Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

MALACAT vs.

CA

FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of
policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with
his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group
of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then
apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner
contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand
grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade
as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

RULING: Trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming
a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence,
or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest
of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
FLORIDA v. J. L. No. 98-1993 (2000)
FACTS:
After an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun, officers went to the bus stop and saw
three black males, one of whom, respondent J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the
officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm or
observe any unusual movements. One of the officers frisked J. L. and seized a gun from his pocket. J. L.,
who was then almost 16, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license
and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. The trial court granted his motion to suppress the gun
as the fruit of an unlawful search. The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of
Florida quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE:
Whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police
officer's stop and frisk of that person.
RULING:
We hold that it is not. An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to
justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for the protection of himself and others,
may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual
conduct where, inter alia, the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous. Here, the officers'
suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations but solely from a call
made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to
provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore
left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. The contentions of Florida
and the United States as amicus that the tip was reliable because it accurately described J. L.'s visible
attributes misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable suspicion
here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a
determinate person. This Court also declines to adopt the argument that the standard Terry analysis
should be modified to license a "firearm exception," under which a tip alleging an illegal gun would
justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. The facts
of this case do not require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged
in an anonymous tip might be so great-- e.g., a report of a person carrying a bomb--as to justify a search
even without a showing of reliability.

You might also like