Case # 71 People vs.

Valenzuela

Contention of the State

Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were charged and convicted of the crime of
consummated theft. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended by the security guard of Super Sale Club
after stealing cases of Tide detergent from said establishment.

Defense of the Accused

Petitioner concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists
that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated
stage of which he was convicted. Petitioner argues that at the time of he was apprehended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

Ruling:

The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to
accommodate the Adiao, Dio and Empelis rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that
expressly or impliedly allows that the “free disposition of the items stolen” is in any way determinative of
whether the crime of theft has been produced. The Court thus concludes that under the Revised Penal
Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.

*Adiao ruling: Theft was consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.

*Dio ruling: The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is
determinative as to whether the theft is consummated of frustrated.

*Empelis ruling: The crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence.

Case # 72. Miranda vs People

Contention of the State:

Anita Miranda was convicted of qualified theft by the RTC of Manila, Branch 20.

Miranda was employed as bookkeeper in Video City Commercial, Inc. and Viva Videocity, Inc.
As such she was entrusted and had access to the financial records, documents and checks and transactions
of the aforesaid firm. Miranda took and stole a total amount of Php797, 187.85 from the firm by making
herself the payee in forty-two checks in the account of Video City and Jefferson Tan.

Defense of the Accused:

Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution
failed to prove the private complainant’s absolute ownership of the thing stolen.

Ruling:
 The subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as
the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim there over, it is immaterial
whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.

Case # 73. People vs. Asamuddin

Contention of the State:

Consolidated cases for violation of RA 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, and
Qualified Theft were filed against accused Julkipli Asamuddin.

Emelina hired appellant as messenger in E. Gloria Money Charger with the main function of
delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers. Assigned to appellant to be used
in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM motorcycle. On July 11, 2007, Emelina handed the
appellant the cash amount of Php 800,00.00, and various foreign denominations with a peso value of Php
277, 995.00. Asamuddin was instructed to bring the currencies to her friend Rina Rosalial. The same was
not delivered to Rosalina.

Defense of the Accused:

Appellant denies the accusations. Appellant asserts that he cannot be convicted of Qualified Theft
because his employment as messenger did not create a fiduciary relationship that will qualify the crime of
theft.

Ruling:

All the elements of Qualified Theft is present in the instant case. A fiduciary relationship between
appellant and Emelina, his employer, existed. Emelina testified that she does not have proof that he
handed to appellant Php 800,00.00 and various foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total
trust and high degree of confidence on appellant. This exhibited the trust and confidence of Emelina to
the appellant which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the former.

Case # 74. People vs. Gulinao

Contention of the State:

Gulinao shot Dr Chua in the act of taking and stealing a Toyota Corona Silver Edition, colored
blue, then left. Gulinao went back to get Dr Chua’s diamond ring. He was convicted of illegal possession
of firearm, carnapping, and robbery.

Defense of the Accused:

The accused-appellant contends that the Trial Court gravely erred in finding him guilty of
robbery under article 294, paragraph 5, of The Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5 of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code. The taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force
employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring.

Case # 75. Santos vs. People

Contention of the state:

Petitioner Santos was originally charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the car of private respondent
which he allegedly repaired and re-painted after two months from the time private respondent left her car
in his care. Petitioner was found guilty and convicted of Estafa but on appeal, his conviction was affirmed
but modified and found the accused guilty of qualified theft but since the object of the crime which is a
car was not alleged as a qualifying circumstance, it is only an aggravating circumstance for the crime
theft once proven, therefore, the accused was charged with the crime of theft with 1 aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance.

Defense of the accused:

That the petitioner bought the car from private respondent showing his copy of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase and that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle so there was no
crime committed.

Ruling:

Guilty. Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is
settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the
information. And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of
theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things.

Furthermore, the SC held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to
him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.

Case # 76. Laurel vs. Abrogar

Contention of the State:

Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and
using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) – “a
method of outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the
call is destined”. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and
caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92. PLDT alleges that the international calls and
business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
Defense of the accused:

He averred that the Revised Penal Code, or any other special penal law for that matter, does not
prohibit ISR operations. He claimed that telephone calls with the use of PLDT telephone lines, whether
domestic or international, belong to the persons making the call, not to PLDT. He argued that the caller
merely uses the facilities of PLDT, and what the latter owns are the telecommunication infrastructures or
facilities through which the call is made. He also asserted that PLDT is compensated for the caller’s use
of its facilities by way of rental; for an outgoing overseas call, PLDT charges the caller per minute, based
on the duration of the call. Thus, no personal property was stolen from PLDT. According to Laurel, the
P20,370,651.92 stated in the Information, if anything, represents the rental for the use of PLDT facilities,
and not the value of anything owned by it.

Ruling:

The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended Information, for theft of telecommunication or
telephone services offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the term "personal property" under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be interpreted beyond its seams so as to include "telecommunication or
telephone services" or computer services for that matter. The word "service" has a variety of meanings
dependent upon the context, or the sense in which it is used; and, in some instances, it may include a sale.
For instance, the sale of food by restaurants is usually referred to as "service," although an actual sale is
involved. It may also mean the duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another; performance of
labor for the benefit of another. In the case of PLDT, it is to render local and international
telecommunications services and such other services as authorized by the CPCA issued by the NTC. Even
at common law, neither time nor services may be taken and occupied or appropriated. A service is
generally not considered property and a theft of service would not, therefore, constitute theft since there
can be no caption or asportation. Neither is the unauthorized use of the equipment and facilities of PLDT
by the petitioner theft under the aforequoted provision of the Revised Penal Code.

Case # 77. Hizon v CA

Contention of the state:

Petitioners were charged with a violation of P.D. 704 illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance. Report was received by the Task force Bantay Dagat that a boat and several small
crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. Task
force Bantay Dagat immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized
sampans and a big fishing boat identified as FB/Robinson. They boarded the boat and inspected it with
the consent of the boat captain. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the
captain’s deck. They examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also
discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish at the bottom of the boat. They
checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. nonetheless, the
policemen brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further
investigation. The boat captain was ordered to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of FB/
Robinson for laboratory examination. The samples were delivered to the NBI for examination to
determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes. The Forensic Chemist
conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.

Defense of the accused:

Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. In their defense, they claimed that they
are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage
in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they were intimidated
by the policemen.

Ruling:

Not guilty. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes
to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal
fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or
device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish
caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found
in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have
engaged in illegal fishing.

The SC stresses, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It cannot, under the guise
of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to
rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption.

Here, after the information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail, petitioners moved that the fish
specimens taken from the FB/ Robinson be re-examined. The trial court granted the motion. The re-
examination revealed that there is negative presence of sodium cyanide. The absence of cyanide in the
second set of fish specimens supports petitioners claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. Also,
the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first laboratory test on
the four fish specimens.  Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force
Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor
General, the report received by the Task Force Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally
through muro ami on the waters of San Rafael. Muro ami is made with the use of a big net with sinkers to
make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surrounding the net. This method of fishing needs
approximately two hundred fishermen to execute. That the apprehending officers instead discovered were
twenty eight fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the
boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. And the documents of the boat and the
fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

Case no. 78. Yongco vs. People.

Contention of the State

The accused, Joel Yongco, Julieto Lanojan and Anecito Tangian, being a security guard and a truck driver
of City Engineer’s office (CEO) was charged of qualified theft by grave abuse of confidence with
conspiracy when they stole and carried away the unit transmission, boom, differential of Tamaraw and l-
beam of Nissan belonging to the City government of Ilagan.

Facts

Tangian, the truck driver, loaded the stolen items into his truck. Yongco, the security guard at that time,
allowed the Tangian to exit the premises without securing a gate pass and helped the said driver in
loading the items. After the arrival of the stolen items to the junk shop, Lanojan, another security guard of
the CEO, secured the stolen items into his possession.

Defense of the Accused

Tangian’s defense is that he should not be considered as a conspirator since he merely innocently obeyed
Lanojans instructions on the assumption that the latter was his superior. In their joint brief, Yongco’s
defense is that Tangian and his two other helpers asked for his assistance which he extended in good faith.
Lañojan, on the other hand, insisted that he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he was not present
at the time of taking.

Ruling

Guilty. Art. 310 of the RPC states that it is qualified theft when it is committed with grave abuse of
confidence. Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave
abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, all of the elements of Qualified Theft are present in
this case. There is no dispute that the items which are the subject matter of this case belong to
the CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these items, although considered "heap of
scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by the proper authority or office.
There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already
under complete and effective control of the persons taking the same. Apparently, the taking of
these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was no gate pass
issued to that effect.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these items were brought to the junk store,
intent to gain becomes obvious. The presumption of animus lucrandi has not been overturned.

It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of
confidence. The accused in this case, it bears stressing, were guards and drivers with access to
the entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they enjoyed the trust and
confidence reposed on them by their employer (the City of Iligan) to have access throughout the
CEO premises on account of their respective duties.

Case no. 79. Empelis vs Iac

Contention of the State

The accused was charged of qualified theft after being caught in the act of stealing fifty coconuts from the
coconut plantation of Guillermo Catarining.

Defense of the Accused

It is only simple theft instead of qualified theft.

Ruling

Guilty. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that it is qualified theft if the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are
still in the tree or deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft. When the coconuts are
stolen in any other place, it is simple theft.

In the case of People vs. Isnain the Supreme Court held that "in the matter of theft of coconuts,
the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as
one of the sources of our national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is
unobstructed, coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of
coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, of will be as it has been in
the past the favorite resort of thieves."

In the case at bar, petitioners were seen arriving away fifty coconuts while they were still in the
premises of the plantation. They would therefore come within the definition of qualified theft because the
property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation.
 Case No. 80 Mustang Lumber Inc vs. CA

Contention of the State

The petitioner was charged of illegal possession of lumber in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.
Acting on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts and slabs were seen inside petitioner’s
lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman organized and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner’s truck loaded with
lumber. The driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents. The team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded them.

Defense of the Accused

The petitioner argues that the information does not charge an offense, for possession of  lumber,
as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705

Ruling

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not
mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised
Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a
processed log or timber. Even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items confiscated fall
within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense. The court
held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as
alleged by the facts in the information.
The court further ruled that the exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose
of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our
forest resources