1. Re: Letter of Tony Q.

Valenciano, re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the

Halls of Justice Building in Quezon City, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
(Include Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen)

Facts: This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and
addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the
Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic
Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for
religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional
provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a
sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that
the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to
favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great
disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to the
masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue: W/N the holding of masses at the basement violates the constitutional
principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition
against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

Ruling: No. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity
of our people as reflected in lmbong v. Ochoa,20 as follows: At the outset, it cannot
be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious,
cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it
instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as
a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality,
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

LEONEN, J.:

Tolerating and allowing court personnel to hold and celebrate daily masses
within public Halls of Justice is a clear violation of the Constitutional
prohibition against the State's establishment of a religion. It has no secular
purpose other than to benefit and, therefore, promote a religion. It has the
effect of imposing an insidious cultural discrimination against those whose
beliefs may be different. Religious rituals should be done in churches,
chapels, mosques, synagogues, and other private places of worship.

To provide that all faiths of all denominations may likewise avail of the same public
space within courts of law is a painful illusion. Apart from violating Sections 5 and 29
(2) of Article III of the Constitution, it is a privilege that is not available to those who
profess non-belief in any god or whose conviction is that the presence or absence of
god is unknowable. It likewise undermines religious faiths, which fervently believe
that rituals that worship icons and symbols are contrary to their conception of god.

Furthermore, the majority opinion invites judges to excessively entangle themselves

with religious institutions and worship. Decisions on the duration, frequency,
decorations, and other facets of religious rituals are not judicial functions. This also
should certainly not be a governmental one.

By holding daily Catholic masses or any religious ritual within court premises, courts
unnecessarily shed their impartiality. It weakens our commitment to protect all
religious beliefs.

2. Reagan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968

Facts: William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing

technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines disputed the
payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount
realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine
Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.
It is his contention, seriously and earnestly expressed, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional
power to tax.

Issue: W/N the said income tax was legally collected by respondent for petitioner
who is based in Clark Air Base, a base outside the Philippines, where the sale
therefore having taken place on "foreign soil."

Ruling: No. Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise
is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.
"By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein."

Thus: "This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a
limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic
recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of the
truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not exercised by
the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself."25

It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question confronting us in

this litigation. We hold, as announced at the outset, that petitioner was liable
for the income tax arising from a sale of his automobile in the Clark Field Air
Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within our territorial
jurisdiction to tax.

3. People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476

Facts: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United
States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which
she then demolished to build another one in its place. These she did without
securing the building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in
Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of
violation of the said ordinance, which she contested by invoking due process as
taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that her house was
constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. She argued
the validity of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very least its applicability to her in
view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.

Issue: W/N Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced
within the naval base.

Ruling: Yes. First, the Court held that using the precedent in People vs. Fajardo is
fruitless because this case contemplates upon defendant Fajardo who tried securing
a permit from the Mayor and, when unable to, built his home nonetheless for needing
it badly. The case at bar, on the other hand, shows that the appellant never bothered
to comply with the ordinance. The Court reiterated that, under the terms of the
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. The United States Government has prior or preferential but not
exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. Jurisdiction of the Philippines over the military
bases may be diminished but it does not disappear. These bases are under lease to
the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They
are not and cannot be foreign territory.

4. Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476

Facts: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which
the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,

among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some
of their particular arguments are as follows:

RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.

RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage
by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue: W/N RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. SEC. 2. The baselines in the
following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596
and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of
the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3)
of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article
47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which
can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago."

5. Most Rev Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, GR 206510, Sept 16, 2014

Facts: While transiting the Sulu Sea, the USS Guardian, a US Navy ship, ran
aground on the South Shoal of Tubbataha Reefs, a restricted and marine protected
area. The US Government provided compensation for the damaged caused and
undertook salvage operations to remove the grounded ship from the coral reef.

A Petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) was filed relation to the
grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.

Issue: W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit
any pleading or manifestation in the case.

Ruling: No. The inhibition to implead a foreign state in a local jurisdiction is

expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. That is, all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. This is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded.

The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while the US respondents were performing
official military duties and working as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The suit is deemed to
be one against the US itself as the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government. Therefore, the principle of State immunity bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

6. People vs. Gozo, G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973 *is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction."

Facts: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United
States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which
she then demolished to build another one in its place. These she did without
securing the building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in
Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of
violation of the said ordinance, which she contested by invoking due process as
taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that her house was
constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. She argued
the validity of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very least its applicability to her in
view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.

Issue: W/N Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced
within the naval base.

Ruling: Yes. The appellant’s contention that because her property was located within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces located inside the United States
Naval Reservation, she must be entitled of the exemption from complying with the
ordanance was given no merit. Though the property yielded within the Naval base of
US, it is a clear doctrine that the Philippines still possesses the sovereignty over that
area – given the record that it is still a part of its territory.

"It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit
to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property
of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion
was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution
of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.

7. Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts: Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III.

Issue: W/N RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.

Ruling: No. We find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of

choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones
and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it
sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it
weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding
its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

8. Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts: Petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters
into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and
sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38

Issue: W/N RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.

Ruling: Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the

Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil. –

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the

archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as
to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in
other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or
the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their
air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis
supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage
are now pending in Congress.41

9. Laurel vs. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947

Facts: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that
there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.

Issue: W/N treason be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government.

Ruling: Yes. Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government
established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this,
the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines
and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the
Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the
sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an
instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not
receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed
against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth
Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is
therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the
Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution
applicable to the Republic.

10. Lansang vs. CA, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971
causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth
of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by
Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.

Issue: W/N the suspension is constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. With such presidential determination of the existence of the conditions
required by the Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ no
longer conclusive on the other branches, this Court may thus legitimately inquire into
its validity. The question before us, it bears repeating, is W/N Proclamation No. 889
as it now stands, not as it was originally issued, is valid. The starting point must be a
recognition that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ belongs to the
Executive, subject to limitations. So the Constitution provides, and it is to be
respected. The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by this Tribunal is
necessarily limited then to the ascertainment of W/N such a suspension, in the light
of the credible information furnished the President, was arbitrary. Such a test met
with the approval of the chief counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno. To
paraphrase Frankfurter, the question before the judiciary is not the correctness but
the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the Executive but equally
knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with the
occupant of the office. As would be immediately apparent even from a cursory
perusal of the data furnished the President, so impressively summarized in the
opinion of the Chief Justice, the imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult to
sustain. Moreover, the steps taken by him to limit the area where the suspension
operates as well as his instructions attested to a firm resolve on his part to keep
strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under the circumstances, the decision
reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is warranted commends
itself for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a manifestation of
presidential power well-nigh touching the extreme border of his conceded
competence, beyond which a forbidden domain lies. The requisite showing of either
improvidence or abuse has not been made.

11. Amigable vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government.
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the
portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways,
for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment
for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.

Issue: WON the appellant may properly sue the government.

Ruling: Yes. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just
compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.

12. City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003

Facts: The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the
amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Then
Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended
as payment for respondent Santiago’s claims. This, despite the fact that he was one
of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.

Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City
Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter
to PNB that the garnishment was illegal with a warning that it would hold PNB liable
for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB
opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a
manager’s check.

Issue: W/N the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt
from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.

Ruling: Yes. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in
the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain
government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of
a corresponding appropriation as required by law:

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the
courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has
been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to
pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments
recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such
judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.

The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is,
when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated,
the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply
where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In
such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

13. Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

Facts: Portion of the registered land of the Spouses Ramos was being used as part
of the runway of the airport operated by ATO. They agreed that ATO will pay 700K.
However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated demand.

Spouses Ramos filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its
officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an
affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President
Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected
portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that
the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental
functions.

Issue: W/N ATO be sued without the State's consent?

Ruling: Yes. The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to ATO because it is an
agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s
exclusive prerogative. It is tasked with private or non-governmental functions which
operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the
correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states:

Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune

from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects
for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Legal Value of Article II

14. Tondo Medical Center Employees Assoc. vs. CA n Sec of Health

Facts: Petitioners allege that the Hospital Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) launched
by the DoH should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals
of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. One of the Reform areas is to
provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. They claim that the HSRA’s
policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement
violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This
contention is unfounded.

Issue: W/N the petitioners have a cause of action in declaring the HSRA void.

Ruling: No. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered
self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement.
However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this
Court as non self-executing.

The Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987
Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need
legislative enactments before they can be implemented. By its very title, Article II of
the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides
in the exercise of its power of judicial review. These provisions, which merely lay
down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as
non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts;
they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

15. BCDA vs. COA

Facts: COA issued AOM No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end benefit to
Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. In Notice of Disallowance, Director
IV Rogelio D. Tablang , disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board
members and full-time consultants. BCDA claims that the Board members and full-
time consultants should be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of
year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the COA’s disallowance of the year end benefits to BCDA’s Board
member unconstitutional?

Ruling: No. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and

State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological
principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical
Center Employees Association v. CA,the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II
of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions. Since the implementing law
which is RA No. 7227 did not unreasonably single out Board members and full-time
consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit, thus it did not show any clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Fundamental Principles and State Policies

16. Tanada vs. Angara

Facts: On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Thus, the present petition.
Arguing mainly that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the
WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy
of the Constitution such is prejudicial to the economy and constitutionally
impermissible. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled
by Filipinos."

Issue: W/N the WTO agreement violates the Filipino first policy and is contrary
to the Constitution

Ruling: No. Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and
understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13.
Thus,there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. All told,
while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

17. Legazpi vs. CSC

Facts: Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information as these government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians

Issue: W/N the remedy of mandamus compelling CSC to disclose such

information would prosper
Ruling: Yes. From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

Since petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right,
CSC is without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern.

18. Oposa vs. Factoran

Facts: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors
duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The complaint was instituted
as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered: ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.

Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of legal standing and
valid cause of action

Issue: W/N the a valid cause of action based on the right to healthful ecology
exists against the respondent

Ruling: Yes. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. Thus, they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.

19. Imbong vs. Ochoa

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize
the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. Specifically, they aim to strike down Section 3.01 as it allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily (TAKE
NOTE OF THRE WORD PRIMARILY) induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.

Issue: W/N such provision of the RH law violate of the right to life as guaranteed by
the constitution?

Ruling: Yes. It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the
right to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws
of men. (Main point in the syllabus).

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole
known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of
the fertilized ovum.

Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
20. Espina vs. Zamora

Facts: President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the
same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000 petitioners all members of the House of Representatives, filed
the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as the law runs afoul
of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the
control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair
competition and trade policies and, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to
alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other
areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.

Issue: W/N R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional

Ruling: No. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to
prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies
and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens
the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to
have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in
question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.

21. Bacani vs. Nacoco

Facts: During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco
Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico
Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs
complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo
T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19,
1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was
expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of the fees in . Thus, plaintiffs were ordered to reimburse
NACOCO for the said amount.

Issue: WON Nacoco is performing governmental functions?

Ruling: No. It was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a
position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing
“Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote
the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned.

The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the
functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this
are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether
they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we
call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given
a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law.

22. ACFA vs. CUGCO

Facts: The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)

was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended.

Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed for

certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case
No. 3450-ULP) for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The ACCFA
denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of
jurisdiction of CIR over the case raising the defense that it was engaged in
governmental functions

Issue: W/N ACFA is engaged in governmental functions

Ruling: Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the

government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a
governmental, not a proprietary, function;

The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to

Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function;
and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land
Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made
available for assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures.

There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in
the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into
reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the
governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the
land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a
government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no
longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;

23. PVTA VS. CIR

Facts: Claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition
wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess
of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

PVTA raises the defense that they are performing governmental functions and not
proprietary as claimed by respondent thus CIR doesn’t have any jurisdiction over the
case.

Issue: W/N PVTA is performing governmental functions

Ruling: Yes. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes
and objectives were set forth thus (a) To promote the effective merchandising of
Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the
industry will be placed on a basis of economic security. The Court explained that the
traditional classification of governmental functions is obsolete.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social
justice.
24. PHCC vs. CIR

Facts: People’s Homesite and housing corporation recruited participants for it’s
Sapang Palay Project. In recruiting participants to the program, application forms
entitled WFP Self Help Community Project Information Sheet," (Exh. "2") were
issued, mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered.

Although the participants were assigned to work on canals and roads, the projects
agreed upon between the PHHC and the World Food Program were never fully
implemented.

Complaining about their work and compensation, the participants went to the
Department of Labor. After investigation, Secretary Ople sent to the PHHC General
ManageIn its answer, PHHC claimed, among others, that it was exercising
governmental functions; that it did not employ private respondents herein; and that
the CIR had no jurisdiction over PHHC, and over the subject matter of the action.

Issue: W/N PHCC is exercising governmental functions

Ruling: Yes. Coming now to the case at bar. We note that since 1941 when the
National Housing Commission (predecessor of PHHC, which is now known as the
National housing Authority [NHA]) was created, the Philippine government has
pursued a mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos for
decent housing. The agency tasked with implementing such governmental program
was the PHHC. These can be gleaned from the provisions of Commonwealth Act
648, the charter of said agency.

We rule that the PHHC is a governmental institution performing governmental

functions

This is not the first time We are ruling on the proper characterization of housing as
an activity of government, In the 1985 case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco
and the NLRC (No. L-64313, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172), We ruled that
housing is a governmental function.

25. Spouses Fontanilla vs. Hon Maliaman

Facts: It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency,
then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular
driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners,
and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a
result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was injured and brought to the San Jose
City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. The Spouses Fontanilla then
instituted an action against NIA for the tortuous conduct of it’s driver to which they
alleged that the driver was performing governmental functions.
Issue: W/N NIA is performing governmental functions

Ruling: No. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the

government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act
No. 3601. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate
body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the
damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-
employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

26. VFP vs. Reyes

Facts: Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a
corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640, and duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Respondent Angelo T. Reyes was the
Secretary of National Defense (DND Secretary) who issued the assailed Department
Circular No. 04, dated 10 June 2002. Respondent Edgardo E. Batenga was the DND
Undersecretary for Civil Relations and Administration who was tasked by the
respondent DND Secretary to conduct an extensive management audit of the
records of petitioner.

Petitioner mainly alleges that the rules and guidelines laid down in the assailed
Department Circular No. 04 expanded the scope of "control and supervision" beyond
what has been laid down in Rep. Act No. 2640.

Petitioner claims that it is not a public nor a governmental entity but a private
organization, and advances this claim to prove that the issuance of DND Department
Circular No. 04 is an invalid exercise of respondent Secretary’s control and
supervisio

Issue: W/N VFP is a private corporation

Ruling: No. In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031 should most certainly fall within the category of
sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant
to promote social justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism.. It would be
injustice of catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to
reward the people who defended her.

Like the holding of the National Centennial Celebrations, the functions of the VFP
are executive functions, designed to implement not just the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 2640, but also, and more importantly, the Constitutional mandate for the State to
provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war
veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.
27. Ramiscal vs SGB

Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and
Jesus Garcia were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al.
misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal
use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.

Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of

Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a
private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The
Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et.
al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its
Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for
certiorari with the SC.

Issue: W/N the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.

Held: No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential

Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as
in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the
military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997.
Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the
Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement,
pension and separation benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the System
shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

28. Alzaga vs SGB

FACTS: October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the petitioners regarding
alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas
by the AFP-RSBS. Being vice presidents and assistant vice president of the AFP-
RSBS, the petitioners claim that they are not under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan since AFP-RSB is a private entity.

ISSUE: (1) WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.

(2) WON the petitioners are under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: (1) Yes. Considering that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS
are imbued with public interest and its fund are in the nature of public fund, it
is indeed a government entity.
(2) Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over “presidents, directors, trustees, or
managers of GOCCs, state universities, or educational institutions or foundations.”
The positions of the petitioners being vice president and assistant vice president are
not specifically enumerated in RA 8249 but it is clearly higher than managers. Thus,
considering them under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

29. Javier vs SGB

FACTS: Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), which was created by R.A. 8047, otherwise known as
the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act.” R.A. No. 8047 provided for the
creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and supervision of
the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are
appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while the
remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book
publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private
education sector.

Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of one year.
During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (BSAP). She was on a holdover capacity in the following year. On
September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the
same period of one year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board
is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies.

ISSUE: W/N Javier is a public officer. (YES)

HELD: YES, Javier is a public officer.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of
the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the
government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant
role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the
public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does
not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.
30. Manila International Airport Authority vs CA

Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy
International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent
notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the
amount.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building
are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also
contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from
real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore
cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of
Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation
therefore not exempted to real estate tax.

Issues: W/N MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government

owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.

Ruling: No. Under the Local government code, government owned and
controlled corporations are not exempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a
government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA
should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation
since it has no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with
corporate powers and government functions.

31. PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

vs. COA

FACTS: The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in
Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon
animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals
and promote their welfare.

In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected
through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a
portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by
virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense
against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound
to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the
reason that they are a private entity and not under the said commission. It
argued that COA covers only government entities. On the other hand the COA
decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING: YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test”
cannot be applied. Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to
determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or
private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a
public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with
special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of
the GSIS.

32. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, vs SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Facts: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student

regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against
her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information.

She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer
with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her
office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from
the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP
student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio
capacity.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.

Held: No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the
SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27
and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law.

Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
33. SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED VS CA

Facts: On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-381 was issued
in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land Lot 1-4. Lot 1 and 4 was sold by
Galves to Mamaril, et. al. who then sold the said lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company. Without knowledge of the order issued by the Court of First Instance of La
Union, declaring OCT 0-381 null and void, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
sold Lot 1 and 4 to the petitioner herein.

Petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss as one of its grounds is that
the plaintiff Republic is not the real party-in-interest because the real property,
allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and
administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under
Republic Act No. 7227. The Solicitor General on the other hand states that the real
party-in-interest in the case at bar being the Republic of the Philippines, it claims it
imprescriptible.

Issue: W/N the BCDA is a government agency

Ruling: No. BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions. It is certain that the functions performed
by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature—the promotion of economic and
social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for
enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government.

The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular,

and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA
equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government
to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and
the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although
performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes.

34. PVTA v CIR

Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with
CA No. 444.

Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this
petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental
functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth
Act No. 444.

Issue: W/N PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of
the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the
welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent
and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time:
“The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve
scant consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency.

As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case.

35. ROSAS VS. MONTOR, G.R. No. 204105. October 14, 2015

FACTS:

 On December 7, 2004, Iranian nationals Jafar Saketi Taromsari and Jalal

Shokr Pour Ziveh, arrived in the Philippines at the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport (MCIA). After staying in a hotel in Cebu City for a few days, they left for
Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004.

 On December 16, 2004, Japanese immigration authorities discovered that

Taromsari and Ziveh had counterfeit or tampered Mexican and Italian
passports and used falsified names: “Jaime Humberto Nenciares Garcia” for
Ziveh and “Marco Rabitti” for Taromsari.

 For using these fraudulent passports and lack of entry visa, the Japanese
immigration authorities denied entry to Taromsari and Ziveh and sent them
back to the Philippines.

 Taromsari and Ziveh arrived at MCIA on the same day at 6:45 p.m. and
admitted at the detention cell of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Cebu
Detention Center.

 Petitioner Geronimo Rosas gave his report and an Exclusion Order was
issued against Taromsari and Ziveh on grounds of “Not Properly
Documented” and “No Entry Visa

 Security guards, Napilot and Ugarte received an order from petitioner to

escort the Iranian nationals from BI to MCIA
  On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released from detention
and brought by Napilot and Ugarte to the MCIA for deportation. They were
allowed to leave for Tehran, Iran via Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia onboard
Malaysian Air Lines.

 On January 18, 2005, respondents Imra-Ali Sabdullah and Dilausan S.

Montor, employees of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Cebu, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit12 before the OMB against petitioner, Napilot and Ugarte for grave
misconduct, violation of Section 3(e)13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service.

Issue: W/N the power to deport is an act of the State

Ruling: Yes. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.

36. Pp vs Perfecto

Facts: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the

newspaper La Nacion regarding the disappearance of certain documents in the
Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The article
of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an
official concealment by the Senate since the missing documents constituted the
records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies. This
resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the
Penal Code. He was found guilty by the MTC and again in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal in the SC to dismiss the case on the ground
that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

Issue: Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American

Sovereignty over the Philippines?

Ruling: No. The SC held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by
the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were representative of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old
laws. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in bated breath.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.

37. VILAS VS CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:

 Vilas was a creditor of the Ayuntamiento of Manila as it existed before the

cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. The
action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from
the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable
upon the obligations of the old city.

 The City of Manila argued that its charter has no reference to obligations or
contracts of the old city; that their case is analogous to a principal and agent,
where the sovereign gets changed, the city, as agent of the State, could no
longer be held accountable for debts of the previous sovereign; that the city of
Manila has been reincorporated under Act 183 of the Philippine Commission and
thus not liable for the said obligations.

 The Philippine SC held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate
entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The case
was appealed to the US SC.

ISSUE: Is the city of Manila still liable for the obligations of the city incurred
prior to the cession to the United States?

Ruling: YES. Municipal corporations exercise powers which are governmental

and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character a
municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises
by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a mere
legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the
administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purpose for
which its governmental powers are conferred.

38. Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 (1947)

Facts: In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting
on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended.

Issue: W/N the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was
then suspended

Ruling: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred
to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that
the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state).

39. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (de facto and de jure govt)

Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the
case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that
the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the

Japanese occupation were no de facto government.

Issue: W/N judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.

Ruling: Yes.

The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The
governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of
justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were
good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after
the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

40. IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO, 210 SCRA 588

Facts: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno was first appointed as associate justice of the
CA in 1980. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC). In Edsa Revolution in 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire
government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee that was created
assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA.
However, When the appointments were signed by President Aquino, petitioner’s
seniority ranking changed, from number eleven to number 26. He alleges that the
change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued
Executive order No.33 of Pres. Aquino.

Issue: Whether the present CA is a continuation of the CA and IAC that would
negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner.

Ruling:  No. The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the
IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A government as
a result of people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the
family of nations or countries. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the
claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

41. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR. 104768

Facts: Following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all... ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Major General Ramas. PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379] against the latter.

Issue: Whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against M/G Ramas for unexplained wealth under
RA No. 1379.

Ruling: The court held that PCGG has no such jurisdiction. Ramas was not a
"subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No.
1. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
"subordinate". The term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who
enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to
the immediate family member, relative. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close. The PCGG failed to
do.

42. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476

Facts: Apellant, Loreta Gozo, bought a house and lot within the naval base leased to
the American Armed Forces. She then destroyed the old house and built a new one
without getting a permit from the Mayor’s Office, in which the Court of First Instance
found her in violation of an Ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales. To which she seeks
to set aside.
Issue: Whether the Court of First Instance ruling that the appellant is in
violation of the municipal ordinance.

Ruling: Yes. Military-Bases Agreement with foreign Countries, within a state, does
not preclude municipal corporations of the state from exercising administrative
jurisdiction.

43. TANADA VS ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18

Facts: Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO
Agreement. A petition was filed assailing its constitutionality as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issues: W/N the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is

unconstitutional?

Ruling: No. The ratification of the WTO Agreement only limits or restricts the
absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. While the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

44. AGUSTIN vs.EDU, 88 SCRA 195

Facts: President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. LTO then issued Administrative
Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. However, this Letter of Instruction and
Adm. Order was petitioned assailing its validity for being unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the
law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue: W/N it is valid and constitutional.

Ruling: Yes, the orders and issuances in question are deemed valid and
constitutional. The exercise of police power as such was established to promote
public welfare and safety. The letter of instruction is based on the constitutional
provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. It is premise and base on the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in this case.
45. JBL REYES VS BAGATSING, GR No 65366

Facts: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases
Coalition pursued a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US
embassy which is less than two blocks away. The permit has been denied by then
Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing which claimed that there have been intelligence
reports affirming that the rally would be infiltrated to disrupt the assembly. He also
issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet
radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide
protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Issue: W/N the treaty as the basis of denial of the petitioner’s permit request,
used by the Mayor was vaild?

Ruling: No, the implementing state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats
from any lawless element and the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law. But it cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights, which is
the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly.

46. TANADA VS ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18

Facts: Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO
Agreement. A petition was filed assailing its constitutionality as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issues: W/N the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is

unconstitutional?

Ruling: The SC ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

47. BAYAN v. ZAMORA, GR 138570

Facts: Zamora submitted the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
agreement.

Issue: W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII and
or Section 25, Article XVIII of the constitution.
Ruling: Both constitutional provisions, contradicts each other but shares some
common ground. The concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the
treaty or international agreement valid and effective.

VFA was ratified by the then-president Estrada and was approved by the Senate, by
a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members.

48. BAYAN vs. ROMULO, GR. 159618

Facts: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to the

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes, the Phil.,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the
Agreement with the US government. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck
down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: W/N the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.

Ruling: No. the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of
individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other
party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With that
view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of
the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.

49. LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SEC., GR. 151445

Facts: Lim attacks the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. It averred that the Visiting
Force Agreement (VFA) permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in "activities," hence authorizing American Soldiers to engage in
combat operations in the Philippines.

Issue: W/N the petition has merit.

Ruling: No. The issue raised by petitioners was based on fear of future
desecrations. The meaning of the word “activities", was deliberately made that way
to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to
the current Balikatan exercises. Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting
Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the
Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially
Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2.
50. SHANGRI-LA HOTEL INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT vs. DEVELOPERS
GROUP OF COMPANIES

Facts: The core of this controversy: “Shangri-La” mark & “S” logo. Respondent
DGCI claims ownership of said mark & logo in the Philippines. Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) issued DGCI a certificate of
registration (may 31, 2983) and since then, DGCI started using the “Shangri-La” &
“S” in its restaurant business. Petitioner SLHIM, owned by the Kuok family worldwide
moved to register the mark and logo in its name. DGCI filed a case of infringement
against petitioner.

Issues: W/N the petitioner is guilty of infringement?

Ruling: No. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioner of infringing a mark
and when they are the originator and the creator of it. Protection should be
afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention.
International law has been made part of the law of the land.

51. PHILIP MORRIS INC. VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GR. 158589

Facts: The petitioners are foreign corporations that are not doing business in the
Philippines and are registered owners of the trademarks ‘MARK VII’, ‘MARK TEN’,
and ‘LARK’. They claim that an infringement of their trademark had been committed
by the respondent in the country.

Issues: W/N petitioners are entitled to enforce trademark rights in this

country?

Ruling: No. They lack of evidence that their product is well-known in the Philippines.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement without the need of
obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines. However,
appellants failed to establish that their products are widely known by local
purchasers on the country or in other countries circulated locally. International law
has been made part of the law of the land.

52. MIJARES V. RANADA, GR. 139325

Facts: Ten prominent petitioners filed a complaint to the estate of the deceased
former President Marcos, as the petitioners suffered human rights abuses such as
arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime. The Final Judgement was affirmed by the US CA and the
petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final
Judgement. However, Marcos Estate contended that the PHP 410 filing fee was
incorrectly computed for they argue that the amount is too small to constitute
damages amounting to $2.25 billion.
Issues: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgement is incapable of pecuniary
estimations?

Ruling: No. In this circumstance, the Final Judgement is not conclusive yet, but
presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioner against the Marcos Estate.
Petitioners' complaint is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US
District Court. However, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our
local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

53. Pharmaceutical vs. DOH - G.R. 173034, October 9, 2007

FACTS: Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages
of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations(RIRR).
Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement.

ISSUE: W/N the law with regards to the EO adopted from Article 11 of the
international code of marketing and breastmilk substitutes (international law) is part
of the law of the land and may be implemented in the Philippines.

RULING: No, because under Sec.2.of Article 2, international law can become
domestic law by transformation or incorporation. Under Article 23, recommendations
of the WHA do not come into force for members ,in the same way that conventions
or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

54. SOJ vs. Lantion

DOCTRINE: In the Philippines, statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they

conflict with the Constitution.

FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for
the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day, petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of
the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: W/N respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

RULING: No. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of
the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate
priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic
of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution.

55. Philip Morris vs. CA - GR 91332, July 16, 1993

“While international law is made part of the law of the land, it does not imply
primacy of international law over national law”.

Facts: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the
reversal and setting aside of the following issuances of the CA. Philip Morris, Inc.
and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred
upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when
respondent lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling “MARK” cigarettes in
the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’ respective symbols “MARK
VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against
unauthorized appropriation.

 All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated
transaction. They Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals of member-countries of
the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of
trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a
license to do business in the Philippines, and without necessity of actually doing
business in the Philippines.

Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages
against Fortune Tobacco before RTC-Pasig for manufacturing and selling cigarettes
bearing the trademark “Mark” which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip
Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.

 ISSUE: W/N the provisions of Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property find applicability in cases of suit before Philippine courts for
infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition.

RULING: No. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must
subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being
decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international
law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative enactments.

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce

in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark
or a trade name.

 In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not
engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable
damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration
heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.

56. Vinuya vs. ES

FACTS: Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army
attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of
the village. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners
have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability,
and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines.
However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that
the individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners
also argued that the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity,
sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these
international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as
such, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford
impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE: Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in

not espousing petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.

RULING : No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking
up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch
to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In the
international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to
persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals’ behalf. Even then, it is
not the individuals’ rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights.
The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

                        The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual
violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary
international law. However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is
under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the
consent of the states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security
Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even
the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in
1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

57. Saguisag vs. ES

FACTS: Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine
government, with the United States of America was not a treaty .In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues
of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word
"allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based
on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting
the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in
by the Senate

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has
simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.
Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances
of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not
state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) is
unconstitutional.

RULING: No, EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has
long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as
the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms

to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to
the government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of
various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for
Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision.

58. Bayan vs. DND Sec. Gazmin - GR 212444

FACTS: The Motion for Reconsideration was sought to reverse the decision of the
Court in Saguisag et. Al vs. Executive Secretary questioning the constitutionality of
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the US. There this court ruled that the petitions be dismissed.
Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider, reverse and set-
aside its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision granting the
instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government,
with the United States of America, unconstitutional and invalid and to permanently
enjoin its implementation.

Petitioners claim that the Decision did not consider the similarity of EDCA to the
previous Military Bases Agreement (MBA) as grounds to declare it unconstitutional.
In disagreeing with the Court in respect of the MBA’s jurisdictional provisions,
petitioners cite an exchange of notes categorized as an “amendment” to the MBA as
if to say it operated as a new treaty and should be read into the MBA.

ISSUE: W/N the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.

RULING: No. The motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal
arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision. It is correct to state that the MBA as
the treaty did not give the Philippines jurisdiction over the bases because its
provisions on U.S. jurisdiction over the bases because its provisions on U.S.
jurisdiction were explicit. What the exchange of notes did provide was effectively a
contractual waiver of the jurisdictional rights granted to the U. S under the MBA, but
did not amend the treaty itself. While it is a fact that our country is now independent,
and that the 1987 Constitution requires Senate consent for foreign military bases,
troops and facilities, the EDCA as envisioned by the executive and as formulated
falls within the legal regime of the MDT and the VFA.

59. IBP vs. Zamora

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE: W/N the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING: No. the Deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. In his case, it constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the Police Force.

60. Kulayan vs. Tan 675 SCRA 482 (2012)

FACTS: On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was
identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports
linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the
Local Crisis Committee.

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed
male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to
surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police,
represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded
to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the
municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the
hostages may be achieved.”

ISSUE: W/N respondent governor is clothed with authority to convene the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) and to declare a state of emergency.
RULING: No. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is
ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

61. Alih vs. Castro GR 69401, June 23, 1987

FACTS: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense
forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the
intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized
returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights on illegal seizure.

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but
reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the
assassination of the city mayor.

ISSUE: W/N the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and
photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of
the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

RULING: Yes. The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the
respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the
guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and
seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from
the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no
showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners
as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held
inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation
by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said
operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition
against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.

62. People vs. Tranquilino Lagman

FACTS: Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with
a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense
Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the
age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military
service between the1st and 7th of April of said year, even though they h ad
been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the
Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did n ot register up
to the date of the filing of the information. Appellants argue that they did not register
because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to
support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to
one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE: WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was
constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military
or civil service.

RULING: YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, insofar as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make
this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to
defend the State; and, that a person may be compelled by force to take his place in
the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense. What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
The circumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to present
themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).

63. People vs. Primitivo De Sosa - GR L-45893, July 13, 1938

FACTS: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino
and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos
and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding
the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants
were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board
in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in
spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not
registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a
mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a
father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month
and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused
were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

ISSUE: W/N the National Defense Law is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory

military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the
State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory
military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate
the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to
Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence
of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty,
and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11;
25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person
may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary
interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in
the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that
this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just
sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual
existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last
analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with
their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

64. Kilosbayan vs. Morato - 246 SCRA 540 (1995) and MR 250 SCRA 130

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO.
(Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. A petition
was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease

Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of
PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. Standing can no
longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case.

Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO.

ISSUE:  W/N the amended equipment lease agreement is null and violative of the
law on public bidding of contracts for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to
the Government.

RULING: Yes. The challenged ELA must then be declared void for the following
reasons: (1) it is a joint venture contract prohibited; (2) it was entered into without the
mandatory public bidding ; and (3) it is grossly disadvantageous to the PCSO and
private respondent since unlike in the old contract where nothing may at all be due
the PGMC in the event that the ticket sales, computed on an annual basis, are
insufficient to pay the entire prize money, under the new ELA, the PCSO is under
obligation to pay the rental equivalent to 4.3%of the gross ticket sales.

65. Kulayan vs. Tan (Same no. 60) 675 SCRa 482 (2012)

FACTS: On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was
identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports
linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the
Local Crisis Committee.

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed
male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to
surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police,
represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded
to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the
municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the
hostages may be achieved.”

ISSUE: W/N the declaration of State of Emergency and calling out the members of
the AFP is valid.

RULING: No. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief Powers dictate that

they are exercised by the one president. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has
the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. He is
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces.

66. UCCP vs Bradford United Church of Christ Inc.

Facts: BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP. The effectivity of the disaffiliation was made
to retroact to 16 September 1990 when BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This
disaffiliation was duly ratified by BUCCI’s members in a referendum held on 19 July
1992.1Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws
which provided for and effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same
on 2 July 1993. Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for
rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction, claiming
among other things that the issue at hand is purely ecclesiastical and the State
should not interfere therein.

Issue: W/N the separation between these two is purely ecclesiastical

Held: No. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association
of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership.32 Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete,
examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration
of sacraments and other activities attached with religious significance. BUCCI, as a
juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom to
determine its steps. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole prerogative
and power as a church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions,
that may have religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must
respect and cannot review. 

67. Lim vs. Exec Secretary

Facts: Balikatan case. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Beginning January of this year 2002,
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” 
On February 7, 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan” exercise
wherein Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft Terms of Reference (TOR). Petitioners claim
that this whole activity would enable the foreign forces to engage against the ASG,
which in effect will violate Independent Foreign Policy provision in our constitution.

Issue: W/N the Balikatan 02-1 is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA. Under
these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. In our
considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in
an offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear in mind the salutary proscription
stated in the Charter of the United Nations, The Constitution also regulates the
foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that “[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” The purpose of Balikatan is to train but
to never engage against the enemies of the Philippines, internally.

68. Saguisag vs. Exec Sec

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement

that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine
military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there.
It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with China
over the West Philippine Sea.

The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April
2014. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not
submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.

Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have
been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement.

ISSUE: Whether the EDCA between the PH and US is constitutional – YES.

The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence.
As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that
it purports to implement.

69. Bayan vs DND Sec Gazmin - Consolidated

Facts: The constitutionality of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between

PH and US is being challenged. Accordingly, the respondent bypassed the Senate
vote requirement for a treaty to be part of the law of the land in EDCA. EDCA will
give access to US troops to agreed locations for some activities. EDCA was
considered as an executive agreement only, and not a treaty, which requires a
Senate Voting. Petitioners claim that EDCA should be treated as a treaty upon their
review of the same, as echoed by the Senate themselves.

Issue: W/N EDCA is well within the power of the president to enter into executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops and facilities.

Held: Yes, EDCA is a valid exercise of executive agreement. It is evident that the
constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter
subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. VFA already
allowed their entry, and this agreement is merely an adjustment to the VFA.The
President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign
relations. The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in
that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the
nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino
people to self-determinationexecutive agreements merely involve arrangements on
the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are
concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty; 209 (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation
by an act of the Legislature; 210 or (3) in the exercise of the President’s independent
powers under the Constitution.

70. Bayan vs. Zamora

Facts: The VFA is being challenged in this case, which was approved by Pres.
Ramos and ratified by Pres. Estrada, and was transmitted to the Senate for
concurrence, which was actually concurred. Among other things, petitioner contends
that the nuclear capabilities of USA will translate into them bringing the nukes in the
Philippines, thus violating the constitutional provision against nuclear weapons.

Issue: W/N the VFA violates the invoked provision.

Held: No. There was no clear indication of the VFA forces to bring in nukes, specially
the fact that the VFA expressly states that the US shall respect the above-invoked
provision.

71. Calalang vs. Williams

Facts: It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation
and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: W/N the delegation of power violates social justice insofar as it prohibits the
transit or use of the roads by animal-drawn vehicles.

Held: No. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained tof is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy "to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." To promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the re-
quirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. 

72. Roe vs. Wade

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when

medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane
Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their
face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from
enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and
that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her
life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was
unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant
sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the
statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy,
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue: W/N abortion is a right possessed by pregnant mothers as part of their right to
privacy

Held: Yes. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy.. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by
neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure
is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,
and may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the
State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based
upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

73. Meyer vs. Nebraska

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute
that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet
completed the eighth grade. The SC of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the

liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty

interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the
competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from
bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the
English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state.
Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other
languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and
mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as
harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the
interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.

74. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private
organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training
school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing
Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to
send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed
the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected
liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be
destruction of the appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all
schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper
education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty
interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.

75. Wisconsin vs. Yoder

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of
the Amish religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to
cause their children to attend public or private school until they reach 16.
Respondents declined to send their children to public school after completion of the
eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are
in marked variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in
an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community
during a crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education.
Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only
great psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old
Order Amish church community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield
to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated
system.

Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious
beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.
Such education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which
we live, but is not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children
must be protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish
community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, producing
productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its position on the
possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish community. This
argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical agricultural training
and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent

development, designed to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to
avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in
compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish children than for children
generally.

The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the
children’s substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power
of the State as parens patriae

76. Ginsberg vs. New York

Facts: Sam Ginsberg and wife operated a stationary and luncheonette in Long
Island, New York. Due to Ginsberg’s sale of girlie magazines to a 16-yr-old minor,
which contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and
conduct. It was in New York Penal Law which prohibits the sale of the
aforementioned materials to minors.

Issue: W/N the prohibition is justified insofar as the minor is concerned

Held: Yes. Some of the contents may not be obscene for adults, but the same would
be so for children, which will affect or hamper the growth of the child’s well-being,
which is constitutionally protected.

77. Orceo vs. COMELEC

Facts: the validity of Resolution No 8714 insofar as it included airsoft guns and
replicas as firearms, which in turn put it in the coverage of the gun ban during the
election period. Petitioner asserts that the intendment of R.A. No. 7166 is that the
term “firearm” refers to real firearm in its common and ordinary usage. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family
members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose and enjoy their
recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC.
Issue: W/N the inclusion of airsoft guns and its replicas run counter to the Art. II,
Section 12, as invoked herein.

Held: No. Airsoft guns in the eyes of the laymen are similar to that of a real gun,
which may cause unrest during the conduct of the elections. The Court holds that the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns
in the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the
election period, with the apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and
credible elections this year. However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and
airguns are excluded from the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714. The right to
have bonding moments is not absolute as it can be regulated as the State sees fit.

78. Imbong vs. Ochoa

Facts: Reproductive health law is being challenged, The RH Law violates the right
to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives,
in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of
both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

Issue: W/N the RH Law is violative of Art. 2, Sec 12 of the Constitution.

Held: The Rh Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in. The
question of when life begins is scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided without proper hearing and evidence. The framers of the constitution
intended conception as fertilization and protection is given upon fertilization. Not all
contraceptives are banned. Only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are
prohibited. The intent of the framers was to prevent the legislature from passing a
measure that would allow abortion. The IRR redefinition of abotifacient in S4a of the
RH lLaw is violative. S7 of the RH Law which excludes parental consent incases
where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage
is anti family and is violative of s12 a2

ARTICLE II - SECTION 12 (FAMILY)

79. ORCEO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the validity of Resolution No. 8714, particularly on the
term “firearm,” as it included airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the election
gun ban. Petitioner, an airsoft player, contended that the resolution will make him
liable for an election offense if caught in possession of an airsoft gun going to and
from the game site during the election period. Pursuant thereto, they are free to
choose and enjoy their recreational activities. Petitioner further contends that
Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies in these
constitutional provisions: Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among
family members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These liberties, according to
petitioner, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC and are not in accordance with the
State policies. COMELEC defended that constitutional freedoms are not absolute in
a sense, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner’s contention that the COMELEC Resolution
8714 violates Sec. 12, Art. 2 of the Constitution.

RULING: NO. Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments
among family members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the
State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose and
enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be
abridged by the COMELEC. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Solicitor
General, states that it adheres to the aforementioned state policies, BUT EVEN
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE, AND THEY MAY BE
ABRIDGED TO SOME EXTENT TO SERVE APPROPRIATE AND IMPORTANT
INTERESTS. As a long-time player of the airsoft sport, it is presumed that petitioner
has a license to possess an airsoft gun. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that a
licensee of an airsoft gun is subject to the restrictions imposed upon him by PNP
Circular No. 11 and other valid restrictions, such as Resolution No. 8714. These
restrictions exist in spite of the aforementioned State policies, which do not directly
uphold a licensee’s absolute right to possess or carry an airsoft gun under any
circumstance.

SECTION 13 (ROLE OF YOUTH)

80. BASCO vs PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52

FACTS: A TV ad proudly announces: “The new PAGCOR —responding through

responsible gaming.”

Petitioners think otherwise, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter—PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because—

“It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license
fees, which is recognized by law;

“For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has
intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees.
This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
“It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR
-- conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.”

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to
the declared national policy of the “new restored democracy” and the people’s will as
expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a “gambling
objective” and therefore is contrary to Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners that PD 1869 violates
Section 13 of Article II of the constitution.

RULING: NO. Suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be
passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. Every law has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law,
or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is
therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of “morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization
as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values”
being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

81. BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COA GR. 177131; June 7, 2011

FACTS: BSP was created by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 111 as amended by
RA 7278. COA wanted to subject its funds to an audit. BSP alleges that it cannot be
subjected to an audit as it not a public corporation thus it is not within the jurisdiction
of COA. Although it was ruled in BSP vs NLRC that BSP is a public corporation.
According to BSP, the purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows
that it was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section
13 of the Constitution, which reads: “Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role
of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.”
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s contention is correct that BSP is a public corporation.

RULING: YES. Court cannot agree with the dissenting opinion which equates the
changes introduced by Republic Act No. 7278 to the BSP Charter as clear
manifestation of the intent of Congress “to return the BSP to the private sector.” It
was not the intent of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 7278 to give up all
interests in this basic youth organization, which has been its partner in forming
responsible citizens for decades. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special
law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the
class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and
governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.

SECTION 15 (RIGHT TO HEALTH)

82. IMBONG v. OCHOA GR 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS: The Imbong spouses petitioned for Certiorari and Prohibition against the RA
No. 10354, also known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law). Prior to the RH Law, the Philippines enacted R.A. No. 4729
entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" on June 18, 1966; which prohibits the sale,
dispensation or distribution of contraceptive drugs "unless such sale, dispensation
and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with
the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The petitioners assert that, rather
than promoting the health of women, the State is exposing women to serious
illnesses in its enactment of the RH Law and sponsorship of the universal access of
so-called modern means of family planning. The Solicitor General posits that the
constitution provision under Article 2, specifically, section 15 is not self-executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to health under Section 15 of
the constitution.

RULING: NO. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In
this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. The RH Law does not violate Section 15 of Article II of the
Constitution, which states that “the State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and shall instill health consciousness among them,” because the
enactment of the RH Law does not do away with the provisions of RA 4927. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that
only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. 

SECTION 16 (RIGHT TO A BALANCE AND HELPFUL ECOLOGY)

83. OPOSA v. FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, opting to cancel all
existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs and
granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment
of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 16 provide for an enforceable right.

RULING: YES! This provision, as worded, recognizes an enforceable “right”.

Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology, thus the minor’s
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

84. LLDA v. CA 231 SCRA 292 (1994) and 251 SCRA 42 (1995)

FACTS: The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to
dispose of the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala
Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub
of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) for adjudication. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity
in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fish
pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. Then RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code of 1991 was promulgated. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters. LLDA issued the assailed cease and desist order.
ISSUE: Whether or not LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.

RULING: YES. The immediate response to the demands of “the necessities of

protecting vital public interests” gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied
in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, particularly Section 16 of Article II,
of the 1987 Constitution. The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by
the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is
a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the
City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps
would have been necessary. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the
provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. The Supreme Court upheld
the empowerment of the LLDA to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Area
from the detrimental effects of pollutants coming from garbage dumping and the
discharge of wastes in the area as against the local autonomy claim of local
governments in the area.

85. MMDA v. RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY GR No. 171947, December 18, 2008

FACTS: In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action
for mandamus to compel the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and other government agencies to clean up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the
environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the
inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights
to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also
averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila
Bay. The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the
Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision on the ground that MMDA’s duty under the
Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled by
mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a general clean-up
of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to
attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean-up such
as that ordered by the court. The complaint by the residents alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila

Bay.

RULING: YES! the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind
and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement
laws like the Environmental Code, the process of implementing usually involves the
exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean that their
function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s
function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a
ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not
alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay
area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what
the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.

86. Boracay Foundation, Inc. v The Province of Aklan 674 SCRA 555; 2012

FACTS: Respondent Province built two ports: the Caticlan and the Cagban Jetty
Ports with their respective Passenger Terminals; both of which are to be operated by
the respondent in order to provide structural facilities suited for locals, tourists, and
guests, and also provide safety and security measures. The Financial
Advisor/Consultant came up with a feasibility study which focused on the land
reclamation of 2.64 hectares by way of beach enhancement and recovery of the old
Caticlan coastline for the rehabilitation and expansion of the existing jerry port.
Petitioner contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit
Boracay’s tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support services
thereto; however, this objective would not be achieved since the white-sand beaches
for which Boracay is famous for might be negatively affected by the project. The
Petitioner seeks to compel respondent province to comply with certain environmental
laws, procedure and rules that it claims were either circumvented or ignored.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s action for continuing mandamus is proper.

RULING: YES! Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious

implications on the future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to
the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to
rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial
component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s action or
inaction will need to be analyzed. This point is emphasized in the availability of the
remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of
the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.” The writ of
continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order
to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of
other means to monitor compliance with its decision.

87. C&M TIMBER vs ALCALA GR. 111088; June 13, 1997

FACTS: In 1993, C&M Timber Corp. (CMTC) filed a petition for certiorari that seeks
the nullification of the order and resolution of the Office of the President declaring as
of no force and effect its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued on 1972,
which was a log ban imposed by the previous administration that led to petitioner
and other loggers in the region stopping in their operations. Petitioner claims that any
new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioner’s vested rights in its TLA No. 106. Petitioner’s petition was barred because
it did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation (FLDC) until after FLDC had been logging under CMTC’s
license for almost two years and failed to contest its first suspension and subsequent
cancellation on 1983.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Total Log Ban is a new policy that takes prospective
application.

RULING: NO. The log banning is a mere reiteration of conserving and protecting
Section 16 of Article 2 of the Constitution on the State’s right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Regarding the contract of petitioner; timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public is promoted. They
are privileges granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

88. MMDA v. RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY GR No. 171947, December 18, 2008

FACTS: In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action
for mandamus to compel the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and other government agencies to clean up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the
environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the
inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights
to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also
averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila
Bay. The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the
Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision on the ground that MMDA’s duty under the
Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled by
mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a general clean-up
of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to
attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean-up such
as that ordered by the court. The complaint by the residents alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila

Bay.

RULING: YES! the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind
and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement
laws like the Environmental Code, the process of implementing usually involves the
exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean that their
function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s
function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a
ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not
alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay
area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what
the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.

89. Boracay Foundation, Inc. v The Province of Aklan 674 SCRA 555; 2012
FACTS: Respondent Province built two ports: the Caticlan and the Cagban Jetty
Ports with their respective Passenger Terminals; both of which are to be operated by
the respondent in order to provide structural facilities suited for locals, tourists, and
guests, and also provide safety and security measures. The Financial
Advisor/Consultant came up with a feasibility study which focused on the land
reclamation of 2.64 hectares by way of beach enhancement and recovery of the old
Caticlan coastline for the rehabilitation and expansion of the existing jerry port.
Petitioner contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit
Boracay’s tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support services
thereto; however, this objective would not be achieved since the white-sand beaches
for which Boracay is famous for might be negatively affected by the project. The
Petitioner seeks to compel respondent province to comply with certain environmental
laws, procedure and rules that it claims were either circumvented or ignored.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s action for continuing mandamus is proper.

RULING: YES! Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious

implications on the future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to
the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to
rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial
component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s action or
inaction will need to be analyzed. This point is emphasized in the availability of the
remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of
the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.” The writ of
continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order
to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of
other means to monitor compliance with its decision.
90. PAJE vs CASIÑO G. R. 207267; February 3, 2015

FACTS: DENR issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for a

proposed coal-fired power plant in Subic, Zambales. A petition for Writ of Kalikasan
was filed against them by Casiño and a number of legislators on the ground that
actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented
and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or
relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition challenging the validity of the ECC through a writ of
Kalikasan is valid.

RULING: YES! The validity of an ECC can be challenged by the writ of Kalikasan
because such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation
Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and
territorial boundaries. Moreover, the party invoking the writ must prove the defects
and irregularities of the issuance of the ECC, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In the case at bar, no such causal
link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid
second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities
in the issuance of the ECC. The state’s duty to "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature" must be done. An ECC must entail and outline the conditions under which
the activity or project with ecological impact can be undertaken.

91. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA GR

209271 and GR 209430

FACTS: A memorandum was executed between International Service for the

Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Inc (ISAAA), UPLBF and UP Mindanao in pursuance of a
collaborative research on eggplants. Bureau of Plant Industry issued biosafety
permits to UPLB. Greenpeace MASIPAG and others filed a temporary protection
alleging that the BT Talong Trials violate constitutional right to healthful and
balanced ecology. ISAAA, UPLBF filed motion for reconsideration but CA rejected it.
With the justification that introducing genetically modified plants into our ecosystem
is an “ecological imbalance”. The petitioner questioned the legal standing of the
respondent to file said action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the locus standi to file an action for writ
of Kalikasan.
RULING: YES! we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We held that such right need not be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to
“further encourage the protection of the environment.” There is therefore no dispute
on the standing of respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ
of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus.

Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

92. GUINGONA V. CARAGUE

Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4B in automatic appropriation, of which

P86.8B is appropriated for debt service, and P155.3B appropriated under RA 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports amounted to P27,017,813,000.00.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation
for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education.

Issue: Whether the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional mandate to accord highest priority to education.

Ruling: No. Budget prioritization for education, culture and sports is not absolute as
it still depends on the needs of the Country. While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the Congress is not
free to balance the demands of education against other equally important matters
concerning the State, much more to deprive the Government to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest. Congress is certainly not without power to
provide an appropriation that can reasonably service the Country’s enormous debt
since the very survival of our economy is at stake.

93. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of

the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of
Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt
service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the
Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding.
Issue: Whether the appropriation is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
mandate to accord highest priority to education.

Ruling: No. As held in the case of Guingona Jr. v. Carague, that Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory. While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to 'assign the highest
budgetary priority to education' in order to 'insure that teaching will attract and retain
its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.

Sec 18. Labor Protection

94. PNB v. DAN PADAO

Facts: Dan Padao, was a loan and credit officer of PNB. After due investigation,
PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him
dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the Board of Directors but he
eventually instituted a complaint against PNB and its then AVP (Assistant Vice
President) with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for reinstatement,
backwages, illegal dismissal, and treachery/bad Faith and palpable discrimination in
the treatment of employees with administrative cases.

The ELA (Executive Labor Arbiter) found Padao’s dismissal to be valid but awarded
a separation pay. Padao’s appeal to the NLRC reversed the decision and found the
termination to be illegal; he was to be reinstated and provided with other monetary
awards. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC and
thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Issue: Whether Dan Padao’s was illegally dismissed by PNB?

Ruling: No. He was terminated under an authorized or just cause as laid down in
Article 282 (b - Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties) of the
Labor Code. He not only failed to perform what he was employed to do, but also did
so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage to PNB. PNB, as
an employer, has the basic right to freely select and discharge employees, if only as
a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interests. It has the authority
to impose what penalty it deems sufficient or commensurate to an employee’s
offense.

Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor as a primary social economic force, and as
such, the State is bound to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare;
however, it is the basic right of the employer to freely select or discharge its
employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.
95. JMM PROMOTION v CA

Facts: Following the much publicized death of Maricris Sioson, former President
Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and
other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after the promise to
extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of
deployment. In its place the government through the Secretary of Labor, upon the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council’s (EIAC’s) recommendation, issued
Department Order No. 03 establishing various procedures and requirements for
screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training
and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a
necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.

Petitioners contends that overseas employment is a property right within the

meaning of the Constitution and avers that the alleged deprivation thereof, through
the onerous requirement of an ARB, violates due process and constitutes an invalid
exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the order for requirements for overseas employment
is valid

Ruling: Yes. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of

Article II of the Constitution provides: “Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.” The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the
Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a
backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the
protection of our workforce, local or overseas.

The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and
nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and
helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites
associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.

The Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce,

particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond
the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must
somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and
entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to
assume a measure of control.
96. PASE V. DRILON

Facts: DOLE enacted D.O. No. 1 series of 1988 which outlines the guidelines of
temporary suspension of Filipino domestic and household workers. Such order was
contested by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASEi) on the
bases of being discriminatory on both males and females, that it does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills.

Solicitor General however on behalf of the respondents secretary of DOLE and

administrator of POEA filed a comment on May 25, 1988 informing the court that
effective March 8, 1988 the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in states
where the department deems it appropriate. The enacted guidelines allow for
vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers to process with POEA and therefore
not covered by the ban on the condition that they are returning to the same employer
to finish an existing or partially served employment contract.

Issue: Whether D.O.1 is valid

Ruling: Yes. DO No. 1 is a valid regulation. The state gives a paramount importance
to its labor force, as stated in ARTICLE II. SEC. 18 of the Constitution, it is the duty
of the state to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. The
Department Order of DOLE aims to “enhance the protection of Filipina domestic
workers” in the midst of maltreatment of our workers have suffered abroad; a
deployment ban will be for their good and welfare.

The court believes that there is no undue discrimination between the sexes as stated
by the petitioners since the preference for female workers rests on substantial
distinctions; furthermore it is preferred to be applicable only to female domestic
helpers since they are being ill-treated on massive instances validated by tales and
cases of maltreatment extending to even rape and various forms of torture. The court
understands that it is the state’s policy to protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare, which is why the court backs up the government’s efforts to protect
victims of exploitation.

Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

97. GARCIA V. BOI

Facts: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical

Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for
the transfer of its proposed plant site from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of the
plant's feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant from "naphta only" to "naptha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas. 1 year after the BPC began its production in Bataan,
the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to
Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Garcia and others,the
BOI granted private respondent BPC's application, stating that the investors have the
final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk
capital for the project.

Issue: Whether BOI disregarded the national interest

Ruling: Yes. Affairs regarding the development of national economy must fuel the
spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full
control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements
with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in
accordance with national goals and priorities are disregarded in the approval of the
BOI of the investor’s request to amend. The BOI therefore has disregarded the best
interest of the Filipinos by adhering to the desires of this foreign investor; there is no
cogent advantage to the government shown in this transfer.

98. TANADA V. ANGARA

Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, Secretary of DTI representing the Government

of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. This was
then adopted as a resolution No. 97 in the Philippine senate and signed by the
President.

Tanada et.al seeks for nullification of the World Trade Organization on the grounds
that it violated the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO contravene
Sec.19, Art II of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No. The WTO agreement is not contravening with the provisions of the
Constitution rather it aims to be a surrogate of the state to fully develop its potential
in national economic development. The agreement does not undermine Art. II sec.
19, this charter provision has been merely set to be a general policy and is therefore
not self-executing. When read with other provisions particularly Sections 1 and 3 of
Article XII, the clauses cited in the WTO does not conflict with the Constitution, and
that the agreement is embedded in itself with sufficient provisions to protect the
Philippines and other developing countries from sudden trade liberalization.
99. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY

Facts: Petitioner filed a suit against the respondent ( an agency created by PD No.
232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry) in RTC of NCJR
in Makati , Metro Manila to enjoin the respondent’s resolution in which it declares
that it will no longer require licenses for applicants of coconut processing as a
condition in engaging in such business The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in
congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based
commodities.

Issue: Whether the policy of free enterprise calls for a removal of protective
regulations?

Ruling: No. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy,
it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare. Thus, an inclusion of protective regulation
in the application of coconut processing firms strongly corresponds to the effective
control of National Economy.

100. PHARMACEUTICALS VS. DUQUE

Facts: Petitioner posits that RIRR of EO 51 (Otherwise Known as the "Milk Code,"
Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes) is not valid as it contains provisions that are unconstitutional. Petitioner
also alleged that the RIRR sought to be implemented by the respondents is
unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to the due process clause of the
Constitution, insofar as the same is in restraint of trade and because a provision
therein is inadequate to provide the public with a comprehensible basis to determine
W/N they have committed a violation.

Issue: Whether the RIRR of EO No. 51 suppress the trade of milk

Ruling: No. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk
manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and
seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and
logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not
established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the
RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

Moreover, free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." It
must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. The framers of the
constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation
for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests.
Furthermore, despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." Hence, such power promoting
general welfare coincides to having an effective control of National Economy.

Section 20. Role of Private Sector

101. MANILA RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. VS. REYES

Facts: Petitioner brought the instant suit, alleging, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes
had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion upon the unveiling of the DOTC an
P880-million maritime coastal communications system project, designed to "ensure
safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of efficient communication
facilities between coast stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in
navigational routes at sea.

Petitioner argued that such Department cannot compete in the business of public
correspondence, and rely on the provision of Section 20, of Article II, of the
Constitution. The Solicitor General, rebutted that, the Government "cannot abandon
its ministerial functions of rendering public services to the citizenry which private
capital would not ordinarily undertake, or which by its very nature is better equipped
to administer for the public welfare than by any private individual or entity.

Issue: Whether the petitioner can legitimately rely on Section 20, Art II of 1987
Constitution

Ruling: No. The petitioners cannot legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20,
of Article II, of the Constitution, to defeat the act complained of. The mandate
"recognizing the indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an
acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation.
However, it is not a call for official abdication of duty to citizenry. The Constitution
does not bar, however, the Government from undertaking its own initiatives,
especially in the domain of public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy
as chief economic caretaker of the nation.

102. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. V. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN

Facts: This is an original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection

Order in the nature of a continuing mandamus. Petitioner is a duly registered, non-
stock domestic corporation. Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority(PRA),
formerly called the Public Estates Authority, is a government entity created by P.D.
No. 1084.
The Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, issued Resolution No. 13 stating that it had
learned that respondent Province had filed an application with the DENR for a
foreshore lease of areas along the shorelines of Barangay Caticlan, and manifesting
its strong opposition to said application, as the proposed foreshore lease practically
covered almost all the coastlines of said barangay, thereby technically diminishing its
territorial jurisdiction, once granted, and depriving its constituents of their statutory
right of preference in the development and utilization of the natural resources within
its jurisdiction. The resolution further stated that respondent Province did not conduct
any consultations with the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan regarding the
proposed foreshore lease

Issue: Whether Resolution No.13 is valid

Ruling: No. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang
Barangay of Caticlan, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the  Municipality of Malay,
which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent
Province. It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the
promotion of tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill
the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. 

In the case at bar, the national agency involved is PRA. Even if the project proponent
is the local government of Aklan, it is PRA which authorized the reclamation, being
the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation
nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go through
respondent PRA and to execute a MOA (Memorandum of Agreement), wherein
respondent PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent
Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a
national government institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC
(Environmental Compliance Certificate) that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.

Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

103. WILSON P. GAMBOA VS. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES

Facts: This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine

Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council
(IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific
Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and
holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT). 

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale
of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of
PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With this sale, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility
to not more than 40%.

Issue: Whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of

the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign
ownership of a public utility

Ruling: Yes. The (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the
Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common
shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be
shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the
beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.

Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and
restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino
nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking said activities.
Otherwise, if the Trial Court’s ruling upholding respondents’ arguments were to be
given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure of a public utility
corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine
percent (99%) preferred stocks. If the common shares can be owned entirely by
foreigners it will create an absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are supposed to
be minority shareholders, control the public utility corporation.

Section 24. Vital Role of Communications

104. PLDT vs NTC

Facts: Petitioners seeks to set aside and annul the decision of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) signed by former NTC Commissioner Jose
Luis Alcuaz as well as the order of the NTC En Banc. Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Eastern) filed with the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, maintain and operate an
International Digital Gateway Facility (IDGF). The NTC granted provisional authority
to ETCI (EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC) subject to the condition
that it shall enter into “interconnection agreement” with PLDT. PLDT elevated the
case to the SC pointing out ETCI’s defective legislative franchise to operate
telecommunications system, among others.

Issue: Whether PLDT’s petition should prosper.

Ruling: No. Through the egregious interpretation urged by PLDT and, in some
measure not yet fully clear, unfortunately adopted by the majority in the instant case,
PLDT seeks to monopolize the external transmission and reception of
telecommunications messages, i.e., the sending and receiving of such messages
across the boundaries of the Philippines. 

The decisive consideration is public need, public interest, and the common good.
Those were the overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional
authority to ETCI. Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital
role of communication and information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy
to provide the environment for the emergence of communications structures suitable
to the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country.

105. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. 180050,

APRIL 12, 2011) Art 2, Sec 25.

FACTS: Petitioners were former political leaders of Surigao del Norte challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 which created the Province of Dinagat Islands. The Court
dismissed the petition. Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of Surigao del
Norte, filed another petition seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They
alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, pointing out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area and
population which failed to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section
461 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N land area requirement should be read together with territorial
contiguity

RULING: YES - Consistent with the declared policy to provide local

government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and min
land area requirements for prospective local government units should be
liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results; The land area
requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity. The component
cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the min land area
requirement of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the min
land area criterion even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that
Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with
contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater
imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the
delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove
more difficult and burdensome if the prescribed land area territory of a province is
scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water. Moreover, a very
restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.

106. BELGICA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2013)

FACTS: The investigation was spawned as six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that
JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" for an entire decade.
Petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives,
who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for
local development.

ISSUE: W/N/ the 2013 PDAF Article and similar forms are unconstitutional?

RULING: YES

The Court finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, it observes that the gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have
been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of
a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to
the former.  With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local
development council and initiate a project on his own. Thus, insofar as
individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article and similar
forms are unconstitutional.

107. PAMATONG VS COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96

FACTS: Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President but Respondent refused

to give due course to it. The COMELEC denied his motion for reconsideration too.

Petitioner now seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited
the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates.

ISSUE:W/N Section 26 mean that everyone has a right to be a candidate for

President

RULING: NO - The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause
of action before the courts. Also, it is within the power of the state to limit the number of
qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.
108. NERI vs SENATE (G.R. 180643)

FACTS: Petitioner testified before respondent on matters concerning the National

Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman
Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed Pres. Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. When probed further on their discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege" to 3 questions: (a) W/N President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) W/N she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)W/N she
directed him to approve it. Respondent persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these 3
questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more but, petitioner did not appear
upon the President’s orders invoking executive privilege.

ISSUE:W/N the claim of executive privilege will violate Sec. 28, Art. II (Full
public disclosure) 

RULING: NO - Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation this Court is wary
of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only
official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and
informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said
questions serve some vague legislative need. The right to information is not an
absolute right. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. But, it
enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national
security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters,
and (4) other confidential information. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the
assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN
Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by
executive privilege.

109 is not related to the topic

110. POLLO VS CHAIRPERSON KARINA DAVID

FACTS: An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson

David asking for an investigation as a person have been lawyered by one of the
attorneys in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. Chairperson David
immediately formed a team which backed-up all files in the hard disk of computers. It
was found that most of the files were copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals for and on behalves of parties,
who are facing charges as respondents in admin. Pet. was a Supervising Personnel
Specialist.

ISSUE: W/N a no-privacy expectation is present upon the use of government

property.
RULING: YES (Disclaimer: This is the opinion of Justice Carpio as the right to
privacy is the case’s main focus)

The CSC’s computer use regulation, which opens to access for internal scrutiny
anything CSC employees "create, store, send, or receive in the computer system,"
has a statutory basis that "[g]overnment x x x property shall be x x x used solely
for public purposes." In short, any private use of a government property, like a
government-owned computer, is prohibited by law. Office regulations mandating
no-privacy expectation such as the CSC regulation in question cannot justify
access to sensitive government information traditionally recognized
as confidential. Thus, insulated from the reach of such regulations are
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-
door Cabinet meetings, internal deliberations of the SC and other collegiate
courts, draft decisions of judges and justices, executive sessions of either
house of Congress, military and diplomatic secrets, national security matters,
documents relating to pre-prosecution investigations by law enforcement
agencies and similar confidential matters.

111. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK AND PASCUAL GARCIA III vs SENATE

IMPEACHMENT COURT

FACTS: Petitioners sought to nullity the Resolution of respondent which granted the
prosecution's requests for subpoenas to PSBank them to testify and produce before the
Impeachment Court documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to
belong to then Suprerme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. They then filed to withdraw
the petition averring that subsequent events with the termination of the impeachment
proceedings against former Chief Justice, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of
violating Republic Act No. 6426 (RA 6426) or being held in contempt of court for refusing to
disclose the details of the subject foreign currency deposits.

ISSUE: W/N the impeachment court could order the disclosure of the
information of the foreign currency deposits

RULING: The petition has become moot and academic due to the supervening
conviction of Justice Corona.

No executive privilege was invoked in this case. However, in RA 6426, All

foreign currency deposits authorized as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under PD No. 1034, are declared as and considered absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in
no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or
administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private. With RA
6426 in mind, like the executive privilege, the rule on a full disclosure of
information is no an absolute rule as it is subject to exceptions.
112. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS, 14 FEBRUARY 2012

FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
Prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE dated January 27, op that it would
present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from
both private and public offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of
the SC, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which
are internal to the Court. The letters asked for the examination of records, and the
issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the
Deliberations, as above described, for purposes of Articles 3 and 7 of the
impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: W/N the Members of the SC have a privilege that is akin to or

equivalent to the executive privilege?

RULING: YES

Specifically, the Internal Rules of the SC prohibits the disclosure of (1) the
result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included
in the agenda of the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in
court sessions on cases and matters pending before it. [t]he information x x x
like internal deliberations of the SC and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This
kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government.
A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence
of decision-making. This privilege is called the deliberative process privilege.
All the great branches of government are entitled to this treatment for their
own decision and policy making conversations and correspondence.