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Combating Corruption in Bangladesh: Role of the Anti Corruption

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Combating Corruption in Bangladesh:
Role of the Anti Corruption Commission
Tarana Begum
Nurul Huda Sakib
Introduction
Corruption appears in all societies in innumerable forms. However, reportedly corruption has been severe in most of
the developing countries like Bangladesh. As for instance, according to Transparency International (TI), Bangladesh
earned the distinction of becoming the most corrupt country in the world for five successive years (2001-2005). Rather
than unitedly addressing a national problem like this, the two major political parties/alliances of the country consider
the issues on partisan lines. As such the anti-corruption bodies could not be made effective. However the sudden
political change of 11th January 2007 when a military backed government captured state power the scenario started
changing. Since then, a lot of institutional steps were taken to make the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) effective
to act as watchdog against corruption. The broad objective of this study is to define corruption from various
perspectives and examine the role of the ACC in combating corruption in Bangladesh.
History reveals that corruption in one form or another has existed for ages. Corruption was practiced in ancient Greek
civilization as rulers and kings spent public money for their own interests. Plato treated corruption broadly to serve
as a guide for institutional reforms other than as moral indictments of individuals, peoples and cultures. 1 The notion
of corruption was emphasized by Aristotle as he made distinctions between political constitutions which are ‘right’ or
‘just’ because they serve the common interest, and those which are ‘wrong’ or ‘perversions of the right forms’,
because they consider only the personal interests of the rulers. 2 These tendencies persisted within early modern
republics as Machiavelli, the period’s most perceptive student of corruption, understood it primarily as a moral
condition, measured by the distance between a people’s collective character and moral standards of everyday conduct
as defined by their Christian context.3 For Rousseau corruption was the centerpiece of a philosophical anthropology
that traced the corrosion of a natural moral empathy among humans and the emergence of bourgeois egoism. 4
All these definitions based on moral perspective, however, fail to include all the features of corruption. According to
many theorists corruption is closely connected with bureaucratic administration, political system and economy of a
particular state. Among the moralists, Nye, defined corruption as ‘any behavior which deviates from the formal
duties of a public role because of private (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates
rules against the exercise of certain types of private gains. This includes such behaviors as bribery, nepotism
(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationships rather than merit)’. 5 On the other hand, functionalists
judge corruption from the role it plays in socio-economic development. Their claim that corruption flourishes as a
substitute for the market system offers an acceptable alternative to violence and increases public participation in
public policy.6
The genesis and impact of corruption is quite different in politics and in economics. From the economic point of view
Rose-Ackerman, in her definition of corruption has emphasized the market mechanism and its impact on the voting
process and the decision-making system in large organizations.7 On the other hand ‘…illegitimate use of public
power for private benefit’, violation of responsibility, illegal or unethical use of governmental authority as a result of
considerations of personal or political gain and illegal use of organizational power for personal gain, are some of the
dimensions covered in the definitions constructed by the political scientists.8 Basically their definitions cover a wider
area. They include legitimacy of state, political ideology and civil society of a country in measuring corruption. In this
sense Carl Friedrich argues that ‘The pattern of corruption may be said to exist whenever a power holder who is
charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards,
such as the expectation of a job in the future, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the reward and
thereby damages the group or organization to which the functionary belongs (more specifically, the government and
other socio- economic institutions)’.9 According to Inge Amundsen corruption is usually understood as involving
some “corrupted” politicians and public administrators. Corruption is when a civil servant, official, bureaucrat or
politicians (anyone elected or appointed to a position of public authority, with power to allocate (scarce) public
resources in the name of the state or the government) is abusing this official position for personal or group gain. The
corrupt act is when this person demands or accepts money or some other form of reward, for himself or for his
family, friends and allies.10
Vito Tanzi, describes corruption in a different manner. He provides a hypothetical scenario illustrating situations of
corruption. “An employee who uses his official position to favor acquaintances–say to help them get a valuable
license, a government contract, or a government job–may be compensated with an immediate or explicit payment
(clearly a bribe). Alternatively, he may be compensated, at a much later time, with a generous gift to his daughter
when she gets married, or with a good job offer for his son when he completes his studies. In other words, there may
not be any direct, explicit, and immediate compensation for the favor. The payment may be delayed in time and,
when made, it may appear completely unconnected with the favor received.” 11
Considering all these discussions a comprehensive definition of corruption can be as follows. Corruption is a social,
political and economic problem which includes two or more actors. Here individuals or institutions preserve their
own interest from their respective position with the exercise of power and resources and avoiding legal framework,
which circumvent group interest. Corruption is a process from a communication-perspective and it indicates a type of
exchange relation. Of course, somebody has to initiate the exchange, and at least one other actor has to be induced or
influenced to engage in the relation, so that one of the two parties can potentially have a more active role in the
interaction. Criminal law in some countries distinguishes these types as “active” and “passive” corruption. The briber
is viewed as the “active” party and the public official as “passive”.
Some of the basic characteristics of corruption can be identified through the following concepts. Bribery is the
payment (in money or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt relationship. Embezzlement is theft of public resources
by public officials, which is another form of misappropriation of public funds. Fraud is an economic crime that
involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit. It is fraud for instance when state agencies and state representatives
are engaged in illegal trade networks, counterfeit and racketing, and when forgery, smuggling and other organized
economic crime are propped up by “official” sanction and involvement. Extortion is money and other resources
extracted by the use of coercion, violence or the threats to use force. “Protection” or “security” money can be extorted
in the classical, infamous mafia style. Favoritism is a mechanism of power abuse implying “privatization” and a
highly biased distribution of state resources, no matter how these resources have been accumulated in the first place.
Nepotism is a special form of favoritism, in which an office holder (ruler) prefers his proper kinfolk and family
members. Corrupt payments to win major contracts concessions and privatizing of companies are generally the
preserves of large scale business and high-level officials. These deals are by definition the preserve of top officials and
frequently involve multinational corporations operating alone or in consortia with local partners.
Corruption Scenario in Bangladesh Bureaucratic corruption was very much evident in Pakistan. A number of civil servants belonging to the Civil Service
The rank of Bangladesh in corruption since 2001 is presented in the following table. of Pakistan (CSP), had been dismissed from their services on corruption charges. Information obtained from the
Table 1: Bangladesh’s Rank in Score List from 2001 - 2008 Ministry of Finance show that in Bangladesh over a period of twenty-two years (1971-1993), taka 18,000 crore were
lost in the public sector due to misappropriation of public funds and theft. 18 TIB shows that 64.1 percent government
Year Rank CPI Numember of
officials were involved in corruption. Among them high officials were involved in the maximum proportion (26.9%)
Score Surveyed
Countries followed by the subordinate staff (25.7%).19
2001 1st 0.4 91 The Official Secrets Act of 1923 is used as a convenient tool to deny information, which works as a safeguard for
2002 1st 1.2 102 corrupt officials. TIB identified that due to lack of transparent assessment criteria for examinations, there is scope of
irregularities and corruption in the recruitment process through rampant transaction of bribes in the Public Service
2003 1st 1.3 133
Commission (PSC).20 This process motivates the civil servants to get involved in the same process of corruption when
2004 1st 1.5 145
they start their career. As a result, the cost for the poor to get services, which they were supposed to receive free or
2005 1st (with Chad) 1.7 158
almost free of charge, turn out to be very expensive. A recent report of the UNDP titled "Corruption and Good
2006 3rd (Along with Chad, Congo, and Sudan) 2.0 156 Governance" found that bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency are taking a heavy toll on the Bangladesh economy,
2007 7th 2.0 180 causing hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of loss in terms of unrealized investment and income. The report
2008 10th 2.1 180 pointed out: "If Bangladesh were to improve the integrity and efficiency of its bureaucracy, its investment would rise
Source: Transparency International Bangladesh (Based on TI Report Authors prepare herself.) by more than five percent and its yearly GDP rate would rise by over half a percent". 21
When corruption is systemic in public sector, firms that do business with government agencies, can seldom escape
The World Bank also identified Bangladesh as the 12th and 17th among the most corrupt countries in 2004 and 2005
participating in bribery. The ban and stigma on corruption necessitates a collusion or conspiracy between individuals
respectively in the corruption index of the governance indicators. Furthermore, the World Economic Forum identified
or at least a certain closeness and confidentiality. Corruption has thus been defined as a secret social exchange, and
Bangladesh as the most corrupt country among 125 in the corruption sub-index of the Global Competitiveness Report
the private gains have been emphasized. The money or benefit so collected through corruption is ‘privatized’ to
for 2006-07. In one survey 76% of the respondents identified corruption, 71% democracy and 64% human rights as
major concerns in Bangladesh.12 In reality very few institutions are free of corrupt practices and these are causing various degrees. It may be extracted for the benefit of an individual who will share nothing or a very little with
huge financial loss for the government. More importantly because of corruption and mismanagement in police his/her equals, or it may be extracted for the benefit of a particular group with some coherence and unity. 22
administration, judiciary, health sector, education, etc., people begin to lose their trust on government day by day.
Corruption is broadly considered to be a key deterrent for development in Bangladesh. Causes and Consequences of Corruption in Bangladesh
It has been observed that all regimes in Bangladesh are susceptible to political corruption. According to Senturia Corruption is generally connected with the activities of the state and especially with the monopoly and discretionary
political corruption is, ‘when any powerful political leader gains his/her personal interest with the misuse of power of the state. Therefore, Robart Klitgaurd a leading expert in this field has enumerated the causes of corruption
power’.13 Here misuse of power means an unlawful act. It is formed when human beings become greedy. In that sense in a simple equation.23 That is C=M+D-A. According to this equation, corruption is a form when bureaucrats use their
we can define political corruption as ‘abuse of power’. discretionary power in decision making and create a monopolistic system. Because of discretion and monopoly of the
bureaucrat, administrative accountability does not come into force. The UNDP takes into account other dimensions
Political corruption in this region can be traced back to British colonial rule and Pakistan period. According to
which are also important to balance monopoly and discretion. The UNDP sourcebook proposes the following
Planning Commission, during (1949-50) ~ (1969-70) almost 3112 crore taka of government property was transferred
formula.24
from East Pakistan to West Pakistan with the help of a dominant corrupt cycle. 14 After independence, corruption
became one of the major concerns. The followers of the ruling party got job opportunities in government controlled Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – (Accountability + Transparency + Integrity). This suggests that the absence
industries and some of them became very rich by illegal business. After army take over in August 1975, corruption of ATI (as a consequence of weak governance) in addition to Monopoly and Discretion results in corruption. Hence
and misuse of power resulted in the wastage of almost 40% of the total resources earmarked for development. 15 corruption is principally a failure of governance. In this regard Vito Tanzi mentions some particular aspects of
General Ershad usurped power by declaring ‘Jehad’ (war) against corruption, but through Upazila (Sub district) governmental activities which create a fertile ground for corruption.25
system he allegedly extended corruption at the grassroots level. Since 1991 all the popularly elected governments Direct Cause Indirect Cause
were also accused of indulging in corruption and corrupt practices of different sorts.
Complex Regulation and Authorizations. Quality of the Bureaucracy.
Bureaucratic corruption can be defined as ‘administrative’, ‘petty’, ‘low level’ or ‘street corruption’ which takes place Taxation. Level of public sector wages.
at the implementation stage, where the public meets public officials in daily business and services like hospitals, Spending Decisions. Penalty Systems.
schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing authorities and so on. According to Gould bureaucratic corruption is
Provision for goods and services at below market price. Institutional controls.
‘the institutionalized personal abuse of public resources by civil servants’. 16 We can define it as “systematic
Financing of Parties. Transparency of Rules, Laws
corruption” or “collective corruption”. Bribe is the major force of bureaucratic corruption and it works as “speed and process.
Other Discretionary Decision.
money”. Those who want to get wealth very quickly and do not want to follow rules and regulations, offer bribe to Examples by leadership.
governmental officials. Basically bureaucrats retain power with intent to monopolistic attitude over the public and to
These are mostly symptoms rather than causes of corruption. We consider them as correlates of corruption since
gain their own personal interests. In this regard Jacob Van Klavenren mentions that “a corrupt administrator looks at
corruption is likely to occur when any of these conditions exist, besides poverty, war (effect of war), illiteracy,
his/her office as a business, from where he/she can earn extra money”.17
population explosion, weak public opinion and unequal distribution of wealth. All these sociological problems also
encourage corruption.
Our observation is that poverty is a major cause of corruption as well as a barrier in Bangladesh. Almost 42.1% people
live below the poverty lines who struggle every day to upgrade their living standard and are forced to take
opportunity to make money whether it is a corrupt way or not. It is found that corruption is perceived as most severe
in Chad, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Myanmar and Haiti, which are the poorest countries in the world.
Persons related with public and private administration can misuse their power and deprive mass people from public
services because most of the victims are illiterate, as they do not understand the complex rules and regulations of
public administration. The monopoly and discretionary power of the politicians and the bureaucrats also cause
corruption in Bangladesh. Public officials along with the politicians use their authority and exercise illegitimate
power over the public. TIB report in 2000 shows that, out of 1948 cases of corruption monopoly power was being
used by the public servants in 662 cases on a large scale and 371 cases on a smaller scale. 26
One survey shows that almost 50% household of the country think that lack of accountability is the main reason for
corruption. Recently, the speaker of the parliament at a roundtable, said that over 1000 audit reports were prepared
by the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) since its inception in 1973, but only 300 of them were
discussed in the public accounts committee (PAC) of the parliament as over 700 audit reports are kept lying in the
PAC.27 Until 1/11 2007, there was hardly any practice for monitoring assets of the Ministers or submission of
statements of wealth by high government officials.
The complex rules and regulations in Bangladesh create opportunity and avenues for corruption. Moreover political
culture of this country is characterized by mistrust, unfaithfulness and misdeeds among the political parties and such
a conflicting political culture installs corruption. The salary of the employers of the public sector is low compared to
that in the private sector. This instigates the public servants to involve in corruption in order to meet the ever
increasing price hike of essential goods.
Corruption hits the poorest and weakest badly as they cannot afford to pay bribes or offer other forms of
remuneration in order to safeguard their rights. This means that they are rejected by health services, they do not get
into schools or receive fair treatment in the judicial system and that they are excluded from political influence. The
poorest are also affected as corruption has adverse impact on the economy, employment possibilities and
environment. According to Vito Tanzi corruption28 reduces investment and as a consequence, reduces the rate of
growth. Corruption impedes Bangladesh's efforts to reduce its massive poverty. In World Bank’s Survey in 2004
Bangladesh was placed at the lower end of the scale of 100 countries as most firms reported that they made off-the-
record payments to get things done. Such payments cumulatively result in 2-3% points of foregone GDP annually.
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 29 stated that almost all Bangladeshi companies are subject to
illegal payments and the volume of such payments is almost 3% of their total sales.
A major feature of the Bangladesh economy is prolonged low investment both in public and private sectors. Recently
published UNCTAD survey shows that Bangladesh has a lot of potentials for business through foreign investment
but because of corruption and an inefficient, corrupt bureaucracy, it has not been realized. It is found that as a result
of massive anti-corruption drives during the term of the recent caretaker government, private investment increased
marginally from 19.3% of GDP in FY2008 to 19.6% FY2009. But investment in public sector has steadily declined from
6.2% of GDP in FY2005 to 4.6% in FY2009.30 It is also found that from independence to date Bangladesh got $35 billion
as grant, 75% of which was embezzled through corruption. In 2006, the World Bank demanded return of the 6 crore
80 lac taka allocated against three different projects on grounds of corruption. Most of all corruption is destroying
citizens’ faith in their government as lack of transparency, monopolistic power, and administrative complexity make
people suffer.
Institutional Background of Anti Corruption Drives
At the end of WW II an organization by the name "Enforcement Branch" was created in 1943 under the Food
Department to monitor and check pervasive corruption in the food rationing system amid famine like situation in the
Sub-Continent. When the measure proved to be futile the branch was placed under the CID and the Anti-Corruption
Act 1947 was enacted. In the year 1957 the branch was reorganized as Bureau of Anti- Corruption. Since its inception
until 1983 the organization functioned as a branch of the Police although the control of the organization changed
along with changes in the system of the government. However, through a notification issued by the Chief Martial
Law Administrator’s Office on 19 October 1983 a separate employment charter was provided to the Bureau curtailing
its dependency on the police for manpower. From 1991 it was totally under the control of the Prime Minister’s Office
as a directorate. The Bureau had sanctioned strength of 968 members. But the Bureau could not function properly
because of cumbersome laws, weak enquiry report, inefficiency of the Bureau’s personnel, stay-orders from the
Higher Courts, inordinate delay in obtaining permission from the government, foot-dragging by the defense lawyer
etc. Subsequently, the Bureau was abolished and the ACC was constituted under the ACC Act on 9 May 2004.
The ACC started its journey with twenty thousand unsolved cases inherited from the Bureau. Hence, initially the
ACC had to meet numerous challenges. Once the ACC was established, the Bureau became functus officio. The
Commission was under pressure to regularize all 1231 employees of the non defunct Bureau, although some of the
staff were accused of corruption. This tussle continued for 18 months and the organizational structure, roster
manpower remained unsettled. During this period, millions of taka were spent for hiring consultants, but with no
significant output.
There were some loopholes in the ordinance through which the commission was created. Firstly, the bill made it clear
that, for appointing a commissioner five member screening committee is to be constituted. The persons selected
should have at least twenty years of experience in law, education, administration, judicial service or in defense
services. The weakness of the ordinance is that, emphasis was given only on experience rather than specifying the
area of experience. Secondly, there is no exclusive court or judge for adjudication of anti-corruption cases. As a result,
judicial procedures were to be undertaken by special judges whose appointment, transfer, increment and up-
gradation were determined by the law ministry. Thirdly, Article twenty three of the bill showed that, there was no
time limit to take action against an incriminated person. In matter of delays in taking action against a person or if the
charge was dismissed by the court, there was no provision in the bill to demand trial by a higher court. Fourthly,
ACC had the right to inquire into some criminal activities under two laws; one is under the protection law and the
other is under the Penal Code. Many of the penalizing criminal activities were scheduled under Penal Code. For
example, any false statement given as witness under the law or any use of such false statement for illegal purpose or
criminal activities, the matter may be brought before the ACC. Further, offences relating to passport, money
laundering and foreign investment related criminal activities had not been taken into consideration in the schedule of
the bill. Fifthly, Apart from the legal procedures there were also unlawful and dishonest motives of some politicians
who made the Commission inactive from inside.
As mentioned earlier the CTG after 11 January, 2007 took initiatives to reconstitute the ACC and to make it effective.
A seven member Advisory Council Committee was formed through a gazette notification of the cabinet division.
However the question of its legitimacy was raised in the court and the court consolidated the status of ACC through
its verdict. An official notification mentioned that the statutes of the ACC would be determined as ‘independent, self-
governing and impartial’ instead of ‘independent and impartial’ in relation to Section 3(2) of the ACC Act 2004.
Besides, investigation of money laundering has also been given to the ACC. Thus, the Act proves that both public and
private servants can be taken into account. The Commission issued Anti-corruption Rules 2007, which enhanced its
power one step further to combat corruption in the country. Another significant milestone for the Commission was -
Bangladesh’s accession to the UN Convention against Corruption, on February 27, 2007.
To support the mission and tasks of the Commission an organogram consisting of 1264 has been sanctioned. This
consists of the Chairman and two commissioners; one secretary, six Director Generals, 19 Directors, and the rest are
subordinate investigating officers and clerical/ supporting staff as can be seen in the following box.
 Box 1: ACC Organogram Source: www.acc.org.bd (Accessed: 01.09.2008).

An Evaluation
The ACC gave final reports on 240 graft cases, exonerating a total of 403 people from various charges. Considering
the above data, it is quite evident that the Commission showed much better performance than the earlier Bureau – the
BAC. Undeniably the entire nation was amused by the courage of the Commission’s institutional initiative. The
arrests of these corrupt politicians led many to believe that a new political age was imminent. Unfortunaly, as the
government's self-imposed deadline of election was coming closer, this strategy started to fadeout. Many of the
politicians were released from prison. The well-publicized anti-graft campaign which was meant to be the foundation
of CTG's reform lost its accomplishments. Now the question is- whether the role of ACC is dynamic or not? What are
its problems?
The effectiveness and success of a public organization depends on the degree of faith amongst the people. In case of
the Commission it seems to be losing its strength in the process of combating corruption. From a legal point of view,
the Commission is still weak to perform a positive role. As per article 25 and 30 the organizational set-up of the
Commission and its budget shall be determined by the government. It means that any government can interfere in the
Source: www.acc.org.bd. Accessed June 31, 2009 ACC activities. Besides, the ACC is now under the Cabinet Division, which also raises the question of its
As part of anti-corruption movement the military backed caretaker government issued the Emergency Power independence.
Ordinance (EPO) on 25th June 2007. Although the Commission was reformed to make it 'free' and 'independent', the There were several weaknesses in the proceedings for preparing cases of the ACC. According to one legal expert, "As
government formed another body namely National Coordination Committee (NCC) for Combating Corruption and a result of the High Court verdict all the notices the ACC has issued asking people to submit wealth statement will be
Crime comprising civil and military officials. The NCC and its taskforces prepared lists of graft suspects and cancelled. The ACC notice was not served in accordance with the ACC Act. The commission could have issued the
conducted primary investigation against a number of former ministers, Members of Parliament, businessmen and notice after certain formalities, including primary enquiry and investigation, but it could not produce any document
others. The ACC published lists in phases and issued notices on them to submit their wealth statements. From 1/11, regarding any such enquiry and investigation.”32 As a result of these shortcomings many of the ACC efforts are now
2007 to 1/11, 2008 the caretaker government’s anti-corruption drives were the following31: Published List of Corrupt being challenged in the higher courts apparently for not maintaining procedures properly in serving notices for
Persons - 222; Arrested- 80; Under Trial (ACC Cases-24, NBR –13 & Police -35) - 72; Trial Completed (ACC Cases-18, wealth statements and conducting investigations. In many cases the anti-graft watchdog also had to accept some
NBR –12 & Police -14)- 44. wealth statements even after the submission deadline expired following order from the higher court. These events
According to ACC statistics, 239 out of 256 graft suspects were served with notices to submit wealth statements. have made the ACC activities sluggish.
Around 141 cases were filed against former ministers, state ministers and lawmakers including chiefs of the two main The anti-corruption drive could not progress properly due to lack of field-level experience and poor coordination as
political parties -the BNP and the Awami League (AL). Besides ACC, National Board of Revenue (NBR) also filed well as understanding among those involved. Even the taskforce members from the defenses, who played a key role
cases for tax dodging, and some individuals filed extortion cases against some high-profile political personalities in probing corruption allegations, reported difficulties in ensuring quality investigation and mentioned that lack of
including the chief of the AL. Bank accounts of these accused persons were asked to freeze. The government also set skill or expertise hampered the process. According to the chief coordinator of the NCC, "Many of us involved in the
up nine special courts on the national parliament complex to deal with the graft cases filed by the ACC and the NBR. process of enquiry and investigation lack experience. The task force members [under the coordination committee]
Some of the cases were brought under the Emergency Power Rules (EPR). The prosecution status during 2007-08 can from the army, navy and air force also do not have that kind of experience in investigation. This has specially affected
be seen from the following table. the pace of progress of investigation. We are dealing with high profile people, many of whom were involved in
Table 2: Prosecution Status during 2007-08 corporate corruption. To tell you the truth, none of our departments has any experience of [probing] corporate
Status No corruption.”33 As a result, the rate of executing suspects reduced. Bringing the cases under EPR was challenged in the
Number of FIR Lodged by ACC 1146 higher courts as the time of the incidents taking place was much earlier than proclamation of the state of emergency.
Number of Inquiry in Progress 678 This added to the slowness of the legal proceedings.
Number of Wealth Statements Asked For 373 The Commission initiated a drive against institutional corruption. It was almost impossible to collect all the pieces of
Number of Investigation in Progress 725 evidence for a standard investigation as the task given to a single person was huge in comparison with the timeline.
Number of Charge Sheet in Progress 58 The Commission could not even look into 70,000 allegations submitted by individuals since its inception due to excess
Number of Writ Petition 308 workload.
Number of Criminal Miscellaneous Cases 220 According to law, the Commission is mandated as independent, self-governed and neutral entity. It consists of three
Number of Stayed Cases in HCD due Writ 64 Commissioners; of them one as the chairman and all appointed by the President on the recommendation of the
Number of Stayed Cases due Criminal Miscellaneous Cases 182
Selection Committee for a period of four years from the date of their appointment. From November 2004 to till now
Number of Appeals in which the Stay Order of the HCD were
stayed by the Appellate Division and the Appeals were finally 60
(almost five years) any chairman and commissioner could not complete their tenure of four years. In fact two former
disposed off chairmen had resigned only because of political pressure. If such is the case, there will be hardly any difference
between the ACC and the defunct Bureau.
One of the main reasons for dissolving the earlier Bureau was immense corruption of the officials who were closely
related with investigation. Unfortunately a number of former members from defunct Bureau were included in the
ACC. Thus the transparency, effectiveness and institutionalization of the new ACC became questionable.
The ACC published a verdict list consisting of top politicians and their relatives. Undoubtedly it was a courageous
progress. But most of them got bail from the high court and thereby the institutional value was under doubt. Recently
the government has withdrawn 62 political cases out of 112 reviewed cases filed under the penal code and the Anti-
Corruption Commission Act. The politicians opine that during the caretaker government the ACC was used to harass
political leaders.
The politicization of state institutions results in administrative and policy choices for partisan advantage. It renders
institutional managers and civil servants unwilling to resist the pervasive culture of corruption. It is observed that,
changes in the governance structure in the past have led to various changes in the structure of the BAC. At one point
it was brought under the control of the President and at another point it was shifted to the PM’s Office. A close
examination of certain cases indicates that obtaining permission for carrying out an investigation from the PM’s office
requires 4 to 9 years. In addition, several functions of the BAC were activated through ordinance at various points in
time. Despite many attempts to make it an effective agent for combating corruption, the BAC was ineffective due to
negligence of officials at the inquiry/investigation stage, unnecessary time taken in conducting inquiry/investigation
and lack of proper planning at the inquiry/investigation level. Moreover disruptive transfer of officials involved in
investigation, delay in obtaining permission for carrying out investigation, stay or suspension order of the court,
submission of weak charge-sheet and lack of witnesses also created obstacles for effective functioning of the BAC. In
addition incapability of the inquiry/investigation officials and lack of proper training had been another phenomenon.
It was observed that from 1994 to 1999, only 90 BAC officials had received training.
For the reason that prior permission has to be obtained from the PM, no charges are usually brought against any
person affiliated with the ruling party. Thus the Bureau could not take independent action on charges brought against
the members of the ruling party. According to data received until April 12, 2001, the Bureau filed 151 cases against
prominent people including Ministers, MPs, former Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and a few senior officials of
autonomous bodies. After completing inquiries and obtaining the permission of the concerned government authority,
cases were filed. Charge-sheets for the filed cases had been submitted at the concerned courts. No cases however
completed trial. All political cases filed during the years 1991 to 2000 were at either inquiry or investigation and trial
stage. It is worth noticing that when a new party assumes office charges are brought against the Ministers/MPs of the
previous government. From a TIB survey it is revealed that 64.3% of the respondents think that government uses or
wants to use the institution as a weapon for repression of the opposition. 34 As a result of this trend the Bureau was
basically known as “a weapon for repression of the opposition”. The Bureau also lacked authority to take action
against senior officials. If there was a case filed against an official considered for promotion, improper pressure was
brought to the Bureau to write a note stating that there was no basis for the case filed and that there was no possibility
of proving the case.
The ACC was named as an ‘Independent’ Anti-corruption Commission, but it was still under the PM’s Office. As a
result of this, the consequences of all corruption cases remained the same, because, like the Bureau, the so-called
independent ACC was politically-motivated and was used for political purposes. It is evident that the CTG also used
the ACC as a tool to repress politicians. The aim of the CTG was to embark on political reforms, but soon, the reforms
of the political party had been diverted into "minus two" formula. As a result the ACC was used to suppress politics
and politician instead of curbing corruption.
Political culture in Bangladesh is characterised by mistrust, misperception and disagreement. Following example will
describe the scenario of mistrust and intolerance among the political parties in Bangladesh. In 2001, when Bangladesh
according to TIB report, became the most corrupt country achieving lowest CPI score, then the ruling party did not
accept the report. They blamed the opposition for it and branded it as a misleading report. On the other hand the
opposition blamed the ruling party for this discredit. Next year, in 2002 when Bangladesh again became the top most
corrupt country under the changed administration, same sort of mudslinging went on. The political parties therefore
are always ready to blame each other rather than curbing corruption.
Conclusion
No society is totally free of corruption, but with appropriate institutional and legislative measures, corruption can be
kept within acceptable limits. This requires a systematic, comprehensive and long-term approach. In order to perform
successfully the institutions charged with combating corruption must be given adequate freedom, necessary
resources and logistic facilities. The following institutional steps can be taken to make the ACC effective.
The ACC must be independent politically as well as operationally from outside influence in order to enable it to
pursue corruption allegations at all levels. For reducing corruption to the minimum it needs to be accorded a
constitutional status like PSC or the Election Commission and the constitution should be amended towards this goal.
Moreover the ACC needs to operate on the basis of solid and comprehensive legal frameworks and new laws should
be adopted as necessary. Its manpower should be increased to deal with large number of cases and clear the back log.
The ACC must have adequate powers of investigation, i.e. to question witnesses, access to documents, as well as the
possibility to prosecute where required. The ACC also needs to develop a coherent and holistic strategy for
combating corruption, focusing on prevention, investigation and awareness raising. To make the ACC more
responsive to the public, its activities should be conducted in a transparent manner. Management of finance and staff
should also strictly follow the standard rules and regulations. One of the main reasons of closure of the Bureau was
endless corruption of its own staff. It is observed that, after the formation of the ACC many of them could manage
absorption and regular appointment. As such the recruitment process in the ACC is to be proper and without any
bias. The officials need appropriate training so that morality bound and promise-determined manpower is created.
Simultaneously other institutional aspects of governance need to be strengthened. The judiciary should be free from
executive intervention so that legal process can establish rule of law. The accountability structure of the officials
should be strengthened so that stringent actions can be taken against those who nurse corrupt process. To keep
corruption at bay, procurement systems must be based on transparency, competition, and objectivity. Civil society
organizations can come forward and mobilize people’s resistance movements against all sorts of corruption. All
government employees, ministers, Members of Parliament and politicians should declare their assets every year
whether it is in their own names or in the names of family members. All outdated laws preventing the people’s rights
to information, including the Official Secrets Act 1923, must be abolished and the Right to Information (RTI) must be
practiced to ensure transparency and free flow of information. Appointment of sector-wise ombudsmen as per article
77 of the constitution can make a difference in ensuring accountability, especially in the key sectors of public service.
Application of e-governance in all sectors will reduce paper work and will introduce automation that will result in a
more transparent system. The ultimate source of strength in anti-corruption movement is the people and as such their
awareness and participation in the form of a social movement with active support of all the stakeholders, especially
the media are the demand of the time.
Notes and References
1. Mark, E. Warren, “What does Corruption Mean in a Democracy”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol- 48, Issue-2, April-2004, pp. 3-24
2. Barker, Ernest (Trans.), The Politics of Aristotle, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1948, p.130
3. Mark, E. Warren, op: cit. p. 7
4. Ibid. p. 8
5. Nye, J. S., “Corruption and Political Development : A Cost-Benefit Analysis”, M. U. Ekpo (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Toward a Search for Causes and Consequences, Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1979, pp. 257-266
6. Leff, H. N., “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption”, M. U. Ekpo (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub- Saharan Africa:
Toward a Search for Causes and Consequences, Washington D. C. : University Press of America, 1979. pp. 234-247
7. Rose-Ackerman, S., Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, New York: Academic Press, 1978, pp. 1-10
8. Akhter, Muhammed, Yeahia, Electoral Corruption in Bangladesh, Burlington, USA, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 2001
9. Fredrick, C. J., The Pathology of Politics Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda, New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 127
 10. Amundsen, I., “Corruption: Definitions and Concepts”, Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Draft- 17,
January, 2000
11. Tanzi, V., “Corruption Around the World- Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, December, 1998
12. USAID, “Bangladesh: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices”, National Survey Covering Democracy and Governance Issues, 2004
13. Joseph, J. Senturia, “Political Corruption”, R. A. Edwin Selingam and others (Eds), Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vols. III and IV, London,
1931, p. 448
14. Rabby, A. M. M., “Natures, Characteristics and Trends of Corruption in Bangladesh”, Journal of Bangladesh Public Administration Training
Centre, Dhaka, Vol.-5, Krattik 1407, p. 20
15. Kochanek, S. A., Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh, Dhaka: UPL, 1993
16. Gould, D.J., “Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Causes, and Remedial Strategies”, A. Farazmand (ed), Handbook of Comparative and
Development Public Administration, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1991, pp. 467-480
17. Alam, M. S., “Corruption in Administration”, (in Bangla), Bangla Bazar Patrika (a vernacular Daily Newspaper), January 28-29, 1996
18. Ibid
19. Transparency International Bangladesh, “Corruption Database Report”, 2005
20. Karim, R. and Sharmin, R., “Bangladesh Public Service Commission: A Diagnostic Study”, Transparency International Bangladesh, 22
March, 2007
21. Mustafa, S., "Corruption Costs Millions, says UNDP”, Financial Express, 31 July, 1997
22. Franda, M., Bangladesh: The First Decade, New Delhi: South Asian Publisher, 1982
23. Klitgaard, R., & Ronald, M., Corruption Cites, Washington D. C.: World Bank Institute, Abaroa and H Lindesy Press, 2000, p. 24
24. http://intra.undp.org/bdp/anticorruption/sourcebook_ati.htm
25. Tanzi, V., “Corruption Around the World- Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, December, 1998,
pp. 568-572
26. Zahid, S. H., “Corruption—Ranking and Reality”, Financial Express, 24 October, 2005
27. Transparency International Bangladesh, “Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey”, 2002
28. Tanzi, V., op.cit p 583
29. Chetwynd, Chetwynd, and Spector, ‘Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent Literature’, Management Systems International,
January, 2003
30. Hossain, M., “Fighting Corruption a Tall Order for the Government”, The Financial Express, 12th April, Dhaka, pp. 1-4
31. The Daily Star, January 11, 2008
32. The Daily Star, February 14, 2009
33. Manik, A. J. Hossain, E., “Petty corruption ails people despite year-long drive-Crackdown targeted large-scale individual graft only”, The
Daily Star, February 14, 2009
34. Transparency International Bangladesh, Bureau of Anti Corruption Fact Finding Report, December, 2001, pp. xiv-xvii.

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