G.R. No.
165448               July 27, 2009 On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises
ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 5 June
1997 Decision2 and 24 September 2004 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers’ Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within
the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a
total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the
repairs of Teachers’ Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team
composed of members from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng
(Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of
the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City,
conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the
DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under
the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-
wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty
(140) pine seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In
the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is
required to plant within forest area duly designated by
CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and
protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the
planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable
under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277,
Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or
violations of forestry laws and regulations shall render this
permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10)
days from issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized
volume is exhausted whichever comes first.4
Sobrepeña, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio
Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that
pine trees were being cut at Teachers’ Camp without proper
authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto
Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng
supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers
Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on
the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew
Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of
the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of
which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the
trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume
of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The
market value of the trees cut without permit was ₱182,447.20,
and the forest charges were ₱11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 7055 (PD 705) was filed against petitioner,
Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9)
pine trees with a total volume and market price as ₱182,447.20
(Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price – ₱26.00 bd.
ft.) and with a total forest charge of ₱11,833.25 or having a
total sum of ₱194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City,
without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, particularly the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of
1989, in violation of the aforecited law.6lawphil
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the
permit as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing stated
that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner
who claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He
stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five
feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he
was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioner’s
supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the
permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut
into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired
as sawyers and they merely followed petitioner’s instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the
trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that the
trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers’ Camp on 13
1
July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the
Page
trees in petitioner’s presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of
trees at Teachers’ Camp. He allegedly informed his superior,
Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees
without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone
while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other
men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused
ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y
LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby
sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the
amounts of ₱182,477.20 and ₱11,833.25, representing the
market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees
cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the
costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y
DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted on
reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they
deposited for their provisional liberty in the amount of
₱7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are
ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed
number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further
ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in
the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial court’s
Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the
trial court’s Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED.
The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael
Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The
appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of
the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the
cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with
the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers’ Camp which hired
the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court
of Appeals rejected petitioner’s claim that he was restrained
from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because
petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do
so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioner’s
contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without
permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down
the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were
cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not
sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that
the prosecution failed to prove Cuteng’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted
Santiago because he was only following orders as to which
trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24
September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be
denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not
questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.10 For questions to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.11 The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances.12
2
Page
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
68 of PD 705. ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides: Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Costs de officio.
Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products SO ORDERED.
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under

Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or

other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.13

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather,

collect or remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority. In this case,
petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the
implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,
gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the
contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in
possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by
Teachers’ Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his
co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed

to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was
covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled,
petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really
intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough
to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of

Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership,
association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering,
or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
3
Page

G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigations
Division, DENR, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No.
123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third
Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently
consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos.
1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber
dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under
Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its
permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time
material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of
the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the
DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge
stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.1 The team was
not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal
of the owner.2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant
from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof,
the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a
negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board
feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices,
tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their
source and origin.4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative
seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized
articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed
by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited
from disposing them until further orders.5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to
Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April
1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized
articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino
Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents
being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber
or forest products placed under seizure.6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report
recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber
Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang
Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and
the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in
the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from
date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances
warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber
and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV.
458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber
using "recycled" documents.7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to
explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's
permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter
4
to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already
Page
secured the required documents and was ready to submit them.
None, however, was submitted.8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order
wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April
and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard.9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The
case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said
court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1
April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a
judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of
assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of
different sizes and dimensions with a total value of
P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23
April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May
1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations
of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon
instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series
of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises
of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo,
Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber
dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been
suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-
type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon
investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded
on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer.
It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction.
The members of the team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the
petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po,
who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able
to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including
newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded
with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive
seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in
assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the
petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter,
the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and
general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro
Arellano, handed down a resolution 11 whose dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against respondent
Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000
bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68
of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be
released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task
Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5
June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section
58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL
CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as
follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads
of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its
decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized
from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on
April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and
instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the
Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
5
NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet
Page
of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be
dealt with as directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the
appropriate action before the proper court regarding the Lauan
and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded
in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were
seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa
and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner is withheld in this case until after the proper court
has taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber,
shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the
warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's
lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large
volumes of lumber without covering document showing the
legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the
constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of
the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search
and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990,
the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of
that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by
virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio
whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17 And,
although the search warrant did not specifically mention
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was
valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not
required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of
the
search.18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order
of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles
in favor of the Government for the reason that since the
articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him
in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber
dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL
CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not
charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be
used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of
an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch
35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then
pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the
legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is
included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the
definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very
purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging
that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest
resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL
CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted
the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal documents required
by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order
of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it
contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing
the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of
merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying
contraband articles since there is no law punishing the
possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose
possession without the required legal documents is unlawful
under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of
the forest product involved has always been foisted by those
who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
6
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when
Page
appellant was required to present the valid documents showing
its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question,
it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted
to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which
was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila
handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because
(a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b)
when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the
petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was
still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section
68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80
of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP
No. 33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for
lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on
the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs,
especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz.,
"wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building
purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in
Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer
or employee can seize the forest product involved in a
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80
thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part
as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said
Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by
the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the
petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No.
106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an
offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in
the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber"
nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under
the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been
said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent
the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
7
where the timber or forest products are found.
Page
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from
the places therein mentioned without any authority; and
(b) possession of timber forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But
conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion
of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in
the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a
violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in
the possession of the private respondent, without the required
legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are
not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the "lumber"
in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
"approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and,"
and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw
forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. --
x x x           x x x          x x x
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top,
resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by
the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information.
Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the
other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the
said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an
offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in
his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the
information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion
that "only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are
insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint
Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which
is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer
that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof
expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found
approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber,
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution31 of
the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the
filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against respondent
Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's
conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime.
On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the
term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in
its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for
the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or
timber.
8
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
Page
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has
miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November
1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid
exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee
by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted
on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation
of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus,
when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it
may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal
because possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor
included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits
further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this
case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible error
has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter
want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to
comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's
appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its
lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was
never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to
25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to
possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the
authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head
or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.
-- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed
or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is
not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and ruling
on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is
totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the
violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber
dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are
nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as
amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the
serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts
which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers
of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to
the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by
prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to
violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our
forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
9
Page
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b)
SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders
of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and
(d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear
and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R.
No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998
ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED
MORENO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the gathering,
collection and/or possession, without license, of lumber, which
is considered timber or forest product, are prohibited and
penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
The Case
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR No. CR-12815 promulgated
on July 30, 1993, and its Resolution 3 promugated on April 28,
1994. The assailed Decision affirmed the judgment 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, 5 which, in the
complaint against petitioners for violation of Section 68, PD
705 (Forestry Reform Code) as amended, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds:
a) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and
FRED MORENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of lumber under the Information,
dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of
them to an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6) MONTHS, as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs, and
b) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and
CRISPIN CABUDOL GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the
Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D.
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, and
sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of SIX
(6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay the costs.
The two (2) terms of imprisonment of each of the accused
shall be served successively under Article 70, RPC.
The preventive imprisonment which any of the accused may
have suffered is credited in his favor to its full extent.
The Court further orders the confiscation of the lumber
described in the aforesaid Informations in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of
Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph
Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck
loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was
driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E
Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989,
this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and
Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-
646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by
Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction.
Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were
owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no
documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon
demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of
lumber were confiscated.
On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael
Ramilo, caretaker and time keeper of A & E Construction,
were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R.
Rocero with violation of Section 68, 6 PD No. 705, as
amended by EO No. 277, in an Information 7 which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30
o'clock in the Poblacion, municipality of Cajidiocan, province
of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and
without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in their possession and under their
custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber about 171 board
feet and 41 pieces tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued
10
at P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the aforestated amount.
Page
In another Information, 8 Tan and Ramilo, together with
Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for the same violation in
connection with the October 30, 1989 incident.
On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were
arraigned on the basis of the aforementioned Informations;
each pleaded not guilty. 9 The cases were thence jointly tried,
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 10
During the trial, the defense did not contest the above factual
circumstances except to deny that the forest guards demanded,
on either of the two occasions, papers or documents showing
legal possession of the lumber. Additionally, Prisco Marin,
who claimed to have been the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the
Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the
seized pieces of lumber were bought by Tan's Cajidiocan
Trading, one of the licensed lumber dealers in the island, from
Matzhou Development Corporation ("Matzhou") which thus
delivered to the former Auxiliary Invoice No. 763850 11 dated
March 19, 1987 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
office in Romblon. According to Marin, the director of
forestry had granted Matzhou a Tree Recovery Permit
covering the entire island of Sibuyan. He added that he had
inspected the lumber in question in the compound of A & E
Construction or Cajidiocan Trading, where he was shown the
auxiliary invoice covering the subject. 12
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and
ruled that the confiscated pieces of lumber which were
admittedly owned by Accused Tan were not legitimate
deliveries but aborted nocturnal hauling. It convicted all the
accused as charged, for their failure to comply with the
Forestry Reform Code, which requires the following legal
documents: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin,
(3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber
dealer permit.
Ruling of Respondent Court of Appeals
On appeal, the accused assigned to the trial court these ten
errors: (1) holding them liable under Section 68 of EO 277; (2)
ruling that their possession of the lumber were unauthorized or
illegal; (3) retroactively applying E.O. 277; (4) ruling that the
accused did not have the necessary documents to make their
possession legal; (5) convicting them despite the absence of
the corpus delicti; (6) admitting in evidence the alleged
seizure receipts or, assuming their admissibility, considering
them as evidence of corpus delicti; (7) finding that the
deliveries were aborted nocturnal hauling; (8) convicting
Alejandro Tan on the ground of conspiracy; (9) ruling that the
guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt; and
(10) sustaining the constitutionality of EO 277. 13
As regards the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals held
petitioners' "artful distinction between timber and lumber" "to
be fallacious and utterly unmeritorious." It thereby upheld the
solicitor general's manifestation that "forest products" include
"wood" which is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "the hard
fibrous substance beneath the back of trees and shrubs."
Respondent Court succinctly ruled that to construe "sawn
lumber" as not covered by "sawn timber" would defeat the
evident intent and purpose of the law, for "what would prevent
an illegal logger [from bringing] with him a portable saw and
having the timber illegally cut/gathered [and] sawn right on
the spot, thus gaining immunity for himself[?]" 14
As to the next three assigned errors which relied heavily on
Prisco Marin's testimony, Respondent Court dismissed the
said witness' account as "anything but credible." It added that
Marin's testimony largely focused on a certification he made
stating that, five years ago, he inspected the same confiscated
lumber which were to be used for the repair of school building
by A & E Construction in Sibuyan. But during the cross-
examination, he admitted that he made the inspection in
December 1989. The appellate tribunal noted that, by then, he
had already been relieved of his position as OIC of the Bureau
of Forest Development in Romblon; hence, he had no business
inspecting the lumberyard of Petitioner Tan. In fact, he
admitted that in December 1989, it was Romulae Gadaoni who
was already the highest forest officer in the island. 15
As to the fifth and sixth alleged errors, Respondent Court
ruled that corpus delicti does not refer literally to the object of
the crime — in this case, the forest products possessed without
the required legal documents. The fact that the crimes charged
were perpetrated by the petitioners was credibly and amply
proven by the detailed testomonies of the prosecution
witnesses, including the admission of Defense Witness Ismael
Ramilo. The seizure receipts merely served to corroborate
their testimonies. 16
The seventh and ninth assigned errors were deemed answered
in the foregoing discussions. As to the eighth, no other than
the admission of his caretaker or katiwala, Co-Accused
Ramilo, proved that Tan was involved in the conspiracy.
Ramilo testified that the deliveries of lumber on the subject
dates (October 26 and 30, 1989) were made pursuant to the
instruction of Tan; and that the latter owned said lumber, the
trucks and the construction firm. The two accused truck
drivers who were caught in flagrante delicto were mere
employees of Tan. 17
The last assigned error was set aside by Respondent Court as
unnecessary. Absolutely of no concern to the petitioners, who
were caught in possession of lumber without the required legal
documents, was the alleged unconstitutionality of the inclusion
of "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub,
'the associated water' or fish" in EO 277. There being other
grounds to resolve the case, the constitutionality of said phrase
was not passed upon. 18
In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners raised these
additional grounds: (1) the Forestry Reform Code and the laws
and regulations of the Department of Environment and Natural
11
Resources (DENR) distinguish between timber and lumber
Page
and between lumber and other forest products; (2) the
Informations alleged and the facts proved that lumber is not
covered by the provision supposedly violated; (3) judicial
interpretation or construction may not be resorted to in order
to fill a gap or clear an ambiguity in penal statutes and,
assuming the propriety thereof, construction should be in favor
of the accused; (4) lack of documents for possession of lumber
is not punishable under the law; and (5) the perceived
weakness in the testimony of Defense Witness Prisco Marin
should not strengthen the case for the prosecution. In its April
28, 1994 Resolution, Respondent Court found "no cogent
reason for the reversal or modification" of its Decision. Hence,
this petition. 19
The Issues
Petitioners now ask this Court to likewise pass upon their
foregoing submissions. Many of the errors raised, however,
involve factual questions, the review of which is not within the
ambit of this Court's functions, particularly in this case where
the findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate
court and where petitioners failed to show any misappreciation
of the evidence presented. 20 We shall therefore limit our
review only to questions of law.
Accordingly, we shall rule on the following legal issues: (1)
the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277, (2) the treatment
by the lower court of lumber as timber and/or forest product
within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3) the
alleged retroactive application of EO 277.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Constitutionality of Sec. 68, E.O. 277
The impugned legal provision reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other
Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceeding on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
Petitioners aver that the above provision is violative of
substantive due process, because it requires the possession of
certain legal documents to justify "mere possession" of forest
products which, under Section 3(q) of PD 705, includes,
among others, "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even
grass, shrub, flowering plant, 'the associated water' or fish"
and penalizes failure to present such required documents.
One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry
into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination. 21 As Respondent Court
of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not "charged
with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey,
beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish";
thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277
"is absolutely of no concern" to petitioners. They are not
asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial
determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any
convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution that would justify the nullification of said
provision. 22 A statute is always presumed to be constitutional,
and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality
must convincingly prove its invalidity. 23
Main Issue: Under PD 705 and EO 277,
Is Lumber Considered Timber or Forest Product?
Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is
not punishable under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
As explicitly provided in Section 68 of both PD 705 and EO
277 (the law that amended the former), only the cutting,
gathering, collecting and/or possession, without license, of
timber and other forest products are prohibited. As expressly
defined under Section 3(q) of PD 705, lumber is not timber or
a forest product. It is only in Section 79 of the same law where
the sale of lumber, without compliance with established
grading rules and standards, is prohibited. Petitioners submit
that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate
between timber and lumber; therefore, court should not
construe lumber as timber.
The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, has been settled
in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 24 in which this
Court expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term
timber." 25 We quote at length the Court's discussion:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber of lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant," which reads:
12
Page
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in
its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for
the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar
as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes
no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do
we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. 26
1987, or more than two and a half years prior to the
apprehension and seizure that gave rise to this case. It is highly
doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date was the very
same lumber confiscated in October 1989. No evidence was
presented to overcome this veritable doubt. Third and most
important, assuming that indeed they were the very same
lumber, forest laws and regulations also require the following
documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales invoice,
(3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate of
transport agreement. 30 None of these documents were
proffered in court or elsewhere. Petitioners' unlawful
possession of the subject lumber occurred in October 1989.
EO 277, which specifically included "possession" of timber
and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705,
had already been issued and in effect more than two years
previous thereto. Nothing will prevent the indictment of
petitioners for violation of EO 277 at the time they were
caught by the forest guards in flagrante delicto. The
prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice
or criminal intent will not save the day for them. 31

Mustang was recently reiterated in Lalican WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
vs. Vergara, 27 where we also said that "'[t]o exclude The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
possession of 'lumber' from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
would certainly emasculate the law itself. . . . After all, the
phrase 'forest product' is broad enough to encompass lumber SO ORDERED.
which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber" Indeed, to mention
lumber in the aforesaid section would simply result in
tautology.

In addition, under American jurisprudence, lumber has been

legally accepted as a term referring to the manufactured
product of logs 28 or to timber sawed or split into marketable
form, especially for use in buildings. 29

Consistent with Mustang, we find no error in the holding of

both lower courts. Clearly, petitioners are liable for violation
of Section 68 of the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.

Corollary Issue:

No Retroactive Application of EO 277

Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them,

because the seized lumber had been lawfully possessed by
Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987, while the amendatory
law was issued only on July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen
days after publication. This strained reasoning deserves scant
consideration. First, at no time during the apprehensions did
petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan
Trading. In fact, Petitioner Ramilo and the drivers openly
claimed that the lumber and the trucks belonged to A & E
Construction which was, in turn, owned by Petitioner Tan. It
was only during the course of the trial, through the testimony
of Prisco Marin (characterized by the appellate court as
"anything but credible"), that the alleged ownership thereof by
13

Cajidiocan Trading was brought out. Second, the supposed

sale of the subject lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading,
Page

as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred in March


G.R. No. 125797               February 15, 2002
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City,
Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C.
Gaddi, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and
Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog
City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,
particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the
government of, among others, the vehicles used in the
commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995
Decision1 and the June 3, 1996 Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case
No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court
hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and
NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with
costs de [o]ficio.
"The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
"The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any
DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross
Funeral Services vehicle ‘St. Jude’, with Plate No. HAJ-848,
to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof."3
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration
challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the
return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts
of this case as follows:
"The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso
Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:
‘That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality
of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72)
pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of
72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without
first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor
from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further
Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
"Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and
they entered the plea of not guilty.
"Thereafter trial was conducted.
"The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as
follows:
14
Page
"That he is an employee of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30,
1993 at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while he was in
his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named
‘St. Jude’ with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay
Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and
found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings
inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1" x 2" x 4", 16
pieces of 1" x 24" x 2.3" and 1 piece of 1" x 2" x 4." In his
estimate at the price of ₱10.00 per board foot the total value of
the lumber would be ₱729.30. He asked the driver for [the]
owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain
Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him
that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso
Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog
City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber
and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs.
‘B’ and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which
are now marked as Exhs. ‘C’ and series. Besides, he signed a
Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger.
When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers
for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none
because they were not his. Daraman further told him that
[they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan
merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in
the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought
to his (Asan’s) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
"The prosecution has still another witness in the person of
Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense
agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case
would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by
Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the
admission of Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ and their series. Its Exhs. ‘C’
and series were rejected because the photographer who took
them did not testify to identify [them].
"For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified
because his co-accused would merely offer corroborative
testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been
established:
"That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer
Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood
shavings (‘sinapyo’) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service
vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s]
were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went
to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they
got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a
certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings,
each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in
circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood
shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral
Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood
shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring
his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero,
Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was]
also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted
lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were
already in the furniture shop where they got the wood
shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao,
Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings.
Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told
him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture
shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle
to be brought to his (Asan’s) house in Barangay Obrero,
Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him
that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the
person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his
furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar.
Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead
impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At
about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not
returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to
his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the
latter about what happened."4
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the
return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Community and
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation
proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence
of private respondents.5 The two failed to present documents to
show the legality of their possession and transportation of the
lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera
recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the
final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.6 Atty.
Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26,
1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the
lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The
Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan
and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the
DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.7
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City,
moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only
insofar as it ordered the "return of the said vehicle to the
owner thereof."8 He contended that the vehicle had already
been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December
2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January
26, 1994.9 He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive
jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in
violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-
A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency
of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent
Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from
Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s
15
house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral
Page
Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to
reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization
for the lumber were in the former’s shop in Barangay Blanca
Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to
be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an
effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion
for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and
substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed
his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
"x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits
considering that as found by the Court the owner of the
vehicle in question, ‘St. Jude,’ which is the Holy Cross
Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not
commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman
had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion
which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession
of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the
evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber.
xxx.
x x x           x x x          x x x
"The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal,
thereby the same has long become final and executory.
"Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation
proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano
Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in
question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But
notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court,
the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present
case.
"Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the
owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has
been found to have conspired with any other persons who
committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to
the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present
case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral
Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed
a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its
decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused
Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the
violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed."10
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for
the Court’s consideration:
"(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or
authority to order x x x the return of property already owned
by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or
misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its
interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to
perform their duties."12
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had
jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the
trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether,
as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is
estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction
when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the
vehicle had already become government property by virtue of
the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The
DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under
Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order
the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land,
water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing,
possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.13 A
comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of
PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC
covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found;
it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of
forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the
commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
"Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
16
Page
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found."14
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department
Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter."15
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to
interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly
expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it
differently.16
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances
used in the industrial arts;17 equipment covers physical
facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;18 and implements pertains to whatever
may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or
utensil.19 These terms do not include conveyances that are
specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing
guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that
includes "any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether
motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a
combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the
movement of any forest product."20
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
confiscation of "all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same" is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized
representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and
control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks,
game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.21
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated
Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides
the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition
of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited
the acts attributed to private respondents to "willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy
two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first
securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the
proper authorities, x x x." The Information did not contain any
allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of
illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in
violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of
Forfeiture (Annex "C") is a "false, falsified and perjurious
document." The Order was attached to and made part of the
record only when petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial
court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it
appear, according to the private respondents, that RED
Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26,
1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita,
officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of
Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending
approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of
Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial
environment and natural resources officer to transfer the
confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with
the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.22 Reynaldo R.
Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not
deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.23
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of
Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed
Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release
the vehicle was private respondents’ acquittal of the charge of
violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order
issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which
involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it.
Petitioner is questioning only the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private
respondents have not appealed the DENR’s Order of
Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.24 The
genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are
factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which
is not a trier of facts.25
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors
committed by a lower court.26 Under PD 705, the actions and
the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only
through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.27
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it
held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in
17
which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a
conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order
Page
No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the
confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture. costs.

In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed SO ORDERED.
Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in
which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or
conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to
the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents
Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD
705, and their acquittals were not appealed.

We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the

accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is
punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or
conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The
DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not
possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of
making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the
courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not
clothe petitioner with that authority.

Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction

of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances
used in violation of forestry laws.1âwphi1 Hence, we cannot
expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the
accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A
covers only the movement of lumber or forest products
without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an
injustice.28

We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the

vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and
undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble
of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to
conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest
resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws.29 Strong paramount public policy should not be
degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its
clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.30

Third Issue:

Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this

Court to resolve petitioner’s third issue. It is no longer
material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to
hold that the assistant provincial prosecutor’s failure to
comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was an
implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s
disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or
18

authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.

Page
 At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers
of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte
apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck
loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were
impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that
a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the
release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe,
was not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department

of Environment and Natural Resources filed the instant
complaint against respondent Judge alleging that his order
releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest
products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A1 and
Administrative Order No. 59, Series of 1990.2 Complainant
claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the
release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in
the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San
Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same
falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office.

In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after

conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe,
the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of
sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks. On his way
home after delivering hollow blocks in Barangay Sto. Niño II,
he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced
lumber and deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan,
Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a barangay high
school building. They were apprehended when the truck had a
flat tire. After changing the tire, both the lumber and the truck
were ordered deposited at the police station of Hinunangan.

Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser

participation in the crime of illegal logging and, being a mere
accessory, he might be utilized by the Acting Chief of Police
  as prosecution witness against Cabig. More importantly, the
fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent Judge,
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995 in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of
the truck owned by Golpe.
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
Region VIII, Tacloban City, petitioner, recommended that a formal investigation be conducted. An
vs. excerpt from its Memorandum states:
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Hinunangan Silago, Southern
Leyte, respondent.

RESOLUTION
19

ROMERO, J.:
Page
We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While
he is authorized to conduct preliminary investigation in all
cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Sec. 68-A
thereof provides that it is the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative who may order the confiscation and
disposition of the forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
There may be some facts that are not extant in the records
which can only come out during a formal investigation to
better establish clear culpability or exoneration over the
respondent.
In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to clear
himself, it is respectfully recommended that this matter be
referred to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr.,
RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty days from receipt of
the records.3
In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to
refer the case to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao,
Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60)
days from receipt of the records.4
During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to
attend but sent his representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino
Esber and legal assistant Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge
appeared with his counsel. However, on the third hearing date,
respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a stroke and
was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for
the turnover of the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the
DENR. He also manifested that the complainant is submitting
the administrative matter for resolution and recommendation
without adducing evidence against respondent. Respondent's
counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The
counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to
submit the case for appropriate action.
The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:
In view of this development in the course of an intended
investigation this investigator could not elicit additional facts
than are found in the records, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory. Respondent was given an opportunity to explain
the unfavorable circumstances against him but he was
overtaken by a serious illness. So much was expected from the
complainant to supply the facts not extant in the records, but
he lost interest in substantiating his April 1993 report to the
Supreme Court. In fact, he was submitting this administrative
matter for resolution without adducing evidence against
respondent.
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation of
DENR counsel Esber which sought for the inclusion of jeep
owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in the criminal information,
there is nothing new that can be added to the facts found by
the Honorable Deputy Court Administrator as reflected in his
Memorandum for the Honorable Chief Justice dated 12
October 1993.
There being no actual investigation conducted, no additional
facts could be reported and consequently, there is no basis for
a recommendation on the basis of facts.
This investigator can only recommend appropriate action by
the Supreme Court on the basis of the facts already extant in
the records with a prayer for consideration of respondent
plight especially so since on account of this investigation his
health has deteriorated and may affect his efficiency output as
a judge. Perhaps, allowing him to bow out of the service with
honor and corresponding benefits.5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for
disability retirement. His application was approved but his
pension was not released pending the outcome of this case.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned
and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he
is not subject to any disciplinary sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph:
"[E]very penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools with which it was committed." However,
this cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools
"be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In
this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event
accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver,
Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no
justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres.
Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the
DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the
power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest
products and all conveyances used in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws. However, as complainant himself likewise
pointed out, this power is in relation to the administrative
jurisdiction of the DENR.
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck
after he conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied
himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck,
he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The
release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative
authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation
proceedings under Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the
20
confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an
Page
additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite
the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by
filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the
truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has
done as manifested before the lower court or by enforcing
Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states
that "[t]he confiscation of the conveyance under these
regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action
which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person
who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."
Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances,
respondent Judge should have turned over the truck to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate
disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified matters and
prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one
government official files a complaint against another. Under
Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made
by DENR field offices, deputized military personnel and
officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other
forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest
DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. A period of
about two weeks lapsed from the time the seizure was made
before a complaint was filed. During this period, the
apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs
and the truck to the nearest DENR field office for proper
action and disposition since the duty to turn over the truck to
the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials
apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory duty
on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he
should not be visited with disciplinary sanction when he did
not refer the same to the DENR field office in San Juan,
Southern Leyte.
The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police,
the DENR, the prosecutors, and the members of the bench to
coordinate with each other for a successful campaign against
illegal logging. It behooves all the concerned agencies to
seriously strive for the attainment of the constitutionally-
declared policy to "protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature"7 in order to preserve our natural
resources for the benefit of the generations still to come.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184098             November 25, 2008
AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded
with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido
Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber
to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to
petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the
owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with
violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as
amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac,
Catanduanes. The information against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of
Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS
839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one
hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine
Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net
volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684)
board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine
Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them
guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's
conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA
decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant Placido
Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to accused-
appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the
penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
21
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Page
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges
against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was
not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's
alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active
participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In
particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was
loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa
and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison
up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts
proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and
control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa
(and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran
away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely
indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and
Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the
penalty imposed on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be
imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other
forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be. (emphasis supplied)
2. xxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles xxx (emphasis supplied).
The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber
was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309,
the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14
years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional
period of four years for the excess of P47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable
on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in
the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere
between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months
or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four
years and the medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and
11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere
between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion
temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January
31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado
Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
22
Page
 GALO MONGE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which
affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of accused
Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.

The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner

and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and
Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of
mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City.
Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown
the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither
petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.3 Petitioner
fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to
the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the
DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (DENR-CENRO).4 The DENR-CENRO issued a
seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that
the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued
at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio.5 Later on,
petitioner was arrested, but Potencio’s whereabouts had been
unknown since the time of the seizure6 until he surfaced on 3
January 1998.7

An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with
violation of Section 688 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705,9 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of
1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30

o’clock in the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with
necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to
gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
transport and have in their possession three (3) pieces of
Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate
volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen
(0.18) cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00,
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the DENR
in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a

23

negative plea.11
Page

G.R. No. 170308             March 7, 2008

Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the
circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear in
court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken
out.12 On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used
as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.13 Accordingly,
he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that
for a promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner, the
owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from
the mountain. Potencio’s testimony was materially
corroborated by Molina.14 Petitioner did not contest the
allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned
the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio had
stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log
from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn
into pieces.15
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner
was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay the costs.16
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state
witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of
the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his
testimony.17 The appellate court dismissed this challenge and
affirmed the findings of the trial court. However, it modified
the penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight
(8) months of prision mayor as maximum.18 His motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence the present appeal whereby
petitioner reiterates his challenge against the discharge of
Potencio.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante
delicto transporting, and thus in possession of, processed
mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR.
Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to
exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was
Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his
assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in
transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The
contention is unavailing.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the
cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents required under existing
laws and regulations.19 DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof
materially requires that the transport of lumber be
accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by
the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts
of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other
forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued
by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal
of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession
of forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.20
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and
Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent
failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken
together, has already given rise to criminal liability under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act
punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of
Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances
surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner’s
liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of
ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession
nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio
to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber.
P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts
essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under
its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as
defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability
attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. 21 In other
words, mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or
criminal intent, is illegal.22 It would therefore make no
difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio
who owned the subject pieces of lumber.
Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to
nothing less than petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged,
there is no cogent reason to reverse his conviction.
Petitioner’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state
witness must also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine
that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is
left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound
discretion23 limited only by the requirements set forth in
Section 17,24 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether
the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least
guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity
for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of
the trial court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The
discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this
highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate
courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion.25 No such
grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues
relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the
trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on
appeal.26
Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an
accused from the information in order that he may testify for
the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal.27 Once the
discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development
showing that any or all of the conditions provided in Section
24
17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the
legal consequence of an acquittal.28 Any witting or unwitting
Page
error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge
and of the court in granting the motion—no question of
jurisdiction being involved—will not deprive the discharged
accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right against
double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to
the discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a
failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that
the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the
fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who
may handle the prosecution.29 Indeed, the only instance where
the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is
when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in
accordance with his commitment,30 as provided for in Section
18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for
that reason, petitioner’s challenge against his discharge must
be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144640             June 26, 2006
RODOLFO TIGOY, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the decision and resolution, dated March 6,
2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy," acquitting
Nestor Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting
Rodolfo Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,
Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the
trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly
introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo
who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport
construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to
Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered
into between Ong and Bertodazo, the salient portions of which
state:
1. That the party of the First Part is an owner of Cargo Trucks
with place of business at Iligan City;
2. That the party of the Second Part is a businessman dealing
in buy and sell of General Merchandise, dry goods and
construction materials;
3. That the party of the Second Part will engage the services of
the two (2) cargo trucks of the party of the First Part;
4. That the services agreed upon should be rendered by the
party of the First Part on August 3, 1993 from Larapan,
Linamon, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City for an agreed
amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or
a total of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency for the carriage of cement and other
merchandise owned by the party of the Second Part;
5. That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of and
when the cargo trucks are not actually used for the purpose
25
herein stipulated, it is agreed that the same is the sole
responsibility of the party of the Second Part without any
Page
liability of the party of the First Part.1
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered
Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been
employed by him as truck drivers for two (2) years and ten
(10) years, respectively, to bring the two trucks to Lolong
Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about fifteen
(15) minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed the two
drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the
construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at
dawn for the trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with
Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went
home to return to Larapan at four o’clock in the morning the
next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with
bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.2 Before
departing, they allegedly checked the motor oil, water, engine
and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in good
condition.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico
Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City),
while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the
ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the members of
the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the
466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis
City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded
with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not
stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome, along
with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real,
boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept
the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.3
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in
uniform among the police officers, flagged down the two
trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded towards the
direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they
chased the trucks and overtook the same at Barangay
Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the
two trucks to stop.
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver who
had alighted from the green truck why he did not stop at the
checkpoint but the latter did not answer. When he inquired
what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is
"S.O.P," which means grease money in street parlance. 4 This
raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with
"hot items."
Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding behind
the green truck and was being driven by Sumagang was
intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon inspection, the police officers
discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in
both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the
lumber but the latter could not produce any.
The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at
the City Hall in Ozamis City. The truckmen, namely, Felix
Arante and Doro Lopez, and another passenger whom Tigoy
identified as Lolong Bertodazo, who were riding with them in
the trucks, were not investigated. According to Nuqui, they did
not notice that the group had left. It was later learned that they
were instructed by Sumagang to inform Nestor Ong of the
incident.
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the ICC
Arts Center and informed the Provincial Director of the
apprehension. Meanwhile, the drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang,
were detained at the Ozamis City Police Station while Arante
and Lopez were released.5
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources – Community and
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO),6 after receiving a call from the Ozamis City Police
Station that two trucks were apprehended transporting sawn
lumber without a permit and were brought to the City Hall,
sent Rolando Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with
Teodoro Echavez, Juanito Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to
investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the
registration papers of the two trucks and appearing therein was
the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After ascertaining that
the sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did not have
supporting documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the
subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in the blue
Nissan ten-wheeler truck were 229 pieces of lumber with a
total volume of 6,232.46 board feet; and, in the green Isuzu
eight-wheeler truck, 333 pieces of lumber with a total volume
of 5,095.5 board feet.7 Consequently, the lumber and the
vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional
Executive Director.8
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor
Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for
possession of forest products without legal permit, thus:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay
Catadman, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, for a common design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally possess and
transport without the necessary legal documents nor permit
from the lawful authorities, sawn dipterocarp lumbers
(Philippine Mahogany), in the following manner, to wit:
accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks
with Plate Nos. GDA-279 and PNH-364 facilitated and
allowed the use and transport of above-stated sawn [lumber]
from Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but intercepted by the PNP
authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong
Bertodazo facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn
lumbers, while accused Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the
Nissan 10 wheeler cargo truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279
which was loaded with 333 pieces of said sawn dipterocarp
lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent
[to] 5,095.5 board feet which was concealed under piled bags
of cement, which lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36;
26
while accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck
Page
bearing Plate No. ONH-364, which was loaded and
transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp lumbers
(Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent to
6,232.46 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of
cement which lumbers [were] valued at P92,316.77 or total
value of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage to
the government, inasmuch as the aforestated lumbers were
recovered.
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in
relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.9
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the
arraignment. Sumagang died after the case was filed while the
other co-accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not arrested and has
remained at large.
On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo
Tigoy [GUILTY] beyond reasonable doubt of possession of
dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at more than P22,000.00
without the legal documents as required by existing laws and
regulations, penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences
them to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years and three (3)
months of reclusion temporal. The lumber and the
conveyances used are forfeited in favor of the government.
With costs.
The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and
conveyances in accordance with the existing laws, WITHOUT
DELAY. Let the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division,
before which accused Ong’s appeal of this Court’s denial of
his action for replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be
furnished with a copy of this judgment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Declaring that "constructive possession" of unlicensed lumber
is not within the contemplation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
and for failure by the prosecution to prove the complicity of
Ong, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 6,
2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Nestor Ong is acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence and his two (2) trucks are
ordered returned to him. The conviction of Rodolfo Tigoy is
upheld and the decision dated October 11, 1996 is
AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a Motion for Reconsideration praying for his acquittal but the
same was denied on August 23, 2000.
Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
"COLLUSION" BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO AND
PETITIONER TIGOY;
II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY
DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG
BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST;
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONER TIGOY TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND,
IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.12
Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not
petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or
transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation
of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code:
1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting
lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68
of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions
were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as
they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to
Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with
Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed
lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was
27
transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract
Page
between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when
Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the
bags of cement. Court of Appeals, are generally final and conclusive.20

This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed by WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision
the lower court. In declaring that petitioner connived with and Resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000,
Bertodazo in transporting the subject lumber, the court a respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
quo noted: 20864 are hereby AFFIRMED.

x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two Costs against petitioner.
drivers of accused Ong refused to stop at a checkpoint, a fact
admitted by both in their affidavit, Exhs. "E" and "E-2". SECOND DIVISION
Likewise, the two drivers refused to stop on the national
highway near a bus terminal when required by a uniformed
policeman. When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom
witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck,
Sumagang, but who actually was Tigoy (as he was the driver
of the green truck and who came to the road block first, being
the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which to witness Tome meant
that the trucks were carrying "hot items."
G.R. No. 131270             March 17, 2000
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they
fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner,
street parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the vs.
passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying
contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had MENDOZA, J.:
knowledge of the fact that they were transporting and were in
possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law.13
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of of lumber in violation of §68 2 of the Revised Forestry
an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present Code 3 (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial
case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly
The facts are as follows:
and consciously.14
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in
not necessary to prove conspiracy.15 Conspiracy may be
Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being
proven by circumstantial evidence.16 It may be deduced from
delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest
the mode, method and manner by which the offense is
Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such
in rice milling and trading.
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.17 It is not even required that the
participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine
commence it.18 National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion,
Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a
Petitioner’s actions adequately show that he intentionally
large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw.
participated in the commission of the offense for which he had
As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by
been charged and found guilty by both the trial court and the
purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L.
Court of Appeals.
Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6
and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give
Finding that petitioner’s conviction was reached without credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero
arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, this Court upholds the Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended.
same. The Court accords high respect to the findings of facts What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and
of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
the witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the
evidence of the parties as well as its conclusions 19 especially
28

The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in

when these are in agreement with those of the Court of
all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in
Page

Appeals, which is the case here. As a matter of fact, factual

total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch
of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board
feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in
Sumpong; Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order 4 was
served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of
the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, raiding team returned for the remaining
lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain
Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer,
asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek
a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court
which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion
was denied. 5 Accordingly, the remaining lumber was
confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the
warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner
Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the
DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together
with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco
Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with
violation of §68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. The
Information alleged: 6
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior
thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation
Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115
pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume
of 29,299.25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters
with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY
EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency,
without any authority, license or legal documents from the
government, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on
July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as follows: 7
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having in their possession timber products
worth of P488,334.45 without the legal documents as charged
in the information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in
favor of the government.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for
lack of evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's
conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his
participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized
lumber. 8
Hence this petition which raises the following issues: 9
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE
PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR
FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE
OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER
ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following
documents, as summarized by the trial court, to establish that
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the
seized lumber was legal: 10
1. Exh. 6 — Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short),
dated December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent
to 12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del
Sur of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken
from the forest area of Wahab and H.D. Pangcoga.
Exh. 6-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 6-B — Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for
short)
Exh. 6-C — Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463
pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D — Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from
WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the
Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F — Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP
29
Enterprises, dated December 16, 1992, for the 5,056.94 board
Page
feet of lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 — [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2. Exh. 7 — CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent
to 25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain
Somira M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM.
Exh. 7-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B — CTA
Exh. 7-C — Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961
pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to
Somira N. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991
Exh. 7-F — Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the
Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for
10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3. Exh. 8 — CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an
equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of
Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25,
1992
Exh. 8-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 8-B — CTA.
Exh. 8-C — Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber.
Exh. 8-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F — Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for
8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation
payable to WHP Enterprises
4. Exh. 9 — CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent
volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M.
Ampuan of Lama Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned
to the Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B — CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C — Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D — Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading
Company to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F — Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189
board feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 — Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the
Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the
lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates
of Lumber Origin. 11 For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-
83 12 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . .
and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the
attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which
form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable
forms for official use by authorized BFD officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required
shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as
such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber
and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their
attachments should have been considered in establishing the
legality of the company's possession of the lumber. 13 In
support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling
in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 14
The contention has no, merit. The statement in Mustang
Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore,
the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to
the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "posses
timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means
that only those who possess timber and forest products without
the documents required by law are criminally liable, while
those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand,
the question in this case is whether separate certificates of
origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed,
different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber
and non-timber forest products. 15 As already noted, the
opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states
that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber
is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve
as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting
petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects
found in the documents presented by the latter. According to
30
the trial court: 16
Page
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of
flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the
Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash
Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . .
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420
pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents
describe the forest product[s] as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions
678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also
states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the
"mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and
so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and
enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic)
Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A")
mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the
consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that
the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact,
the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name
of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia,
Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the
Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name
and address of the consignee was smudged with a typewriter
correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally
typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked
Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh.
"[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]". 17
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly
accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank.
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber
Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the
certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991,"
while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February
6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list in sizes and
volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company
purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the
testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the
forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs,
and they were cut into lumber by the company. 18
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in
which they are found not only questionable but invalid and,
thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the
same. 19
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits
should not be taken against petitioner because the documents
came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the
CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should
be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution. 20
This contention is untenable. What render these documents
without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their
faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such
irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer
in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have
noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken
steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance
and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are
regular and complete. 21
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the
presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the
DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by
petitioner applies only when the public
accomplished.22 documents are, on their faces, regular and
properly accomplished. 22
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of
the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by
P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium;
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000
pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of
the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the Case may
be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 23 the penalty to be
imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
31
Page
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant

PUNO, J.:p

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction

for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
705 1 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277. 2

The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1
Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said
information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on
patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City. 3

On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy

Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the
area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at
the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street.
Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge. 4
32

There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo

Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed
Page
person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner
of the truck and the cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained
coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told
SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between
the coconut slabs. 6
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's
supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber
origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary
invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from
the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents .
All he could show was a certification 7 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut
slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the
slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. 7
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the
Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again,
accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial
Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut
slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the
Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel
examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo
consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The
coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing
the tanguile lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel
inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted
two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a
total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and
total assessed value of P93,232.50. 11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
owner of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No.
PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and
custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products
chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume of
3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the
total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit,
license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus
violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage
and prejudice of the government.
12
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed
that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal
source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber
permits (PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica
Cayosa 13 and Elpidio Sabal. 14 The PLTP authorizes its holder
to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered
by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from
the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and
that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment
for his hauling services. 15
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258
pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that
they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an
uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of
the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the
Decision 16 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty
of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile
specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548
which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed
of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment
of
errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section
68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that
since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing
forest laws and regulations which required certain legal
documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of
the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches
33
and seizures.
Page
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of
the constitutional rights of accused under custodial
investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705
because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the
possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did
the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68
of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other
Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis
supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and
regulations" to refer to those laws and regulations which were
already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law
inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to
the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or
other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs,
lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and
wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be
covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by
authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding
sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of
lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF
LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly
authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm
authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid,
the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or
delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
x x x           x x x          x x x
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant
failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused
admittedly could not present a single document to justify his
possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the
police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his
possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of
the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E")
and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the
parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.(Exhibit "F").
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994
states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck
bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured
coconut palms gathered inside the private land of Miss
Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614(8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr.
Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of
said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11,
1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination,
whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit
by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut
slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the
lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were
placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs
34
which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were
Page
removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the
accused was very much aware that he needed documents to
possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one
and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in
such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities
by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged
letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO
Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the
CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on
March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo,
Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did
not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibits
"8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by
CENRO on March 4, 1994, the Court has doubts that this was
duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused,
he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in
the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an
employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did
not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber
would be for personal used (sic) and ". . . came from PLTP."
(Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates
doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other
papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government
agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits
any document to a government agency, the agency gets the
original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that
he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his
avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the
CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also
creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the
accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the
CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that
he could recognize the person ". . . but they were already
reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the
accused also said that he did not know if that person was an
employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last
paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement
in view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own
lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as
his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was
telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes
from a polluted source. 19
x x x           x x x          x x x
Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without
any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under
Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes
possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor
cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There
are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of
the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the
crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant
contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence
for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that
these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as
well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle
was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated
in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his
person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except
by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable,
35
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
Page
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence

obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches

and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been

justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited

discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations
omitted; emphasis supplied)

As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had

probable cause to search appellant's truck. A member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through
Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the
Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo
Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the
informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge,
accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo,
admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut
slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's
supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present
any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the
existence of probable cause which justified the extensive
search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were
thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant.

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of

whether appellant's right to counsel under custodial
investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not
affect the finding of guilt of appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
36
Page

SO ORDERED.