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FIU Cuba Poll PDF
FIU Cuba Poll PDF
CUBA POLL
HOW CUBAN AMERICANS
IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES
TOWARD CUBA
Prosperous
World
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 ........................................................................................................ Foreword
48 ........................................................................................ Appendix 1:
Methodology
49 ........................................................................................ Appendix 2:
Selected Trends
50 .......................................................................................... Appendix 3
How Were the Questions Asked?
Recommended Citation:
Grenier, Guillermo and Qing Lai. 2020. 2020 FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban Americans
in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba. Miami, FL: Florida International University.
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
FOREWORD
M uch has changed in the narrative shaping U.S./Cuba
policy during the administration of President Donald J.
Trump. The policy shifts initiated by President Obama
Various units within Florida International University
contributed to funding the 2020 FIU Cuba poll. Along with
the Steven J. Green School of International and Public
in 2014 have all but disappeared. Old hostilities, dating to Affairs, these units include the Office of the President, the
the Cold War period, now dominate relations between the Division of External Relations, Strategic Communications &
two neighbors. Marketing, the Cuban Research Institute and the Kimberly
Green Latin American and Caribbean Center. We appreciate
Two FIU Cuba Polls have been conducted since Trump’s their generous support.
inauguration. The trend measured in the 2018 Poll of a
community hardening its isolationist views have continued Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to once again
in this 2020 FIU Cuba Poll. The community’s attitudes reflect recognize the co-principal investigators, Dr. Guillermo J.
those of the administration. Relations between the two Grenier and his new collaborator, Dr. Qing Lai. Dr. Grenier
countries since the last poll have not followed the path of has led the FIU Cuba Poll for almost three decades, keeping
engagement. While the community still supports quite a few his finger on the pulse of the public opinions of the Cuban-
engagement policies that it holds out as “carrots,” the overall American community in South Florida. We would also like to
tendency is to establish a stronger hold on the “stick” that acknowledge the collaboration of the staff members of the
promotes sanctions and isolation. Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs,
especially Pedro Botta and Amy Ellis.
The findings of the poll suggest that there is a return to
traditional hard-line views toward U.S.- Cuban relations. John F. Stack Jr., Ph.D
While political and social engagement policies still have Founding Dean
proponents, support for the wielding of the “stick” of the Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs
embargo—the economic isolation of Cuba from the U.S.
economy—has increased among Cuban Americans as
a whole. The second and third generations of Cuban
Americans are driving the hope for engagement while more
established residents insist on a tougher stand. The return to
hard-line views might be driven by the slow pace of change
on the island, or the hostile national narrative that currently
surrounds U.S./Cuba relations in the United States. Whatever
the reason, the demographics of the Cuban-American
community in South Florida continue to change while many
of their attitudes directed at the state-to-state relations
between the U.S. and their homeland remain conflicted.
THE POLLSTERS
Guillermo J. Grenier is a professor of sociology Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology at the
and the chair of the Department of Global and Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at
Sociocultural Studies at Florida International Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D.
University. Born in Havana, Dr. Grenier is one of the in sociology at the University of Michigan. Dr. Lai
founders of the Miami school of social analysis and received graduate training at the Institute for Social
has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens Research’s Population Studies Center and Survey
of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation Research Center. His research interests include
and Cuban-American ideological profiles. His books Chinese Muslims, development, demography and
include A History of Little Havana, with Corinna J. survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed
Moebius (2015); This Land Is Our Land: Newcomers articles in Social Science Research, Journal of Muslim
and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex Minority Affairs, Chinese Sociological Review, Chinese
Stepick, Max Castro and Marvin Dunn (2003); The Journal of Sociology, Research in the Sociology
Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States, with of Work, Natural Hazards and Proceedings of the
Lisandro Pérez (2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. America. His current research focuses on the Muslim
Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick population in China. He analyzes census and survey
(1994); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and data to examine the group’s heterogeneity and its
Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. relations with the majority Han society, the Chinese
Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a faculty State and the Islamic world. He has participated in
fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute survey projects on various Asian Muslim communities,
of Latino Research and the director of the Florida including the Xidaotang Islamic sect in Gansu and the
Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures Dungan people of Central Asia, and studied Chinese
nationally and internationally on his research. He Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.
received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin
American studies from the University of New Mexico
in Albuquerque.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The majority of the Cuban-American population in 6. Cuban Americans strongly support the resumption of
South Florida supports the way that President Donald the issuing of visas at the Cuban Embassy in Havana
Trump has handled key issues of national importance. (62%). All respondent categories are in support of this
He receives high marks in his handling of immigration change in current U.S. policy. (Figure 14)
(64% support), race relations (55% support), national
protests (55% support), healthcare (67% support), 7. Cuban Americans support the resumption of Family
Cuba policy (66% support), China policy (71% Reunification Parole Program (60%). Only the oldest
support), the COVID-19 crisis (65% support) and the respondents and those migrating before 1995 oppose
economy (80% support). (Figures 26-33) this policy by as much as 50%. (Figure 16)
2. While the Republican Party maintains a slight majority 8. The community is evenly split on the issue of reinstating
among registered voters (53%), it is receiving new blood the “Wet Foot/Dry Foot” policy. (51% oppose and 49%
from the most recent arrivals. Seventy-six percent of support reinstating the policy.) This split is evident along
registered voters who arrived between 2010-2015 report all respondent categories. (Figure 15)
registering as Republicans. (Figure 36)
9. The economy and health care remain the two most
3. It is expected that President Trump will receive important national issues for Cuban Americans.
approximately 59% of the Cuban-American vote in Respondents were asked to independently rank the
November. (Figures 38) importance of six policies related to the economy, health
care, race relations, immigration, Cuba and China. The
4. Sixty percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida economy and health care were considered to be the
support the continuation of the embargo. (Figure 5) two most important issues facing the community across
all age groups, migration cohorts and political party
5. The support for some policies promoting engagement registration. Cuba policy ranked last for all but the oldest
remains relatively high, such as the selling of food (69% cohort and the non-citizens in the sample. (Figure 23-25)
support) and medicines to the island (74% support)
maintaining diplomatic relations (58% support) and the
resumption of airline travel to all regions of the island
(65% support). (Figures 8, 9, 13, 21)
Table 1: Cuban Americans in Miami Dade County: Migration/Nativity, Age, Gender, Race
(ACS and Cuba Poll Sample Estimates)
ACS Cuba Poll (2020 weighted)
Nativity & immigrant cohort
Cuba
Migrated before 1980 19.2 19.6
Migrated in 1980-1994 15.2 15.5
Migrated in 1995-2009 29.8 30.4
Migrated in 2010-2020 15.0 13.6
United States 19.1 19.5
Other countries 1.6 1.5
Age group
18-39 29.5 30.0
40-59 36.2 36.9
60-75 20.2 19.1
75 or older 14.1 14.0
Gender
Male 48.6 49.3
Female 51.4 50.7
Race
White 95.4 80.0
Black 1.9 3.6
Other 2.8 16.5
Years of education 12.5 14.3
Note: The Cuba Poll results are weighted toward ACS using a three-way weight
based on nativity/immigrant cohort, age, and gender.
Sources: 2020 Cuba Poll; American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample.
Table 2: Estimated Number of Registered Cuban-American Voters by Party (Florida and M-D County)
FLORIDA MIAMI-DADE
Notes: Non-Cuban numbers are official voter registration data as of July 30, 2020.
Cuban numbers are estimated based on American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample,
2020 Cuba Poll, and official Florida voter registration data.
Figure 4 EMBWOR K
DK Worked very well Worked well Worked not very well Not working at all
0 25 50 75 100
Total 10 19 27 44
76+ 16 19 22 42
60-75 10 17 23 50
40-59 9 20 28 43
18-39 9 18 31 43
Not Cuba-born 7 19 40 35
Republican 15 21 27 36
Independent 6 19 28 47
Democrat 4 11 27 59
Non-citizen 11 23 23 44
Figure 5 FAVCONE M B
0 25 50 75 100
Total 43 17 15 26
76+ 49 11 16 25
60-75 45 16 10 29
40-59 46 16 14 24
18-39 33 20 18 28
Not Cuba-born 21 28 23 27
Republican 61 13 11 15
Independent 30 24 14 31
Democrat 14 14 23 48
Non-citizen 46 14 20 20
Figure 6
UCSANCTION
0 25 50 75 100
Total 31 8 18 43
76+ 30 10 11 49
60-75 45 4 20 32
40-59 29 9 17 45
18-39 27 9 20 44
Not Cuba-born 18 9 27 45
Republican 40 7 18 35
Independent 29 3 17 51
Democrat 16 7 20 56
Non-citizen 29 22 15 35
Figure 7
UCCRUIS E
0 25 50 75 100
Total 50 8 15 27
76+ 57 9 8 27
60-75 56 9 16 19
40-59 52 6 15 26
18-39 42 9 18 31
Not Cuba-born 36 11 24 30
Republican 66 6 8 19
Independent 43 10 20 28
Democrat 27 8 24 41
Non-citizen 35 11 27 27
0 25 50 75 100
Total 22 8 25 44
76+ 21 9 28 42
60-75 28 8 15 48
40-59 22 8 27 43
18-39 19 9 28 45
Not Cuba-born 16 11 32 41
Republican 35 11 20 35
Independent 15 6 28 51
Democrat 12 7 30 50
Non-citizen 11 7 28 53
0 25 50 75 100
Total 18 8 26 48
76+ 12 8 29 51
60-75 26 9 20 46
40-59 18 7 26 49
18-39 15 8 30 47
Not Cuba-born 17 12 33 38
Republican 26 9 23 42
Independent 15 10 30 46
Democrat 12 5 31 52
Non-citizen 9 5 24 61
Does Cuba pose a threat to vital American interests? Most say, “no.”
A majority of Cuban Americans do not consider Cuba a threat to vital American interests. The exception to this view is
presented by the oldest group of respondents as well as those migrating before 1995 and registered Republicans. Cuban
Americans born outside of Cuba, the youngest group and registered Democrats are most emphatic about the majority’s
answer to the question.
Figure 10 THREAT
0 25 50 75 100
Total 37 8 14 40
76+ 47 7 11 35
60-75 42 6 13 39
40-59 41 6 14 39
18-39 26 13 17 44
Not Cuba-born 16 17 19 47
Republican 51 9 13 27
Independent 38 8 10 45
Democrat 14 10 22 54
Non-citizen 27 4 16 53
0 25 50 75 100
Total 59 14 8 18
76+ 55 8 7 31
60-75 65 12 2 22
40-59 63 15 8 14
18-39 54 19 12 15
Not Cuba-born 53 21 14 12
Republican 66 12 6 16
Independent 61 11 9 19
Democrat 44 21 10 25
Non-citizen 60 19 8 13
Figure 12
SOFTPOL
0 25 50 75 100
Total 23 6 22 48
76+ 31 3 15 51
60-75 31 6 16 47
40-59 22 8 21 49
18-39 17 5 31 47
Not Cuba-born 17 7 37 40
Republican 31 6 22 42
Independent 30 7 21 43
Democrat 7 5 28 60
Non-citizen 15 5 21 59
Figure 13 FAVDIP
0 25 50 75 100
Total 34 8 22 36
76+ 42 8 16 33
60-75 42 3 20 35
40-59 33 10 22 36
18-39 25 8 27 40
Not Cuba-born 14 10 32 44
Republican 49 8 20 23
Independent 28 3 22 46
Democrat 11 9 26 54
Non-citizen 26 11 20 43
Figure 14
UCCONSULA TE
0 25 50 75 100
Total 28 11 17 45
76+ 35 6 19 40
60-75 32 11 10 47
40-59 29 10 18 43
18-39 20 14 19 48
Not Cuba-born 21 17 22 40
Republican 38 12 13 37
Independent 24 10 19 47
Democrat 13 12 18 58
Non-citizen 21 5 25 49
Should the United States reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy?
Maybe yes…maybe no.
The community is evenly split on the “wet foot/dry foot” policy issue. Fifty-three percent would oppose the
reinstatement of the preferential immigration policy while 47% would support it. Most respondent categories are
similarly divided.
Figure 15
WETFOOD
DK Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support
0 25 50 75 100
Total 42 11 14 34
76+ 43 8 14 35
60-75 46 8 11 35
40-59 44 13 13 31
18-39 36 13 15 36
Not Cuba-born 37 15 22 26
Republican 46 8 12 33
Independent 42 9 14 35
Democrat 35 16 20 29
Non-citizen 42 10 11 38
Figure 16
REUNION
0 25 50 75 100
Total 31 9 13 47
76+ 48 8 14 30
60-75 38 6 9 47
40-59 30 12 14 45
18-39 19 10 12 59
Not Cuba-born 22 13 18 47
Republican 44 14 10 32
Independent 27 7 12 54
Democrat 14 4 13 69
Non-citizen 20 5 19 56
Figure 17 UNRTRAV
0 25 50 75 100
Total 41 12 17 30
76+ 47 14 11 28
60-75 42 10 15 33
40-59 43 12 18 28
18-39 34 13 21 32
Not Cuba-born 27 14 26 33
Republican 52 13 15 20
Independent 38 8 17 37
Democrat 20 12 22 46
Non-citizen 35 15 20 30
Figure 18
RELATIVE
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total 30 70
76+ 32 68
60-75 27 73
40-59 27 73
18-39 34 66
Not Cuba-born 54 46
Republican 31 69
Independent 34 66
Democrat 37 63
Non-citizen 8 92
Figure 19
JOIN
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total 56 44
76+ 68 32
60-75 65 35
40-59 50 50
18-39 54 46
Not Cuba-born 72 28
Republican 64 36
Independent 62 38
Democrat 54 46
Non-citizen 31 69
Figure 20 TRAVCU B A
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total 47 53
76+ 46 54
60-75 50 50
40-59 41 59
18-39 52 48
Not Cuba-born 72 28
Republican 52 48
Independent 52 48
Democrat 55 45
Non-citizen 12 88
Figure 21
UCAIRLIN E
0 25 50 75 100
Total 27 7 14 51
76+ 29 7 12 52
60-75 31 7 12 50
40-59 27 6 14 54
18-39 25 10 18 47
Not Cuba-born 21 13 22 44
Republican 37 7 13 43
Independent 28 9 14 49
Democrat 14 9 20 57
Non-citizen 8 3 14 74
Figure 22 SENDREMIT
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total 52 48
76+ 57 43
60-75 53 47
40-59 45 55
18-39 57 43
Not Cuba-born 77 23
Republican 58 42
Independent 51 49
Democrat 56 44
Non-citizen 33 67
Figure 23
4.90
5.00
4.81
4.76
4.76
4.71
4.69
4.68
4.68
4.58
4.47
4.50
4.26
4.12
4.09
4.08
4.04
4.05
4.00
4.01
3.95
3.93
3.89
3.84
3.83
3.82
4.00
3.81
3.81
3.79
3.78
3.78
3.37
3.50
3.00
Total 76+ 60-75 40-59 18-39
Figure 24
4.83
5.00
4.76
4.76
4.74
4.72
4.68
4.64
4.44
4.50
4.23
4.17
4.09
4.07
4.04
4.02
4.01
4.01
4.00
3.86
4.00
3.82
3.82
3.81
3.73
3.71
3.55
3.50
3.00
Total Mig. before 1995 Mig. since 1995 Not Cuba-born
Figure 25
4.93
4.90
5.00
4.82
4.76
4.76
4.74
4.68
4.66
4.58
4.51
4.50
4.32
4.30
4.21
4.20
4.09
4.06
4.04
4.01
4.00
3.95
3.93
3.88
3.87
3.84
4.00
3.82
3.81
3.75
3.67
3.58
3.56
3.50
3.00
Total Republican Independent Democrat Non-citizen
Figure 26 TIMMIG
0 25 50 75 100
Total 46 18 11 25
76+ 58 11 12 19
60-75 51 18 3 28
40-59 48 18 12 22
18-39 37 21 15 28
Not Cuba-born 29 21 13 37
Republican 68 18 7 7
Independent 33 22 11 33
Democrat 11 12 13 65
Non-citizen 50 17 21 12
Trump receives support for his handling of the issue of health care.
The respondents express solid support for the President’s handling of health care policy as well. Approximately 67%
of respondents express the opinion of “strongly” or “somewhat” supporting the President’s approach. A majority of all
categories of respondents, except those not born in Cuba and registered Democrats, express support. Approximately
52% of the non-Cuba-born respondents oppose the President’s handling of health care as do 75% of registered Democrats.
Figure 27 THEALTH
0 25 50 75 100
Total 44 23 10 23
76+ 52 22 9 17
60-75 56 20 3 21
40-59 40 27 10 22
18-39 37 20 15 28
Not Cuba-born 26 22 16 36
Republican 61 25 9 5
Independent 40 19 12 29
Democrat 8 18 10 65
Non-citizen 51 33 7 9
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the issue of race relations.
A majority of respondents (55%) support the way that President Trump has handled race relations issues during his term.
The support is not unanimous across all of the categories of respondents. A majority (54%) of younger respondents (18-39)
oppose the President’s handling of race issues as do a majority of the non-Cuba-born category (60%), independent voters
(54%) and registered Democrats (84%). The opposition of the post-1995 migrants (47%) is within the margin of error of the
poll as is the opposition expressed by the respondents included in the non-citizen category (48%).
Figure 28
TRACE
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total 37 18 14 31
76+ 50 15 16 20
60-75 39 23 6 32
40-59 37 19 18 26
18-39 31 16 14 40
Not Cuba-born 19 21 8 52
Republican 56 25 9 11
Independent 27 19 12 42
Democrat 7 10 10 74
Non-citizen 43 10 33 15
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the recent national protests.
The President’s handling of the wave of protests that have swept the country for weeks receives mixed reviews. While
55% of respondents support the President’s handling of the protests, the younger respondents and the non-Cuba-
born respondents voice significant opposition (53% and 60% respectively) as do registered Democrats (76%) and
independents (50%).
Figure 29
TPROTEST
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total 39 16 14 31
76+ 51 15 8 26
60-75 37 22 15 26
40-59 40 14 16 30
18-39 33 14 14 39
Not Cuba-born 26 15 11 49
Republican 56 16 12 17
Independent 32 18 13 37
Democrat 14 10 11 65
Non-citizen 35 18 26 20
Figure 30 TCUBA
0 25 50 75 100
Total 48 18 11 23
76+ 50 20 10 20
60-75 54 18 6 22
40-59 52 18 9 21
18-39 38 18 16 28
Not Cuba-born 29 19 21 31
Republican 65 21 7 7
Independent 36 21 14 29
Democrat 11 15 16 58
Non-citizen 66 13 7 15
Figure 31
TCHINA
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total 52 19 11 19
76+ 43 26 6 26
60-75 56 18 9 17
40-59 58 16 11 16
18-39 45 19 15 22
Not Cuba-born 38 16 17 29
Republican 69 19 5 7
Independent 47 16 17 21
Democrat 16 16 15 53
Non-citizen 58 29 8 4
Figure 32
TCOVID
0 25 50 75 100
Total 42 23 10 26
76+ 47 26 8 19
60-75 50 22 8 20
40-59 45 21 11 23
18-39 32 24 10 35
Not Cuba-born 20 20 11 49
Republican 59 24 8 9
Independent 27 24 13 36
Democrat 10 19 11 60
Non-citizen 56 22 8 14
Figure 33 TECON
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total 65 15 9 12
76+ 62 14 7 17
60-75 70 14 6 10
40-59 70 13 7 10
18-39 57 18 13 12
Not Cuba-born 47 15 18 20
Republican 85 7 4 4
Independent 58 17 11 14
Democrat 24 22 20 34
Non-citizen 74 20 2 3
Figure 34
CONLIB
Total 3.23
76+ 3.10
60-75 3.05
40-59 3.26
18-39 3.37
Republican 2.35
Independent 3.59
Democrat 4.25
Non-citizen 3.86
Figure 35
CUBA POLL WGTED
0 25 50 75 100
Total 13 87
1959-1964 0 100
1965-1979 1 99
1980-1994 7 93
1995-2009 11 89
2010-2020 61 39
0 25 50 75 100
Total 53 24 23
prior to 1959 67 11 22
1959-1964 56 22 22
1965-1979 68 17 15
1980-1994 59 25 16
1995-2009 49 31 20
2010-2015 76 20 5
Born in U.S. 40 24 36
Figure 37 VOTENOV
0 25 50 75 100
Total 90 8 11
76+ 92 7 10
60-75 92 8 0
40-59 94 5 02
18-39 85 11 21
Not Cuba-born 89 8 21
Republican 94 5 10
Independent 88 10 11
Democrat 87 10 12
The Horserace
If the election for President were held today with Joe Biden and
Donald Trump as candidates, whom would you vote for?
Cuban-American voters since the 1980s have expressed overwhelming support for Republican candidates. This year
will be no exception. Approximately 59% of all registered voters intend to cast their vote for President Trump. Among
registered Democrats, 71% intend to vote for Biden. Cuban-American independent voters usually vote like Republicans
and they intend to do so in November. The support for Trump among non-Cuba-born respondents is a bit under 50%.
Swaying the undecided might have an impact for the Biden campaign in a race where receiving the majority of the
Cuban vote is not a reasonable expectation. Ten percent of all registered voters remain undecided and most of these are
distributed among independent voters, post-1995 migrants and a couple of age cohorts.
Figure 38 GOVVOTE
0 25 50 75 100
Total 25 59 4 10 1
76+ 23 59 2 12 4
60-75 24 62 4 9 1
40-59 23 62 4 11 0
18-39 29 55 6 8 2
Not Cuba-born 37 46 8 8 2
Republican 6 87 1 5 1
Independent 26 49 10 14 0
Democrat 71 15 6 8 0
Figure 39
CVHEALTH
Very badly affected Badly affected Somewhat affected Slightly affected Not at all affected
0 25 50 75 100
Total 6 4 16 19 56
76+ 5 2 12 21 60
60-75 3 2 12 17 66
40-59 5 4 15 18 57
18-39 9 6 20 21 44
Not Cuba-born 7 6 21 23 44
Republican 6 4 15 16 60
Independent 5 2 12 18 63
Democrat 7 3 25 22 43
Non-citizen 6 4 13 21 56
Figure 40
CVFIN
Very badly affected Badly affected Somewhat affected Slightly affected Not at all affected
0 25 50 75 100
Total 8 10 25 22 35
76+ 3 6 23 16 52
60-75 8 7 17 23 45
40-59 10 13 28 21 29
18-39 9 10 28 24 29
Not Cuba-born 9 8 29 26 28
Republican 5 8 24 19 44
Independent 7 9 27 21 36
Democrat 11 10 27 24 28
Non-citizen 16 14 29 21 20
DISCUSSION AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The major conclusion drawn from this poll is that many the Politics of the Stick and support for the Politics of the
Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County are reevaluating the Carrot. These cryptic categories are associated with policies
engagement attitudes that they supported during the brief period of isolation and policies of engagement, respectively. It is
of glasnost under the Obama administration. It is likely that the not surprising that the poll measures a certain amount of
reevaluation is influenced by the dramatic change in the narrative ambivalence in the population. Most Cubans desire change,
toward Cuba adopted by the Trump administration. If this is the in Cuba and in U.S. Cuba policy. They are unclear, even after
case, Cuban Americans are not so much shaping as reflecting 60 years of experience, whether isolation or engagement
U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. will bring about change so they are leaving the door open to
Another social force potentially shaping the general shift in more engagement while signaling that, perhaps due to the
attitudes is the high expectations established by the Obama leadership provided by Trump and his administration, they
engagement policies and the unsteady handling by the Cuban are willing to give isolation policies their support. Still, both
government of economic reforms. Cubans here and on the island tendencies are evident in the community.
expected great changes and they never came. The revival of
antagonism initiated by the Trump administration is building on
the frustrations accumulated by the modest and nonsustainable Policies of the Carrot
changes brought about by engagement, and the result is a 1. There is strong support for suspending the sanctions
passionate response to the unambiguous policy initiatives codified in the embargo to allow for humanitarian
emanating from Washington. Cubans in South Florida follow assistance during the COVID-19 crisis. There is broad
the lead of strong leadership from Washington, in engagement support across all respondent categories for this
or in isolation. A strong status quo bias seems to govern the hypothetical, temporary interruption of the embargo.
APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Methodology
Following the methodology used in previous polls, the 2020 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone
survey of Cuban-American residents in South Florida. The intended population includes all self-
identified Cuban adults (aged 18 or older) who currently live in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The
sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant LAN and cell numbers
operating in the area. A probability sample was constructed using Random Digit Dialing (RDD)
procedure. FIU contracted the NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the interviews. The respondents who
self-identified as Cuban were interviewed with our bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire and
the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system.
Data collection took place from July 7 to August 17, 2020. We successfully reached a total
of 4,355 telephone users (757 LAN and 3,598 cell phone users), among whom 1,117 (25.6%)
identified themselves as Cuban. Most (89.7%) completed the interview, yielding a final sample of
1,002 respondents. A majority (81.1%) of those who completed interviews did so via cell phone.
Approximately half (45.4%) of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.
All results presented in this report are weighted to better represent the intended population. A
three-way weight is constructed based on gender, age and nativity/migration cohort. Our population
benchmark is the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2014-2018 5-year sample,
which represents the 2018 U.S. population. Our weight variable adjusts our sample composition
toward all MDC Cuban residents aged 16 or older in 2018.
All figures in this report are graphed using precise values. However, in some figures the percentages
do not add up to 100 due to rounding error.
In Table 2 we estimated the number of Cuban-American registered voters by party. Two
assumptions were made. First, the registration rate is assumed to be the same (84.1%) for all
Hispanic communities. Second, the state-level party distribution of Cuban-American registered
voters is assumed to be the same as that in Miami-Dade County. Figures 2 and 3 are also built upon
these assumptions.
Figures 38 and 39 summarize the health and financial impacts of COVID-19. The results might
involve a survival bias. For instance, Figure 38 shows that those aged 60 or older are less affected by
the pandemic in terms of health. This needs to be interpreted with caution. It is known that COVID-
19-induced mortality is highly age-dependent, which means that many elderly Cubans did not survive
to our window of observation. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that our results reflect the perceptions of
the surviving Cuban adult population in MDC.
Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2020)
T RE N D S O F % E N D O RSE M E N T
Figure 41
embargo diplomatic
75
72
70
66 67
65
60 60 59
56 59
55
54 54
50
47 47
45
40
35 34
30
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
0 25 50 75 100
200 7 68 15 17
201 0 49 24 27
201 4 45 25 29
201 6 49 29 23
201 8 51 30 20
202 0 53 24 23
13. Now thinking now about the policies 16. Do you strongly agree, somewhat support or not support the way that
that are directed specifically at agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly President Trump has handled some
improving the economic well being agree that Cuba poses a threat to the important issues: Overall, do you
of the Cuban people, do you strongly vital interests of the United States. strongly support, somewhat support,
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose
disagree, or strongly disagree with acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en the way that he has handled …
this policy approach? desacuerdo con que Cuba representa Independientemente de su elegibilidad
Pensando ahora en las políticas que se una amenaza para los intereses vitales de o intención de votar en noviembre,
dirigen específicamente a mejorar el los Estados Unidos? me gustaría saber si apoya o no la
bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, forma en que el presidente Trump ha
¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de 17. Have you ever traveled to Cuba [ADD manejado algunos asuntos importantes:
acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy IF BORN IN CUBA:] since you left? En general, ¿apoya firmemente, apoya
en desacuerdo con este enfoque ¿Ha viajado a Cuba alguna vez IF BORN un poco, se opone algo o se opone
de política? IN CUBA: desde que salió? firmemente a la forma en que ha
manejado la Política de …
14. President Trump has suspended 18. Do you have close relatives or
the Cuban Family Reunification significant others living in Cuba now? 23. Finally, we would like to get an idea of
Parole Program, which allows ¿Tiene parientes cercanos u otras COVID-19’s impact on you and your
Cuban Americans to sponsor their personas significativas que están family. First, in terms of health, would
close family members in Cuba viviendo en Cuba ahora? you say you or your family have been
for immigration to the United very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly,
States. Do you strongly support, 19. How likely are you to vote in the or not at all affected by the pandemic?
somewhat support, somewhat general election in November? Are Finalmente, nos gustaría tener una idea
oppose or strongly oppose President you definitely going to vote, probably del impacto de COVID-19 en usted y su
Trump’s suspension of the Family will vote, probably will not vote or are familia. Primero, en términos de salud,
Reunification Parole Program? definitely not going to vote? ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido
El presidente Trump ha suspendido el ¿Qué tan probable es que usted gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o
Programa de Parole para la Reunificación vote en las elecciones generales de nada afectados por la pandemia?
Familiar Cubana, que permite a los noviembre? ¿Definitivamente va a votar,
cubanoamericanos patrocinar a sus probablemente votará, probablemente 24. In terms of financial situation, would
familiares cercanos en Cuba para que no votará o definitivamente no votará? you say you or your family have been
puedan migrar a los Estados Unidos. very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly,
¿Apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se 20. If the election for President were held or not at all affected by the pandemic?
opone algo o se opone firmemente a la today with Joe Biden and Donald En términos de su situación financiera
suspensión del Presidente Trump del Trump as candidates, whom would ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido
Programa de Parole de Reunificación you vote for? gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o
Familiar de los cubanos? Si las elecciones para presidente se nada afectados por la pandemia?
celebraran hoy con Joe Biden y
15. Some people say that the U.S. should Donald Trump como candidatos,
reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy ¿por quién votaría?
that allowed Cubans without a visa
a guaranteed path to legal entry into 21. Now let me list some important issues
the United States when they reached for the general election in November.
U.S. soil. Do you strongly support, Regardless of your eligibility or
somewhat support, somewhat intention to vote, please tell me
oppose, or strongly oppose the how important the following issues
reinstatement of this policy? are to you.
Algunas personas dicen que Estados Ahora permítame enumerar cuestiones
Unidos debería restablecer la “política de que pueden ser importantes en
pies secos/pies mojados” que permitió noviembre. Independientemente de su
a los cubanos sin visa un camino elegibilidad o intención de votar, dígame
garantizado para ingresar legalmente cuán importantes son los siguientes
a los Estados Unidos cuando llegaran asuntos para usted.
a territorio estadounidense. ¿Apoya
firmemente, apoya un poco, se opone 22. Regardless of your eligibility or
algo o se opone firmemente a la intention to vote in November, I
reinstauración de esta política? would like to know whether you