assault them, giving the Union the
proper incentive to invest in
ironclads, or you need to maneuver
around them.
This rule, in conjunction with a minor
map change to the Potomac river
denies the Confederate player the
ability to go straight after Washing-
ton, but still leaves it vulnerable to a
flanking maneuver. This subtle
change enables a Peninsula cam-
paign, because the Union has a bit
more time to react to a Confederate
thrust. For example, assuming the
Union holds Manassas with a force
which is more than half the size of
the AoNV, the AoP can leave Wash-
ington using the special McClellan
army move to Monroe. If Lee attacks
north in response, the AoP could
either take Richmond or maneuver
back to Washington by sea. The one
extra space of maneuver required to
take the Union capital doesn't
significantly reduce its vulnerability,
but to a well prepared Union force,
enables some of the more extraordi-
nary historical maneuvers.
In the same vein the new optional
Shenandoah Valley rule (which I
encourage everyone to use) causes
the South to gain the proper histori-
cal perspective regarding this region.
If the Confederate player ignores the
valley it is possible for the Union to
capture the state of Virginia by
conquering the northern half of the
state, without capturing Richmond.
This motivates the Confederate
player to detach a small force to keep
Union flanking forces at bay. Because
it is important to not lose these small
and medium battles, I have found it
best to use a high DRM leader who is
easy to move. For my money, the best
candidate that fits this bill is none
other than Stonewall Jackson. During
my playtests of the second edition I
found it gratifying to see Jackson
detached from the AoNV to keep the
valley situation under control.
Practical Advice
Moving from the philosophical to the
practical, here is how the situation
broadly works. With the capitals
vulnerable, the armies in spatial
opposition to the enemy are moved at
some risk. Along the line between
Washington to Richmond, the three
spaces are Manasass, Fredericksburg
and Hanover. These three spaces
define the main Eastern Theater axis.
A typical situation sees the AoP in
Manasass and the AoNV in
Fredericksburg, which is where the
armies usually resided when they
weren't conducting offensive opera-
tions. It is a standoff situation where
the side that first moves off the line
loses, because this army is out of
position to stop a thrust at its capital.
If the Union plays a cautious game
and avoids attacking in the East, as
they did historically, trouble can
ensue elsewhere on the map. If the
Union plays ahistorically during 1862
or 1863, Lee moves and attacks the
AoP driving it into Washington.
Because Lee is less than 2 to 1
stronger than the Union, his move is
finished. The Union moves reinforce-
ments into DC and then Lee activates
again, marches through Frederick,
and takes Washington. The Union
capital is displaced, plus Lee has won
two Large battles with a net effect on
the Union of at least minus 40
Strategic Will points.
The question at hand is
how is a different result
achieved by the Union.
There are two key concepts
in the Eastern Theater.
First, Washington always has top
priority on resources until it is
secure. Second, never ignore the first
concept.
To secure Washington, the Union
player must do several things. First,
the AoP must start every Strategy
Phase at 15 SPs. Second, Washington
must contain at least 8 and probably
10 SPs. Third, never let the AoNV
start the Strategy Phase in Manassas.
Fourth, maintain a fort in Manassas
whenever possible. Fifth, maintain
the capability to launch forces into
the Shenandoah Valley (via Harper's
Ferry into Winchester, Strasburg and
Staunton). \.
The Army of the Potomac is going to
get the raw end of the historical stick
during 1862 and early 1863. This
means that with few exceptions the
AoP will lose 5 or 6 SPs per battle if
they are facing the historical Army of
Northern Virginia command combi-
nation (e.g., Lee, Jackson, Longstreet
and Stuart). The good news is the
Army of Northern Virginia will be
taking from 3 to 4 SP losses per
battle. A twelve-point army can
sustain two large battles per turn.
This simulates the basic historical
limits that were achieved in this
theater (e.g., Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg, or Second Manassas and
Antietam). Therefore, the Union goal
is to force the Confederate player to
expend one of these two opportuni-
ties by attacking at his first opportu-
nity. Since the Union usually goes
first, the AoP should be activated on
the first card play. The result will be a
6 SP loss for the Union and a 3 or 4
SP loss for the Confederacy with the
Union army back in Manassas.
Because the Army of Northern
Virginia rolls a ten, there is a fifty
percent chance that one of the key
commanders will be killed.
Assuming that the Confederate
response is to try and threaten
Washington, the AoNV attacks and
wins another large battle. Due to the
fort in Manassas and the increased
Union defensive DRM capabilities,
the Confederate losses are probably 4
or possibly 5 SPs reducing Lee down
to 3 or 4 SPs. Now Lee is in Manassas
and should have lost at least one key
general. For all intents and purposes,
the danger is past. If the Southern
player overplays his hand, Richmond
becomes vulnerable to a counterat-
tack since the AoNV will have
insufficient strength to defend it. If
Lee attacks, the Union should be able
to win a defensive battle in either
Frederick, MD or in the Washington
space where McClellan, plus the fort,
another Union general and any force
advantage gives the Union a +6 or
better total DRM. This large a DRM is
usually sufficient for the Union to
hold his capital.
This formula has a few key uncertain-
ties. What if the Union player doesn't
get any 3 operations cards? What if
the Confederate player goes first with
a campaign card? Well the answer is
that then it gets very exciting. If the
Confederate player is a carpe diem
kind of guy, Lincoln could get an
earlier than historical trip back to
Illinois when the capital is re-located
during the Political Phase.
One thing that both players need to
have in their FOR THE PEOPLE kit is
the ability to create a credible
diversion. This is where the Valley
campaign comes into its own. If the
Union can move through the
Shenandoah Valley astride Lee's line
of communication (LOC), the Confed-
erate will be out of supply during
attacks, giving the Union a +2 DRM,
potentially causing the defeat of Lee
in a battle. Another variant of this
tactic is to have positioned 3 or 4 SPs
in Fort Monroe. Even though Butler
is an incompetent, he can still move
into enemy territory to cut Lee's
LOC, if not threaten Richmond itself.