G.R. No. 148468             January 28, 2003 former President Joseph E.
esident Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769             January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116             January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari
filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail,
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash,
and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to
Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with
P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of
the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-
profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for the purpose of providing
educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance
studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of
the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation
in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit"
Singson through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and
turned over the said amount to the Foundation's
treasurer who later deposited it in the
Foundation's account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson
publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada
and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities, including its operation on the illegal
numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered
the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of
several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with
other persons. Among such complaints
were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption,
versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et
al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-
1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc.,
versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et
al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755;
Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman,
Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB
Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit
dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents
likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits.
The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation of the complaints and on
April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution
recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada,
petitioner and several others be charged with the
criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several Informations against
former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned
from his post as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph
Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said
case charging Estrada and several co-accused,
including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was
recommended for the provisional release of all the
accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled
to a special division which was subsequently
created by the Supreme Court. The amended
Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to
January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17],
more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND
TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit
public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more
or less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00])
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province
of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable
cause against him for plunder. The next day, April
6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed on said
date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of
Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's
Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman
to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges
against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an
order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended
Information charging petitioner with plunder had
already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused,
including petitioner. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date
for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said
order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45
p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police
Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since
been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the
accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No.
26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April
27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan
an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for
hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part, petitioner's
co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20,
2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that
he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's
Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for
the resetting of the arraignment of the accused
earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However,
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the
petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioner's arraignment on June 27,
2001 and even before the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective
petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
set the hearing for the reception of evidence on
petitioner's petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on
petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed
an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a
motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day,
petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the
propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's) petition
for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18,
2001 resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition
for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court
to resolve the prosecution's pending motions as
well as petitioner's motion that his petition for bail
be heard as early as possible, which motion the
prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's April 6, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the
issues posed by petitioner had already been
resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding
probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-
accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner
as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case
No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for
bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination.
The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings
and speedy termination of the case, directed the
other accused to participate in the said bail
hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence
is adduced during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail
hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001
canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the
hearing to June 26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again
proceed because on said date petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
amended Information on the grounds that as
against him, the amended Information does not
allege a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have
been illegally received or collected does not
constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section
1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended
Information charges him of bribery and illegal
gambling.10 By way of riposte, the prosecution
objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to
quash. The prosecution contended that
petitioner's motion to quash the amended
Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10,
2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents
and the motion to quash of petitioner. However,
even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the
pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on
June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying
that the Court declare void the questioned orders,
resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on
his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of
his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that
the People be declared to have waived their right
to present evidence in opposition to his petition
for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People
to adduce strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on
bail after due proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his
bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash
the amended Information. Petitioner, through
counsel, received on said date a copy of said
resolution.12 The motion to fix bail filed by Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to
the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a
motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash and for
the deferment of his arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was
no provision in the Rules of Court or in the
Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to
petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration
of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered
petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment.
Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to
enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution
denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the
fact that material inculpatory allegations of the
amended Information against him do not
constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is
charged, under the said amended Information, for
more than one offense. Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada
likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court
docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of
a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his
motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court
another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's
Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his
April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June
25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'S MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT —
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO
DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner
Serapio, does not allege a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner
Serapio, does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information and alleged to have
been illegally received or collected does not
constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in Section
1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE
THAN ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended
Information, he is charged with plunder only in
paragraph (a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of
R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He
avers that his single act of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal
resolution does not constitute the requisite
"combination or series of acts" for plunder. He
further claims that the consideration consisting of
gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of
said resolution turned over to and received by
former President Joseph E. Estrada "on several
occasions" does not cure the defect in the
amended information. Petitioner insists that on
the face of the amended Information he is charged
only with bribery or illegal gambling and not of
plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which
forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by
former President Joseph E. Estrada in
confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten
wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. —
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused, the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than
one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the
court to know the proper judgment. The
Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the
definition and elements of the specific crimes. The
purpose of the requirement of alleging all the
elements of the crime in the Information is to
inform an accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
for his defense.16 Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.17 The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically
alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President
Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder "through any
or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts or similar schemes or means." And in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information,
petitioner and his co-accused are charged with
receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly,
on several instances money in the aggregate
amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et
al.,19 we held that the word "series" is synonymous
with the clause "on several instances"; it refers to
a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the
items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held
that the word "combination" contemplates the
commission of at least any two different predicate
acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
"plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended
information charges accused therein, including
petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of
the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of
the law" and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act
of receiving, on several instances, money from
illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly
names petitioner as one of those who conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended
Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and
the general rule is that matters of evidence need
not be alleged in the Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million
alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as
amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a)
to (d) of the amended information conspired and
confederated with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused,
including petitioner, are charged of having
conspired and confabulated together in
committing plunder. When two or more persons
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for
all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the
act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.23 Conspirators are one man, they breathe
one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one
arm and the law says that the acts, words and
declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the
common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the
amended information of bribery and illegal
gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its
part, held that petitioner is not charged with the
predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is
charged only with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward
Serapio the information charges more than one
offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds
or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No.
3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts
alleged in the information are not charged as
separate offenses but as predicate acts of the
crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law
specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make any
express reference to any specific provision of laws,
other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which
coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime
any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated
therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their
generic sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of
public funds, the law also uses the generic terms
'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of said
fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise
be penalized under other laws is incidental. The
said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of
the crime of plunder and the allegations relative
thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses
punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is
clear on the face of the amended Information that
petitioner and his co-accused are charged only
with one crime of plunder and not with the
predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears
stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute
acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly
then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his April
4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY
2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE
AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF
PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR
PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest as well as the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to
conduct a determination of probable cause; and to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed
grave abuse of discretion in charging him with
plunder. He further argues that there exists no
probable cause to support an indictment for
plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of
the Ombudsman does not even mention him in
relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng
money which started in 199828 and that the
Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion
that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a
money laundering front organization put up by
Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even
though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private
foundation.29 More importantly, he claims, said
joint resolution does not indicate that he knew
that the P200 million he received for the
Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with
plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received
does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined
in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is no
evidence linking him to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no showing that
petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200
million constitutes an overt criminal act of
plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for
reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for
plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be
spared from the inconvenience, burden and
expense of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of
government prosecutors is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not
ordinarily look into the existence of probable
cause to charge a person for an offense in a given
case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances,
which are present in this case: (1) to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority;
and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner
claims that he raised proper grounds for a
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the
questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from
the charge of plunder and committed errors of law
or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.37 He also states that during the joint
preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which
the plunder charge was only one of the eight
charges against Estrada et al., he was not
furnished with copies of the other complaints nor
given the opportunity to refute the evidence
presented in relation to the other seven cases,
even though the evidence presented therein were
also used against him, although he was only
charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's omnibus motion. They assert that
since the Ombudsman found probable cause to
charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to proceed to try the same. They
further argue that "a finding of probable cause is
merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual
determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused," and that petitioner still has the chance
to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial
where his guilt or innocence may finally be
determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's omnibus motion asking for,
among others, a reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman, because his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint
resolution did not raise the grounds of either
newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or
irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770
are the only grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists
probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder
as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere
with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct
of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is
paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this
Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has
adopted a policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves
to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude
of discretion in the exercise of determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish 'probable cause' for filing of information
against the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are
essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in
assailing said findings on the contention that the
Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for
estafa through falsification of public documents,
petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here.
His arguments are anchored on the propriety or
error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts.
Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither question of fact nor even
of law are entertained, but only questions of lack
or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned,
we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by respondents which would warrant
the granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that
the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that
matter committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against
petitioner for plunder. Neither did the
Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the
charges against him in the amended Information.
In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the
Ombudsman that probable cause exists against
petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of
plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the
allegations of the Amended Information dated 18
April 2001 charging the accused with the offense
of PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence
submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies
of prosecution witnesses and several other pieces
of documentary evidence, as well as the respective
counter-affidavits of accused former President
Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose
"Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated February 20,
2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001
and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001,
the Court finds and so holds that probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan
noted that a preliminary investigation was fully
conducted in accordance with Rule II,
Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989); and that all the basic complaints and
evidence in support thereof were served upon all
the accused.45 It was in light of such findings that
the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis
for the allegation that accused therein (including
petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution
dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to
charge them with plunder after the conduct of
preliminary investigation in connection therewith.
In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in his
motion that there were newly discovered
evidence, or that the preliminary investigation was
tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are
the only grounds for which a reconsideration of
the Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute.47 The absence
of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute
a ground for quashing the Information.48 If the lack
of a preliminary investigation does not render the
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of
the court over the case, with more reason can it be
said that the denial of a motion for reinvestigation
cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court
of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be
said that petitioner had been deprived of due
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute
the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is
merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a]
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of
the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule
must defer to said officer's finding and
determination of probable cause, since the
determination of the existence of probable cause
is the function of the prosecutor.51 The Court
agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner
failed to establish that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was
tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated
in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not
supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation
was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the
Sandiganbayan's resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that there was no
need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that
an accused shall not be deemed to have waived his
right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he
had been arraigned over his objection and despite
his insistence on the conduct of said investigation
prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the
instant case because petitioner merely prayed for
a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-
discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary
investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended
Information, and that petitioner had participated
therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore,
the Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion
for reinvestigation as well as his motion for
reconsideration thereon prior to his
arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is
dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and
the pleadings of the parties, the issues for
resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner
should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether
petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
Information during the pendency of his petition for
bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for
bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4)
Whether the People waived their right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of
guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5)
Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to
due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should
thus be released from detention via a writ
of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his
petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on
said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him
when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
does not require that he be arraigned first prior to
the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can
stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard
immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his
arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not
necessary since he would not plead guilty to the
offense charged, as is evident in his earlier
statements insisting on his innocence during the
Senate investigation of the jueteng scandal and
the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be
prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence
before his arraignment because, under the Revised
Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is
mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution,57 and petitioner
admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or
proceedings taken during the bail hearings
because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules
of Court expressly provides that evidence present
during bail hearings are automatically reproduced
during the trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the
prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior
to the posting of a bail bond should he be granted
bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary
before bail hearings may be commenced, because
it is only upon arraignment that the issues are
joined. The People stress that it is only when an
accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for
bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there
would be no more need for him to file said
petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment
that the accused is first informed of the precise
charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to
the bail hearings to prevent him from later
assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the
ground that he was not properly informed of the
charge against him, especially considering that,
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence presented during such
proceedings are considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings
diminishes the possibility of an accused's flight
from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because trial in absentia may be had only if an
accused escapes after he has been arraigned.61 The
People also contend that the conduct of bail
hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an
accused the undeserved privilege of being
appraised of the prosecution's evidence before he
pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on
July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had been
entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf,
thereby rendering the issue as to whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of
bail hearings in petitioner's case moot, the Court
takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function
of educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The
arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he
is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.64 An accused need not wait
for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled
on the issue of whether an accused must first be
arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides
involved an accused charged with violation of
Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable
by reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein
assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition of
the condition that he should first be arraigned
before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein
that "in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash."66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should
not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede
arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
complaint or information is filed against him.67 The
Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in
said case filed a petition for bail as well as a
motion to quash the informations filed against
him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has
to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. This
would undermine his constitutional right not to be
put on trial except upon a valid complaint or
Information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be
first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on
his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of
right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail
even prior to arraignment. The ruling
in Lavides also implies that an application for bail
in a case involving an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard
even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled
to bail because the evidence against him is not
strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even
prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail
would be "authorized" under the circumstances. In
fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether
petitioner may file a motion to quash during the
pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner
maintains that a motion to quash and a petition
for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed
independently of each other. While he agrees with
the prosecution that a motion to quash may in
some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the
accused therein, thus rendering the petition for
bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not
always the case; hence, an accused in detention
cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a
motion to quash and decide whether or not to file
a petition for bail or to withdraw one that has
been filed.69 He also insists that the grant of a
motion to quash does not automatically result in
the discharge of an accused from detention nor
render moot an application for bail under Rule
117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists
between an application of an accused for bail and
his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in the custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions set forth under the
Rules of Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an
offense until his conviction while at the same time
securing his appearance at the trial.72 As stated
earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an
Information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on
its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information.74 An
accused may file a motion to quash the
Information, as a general rule, before
arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly,
the right of an accused right to seek provisional
liberty when charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when charged with an offense
punishable by such penalties but after due
hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be
strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such
offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a
motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the
petition for bail of an accused may become moot
and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is
mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for
bail of petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of
the said case as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail
hearings would negate his right to have his
petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding
since said hearings might be converted into a full
blown trial on the merits by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail
hearings will save the court from having to hear
the same witnesses and the parties from
presenting the same evidence where it would
allow separate bail hearings for the accused who
are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of
plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate
in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained
that the directive was made was in the interest of
the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused
other than the accused Serapio were to be
excused from participating in the hearing on the
motion for bail of accused Serapio, under the
pretext that the same does not concern them and
that they will participate in any hearing where
evidence is presented by the prosecution only if
and when they will already have filed their
petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file
any, that they will participate only during the trial
proper itself, then everybody will be faced with
the daunting prospects of having to go through the
process of introducing the same witness and
pieces of evidence two times, three times or four
times, as many times as there are petitions for bail
filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive
to the speedy termination of a case. Neither can
such procedure be characterized as an orderly
proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of
the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two
or more petitions for bail filed by different accused
or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against
the other accused. The matter of whether or not
to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions
for bail filed by two different accused or to
conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the
trial against another accused is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere
with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its
discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its
discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into
account not only the convenience of the State,
including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution
and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also
consider the complexities of the cases and of the
factual and legal issues involving petitioner and
the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo
the observation of the United States Supreme
Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in
his being afforded our historic individual
protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not
become careless or complacent when that fashion
has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs.
Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a petition for bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court
does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be offered therein. It may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference
to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by
two accused will of course avoid duplication of
time and effort of both the prosecution and the
courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused,
especially so if both movants for bail are charged
of having conspired in the commission of the same
crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the
same evident against them. However, in the cases
at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition
for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an
entirely different matter. For, with the
participation of the former president in the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the
proceeding assumes a completely different
dimension. The proceedings will no longer be
summary. As against former President Joseph E.
Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial
which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with
conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-
paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it
is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each
other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten
wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be
charged with having conspired with the other co-
accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving
or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x
in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling.81 Thus, with respect to petitioner,
all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove
that the evidence against him for the charge of
plunder is strong are those related to the alleged
receipt or collection of money from illegal
gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial
of the former President, the latter will have the
right to cross-examine intensively and extensively
the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will
adduce evidence in support of his petition after
the prosecution shall have concluded its evidence,
the former President may insist on cross-
examining petitioner and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition
with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada
will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly
delay the determination of the issue of the right of
petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the
speedy resolution of an application for bail was
succinctly explained by Cooley in his
treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement
which would with reasonable certainty insure the
attendance of the accused to answer the
accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict
upon him that indignity, when the effect is to
subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the
punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any
crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying
Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered "to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings
and speedy termination of the case,"83 the Court
finds that it gravely abused its discretion in
ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and
the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be
held jointly. It bears stressing that the
Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4,
2001 Order the "pre-eminent position and
superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the
matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . .
without unnecessary delay,"84 only to make a volte
face and declare that after all the hearing of
petition for bail of petitioner and Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada and the trial as against former President
Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously.
In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be
heard jointly with the trial of the case against his
co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the
Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the
prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on
its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the
prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by
filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is
petitioner and his co-accused who caused the
delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by
their filing of numerous manifestations and
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85 They assert
that they filed the motion for joint bail hearing and
motion for earlier arraignment around the original
schedule for the bail hearings which was on May
21–25, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right
in capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite
Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states
that —
"All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. — All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released
on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x
x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital
offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to
obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
judgment of his case. However, as to such person,
bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary
upon the court.90 Had the rule been otherwise, the
Rules would not have provided for an application
for bail by a person charged with a capital offense
under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. — At
the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead,
outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a
showing that the evidence of guilt against a person
charged with a capital offense is not strong for the
court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application
for bail by the person charged with a capital
offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted,
where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that
the evidence of guilt against an accused is
strong.92 The prosecution shall be accorded the
opportunity to present all the evidence it may
deem necessary for this purpose.93 When it is
satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of
guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the evidence
of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of
right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right at this stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner's claim that the prosecution had refused
to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes
of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan
has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not
borne by the records. The prosecution did not
waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to
adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for
bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing
dates for petitioner's application for bail but the
same were reset due to pending incidents raised in
several motions filed by the parties, which
incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to
the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually
scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001
but the hearing did not push through due to the
filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on
petitioner's application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the
prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame
therefor, as is evident from the following list of
motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
•         Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6,
2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct
ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2)
conduct a determination of probable cause as
would suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3)
hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest
and other proceedings pending determination of
probable cause;
•         Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24,
2001;
•         Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest for
Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on
Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
•         Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to
Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
•         Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated
May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of May 18,
2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the
earliest possible time;
•         Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on
Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
•         Motion for Reconsideration of denial of
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001,
praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and
•         Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
•         Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May
8, 2001;96
•         Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused
Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and
Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;97
•         Opposition to the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust
Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and
•         Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony
and Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also
contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of
the following motions:
•         Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that
the Amended Information be quashed;
•         Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April
30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he
be (1)excluded from the Amended Information for
lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody;
or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;
•         Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House
Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on
house arrest during the pendency of the case;
•         Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May
2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Supplemental Position Paper [re: House
Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed
by Joseph Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of
the case by the Ombudsman or the outright
dismissal of the case;
•         Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated
May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting
for five (5) days within which to respond to the
Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the
holidays and election-related distractions;
•         Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
•         Omnibus Manifestation on voting and
custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they
be placed on house arrest;
•         Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated
May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Summation regarding house arrest, dated
May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May
6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be
allowed to be confined in Tanay;
•         Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit"
Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
•         Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking
reconsideration of denial of requests for house
arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame;
motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
•         Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His
Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated
June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
•         Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that the resolution compelling them to be present
at petitioner Serapio's hearing for bail be
reconsidered;
•         Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed
by Joseph Estrada;
•         Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating
that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;
•         Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to
be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail
hearings and reserving their right to trial with
assessors;
•         Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day
House Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying
of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
•         Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind
Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;
•         Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for parties,
claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution
witnesses, availing of production, inspection and
copying of documents, requesting for status of
alias case; and
•         Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission to
attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro
Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that
even in cases where the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to an application
for bail by an accused charged with a capital
offense, the trial court is still under duty to
conduct a hearing on said application.101 The
rationale for such requirement was explained
in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra),
citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to
the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from
detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a
hearing of his application for bail and resolve the
same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a
finding that the evidence against petitioner is not
strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends
that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ
because the State, through the prosecution's
refusal to present evidence and by the
Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing,
has failed to discharge its burden of proving that
as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital
offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends
that the prosecution launched "a seemingly
endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves"
to prevent the conduct of bail hearings.
Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's
arraignment before the commencement of bail
hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada
despite the fact that it was only petitioner who
asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would
present its evidence as if it is the presentation of
the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail
hearings would be concluded only after the
prosecution presented its entire case upon the
accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to
quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent,
and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue
only one of these two remedies.104 He further
claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the
bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to
bail and to due process of law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail
hearings which it had earlier set did not render
moot and academic the petition for issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have
resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's
right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact that
he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid
process does not by itself negate the efficacy of
the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs.
Enrile,107 where the Court held that habeas
corpus extends to instances where the detention,
while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is
not proper because petitioner was arrested
pursuant to the amended information which was
earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of arrest
issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will
not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by
the courts even when the person concerned is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
"the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action" due to "its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in
previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the
law, had later become invalid,113 and even though
the persons praying for its issuance were not
completely deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The
general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the
same115 applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by
the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the
filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his
co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25,
2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
116
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile  that habeas
corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty
which was initially valid has become arbitrary in
view of subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because the
hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet
to commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be
pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is
partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition
for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy
for asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court
and the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,118 or has not even exercised
said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not
only be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending
application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of
petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing
on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the
petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said
petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering
a joint hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and
the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE;
the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is
also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
G.R. No. 153675             April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN
ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto
T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent,
to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of
December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that
both Orders were issued by respondent judge with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy
to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from
the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19,
Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the
Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of
the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a
Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest
against private respondent. The Decision became
final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999,
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the extradition of private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition
for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided
by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge in an Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing private respondent to post bail,
thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to
accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to
this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire
to the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private
respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation
of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides
that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in
this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the
question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the
loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41
SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the
"right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that
the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus  finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to
private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international
law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is
the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly,
the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
These significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II,
both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to
life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a
treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein
are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of
the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before
a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s
power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise
been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would
be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings
only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons
in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions
to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In
this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration
was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is
to treat him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of
the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was
applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that
the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069
(The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from
the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the
right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted
of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender
him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a
crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding,
it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery
of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve
the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of
urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition
of the accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was
arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the
trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted
the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due
process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly
points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of
the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention"
is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given
the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she
is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda  demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is
a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also
by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases
cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his
bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings
with dispatch.
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ             November 26,
2004
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R.
ZUÑO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the
sworn complaint1 dated January 15, 2003 of Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of the
Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino
C. Cabebe,2 then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges
are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño
alleged that Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey Daquep Arcangel,
Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas
Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed
Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed
with this Court a petition for change of venue but
was denied in a Resolution dated August 13,
2001.3 On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a
motion for reconsideration.4 In the meantime, the
proceedings before respondent's court were
suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused
to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002,
respondent judge motu propio issued an
Order5 granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail
for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at
P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash.
Respondent judge issued the Order without the
accused's application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for
reconsideration.6 Instead of acting thereon,
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting
himself from further proceeding with the case,
realizing that what he did was patently irregular.
Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,7 respondent denied the charges.
While admitting that he issued the Order dated
November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused
without any hearing, "the same was premised on
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
trial." There was delay in the proceedings due to
complainant's frequent absences and failure of the
witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court,
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The
prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to
the accused.8 He added that the administrative
complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It
is not the appropriate remedy to question his
alleged erroneous Order. Accordingly, and
considering his forty (40) years of government
service, he prays that the administrative complaint
be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge
compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be
imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution9 dated August 25, 2003, we
directed that the complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and required the
parties to manifest whether they are submitting
the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the
required manifestations that they are submitting
the case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,10 we
held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions
on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion.11 It must be stressed that the grant or
the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and
the determination of whether or not the evidence
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the latter to
properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.12 In fact, even in cases
where there is no petition for bail, a hearing
should still be held.13
There is no question that respondent judge
granted bail to the accused without conducting a
hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted
as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At
the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
The evidence presented during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at
the trial but, upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In
the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule,
the court must give reasonable notice of the
hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit
his recommendation. (18a)"
In Cortes vs. Catral,14 we laid down the following
rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition
should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the
hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate
the guilt of the accused.15
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules
and procedure enumerated in Cortes.16 He did not
conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the
accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of
bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused, he should have conducted a hearing and
thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and
a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed,
these are considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense;
its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.17
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to
submit its recommendation on whether or not bail
should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object
to the grant of bail to the accused, hence, he
cannot be held administratively liable for not
conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held that the failure to
raise or the absence of an objection on the part of
the prosecution in an application for bail does not
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing.
Thus –
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to
interpose an objection to the granting of bail to
the accused will not justify such grant without
hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails
to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory
questions from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the
accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution
such questions as would ascertain the strength of
the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the
amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the
temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all
justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for
hearing and diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter was not in fact
contesting the bail application. In addition, a
hearing was also necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines set forth in the
then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of
the bail, Only after respondent judge had satisfied
himself that these requirements have been met
could he then proceed to rule on whether or not
to grant bail."
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek
refuge on the alleged absence of objection on the
part of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the
accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were
entitled to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he
granted bail without a hearing. He blames the
prosecution for the delay.
Respondent's contention is bereft of merit. There
is no indication in the records of the criminal case
that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the
trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay,
this does not justify the grant of bail without a
hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The
requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly
stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant
with the law and the Rules and maintain
professional competence; and by the very nature
of his office, should be circumspect in the
performance of his duties. He must render justice
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.
Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being
charged with knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality. We ruled that in order to be held liable
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
order, respondent judge must have acted in bad
faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the right
of a litigant.19 A perusal of the records, specifically
the assailed Order, hardly shows that any of these
incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law,
suffice it to say that to constitute such infraction, it
is not enough that the subject decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his
official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. 20 In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.21 we
categorically held that "good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge." In Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee,22 we ruled
that "a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order he renders.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the
assailed order of a judge must not only be
erroneous; more important, it must be motivated
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other
similar motive." Complainant, having failed to
present positive evidence to show that respondent
judge was so motivated in granting bail without
hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence
to sustain the same. It is merely based on
complainant's speculation. Mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove this charge.
The only exception to the rule is when the error is
so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith and malice,23 which are not
present here.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation
of Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
grant of bail. This administrative offense is
considered a less serious charge, punishable under
Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the
same Rules, thus:
"Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious
charges include:
x      x      x
"4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives,
and circulars;
x      x      x
"Sec. 11. Sanctions. – x x x
"B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious
charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00."
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C.
Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of violation of
Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the
sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the
same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213847               August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an
accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm
to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective
of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed
by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul
the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8,
20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others.
Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him. The
motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after
the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its
resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest
was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at
the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix
Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard
by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support
of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be
allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution
had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be
reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first
assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have
presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is
not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will
the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his
bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made
by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed
an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing
can even commence. It is thus exceedingly
premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to
fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should
grant him bail because while he is charged with
plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be
possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on
the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly,
it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of
mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be
appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should
already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk
and his physical condition must also be seriously
considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition
and his being a flight risk are among the factors
that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount
of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail
without an anterior showing that the evidence of
guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan
Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s
second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion
for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of
his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile
is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be
deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where
the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as
a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not
a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction,
an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th
at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes
under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has
failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not
be considered a flight risk taking into account that
he is already over the age of 90, his medical
condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that
Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted
bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted
in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail,19 and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on
the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to
prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The
amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but
it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section
13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution,
viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section
7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers
to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for
admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained
or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under
the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.26 Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the
competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable
as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right
prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is
discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong in criminal cases involving capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has
held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed
when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part
of the trial court unless there has been a hearing
with notice to the Prosecution.31 The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has
been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim
case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory
before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting
bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the
prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The
court granted bail on the sole basis of the
complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing.
Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued
the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call
for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it.
Among them are the nature and circumstances of
the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the
trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under
bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of
Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or
otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing,
the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion
to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his
favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense,
and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by
the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion
to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum
possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice
it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration
that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant
clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum
penalty provided by the offense that has bearing
and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances
being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of
whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle
him to bail despite the crime alleged against him
being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual
in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized
the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon
a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect
for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long
years of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health
presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan
did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric
patient who was found during the medical
examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be
suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood
pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes
1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease
composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with
carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4,
4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular
heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and
postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular
s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology
uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical
conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead
to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular
events, especially under stressful conditions; (3)
coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS,
because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust
or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that
Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention. His confinement at the
PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the
officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of
that medical facility because of the limitations in
the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the things, Your Honor.45
PNP Hospital ?
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
PSUPT. JOCSON: regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge,
No, Your Honor. provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
JUSTICE MARTIRES: his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true
Why? objective of preventive incarceration during the
trial.
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we not unprecedented. The Court has already held in
cannot give him the best. Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
JUSTICE MARTIRES: x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for
certiorari, held the following:
At present, since you are the attending physician
of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law
have any fear in your heart of the present in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of
the hospital? independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes
DR. SERVILLANO: it a consideration which should, regardless of the
charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear. the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail ;47
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
xxx
That you will not be able to address in an
Considering the report of the Medical Director of
emergency situation?
the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal,
DR. SERVILLANO:
early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can
institute they "have seen similar cases, later
handle it but probably if the condition of the
progressing into advance stages when the
treatment and medicine are no longer of any
avail;" taking into consideration that the
petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied
by the People’s Court on the ground that the
petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the
People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was
evidently to verify whether the petitioner is
suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act
accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and
considering further that the said People’s Court
has adopted and applied the well-established
doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio
Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case
No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill
and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the People’s Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re
lease the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional
liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in
court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait
for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had
is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue
of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial
notice – that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting
the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance
at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure
the appearance of the accused during the trial;
and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing
of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.
Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The
abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES
the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING
ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14
CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner
Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in
the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from
custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
G.R. No. 189122               March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the
custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be
required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice
system to a vexing question: what is to be done
with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been
proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long,
between arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who
has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application,
he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on
bail is incarcerated before an appellate court
confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail
loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has
never owed.5 Even if the conviction is
subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom
pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently
prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society
has a compelling interest in protecting itself by
swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized
societal interests in the denial of bail pending
appeal include the prevention of the accused’s
flight from court custody, the protection of the
community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending
appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided
by the fundamental principle that the allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail.13 It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised "with grave caution
and only for strong reasons." Citing well-
established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. It found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of
such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his
life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition
of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking
medical attention while confined in prison, though
he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal
physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s
application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the
fact of petitioner’s conviction. It made a
preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and
made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of
discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying
denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years
but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an
application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing
of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused
may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an
application for bail by an appellant sentenced by
the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than
six years’ imprisonment should automatically be
granted.
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental
considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of
Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
While the said remedy may be resorted to
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is
proper only where the interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s application for
bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of
the conditions to justify the denial thereof under
Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven
by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually
failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed
acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply
relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should
have granted bail in view of the absence of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave error and
prejudged the appeal by denying his application
for bail on the ground that the evidence that he
committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued
the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion
to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case
such as this where the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus,
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and
resolve petitioner’s urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner’s application for bail
pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgment but it is such a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for
a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his
application for bail pending appeal, the Court of
Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and
whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the
appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the
Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s
application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough
assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the
case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also
determined whether the appeal was frivolous or
not, or whether it raised a substantial question.
The appellate court did not exercise its discretion
in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings
of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of
Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or
erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this
connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not
shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its
findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would
at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is
shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders.
To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will
not only delay the administration of justice but will
also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis
supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
Contradicts Petitioner’s Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies
to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion
of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the
offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the
probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk
of committing another crime during the pendency
of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed
with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the
availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:
x x x           x x x          x x x
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and
not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall
be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis
supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera,
another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is
a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is
a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court
has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An
application for bail pending appeal may be denied
even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.
In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail
pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether
any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any
application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of
the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish
whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal
and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls
within the second scenario, the appellate court’s
stringent discretion requires that the exercise
thereof be primarily focused on the determination
of the proof of the presence of any of the
circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance
of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny
or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of
the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial
distinction between the two different situations
that are governed by the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import
of the said provision and trivializes the established
policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s
arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to
limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the
determination of whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances exists. The implication of
this position is that, if any such circumstance is
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail
will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate
court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of
the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This
unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial
Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation
severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court
by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue
— whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
"choice."28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number
(of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to
the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is
the end of discretion.30 Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that
tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant
is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s
theory effectively renders nugatory the provision
that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court
(the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must
necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on
the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its
understanding of the applicable law on the
matter.31 In view of the grave caution required of
it, the court should consider whether or not, under
all circumstances, the accused will be present to
abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any
other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and
reputation of the applicant,33 among other things.
More importantly, the discretion to determine
allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial
determination that the appeal is not frivolous but
raises a substantial question of law or fact which
must be determined by the appellate court.34 In
other words, a threshold requirement for the
grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro
forma and merely intended for delay but presents
a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so;
otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged
with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for
the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient
attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower court’s
exercise of discretionary power was
sound,36 specially since the rules on criminal
procedure require that no judgment shall be
reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals
except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances
to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By
restricting the bail-negating circumstances to
those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in
statutory construction. However, the very
language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of
the five situations therein was meant to be
exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the
following or other similar circumstances." Hence,
under the rules, similarly relevant situations other
than those listed in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance,
denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in
such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where
the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be
granted if none of the listed bail-negating
circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending
appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more
than six years of imprisonment will be more
lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment
must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six
years imprisonment may be denied even without
those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates
of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses,
compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And
Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even
radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were
provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction
by the Court of First Instance. — After judgment by
a municipal judge and before conviction by the
Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be
admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the
Court of First Instance. — After conviction by the
Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon
application, be bailed at the discretion of the
court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time
of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in
custody for the commission of a capital offense
shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced
as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All
persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time
of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified
in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January
20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the
accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All
persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused
who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar
with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays
down the following policies concerning the
effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense
which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged
or of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, he may be allowed to
remain free on his original bail pending the
resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court
directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a)
of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than
that charged in the complaint or information, the
same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged,
his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
be placed in confinement pending resolution of his
appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule
abovecited, which are now pending appeal before
his Court where the accused is still on provisional
liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to
surrender the accused within ten (10) days from
notice to the court of origin. The bondsman
thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the
bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the
accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall
remain under confinement pending resolution of
his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered
within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his
bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall
be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the
accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall
be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis
supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in
the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in
custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused
to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period of appeal subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence
or has violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while
on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his
case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished
with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals
an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a
faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is,
bail pending appeal should be allowed not with
leniency but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of
bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by
the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the
Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending
appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-
capital offenses or offenses not punishable by
reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning,
admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage
of the action where the charge was not for a
capital offense or was not punished by reclusion
perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules
on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which
court has authority to act on applications for bail
pending appeal under certain conditions and in
particular situations. More importantly, it
reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal"
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the
accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a
matter of discretion upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending
appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of
bail pending appeal such that those circumstances
are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the
trial court for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail
is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent
standards approach to bail pending appeal? What
is more in conformity with an ex abundante
cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule
which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
absence of any of the circumstances under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a
rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if
none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal
procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United
States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While
this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail
pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict
attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial
discretion — particularly with respect to extending
bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with
caution and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has
even been pointed out that "grave caution that
must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section
5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the
following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to
the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would,
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.
After a person has been tried and convicted the
presumption of innocence which may be relied
upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that
the accused is much more likely to attempt to
escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning
quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated
in 2001 when the present rules were already
effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a
matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption
of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on,
the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At
the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must
be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was
in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of
bail pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This judicial
disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is
likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on
bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal because
long delays often separate sentencing in the trial
court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain
prison sentence and thus may be more likely to
flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in
spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve
and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 185128               January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY
CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for
Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del
Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006
and Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 14, 2003
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu,
in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the
following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that
petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock
in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same
police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo,
Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which
prompted them to immediately disembark from
the jeep they were riding and went directly to
petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure
of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house
and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's
wife and informed her that they will implement
the search warrant. But before they can search the
area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa
hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not
familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the
petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested
his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles
that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The contents of the
four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs
were subjected to laboratory examination, the
result of which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride,  or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC
against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997,
at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then
and there have in his possession and control four
(4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as
"shabu," all containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or
prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance
of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.7 Subsequently,
trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and
Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the
testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo,
Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can
be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical
wirings and airconditioning units of the Four
Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky
Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his
job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was
engaged by the owner of the establishment in a
conversation. He was able to go home around
8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he
learned from his wife that police operatives
searched his house and found nothing. According
to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from
his house where they found the confiscated items,
was owned by his older brother and was used as a
storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo,"
GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven
before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as
Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months
as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white
crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31
gram, positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered
confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the
CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this
Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the following
arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY
OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF
THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED
THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT
THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE
SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE,
BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT
OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE
PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT.
THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE
POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION"
AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD
HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT
BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated
the following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by
Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop
of petitioner are admissible in evidence against
him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him
guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause
to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied
for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged
illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation
conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that
the petitioner, aside from failing to file the
necessary motion to quash the search warrant
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce
clear and convincing evidence to show that
Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his
assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts
that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away
from his house is no longer within the "permissible
area" that may be searched by the police officers
due to the distance and that the search warrant
did not include the same nipa hut as one of the
places to be searched. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities
and not to private individuals such as
the barangay tanod who found the folded paper
containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims
that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of
the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and
regulated drugs are found in a house or other
building belonging to and occupied by a particular
person, the presumption arises that such person is
in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and
the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of
petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by
the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.12 According to petitioner,
there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a
search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.13 A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction.14 The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the
totality of the circumstances made known to him
and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard.16 The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. This Court, therefore,
is in no position to disturb the factual findings of
the judge which led to the issuance of the search
warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as
there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the
objects in connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.18 A review of the records shows that in
the present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner,
it must be remembered that the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to
be valid. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case,
Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically
designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally,
the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a
nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of
the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been
found in a place other than the one described in
the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of
an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The OSG argues that,
assuming that the items seized were found in
another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible
as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a barangay tanod who is a private individual,
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid
of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers
who effected the search warrant that they asked
the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the
testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not
able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men
to get a barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay
tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay
tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the
house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went
upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with
Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the
house yielded negative what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious
of his shop because he ran from his shop, so we
searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the
shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder
sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del
Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up
white folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded
paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found
those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence
of petitioner and that the items that were actually
seized were found in another structure by
a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2
Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del
Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took
place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything
happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the
presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del
Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can
recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around
when [you] conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team
leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that
Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop
near his house, in front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the
house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see
anything. The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to
his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to
his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido
Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store
and furthermore the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is
our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do
you mean to say that there were other persons or
other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay
tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of
Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded
paper and I saw him open the folded paper which
contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded
paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very
small.22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter,
thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr.
Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you
in conducting the search at the residence of the
accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the
house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small
house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court,
what was that small house which you proceeded
to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from
the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that
nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del
Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team
proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of
the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant,
the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by
election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of
public order and the protection and security of
life and property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person
in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a
provision which describes the function of
a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in
authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of
the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of
the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall
be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and
balanced environment, and any barangay
member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in
authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police
officers, as well as the barangay tanods were
acting as agents of a person in authority during the
conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted
was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the
confiscated items is considered a private
individual, thus, making the same items admissible
in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive
possession of the regulated drugs seized, would
still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the
factual findings of the trial court since the latter
has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying,24 unless attended with
arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts
or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded
the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the
present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case
is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In
every prosecution for the illegal possession
of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession
of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge
that the said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept
of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with
another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be
searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there
must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellant’s control or possession.29 The CA,
in its Decision, referred to the possession of
regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive
one. Constructive possession exists when the drug
is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.30 The
records are void of any evidence to show that
petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its
Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating
prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her
husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure,
which housed the electrical equipments is actually
used by the respondent. Being the case, he has
control of the things found in said structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the
ownership of the structure where the seized
articles were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating their
basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1
Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner,
thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court,
what was that small house which you proceeded
to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from
the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that
nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del
Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded
to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3
Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical
shop but denied what he said in his earlier
testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an
electrical shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say
that he owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other
side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a
structure rented by a couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner
had knowledge of the existence and presence of
the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With
the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut
was under petitioner's control and dominion,
there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions,
he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.37 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which
affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal
Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 172035               July 4, 2012
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 651 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner),
assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006
resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan. These
resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension
from public office and (ii) denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the suspension
order.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M.
Lucido and other local officials3 of Koronadal City,
South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman)4 charging the petitioner, among
others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, in connection with the consultancy services
for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and
management of the proposed Koronadal City
public market (project).6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed
the petitioner, among others, to submit his
counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after
moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit.7 In its July 29, 1999 resolution,
the Ombudsman found probable cause against the
petitioner and some private individuals for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the
petitioner alone for Falsification of Public
Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the
corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan.9 The information for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
[petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his
capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and as such while in the
performance of his official
functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with the private
[individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said [accused], by
inviting them to participate in the prequalification
of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and
Construction Supervision and Management of the
proposed Koronadal Public Market, without
causing the publication of said invitation in a
newspaper of general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from participating in
said prequalification.10 (Emphases and
underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the
petitioner’s co-accused,11 the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000,
the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and
orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The
Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days
within which to file his counter-affidavit with the
OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the
petitioner asked13 the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-
day extension to submit his counter-affidavit.
Shortly before the expiry of the extension
requested, the petitioner asked14 the OSP for an
additional thirty-day period to file his counter-
affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and
granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a
twenty-day extension period.15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the
petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare
that the petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution).
On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto approved the resolution.16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought
and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal
cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion
because of the pending OSP reinvestigation – this,
despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the
reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous
failure to submit his counter-affidavit.18 The
petitioner did not question the denial of his
motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was
arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal
cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to
Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June
27, 2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous
Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal
defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that
the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages
was done through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.20
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated the assailed resolution21 suspending
the petitioner pendente lite –
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for,
the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the
petitioner] from his position as City Mayor,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any
other public position he now holds. His suspension
shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only.22
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.23 The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion,24 prompting him
to file this certiorari petition to challenge the
validity of his suspension order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information
to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits
and advantages by the petitioner was made
through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the
phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest
partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-
accused,25 rendering the information fatally
defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before
the issuance of his suspension order. Citing
Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,26 he
claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the [case]
can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the
[p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended."27 For the petitioner, the requirement
of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if
the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to
settle the "defect" in the information.
THE OSP’S COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the
information since all the elements of the offense
under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically
pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These elements
are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material to
the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith when he invited only his co-
accused private individuals to participate in the
prequalification of consultants for the project
instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general
circulation; and
3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation
to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused.28
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to
mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information, by conveniently
failing to cite the phrase "acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality" when the petitioner
quoted the "relevant" portions of the information
in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while
no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted,
the events preceding the issuance of the
suspension order already satisfied the purpose of
conducting a pre-suspension hearing – i.e.,
basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his
right to preliminary investigation both by the
Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner
moved for a reinvestigation with the
Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner
was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019
and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code;
and the petitioner already moved to quash the
information, although unsuccessfully, after he had
been declared to have waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by
the OSP.30
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our
resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the
petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual
pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.
THE COURT’S RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
assailed resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is
valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him,31 Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that
these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and
concise language" and "in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged x x x and for
the court to pronounce judgment."33
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether
the crime is described in intelligible terms and with
such particularity with reasonable certainty so that
the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged. In particular, whether an information
validly charges an offense depends on whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or
information shall establish the essential elements
of the offense charged as defined in the law. The
raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.34
In arguing against the validity of the information,
the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard
of a "person of common understanding" in
appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A
reading of the information clearly reveals that the
phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior
allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he
ultimately acted with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits
and advantages to his co-accused private
individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have
us believe that this elemental phrase was actually
omitted in the information35 when, in his reaction
to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner
actually disputes is simply the clarity of the
phrase’s position, in relation with the other
averments in the information. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the
phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for
the quashal of an information which sufficiently
alleges the elements of the offense charged.36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this
provision is mandatory,37 the suspension requires a
prior hearing to determine "the validity of the
information"38 filed against him, "taking into
account the serious and far reaching consequences
of a suspension of an elective public official even
before his conviction."39 The accused public
official’s right to challenge the validity of the
information before a suspension order may be
issued includes the right to challenge the (i)
validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the
filing of an information against him, and (ii)
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that
the acts charged do not constitute a violation of
R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied
upon, the Court required, "by way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of
the power of suspension," that –
(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial
court should issue an order with proper notice
requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office pursuant to the
cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where
either the prosecution seasonably files a motion
for an order of suspension or the accused in turn
files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial
court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or
withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such
pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has
not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which
would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show
cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before
his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as
the day, however, Luciano considered it
unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show
cause order when the motion, seeking the
suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been
submitted by the prosecution, as in the present
case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-
suspension hearing is to determine the validity of
the information so that the trial court can have a
basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold
the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct
any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity.1âwphi1 That hearing is similar to a
challenge to the validity of the information by way
of a motion to quash.42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at
securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him,43 Luciano likewise emphasizes that no
hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.44 With the purpose of a pre-suspension
hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing
alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a
suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered
the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s
motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to
dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same
conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,46 where
the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-
suspension hearing held to determine the validity
of the Informations that had been filed against
petitioners, we believe that the numerous
pleadings filed for and against them have achieved
the goal of this procedure. The right to due
process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but
by the filing and the consideration by the court of
the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other
position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be
heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain that
no actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled
that "to be heard" does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
has been accorded, no denial of procedural due
process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his
Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after
receiving an adverse ruling from the
Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of
the suspension order issued against him, and (iii)
filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration.49 Given this opportunity, we find
that the petitioner’s continued demand for the
conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing –
based on the same alleged "defect in the
information,"50 which we have found wanting – has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the
petitioner’s position relates to the nature of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal
provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public
official and a strict construction against the
State.51 The suspension required under this
provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted,
the accused official shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during his suspension.52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure53 that
arises from the legal presumption that unless the
accused is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance
or do both, in the same way that upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge
to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere
preventive measure whose duration shall in no
case exceed ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the
opportunity to contest the validity of the
information and of the proceedings that preceded
its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the
accused cannot be measured alone by the absence
or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity
to be heard on one’s defenses, however
unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension
mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves
both the due process right of the accused and the
mandatory nature of the suspension required by
law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
reinforces the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that a public office is a public
trust.56 In light of the constitutional principle
underlying the imposition of preventive
suspension of a public officer charged under a
valid information and the nature of this
suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-
type hearing in the present case would only
overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote,
the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
G.R. No. 199877               August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the
Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA
affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch
268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara
with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and
confederating together with one unidentified
person who is still at-large, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest
from Joselito M. Bautista cash money amounting
to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented by
Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said
robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista
with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses:
Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz
(SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting
staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San
Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around
9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱
230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch,
Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees
of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode
a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito
Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the
bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while
they were at the intersection of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly
appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-
up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang
pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was
seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay";
(g) heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in
Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the
bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i)
seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his
gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the
pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called
up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident;
(k) when he went back to where the pick-up was
parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle
and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed
by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the
bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay
officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2)
other companions were brought to the police
station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while
on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he
saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay
San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police
and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the
police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified
Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastian’s money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the
Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b)
at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001,
Sumulong went to the police station and informed
him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil
Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong
went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara,
who Sumulong identified; (d) they then
approached Lara and invited him for questioning;
(e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-
up where he was positively identified by
Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being
identified, Lara was informed of his rights and
subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of
the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City
Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was
informed of a robbery that took place at the
corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police
officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon
arriving thereat, one of the police officers who
were able to respond ahead of them, handed to
him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6)
deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his
investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie,
Manacob at the police station; and (f) before
Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at
the hospital where the latter was brought after the
incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a
plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San
Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at
his house, digging a sewer trench while his
brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort
room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the
morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7,
2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he
was at the house of one of his cousins, police
officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo
Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara,
the police officers asked him to go with them to
the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with
them and while inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to
caught you in your house, if in another place we
will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police
station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier
told where he was investigated for robbery with
homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was
at home when the subject incident took place, the
police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i)
when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of
the police officers told them to come back the
following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up
holding a name plate, a police officer told
Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na
tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the
following day, they were told that he will be
subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one
of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She
testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was
manning her store, she saw Lara working on a
sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in
the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister,
Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working
on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of
robbery with homicide in a Decision,11 the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the
money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong
positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the
person who carted away the payroll money of San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at
around 10:30 o’clock in the morning along the
corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City
and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which
caused his instantaneous death on the same day.
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For
alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at
some other place for such a period of time that it
was impossible for him to have been at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the
crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697).
Considering the proximity of the distance between
the place of the incident and the residence of the
accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day
of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene within the same
barangay. The positive identification of the
accused which were categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi
and denial of the accused whose testimony was
not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA
259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that
supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless
arrest rendered void all proceedings including
those that led to his conviction. Second, he was
not assisted by counsel when the police placed
him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses
for the prosecution in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is
part of custodial investigation and his right to
counsel had already attached. Third, the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to present a witness who actually saw him
commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely
presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista
and who took the bag of money from him. The
physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to
the police was different from the one he gave
during the trial, indicating that he did not have a
fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this
gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and
took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be
reasonably claimed that his conviction was
attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial
court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were
impelled by improper motives in testifying in his
favor, their testimonies should have been given
the credence they deserve. While his two (2)
witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does
not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair
their credibility.
The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was
supposedly arrested without a warrant may not
serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Any objections to the legality of the
warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused
enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is
not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at
and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:
Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily
submitting himself to the court by entering a plea,
instead of filing a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-
appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
assail the legality of his arrest. Applying the
foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is
estopped from questioning the validity of his
arrest since he never raised this issue before
arraignment or moved to quash the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial
free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if
illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the
appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts on record point to their
culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the
police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel
was violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal
compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police
line-up since the latter is not part of custodial
investigation.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial
investigation at the time he was identified in a
police line-up and therefore had the right to
counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our
jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police
line-up considering that such is usually not a part
of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule
is when the accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the investigation. In the
case at bench, appellant was identified in a police
line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of
persons gathered for the purpose. However, there
was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all
or that a statement or confession was extracted
from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to
appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact
that during the police line-up, the accusatory
process had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was
subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the
police line-up, it does not in any way affect his
culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
Here, appellant was convicted based on the
testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or
admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the
prosecution’s failure to present a witness who
actually saw him commit the crime charged as
follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged
failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness
to prove that he shot the victim and took the
money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution
witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista,
the victim. Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from
this act was there any other words spoken by this
person?
A There was, sir.
Q What did he say?
A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
Q Where were you looking when this person
approached you?
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you
do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at
that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the
money to him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s)
shouted not to give the money or the bag so I
immediately threw away the bag at the back seat,
sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person
standing by your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag
containing money to the back of the vehicle, what
did that person do?
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying
the bag and ran away, sir, and I also saw
somebody shoot a gun?
Q Who was firing the gun?
A The one who held-up us, sir.
Q By how, do you know his name?
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able
to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to
recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please look around and please tell this
Honorable Court whether indeed the person you
saw holding you up at that time is in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to
identify him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on
the first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-
shirt and black pants who when ask identify
himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted
from the vehicle and ran away with it, what did the
accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle,
sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your
recollection were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9)
shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had
transpired or happened after you stepped down
from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?
A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista
was shot.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already
proceeding towards that store to call your office
by phone, that is correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the
Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was
also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the
vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the
rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that
firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the
gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who
fired the gun because he was holding the gun, am I
correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if the following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are
tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of
appellant is beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at
prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from
him to produce the bag containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to
the victim who was then seated at the backseat of
the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the
bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the
victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of
the crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to
convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule
that positive identification of the accused, where
categorical and consistent, without any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must
prove (a) that he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b)
that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility
"refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime transpired and
the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.
Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis
at the time of the perpetration of the felonious
act. He himself admitted that his house was just a
stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from
the crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court
accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua and the parties were afforded
an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs.
Both parties waived their right to do so, stating
that they would adopt the allegations in their
respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery
with homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong,
Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without
the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be
raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose
of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict
Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as
to exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court.19 Any objection to the arrest
or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial
court upon entering a plea and participating
actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking
any irregularities that may have attended his
arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a
conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly
filed and a trial conducted without error.21 As
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any
ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed
a waiver of any objections except those based on
the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g)
and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided
with counsel when he was placed in a police line-
up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to
without the assistance of counsel did not render
Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The
right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
As this Court previously ruled in People v.
Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees
of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or
the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only
by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when
the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part
of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet
be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the
case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent
case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be
assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police line-up
because it is not part of the custodial investigation
process. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory
to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or
the complainant who is interrogated and who
gives a statement in the course of the line-
up.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA
that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in
this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the
presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the
only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence
of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the
established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain, consistent with each other and to the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence
sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused
may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is
essential since to insist on direct testimony would,
in many cases, result in setting felons free and
denying proper protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following
circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while
the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista
were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front
passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while
pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front
passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong
give him the bag containing the money; (c) instead
of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to
Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-
up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he
alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up;
(e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired
his gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g)
Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and
empty shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the
taking of personal property with intent to gain
must itself be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical
act of asportation by the accused must be
presented by the prosecution. It must be shown
that the original criminal design of the culprit was
robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a
view to the consummation of the robbery by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery.26 The
mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is
not enough to implicate him. It is essential to
prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was
necessary to realize such intent.
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by
Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the
bag containing the money be turned over to him.
That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize
his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s
testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the
direction of Bautista, who was running away from
the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight
and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the
witness does not appear to be biased against the
accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of
the malefactor should be normally accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly
demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by
improper or malicious motives to impute upon
him, however perjurious, such a serious charge.
Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to
be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith
and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is
against the natural order of events and of human
nature and against the presumption of good faith
that a prosecution witness would falsely testify
against the former.28
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of
Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as
a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to
disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the offense was
committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated
that he was so far away that it was not possible for
him to have been physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi
must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the
scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi.
Assuming as true Lara’s claim and that of his
witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on
the day of the incident, it is possible that his
witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and
returning given that the distance between his
house and the place where the subject incident
took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in
just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed
in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the
equation by the respondent Judge of the right of
an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"  accorded by Section 20, Article III
of the Constitution, with the right of any
person "under investigation for the commission of
an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right," granted by the same
provision. The relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket
freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having
allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.2
On the day before the investigation, February
8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT
HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES
ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P
76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS
MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9
FEB 86.(s) Felipe Ramos (Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986,
conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio
City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station
Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk
Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of
the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his
answers in response to questions by Cruz, were
taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to
the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made
disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit
Team's findings, that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned
on paying back the money, he had been prevented
from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was
still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and)
the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next
investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio
CTO," and that he should be represented therein
by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that
he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out
is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would
seem that no compromise agreement was reached
much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was
filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the
crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City
during the period from March 12, 1986 to January
29, 1987. In that place and during that time,
according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully ... defraud the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the
following manner, to wit: said accused ... having
been entrusted with and received in trust fare
tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-
trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the
express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the
sale, account for it and/or to return those
unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead
of complying with his obligation, with intent to
defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate,
misapply and convert the value of the tickets in
the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his
obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos
entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter
ensued. The prosecution of the case was
undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction
and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private
prosecutors made a written offer of evidence
dated June 21, 1988,6 which included "the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City
Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit
A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given
on February 8, 1986," also above referred to,
which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed
"Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
Evidence."7 Particularly as regards the peoples'
Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document,
which appears to be a confession, was taken
without the accused being represented by a
lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same
reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent
judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are
worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected.
His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in
evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986
at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation
conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does
not appear that the accused was reminded of this
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance
actually of a counsel." He also declared
inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission
made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on
February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in
the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear
that the accused was assisted by counsel when he
made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for
reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated
September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said
Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's
rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et
al.,  121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit,  135 SCRA
467,  People. v. Sison,  142 SCRA 219, and People v.
Decierdo,  149 SCRA 496, among others, to the
effect that "in custodial investigations the right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel,"
and the explicit precept in the present Constitution
that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of
Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one
"for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the
proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and
therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the
constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos
was not detained at the time, or the investigation
was administrative in character could not operate
to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September
14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court
by the private prosecutors in the name of the
People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated
October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson
and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and
directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of
Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe
Ramos), including the issuance of any order,
decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on
any matter in relation to the same case, now
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition. The comments of Judge
Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General
have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made
common cause with the petitioner and prays "that
the petition be given due course and thereafter
judgment be rendered setting aside respondent
Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit
Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The
Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever
impropriety might have attended the institution of
the instant action in the name of the People of the
Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended
party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full
ventilation of the issue — of whether or not it was
grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to
have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will
now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent
Judge has given a construction that is disputed by
the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two
(2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the
section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the
right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself — set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and
is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment
of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation,
i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates
much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the
rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself," is now embodied in
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which
have been made more explicit, are now contained
in Section 12 of the same Article III.13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination,
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a
settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not
a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to
refue to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right
to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving
a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take
the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is
only when a particular question is addressed to
him, the answer to which may incriminate him for
some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge,
or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a
right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every
one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance
of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the
very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the
latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self-
executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the
witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or
impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also
treats of a second right, or better said, group of
rights. These rights apply to persons "under
investigation for the commission of an offense,"
i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights
different from that embodied in the first sentence,
that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons
under investigation for an offense was not in the
1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake
in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is
"under investigation for the commission of an
offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x
(these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must
be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this
Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The
situation contemplated has also been more
precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and "cross-examined" not
only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to
him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study
have taught them to extract the truth, or what
may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of
their constitutional rights. And even if they were,
the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a
person involved in some crime is within the scope
of the constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under
investigation for the commission of an offense,"
the statement is not protected. Thus, in one
case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct
and before any sort of investigation could be
initiated, declared that he was giving himself up
for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft,
this Court ruled that such a statement was
admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being
exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the
rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-
incrimination and (2) those during custodial
interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a
crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or
under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would already have
been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal
case in court (or the public prosecutors' office).
Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal
case already pending in court (or the public
prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak
of his right while under "custodial interrogation"
laid down by the second and subsequent
sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no
longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or
undergoing preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self-
incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e.,
the right to refuse to answer a specific
incriminatory question at the time that it is put to
him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court
has other rights in the matter of giving testimony
or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among
others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own
behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may
be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be
exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or
produce evidence in the criminal case in which he
is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot
be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be
required to be a witness either for the
prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary
witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the
right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory
question at the time it is put to him-the defendant
in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether.
He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn,
answer any question. 34 And, as the law
categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf,
however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he
does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as
any other witness." He may be cross-examined as
to any matters stated in his direct examination, or
connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-
examination refuse to answer any question on the
ground that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a tendency
to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.
It must however be made clear that if the
defendant in a criminal action be asked a question
which might incriminate him, not for the crime
with which he is charged, but for some other
crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he
may decline to answer that specific question, on
the strength of the right against self-incrimination
granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a
prosecution for murder, the accused should testify
in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that
he might be implicated in that crime of murder;
but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different
and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a
crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the
matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to
wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with
the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by
the police: the continuing right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to
be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that
respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature
and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He
has taken them as applying to the same juridical
situation, equating one with the other. In so doing,
he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought
to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to
be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so
far divorced from the actual and correct state of
the constitutional and legal principles involved as
to make application of said thesis to the case
before him tantamount to totally unfounded,
whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. They should be as they are hereby,
annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case
that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared
to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did
not therefore come into play, were of no relevance
to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter
been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as
it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering
to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act
on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the
"greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of
any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining
parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike
the police agencies who have no propriety or
pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their
over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not,
to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence."
It suffices to draw attention to the specific and
peremptory requirement of the law that
disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any
employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by
which is meant that the latter must be informed of
the offenses ascribed to him and afforded
adequate time and opportunity to explain his side.
The requirement entails the making of statements,
oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with
opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or
his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the
investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should
opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation
against him, it would be absurd to reject his
statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action
brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting
them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to
counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to
repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the
employee's statements, whether called "position
paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him
precisely so that they may be admitted and duly
considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that
in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or
intimidation, undue pressure or influence be
brought to bear on an employee under
investigation — or for that matter, on a person
being interrogated by another whom he has
supposedly offended. In such an event, any
admission or confession wrung from the person
under interrogation would be inadmissible in
evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating
consent, not because of a violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on
the general, incontestable proposition that
involuntary or coerced statements may not in
justice be received against the makers thereof, and
really should not be accorded any evidentiary
value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted
annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R,
dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988,
and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence
Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed
with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The
temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988
having become functus officio, is now declared of
no further force and effect.
G.R. No. 151258               December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG,
JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR.,
and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case
involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due
to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in
the arguments raised by the parties in their
respective Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters
needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these
matters include the effect of our Decision on the
finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as
respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda),
June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are
concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek
probation; and the issue of the validity of the
probation proceedings and the concomitant orders
of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for
Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa);
and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the
Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The
Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found
respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The modification had the effect of
lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the
crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries.
The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of
the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the
crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate
but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto
Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
on the ground that their right to speedy trial was
violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive
portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No.
155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN
PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 –
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty
of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and
penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally
to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12%
from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954,
acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258
is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-
resident or alumni fraternity members during
hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual
antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of
the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes
were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to
have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation
rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any
time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought
to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had
already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from
the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation
rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows
to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which
obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes
were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of
lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows
on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by
two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to
inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this
time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first
day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February
1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also
required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes
were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a
few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni
fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites
be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it
sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty
in breathing. After their last session of physical 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
the carport.
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were
suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal
and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
thought he was just overacting. When they realized,
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
16. Antonio General (General)
pronounced dead on arrival.
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was
filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused
in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case
No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520)
set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. Accused De Leon had by
then passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants–
Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores,
Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as
their individual guilt was not established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent
Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuriesand
sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
They were also ordered to jointly pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as
indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito
Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
CA sentenced them to an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount
of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case
No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On
25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060
& 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5)
consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial
Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona
et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa
reiterates her previous arguments that the right to
speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since
they had failed to assert that right within a
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike
their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke
their right to speedy trial during the time that the
original records and pieces of evidence were
unavailable. She again emphasizes that the
prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse
of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial
trial, as there were a number of incidents
attributable to the accused themselves that caused
the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that
we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was
violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
9
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration  of G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People
v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this
Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had
neither the felonious intent to kill (animus
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes
that the mode in which the accused committed the
crime was through fault (culpa). However, it
contends that the penalty imposed should have
been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant
to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the
imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine
distinction between dolo and culpaby considering
the act as one committed with malicious intent. It
maintains that the accused conducted the initiation
rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner
that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates
and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino
et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also
be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as
the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520).
The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have
been similarly convicted like their other co-accused
Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the
former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa,
and their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of
Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective
motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a
clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar
as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA
rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering
their criminal liability from the crime of homicide,
which carries a non-probationable sentence, to
slight physical injuries, which carries a
probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that,
as a result, they have already been discharged from
their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was
supposedly by virtue of their Applications for
Probation on various dates in January
200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October
200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and
conditions thereof, discharged them from
probation and declared the criminal case against
them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents
attached14 certified true copies of their respective
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders
granting these applications, discharging them from
probation, and declaring the criminal case against
them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed
into finality, insofar as they were concerned,
whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied
for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right to
speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson
et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al.
of the terms and conditions of their
probation discharged them from their
criminal liability, and closed and terminated
the cases against them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the
factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial
Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080 have already been thoroughly considered
and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to
our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize
that in light of the finding of violation of the right of
Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of
the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration
thereof would result in a violation of their right
against double jeopardy.16 Though we have
recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the
case was attended by a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and
so severe as to deprive the court of its very power
to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and
the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records,
the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in concluding that the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case
and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of
petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to
G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the
arguments raised therein are essentially a mere
rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original
Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s
theory that even if the act complained of was born
of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can
still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the
finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with that committed by means
of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs
done as a result of an act performed without malice
or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any
person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform suchact,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases
supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern
those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent
to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our
exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised
Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of
thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as
a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.
Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.
In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of
doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea
involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this
Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve
with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while
intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is
the "moving power" that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a
particular means to produce the result. On the
other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an
evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional
felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying
a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that
the act or omission be done "willfully,"
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of is innocent. As is required of the
other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to
commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional
felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo
immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus
interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must
not have been the product of accident, natural
cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act
executed without malice or criminal intent – but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence –
the act must be qualified as reckless or simple
negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious
acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be
coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If
there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does
not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that
the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of
fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is
fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a
voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast,
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act
done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so
constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid
being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the
degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm
to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct
is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is
minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible
that there are countless degrees of precaution or
diligence that may be required of an individual,
"from a transitory glance of care to the most
vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused
can be adjudged liable for committing an
intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a
felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the
argument of the OSG. It contends that the
imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be
applied to the present case on the ground that the
nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
accused was so gross that the felony already
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as
regards felonies committed by means of culpaon
the one hand and felonies committed by means of
doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in
Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs
as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in
Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of
the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by
a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are
statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved –
and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and
Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor
animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny
Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is
what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in
light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al.
vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that
the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of
slight physical injuries has already lapsed into
finality as a result of their respective availments of
the probation program and their ultimate discharge
therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no
longer be convicted of the heavier offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in
Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the
CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled
even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not
have attained finality, as the former had timely filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues
that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a
petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from
becoming final and executory until after the matter
is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused
applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A
judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where
the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied
for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1
of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the
criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the
judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order
to give life to the constitutional edict27 against
putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that
the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy
if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order
to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to
appeal – as when applying for probation – makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and
executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is
worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment
of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete
opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to
enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already
established innocence at the first trial where he had
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same
untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has at its
disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result,
as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of
judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments.
We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that
this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued
the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the
exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we
quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and
law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal,
actually takes place; the focus of the review is on
whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction,
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other
words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on
the question of the decision’s error or correctness.
Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition,
the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show
the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise
of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of
a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may
have created an impression of the unassailability of
a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies
for probation, we point out that what the state filed
therein was a mere motion for the modification of
the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition
for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct
and separate from the main case. While in the main
case, the core issue is whether the accused is
innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of
a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a)
without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there
is nomodification of judgment in a petition for
certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of
the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting
annulment of a criminal judgment is but a
consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper
interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that
it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s
jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65
petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification
of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought
before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45, and if that appeal would put the accused in
double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in
the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment
therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for
Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of
our criminal justice system is the authority or
jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide
the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power
and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide
a particular case or matter before it.31 That power
and capacity includes the competence to
pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and
enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings
involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the
trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it
was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The
OSG points out that the trial court that originally
rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City
RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is
hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the
law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted
and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of
homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch
130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings
have presented any explanation or shown any
special authority that would clarify why the
Applications for Probation had not been filed with
or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch
121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of
Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), the ruling was made specifically
applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.
accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S.
Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when
they filed their probation applications with
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch
121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to
choose the forum in which they may seek
probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of
the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the
probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the
CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the
probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is
lodged with the court in which the criminal action
has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the
trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court. The execution of
the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing
party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses
jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the
other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any
residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall
cease – including the authority to order execution
pending appeal – the moment the complete
records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that
shall have the authority to wield the power to hear,
try, and decide the case before it, as well as to
enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant
thereto. That power and authority shall remain with
the appellate court until it finally disposes of the
case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any
subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code,
"[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a
final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or
acquitting the accused of the offense charged
becomes final under any of the following conditions
among others:42 after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the
right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan
appeal; when the sentence has already been
partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
accused applies for probation. When the decision
attains finality, the judgment or final order is
entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the
case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be
remanded to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then
reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate
action. It is during this time that the court of origin
may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or
the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including
the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA
had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the
case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took
cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications47 while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the
CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The
CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or
about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed
their applications with the trial court.50 In
September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October
2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG
had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for
Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately,
the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before
this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required
respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After
their submission of further pleadings and motions,
we eventually required all parties to file their
consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case
remained with the CA until they were elevated to
this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch
130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the
power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,
place them on probation, order their final
discharge, and eventually declare the case against
them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of
the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the
part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek
probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the
state to penitent qualified offenders who
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce
their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of
their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration recordby making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to
eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and
self respecting individuals, as well as to assist them
in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right
enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v.
Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person
or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore
be permitted to divest the state or its government
of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to
this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the
probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It points
out that when they appealed to the CA their
homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the
Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation
is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of
Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even
after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the
probationable limit. In that case, the trial court
sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight
years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the
coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the
maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8
months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the
reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused
was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an
appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized
that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no
ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are
disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat
the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they
obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of
their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various
Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation,
the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere
reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the
1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and
Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson
et al., therefore, should not have been granted by
RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their
conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly,
even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to
slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20
days of arresto menor, which made the sentence
fall within probationable limits for the first time, the
RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible
for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged
as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to
dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders
granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et
al. and thereafter discharging them from their
criminal liability must be deemed to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and
judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et
al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman
v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at
all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights
can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis
supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their
criminal liability has already been extinguished as a
result of their discharge from probation and the
eventual termination of the criminal case against
them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support
his argument, he cites the following provision of the
Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally
Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
 3. By amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman,
as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be
the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if
no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering
our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 in relation to the probation
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits
that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89
of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable
to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation
Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the
sentence,"66 and not to replace the original
sentence with another, as we pointed out in our
discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of
the imposition of sentence. It is not a final
judgment but is rather an "interlocutory
judgment"in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be
followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or
by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are
violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et
al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited
our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for
probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the
Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the
accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of
the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting
opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation
law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense
and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit
ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the
whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension
that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court
of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. But there
is a huge difference between Franciscoand this
case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a
judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to
say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will
not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of
conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was
guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that
for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start,
it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of
two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an
accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one
of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation
of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of
the accused not because it is a criminal law but to
achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done
what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would havehad the right to apply for probation. No
one could say with certainty that he would have
availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright
by him. The idea may not even have crossed his
mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of
fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the
Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
(Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA
judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto
mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its
medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new
ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et
al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for
probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was
convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that
Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders
of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications
for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that
Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions
of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should
they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at
its discretion, consider their antecedent probation
service in resolving whether to place them under
probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an
unintentional typographical error in the minimum
term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by
any of the parties before us, this Court deems it
proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the
interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer
anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the
maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day,"
which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should
now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer
anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum. In this instance, we further find it
important to clarify the accessory penalties
inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon
and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the
Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory
penalty automatically attaches every time a court
lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25
and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty
is determined by using as reference the principal
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison
sentence is computed in accordance with the
ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two
classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate
sentence. It must be emphasized that the
provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties
specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed,
not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We
believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect
of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of
accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two
penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the
minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after
which the convict may apply for parole and
eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its
medium period. As this provision grants courts the
discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to
the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be
within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before
applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon
and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of
four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional
automatically carries with it80 the following
accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión
Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The
penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it
that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer
the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same
as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that
is, for four years and two months81 or until they
have served their sentence in accordance with law.
Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the
judgment of conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their
imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under
Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this
accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive
them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any
popular election for any public office; (b) to be
elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public
office.83 Any public office that they may be holding
becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory
penalties can only be wiped out if expressly
remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties
are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As
we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno
v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an
order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of
the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from
the order granting probation the paragraph which
required that petitioner refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon
Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation,
the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by
the court but is merely required to comply with all
the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also
DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding
that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the
entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all
orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna,
Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito
Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation
in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of
the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their
remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1)
day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as
follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as
maximum."
G.R. No. 171020             March 14, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01414 dated 16 November
2005 which affirmed with modification the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Criminal Cases
Nos. DH 586-97 and 587-97, finding appellant
Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinan guilty of two counts of
rape. The Court of Appeals upheld the two death
sentences imposed on appellant but modified the
award of damages.1ªvvphi1.nét
Two informations were filed charging appellant
with raping AAA,3 his daughter. The informations
read:
Crim. Case No. DH-586-97
That in or about the month of September 1995 at
Brgy. Pita, Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, thru force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor
girl, who is his daughter against the will and
consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.4
Crim. Case No. DH-587-97
That in or about the month of January 1997 at Brgy.
Pita, Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, thru force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed to have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor
girl, who is his daughter against the will and
consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.5
On 5 May 1997, appellant, who was arrested and
detained with no bail recommended, filed a petition
for bail.6
In the hearings for the petition for bail, the
prosecution presented the private complainant-
victim, BBB, and Dr. Melinda Layug.
From the evidence presented, the prosecution’s
version of what transpired, as summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is quoted by the
Court of Appeals:
BBB is the wife of appellant Alfredo Pangilinan. On
May 9, 1985, BBB gave birth to AAA. Their family
lived in Barangay Pita, Bayan-bayanan, Bataan.
On September 9, 1995, around 9 o’clock in the
evening, AAA, her brother and two (2) sisters were
asleep. Suddenly, she felt her father, herein
appellant, approach their bed, remove her shorts
and lay on top of her. She could not move.
Appellant proceeded to remove the rest of her
clothes. AAA struggled with all her strength even
though her hands were pinned down by appellant
above her head. AAA cried and shouted for help,
but appellant quickly covered her mouth. When
appellant attempted to insert his penis into her
vagina, AAA unceasingly resisted until appellant
finally stopped his attack and left her.
Around 11 o’clock the following night, appellant
once again crawled beside AAA while she was
asleep beside her siblings. He removed all her
clothes. When AAA woke up, she resisted appellant
with all her strength and shouted for her
grandmother’s help, but he quickly covered her
mouth, thus stifling her cries. Appellant, who was
naked, mounted AAA and kissed her on different
parts of her body. After a while, AAA’s energy
waned. AAA felt excruciating pain when appellant
forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina and had
sexual intercourse with her. The following morning,
AAA was feverish. She saw blood oozing out of her
vagina. Scared and confused, AAA confided to her
eight (8) year-old brother CCC that appellant raped
her the previous night.
The following week, appellant repeated his
dastardly act. While his children were playing in the
creek behind their house, appellant pulled AAA,
who was busy washing dishes, inside their house.
Appellant brought her upstairs and pushed her
down to the floor. As before, AAA tried to push
appellant away and scream for help but he covered
her mouth and easily overcame her resistance.
Appellant removed AAA’s clothes, mounted her and
had sexual intercourse with her. After a few
minutes, appellant stood up, put on his clothes and
ordered AAA to take a bath.1awphi1.nét
That same evening, appellant raped AAA again.
After doing so, he threatened to kill her and her
siblings should she report him to the authorities.
During the month of September in 1995, appellant
repeatedly raped AAA. AAA lost count of the
number of times appellant had raped her. Fearing
for her safety and that of her siblings, AAA kept her
silence.
For a while, AAA thought that appellant would no
longer abuse her. She was wrong. Around 11
o’clock in the evening of January 5, 1997, AAA felt
her father grope for her while she was sleeping in
their room. Like in the past, appellant removed her
clothes. AAA resisted and struggled to free herself
in vain. Appellant was too heavy. Appellant
mounted her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
had sexual intercourse with her.
AAA’s fear of her father intensified. His stares
stopped her from confiding her ordeal to her
mother, who had just arrived from Singapore.
On March 16, 1997, BBB informed her children that
she was leaving for Singapore again. DDD, AAA’s
grandmother, advised BBB not to leave her
children. She told BBB that appellant had been
molesting AAA. Shocked by the revelation, BBB
confronted AAA. AAA tearfully confessed
everything to her mother. BBB could only embrace
her daughter tightly after hearing the sordid details.
That same day, BBB confronted appellant. As
expected, appellant denied any wrongdoing and
hastily left their house.
After the confrontation, BBB decided to leave
appellant.
On March 17, 1997, BBB brought AAA to the
Dinalupihan District Hospital where she was
examined by Dra. Melinda Layug. The examination
revealed that the victim had a non-parous introitus
with an old healed hymenal laceration at the 4
o’clock position. Thus the instant case was filed.7
On 30 October 1997, the prosecution formally
offered its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A" to
"E," with sub-markings, and the testimonies of its
witnesses, praying that they be admitted and
considered in the resolution of the petition for bail,
and that the same be considered as part of its
evidence in chief.8 On 15 December 1997, appellant
filed his comment and/or opposition to the
prosecution’s offer of evidence.9
In an Order dated 23 April 1998, the trial court,
finding that the evidence against the accused is
strong, denied appellant’s petition for
bail.10 Thereafter, the defense presented its
evidence with appellant as the sole witness.
Appellant testified as follows:
Appellant narrated that he left for Saudi Arabia on
27 May 1990 and returned on 22 September 1992.
Upon his return, a lot of people informed him that
his wife was having an affair. Complainant even told
him he is not the father of his youngest daughter.
As a result, he lost interest in going back to Saudi
Arabia, merely stayed at home and did not look for
work. He revealed that before he left for Saudi
Arabia, his daughter AAA was sweet to him, that is,
she hugged and kissed him. When he returned from
Saudi Arabia, he said AAA became sweeter.
In September 1995, his wife was in Singapore
working as an overseas contract worker. He kept in
touch with her through phone and letters. Once,
while he was writing a letter to his wife, he said he
became drunk and was not able to finish the letter.
He felt dizzy, lay down and slept. He was awakened
by the embraces and kisses of a person who turned
out to be his daughter, AAA. He said there was
malice in the way his daughter embraced and
kissed him. He wondered why his daughter was
kissing him the way she did. He embraced her but
he did not allow anything to happen, she being his
daughter.
Appellant further testified that the same incident
happened again, but this time, he was not drunk.
He said AAA approached him wanting to have sex
with him by pointing her finger on her palm. He
advised her that sex is only done by married
couples. He claimed he did not have any sexual
relationship with her although she seduced him. He
added he did not know of any reason why she is
mad at him and why she filed the rape cases against
him.
On 9 June 1999, the trial court, having discovered
that appellant had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment. On 17 June 1999,
appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.11 Since the prosecution adopted all the
evidence it adduced during the hearing for the
petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief,
which evidence the trial court admitted, the trial
court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 9 September 1999, the trial
court convicted appellant of two counts of rape and
imposed on him the capital punishment for each
count. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfredo
Pangilinan Y Trinidad GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of RAPE in both cases, Criminal Cases Nos.
DH-586-97 and 587-97, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each case and to
indemnify the victim, AAA, with the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS.12
The trial court was convinced that private
complainant was raped several times by her father
during the month of September 1995, and once on
5 January 1997. It accorded credence to the
testimony of private complainant who, at 12 years
old testified in a spontaneous and direct manner. It
found private complainant to be immature,
innocent, naïve, unfamiliar with sex and incapable
of inventing or fabricating charges against her own
father when the sexual assaults were committed in
September 1995 and January 1997 when she was
only 10 or 11 years old.
The trial court brushed aside appellant’s defense of
denial. It said it is simply unbelievable for a ten-year
old girl to be as malicious as appellant described his
daughter. It explained that the minor
inconsistencies in private complainant’s testimony
did not in any way affect her credibility.
In conclusion, the trial court said:
In this society, at a time when incestuous acts are
not uncommon, and with the situation where the
accused and offended party were in, when the wife
of the accused was away working in Singapore, it is
easy to believe that his loneliness urged him to
sexually abuse his daughter. The offended party
had no ill motive in filing the case against him. It
was even the paternal grandmother who initially
informed her mother that the accused was raping
his daughter while she was gone. For fear that the
accused might do it again, the paternal
grandmother was trying to prevail over the mother
who was again planning to leave for abroad. The
one responsible for bringing the matter to the
attention of the mother who later reported to the
police was no less tha(n) the mother of the accused.
A mother would not allow herself to be used to
make her son suffer, (e)specially if the charges are
fabricated. She heard the cries/shouts from the
offended party while the accused was sexually
assaulting her. What she did was to tell the truth. Is
accused blaming her own mother for simply telling
the truth?13
Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the death
penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of the
case to the Supreme Court for automatic review
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure.14 However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.16
On 16 November 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial
court but modified the amounts of damages
awarded. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated September 9, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch V, Dinalupihan, Bataan in Criminal
Case Nos. 586-97 and 1257 (sic), finding appellant
Alfredo Pangilinan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape in both cases and sentencing him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the
modification that he is ordered to pay the victim
AAA, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages in each case. Appellant is further
ordered to pay an additional amount of ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages, also in each case.17
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals elevated
the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.18 Thereafter, in our resolution
dated 28 February 2006, the parties were required
to submit supplemental briefs, if they so desired,
within thirty (30) days from notice. The parties
opted not to file supplemental brief on the ground
they had fully argued their positions in their
respective briefs.
Appellant makes the following assignment of
errors:
I His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF TWO (2) COUNTS
OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT
PROPERLY ARRAIGNED, AND WAS NOT INFORMED
OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM BEFORE THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION WAS PRESENTED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
On the first assigned error, appellant assails his
conviction because he was not properly arraigned.
Since he was arraigned only after the case was
submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues,
is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the
appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation against him. He claims that his
subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in
the trial proceedings because at the time the
petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not
yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his
petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had
already acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997.
trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of
implementing the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.20 The purpose of
arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending
on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at
the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting
arm of the State is mobilized against him.21
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case
was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the
fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings?
We do not think so. Appellant’s belated
arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural
defect was cured when his counsel participated in
the trial without raising any objection that his client
had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His
counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a
clear indication that he was fully aware of the
charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would
have objected and informed the court of this
blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when
appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties
did not question the procedure undertaken by the
trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant
cries that his constitutional right has been violated.
It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale22 and People v. Atienza23 where
the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment
of appellant was conducted after the cases had
been submitted for decision, the error is non-
prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since
appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced
by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him was not
violated.
With the procedural issue resolved, we now go to
the substantial issues raised by appellant.
Appellant tries to discredit private complainant by
citing several circumstances that tend to create
doubt as to his guilt, to wit: (1) the alleged
molestations could not have been perpetrated
within the confines of the small room in the
"upstairs" portion of their house in the presence
and within the hearing distance of the victim’s
brother and two sisters in September 1995, and of
her mother in January 1997; (2) the failure of
private complainant to immediately report the
sexual attacks to her maternal relatives and to her
mother upon her arrival from abroad, and the delay
of more than one (1) year from the alleged offense
in September 1995 and more than two (2) months
from the alleged felony in January 1997 before they
were reported to the police or to any barangay
official, before private complainant reported the
incidents, render doubtful her charges of rape; (3)
private complainant’s declaration in her sworn
statement contradicted her testimony in court as to
how she reported the incidents; (4) the alleged
material inconsistencies in the testimony of private
complainant; and (5) the result of the medical
examination that there was no sign of violence on
the person of private complainant is an indication
that she was not a victim of rape.
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused
in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-
entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape,
the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24
After examining the testimony of the private
complainant, we find no compelling reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to
credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate a. I was raped, sir.
properly testimonial evidence.25 In the case at bar,
there being overwhelming evidence showing that in Atty. Danan:
September 1995 and in January 2000 appellant had
carnal knowledge of private complainant by means Ginamit, ginahasa, rape.
of force and intimidation, we have no reason not to
apply the rule and to apply the exception. Prosec. Tanciongco:
In a clear and straightforward manner, private I was raped by my father.
complainant recounted her ordeal as follows:
q. When you said you were raped by your father,
Prosec. Tanciongco: you are referring to the accused in this case,
Alfredo Pangilinan?
Now, in this month of September 1995, while you
were there at your house together with your Witness:
brother and sisters, and with your father, do you
recall of any unusual incident that happened to Yes, sir.
you?
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Witness:
How were you raped by your father?
Yes, sir.
a. It was night time, sir, my brother and sisters, sir,
Prosec. Tanciongco: including me, sir, were already sleeping, I just felt
that my father was removing my short.
What was that unusual incident that you remember
that happened to you? q. Where were you then at the time when you felt
that your father was removing your short?
a. I was molested by my father, sir.
a. I was in my bed, sir.
Atty. Danan:
q. You said a while ago that night time, what time
Ginamit? more or less of the night?
Court: a. Between the hours of 9 and 10 o’clock in the
evening, sir.
What do you mean be "ginamit".
Prosec. Tanciongco:
We would like to make on record that the witness is
crying at the time she is testifying.
Court:
Take note of that. The Court has observed that the
witness is crying.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
And where were your brother and sisters at that
time that your father was molesting you?
a. They were already sleeping, sir.
q. Were were your brother and sisters sleeping at
that time?
a. Upstairs, sir.
q. Where were you sleeping?
a. Upstairs also, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about your father, where was he sleeping?
a. Also upstairs, sir.
q. In relation to your father, where were you
sleeping? In what part of the house were you
sleeping?
a. We were in the same room, sir. Witness:
Prosec. Tanciongco: Sumigaw po ako. "Inang, inang tulungan po ninyo
ako inaasawa po ako ng papa ko." (I was shouting.
Now, according to you your father was removing "Inang, inang tulungan po ninyo ako, inaasawa po
your shorts, was he able to remove your shorts? ako ng Papa ko.")
a. Yes, sir. xxxx
q. What else did your father do aside from Witness:
removing your shorts if he did anything?
Hindi pa rin niya po ako tinitigilan, tapos po
Witness: sumisikad na po ako, hindi pa rin po siya umaalis.
Tapos po hinahalikan niya ang suso ko.
He raised my clothes, sir.
Court:
Prosec. Tanciongco:
You translate it first.
How about you, what were you doing at that time
that he raised your clothes and removing your Court Interpreter:
shorts, what were you doing then?
He still continued with what he was doing, I am
a. I was preventing him from doing so, but he was kicking him, but he is (sic) continue to kiss my
so strong I cannot control him. breast, sir.
q. After the accused, your father raised your shirt, Prosec. Tanciongco:
what happened next?
What else did the accused do if any, aside from
a. I was fighting back sir, but both of my hands were kissing your breast?
pinned by him.
a. He followed my vagina, sir.
q. You mean both of your hands were pinned by
your father? Court:

Court: a. Yes, sir. What do you mean by that?

Sama-sama ba kayo? q. And then what happened to you? Prosec. Tanciongco:

What do you mean by that when you said, "he q. But he was not able to completely insert his q. What time more or less of the night was that
followed your vagina? penis? done by your father?

Witness: xxxx a. Between ten (10) to eleven (11), sir.

He placed himself on top of me, sir.
q. What happened when he was on top of you?
a. Tapos po kumikinyud po siya sa akin. (He was
pumping, sir.)
q. How long was he pumping if you know?
a. Less than five (5) minutes, sir.
q. Now, after he was pumping, what happened
next?
a. Hindi niya makuha ang gusto niya. Umalis na po
siya. (He was not able to succeed of what he
wanted to do, so he left)
Court:
What do you mean?
Prosec. Tanciongco?
Why?
Witness:
Because I was fighting back, sir.
q. Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
a. He was forcing to insert it, sir.
Court:
Yes, that is the question. And the answer is, Yes, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Now, after that, what happened?
a. The following evening, sir, the same thing was
also repeated by my father. He repeated what he
had done to me.
q. When you said the same thing was repeated
what do you mean?
Witness:
He repeated what he had done on the first night.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Can you tell this Honorable Court, what was that
same thing that was done to you again by your
father?
a. He removed my pants and panty and raised my
clothes, sir.
q. What were you doing then at the time your
father was doing that?
a. I was shouting and struggling, sir, because my
father was very heavy.
q. Where were your brother and sisters at that time
while your father was doing that to you?
a. There were sleeping during that time, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
And your father was the only person awake at that
time?
a. Yes, sir.
q. Now, after that he raised your skirt and removed
your shorts and panty, what happened next?
a. I was shouting sir, but he was covering my
mouth, sir.
q. Covering your mouth?
a. Yes, sir.
q. After that what happened next?
a. He was kissing my breast, sir, then he placed
himself on top of me, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about you, when he placed himself on top of
you, what were you doing?
a. I was kicking my feet, sir.
q. After he was on top of you, can you tell us what of January to be specific, Your Honor, do you recall answer:
was he doing when he was on top of you? of any incident that happened to you?
Upstairs, sir.
a. He was pumping, sir. Witness:
question:
q. While he was pumping, what happened? Yes, sir.
What time more or less were you raped by your
a. He was able to take my virginity, sir. question: father?

Court: Will you please tell that before this Honorable answer:
Court?
What do you mean by, he was able to take your Between the hours of ten (10) to eleven (11) o’clock
virginity? answer: in the evening, sir.

a. He was able to completely penetrate his penis I was raped by my father, sir. Prosec. Tanciongco:
inside my vagina, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco: In the evening or in the morning?
Prosec. Tanciongco:
You are referring to the accused Alfredo Pangilinan, answer:
How about you when you feel that he was able to in this case?
completely penetrate his penis inside your vagina, In the evening, sir.
what is your reaction? How do you feel? Witness:
question:
Witness: Yes, sir.
Can you tell this Honorable Court, how were you
It’s painful, sir. question: [raped] by your father?

Prosec. Tanciongco: Where were you raped by your father? answer:

What did you do? answer: I was sleeping then and suddenly I felt my father
was removing my clothes including my short and
a. After his penetration a thick fluid came out from In our house, sir. panty and he was raising my shirt, sir. And then, I
his penis.26 felt he was on top of me.
question:
question: question:
In what portion of your house were you raped by
Now, while you were there at your house in the your father? By the way, what was your father wearing at that
month of January 1997, by the way in the first week time?
answer: I was pushing him sir, but he was so heavy, I was
not able to push him.
He was wearing shorts, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Prosec. Tanciongco:
I would like to make of record that the witness is
At that time that he was on top of you, was he crying while testifying.
wearing anything?
Court:
answer:
Make that on record.
No more, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
question:
Now, while he was pumping and you were trying to
Now, at the time he was removing your panty, push him and failed to do so, what happened next?
raised your shirt, what did you do?
Witness:
answer:
Something sticky came out from him, sir. And then,
I was fighting back, sir. I was kicking and pushing he stopped.27
him, but he was so heavy so I can’t push him, sir.
This Court has held time and again that testimonies
question: of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young
When you stated that he was on top of you, what woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a
happened when he was on top of you? story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
Witness: being subject to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for
the wrong committed against her.28 Youth and
He was pumping, sir.
immaturity are generally badges of truth.29 It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one
Prosec. Tanciongco:
not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if
While he was pumping, what were you doing at
what she claims is not true.30 A rape victim’s
that time?
testimony against her parent is entitled to great
weight since Filipino children have a natural
answer:
reverence and respect for their elders. These values
are so deeply ingrained in Filipino families and it is
unthinkable for a daughter to brazenly concoct a
story of rape against her, if such were not
true.31 Her credibility was bolstered beyond
reproach by her spontaneous emotional breakdown
during trial.32
In this case, considering that the victim was of
tender age, has undergone a harrowing experience,
and has exposed herself to the rigors of public trial,
we find it very unlikely that she would impute so
grave a crime to her father.
Appellant’s contention that it is impossible for him
to have consummated the rapes in the "upstairs
room" without her brother and two sisters
becoming aware thereof is untenable.
It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time
or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor
the presence of other people therein, nor the high
risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of
rape.33 There have been too many instances when
rape was committed under circumstances as
indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family
members sleeping side by side.34 There is no rule
that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.35 As
testified to by the private complainant, her brother
and two sisters were sleeping soundly and were not
awakened by the commotion36 She further said that
when the rape was perpetrated on 5 January 1997,
her mother was in the sala downstairs sleeping
while her father proceeded upstairs to commit the
dastardly act on her.37 With her brother and sisters
sleeping soundly, and her mother sleeping
downstairs (during the rape committed on 5
January 1997), appellant had all the opportunity to
carry out, which he did, his dissolute plan.
Appellant’s argument that the delay of more than
one (1) year from September 1995 and more than
two (2) months from January 1997 before reporting
the sexual attacks to her maternal relatives, mother
or to the authorities is a clear indication that the
claimed sexual assaults never happened does not
persuade.
The delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to
make public the assault on her virtue is neither
unknown nor uncommon. Particularly in incestuous
rape, this Court has consistently held that delay in
reporting the offense is not indicative of a
fabricated charge.38 It has been repeatedly held that
the delay in reporting a rape incident due to death
threats cannot be taken against the victim.39 The
fact of delay does not necessarily lead to an
acquittal. In several cases we have decided,40 the
delay lasted for two years or more; nevertheless,
the victims were found to be credible. The charge
of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was
unreasonable and unexplained.
Private complainant was only 10 years old when
she was sexually molested by her father in
September 1995 and 11 years old when her father
satisfied his bestial desire in January 1997. Private
complainant explained to the satisfaction of the
Court why she did not immediately report the
matter to anybody. She disclosed that she is afraid
of her father and that the latter threatened to kill
her and her siblings if she would report the matter.
Though she told her eight-year old brother of her
ordeal, her brother likewise did not report to the
authorities because he was also afraid of his
father. 41 She added that she really wanted to tell
her mother after she arrived from abroad but every
time she went near her mother, her father kept
staring at her. Exercising moral ascendancy and
influence over his children, appellant clearly
instilled fear in them, causing them not to go to the
authorities. Her unwillingness to report which
caused the delay does not diminish her credibility
or weaken the charge of rape.
Appellant further attacks private complainant’s
credibility because the latter’s declaration in her
sworn statement as to how she reported the
incidents contradicted her testimony in court. In
her sworn statement,42 it was stated that she
reported the rapes to her mother in January 1997,
but in her testimony in court, she said that she
reported the matter on 16 March 1997.
Settled is the rule that affidavits, being taken ex
parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer or due to partial suggestions,
and are thus generally considered to be inferior to
the testimony given in open court.43 In the instant
case, the said contradiction between private
complainant’s sworn statement and her statement
in court was fully explained by her. She made it
clear in court that this portion of her sworn
statement was wrong and what was correct was
her declaration in court. She explained in court that
she informed the investigator about the mistake in
her sworn statement but the latter told her to just
sign it and that he will change this portion.
However, the investigator never corrected the
same.44 Having fully explained the discrepancy, her
credibility has not been impaired.
Appellant ascribes to private complainant several
alleged material inconsistencies that affect the
veracity of private complainant’s testimony. These
are: (1) whether the rapes were committed inside
or outside the room in the "upstairs" portion of
their house; (2) whether private complainant was
able to shout or utter the words "Inang, inang
tulungan po ninyo ako inaasawa po ako ng papa
ko"; (3) whether the sticky fluid coming out of her
father’s penis was ejected inside or outside her
vagina; and (4) whether it was private complainant
or her grandmother who told Dr. Melinda Layug
that she was abused.
These inconsistencies refer to minor and collateral
matters. Inconsistencies in the testimony of the
witness with regard to minor or collateral matters
do not diminish the value of his testimony in terms
of truthfulness or weight. The gravamen of the
felony is the carnal knowledge by the appellant of
the private complainant under any of the
circumstances provided in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Where the
inconsistency is not an essential element of the
crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot
have any bearing on the essential fact testified
to.45 In fact, these inconsistencies bolster the
credibility of the witness’s testimony as they erase
the suspicion of the witness having been coached
or rehearsed.46 It is when the testimony appears
totally flawless that a court might have some
misgiving on its veracity. This is especially true in
rape cases where victims are not expected to have
a total recall of the incident.47
Appellant tries to utilize the first and second
inconsistencies in order to show that the rapes
could not have happened in a room in the presence
and within hearing distance of other people. As
discussed above, a rape can be committed inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even
in the same room where there are other members
of the family who are sleeping. More importantly,
what is clear from the evidence adduced is the fact
that, regardless of whether private complainant
was able to shout or not, appellant was shown to
have carnal knowledge of private complainant in
the room located in the "upstairs" portion of their
house.
On the third inconsistency, appellant makes a big
fuss as to where appellant’s sperm was ejected.
Whether the sperm was ejected inside or outside
the vagina of private complainant is of no moment.
It is clear from the testimony of private
complainant that appellant already consummated
the crime of rape when the latter tried to insert his
sexual organ into her vagina during the first time
that he molested her because his penis already
touched her hymen.48 It is a settled rule that for
rape to be consummated, the hymen of the private
complainant need not be penetrated or ruptured. It
is enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or
at the very least, the labia. The briefest of contacts
under circumstances of force, intimidation or
unconsciousness, even without laceration of the
hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence.
The mere introduction of the penis into the
aperture of the female organ, thereby touching the
labia of the pudendum, already consummates the
crime of rape.49
As to the last inconsistency regarding the person
who informed Dr. Melinda Layug that private
complainant had been abused, we find this to be
very trivial as to affect her credibility.
To support his claim that private complainant was
not a victim of rape, appellant uses the answer
elicited from Dr. Layug that she had not observed
any physical violence or force perpetrated on the
body of private complainant, specifically on the
area surrounding the private organ.
This is not sufficient to exonerate him. The trial
court addressed this issue in this wise:
As to the absence of violence, accused pointed out
that the physical examination revealed that there
were no signs of violence. This is understandable
since the offense took place in September 1995 and
January 5, 1997 while the physical examination was
conducted on March 17, 1997 or almost two (2)
years and two (2) months, respectively. Whatever
signs of physical violence or wounds/injuries there
may be at the time of the commission of the
offense the same had healed in time.50
Though there were no longer physical
manifestations of violence outside the sexual organ
of private complainant, there was, however, an
indication that the vagina had been injured.51 The
medical certificate issued52 by Dr. Layug contains,
among other things, a finding that reads "Internal
Examination revealed non-parous introitus with old
healed hymenal laceration at 4 o’clock position."
The finding that the victim had a healed laceration
at 4 o’clock position on her hymen substantiates
her claim that appellant had sexual intercourse with
her. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh,
are the best evidence of forcible defloration.53] And
when the consistent and forthright testimony of a
rape victim is consistent with medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that
the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.54]
Against a deluge of damning evidence from the
prosecution, appellant merely raises the defense of
denial. He denies sexually molesting her daughter.
He even claimed that private complainant seduced
him and wanted to have sex with him, but he
refused.
His defense, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated,
must certainly fail. Mere denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
than the positive testimony of a rape
victim.55 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a
negative and self-serving assertion.56 The trial court
had this to say:
It is unbelievable for a ten (10)-year old girl to be as
malicious as accused described the offended party.
At age ten (10), girls still play games that children
normally play, but definitely not sex. If indeed
accused had good relationship with the offended
party, he would not destroy the reputation or
character of his daughter just to save himself from
punishment of his immoral and bestial act.
Following his line of defense, offended party would
not file charges against the accused had the latter
treated her well, respected her as a child and cared
for her like a precious jewel. Had the offended party
enjoyed this treatment and did not suffer in his
hands, the former would not have any reason nor
have a heart to file charges against the (latter). x x
x.57
Moreover, appellant’s statement that he does not
know of any reason why his daughter filed the rape
charges58 further bolstered the credibility of private
complainant. When there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the rape victim
to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely
implicate him in the commission of a crime, the
logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.59
Since the felonies were committed in September
1995 and in January 1997, the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7659,60 which was the law in effect
on the day when the rapes were committed, shall
apply.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual
congress with a woman by force and without
consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age,
proof of force is not an element of statutory rape,
but the absence of a free consent is presumed.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual
intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years
of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual
intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or
threat.61
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code,62 sexual
intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is
statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape
are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years
of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years
old is always rape.63
In the present case, appellant was charged with two
counts of statutory rape. The first element was
proved by the testimony of the victim herself, while
the second element was established by appellant’s
admission and the presentation of private
complainant’s Certificate of Live Birth64 showing
that she was born on 9 May 1985. When the crimes
were committed in September 1995 and in January
1997, private complainant was not yet 12 years old.
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least
one of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
Article 33565 must be alleged in the information and
duly proved during the trial.66 In the instant case,
since the attendant circumstances of the victim’s
minority and her relationship with the offender
have been properly alleged in the informations and
established during trial, the trial court’s imposition
of the penalty of death on appellant is justified.
With the effectivity,67 however, of Republic Act No.
9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of
the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited.
Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be
meted on appellant shall be reclusion perpetua.
Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the
following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when
the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when
the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty
imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of said law which provides:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
As regards the award of damages, the same must
be modified. The ₱50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as civil indemnity was correctly increased by
the Court of Appeals to ₱75,000.00 which is the
amount awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances which warrant the imposition of the
death penalty.68 With respect to the award of moral
damages, the ₱50,000.00 awarded by the Court of
Appeals should be increased to ₱75,000.00 without
need of pleading or proof of basis thereof.69 In
addition, the amount of ₱25,000.00 awarded by the
Court of Appeals as exemplary damages was proper
due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship.70
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16
November 2005 finding appellant Alfredo
Pangilinan y Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that each penalty of death
imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346. He is also ordered to pay
private complainant AAA, for each count of rape,
the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
[G.R. NOS. 163972-77 : March 28, 2008]
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner, v. THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,1 questions the denial by
the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down
by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25,
2004, as follows:
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E.
Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three
counts of malversation of public funds involving the
sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for
given period making it appear that some laborers
worked on the construction of the new municipal
hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their
respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in
fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of
public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to
withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in
their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer
or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by
a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a
plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the
prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of
falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier
mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
a private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to
be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned,
the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer
of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime
of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already
restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government
of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already
been restituted x x x.3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed
Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite
favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on
the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or
writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on
the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his
signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis,"
negating any criminal intent; and that the amount
involved is only P18,860.00, which he already
restituted.6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge.7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-
trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea
bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. -  In all
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall,
after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused
admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense;
and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. - All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot
be used against the accused. The agreements
covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this
Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
But it may also be made during the trial proper and
even after the prosecution has finished presenting
its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has
held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was
not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents
the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made, i.e., that it should be with the
consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The rules however use word may
in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such
plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a
matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court
ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
to a lesser offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the
trial court,14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided
the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with
a yardstick within which their discretion may be
properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-
39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held
that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No.
L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377),
then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and
tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already
rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the
court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant
to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be
nothing more nothing less than the evidence
already in the record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116)
under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed
was not and could not have been intended as a
procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
However, Villarama  involved plea bargaining after
the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial
stage, as in the present case, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary
nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law.16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected
petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the
proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving
the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send
the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face
would be lighter than what their criminal acts
would have merited or that the economic benefits
they are likely to derive from their criminal
activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the
deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft
and corruption in government."17 chanrobles virtual
law library
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid
reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests
of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea
offer should be accepted. The present case calls for
the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks
to reach and do complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want
of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do.
Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than
the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.18
and of its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts,19 in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v.
Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan,  in its Resolution
dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement entered into by the
prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie
"Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the
accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of
the case and promises to return the amount
of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining
Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into
consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining
and whether the agreement complied with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused
had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not
guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the
plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in
relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included
in the offense charged, which is Plunder.21
The Court sees no reason why the standards
applied by the Sandiganbayan  to Estrada should
not be applied to the present case. Records show
that there was a favorable recommendation by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve
petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its
Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted
the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official
receipt issued by the provincial government of
Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already
been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN
voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier
mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who
appears to be the master mind of these criminal
acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as
draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte.22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by
Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included
in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with
which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts
to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion
of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private
Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) the offender is a private individual
or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a
public or official or commercial document.24
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was
also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are
public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking
by another person of such funds or
property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure
of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, "shall be prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that
once such presumption is rebutted, then it is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is
never deemed to have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code, Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to
plead guilty of, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender
must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (c) the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to
render an account for a period of two months after
such accounts should be rendered.27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states
when an offense includes or is included in the
other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. - An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the
complaint or information constitute the latter. And
vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.28
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed
against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may
plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by
Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
that petitioner took advantage of his official
position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the
same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, while the Informations contain
allegations which make out a case for Malversation
against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the
element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may
still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by
an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure
to render account was in violation of a law or
regulation that requires him to render such an
accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential
elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may
plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is
not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or
require possession or custody of local government
funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already
restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in
this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public
coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present
case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will
not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31,
2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan  is
hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain. Let records of this case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-
appellant.
 
REGALADO, J.:p
With our recent adjudgment in People vs. Alicando1 as a backdrop,
even an initial perusal of the records of these cases now before us on
appeal and/or automatic review gives a sense of paramnesia or, in
the French term more often used, deja vu. One cannot escape the
illusion of remembering events when experienced for the first time, or
of something overly or unpleasantly familiar in the present appellate
review.
Indeed, the courtroom dramatis personae in the
cases at bar are the same as in Alicando, that is,
the presiding judge,   the government counsel de
2
oficio,  and the substitute counsel de parte.   The
3 4
cases likewise involve the heinous crime of rape
and were repressed by the sentence of death.
The crux of the controversy in both is identically
the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted
by the same trial court which followed closely
equivalent procedures in conducting the
questioned proceedings. Hence, as will hereafter
be demonstrated, the observations of this Court
will also inevitably converge and move along the
same channels of thought.
On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate
complaints, Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568,
43569, 43570 and 43571 were filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City
charging herein appellant, an illiterate laborer,
with rape committed on five separate occasions
against his own daughter, complainant Estelita
Estomaca.
The trial court detailed its findings and the
prosecution's contentions on the multiple
incestuous rapes, as follows:
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the
second husband of Melita's mother. Melita has
a full-blood younger brother around twelve (12)
years old. She has two (2) half-blood sisters
(from) the first marriage of her mother who are
residing in Manila.
Melita claims that she was first raped in July
1993, at their residence at Barangay Tiolas,
San Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now the subject of
Criminal Case No. 43567. The offense was
repeated by her father before Christmas of
December, 1993 (Criminal Case No. 43568);
January 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43569);
February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43570); and
on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571). 5
There is some inconsistency in the statements on
record as to what actually took place on June 14,
1994 during the arraignment of appellant,
assisted by his government counsel de oficio,
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court
below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he
entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos.
43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to
Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43569 and
43570.  Obviously engendered by the
6
insufficiency of the proceedings conducted and
the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage,
this matter will be further discussed hereafter.
The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by
the offended party on April 29, 1994 and which
are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower
court challenged in this appellate review,
respectively allege:
Criminal Case No. 43568
That sometime in the month of
December, 1993, in the
Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, taking advantage
 of his superior strength, abuse of
confidence and trust, he being the
father of the undersigned, with
deliberate intent and by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned
who, at that time, (was) 15 years
of age.7
Criminal Case No. 43571
That on or about March 6, 1994,
in the Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the father
of the undersigned complainant,
with deliberate intent and by
means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse (with) the
undersigned, who, at that time,
(was) 15 years of age.  8
Proceeding upon the capital nature of the
offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant
ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for
his defense, required the prosecution to adduce
evidence purportedly to establish appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29,
1994, the complainant herself, Melita Estomaca,
appeared in court and testified that she was raped
by her father once in December, 1993 and, again,
on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to
her, took place inside their residence at Sitio
Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas in San Joaquin, Iloilo
at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she
tried to resist her father's assaults to no avail.
After the last rape, she gathered enough courage
to flee from their home, and thereafter she
reported the incidents to her mother who was
then living separately from them. Apparently,
appellant was later apprehended and has since
been under detention. 9
On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which
took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower court
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly
perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme
penalty of death with respect to the rape allegedly
committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said
cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the costs. 
10
What disconcerts this Court, however, is the
alarming consistency of non-compliance by the
court a quo of the procedural rules to be observed
for the validity of the arraignment of an accused.
Indeed, the importance of this particular stage of
a criminal proceeding, especially when capital
offenses are involved, cannot be over-
emphasized. Hence, we pause at this juncture to
once again briefly expound on this vital
procedural aspect which the trial court, once
in Alicando and again in the case at bar, appears
to have treated with cavalier disregard or
frustrating misapprehension.
1. In People vs. A. Albert,   we traced the
11
developmental antecedents which culminated and
found expression in reglementary form in Section
3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure governing a plea of guilty to a capital
offense. We there pointed out that the rationale
behind the rule is that courts must proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form — death — for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons
have at times pleaded guilty. 12
We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas
of guilt since the accused may thereby forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea.   We lamented the confused application
13
adopted or the apathetic indifference in the
application of said rule considering the paramount
importance of a valid arraignment, it being the
stage where the issues are joined in the criminal
action and without which the proceedings cannot
advance further or, if held, will otherwise be void.
We then enjoined the trial courts to review and
reflect upon the jurisprudential and statutory rules
which evolved over time in response to the
injustice created by improvident pleas
acknowledging guilt, at times belatedly discovered
under the judicial rug, if at all.
With exacting certitude, Section 1(a) of Rule 116
requires that the arraignment should be made in
open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of
court furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses
stated therein, then reading the same in the
language or dialect that is known to him, and
asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a
language or dialect that the accused understands
and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as
the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the
accused by way of implementation of the all-
important constitutional mandate regarding the
right of an accused to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to
hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof.   It is an integral aspect of the due
14
process clause under the Constitution.
2. For a more graphic illustration, and thereby a
clearer appreciation of what actually transpired in
the so-called arraignment of appellant in the court
below, we quote at length the pertinent transcripts
of the stenographic notes taken at that stage, with
emphases on significant portions:
Pros. Nelson Geduspan : For the prosecution.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera : For the accused.
Ready for arraignment.
Court : The offended party is the daughter.
Interpreter : (Reading the information/complaint
to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect).
For Crim. Case No. 43567,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43568,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43569,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43570,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43571,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
Court : What is your educational attainment?
Witness : I was not able to finish Grade I.
Court : The court would like to explain to you in
your plea of Guilty. If you plead Guilty to these
five (5) offenses, definitely, you will have five (5)
sentences.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : Under the New Law the least most
probably would be life sentence.
Accused : Yes, your honor. Accused : Because what I recall is that I just
committed two acts of rape.
Court : How old are you now?
Court : Not Guilty in the three (3) charges and
Accused : Forty two. Guilty in two (2) charges. Does counsel and
accused agree to pre-trial conference?
Court : Because of this fact you have no chance
to get back to the new society and your rights Atty. Antiquiera : We dispense (with) the pre-
will be affected. trial conference.
Accused : I know. That's what they told to me. Court : For the two charges (to) which he
pleads guilty, the court will receive evidence in
Court : Despite of (sic) this fact you still insist on order to impose the proper penalty and on the
your plea of guilty in these five cases? other charges, the court will receive evidence
for the prosecution.   (Emphasis and
15
corrections in parentheses ours.)
Interpreter : According to him, he performed
only two (2) acts.
xxx xxx xxx
Court : When (were) these two acts performed?
At the subsequent hearing, just like what
happened in Alicando, the presiding judge went
Accused : December 1993 and March 1994.
through the same formality of having appellant
stand again before him, and this is what
Court : The other cases charged against you transpired:
(are) not true?
Court : Before the
Accused : It is not true maybe it was committed court allows the
by her boyfriend then it was charged against prosecution to
me. present evidence,
accused, please
Court : In so far as. . . What is not included in come here again.
the plea therefore, is the month of July 1993,
January 1994 and the month of February 1994. (At this juncture,
You did not commit these? Why is it that when the accused came
you were asked you entered a plea of guilty? near to the court)
Accused : Because I committed two acts only. Court : The court
informs you as
Court : Why is it that when you were asked you accused that you
entered a plea of guilty? are charged (with)
the crime of rape;
under the new law you intend to Q : Do you admit
which if you plead present evidence. this voluntarily
guilty, you will be without force,
sentence(d) to A : No, I will not intimidation or
death penalty, did present evidence. physical injuries or
you understand mauling on you by
that? Court : Okey, anyone
because of this the whomsoever?
A : Yes, Your court will receive
Honor. evidence of the A : No, Sir.
prosecution.
Q : Despite this Q : In connection
warning for the In another case, with this,
second time by the the last time when therefore, definitel
court to you, do arraigned, you y you will be
you still insist (o)n admitted that convicted in both
your plea of guilty? sometime in cases?
December, 1993,
A : Yes, Your you likewise raped A : Yes, your
Honor. your daughter, do honor.
you still confirm
Q : Is this plea and affirm this? Q : What is your
your voluntary will educational
without force or A : Yes, Your attainment?
intimidation from Honor.
anyone else to A : Grade I.
include the Q : In this case,
complaining because this was Q : Being Grade I,
witness or the committed (i)n the court
family? December 1993, emphasized
the penalty here that you are
A : No, Your is reclusion swayed by your
Honor. perpetua. After own fashion
learning this as because of your
Q : So, therefore, informed to you by low education?
the court will allow the court, do still
you to present insist on your plea A : I am not.
evidence if you of guilty?
wis(h) to because Q : In other words,
you insist (o)n your A : Yes, I will you still insist on
plea of guilty. Do admit. I did it. your plea of guilty?
 A : Yes, sir.
Court : Okey,
proceed with the
presentation of
prosecution
evidence.
Q : In this Criminal
Case No. 43568,
do you intend to
present evidence?
A : No, Your
Honor.
Court : Okey,
proceed.  16
xxx xxx xxx
3. At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar
is that the arraignment appears to have consisted
merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the
transcript, thus: "(Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in
Ilonggo/local dialect)." Since what was supposed
to have been read was stated in the singular, but
there were five criminal complaints against
appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on
whether all five criminal complaints were actually
read, translated or explained to appellant on a
level within his comprehension, considering his
limited education.
Again, on the presumption of correctness, since
this Court has no other bearings to steer by, it
may be assumed that all five complaints were
read since the clerk is supposed to have
thereafter announced in cadence and in the
consecutive order of cases that appellant pleaded
guilty to all the charges. What, however,
punctures this possible bubble of regularity is that
appellant subsequently declared, and the clerk
consequently contradicted her previous recital,
that he was not pleading guilty to three of the
complaints. This is hardly a respectable and
credible performance in the solemnity of a court
trial of five capital offenses.
We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this
very basic procedure alone, involving just the
mechanical process of arraignment outlined in
Section 1, there was the necessary degree of
compliance by the court below. Other
considerations reveal how flawed the supposed
arraignment actually was. For instance, there is
no showing whether or not appellant or his
counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each
complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in
order that the latter may duly prepare and comply
with his responsibilities. Of more troublous
concern is the fact that appellant was
not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty,
he would definitely and in any event be given the
death penalty under the "New Law," as the trial
court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He was also
not categorically advised that his plea of guilty
would not under any circumstance affect or
reduce the death sentence as he may have
believed or may have been erroneously advised.
Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant
which may have impelled him to plead guilty is not
improbable or conjectural, especially when we
consider his mental state and the environmental
situation. This is precisely what People
vs. Dayot  7 cautioned against, thus:
1 and different medium but, inexplicably, without
A "searching inquiry," under the
Rules, means more than informing
cursorily the accused that he
faces a jail term (because the
accused is aware of that) but so
also, the exact length of
imprisonment under the law and
the certainty that he will serve time
at the national penitentiary or a
penal colony. Not infrequently
indeed, an accused pleads guilty
in the hope, as we said, of a
lenient treatment, or upon a bad
advice or promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or
express "remorse." It is the duty of
the judge to see to it that he does
not labor under these mistaken
impressions, . . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
Likewise of very serious importance and
consequence is the fact that the complaints were
supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local
dialect." Parenthetically, there was no statement
of record that appellant fully understood that
medium of expression. This assumes added
significance since Ilonggo, or properly called
Hiligaynon, is a regional language,   spoken in a
18
major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental
and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or
major geographical area using a basic regional
language, there may be other local dialects
spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication
in the aforequoted portion of the transcript
intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local
dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the
same is egregious error; it would be different if
"local dialect" was used to denote an alternative
identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in
the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which,
cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations,
deliberately required that the complaint or
information be read to the accused in
the language or the dialect known to him, to
ensure his comprehension of the charges. The
Court takes judicial notice, because it
is either of public knowledge or readily capable of
unquestionable demonstration,   that in the
19
central and northwestern part of Iloilo province
and all the way up to and throughout Antique,
including necessarily San Joaquin where the
offenses were committed and of which appellant
and his family are natives, the local dialect is
known as "kinaray-a."
Barring previous exposure to or as a
consequence of extended social or commercial
intercourse, "kinaray-a" is not readily
understandable to nor spoken by those born to
the Hiligaynon regional language or who have
lived in the areas under its sway for an
appreciable period of time. The converse is true
for those whose native tongue is the dialect of
"kinaray-a," since they are generally not well-
versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the
complaints are not only in English but in technical
legal language, we are again at sea as to whether
and how the indictments were translated to
Ilonggo and/or to "kinaray-a," or that the appellant
was truly and honestly made aware of the
charges and, especially, the consequences of his
guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do
not reveal anything on this point, nor how the
dialogue between the presiding judge and
appellant was translated. Yet a man's life is at
stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma
created by an omission of official duty.
4. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict
injunction that the trial court must fully discharge
its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry
in such a way as would indubitably show that
appellant had made not only a clear, definite and
unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-
informed understanding and full realization of the
consequences thereof. To ask an accused about
his educational attainment and then warn him that
he might have admitted the crime because of his
poor intelligence is certainly not the logical
approach in assaying the sufficiency of his plea of
guilty.
In the same manner, a mere warning to him that
he could possibly face extreme retribution in the
form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not
even enough.   The trial judge should ascertain
20
and be totally convinced that, for all intents and
purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks
of a valid
and acceptable confession upon which an
eventual judgment of conviction can
stand.   Although there is no definite and concrete
21
rule as to how a trial judge may go about the
matter of a proper "searching inquiry," it would be
well for the court, for instance, to require the
accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned
the charges against him, or by making him
reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to
the court missing details of significance. 
22
The trial court should also be convinced that the
accused has not been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters and this it can do, such as by
ascertaining from the accused himself the manner
in which he was subsequently brought into the
custody of the law; or whether he had the
assistance of competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and,
ascertaining from him the conditions under which
he was detained and interrogated during the
aforestated investigations. Likewise, a series of
questions directed at defense counsel as to
whether or not said counsel had conferred with,
and completely explained to the accused the
meaning of a plea and its consequences, would
be a well-taken step along those lines.  23
Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial
and no truer is this than in the case of appellant
for, again, the original records and rollo of this
case now under review are completely bereft of
any document or record concerning his
apprehension, detention and prior investigation,
whether custodial or preliminary. The foregoing
circumstances must be taken in addition to the
appropriate forewarnings of the consequences of
a plea of guilty, as well as the questions by the
court regarding the age, educational attainment
and socio-economic status of the accused which
may reveal contributory insights for a proper
verdict in the case.
And, on this latter aspect, we are inclined to quote
from Alicando since, as stated in limine the
defective arraignment in the cases now before us
is virtually a reprise of what the same trial court
with its presiding judge did or did not do in that
previous case:
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the
trial court violated is not a new
rule for it merely incorporated the
decision of this Court in People
vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in
an unbroken line of cases. The
bottom line of the rule is that a
plea of guilt must be based on a
free and informed judgment. Thus,
the searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea; and (2)
the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to
 show the voluntariness of the plea
of guilt of the appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate appellant's
full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The
records do not reveal any
information about the personality
profile of the appellant which can
serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age,
socio-economic status, and
educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the
trial court. . . . . (Citations omitted).
It will be readily observed, if one would analyze
appellant's responses during his irregular
arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and
lack of education combined to deprive him of fully
understanding what obviously appeared to him as
mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons. This
was also what happened, and what we duly
noted, in People vs. Albert, supra.
In the transcripts of said proceeding which are
earlier quoted extensively, there are italicized
portions showing not only the grossly inadequate
or ambiguous, if not indifferent, questions of the
lower court but also the erratic answers of
appellant which are neither responsive nor
rational.. There is no need to belabor them here
since they speak for themselves, but we are not
impressed by the formulary questions posed by
the lower court while going through the motions of
interviewing appellant. The Court would want to
stress here, therefore, that the judicial conscience
cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge
with a mandatory death penalty when entered by
an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an
arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
5. Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated
therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et
al.,  no valid judgment can be rendered upon an
24
invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the
arraignment of appellant therein was void, the
judgment of conviction rendered against him was
likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in
justice to the offended party that case was
remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours
with the aforementioned cases on the particular
determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to
the same doctrine and disposition.
Let it be clearly understood, however, especially
by the censorious: This Court will not hesitate to
impose the capital punishment when all the
requisites therefor have been met in accordance
with the law of the land. It cannot, therefore, hold
a life forfeit, no matter how despicable the
offender, when effective protection for his basic
rights was denied because of poverty or
ignorance. Nor will the Court render a death
sentence just to make a meretricious obeisance
to the vengeful call for blood. Judicious verdicts
evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in
chambers and not from the publicity of emotional
acclaim on the podium.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in
Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 convicting
accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of
two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said
cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further
and appropriate proceedings, with instructions
that the same be given appropriate priority and
the proceedings therein be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and circumspection.