NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

Property Law-II Project 2.0 On:

Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj and Ors

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4891 of 2010

SUBMITTED TO : SUBMITTED BY:

Prof. Sanjay Yadav Siddharth Vishwakarma

2018BALLB28
 Table of Contents
CHAPTER -I ............................................................................................................................ 3
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................................................................ 3
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:............................................................................................. 4
OBJECTIVES: ....................................................................................................................... 4
RESEARCH QUESTION:..................................................................................................... 4
HYPOTHESIS ....................................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER-II : CASE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 4
MATERIAL FACTS: ............................................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT FROM THE APPELLANTS SIDE: ............................................................... 5
ARGUMENT FROM THE RESPONDENT’S SIDE: .......................................................... 5
ISSUES: ................................................................................................................................. 5
JUDGMENT/DECISION ...................................................................................................... 6
RATIO OF THE CASE: ........................................................................................................ 6
CHAPTER-III CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS....................................................... 7
 CHAPTER -I

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Books involved:

▪ Poonam Pradhan, Property Law (3rd Edition, 2020, LexisNexis) 285.

▪ “Mulla-The Transfer of Property Act” (9th Edn.: Published by Butterworths India)
Sections involved:
• Section 52 of TP act: it embodies the doctrine of lies pendent (pending litigation) as
expressed in the maxim Ut lite pendent nail innoveteur which means nothing new
should be introduced in pending litigation. As a principle equity, justice and good
conscience, this rule applies even where the Act does not apply.
• Section 9 CPC: it provides that the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a
civil nature excepting the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or
impliedly barred. In other words, we can say that in all types of civil disputes, the civil
courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out from
such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication by any statutory provision and
conferred on other tribunal or authority.
• Section 151 of CPC: It is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of
substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to
make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of
the process of the court.

Cases Discussed:
• Abdul Gafur v. State of Uttarakhand1: in this case court held that the law confers on
every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's
peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute.
• Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar2: in this case court held that There is an inherent right in
every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one
may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever
frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit, for its
maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit.

1
(2008)10 SCC 98
2
(1974)2 SCC 393
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:

Scope of Section52 of TPA in the present case.

OBJECTIVES:

1. To understand the scope of Doctrine of ‘Lis pendens’.

2. To examine section 52 of TPA.
3. To analyze the case of Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj3

RESEARCH QUESTION:

1. Whether a court has the power to pass an order directing a plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance or any other suit, to file an undertaking that in the event of not succeeding
in the suit, he shall pay a certain amount by way of damages to the defendants?

HYPOTHESIS

There are many exceptions, backed up by cases, which show that this Doctrine is not
applicable universally.

CHAPTER-II : CASE ANALYSIS

MATERIAL FACTS:
1. The Appellant is a renowned builder and made an agreement to construct a building for
the Respondent, although it was not a written agreement, just an oral one.
2. One of the clauses of agreement was that the Appellant need to pay a sum of Rupee
51,000/- to the Respondent at the time of handling over the possession for
reconstruction.
3. The Appellant did follow the course of action and paid the required amount to the to
the first respondent in presence of the second respondent and two witnesses and
received a acknowledging receipt.
4. After some time, the Appellant came to know that the owner of the property is not
Respondent number one but the Respondent number two.

3
(2010)8 SCC 1
 5. On 9.3.2007 the Appellant after knowing who the true owner of the property is called
upon the Respondent to comply with the legal formalities to facilitate the collaboration
agreement.
6. The Appellant filled for the Specific performance of the agreement when he came to
know that the Respondent is denying to comply with the agreement.

ARGUMENT FROM THE APPELLANTS SIDE:

1. The Appellant contended that A suit or proceeding initiated in accordance with law,
cannot be considered as an abuse of the process of court, only on the ground that such
suit or proceeding is likely to cause hardship or is likely to be rejected ultimately.
2. That there is no provision in law which authorizes or empowers the court to issue a
direction to a plaintiff to file an undertaking to pay damages to the defendant in the
event of being unsuccessful in the suit.

ARGUMENT FROM THE RESPONDENT’S SIDE:

1. That the property stands in the name of second respondent (Defendant No.2), but she
did not sign the receipt. There is nothing to show that the second respondent participated
in the alleged negotiations or authorized her husband-the first respondent to enter into
any collaboration agreement in respect of the suit property.
2. The agreement is alleged to have been entered on 10.6.2004. But the plaintiff issued
the first notice calling upon defendants to perform, only on 9.3.2007 and filed the suit
on 30.6.2007. There was no correspondence or demand for performance, in writing,
prior to 9.3.2007, even though the alleged agreement was a commercial transaction.
3. That putting her property under the cloud will only cause her damage and she will not
be able to deal with her property as she used to do since nobody would to willing to
transact on a property on which a specific performance trail is pending.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether the suit filled by the Appellant comes under the purview of frivolous, false or
speculative suit?
2. Is the court right in imposing the clause of paying a mandatory sum of Rupees 25 Lakh
on the Appellant in case of losing the trail?
3. Will the required case come under the ambit of doctrine of Lis Pendens and is the appeal
maintainable?

JUDGMENT/DECISION

The court decided that the trail court was wrong in imposing the clause of mandatory paying
the sum of Rupee 25 lakh to the defendant by the Appellant in case of losing the trail, it further
states that the lack of appropriate provisions relating to costs has resulted in a steady increase
in malicious, vexatious, false, frivolous and speculative suits, apart from rendering Section 89
of the Code ineffective also the court permit the defendants-respondents under section 52 of
TP Act, to deal with or dispose of the suit property in the manner they deem fit, in spite of the
pendency of the suit by the plaintiff, subject to their furnishing security to an extent of Rs.
Three lakhs to the satisfaction of the learned Single Judge.
The court further stated that principle underlying section 52 of TP Act is based on justice and
equity. The operation of the bar under section 52 is however subject to the power of the court
to exempt the suit property from the operation of section 52 subject to such conditions it may
impose. That means that the court in which the suit is pending, has the power, in appropriate
cases, to permit a party to transfer the property which is the subject-matter of the suit without
being subjected to the rights of any part to the suit, by imposing such terms as it deems fit.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that this is a fit case where
the suit property should be exempted from the operation of Section 52 of the TP Act, subject
to a condition relating to reasonable security, so that the defendants will have the liberty to deal
with the property in any manner they may deem fit, inspite of the pendency of the suit
.

RATIO OF THE CASE:

Anyone can file any suit in court of law and certain safeguards are built into the Code to prevent
and discourage frivolous, speculative and vexatious suits. And even though any property upon
which there is a pending trail, the court may upon its cognizance permit the affected party to
handle the property as he/she deemed fit.

CHAPTER-III CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

It can be concluded that the doctrine of lis pendens and its principles of public policy as
enshrined under Section 52 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are in compliance with
Justice, Equity and Good Conscience as they rest upon a foundation which is equitable and
just, i.e., alienations of properties having pending litigation or suit cannot be allowed to prevail
as it will be impossible to bring that suit to a successful termination. It only postulates a
condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any
decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission
of the Court4 It has the doctrine of necessity as its basis rather than the doctrine of notice. For
the administration of justice, it is far vital that at the same time as any suit is pending in a court
of law concerning title of the property, the litigant must not be allowed to take decision
themselves and alienate or transfer the disputed property. Hence, Section 52 of The Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 plays a vital role to ensure that justice is well served to the deserved and
that no person’s right is curbed by another to his own satisfaction and will.

4
Sanjay Verma v Manik Roy, AIR 2007 SC 1332