KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.

RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE
WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 118910

November 16, 1995

FACTS:
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC
WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION,
SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH
WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH
DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY
MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY
ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA,
ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES,
EDUARDO P. GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J.
DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 167324

July 17, 2007

FACTS: In 1999, the DOH launched the HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA), a
reform agenda for fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement.
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of
government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. They alleged that the
implementation of the reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free medical
services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that
the HSRA is void for being in violation of the Sections 5,9,10,11,13,15,18 of Art II;
Sec 1 of Art III, Sections 11 and 14 of Art XIII, and Sections 1 and 3 (2) of Article
XV.
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,"
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes
of the DOH. Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102,
which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void,
having been issued in excess of the President’s authority.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to several procedural defects, which proved
fatal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating
the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to
protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for
legislation.
ISSUE:
1. W/O the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution
2. W/O the issuance of Executive Order No. 102 was above the authority of the President
RULING:
1. Generally, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, however, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were categorically ruled by
the SC in its various decision to be non-self-executing. Ergo, such broad principles need
legislative enactments before they can be implemented.
2. This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of
the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the
President.32 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of
the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book
III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.

3. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both
the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BCDA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN,
COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA and COMMISSIONER ROWENA V. GUANZON,
THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

G.R. No. 209219

December 2, 2014

FACTS: On July 9, 2001, BCDA and Design Science, Inc. (DSI) executed a Contract for
Construction Management Services (CMS) for the Two-Story Philippine Army
Officers' Clubhouse Building, by which DSI was engaged as the construction
manager for the building project to be erected at Fort Bonifacio in Metro Manila. As
construction manager, DSI was to ensure that the project would be completed within
the required time frame, budget and quality standard. The agreed consideration for
DSI's services was ₱2,350,500.00, subject to the terms and conditions stated in the
CMS agreement. The contract was for seven months, with the project slated to be
completed by November 1, 2001. Members of the CMS team were to serve for
different lengths of time within the project's five-month construction period and two-
month post-construction period.
The project was later extended to December 1, 2001, given a time extension of 30-calendar
days granted to the project's main contractor, Kanlaon Construction Enterprise
Company, Inc. (KCECI). Accordingly, the contract with DSI was also extended for
one month. The extension was covered by Supplemental Agreement No. 19 signed by
BCDA and DSI, and which provided for a corresponding increase of ₱560,320.00 in
the original contract amount.
A consultancy contract review conducted by the COA's Technical Services Office (TSO),
however, disclosed that the remuneration cost for the contract extension was higher
by P101,200.00 or 39.08% than the remuneration cost that was estimated by COA.
The difference stemmed from the excess extension of one man-month each for the
following DSI personnel: Project Manager, Residential Cost/Quantity/Specs
Engineer and Clerk/Encoder. The TSO then recommended that the amount of
PlOl,200.00 be deducted from the service fee that was to be paid to DSI.
After reconsideration of the TSO’s findings, the Project Manager, nonetheless, revised the
remuneration cost for the extension, reducing it from ₱560,320.00 to ₱456, 720.00.
Thereafter, TSO’s re-evaluation. still declared the reduced amount of ₱456,720.00
higher by ₱117,760.00 or 34.74% than the COA's new estimated remuneration cost of
₱338,960.00. The difference was due to an excess of one man-month each for five
personnel, particularly: The Resident Sanitary Engineer, Resident Electrical Engineer,
Administrative Assistant/ Accountant, Utility Man and Driver. After COA’s Legal
and Adjudication Office-Corporate affirmation of the disallowance of ₱117,760.00,
BCDA moved to reconsider, but its plea was denied. Unyielding, BCDA appealed to
the COA Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB).
On May 7, 2009, the ASB rendered Decision No. 2009-049 denying BCDA's appeal and thus,
affirming the disallowance of Pl 17,760.00. Finding an extension of two months for
the five personnel improper and unnecessary. BCDA appealed the ASB decision to
the COA proper via a petition for review, but the COA proper denied the petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion when it declared that the ₱ 117,760.00
disbursements made covering the remuneration pursuant to the extension of the CMS is
without legal basis.
RULING:
1. There appears to be no grave abuse of discretion by the COA in its disposition of BCDA's
appeal from the ASB decision. In its revised manning schedule following the one-month
extension given to KCECI for project completion, DSI presented an extension of two
man-months each for five employees identified as the Resident Sanitary Engineer,
Resident Electrical Engineer, Administrative Assistant, Utility Man and Driver. The two
man-month extension for these five personnel was clearly not in accord with Article II of
the subject Supplemental Agreement, which contemplated a mere one man-month
extension for DSI' s services.
2. Given the foregoing, COA Decision No. 2013-109 is sustained. As the Court stressed in
Veloso v. Commission on Audit, the petition is DISMISSED
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, et al. TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EXDETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO
(SELDA), REPRESENTED BY DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO,
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, AND DANILO M. DELAFUENTE,*
Petitioners,

v.

REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND RETIREE AFFAIRS, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES), THE GRAVE SERVICES UNIT (PHILIPPINE ARMY), AND GENERAL
RICARDO R. VISAYA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AND HEIRS OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 225973

November 08, 2016

FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos
at the LNMB, to implement the President’s election campaign promise to have the
remains of the late former President Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.
On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to
carry out Marcos’s Funeral Honors and Service.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed the ff suit:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several
others, in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights
violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and
his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his
personal capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as
Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance
(FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and
families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of
the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as
duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing
as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law
regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the
dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.
 6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and
several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former
Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are
victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member
of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned
citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when
they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order
of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB.
2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws, particularly: (a) Sections 2, 11,
13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II
3.
RULING:
1. The court ruled that
(a) this issue raises no JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
(b) Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims,
legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file
such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer
direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
(c) Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available.
2. Article II are not self-executing.
3. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily,
the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT

CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-Appellants.

G.R. No. L-9657

November 29, 1956

FACTS: Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the
pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs.
NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l Coconut Corporation) , requested
the said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by
them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him
their bills for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to
Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue
of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section
16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments in question?

RULING:
1. The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely:
constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on public welfare like public works,
education, charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there are functions which
our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it
may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic life
of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled
corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was given
a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it
may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty,
and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective
whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in
question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.
ACCFA v CUGCO Digest

G.R. No. L-21484

November 29, 1969

FACTS: ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its
name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or
Land Reform Code. While ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA
Workers' Association (AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the
supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was
supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the
unions held a strike. And 5 days later, the Unions, with its mother union, the
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a
complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor
practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal to
bargain.
ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed
which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they
obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon,
EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project
Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the
appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.

ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity

RULING: YES. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute
as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of
any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the
governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform
program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation
of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the
ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its
personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions
and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue
of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental
function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with
said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities
of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not
obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and
are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of
economic forces.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XV, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL and
JOSE SISON, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35919

September 11, 1980

FACTS: Sometime on April 11, 1970, respondent Sison filed a complaint against the Rice and Corn
Administration (RCA for short) for a sum of money with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge. RCA filed a motion to dismiss the said
complaint on the ground of non-suability of the RCA as a mere governmental agency
of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, on May 5, 1970, respondent Sison filed a
motion to amend the complaint for the purpose of showing his actionable interest as
assignee of the purchase price of unpaid deliveries of corn grains to the RCA. Again,
a motion to dismiss the amended complaint based upon similar grounds was filed by
the RCA on June 1, 1970, which the respondent Judge denied in an order dated June
30, 1970. Whereupon the RCA filed its answer on September 22, 1970.
After trial, a decision was rendered by the respondent Judge on May 10, 1972 in favor of
respondent Sison and against the RCA ordering the latter to pay the corn grains it
purchased from respondent Sison in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Twenty-
Eight Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-One Pesos and Fifty Four Centavos
(P1,628,451.54), with interest thereon at the legal rate from the delivery of the corn in
1965 up to the time the same shall have been paid in full, and to pay attorney's fees in
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) and the costs of the suit.
Notice of appeal as well as a motion for extension of time of thirty days from June 16, 1972
within which to file the record on appeal which was granted on May 27, 1972. Before
the expiration of the original period to file the record on appeal, the RCA filed its
record on appeal on June 15, 1972.
Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the RCA's failure to post an appeal bond and the
RCA, represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to Sison's
motion to dismiss the appeal. The record on appeal filed by the RCA was approved
by the respondent Judge but the RCA's exemption from the payment of legal fees and
from posting of the appeal bond was denied.
The respondent Judge issued an order giving the RCA 5 days within which to post an appeal
bond. The RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they are exempt from
posting an appeal bond.
Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of petitioner's refusal to file the
appeal bond. The respondent Judge dismissed the RCA's appeal and ruled that the
RCA, being a mere instrumentality of the Government of the Philippines, is not
exempt from the payment of legal fees and from posting of an appeal bond.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner RCA is exempt from paying legal fees and from posting an appeal
bond.

RULING: Yes. RCA is a governmental agency of Republic of the Philippines without a separate,
distinct and independent legal personality from the latter. And, as a governmental
agency under the Office of the President, the RCA is thus exempt from the payment
of legal fees and from posting of an appeal bond.
THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by Esmeraldo R.
Acorda, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ANGELO T. REYES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense; and Hon.
EDGARDO E. BATENGA in his capacity as Undersecretary for Civil Relations
and Administration of the Department of National Defense, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a corporate body
organized under Republic Act No. 2640 and duly registered with the SEC. Petitioner
received a letter from respondent Undersecretary Batenga to conduct an extensive
Management Audit, VFP being under the supervision and control of the respondent
Reyes, Sec. of DND. DND Sec. issued DC No. 04 which provides the rules that will
govern and shall apply to the management and operations of VFP. The Sec. Gen. of
VFP complained about the alleged broadness of the scope of the management audit
and requested the suspension thereof until such time that specific areas of the audit
shall have been agreed upon. The request was, however, denied. Petitioner then filed
a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition to implement DC No. 04. Petitioner mainly
alleges that the rules and guidelines laid down in the assailed Department Circular
No. 04 expanded the scope of "control and supervision" beyond what has been laid
down in RA 2640. It also alleged that the department circular invalidly lay standards
classifying the VFP, an essentially civilian organization, within the ambit of statutes
only applying to government entities. The claim of petitioner is that it is a private
non-government corporation
.
ISSUE: Whether VFP is a private organization, hence, the issuance of DND Department Circular No.
04 is an invalid exercise of respondent Secretary’s control and supervision?

RULING: No. VPF is a public corporation. Our constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987) explicitly
prohibit the regulation by special laws of private corporations, with the exception of
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). Hence, it would be
impermissible for the law to grant control of the VFP to a public official if it were
neither a public corporation, an unincorporated governmental entity, nor a GOCC.
Basis of the court the following: (1) RA 2640 is entitled "An Act to Create a Public
Corporation to be Known as the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its
Powers, and for Other Purposes”; (2) Any action or decision of the Federation or of
the Supreme Council shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense; (3)
The VFP is required to submit annual reports to the President of the Philippines or to
the Secretary of National Defense; (4) Under EO No. 37, the VFP was listed as
among the government-owned and controlled corporations that will not be privatized;
and (5) jurisprudence provides that “VFP is an adjunct of the government, as it is
merely an incarnation of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines”.
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 169727-28

August 18, 2006

Fact:
The Petitioner In pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute
and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS
President, in relation to the anomalies occurred in the AFP-RSBS. The Ombudsman
found that the culpability of petitioner, Quilicot, Bello and Satuito is evidenced by the
fact that they signed documents in manifest bad faith, with full knowledge of the
anomalous transactions. The bilateral deeds of absolute sale were prepared by the
Legal Department of AFP-RSBS where Bello and Satuito were assigned, later
enabling them to amass enormous profits. The investigating panel “confirmed” the
observations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Criminal Information was filed
in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the crimes charged as provided in Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He insists that the
AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that he does not
fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law, inasmuch as his
position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989.

Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of authority in denying his motion to quash the
Information and in exercising jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
No, the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its authority vested in it. The SC ruled that the AFP-RSBS
is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature
of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or
managers of government owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, whether simple
or complexed with other crimes. As gleaned from the material averments of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner is estafa
through falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and in
relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,
vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 147026-27

September 11, 2009

Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which
was created by R.A. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry
Development Act.” R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was
placed under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The
NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the President, five
(5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are chosen from
the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book
industry related activities, students and the private education sector.

Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of one year. During that time, she was
also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She
was on a holdover capacity in the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was
again appointed to the same position and for the same period of one year. Part of her
functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish
linkages with international book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was
issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of
travel, she was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner
was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Javier is a public officer. (YES)

HELD:

YES, Javier is a public officer.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law
invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that
the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to
enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not
from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position
outside the meaning of a public office.

The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, which
provides that a “public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus,
pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
 appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the
Governing Board of the NDBD.

Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code defines a “public officer” as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall
take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes.