One of the key tenets of this design is
the vulnerability of the respective
capitals and the high payoff achieved
if a capital is captured. This dynamic
tension ensures that both players will
keep strong forces in the Eastern
theater to both protect their own
capital while threatening their
opponents.
When I learned that FOR THE
PEOPLE would be reprinted by GMT,
I set out to pour more history into the
design. One of the things that I had
noticed since the original publication
of the game was the lack of play on
the Peninsula and more obviously in
the Shenandoah valley. My analysis
of the situation revealed that the key
problems were 1) the weakness of
forts in preventing river crossings
and 2) how the map captured the
various historical routes of advance.
My alterations to the map and rules
were minor, but their impact on play
has been profound. This article will
discuss the new operational thinking
that is required for solid play in the
GMT edition of the game.
A View from the President's Desk
Loss of the capital for either side is
not a game-ending event, but a very
painful one. The Union stands to lose
thirty percent of its initial Strategic
Will (SW) if Washington DC is
captured. Just as Lincoln did
historically, your attention is
focused on this potential
problem. If, despite your best
efforts, you still lose Washing-
ton to the rebels, then your
situation is more difficult, but
not impossible. Assuming you
relocate the capital to some-
where in the West out of harms
way, it is very unlikely for the
Union to lose their capital twice
in a game.
The corollary is that the loss of
Richmond drives Confederate
SW down 27 points while the
Union gains 12 points for a net
change of 39 points. At the
beginning of the game, the rebel
capital is flanked by a small, but
strategically-placed Union force at
Fort Monroe and multiple north-
south routes that need to be de-
fended. Although both capitals begin
the game fortified, this is an insuffi-
cient defense.
During the Civil War, the effect of
forts were wide ranging. The unify-
ing historical thread is that a fort was
as strong as the men and leaders who
manned them. Each turn of FOR THE
PEOPLE represents around four
months. If the fort is manned with
sufficient forces and adequate die roll
modifiers (DRMs), then the fort will
hold. If the attacker is superior in
these dimensions, then it is assumed
that over the course of four months
they will prevail. Upon examining
the lengthy siege of Petersburg, you
find that it is the growing weakness
of the Confederate forces coupled
with the threat to their last remaining
lines of communication that results in
the loss of the fort. On the other end
of the spectrum, Forts Henry and
Donaldson were captured in about a
week.
One of the design's other intents is to
use the simulation dynamics to give
the player good reasons to take
historically-motivated decisions. If
Washington were fairly invulnerable
to capture, as it is in most other
strategic Civil War designs, the
player can use the Army of the
Potomac in fairly unrealistic man-
ners. McClellen's Peninsula cam-
paign was a high risk operation in
game terms. Lincoln insisted that a
strong covering force remain behind
to prevent a Confederate thrust at
DC. It was this force, and the
Confederacy's desire not to trade
capitals, which prevented Lee from
moving North until the threat to
Richmond was neutralized. Lincoln's
decision to withhold McDowell's
corps from McClellen will occur in
the game, because to do otherwise is
to court disaster. In game terms, the
Peninsula campaign finds the Army
of the Potomac (AoP) in the
Williamsburg space and the Army of
Northern Virginia (AoNV) in Rich-
mond while McDowell sits in
Manassas with four strength points
(SPs). The best move for the Confed-
erates in this situation is to attack the
AoP, which results in the Seven Days
battle.
Battles on the Flanks
However, not all in the first edition
was as it should be. In the AH
version, it was too easy for players to
attack directly from Manassas to
Washington. The game didn't have
the proper historical rationale
for forcing the Confederates to
maneuver to the west as they
did historically. During the
Antietam campaign the Confed-
eracy crossed from Manassas to
Frederick. During the
Gettysburg campaign they
came through the Shenandoah
valley. What I didn't adequately
factor into the original design
was the impact forts had on
river crossing operations. It was
too easy for forces to cross
rivers and directly assault forts.
A small, but significant, rule
change now prevents direct
attacks on forts across rivers.
You either need to Amphibious