Being in Numenius and Plotinus: Some Points of Comparison

Author(s): Dominic J. O'Meara

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1976), pp. 120-129
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 Beingin Numenius
andPlotinus
SomePointsof Comparison
DOMINIC J. O'MEARA

In his Vita Plotini (17,1-6), Porphyry tells us that "when the people
from Greece began to say that Plotinus was appropriating the
ideas of Numenius, and Trypho the Stoic and Platonist told
Amelius, the latter wrote a book to which we gave the title 'On the
Difference between the Doctrines of Plotinus and Numenius' "(trans.
Armstrong). Whilst this evidence cautions us against making rap-
prochements between Plotinus and Numenius which overlook the
differences between their respective doctrines, it also encourages us
to compare these doctrines, and research has in fact brought to light
Numenian material in the Enneads of Plotinus. Without going into a
discussion of the results of this research1, this article will propose
further possible points of comparison, with respect in particular to
certain accounts of true Being in Plotinus and Numenius, and suggest
that these might provide additional indications of Numenian in-
fluence in Plotinus' thought. The accouilt of Being given by Plotinus
in Enneads VI 4, ch. 2 and VI 5, ch. 3 will first be examined, in re-
lation in particular to the use made in these texts of Plato's Parme-
nides. A comparison will then be proposed between an aspect of the
Plotinian account and Being as described by Numenius, this leading
to a brief discussion of the possibility that Numenius may not only
have influenced the account of Being given in Enneads VI 4 and 5,
but may also have provided a precedent to Plotinus' use of the Par-
menides in these works.

Plotinus treats in Enneads VI 4 and 5 of the problem of "integral

omnipresence", that is the question of how intelligible being (true
Being) can be present in a multiplicity of sensible objects without
thereby suffering division and fragmentation. This issue had been
raised in the first part of Plato's Parmenides,and Enneads VI 4 and 5
seem to refer to the Parmenides in relation both to the problem of
integral omnipresence and to that part of its solution based on an

IWhich are collected and summarized by E. des Places in his edition of

Numenius, Num4nius Fragments, Paris 1973, pp. 23-26.

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exposition of the integrity of Being, an exposition using aspects of
the description of the second hypothesis, the "One that is", in the
second part of the Platonic dialogue2. E. R. Dodds has of course
shown that the latter use of the Parmenidesis not uncommon in Plo-
tinus, the Platonic hypotheses being taken by Plotinus as expressions
of the various hypostases or levels of reality3. Recalling (and adding to)
the textual parallels adduced by Dodds and others, we will set forth
briefly the use made in Enneads VI 5, ch. 3 and VI 4, ch. 2 of the
Parmenides,in the descriptionof the integrity of Being.
Plotinus says of Being in VI 5,3,3-7: &vc'yx-I ao ou',r exov a&t re
auv aUTc(i .tvocL, XOCL atea o cVOOCT a aC' 5ou Pnae aiJOU TO 6296at,
4081 IvZcV,pLj8' 7rpoccVcL as' ocu'to5.With this we may compare a
description of the "One that is" of the Parmenides: eartxe [Lv 7tou,
OLYOp ~ aUTuLV
v CoCV?9 YO?
Cp XeV OV XML EX TOUTOU [tX le so5ctvov
' X a us X av C ,ev
X ? u However, whilst asserting the iden-
tity with itself of Being, from which there is no secession, Plotinus
sees Being, paradoxically, as present also in others: e' o6sv,q obroar8C
COCW'ou tur)Oe jlepm,94v p' [Se'roc,'XXaov ocLlYrotL7)Oe.LLov zrroAv v
7roX0Xo-, 4ta :eq gv 6?ov a4o 'ocut 6V5. A similar paradox is

' See the Br6hier (VI 1, pp. 161-162), Harder-Beutler-Theiler (IIb, pp. 396,
413 ff.) and Henry-Schwyzer (vol. III Index l ontium, p. 451) editions of Plotinus;
see below, pp. 121-123.
S E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic
'One"', Class. Quart. 22 (1928) 129-133; followed by B. D. Jackson, "Plotinus
and the Parmenides", Journ. of the Hist. of Philos. 5 (1967) 315-327.
4Parm. 145 e 8-146 a 2; cf. 146 a 9, c 4. Plotinus goes on, in the passage
quoted above, to deny that Being is &v&XMcw (or indeed "in" anything), for this
would mean that it would not be "by itself" and not impassible; in the Parm.
(138 a 2-b 5, 148 d 5 -e 7), being "in another" (&v&XXco) implies a nt&oq (&4Lc),
and there can even be &i+t in the "One that is", if it is regarded as being "in"
itself (the same thought, in Parm. 148 e, appears in Enn. VI 6,18,35-44, a
text which we shall have occasion to notice again in relation to VI 4 and 5).
Jackson, art. cit., p. 324, relates the "in itself" and "in another" of the Parm.
to Enn. V 9,6,1-2; 7,11; 8,7-8; 10,10 (concerning Intellect/Being; Dodds,
art. cit., pp. 132-133, relates the "in itself" and "in another" of the Parm. to
the One in Enn. V 5,9). Cf. VI 4,2,25.
' VI 5,3,8-10; the paradox is brought out by the repetition of &,ua,and by the
use of a seemingly self-contradictory statement in line 12. Compare the contra-
dictory statements made of the One in Parm. 146 a 9-b 1, 147 b 7-8, 149 d 5-6;
for the use of &.uxin a contradictory context, see Parm. 141 d 2 and 146 c 7-8,
as well as the passage from the Parmenides which we next quote; cf. Plato's
Philebus 15 b 2-8, where the "paradox" of integral omnipresence is referred
to (...-rcxU66 xal &v&,a &v&vt'sc xxl no)Xot; yEyvcaOai...; see below note 10).

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put forward in relation to the "One that is" in the Parmenides: apoc
oiV &v ovnov xXuo5 65?a 6Xov 'atL; This suggestion is rejected;
only by division (,tue,upLa[Le'vov) can the "One that is" be present at
the one time in all parts of being (Parm. 144c 8-d 4). Plotinus, however,
holds to both the integrity of Being and its presence in others, and
gives a solution to the paradox which, whilst making omnipresence
possible, enables him to avoid dividing the identical unity of Being
(TO rv xOcL soeutov cipt4LJ
b i ,us,spLau.sov), in whiclh there is no
"fluxion" or movement out from itself which would imply its dis-
persal6. Being remains whole in itself: O6?ovov, -riv &xx&vtWv 7atp'
ou'& [8evoq 0,CoaTCCzV7. The same emphasis, in the language
of the Parmenides, on the integral perfection of Being8, in which there
is no movement outwards, no abandoning of this integrity, is found
in Ennead VI 4, ch. 2: Being does not "leave itself", but rather that
in which it is present partakes of it by moving towards it, by finding
Being in its integrity, "in itself"9.
It is apparent from these similarities of word and phrase in Enneads
VI 4, 2 and VI 5,3 and in the Parmenides that despite a disparity in
philosophical contexts (and hence the differing meanings and functions
carried by these words and phrases), Plotinus finds in the Parmenides'
treatment of the "One that is" expressions of his thesis of the integrity
in itself of Being, an integrity unmarred by any movement away
or dispersal in Being. Plotinus is not, properly speaking, directly
quoting from the Parmenides, nor is he providing in any sense a
commentary on the dialogue. His selective and adaptive use of the
Platonic text in the expression of his own argument can be regarded
5 Enn. VI 5,3,13 ff., 19-20, 21 ff.
7 VI 5,3,20-21; cf. Parm. 144 bl-4, 145 a 7; Henry-Schwyzer refcrs to Parm.
144 b in relation to the use of the term &X7roc'oseZv in Enns. III 6,6,12; III
9,3,14; V 1,5,2; V 5,9,22-23; VI 4,5,5; VI 5,9,39; one miglht also refer to lV
3,8,53; 11,24; V 3,16,30; V 5,4,9-10 as well asto VI 5,3,20-21. Dodds, art. cit.
p. 133, relates the &atoaraetv of the Parm. to Enn. V 5,9, buit juxtaposes it
however with &toXebreatOatin a phrase in VI 4,2 (see following note).
8 Cf. VI 4,2,14-16: n6&v8 -r6 7r&v o'x ga'rLv 67rc,)q OMoXetnvouL iouToi, a>x> gaTt t-
7XpoxO' eout- xoca av atov kaut7 (compare Parm. 144 e 1-2, 142 e 1, 144 c 7,
153 e 1-4; cf. Enn. VI 4,8,26-28; Jackson, art. cit., p. 323, refers to Parm. 144 b
[&JOoCTo'retv!] in relation to &ZTooXemt6tevovin VI 4,11, citing also VI 4,5,4-5
Oa7rO-raC oUx &k7eL7roua(x,and VI 5,4,11-15 17rt?,etL; for taov iautJp in Plotinus,
cf. Parm. 150 el-4, the Equality/Inequality theme missed by Jackson, p. 324);
VI 4,2.23-24.
9 VI 4,2,17-21; on this theory of intelligible presence, see our Structures hiWrar-
chiques dans la pensle de Plotin (Philosophia Antiqua XXVII) Leiden 1975.

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however as constituting a certain reading or interpretation of the
dialogue, an interpretation guided primarily, it would seem, by his
particular preoccupations, namely his doctrine of the integrity of
Being as an identity in, with, or by itself of Being, an identity un-
broken by any movement outwards, and his desire to reconcile with
this integrity the omnipresence of Being.

In stressing, in his use of the Parmenides, the identity in itself of

Being in Enneads VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 3, Plotinus does not allow any
disruption of this identity: there can be no movement outwards of
Being, no splitting up or dispersal of Being'?. There can be no "depar-
ture from itself)" in Being (oux LaitOTalrt AUrO ecu-roi) 1. Although
"departure from itself" does not appear in the Parmenides 2, there is
evidence thatl atSac, precisely in this metaphorical sense, is by no
means uncommon in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. It is
found in the Cratylus (439 e), where, in describing "Beauty itself",
Plato says: cL 8'eOCocvta 'xL xac o' au'or'F6Ta, 7&)q av roir6 ye
,uc3aboBoLn XLVOZ'rO,v1zev C arktevov 'ri mu'0ro5 186; Again,
in the Republic (II, 380 d 5-e 1), questioning this time the notion
that God assumes different forms, Plato asks in a7r?ov -r sLvac [sc.
T6V 4eov] xoL 7CwXv'Tv jXLGTOX
7c MUVIOV18aS, ixpxLVsLV; ... oVx (vaCyx7,

eCP T'rt e'La,aLTO T'r' Ou'rou a

L8 o?S, -' aAYo0 ucp EOWTQv pteaHoeTOa(I NC

10 oux iocuto5 yevo4kvou (VI 4,2,21); &rwoaTr&afct(VI 4,2,23-24; cf. III 2,

1,29-30; 8Laa,&Ca, a term appearing in VI 5,9,46-47 and IV 3,8,20 and 42-43,
appears in the Philebus passage referred to above note 5, indicating perhaps an
'
importance of this passage in Enneads VI 4-5); 8ta-voa ... rpotvxOC
r8d
(VI 5,3,4-5; Wta'7-,t is used in III 2,1,26 ff., where the integrity of the intelligible
is stressed, in response to a Gnostic theory of alienation: cf. a&7?EeVo.0vov,
line 33; cf. ckcpLta-jLL in VI 5,3,8-9; VI 4,16,9; V 3,16,23); [86vO &7tOa'rOG'rVl
(above note 7), ou86v 'ro5 xEr,a4 8e-qk (VI 5,3,20-21). VI 5,2,15 oQu' &E,t6v
[SC. r O6V]7M,EV O98a'OC5?EOL6b dS O'TLOUvrecalls Tim. 50 c 4-5 in its language, and
Tim. 52 a 2-3 in its thought (compare Alcimus ap. Diogenes Laertius, III 10,
p. 125, 4-5 Long).
"Enn. VI 5,3,1-2; ata&aL is found also in this sense in Enns. II 5,3,4-8;
III 6,4,30; 10,18 ff.; 11,36-37; 13,10 (where the impassibility of matter is in
question: see Tim. 50 b quoted below); VI 2,7,24-25; cf. III 6,3,26; V 3,16,22;
VI 6,18,36 (referred to above note 4: a transitive use of the verb; H. Dorrie,
Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata", Munich 1959, pp. 58-59, cites a transitive
use of the verb in Proclus El. theol. 13).
12 The idea is suggested by the passage from Parm. 145 e ('x rOu&ou t ?Taoo-
vov) quoted earlier in this article, and &.Toarteiv in Plotinus (above note 10)
is from the Parm.; though using the words Mix yEyve&ct, Parm. 138 d 6-8
bears little relation to the Plotinian text (VI 4,2,21) quoted in note 10.

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 u XXou;Finally we may refer to the "receptacle"of the Timaeus,
concerning which Plato states (50 b 6-8): touT'O,acu'7v&d1npoap6&ov-
kx ya'p -rs E'ou-rNs-r6 7rtaphav ouac e'i[a-ovrat 8uvauClcogl.
"Departure" reappearsin Aristotle, in the De anima (I 3, 406 b 11-14)
for example, where it is thought that if soul does not move herself per
accidens,eiL'rmt7' &v ?x ' o6aLm,and the word continues to be used
afterwards in a similar way in the Aristotelian tradition14.As possible
antecedents therefore to the Being of Plotinus which does not "depart
from itself" we find God, Beauty and the "receptacle" (in Plato),
and perhaps soul (in Aristotle), which are said not to "depart" from
their particular "form"or being.
Closer however to Plotinus, in the sense that (i) the "departure"
in question concernstrue Being generally ('op6v), rather than the Form
of Beauty or God, and that (ii) this "departure"is specifically a depar-
ture "from itself" (rather than from the subject's particular form or
nature), is a passage in a fragment surviving from Numenius' account
of true Being in the second book of his work On the Good'5.It will be
convenient for the purposes of comparisonto juxtapose the Numenian
passage with the opening lines of Plotinus Enn. VI 5, 3.

1I Dorrie, loc. cit., quotes the Phaedrus (249 cd) on the use of the term (cWaraL,
a passage of less interest for our present purposes.
14 In his edition of the De anima, Ross reads Wa-rLw'.. x..&X - o
'OcX, whilst
translating it as "the '-)ul will depart from its essential nature" (my italics),
a qualification suggested by variants given by some MSS, and by Themistius,
Sophonias and Philoponus. The De anima passage is quoted by Dbrrie, loc.
cit., in connection with E citing also Hist. an. A 1, 488 b 19 and Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias Quaest., p. 47,27 Bruns (an exegesis of the De anima passage)
and De mixt., p. 223,6 Bruns. Apart from the Aristotelian usage, one might
mention a Platonic/Neo-Pythagorean use of axaaI (see belowv note 18),
and an important passage in Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 10,335, also cited
by Dorrie: &x,atKvcL '6q W&CC Woar&aecoq. See also Nicomachus Intro. arith.,
p. 2,10-13 Hoche; Corpus Hermeticum vol. III Fragments extraits de Stob6e,
ed. A. J. Festugi6re, Paris i954, p. 70 note 22.
15 Numenius Fr. 8 in des Places' edition (Fr. 17 in that of E. A. Leemans,
Studie over den Wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea, Acad. roy. de Belgique, Lettres,
XXXVII 2, Bruxelles 1937), referred to by P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus,
Paris 1968, I, p. 291 note 1, in relation to I&Eafatat in Plotinus Enn. VI 7,27,21
and Ddrrie's references.

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 E' plv a T6 OV 7COv?6)W7MVTf
atco'V'Te 'EaTt xocl &-TpE7CovxOal c)croc&UCoq {X?; xcxl o u x Ztcs-
CKar
ouaoc,uuOq
U,ocAavn
e'Etsa-ctuz- (Plotus6 E uo. ux5c3y1v-a3)
VOV t ?'U'TOU, 4veCt &i x(OC? =spl ccu',rouVgeAt ...
voc Xu x Lal ut&c tic...
(Numenius Fr. 8 = Fr. 17 L.)16 (Plotinus Enn. VI 5,3,1 -3)
The comparison of these two passages (which are not necessarily
related on a close textual level) reveals certain points of similarity.
In both, a description of Being in general is given, in which the
Platonic doctrine of the unchanging identical existence of intelligible
beingl7is complementedby the denial of departurefrom itself in Being.
The condition of remainingidentical is paralleled by that of remaining
in oneself, and as there is no change in the identical existence of
Being, so Being does not depart from itself.
The Numenian passage may be further explicated in this sense by
reference to other fragments surviving from the second book of On
the Good and preceding in that book the passage quoted above. In
Fr. 5 (Fr. 14 L.), Being is characterized by its eternal identity of
existence (ast xcsx 'rau6rv). There can be no change or movement in
this identity of existence, and such is the identity of existence of
Being that Being does not "depart"from this identity, nor can it be
compelled to do so by another: eZvYL8 Cvoc?ooVcxov
xcd xal &v
E860CronCU&,xaorlFqTe aXxouaLov eaR(X0CLaCr'6g S TO6 Ft`' V?'
7po0aCCVy
Tr?POU Numenius remains close here in expression"'
&XMea5cxLo8.
and thought to Plato: Being maintains an unchanging identical exis-
tence, a sameness of form from which it does not depart. The phrase
16 Numenius is giving an exegesis of Tim. 27 d-28 a (-rE'r6 v &eE,y&vcaLv 81 O6x
gXov...; compare Plotinus' ykveaLqnepl accs6o68e[ta), which he quotes in Fr. 7.
17 Cf. Crat. 439 e (quoted above); Phaedo 79 d, 80 bl-2; Sympos. 211 bl.
18 Fr. 6 (Fr. 15 L.); Leemans, ad loc., takes this text as referring to a Pythago-

rean theory of the derivation of the dyad from the monad, and reference to a
mathematical progression is made also perhaps in the denial of "procession"
or "fluxion" in the Plotinian texts (Enns. VI 5,3,5 and 21; cf. IV 3,8,40 ff.;
V 5,4,10). It is characteristic of the Pythagorean monad, however, that in
multiplication it does not bring about a change or "departure" in itself or in
another number (Theo of Smyrna Expos. rer. math., pp. 99,24-100,4 Hiller,
cited by Hadot, loc. cit.; Nicomachus of Gerasa Intro.arith., p. 110,10-12
Hoche; Iamblichus In Nicom. arith., p. 19,5 ff. Pistelli).
19 The Numenian text recalls the passage from the Rep. (II 380 de) quoted
above, not only in its terminology, but also in its movement, both texts ending
with the alternative between change brought about by oneself and change caused
by another. Cf. Iamblichus De mysteriis I 5, p. 47,2-3 des Places.

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?LatosaCocL ts srz6i)to4, however, becomes in Fr. 8 zLaSpCM0vov ?
eocutoi5, a transition providing a close parallel to Plotinus' expression
in its particular formulation and in its application to Being generally.
It may be felt, however, that there is nothing particularly significant
in the similarities between Numenius Fr. 8 and Being in Plotinus Enn.
VI 5, 3. In both passages, an item of traditional Platonism is involved,
Plotinus and Numenius merely providing variations on a theme
found already in the lines which we have quoted from the Cratylus
and the Republic. That both Numenius and Plotinus refer to Being in
general (rather than to the Beautiful of the Cratylus, or to the God
of the Re_public) is not particularly surprising, as both happen to be
using the Being/Becoming contrast of the Timaeus20. As for "departure
from itself" in Numenius and Plotinus, the distinction between
this reflexive use of the metaphor of departure and the usage found in
Plato (departure from one's particular form or being) seems unimpor-
tant, as both usages are closely related in meaning, and the passage
from one to the other is easily made2l. Nevertheless, although the
similarities between Numenius and Plotinus may not appear in them-
selves as remarkable, seeming little else than a coincidence of variations
on a traditional theme, these variations may be seen, with equal
probability, as indications that Numenius influenced, by his particular
presentation of a traditional concept, the way in which Plotinus
formulated that concept. What is involved is not so much a specifically
Numenian conception adopted by Plotinus, as a Numenian presen-
tation of a Platonic dogma which influenced in turn Plotinus' presen-
tation of that dogma. The likelihood of this being true (rather than
there being merely an unimportant coincidence of variations on a
theme) is reinforced by the consideration that the Numenian passage
is not an isolated text coinciding with a Plotinian phrase, but forms
part of the extensive account of Being given by Numenius in the
second book of his On the Good, an account which, in another respect,
is thought to have probably influenced Plotinus22.

The denial of "departure from itself" in Being in Enn. VI 5, 3 forms

part of a context in which Plotinus makes much use of the Parmenides
20 Above note 16; this could be taken of course as suggesting, on the contrary,

a further link between the two texts.

21 Cf. Clement of Alexandria Strom. IV 22, p. 309,27-28 Stahlin: ?1t?
'
6TOCTOL7rOT ?CTq ?'Lq ?c7to7ta05ao TO5 KLq SITVaL.
22 See below note 26 (on the notion of oa6v).

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(above pp. 120-123) in the expression of the integrity of Being, an iden-
tity in itself unimpaired by any movement outwards. If an element of
this account of Being can be related, as we have proposed, to the
Numenian treatment of Being, the possibility arises that Numenius'
influence may have extended perhaps also to the use made by Plo-
tinus of the Parmenidesin his description of Being. Examination of
what remains of the second book of Numenius' On the Good seems at
first to indicate that there may be grounds for finding in Numenius
a precedent to the Plotinian reading of the Parmenides in Enneads
VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 3. In Fr. 5 (14 L.), Numenius deals with Being in
relation to Time, and to Changeand Movement.Fr. 6(15 L.), an extract
taken from a later section in the second book of On theGood23,relates
to the Name of the incorporealexistence which is Being. The structure
of this treatment of Being, allowance being made for the missing
material between Frr. 5 and 6 and for the fragmentary nature of the
surviving passages, may be compared possibly to the structure of the
argument in the Parmenides, where the One is treated successively
under such headings as: Whole/Part, Place, Change and Movement,
Identity/Difference, Likeness/Unlikeness, Equality/Inequality, Time,
Name and Knowledge24.If Numenius does indeed treat of Being in
terms of Time, Change and Movement, Name, all headings suggested
by the Parmenides, the Numenian fragments, in the details of their
treatment, do not however show an immediate relationship with the
correspondingsections of the Parmenides.Thus, concerning Being in
relation to Change and Movement, Numenius uses a classification of
movement closer to an Aristotelian classification than to that suggested
by the Parmenides25.Similarly, on the subject of Being and Time, the
28 See the introductory words of Eusebius (our source for the fragments of the
second book) to Fr. 6 and Numenius' opening words in Fr. 6.
24 The difference in the position occupied by the heading Time in Numenius

(assuming the Eusebian extract which constitutes Fr. 5 is continuous, and not
made up from two different sections in Numenius) may not be felt to weaken
the comparison between the structure of Numenius' account and that of the
argument in the Parm.; one might even be tempted to suggest that the material
missing between Frr. 5 and 6 discussed Being in relation to Identity, Likeness,
Equality.
25 Numenius alludes in Fr. 5 to ykvecnq/q&opck, aunaLq/[Letc,atq, movement (cf
also Fr. 4a, Prae.evang. 820 a 30) in one direction or another (compare Nu-
menius' list of opposite directions with Tim. 43 b 2-4; Aristotle Phys. 261 b 33-
36) and circular movement; cf. Aristotle Phys. III 1, 201 a 13-15; VIII 9,
265 b 6-7; Alexander In met., p. 401,10 Hayduck. The Parm. lists, in the section
closest to Numenius' account (138 b 7-c 8), movement xOcxT'cx&0oCLomv, move-
ment from one place to another, and circular movement.
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Numenian account seems to use sources other than the Parmenides2.
It might be felt, however, that Numenius drew from a variety of
sources, and that the absence of detailed use of the Parmenides in
the few fragments that have survived does not preclude the possibility
that the Platonic dialogue was present in other parts of On the Good.
To conclude, therefore, we do not feel, despite certain similarities,
that the evidence we have permits us to consider Numenius as pro-
viding, in his treatment of Being, a reading of the Parmenideswhich
constituted a precedentto Plotinus' own readingand use of the dialogue
in Enneads VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 327. However, it is suggested that a
Numenian formulation of Platonic ontology, in which identity of
existence in Being is shown as an identity in itself of Being from which
there is no "departure", reappears in Plotinus' presentation of the
integrity of Being in Enneads VI 4 and 5, the Numenian account
furnishing also perhaps a point of view which influenced Plotinus in
his use of the Parmenidesin these works. Moregenerally, we may feel
justified in attributing to this possible Numenian influence at least
part responsibility for that rather static sameness with which Plo-

26 Numenius finds in Fr. 5 that there is no past or future with respect to Being,
but only a defined time, a present (6 iveocrTc) which might be called octcv. Des
Places ad loc. refers to Tim. 37 e 3-38 b 2. J.Whittaker, God Time Being (Symbol.
Oslo. fasc. suppl. XXIII), Oslo 1971, p. 27 note 12 notes a structural resemblance
between Numenius and Parmenides Fr. 8,5 (in Simplicius' version), but thinks
there is little probability that Numenius was inspired by the Parmenidean
fragment (which he views as a tendentious Neoplatonic reading of the original,
p. 24), quoting (p. 38) other texts closer to the Numenian fragment. On Nu-
menius' otclcv,compare mc'Wv in VI 6,18,36 (a text to which we have referred
note 4, on Plotinus' use of the Parm., and, note 11, on &kLcrxsa4at), and in II 5
3,4-8 (also referred to on kLtarraeaoct, above note 11); there is room perhaps for
finding reference in Enn. III 7 to a Numenian concept of tcv (cf. W. Beier-
waltes' notes in his edition of III 7, pp. 146-147), in contrast to which, in part,
Plotinus developed a theory of eternity which recalls however in its nunc stans
aspect the Numenian concept (cf. Beierwaltes, p. 176; G. Martano, Numenio
d'Apamea, Naples 1960, p. 105; Whittaker, op.cit., p. 27).
27 A Neoplatonic-type interpretation of the Parm. is found already in the first
century A.D. Neo-Pythagorean Moderatus by Dodds, art.cit.; J. M. Rist, "The
Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides", Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc. 93,
(1962), does not favour, pp. 390-399, an earlier origin of this interpretation of
the Parm., and comes to negative conclusions, pp. 400-401, regarding the pre-
sence of this interpretation in other pre-Plotinian authors (but cf. J. Whittaker,
"EIIEKEINA NOY KAI OYEIAE", Vigil. Christ. 23 [1969], pp. 96-104)

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tinus sometimes endows Being, an existence which appears elsewhere
in the Enneads as a dynamic and diversified intelligible world28.

D.C.
The Catholic University of America, IWVashington

'8 Cf. A. H. Armstrong in Le Nioplatonisme, Colloque internat. du C.N.R.S.

Paris 1971, p. 67 ff. I am indebted to Prof. H. Cherniss, who was kind enough
to read this paper (referring me to the Philebus, above note 5), and to an ano-
nymous (but nonetheless) provocative referee.

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