Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat v.

Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat
[G.R. No. 202805]

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Rosario Bangui-s Tambuyat
Respondent: Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Date: March 23, 2015

FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on September
16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m.
parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought on
November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee. One of the
signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein as “Rosario
Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.

When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.

When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the
subject TCT. She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was
erroneously registered and made in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis.” That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda
prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name,
with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the
property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case.

The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the TCT
of Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Wenifreda “Winnie” Balcom Tambuyat. RTC justified its decision by
using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: “court authorization is required for any alteration or
amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title.

The CA sustained the trial court’s decision, noting that Banguis’ name was included in the TCT
by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda – and not Banguis
– is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco
and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial
court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT is not real
and genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject property in doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.

HELD:

YES. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of
a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances, included are (1) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate and (2) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of
title. The present case falls under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and
error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s
lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to
the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano
and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common law relationship at all.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that
the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.

Biñan Rural Bank v. Jose Willelmino Carlos

[G.R. No. 193919]

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Biñan Rural Bank
Respondent: Jose Carlos
Ponente: Brion, J.
Date: June 15, 2015

FACTS:

A complaint for reconveyance, annulment of absolute sale, real estate mortgage,

certificate of sale, title, with damages against the petitioner-bank and its co-defendants was filed.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:

(a) the bank is not a real-party-in-interest in the case,

(b) in so far as the bank was concerned, the complaint failed to state a cause of action,

(c) the respondents’ cause of action against the bank was barred by the equitable
principle of estoppel.

The RTC then denied the petioner’s motion to dismiss. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration. Thus the petitioner came before the SC with a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

a. WON certiorari is the proper remedy for this case- NO

b. WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the case- NO

HELD

NO. Certiorari is not the proper remedy for this case. The denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari. Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be
justified. As heretofore clarified, a special civil action for certiorari is for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction (where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion), and not errors of judgment.

NO. We agree with the CA that using this standard, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it acted as it did. No arbitrariness or despotism attended the issuance of the
assailed orders, as the RTC – particularly its August 26, 2008 order – adequately provided and
discussed the reasons and legal bases for denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

Pascual v. Daquioag
[G.R. No. 162063]

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Leonora A. Pascual et. al.
Respondent: Josefino L. Daquioag et. al
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Date: March 31, 2014

FACTS:

On January 24, 1984, Leonora Pascual filed a Free Patent Application over 3 Lots of the Vintar
Cadastre located at Barangay Number 7, Alejo Malasig (Pait), Parut, Vintar, Ilocos Norte.
Catalina Almazan–Villamor presented a protest, claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for
title over the properties.

The Executive Director of Region I of the DENR in San Fernando, La Union ruled in favour of
Almazan–Villamor and rejected the free patent application of Pascual. On appeal, the DENR and
the Office of the President affirmed the decision of the Executive Director of Region I of the
DENR. Thereafter, Pascual failed to timely moved for reconsideration. Hence, the court of
appeals denied her due course for the petition for review.

On July 3, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of execution
directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO),Josefino
Daquioag, of Bangui, Ilocos Norte to execute the decision of the Office of the President.
Accordingly, Daquioag issued a memorandum to implement the writ of execution against
Pascual and directing him to place Villamor in possession of the premises in question.

Pascual brought a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction
in the RTC claiming that Daquioag had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the memorandum to execute the decision “by placing Catalina
Almazan–Villamor in possession of the premises in question” because the decision of the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR did not authorise or direct such action and would
tantamount to her eviction/ejection without due process of law. Pascual argues that the Exec. Dir.
only ordered her “to refrain from entering the area” and did not direct that Almazan–Villamor be
put in possession of the properties.

The RTC dismissed Pascual’s petition, holding that because the ownership of Almazan–Villamor
to the property had been recognized with finality, the DENR came under the obligation to place
“the winning party” in possession, occupation and enjoyment of her properties; and that the
memorandum issued by Daquioag placing Almazan–Villamor in possession had not been issued
in grave abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and ruled that Daquioag did not act in
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CENRO officer Daquioag acted in grave abuse of discretion in

implementing the writ of execution issued by the Exec. Dir. of Region I of the DENR
against Pascual.

HELD:

No. As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it
go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. The phrase “placing the winning
party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in the premises of the land in question” was not expressly
stated in the the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence of
that phrase did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full
consonance with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what appears
on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

The 3 lots in question were inherited by Almazan Villamor by operation of law as the sole living
compulsory of her grandfather Marcos Baria as evidenced by the Certificate of Title (Titulo de
Propiedad) issued to his grandfather in 1895. On the other hand, Pascual was not able to
substantiate her claim of ownership on the 3 lots based on the deed of sales issued in favour to
her by third parties not even related to Baria or Villamor.

Upon the final finding of the ownership in the judgment in favour of Almazan Villamor,
the delivery of the possession of the property was deemed included in the decision,
considering that the claim itself of Pascual to the possession had been based also on
ownership. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever owns the property
has the right to possess it. Adjudication of ownership includes the delivery of possession if
the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of her
rejected claim of ownership.

Accordingly, Daquioag’s memorandum placing Almazan–Villamor in possession of the

properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR, as affirmed by the OP.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari for its lack
of merit.

Heirs of Yabao v. Van Der Kolk

[G. R. No. 207266]

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Heirs of Yabao, represented by Remedios Chan
Respondent: Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Date: June 25, 2014

FACTS:
 Plaintiffs assert that they are sole surviving heirs of Paciano Yabao, thus they are
absolute-co owners of a parcel of land. The defendant herein asserted ownership of said land and
allowed persons to possess the property constituting this said parcel in spite of demands by
plaintiff that she vacate the premises. Van der Kolk filed motion to dismiss based on 1) lack of
jurisdiction by the MTCC over her person due to defective service of summons and 2) lack of
cause of action. They should've used the procedures laid down by Section 15 of the Rules of
Court and she also contended that the couple executed a joint affidavit where they renounced
their hereditary rights in favor of Faustina Yabao who was the mother of Van der Kolk. Heirs of
Yabao filed their opposition to the said motion and contended that Van der Volk was in default
as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the prescribed period. The MTCC thus declared her in
default for failing to file her answer or any responsive pleading within the fresh period of 10
days. Aggrieved, she appealed the MTCC decision to the RTC but here, she also failed to file the
memorandum of appeal within the period mandated by the rules of Court and thus her appeal
was dismissed. the RTC considered the reasons advanced by her counsel in the motion for
extension of time as not compelling enough to warrant a relaxation or suspension of the
requirements of Section 7(b) of Rule 40. It added that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege
and one who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of the statute or rules.

Van der Kolk filed petition for review before the CA. According to the CA, the MTCC
should have required the heirs of Yabao to present evidence ex parte after it had declared Van
der in default, to prove the allegations in the complaint. Ruled that the respondents were not able
to sufficiently prove by competent evidence their entitlement over the lot in issue and therefore
lower courts judgment was reversed. Heirs of Yabao filed a motion for reconsideration which the
CA denied.

Heirs contend that the CA erred in holding that the MTCC should have required them to
present evidence to substantiate their claims because under section 3 of Rule 9, when a defendant
is declared in default the court has the option to either proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief or require the claimant to adduce his evidence ex parte. The petitioners
contend that the MTCC, exercising its discretion, selected the first option.

HELD/RATIO:

The court finds no merit in this.

 The court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it granted the reliefs prayed by
the Heirs of Yabao when they were not warranted by the allegations in the complaint. The Court
notes that the allegations pertinent to the petitioner's cause of action, particularly on their claim
to ownership and right to possession over the property, were not supported by any document
annexed by the complaint.

Ownership cannot be established by mere lip service and bare allegations in the
complaint. A party mush establish his averments in the complaint by sufficient evidence
necessary to prove such claim. In the case at bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the MTCC,
merely alleged that they are the heirs without presenting any proof. It is also significant to note
that the respondents' used a tax declaration as their basis. However, a tax declaration is not a
proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. It can only be a
strong indication of ownership if coupled with possession. In the case at hand it was the
petitioners who had possession of said land.

Moreover, it should be noted that the petitioners failed, in the motion to dismiss, to
address the allegation that they had renounced their hereditary rights over the land.

Thus it is established that the petitioners' claim was not established by preponderance of
evidence. The MTCC, after declaring Van der Kolk in default, should have directed the Heirs of
Yabao to adduce evidence to substantiate their claim. Mere allegation cannot serve as evidence.

Also, The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before a
declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. In this case, Van der Kolk filed
the answer beyond the reglementary period but before she was declared in default, and there was
no showing that she intended to delay the prompt disposition of the case. Consequently, her
Answer should have been admitted.

The MTCC must be reminded that it is the policy of the law that every litigant should be
afforded the opportunity to have his case be tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence,
judgments by default are frowned upon.30It must be emphasized that a case is best decided when
all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and
adduce evidence in support of their positions. By giving the parties the chance to be heard fully,
the demands of due process are observed. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that
accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Donato Sanchez
[G.R. No. 212388]

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Heirs of Spouses Donato Sanchez
Ponente: Velasco, JR., J.
Date: December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 45361 that covered Lot No. 854 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) No. 26.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the CFI issued an Order dated June 24,
2001 giving due course thereto and ordered the requisite publication thereof, among others.
Meanwhile, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) requested the trial
court, which the latter granted through its October 11, 2002 Order, torequire respondents to
submit the following documents: 1. Certification from the RD that OCT No. 45361 was either
lost or destroyed; 2. Copies of the technical description of the lot covered by OCT No. 45361,
certified by the authorized officer of the Land Management Bureau/LRA; and 3. Sepia film plan
of the subject lot prepared by the duly licensed geodetic engineer.

Due to difficulties encountered in securing said documents, respondents moved for the archiving
of the case, which motion was granted by the trial court. It was later revived when respondents
finally secured the said documents. On January 11, 2008, the LRA submitted its Report
pertaining to the legality of the reconstitution sought in favor of respondents. On June 30, 2008,
however, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Decision 3 dismissing the petition for lack
of sufficient evidence, ruling that RA No. 26 only applies in cases where the issuance of the
OCT sought to be reconstituted has been established, only that it was lost or destroyed.
Disagreeing with the trial court’s findings and holding that Lot 854 was judicially awarded to
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920,the
CA reversed the RTC ruling on appeal and directed the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 in
favor of herein respondents. The CA held that even though respondents were unable to present
the documents necessary for reconstitution of title as enumerated under Section 2 of RA No. 26,
particularly (a) to (e) thereof, the documentary pieces of evidence presented by respondents fall
under paragraph (f) of said provision and are sufficient to warrant the reconstitution of OCT No.
45361. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court

ISSUES:

Whether or not the documents presented by respondents to warrant the reconstitution of

the alleged lost OCT No. 45361 is sufficient.

HELD:

No, it is not sufficient. The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and convincing proof
has been adduced that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The Decision
dated March 21, 1930 and the Registrar’s Index Card containing the notation on OCT No. 45361
do not cite nor mention that Decree No. 418121 was issued to support the issuance of OCT No.
45361. At this point, it is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed
OCT requires, as a condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious
reasons.

In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123361, March
3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition for cancellation of the
old decree; the reissuance of such decree and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued
decree.

It is so basic under Republic Act No. 26 that the same shall only apply in cases where the
issuance of OCT has been established, only that it was lost or destroyed under circumstances
provided for under said law. Again, within the context of this discussion, RA No. 26 will not
apply because in this case, there is no established proof that an OCT had been issued. In other
words, the applicability of RA No. 26 hinges on the existence of priorly issued OCT.