RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.
ISSUES:
1) Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC
valid in the absence of marriage license?
2) What governs their property relations?
HELD:
1) No. The Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for
lack of marriage license. A cursory examination of the
marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein
that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code)
being cited as the reason therefor.
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage
contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the
marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage,
but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s
marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their
marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional
character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law
desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations,
rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely
be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony
performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already
exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted
from complying with the required issuance of marriage license
insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For
this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to
each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the
ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and
Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil
ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of
marriage appearing on the records.
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the
only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not
solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or
regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage
does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code.
It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which
are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying
religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior
ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional
character and a marriage license is required for Luis and
Severina’s marriage to be valid.
2) Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the
Family Code. Also, attesting that his marriage with Severina
was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted to a
subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such
suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting his credibility.
14. Republic v. Mola Cruz (2018); - LIM
Facts: Liberato P Mola Cruz and Liezl S. Conag were married
on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. They started out as
textmates because of Liezl’s sister. Liezl left for Japan to work
as an entertainer for six months. They got married after Liezl
returned home. They lived for some time in Manila where
Liberato worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl again
secured a contract as an entertainer and respondent found work
as construction worker. It was while living in Japan when
Liberato noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out without
his perimission and started giving him the cold treatment. Leizl
also started getting angry at him for no reason. They returend
to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due
to overtsaying in Japan. Liezl confessed to Liberato her
romantic affir with a Japanese Man. She did not end the affair
which caused respondent such stress that he was hospitalized.
Liezl chose to walk away from their marriage.
         They reconlized after Liberato made efforts to woo
Liezl back. However, respondent found Liezl’s japanese lover
in their house and to his surprise he was introduced by Leizl as
her elder brother. Leizl left respondent a second time.
         Liberato decided to file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Artilce 36 of the Family Code.
         RTC: Void ab initio. Relied on the testimony of expert
witness Dr. Pacita Tudla a clinical psychologist. Dr. Tuda
found Liezl was afflicted with histronic personality disorder.
Dr. Tudla found that Liezl’s psychological incapacity existed
prior to the marriage because she grew up irritable, hardheaded
and more fond of friends than family. This was rooted on
Liezl’s poor upbringing. Liezl’s father resorted to corporal
punishment while her mother tolerated her whims. Dr. Tudla
found her incapacity too grave that it seriously impaired her
relationship with her husband and caused 
Issue: Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations was sufficiently established by the
totality of evidence presented by respondent.
Ruling: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained
psychological incapacity as follows:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability
to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them x x x."
         Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in
appreciating psychological incapacity cases set in Molina. We
quote the fairly recent iteration of the guidelines in Republic v.
Pangasinan for reference:
         Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases,
to wit:
 ( 1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
         In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina
guidelines should no longer be viewed as a stringent code
which all nullity cases on the ground of psychological
incapacity should meet with exactitude, in consonance with the
Family Code's ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological
incapacity on a case-to-case basis and "to allow some
resiliency in its application" as legally designed.
         Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante 0. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations . but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
         The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review
of Dr. Tudla's psychological report confirms, contrary to
petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla personally interviewed
both spouses regarding their personal and familial
circumstances before and after the celebration of their
marriage. Information gathered from the spouses was then
verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liezl's youngest
sister,  a close relation privy to Liezl's personal history before
and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her
psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the
information she gathered. Her findings were, thus, properly
anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the parties
as individuals and as a married couple under a factual milieu
verified with an independent informant. The courts a quo
properly accorded credence to the report and utilized it as an
aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to meet essential marital functions. Clearly,
petitioner has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla' s psychological
findings as wanting evidentiary support.
         Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal
examination of the couple will not perforce result to the
expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner advances. In
Kalaw, a case also involving a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage wherein the expert witnesses declared the
respondent spouse therein as suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder without personally examining the latter
albeit with the support of the medical findings of the
respondent spouse's own clinical psychologist. In said case, the
Court had the occasion to re-emphasize that such lack of
personal examination does not per se invalidate the experts'
findings of psychological incapacity.
         The Court respects the RTC's appreciation of
respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired before
and during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."
         The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through
actions that occurred after the marriage was celebrated does not
mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological
incapacity to speak of.
         To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the
nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse's psychological
incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of
the marriage. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. "There must be proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to the
marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity."
         The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality
disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her marital
obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and
fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder
was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was
celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner lived together
in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating
the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was
unable to accommodate the fact that she was already married
into the way she wanted to live her life, and essentially treated
petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore
or threaten to accede to her desires. It is er failre to discharge
the basic obliagtions of marriage.
         CA: Decision affirmed
clear that Liezl is truly in cognitive of her marital
responsibilities.
         The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when
Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It
fully appreciated Liezl 's psychological evaluation that revealed
her unconsciousness of her disorder. Together with its
rootedness in Liezl 's personality since her teens, the CA came
to agree with the expert findings that any medical or behavioral
treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective. 
15. Tani-Dela Fuente v. Dela Fuente, Jr., - ALULOD
Facts: 
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo were
UST students when they became sweethearts. Soon, they got
married. Maria Teresa worked at the UST Treasurer’s Office
while Rodolfo was unable to finish college but found a word at
his family business.
         Maria Teresa filed a declaration of nullity of marriage.
She claimed that she noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert,
prone to jealousy and had no ambition. He was so jealous of
everyone. He would skip work and stalk her. At some point, he
pointed a gun to her 15-year old cousin who was living with
them because he was under the impression that the cousin was
her lover. He treated him as a sex slave. They would have sex
4-5 times a day. He sometimes tied her to the bed or poke her
with things. Maria Teresa felt that she was being molested and
maltreated. There was a time that Rodolfo pointed a gun at her.
Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, was presented as an
expert witness. He conducted an in-depth interview with Maria
Theresa and two common friends of the couple since Rodolfo
refused to cooperate.
         Dr. Lopez found that Rodolfo was suffering with
paranoid personality disorder manifested by Rodolfo’s
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy;
his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and
distrust of friends and relatives of Maria Teresa; his being
irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment;
and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He
explained that Rodolfo’s personality disorder was most
probably caused by a pathogenic parental model. Rodolfo’s
family background showed that his father was a psychiatric
patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic
contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his
father’s.
         RTC annulled the marriage of Maria Teresa and
Rodolfo. The OSG opposed on the grounds that Dr. Lopez’s
conclusion was considered as a hearsay and that it did not
follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.
Issue:
         Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations with Maria
Teresa and that whether it can be proven even if the expert
witness was not able to conduct in-depth interview with
Rodolfo.
Ruling:
         Yes, Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations with Maria Teresa.
         In Santos v. CA, declared that “psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.” Furthermore, the incapacity
“should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage.
         In Republic v CA and Molina, guidelines in interpreting
and applying Article 36, FC were provided.
         (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature.”
 Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
 This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
 (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
         There was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the nullity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent.
         Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-
examination of one of the parties will not automatically render
as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining
psychiatrist or psychologist, since “marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality
of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the
other.
         Marcos v. Marcos emphasizes that Molina does not
require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to
be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the
totality of evidence presented establishes the party’s
psychological condition.
         As to root cause, this must have been caused by a
pathogenic parental model.
         The juridical antecedence was also sufficiently proven
during the trial. Maria Teresa attested that she noticed that
Rodolfo was jealous. She believed that he would change after
they got married, however, this did not happen.
         The incurability and severity was discussed by Dr.
Lopez. Also, Maria Teresa consulted with a lawyer, a priest
and a doctor and suggested couple counselling but this was
refused by Rodolfo. Rodolfo was apathetic about their
marriage. He repeatedly harassed the petitioner which show his
need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive
control which is a form of psychological abuse, 
16. Antonio v. Reyes (2006); - ARANAS
FACTS:
 Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and
subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was born
in April 1991 but died 5 months later.  Antonio could no longer
take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so
he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage
that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
 The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus
declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.  It held that
the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish
Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and,
generally, under the Molina guidelines.
 RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside  from his own testimony, presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on
the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of
the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects
as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage.
 The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in
proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she
married him prove that her psychological incapacity was have
existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her
unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
17. Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA (1997); - CAMPOS
FACTS:
On 22 May 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi and the Gina got married.
Although they slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of
this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations. She
was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s
examination was kept confidential.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is
his wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was
found not to be impotent, and any differences between the two
of them can still be reconciled. He admitted that they have not
had intercourse since their marriage until their separation
because his wife avoided him. He added that his wife filed this
case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the
marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears
that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in
holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial
court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact
with the other. But the fact remains that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party,  the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The petition is DENIED.
18. Marcos v. Marcos (2000);
After suffering physical abuse at the hands of her husband,
Brenda Marcos is seeking to have her marriage to Wilson
Marcos declared null and void. The Court ruled that although a
personal medical or psychological examination of Wilson is
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity,
the totality of the evidence Brenda presented does not show
such incapacity.
Important People: Brenda Marcos and Wilson Marcos
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
1. Brenda and Wilson were married twice:
a. September 6, 1982 - Solemnized by Judge Eriberto
H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig
b. May 8, 1983 - Solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacanang Park,
Manila
2. They had five children together.
2. Wilson was part of the AFP and worked under the
Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Brenda was part of the Philippine Air
Force and worked as a security escort of Imee Marcos.
2. After the EDSA Revolution, they both sought a
discharge from the military service.
2. Wilson then engaged in different business ventures but
these did not prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel, and he
would often hit her. He also forced her into sexual
intercourse despite her weariness. He was also abusive
towards their children.
2. In 1992, they were living separately.
2. After they separated, they had other violent
confrontations.
2. Brenda filed for a declaration of nullity. She cited a
case study by Social Worker Sonia Millan, where their
children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive. She also underwent psychological evaluation, but
her husband did not.
2. The RTC found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their
children.
2. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the
root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity
should be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts. Because Wilson was not
subjected to psychological evaluation, the CA ruled that
there was not enough evidence to support a finding of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA could set aside the findings by
the RTC of psychological incapacity of respondent simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and
the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition
HOLDING:
1. No. What is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
2. No, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological capacity on his part. There is no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable. The behavior
of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost
his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. His alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing
that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver. At best, the grounds
cited by the petitioner are grounds for legal separation and
not a declaration of nullity.
19. Tenebro v. CA (2004) - CHAVEZ
Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the
crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage between
the accused and private complainant had been declared null and
void ab initio and without legal force and effect
Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator
that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal
requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age,
and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City
Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is
AFFIRMED.
20. Mercado v. Tan (2000); - GARCIA
FACTS: The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful
wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he
got married to complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27,
1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was
filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor
of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution
of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu
City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage
between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged
Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still
subsisting at the time he had contracted his second marriage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
necessary for remarriage?
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition and
affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family
Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s
previous marriage came not before the celebration of the
second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against
accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a
second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has
been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
21. Morigo v. People (2005); - LIM
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in
Bohol for four years. The lost contacts when the school year
ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore, constant communication took place between them.
They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990,
Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married,
thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On
October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the
nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage
in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.  Hence, he did
not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
22. Castillo v. De Leon Castillo (2016); - ALULOD
Facts:
         Respondent Lea De Leon-Castillo married Benjamin
Bautista in 1972. In 1979, she also married petitioner Renato
Castillo. In 2001, Castillo filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage praying that his marriage to
be Lea be declared void on the ground that Lea has subsisting
marriage with Bautista and her psychological incapacity.
However, the issue on psychological incapacity was not
pursued.
         Lea opposed the Petition, and contended among others
that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member
of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
         In 2002, Leah filed an action to declare her first
marriage void. The RTC rendered its Decision declaring that it
was indeed null and void ab initio. A Certificate of Finality was
also issued.
         The RTC rendered the marriage of Lea and Renato
bigamous, rendering it void under Art. 41, FC.
         The CA reversed RTC’s decision opining that since
both marriages happened before the effectivity of the FC, the Cannot be ratified Can be ratified by cohabitation
Civil Code is applicable. The CC does not state that a judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. no conjugal partnership there is conjugal partnership and
and the offspring are the children conceived before
Issue: natural children by legal the decree of annulment are
fiction considered legitimate
Whether or not the CA is correct in reversing the decision of
the RTC.
no judicial decree to there must be a judicial decree
Ruling: establish the invalidity is
necessary
         No. The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid
in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no
The Supreme Court has held in the cases of People v.
judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this
Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a
is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. the
         The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the
its celebration. Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were
born while the Civil Code was in force.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family

Comparison of Void and Voidable Marriages under the Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
CC as discussed in the case do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children.
Void Marriage Voidable Marriage
23. Diño v. Diño v. (2011) - ARANAS
Nonexistent; no marriage Valid until annulled by a
from the beginning competent court DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case,
petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership.
 FACTS:
 Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.
 Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification.
Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon
finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
 The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
 The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of
the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting
the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute
nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only
after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
 It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family
Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into
before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties
is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
 In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article
40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on
co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
24. Manuel v. People (2005); - CAMPOS
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaa
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati.
 Rubylus Gaa was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned Manuel only visited his wife after
three months and never saw her again
 Manuel met Tina Gandalera in Dagupan City on
January 1996.
 Tina was then 21 years old, a computer secretarial
student while Manuel was 39.
 Manuel visited Tina in Baguio City. Eventually, despite
Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way
with her and proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring Tina that he was single
 Manuel even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son
was still single
 Tina agreed to marry Manuel, April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Baguio City
 For three years, the couple was happy until Manuel
only went to their house twice or thrice a year and when
Tina asks for money, Manuel would slap her.
 January 2001, Eduardo left and did not return and
stopped giving financial support to Tina On August
2001, Tina made inquiries from the NSO in Manila and
learned that Eduardo was previously married
 Eduardo testified that he met Tina in 1995 in a bar
where she worked as GRO. He said that he informed
Tina that he was already married but nevertheless, she
agreed to marry him
 Manuel stated that he declared he was single in his
marriage with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid, that he did not know
that he had to go to the court to seek nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina
 He further claimed that he was only forced to marry his
first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so
ISSUE
Whether or not Eduardo Manuel is guilty of Bigamy
HELD
Yes. Article 349 provides that the penalty of prison mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
For the accused to be guilty of bigamy, prosecution is burdened
to prove the felony:
1. He/she has been legally married
2. He/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved
It is the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when
he married he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife
was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than
20 years since 1975. Eduardo Manuel failed to discharge his
burden since there is no judicial declaration of presumptive
death was shown.
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on
presumptive death on Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
which states that before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
absentee spouse without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse
25. SSS v. Jarque Vda. De Bailon (2006); -
Facts:
 On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and
Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. More than 15 years later or on October 9,
1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice
presumptively dead. By Order of December 10, 1970,8
the CFI granted the petition.
 Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent)
in Casiguran, Sorsogon.
 On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the
Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
 Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits,
and was granted P12,000 by the SSS. Respondent filed
on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits, which was also granted by the SSS on April 6,
1998.
 Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a
daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of
the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with
Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third
with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she,
together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical
and funeral expenses; and all the documents
submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her
claims are spurious.
 In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma
Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated
February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine
children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as
husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were
reserving their right to file the necessary court action
to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent
as they personally know that Alice is "still very much
alive."
 In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P.
Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz
P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits
accruing from Bailon’s death, he further attesting in a
sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed
Bailon’s funeral expenses.
 Elisa and seven of her children subsequently filed
claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries
before the SSS.
SSS RULING
 Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the
SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to
respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund
of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May
1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim
of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon
Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment
of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to
Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of
preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The
pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Alice Diaz never disappeared. The court
must have been misled by misrepresentation
in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as
presumptively dead.
2. The Order of the court in the "Petition to
Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead,"
did not become final. The presence of Alice
[sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it
invalid.
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned
his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his
remarriage is void, being bigamous.
4. In this case, it is the deceased member who
was the deserting spouse and who
remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita
Jarque, for the second time was void as it
was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second
marriage is not necessary as there is no
disappearance of Alice Diaz, the first wife,
and a voidable marriage to speak of.
5. In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch,
by letter of August 16, 2000, advised
respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were
the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral
expenses, she should return the P12,000
paid to her.
6. In a separate letter dated September 7,
1999, the SSS advised respondent of the
cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits in view of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted while the latter’s marriage with
Alice was still subsisting; and the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring
Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary
proof" against the validity of the order. It
thus requested respondent to return the
amount of P24,000 representing the total
amount of monthly pension she had received
from the SSS from February 1998 to May
1999.
RESPONDENT’s PROTEST
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension
for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.24
In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC,
she reiterated her request for the release of her monthly
pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful,
hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and
purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
SSS’ RULING ON THE PROTEST
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her,
however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition
with the SSC.
RESPONDENTS’ PETITION WITH THE SSC
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing
the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and
her siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from
spending any amount during Bailon’s wake.
ALICIA P. DIAZ’s AFFIDAVIT
After the SSS filed its Answer to respondent’s petition, and the
parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz
filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she
disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she
having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona,
Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an
extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.
SSC’s DECISION
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the
marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she
was "just a common-law-wife”.
Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita
Jarque-Bailon is NOT THE LEGITIMATE SPOUSE and
primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the
SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death
benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998
until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the
funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-
Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of
SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e)
and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and
its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON THE COURT OF
APPEALS
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside
the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the
SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension
benefits due her.
Nowhere does the law contemplates the possibility that
respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null
and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare
that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively
dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to
review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of
determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
It is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of
the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where
parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of
the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null
and void beneficiary of Bailon.

WHETHER THE NO SSC is empowered to settle

ISSUES HELD RATIO HONORABLE any dispute with respect to
COURT OF SSS coverage, benefits and
WHETHER THE NO It bears reiterating that a APPEALS contributions, there is no
DECISION OF THE voidable marriage cannot GRAVELY ABUSED doubt. In so exercising
HONORABLE be assailed collaterally ITS DISCRETION such power, however, it
COURT OF except in a direct AMOUNTING TO cannot review, much less
APPEALS IS proceeding. Consequently, LACK OF reverse, decisions
CONTRARY TO such marriages can be JURISDICTION rendered by courts of law
LAW assailed only during the as it did in the case at bar
lifetime of the parties and when it declared that the
Doctrine:  not after the death of December 10, 1970 CFI
Article 83, of the either, in which case the Order was obtained
Civil Code parties and their offspring through fraud and
Article 87, will be left as if the subsequently disregarded
Paragraph 2 of the marriage had been the same, making its own
Civil Code perfectly valid. Upon the findings with respect to the
death of either, the validity of Bailon and
marriage cannot be Alice’s marriage on the
impeached, and is made one hand and the invalidity
good ab initio. of Bailon and respondent’s
marriage on the other.
In the case at bar, as no
step was taken to nullify, in In interfering with and
accordance with law, passing upon the CFI
Bailon’s and respondent’s Order, the SSC virtually
marriage prior to the acted as an appellate
former’s death in 1998, court. The law does not
respondent is rightfully give the SSC unfettered
the dependent spouse- discretion to trifle with
orders of regular courts in

the exercise of its authority
to determine the
beneficiaries of the SSS.
DECISION: Petition denied.
26. Santos v. Santos (2014); - CHAVEZ
Action: Petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J.
Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's
judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
Summary: Celerina was declared presumptively dead after her
husband had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. According to
the husband, she was unheard of for 12 years. Petitioner sought
nullification of said Order declaring her presumptively dead,
arguing that she was never missing in the first place and that
her husband committed extrinsic fraud in declaring that her
whereabouts for 12 years were unknown to him. CA ruled that
annulment of judgment was wrong remedy and that she should
have filed an Affidavit of reappearance before the Civil
Registry. Court ruled to reverse CA. 
Case was remanded to CA for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment
of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
Facts:
According to respondent Ricardo:
- Celerina and Ricardo got married on June 18, 1980. They
rented an apartment in San Juan, MM and a year after their
marriage they went to Tarlac and went into a buy and sell
business, which failed.
- To recover financially, Celerina sought respondent’s
permission to work in HK as domestic helper. In Feb. 1995,
she applied in an employment agency in Manila then left
Tarlac after 2 months and was never heard from again.
- He tried looking for Celerina at her parent’s house in Cubao,
through her relatives and friends but no one gave him
information.
- From the time he filed petiotion before RTC, Celerina was
not heard from for 12 years already. He believed that Celerina
has passed away.
According to Petioner Celerina:
- Her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional
Avenue, Quezon City, which is their conjugal dwelling since
1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
- She never resided in Tarlac.
- She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.
Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.
- Ricardo left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit
with another woman.
- Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children
to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in
his petition.
Procedural History:
- On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007.
- Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
- On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before CA on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
(1) She argued that she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.
(2) court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition
because it had never been published in a newspaper
(3) Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition
- CA dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to CA, the proper remedy was to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance
in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
- MR filed, likewise denied
Issue: WON the correct remedy is an annulment of judgment
(of RTC’s declaration of petitioner’s absence or presumptive
death) instead of merely filing an Affidavit of Reappearance –
YES
- In filing petition for review on certiorari, Celerina argued that
filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the
Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually
absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive
death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.
- She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of
reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place and that
an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.
RATIO:
- Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional
Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final,
and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner."
- There are 2 grounds for annulment of judgment (1) extrinsic
fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
“ It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts
outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no
fair submission of the controversy.
- The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry
with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
- The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
- It also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
reappears.
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
- In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively
dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance. However, the filing of an
affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first
spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that
the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void
ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement
of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance;
and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does
not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination.
- A Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife. This
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to
nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
- Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the
subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice.
Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment
will, therefore, lie.
Fallo: Court ruled to reverse CA. Case was remanded to CA
for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds
for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition.
27. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic (2018) - GARCIA
FACTS: On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias
filed before the RTC of Tarlac City a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N.
Matias (Wilfredo).
 The allegations of the petition read:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, married to Wilfredo, Filipino
and currently a resident of 106 Molave street, Zone B,
San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga
since August 24, 1967;
3. The petitioner and Wilfredo entered into a lawful
marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the
couple put up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street,
Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines and on
September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal
home to again serve as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary;
 6. Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in
Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made
contact or communicated with the petitioner nor to his
relatives;
7. That according to the service record of Wilfredo issued
by the National Police Commission, Wilfredo was
already declared missing since 1979;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine
Constabulary for any news regarding her beloved
husband Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had
no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have
any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he
was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's
Army;
9. Weeks became years and years became decades, but the
petitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three
(3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful,
but the times had been tough on her, especially with a
meager source of income coupled with her age, it is
now necessary for her to request for the benefits that
rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. That one of the requirements to attain the claim of
benefits is for a proof of death or at least a declaration
of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D.
No. 1638 as amended.
RTC Ruling: Declared WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to
him as former military officer.
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition
for certiorari before the CA.
 CA Ruling: Set aside RTC decision. Held:
 1)  It held that the RTC erred when it declared
Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of
the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 41 of the
FC does not apply to the petition as it was clear that
petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition
was invoking the presumption of death established under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that
provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
 2)  The petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively
dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is
without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose
sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively
dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil
Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that
allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead
—which presumption may be invoked in any action or
proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.
Hence, this appeal.
 ISSUES:
1)  W/N the petition for declaration of presumptive death is based
on Art 41 of the FC or Art 390 or 391 of the CC
2)  W/N the petition for declaration of presumptive death should
be granted
 
RULING: The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should
have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must,
therefore, be set aside.
1) The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed
by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the
application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not
seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows
that the presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:
 
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
 
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
 
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the
declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a
prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration
of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the
same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim
for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death
was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was
clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule
regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
 
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose
of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.
 
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in
war, and has been missing for four years;
 (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
 
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in
declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading
and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil
Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
 
2) Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the
declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil
Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright.
This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole
objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead
under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court
has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
 
Few points the Court is minded to make:
The present controversy stemmed from the misconception that
a court declaration is required in order to establish a person as
presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits
as a military serviceman under pertinent laws. This
misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo
and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in
prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either
before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
 
Hence, the Court issued the following guidelines to aid the
public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of
death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
 
1.   The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death
benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to
first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of
such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make
their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by
the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not. It must
be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without
need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions
mentioned in the said articles are established. Hence, requiring
the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to
establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not
proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.
 
2.   In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the
claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate
office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which
shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such
number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the
"evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of
presumptive death.
 
3.   The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then
weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine
their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions
specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order
for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of
death and pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not
sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil
Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the
claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President
(OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek

recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of
the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still
fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the
Supreme Court.