De Gruyter

"PHILIA" in the "GORGIAS"

Author(s): Roger Duncan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1974), pp.
23-25
Published by: De Gruyter
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913339 .
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 23.

"PHILIA"
intheGORGIAS

As far as I can determine insufficient attention has been paid, in the

interpretation of the Gorgias, to the role of viXia, particularly as it figures
in that third and longest section of the dialogue where Socrates and Callicles
confront each other.1 I offer here first some textual observations, and
second, a few paragraphs of interpretation.

The references to philia in the Callicles section are too numerous to be

accidental. If we follow the thread, we get the following:
1) Callicles, in the process of criticizing severely the Socratic way
of life, feels it necessary to declare his friendship and goodwill toward
" eyw
Socrates. 6e, 5 EoiSxpaTes cpiXixos(485E). fl . . . 5 <pi'Xe
itpòsoe êiueixws exu>.
Eutopaxeç ... eúvoía yap êpffi
ttJ oí} (H86A)
2) Socrates underscores this profession in his lengthy reply. Gorgias
and Polus are friendly and wise, but a bit bashful; Callicles is frank. And,
Socrates adds, " ¿yot et euvous" (487B) . The proof of this Calliclean goodwill
is his readiness to give Socrates the same advice that he gives to his partners
(xoivojvoi') in wisdom (487C) . So, says Socrates again (487D) , "when I hear you
giving me the same advice that you give your own most intimate friends (èxaipoTcÍTois)
I have proof (oti is aXndws p<h euvousel)." Finally he calculates the possibilities
of the discussion to come: Callicles1 wisdom and frankness preclude mistakes
arising fromTack of these qualities; what is more, there will be no deception.
Why? "<piXosyap yoi el, is xa' aÛTOs<pi)S"(487E) .
3) Part of Callicles1 defense of lawlessness is an appeal to the ability
of the strong man to give gifts to his friends (492C) .
4) After being shown a few of what most people would consider counter-
examples to the hedonism he champions, Callicles decides to continue his iden-
" uva ôtíuoi yfj
tification of pleasure and good for the sake of consistency:
àvovioXoYov5yevos
Ç ó Xdyoç ..." (495A) Socrates warns that this attitude will
"kill11 ( ôia<pdetpu>)his opening statements (495A) . Callicles then insists that
it really is his opinion that pleasure and good are the same. The point of
this dramatic subtlety begins to emerge at 497D, when Socrates begins to chalk
up the result of Callicles1 persistence in argument for the sake of argument.
To an increasingly sulky Callicles, whomSocrates addresses as friend (2><piXe)
it is demonstrated that the reasoning has now led to a distinction between
"pleasant" and "good". After another turn of the screw pinches Callicles into
a protest to the effect that he had been joking all along, Socrates chides him
and says, tf xaiftoi oúx §'ir''>ye xaxf àpxa£uno aoö èxóvroseivai eCanaTrifcifaeadai
, is ovtos
vuv 6e è(|>e'5a$nv... (499C) .
(pifXou- Callicles has not been able to stand by his
initial profession of friendship.
5) The discussion of qualitative hedonism allows a reassertion of
Socrates1 position qn the nature of rhetoric. The passage is ushered in with
an entreaty "icposSaXtfou"
(500É) . The consequences however, are too much for
Callicles, who at 505C buys out definitely and disowns what he had said so far.
Socrates must go on "talking by himself." (505D)

ApeironVol. VIII (1974) No. 1

 24.

6) Whenhe has recapitulated the argument and described the temperate

and intemperate types of men Socrates makes a new and striking point: the
man who lets his desires go unrestrained without any recognition of limits leads
the life of a robber, and ouxe yctpav aWy àvdpo&TNp itpoa<piXnsäv ein o toioutos ouxe
Se<j>«xoLvajveiv
yap aodvatos, 5t(^ ôè yh evi Koivcovia,quXia ou* av ein. (507E) Furthermore,
heaven and earth, gods and men are held together by xoivwvia,cpiXia,Hoayioms,
and oixairfrns.
au)cppoa'5vn

II

2
This is not the last significant mention of <piXia in the dialogue, but
it terminates any discussion in which Callicles could be said to be a real
participant. We can understand this entire section much better if we distinguish
the plot from the sub-plots. The sub-plots are all the arguments that commen-
tators and philosophers usually focus on, for the most part having to do with
hedonism. What is most significant, however, takes from 481B to 508C to happen.
Callicles has entered a discussion out of friendly feeling; he intends to per-
suade Socrates that the latter 's life-style is all wrong. In the course of
the conversation he cannot sustain his friendly feeling because he is unable to
resist speaking deceptively. Callicles, unlike Gorgias,3 is more interested
in winning than in getting at the truth, although he believes at first, and
probably in the end, that he has the truth. We may say that his enthusiasm
for the truth is subordinate to his interest in recognition. But if his desire
for recognition leads him to speak deceptively, on the gamble that he may carry
off the argument and best Socrates, he must betray cpiXia.
On the theoretical level, Socrates maintains, after we have watched
Callicles go through his changes, that the intemperate man cannot share with
anyone and cannot, therefore, be friends with anyone. This is interesting in
the light of Callicles1 claim that only the "strong man" will be able to give
gifts to his friends and thus, by implication, , to have friends. But it be-
comes even more significant when we realize that Callicles has been coaxed
by Socrates to expose his ideal, his picture of the kind of man he admires and
aspires to be, which picture turns out to be inconsistent with friendship, at
least according to Socrates. At the same time, we have watched the contra-
diction develop in Callicles1 psyche: he wants to be friends with Socrates,
or thinks he does, but he also wants to "overreach" Socrates in the argument.

Two related things are happening, then. First, if Socrates is right in

saying that Callicles1 ideal man cannot have friends, Callicles is caught in
an "existential contradiction," which is to say he maintains a position at
variance vith the way he acts, in this case the very act of maintaining the
position.4 By entering the discussion Callicles shows that he can feel
friendship, that he wants to share the truth. But the "truth" he wants to
share would rule out such sharing as nonsensical. (What, we might ask, is a
strong man doing trying to persuade others to become strong men?) Secondly,
as a kind of evidence that Socrates is right there is the very credible dramatic
dissipation of Callicles1 friendly feeling in the course of the conversation.
In going on to claim a cosmic role for <piXiaSocrates relates the spectacle
of the divided Callicles5 to the nature-convention dichotomy, so crucial to
Callicles1 world-picture.6 <piXia, Socrates tells us, is natural. Now it may
very well be that Callicles is more unconventional than Gorgias and Polus.
But in all men, Socrates tells us and Callicles illustrates, the desire for
 25.

friendship, which contains in itself a tendency to limit appetite, is as

natural as the desire to outdo others, or to have more than others; <pUia
"haturally" limits nXeoveÇto. It has not occurred to Callicles that even on
his own principles, which advocate the strengthening and fulfilling of all
one's desires, there may be good reason to seek an ordering and mutual adjustment
amongdesires, involving inevitably a certain curbing and self-mastery, in order
to achieve maximumsatisfaction. It is the quite natural desire for friend-
ship that produces this tension most profoundly in the soul of the "natural"
man.
Roger Duncan university of Connecticut at
Hartford.

Notes:

1. e.g. Dodds, E.R. : (Plato: Gorgias, Oxford, 1959) restricts his observations on the role
of phi lia to (1) pointing out the origins of the idea of a cosmic bond, finding a heavily
Pythagorean influence at 507E ff . (p. 337) and (2) remarking that pros Philiou at 500B
has something to do with Callicles' previous professions of friendship (p. 318).

2. Consider 510B ff .

3. Cf. 457E-458B, 461À-B, 463A.

4. Friendlander (Paul, Plato% New York: Bollinger Foundation, 1964, vol. I, p. 26}) recognizes
this. The fact that Callicles "consents to talk with Socrates at all ... indicates a
certain concession on his part," and "Men like Callicles ... would not and should not
do this; for by entering into a discussion, they acknowledge the validity of a law
that must ultimately cause their downfall." But he does not connect his insight ex-
plicitly with philia.

5. Note 482B-C.

6. E.g. 482E-484C.