FĀRĀBĪ vi.

Political Philosophy
 

FĀRĀBĪ

vi. Political Philosophy

The central theme of Fārābī’s political writings is the virtuous regime, the political order whose
guiding principle is the realization of human excellence by virtue. Fārābī conceives of human or
political science as the inquiry into man insofar as he is distinguished from other natural beings and
from divine beings, seeking to understand his specific nature, what constitutes his perfection, and
the way through which he can attain it. Unlike other animals, man is not rendered perfect merely
through the natural principles present in him, and unlike divine beings he is not eternally perfect but
needs to achieve his perfection through the activity proceeding from rational understanding,
deliberation, and choosing among the various alternatives suggested to him by reason. The initial
presence of the power of rational knowledge and of the choice connected with it, is man’s first or
natural perfection, the perfection he is born with and does not choose. Beyond this, reason and
choice are present in a human being to use for realizing his end or the ultimate perfection possible
for his nature. This ultimate perfection is identical with the supreme happiness available to him.
“Happiness is the good desired for itself, it is never desired to achieve by it something else, and there
is nothing greater beyond it that a human being can achieve” (Mabādeʾ, ed. Dieterici, p. 46:
cf. Ketāb al-sīāsa, pp. 72-75, 78).

Yet, happiness cannot be achieved without first being known, and without performing certain orderly
(bodily and intellectual) activities useful or leading to the achievement of perfection. These are the
noble activities. The distinction between noble and base activities is thus guided by the distinction
between what is useful for, and what obstructs, perfection and happiness. To perform an activity
well, with ease, and in an orderly fashion requires the formation of character and the development of
habits that make such activities possible. “The forms and states of character from which these
[noble] activities emanate are the virtues; they are not goods for their own sake but goods only for
the sake of happiness” (Mabādeʾ, ed. Dieterici, p. 46; cf. Ketāb al-sīāsa, pp. 43-44). The distinction
between virtue and vice presupposes knowledge of what human perfection or happiness is as well as
the distinction between noble and base activities.

The virtuous regime can be defined as the regime in which human beings come together and
cooperate with the aim of becoming virtuous, performing noble activities, and attaining happiness. It
is distinguished by the presence in it of knowledge of man’s ultimate perfection; the distinction
between the noble and the base and between the virtues and the vices; and the concerted efforts of
the rules and the citizens to each and learn these things, and to develop the virtuous forms or states
of character from which emerge the noble activities useful for achieving happiness.

The attainment of happiness means the perfection of that power of the human soul that is specific to
man, of his reason. This in turn requires disciplining the lower desires to cooperate with and aid
reason to perform its proper activity and also acquiring the highest arts and sciences. Such discipline
and learning can be accomplished only by the rare few who possess the best natural endowments and
who are also fortunate to live under conditions in which the requisite virtues can be developed and
noble activities performed. The rest of men can only attain some degree of this perfection; and the
extent to which they can attain that degree of perfection of which they are capable is decisively
influenced by the kind of political regime in which they live and the education they receive.
Nevertheless, all the citizens of the virtuous regime must have some common notions about the
world, man, and political life. But they will differ with regard to the character of this knowledge, and
hence, with regard to their share of perfection or happiness. They can be divided broadly into the
following three classes: (1) the wise or the philosophers who know the nature of things by means of
demonstrative proofs and by their own insights; (2) the followers of these who know the nature of
things by means of the demonstrations presented by the philosophers, and who trust the insight and
accept the judgment of the philosophers; (3) the rest of the citizens, the many, who know things by
means of similitudes, some more and others less adequate, depending on their rank as citizens.
These classes or ranks must be ordered by the ruler who should also organize the education of the
citizens, assign to them their specialized duties, give them their laws, and command them in war. He
is to seek, by persuasion and compulsion, to develop in each the virtues of which he is capable and to
order the citizens hierarchically so that each class can attain the perfection of which it is capable and
yet serve the class above it. It is in this manner that the city becomes a whole similar to the cosmos,
and its members cooperate toward attaining happiness.

The virtuous regime is a non-hereditary monarchical or an aristocratic regime in which the best rule,
with the rest of the citizens divided into groups that (depending on their rank) are ruled and in turn
rule—until one arrives at the lowest group that is ruled only. The sole criterion for the rank of a
citizen is the character of the virtue of which he is capable and that he is able to develop through his
participation in the regime and obedience to its laws. Like the regime itself, its citizens are virtuous,
first, because they possess, or follow those who possess, correct similitudes of the knowledge of
divine and natural beings, human perfection or happiness, and the principles of the regime designed
to help human beings attain this happiness; and, second, because they act in accordance with this
knowledge in that their character is formed with a view to performing the activities conducive to
happiness.

Once the main features of the virtuous regime are clarified, the understanding of the main features
and the classification of all other regimes become relatively simple. Fārābī divides them into three
broad types: (1) The regimes whose citizens have had no occasion to acquire any knowledge at all
about divine and natural beings or about perfection and happiness. These are the “ignorant” regimes.
Their citizens pursue lower ends, good or bad, in complete oblivion of true happiness. (2) The
regimes whose citizens possess the knowledge of these things but do not act according to their
requirements. These are the “wicked” or “immoral” regimes. Their citizens have the same views as
those of the virtuous regime; yet, their desires do not serve the rational part in them but turn them
away to pursue the lower ends pursued in ignorant regimes. (3) The regimes whose citizens have
acquired certain opinions about these things, but false or corrupt opinions, that is, opinions that
claim to be about divine and natural beings and about true happiness, while in fact they are not. The
similitudes presented to such citizens are, consequently, false and corrupt, and so also are the
activities prescribed for them. These are the regimes that have been led astray or the erring regimes.
The citizens of such regimes do not possess true knowledge or correct similitudes, and they, too,
pursue the lower ends of the ignorant regimes. The regimes in error may have been founded as such.
This is the case with the regimes “whose supreme ruler was one who was under an illusion that he
was receiving revelations without having done so, and with regard to which he had employed
misrepresentations, deceptions, and delusions” (Mabādeʾ, ed. Dieterici, p. 63; cf. Ketāb al-sīāsa, pp.
103-4). But they may also have been originally virtuous regimes that had been changed through the
introduction of false or corrupt views and practices.

All these types of regimes are opposed to the virtuous regimes because they lack its guiding principle,
which is true knowledge and virtue or the formation of character leading to activities conducive to
true happiness. Instead, the character of the citizens is formed with a view to attaining one or more
of the lower ends. These ends are given by Fārābī as six, and each of the general types mentioned
above can be subdivided according to the end that dominates in it: (1) the regime of necessity (or the
indispensable regime) in which the aim of the citizens is confined to the bare necessities of life; (2)
the vile regime (oligarchy) in which the ultimate aim of the citizens is wealth and prosperity for their
own sakes; (3) the base regime is the purpose of whose citizens is the enjoyment of the sensory or
imaginary pleasures; (4) the regime of honor (timocracy) whose citizens aim at being honored,
praised, and glorified by others; (5) the regime of domination (tyranny) whose citizens aim at
overpowering and subjecting others; (6) the regime of corporate association (democracy) the main
purpose of whose citizens is being free to do what they wish.

PHILOSOPHER-KING AND PROPHET-LEGISLATOR

To combine divine and political science is to emphasize the political importance of sound beliefs
about divine beings and the principles of the world. Both Islam and classical philosophy are in
agreement concerning this issue. Muslims believed that the primary justification of their existence as
a distinct community was the revelation of the truth about divine things to Moḥ ammad, and that,
had he not come to them with his message, they would have continued to live in misery and
uncertainty about their well-being in this world and the next. It was also because of such
considerations that Plato thought that kings must become philosophers or philosopher-kings. Once
the quest for the best regime arrives at the necessity of combining divine and political science, it
becomes necessary that the ruler should combine the craft of ruling with that of prophecy or
philosophy. The ruler-prophet or the ruler-philosopher is the human being who offers the solution to
the question of the realization of the best regime, and the functions of the ruler-prophet and of the
ruler-philosopher appear in this respect to be identical.

Fārābī begins his discussion of the supreme ruler with the emphasis on the common function of the
ruler-philosopher and the ruler-prophet as rulers who are the link between the divine beings above
and the citizens who do not have direct access to knowledge of these beings. He is the teacher and
guide “who makes known” to the citizens what happiness is, who “arouses in them the
determination” to do things necessary for attaining it, and “who does not need to be ruled by a
human in anything at all” (Ketāb al-sīāsa, pp. 78-79). He must possess knowledge; not need any
other human to guide him; have excellent comprehension of everything that must be done; be
excellent in guiding all others in what he knows; have the ability to make others perform the
functions for which they are fit; and have the ability to determine and define the work to be done by
others and to direct such work toward happiness. These qualities evidently require the best
endowments, but also the fullest development of the rational faculty. (According to Aristotelian
psychology as Fārābī presents it in his political works the perfection of the rational faculty consists of
its correspondence to, or “contact” with, the Active Intellect; see ʿAQL.) The supreme ruler must be a
human being who actualizes his rational faculty or who is in contact with the Active Intellect.

This supreme ruler is the source of all power and knowledge in the regime, and it is through him that
the citizens learn what they ought to know and to do. As God or the First Cause of the world directs
everything else, and as everything else is directed toward Him, “the case ought to be the same in the
virtuous city; in an orderly fashion, all of its parts ought to follow in their activities in the footsteps of
the purpose of its supreme ruler (Mabādeʾ, ed. Dieterici, pp. 56-57; cf. Ketāb al-sīāsa, pp. 83-84).
He possesses unlimited powers and cannot be subjected to any human being or political regime or
laws. He has the power to confirm or abrogate previous divine laws, to enact new ones, and “to
change a law he had legislated at one time for another if he deems it better to do so” (Ketāb al-sīāsa,
pp. 80-81). He alone has the power to order the classes of people in the regime and assign in them
their ranks. And it is he who offers them what they need to know.

For most people, this knowledge has to take the form of an imaginative representation of the truth
rather than a rational conception of it. This is because most people are not endowed, or cannot be
trained to know divine things in themselves, but can only understand their imitations, which should
be made to fit their power of understanding and their special conditions and experience as members
of a particular regime. Religion contains such a set of imaginative representations. The divine law is
legislated for a particular group of human beings. It is necessitated by the incapacity of most human
beings to conceive things, especially the highest or divine things, rationally. Still, they need to know
these things in some fashion. They need to believe in the imitations of divine beings, and of
happiness and perfection, as presented to them by the founder of their regime. The founder must
then not only present a rational or conceptual account of happiness and the divine principles to the
few, but also adequately represent or imitate these same things for the many. All the citizens are to
accept that with which he entrusts them: “the ones who follow after happiness as they cognize it and
accept the [divine] principles as they cognize them are the wise human beings; and the ones in whose
souls these things are found in the form of images, and who accept them and follow them as such, are
the believers” (Ketāb al-sīāsa, p. 86).

Thus far, Fārābī identifies the ruler-prophet and the ruler-philosopher. They are both supreme rulers
absolutely, and both have absolute authority with regard to legislating beliefs and actions. Both
acquire this authority in virtue of the perfection of their rational faculty, and both receive revelation
from God through the agency of the active intellect. Wherein, then, does the ruler-prophet differ
from the ruler-philosopher?

The first and primary qualification that the ruler of the virtuous regime must possess is a special kind
of knowledge of divine and human beings. Now, a human being possess three faculties for
knowledge: sensation, imagination, and reason (both theoretical and practical), and these develop in
him in that order. Imagination has three functions: (1) It acts as a reservoir of sensible impressions
after the disappearance of the objects of sensation. (2) It combines sensible impressions to form a
complex sensible image. (3) It produces imitations. It has the capacity to imitate all sensible things
(human desires, temperament, passions) through sensible impressions or certain combinations of
them. When later the rational faculty develops, and a human being begins to grasp the character,
essence, or form of natural and divine beings, the faculty of imagination receives and imitates these
rational forms also, that is, it represents them in the form of sensible impressions. In this respect,
imagination is subordinate to the rational faculty and depends on it for the “originals” that it
imitates; it has no direct access to the essence of natural and divine beings. Further, the imitations
that it fabricates are not all good copies; some may be more true and nearer to the originals, others
defective in some respects, and still others extremely false or misleading copies. Finally, only the
rational faculty that grasps the originals themselves can judge the degree of the truth of these copies
and of their likenesses to the originals. The rational faculty is the only faculty that has access to the
knowledge of divine or spiritual beings, and it must exercise strict control to insure that the copies
offered by the imaginative faculty are good or fair imitations. It may happen in rare cases that this
imaginative faculty is so powerful and perfect that it overwhelms all the other faculties, and proceeds
directly to receive or form images of divine beings. This rare case is the case of prophecy (Mabādeʾ,
ed. Dieterici, p. 52).
The description of the nature of prophecy leads to the distinction between the faculty of imagination
and the rational faculty. It explains the possibility of prophecy as the perfection of the faculty of
imagination, and that imagination can almost dispense with the rational faculty and receive the
images of divine beings directly and without the latter’s mediation. There are two powers by means
of which a human being can communicate with the Active Intellect: his imagination and his rational
faculty or his intellect. When he communicates with it by means of his imagination, he is “a prophet
who warns about what will happen and who informs about what is taking place now”; while when he
communicates with it by means of his rational faculty he is “a wise human being, a philosopher, and
has complete intelligence” (Mabādeʾ, ed. Dieterici, pp. 58-59).

LAW AND LIVING WISDOM

Wisdom or philosophy is an indispensable condition for the founding and survival of the virtuous
city. Prophecy, on the other hand, is indispensable for founding a virtuous city, but not for its
survival. In enumerating the qualities of the supreme ruler or the founder of the virtuous city, Fārābī
stipulates the coincidence of excellent rational and prophetic faculties. This requirement is imposed
by composition of the virtuous city as a political community, that is, the fact that it must be made up
of two broad groups: (1) the few who are philosophers or can be addressed through philosophy, and
who can be taught the theoretical sciences and hence the true character of divine and natural beings
as they are; (2) the many who (because they lack the necessary natural endowments or have no time
for sufficient training) are not philosophers, who live by opinion and persuasion, and for whom the
ruler must imitate these beings by means of similitudes or symbols.)

While the few can be made to grasp rationally the meaning of human happiness and perfection and
the rational basis for justification of the virtuous activities that lead to a human being’s ultimate end,
the many are incapable of such understanding and have to be taught to perform these activities by
persuasion and compulsion, that is, by explanations that could be understood by all the citizens
regardless of their rational capacity, and by prescribed rewards and punishments of an immediate
tangible kind. The supreme ruler teaches the few in his capacity as a philosopher, and he presents
similitudes and prescribes rewards and punishments for the many in his capacity as prophet. To be
believed and practiced by the many, these similitudes and prescriptions should be formulated by the
prophet, and accepted by the citizens, as true, fixed, and permanent; that is, the citizens should
expect definite rewards and punishments for belief and unbelief, and for obedience and
disobedience. The prophetic faculty culminates, then, in laying down laws concerning both the
beliefs and the practices of the many, and the prophet who assumes this function becomes a prophet-
legislator. The rational faculty, on contrast, culminates in teaching the theoretical sciences to the few.
In his summary of Plato’s Laws, Fārābī also understood Plato to say that these virtuous few “have no
need for fixed practices and laws at all; nevertheless they are very happy. Laws and fixed practices
are needed only for those who are morally crooked” (Talḵīsá, p. 41).
It is only as viewed by the subjects that laws are fixed and are of unquestionable divine authority.
The supreme rule of the virtuous regime is the master and not the servant of the law. Not only is he
not ruled by any human being, he is also not ruled by the law. He is the cause of the law, he creates it,
and he abrogates and changes it as he sees fit. He possesses this authority because of his wisdom and
his capacity to decide what is best for the common good under given conditions, and conditions can
arise under which the changing of the laws is not only salutary but indispensable for the survival of
the virtuous regime. In so doing he must be extremely cautious not to disturb the faith of the citizens
in their laws, and should consider the adverse effect that change has on attachment to the law. He
must make a careful appraisal of the advantage of changing the law as against the disadvantage of
change as such. Thus he must possess, not only the authority to change the laws whenever necessary,
but also the craft of minimizing the danger of change to the well-being of the regime. But once he
sees that changing the law is necessary and takes the proper precautions, there is no question as to
his authority to change the law. Therefore, so long as he lives, the rational faculty rules supreme and
laws are preserved or changed in the light of his judgment as philosopher.

It is this coincidence of philosophy and prophecy in the person of the ruler, or at least the
coincidence of philosophy and rulership, that insures the survival of the virtuous regime. As long as
rulers who possess such qualities succeed one another without interruptions, the same situation
obtains (Ketāb al-mella, pp. 49-50).

The coincidence of philosophy and prophecy is extremely rare, and chance may not even favor the
virtuous regime with the availability of a human being who possesses all the necessary natural
endowments and whose training as philosopher proves successful. Thus the question arises as to
whether the virtuous city can survive in the absence of a human being with all the qualifications
required of the prophet-philosopher-ruler or of the philosopher-ruler. Granting that the best possible
arrangement demands the existence of such qualifications in one person who must rule, can the
regime originated by the prophet-philosopher-ruler survive at all in his absence and in the absence of
a philosopher-ruler as his successor? Fārābī is willing in the Mabādeʾ to consider the possibility that
this city can survive in the absence of both such rulers, but only if provisions are made for the
presence of proper substitutes for prophetic legislation. These substitutes consist of (1) the body of
laws and customs established by the “true princes,” and (2) a combination of new qualities in the
ruler that make him proficient in the “art of jurisprudence,” that is, knowledge of the laws and
customs of his predecessors, willingness on his part to follow these laws and customs rather than
change them, the capacity to apply them to new conditions by the deductions of new decisions from,
or the discovery of new applications for, established laws and customs, and the capacity to meet
every new situation (for which no specific decisions are available) through understanding the
intention of previous legislators rather than by the legislation of new laws or by any formal change of
old ones. So far as the law is concerned, this new ruler is a jurist-legislator rather than a prophet-
legislator. He must, however, possess all other qualities, including wisdom, that enable him to
discern and promote the common good of his regime at the particular period during which he rules.

In the event that no single human being should exist who possesses all these qualifications, then
Fārābī suggests a third possibility: a wise man and one other human being (who possesses the rest of
the qualities, except wisdom) should rule jointly. Were even this to prove unobtainable, he suggests
finally a joint rule of a number of human beings possessing these qualifications severally. This joint
rule does not, however, affect the presence of the required qualifications but only their presence in
the same human being. Thus, the only qualification whose very presence may be dispensed with is
prophecy. The substitutes for prophecy are the preservation of old laws and the capacity to discover
new applications for old laws. To promote the common good and preserve the regime under new
conditions as these emerge, neither the coincidence of philosophy and prophecy in the same human
being, nor the coincidence of wisdom and jurisprudence, proves to be an indispensable condition. It
is sufficient to have wisdom in the person of a philosopher who rules jointly with another human
being or a group of human beings who possess, among other things, the capacity to put old laws to
new uses. Unlike prophecy, wisdom cannot be dispense with, and nothing can take its place. Unlike
the presence of prophecy, the absence of wisdom is fatal to the existence of the virtuous regime.
There is no substitute for living wisdom.

Bibliography:

Works by Fārābī. Ketāb al-mella, ed. M. Mahdi as Alfarabi’s Book of Religion and Related Texts
(Ketāb al-mella wa noṣūṣ oḵrā), Beirut, 1968.

Ketāb al-sīāsa al-madanīya, ed. F. Najjar as Al-Farabi’s The Political Regime (al-Siyāsa al-
Madaniya Also Known as the Treatise on the Principles of Beings), Beirut, 1964; part. tr. by F.
Najjar in R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, New York, 1963.

Mabādeʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāżela, ed. F. Dieterici, Leiden, 1895; ed. and tr. R. Walzer as Al-
Farabi on the Perfect State, Oxford, 1985. Talḵīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭon, ed. F. Gabrieli as Alfarabius
Compendium Legum Platonis, London, 1952.

For further discussion and extensive bibliography, see M. Galston, Politics and Excellence: The
Political Philosophy of Alfarabi, Princeton, 1990.

(Muhsin Mahdi)
 Originally Published: January 1, 2000

Last Updated: January 1, 2000

FĀRĀBĪ VI. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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al-Farabi
First published Fri Jul 15, 2016; substantive revision Fri Jul 24, 2020
We know little that is really reliable about al-Fârâbî’s life. Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî was probably
born in 870 CE (AH 257) in a place called Farab or Farayb. In his youth he moved to Iraq
and Baghdad. In 943 CE (AH 331) he went to Syria and Damascus. He may have gone to
Egypt but died in Damascus in December 950 CE or January 951 CE (AH 339). Scholars
have disputed his ethnic origin. Some claimed he was Turkish but more recent research
points to him being a Persian (Rudolph 2017: 536–45).
Al-Fârâbî had two main interests:

1. Philosophy and logic in particular. Such interest explains why he is known as “the
second master” (the first one, of course, being Aristotle) and
2. Music. His huge Kitâb al-musiqâ al-kabîr or Great Book of Musicis the most
important medieval musical treatise in Islamic lands and also includes sophisticated
philosophical sections.
Beginning in the 1980s, much has happened in Farabian scholarship. New and better editions
of his works as well as new and better translations have led to deeper studies of his thought
and to some interesting and lively controversies. More current bibliographies allow for more
detailed research. We still lack critical editions, full English translations—and even, at times,
translation in any language of several texts—as well as a solid introduction to al-Fârâbî’s
philosophy. More research is also needed to better understand the relation between his
philosophical and musical interests.
One can find the most recent and detailed listings of al-Fârâbî’s works and their translations
in Ulrich Rudolph, “Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî” (2017: 526–594), and Philippe Vallat (2004: 379–
87). Also, Jon McGinnis & David. C. Reisman translated a series of Farabian texts in
their Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources (2007: 54–120).
 1. Enumeration of the Sciences
 2. Language
 3. Logic
 4. Mathematics and Music
 5. Physics
 6. Metaphysics
 7. Ethics and Politics
 8. Conclusion
 Bibliography
o Research Tools
o Primary Literature
o Secondary Literature
 Academic Tools
 Other Internet Resources
 Related Entries

1. Enumeration of the Sciences

In what follows we will underline important scholarly developments of the last thirty years
and add useful complements to these listings. In order to highlight these scholarly
developments we will follow the traditional order of the Aristotelian sciences that al-Fârâbî
himself offers in his Enumeration of the sciences, ‘Ihsâ’ al-‘ulûm, one of his most famous
texts, as its Medieval Latin versions had much influence in the West. There is no full English
translation of this text, but Amor Cherni (2015) published an edition with French translation
and commentaries. Recently, a new critical edition with German translation of one of the two
Medieval Latin versions have come out: Über die Wissenschaften (de scientiis) Dominicus
Gundissalinus’ version (2006). Alain Galonnier published a critical edition, French
translation and study of the other Medieval latin version: Le De scientiis Alfarabii de Gerard
de Cremone (2016). Following this traditional theoretical order makes much sense since we
know very little about the chronological order of al-Fârâbî’s works, even if there is some
indication that The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City, also known as The Perfect
State, and The Political Regime, also known as The Principles of the Beings, may be among
his latest works. The paucity of serious information about the chronological order of al-
Fârâbî’s works makes it difficult to determine whether some inconsistencies and tensions
between different works result from an evolution in his thought, as Damien Janos claims
(2019, pp. 166–70), or hint at a distinction between exoteric and esoteric treatises or simply
arise from limitations inherent to human nature that affect even the greatest philosophers. As
al-Fârâbî understood philosophy as all-encompassing and attempted to present coherent
views, some works straddle several philosophical disciplines and so we will indicate when
such is the case. Al-Fârâbî’s knowledge of Aristotle’s works is extensive, and even includes
some of his zoological treatises.

2. Language
In the Enumeration of the Sciences al-Fârâbî first focuses on language, grammar, metrics,
etc. His Kitâb al-Hurûf (Book of Letters) or Particles, gives us much information on his
views on language. Muhsin Mahdi, who published the first edition of this text in 1969a based
on a single manuscript, later on found two other manuscripts but could not complete a new
edition. Making use of the new material already gathered by Mahdi, Charles Butterworth has
prepared a second edition with facing full English translation to be published by Cornell
University Press. Muhammad Ali Khalidi gave a partial English translation covering the
middle section (2005). Thérèse-Anne Druart (2010) began studying al-Fârâbî’s innovative
views of language. In Freiburg-im-Brisgau Nadja Germann (2015-16) and her team have
been working on language and logic in classical Arabic and are more and more impressed by
the sophistication of al-Fârâbî’s positions. As for al-Fârâbî, music is at the service of speech,
the last section of the Great Book of Music explains how technically to fit music to speech,
i.e., poetry, in order to enhance the meaning of a text. Azza Abd al-Hamid Madian’s 1992
Ph. D. dissertation for Cornell University, Language-music relationships in al-Fârâbî’s
“Grand Book of Music”, includes an English translation of this section.

3. Logic
Next to the study of language, al-Fârâbî considers logic. For a long time the possibility of a
serious study of al-Fârâbî’s logic remained somewhat elusive. Editions and translations of his
logical works, except for his [‘Long’] Commentary on Aristotle’s De
Interpretatione (Zimmerman 1981), were scattered in various journals and collective works
often difficult to access. Many of these texts were more critically edited and gathered in al-
mantiq ‘inda al-Fârâbî, ed. by Rafîq al-‘Ajam and Majid Fakhry in 4 vol. (1985–87). In
1987–89 Muhammad Taqî Dânishpazuh published in Qumm a more complete collection of
logical texts, including a newly discovered part of a long commentary on the Prior Analytics.
Soon afterwards, two books on Farabian logic followed: Shukri B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic
and the Arabic Language in Alfârâbî (1991) and Joep Lameer, Al-Fârâbî & Aristotelian
Syllogistics: Greek Theory & Islamic Practice (1994). In 2006 Mauro Zonta published
fragments of a long commentary on the Categoriesin Hebrew, Arabic, and English
translation. John Watt (2008) assessed the influence of the Syriac organon on al-Fârâbî and
Kamran Karimullah (2014) dedicated a lengthy article to al-Fârâbî’s views on conditionals.
Translations now are coming out: Alfarabi’s Book of Dialectic (Kitab al-Jadal) (David M. Di
Pasquale, 2019), and Al-Farabi, Syllogism (Wilfird Hodges & Saloua Chatti, forthcoming),
as well as further studies of al-Farabi’s logic by Saloua Chatti (2019) and papers by Terrence
J. Kleven (2013) and Riccardo Strobino (2019).
Some issues dealt with in logic are also relevant to ethics and metaphysics. Al-Farabi sees
logic as the path to happiness (Germann, 2015). He also discusses the issue of future
contingents. If the truth value of statements on future contingents is immediately determined,
i.e., before the event happens, then everything is predetermined and freewill is an illusion.
Aristotle treats of this issue in On Interpretation, 9. Al-Fârâbî discusses more complex
aspects of this issue as he adds a consideration of God’s foreknowledge and defends human
freewill against some theologians (see Peter Adamson (2006), “The Arabic Sea Battle: al-
Fârâbî on the Problem of future Contingents”).
As Deborah L. Black (1990) showed, following the Alexandrian tradition, philosophers in
Islamic lands consider Rhetoric and Poetics as integral to logic proper and so parts of
Aristotle’s Organon. Lahcen E. Ezzaher (2008: 347–91) translated the short commentary on
the Rhetoric. Frédérique Woerther (2018) & Maroun Aouad are preparing a new edition of
some of al-Fârâbî’s texts on rhetoric. Stéphane Diebler in Philosopher à Bagdad au Xe
siècle(2007) [in fact a very useful collection of translations of short Farabian works] gave a
French translation of the three very brief treatises al-Fârâbî dedicated to Poetics. Geert Jan
van Gelder & Marlé Hammond (2008: 15–23) translated one of these treatises, The Book of
Poetics, into English, as well as a brief relevant passage in the first part of The Great Book of
Music. Terrence J. Kleven (2019) studies The Canons of Poetry. Scholars interested in
political philosophy have highlighted the distinctions al-Fârâbî makes between (1)
demonstrative discourse, reflecting Aristotle’s positions in the Posterior Analytics (in Arabic
this text is known as The Book of Demonstration), and which alone is philosophical stricto
sensu, (2) dialectical discourse, typical of the “mutakallimûn” or theologians and linked to
Aristotle’s Topics, and (3) rhetorical and poetical discourse, used in the Qur’ân or Jewish and
Christian Scriptures in order to address ordinary people.
Great respect for Aristotle’s theory of demonstration led al-Fârâbî to attempt to fit any
theoretical discipline in its framework, though some of them, such as music, do not
exclusively rest on necessary and universal primary principles, as they also include principles
derived from empirical observations (Miriam Galston, 2019). As music is dear to al-Fârâbî, it
is in the first part of his Great Book on Music that we find the most extensive consideration
of primary empirical principles and their derivation from careful examination of practice,
i.e., in this case of musical performances.
.

4. Mathematics and Music

After logic comes mathematics. For al-Fârâbî mathematical sciences include arithmetic,
geometry, optics, astronomy, music, the science of weights and mechanics. Only recently has
more attention be paid to this aspect of Farabian thought. Gad Freudenthal (1988) focused on
al-Fârâbî’s views on geometry. Except for pointing to al-Fârâbî’s rejection, in
contradistinction to al-Kindî, of the validity of what we now call astrology, scholars had
neglected his views on astronomy and cosmology. Damien Janos’s Method, Structure, and
Development in al-Fârâbî’s Cosmology (2012) has filled this gap. His book throws new light
on various aspects of al-Fârâbî’s astronomy, cosmology, and philosophy of nature. It also
highlights the link between cosmology and metaphysics. Johannes Thomann (2010–11)
pointed to a newly discovered commentary on the Almagest attributed to al-Fârâbî (Ms.
Tehran Maglis 6531).
In the Enumeration al-Fârâbî follows the traditional classification of music under
mathematics. In The Great Book of Music he certainly indicates that music derives some of
its principles from mathematics but he also insists, as we said above, on the importance of
performance for determining its empirical principles. On some points the ear, rather than
theoretical reflections, is the ultimate judge, even if at times the ear contradicts some
mathematical principle. For instance, he is well aware that a semitone is not exactly the half
of a tone. Of The Great book of Music there exists only one full translation, that of Rodolphe
d’Erlanger into French (originally published in 1930–35 before the Arabic text was edited;
reprint 2001). Only partial English translations exist. I referred to two of them: one in the
section on language and one in the logic section under poetics. George Dimitri Sawa (2009)
translated the two chapters on rhythm. Alison Laywine (McGill University), both a
philosopher with excellent knowledge of Greek musical theories and a ‘Oud player, is
preparing a full English translation of this complex and lengthy text. Yet, The Great Book is
not the only text al-Fârâbî dedicated to music. After having written it, dissatisfied with his
explanation of rhythms, he subsequently wrote two shorter texts on rhythms (English
translation of both by Sawa 2009). Apparently al-Fârâbî invented a system of notation for
rhythms. In his Philosophies of Music in Medieval Islam Fadlou Shehadi (1995) dedicates
his third chapter to al-Fârâbî. Thérèse-Anne Druart (2020) shows how al-Farabi links music
to language, logic and even politics.

5. Physics
After mathematics comes physics. We have only a few Farabian texts dealing with physics
taken in the broadest sense and covering the whole of natural philosophy. Paul Lettinck
addresses some of al-Fârâbî’s views on physics in his Aristotle’s Physics and its Reception in
the Arabic World (1994) and Janos (2012) also does so. Marwan Rashed (2008) attempted a
reconstruction of a lost treatise on changing beings.
Al-Fârâbî wrote a little treatise rejecting the existence of the vacuum by means of an
experiment. Necati Lugal & Aydin Sayili (1951) published the Arabic with an English
translation.
The substantive Refutation of Galen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Views on Human Organs merits
serious studies. ‘Abdurrahman Badawi edited it in his Traités philosophiques (1983: 38–
107). It shows al-Fârâbî’s interest in Aristotle’s zoological works and develops interesting
parallels between the hierarchical structure of the organs of the human body, that of
cosmology, that of emanation, and that of the ideal state. Badr El-Fakkak (2017) explains
these parallels and Jawdath Jadour (2018) studies the structure of this text, which remains
untranslated, and presents a new edition of al-Farabi’s Epistle on medicine.
Physics includes Aristotle’s On the soul and scholars have paid much attention to al-Fârâbî’s
little treatise On intellect (ed. by M. Bouyges, 1983). A full English translation of this
important treatise, of which there exist two Medieval Latin versions, was finally given by
McGinnis & Reisman in their Classical Arabic Philosophy (2007: 68–78). Philippe Vallat
published an extensive study of al-Farabi’s views on the intellect (2019a). The issue of the
soul and the intellect is linked to logic, ethics, cosmology, and metaphysics. It also gives rise
to a debate. Earlier scholars considered that for al-Fârâbî universals are acquired by
emanation from the Agent Intellect, which for him is the tenth and last Intelligence, even if
in many passages the second master uses the language of abstraction. Recently, Richard
Taylor (2006 & 2010) argued that, on the contrary, there is genuine abstraction in al-Fârâbî,
even if in some ways it involves the emanative power of the Agent Intellect.

6. Metaphysics
Metaphysics follows physics. It is not easy to assess al-Fârâbî’s understanding of
metaphysics. The very brief treatise, The Aims of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, insists that,
contrary to what most people assume, metaphysics is not a theological science but rather
investigates whatever is common to all existing beings, such as being and unity. McGinnis
and Reisman provide a full English translation in theirClassical Arabic Philosophy (2007:
78–81). In 1989 Muhsin Mahdi published the Arabic text of a short treatise On One and
Unity. It is still untranslated but Damien Janos (2017) explained its structure and contents
and Philippe Vallat (2019b) studied it. Many passages of The Book of Letters are of great
metaphysical import as Stephen Menn (2008) showed. These texts raise the question of the
exact relation between logic and metaphysics, as, for instance, both disciplines treat of the
categories (see Thérèse-Anne Druart (2007) & Kristell Trego (2018)). Such texts present an
Aristotelian outlook focusing on ontology that sharply distinguishes metaphysics from
Kalâm and seem to leave limited space for philosophical theology and Neo-Platonic descent
in particular.
On the other hand, both The Opinions of the People of the Perfect City and The Political
Regime or The Principles of Beings begin with a metaphysical part presented as a Neo-
Platonic descent followed by a second part dealing with the organization of the city or state
and do not treat of being and unity as the most universal notions. The hierarchical structure
of the ideal state mirrors the hierarchical emanationist structure presented in the first part.
Walzer edited the former with an English translation under the title The Perfect State (1985)
and Fauzi M. Najjar edited the latter (1964). Charles Butterworth (2015) provided the first
full English translation of The Political Regime in The Political Writings, vol. II, pp. 27–94.
The question of how exactly the ontology relates to the Neo-Platonic descent or emanation
has not yet been fully clarified, though The Enumeration of the Sciences addresses both
aspects. Furthermore, whether the Neo-Platonic descent grounds the political philosophy or
metaphysics is simply a rhetorical appeal to make al-Fârâbî’s controversial political and
philosophical views palatable to religious authorities and ordinary people is a hotly debated
issue. Disciples of Leo Strauss and of Muhsin Mahdi divide al-Fârâbî’s views into exoteric
ones for a broad audience and esoteric ones written for an intellectual elite. The exoteric are
more compatible with the religious views and speak, for instance, of an immortality of the
human soul, whereas such views are deliberately muted in esoteric writings (below we will
see that a lost treatise of al-Fârâbî may have denied the immortality of the soul). Among the
most recent “Straussian” positions on this debate one can find two papers by Charles E.
Butterworth: (1) “How to Read Alafarabi” (2013), and (2) “Alfarabi’s Goal: Political
Philosophy, Not Political Theology” (2011). Recently, Philippe Vallat (2019c) attempted to
clarify what al-Farabi means by “esoterism,” Some other scholars such as Dimitri Gutas, S.
Menn and Th.-A. Druart take Farabian metaphysics, including the Neo-Platonic descent as at
the core of al-Fârâbî’s works, even if in hisPhilosophy of Aristotle, al-Fârâbî treats little of
metaphysics. We will say more on this controversy in presenting ethics and politics, which in
the Farabian classification of sciences, follow metaphysics.

7. Ethics and Politics

Al-Fârâbî dealt little with ethics, but part of the controversy stems from what we may know
of his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, his main foray in Ethics. Despite the
existence of an Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (ed. by A. A. Akasoy &
A. Fidora with an English translation by D.M. Dunlop, 2005), we see few signs of its
influence in al-Fârâbî’s extant writings. Yet, al-Fârâbî wrote on it a lost commentary, to
which three Andalusian philosophers, Ibn Bâjja, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes, refer. According
to them, therein al-Fârâbî denied the immortality of the human soul as well as the possibility
of any conjunction with the active or Agent Intellect, considering them tall tales. Yet, in
many other works, such as the Treatise on the Intellect, the Opinions, and the Political
Regime, he claims that this conjunction is possible and constitutes ultimate happiness. If
what the Andalusian philosophers report, presents an accurate reading of this lost text, then
the disciples of Leo Strauss may have some justification in reading al-Fârâbî’s works as
divided between exoteric and esoteric ones since the content of this work would contradict
views in more popular texts, such as the Opinions in which the Neo-Platonic influence is the
strongest. Neo-Platonic metaphysics, construed mainly as the descent and emanation, would
provide an exoteric view good for a more general public, but denied in the esoteric works
reserved for an intellectual elite. Chaim Meir Neria (2013) published two quotations from
this commentary (in Hebrew translation and with English translation) that have been newly
discovered and gave a summary of the issue.
Though we do not have any ethical text from al-Fârâbî relying mainly on the Nicomachean
Ethics, Marwan Rashed (2019) discussed his ethical outlook in relying on the Attainment of
Happiness. We do have a brief ethical treatise in the tradition of Hellenistic ethics, Directing
Attention to the Way of Happiness or Tanbîh(not to be confused with theAttainment of
Happiness or Tahsîl), which is propaedeutic to the study of philosophy proper and of logic in
particular (English translation in McGinnis & Reisman’s Classical Arabic Philosophy (2007:
104–20)). This treatise (1) incites the student to curb his passions in order to be able to focus
on his studies and (2) encourages him to begin the study of philosophy and of logic in
particular. It is obviously pre-philosophical and serves as introduction to a Farabian
elementary introduction to logic The Utterances Employed in Logic(Mahdi’s edition, 1968;
no English translation). Al-Fârâbî’s conception of truly philosophical ethics remains unclear
as we have so little extended textual basis to establish it. Janne Mattila (2017) compared the
philosopher’s ethical progression in al-Farabi and in al-Razi. Ethics, when treating of our
relations with other people, implies intersubjectivity, but al-Farabi, though not treating it
much in what concerns this life, offers an interesting picture of it in the afterlife (Druart,
2017).
Al-Fârâbi’s political philosophy fared much better and has attracted much attention from
many scholars. According to The Enumeration, it also includes kalâm, i.e., non-philosophical
theology, and fiqh or Islamic law. Many Farabian political works have been translated into
English. Muhsin Mahdi translated three of them in Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (1969b;
reprint 2001), which contains The Attainment of Happiness, The Philosophy of Plato,
and The Philosophy of Aristotle. These three texts form a trilogy. Charles E. Butterworth
in, The Political Writings, vol. I (2001), translated Selected Aphorisms, part V of The
Enumeration of the Sciences, Book of Religion, andThe Harmonization of the Two Opinions
of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle and in vol. II (2015), Political
Regime and Summary of Plato’s Laws.
Al-Fârâbî does not take inspiration from Aristotle’s Politics (a text which does not seem to
have been translated or summarized into Arabic) but rather takes some inspiration from
Plato’s Republic and Laws, even if his access to these two texts may have been rather
limited, as there is some doubt that a full Arabic translation of them ever existed. Though
Averroes wrote a commentary of sort on the Republic, its brevity and content do not testify
to an in-depth knowledge of the whole text. Yet, David C. Reisman (2004) discovered an
Arabic translation of a single passage from the Republic (VI, 506d3–509b10). As for
the Laws, we certainly have al-Fârâbî’s Summary of Plato’s Laws, but this text (Arabic ed.
by Th.-A. Druart (1998) and English translation by Butterworth, in The Political Writings, II,
(2015: 129–73)) is very brief and covers only the first eight books. Whether this summary
relies on a full or partial Arabic translation of the Laws or on a translation of a Greek
summary, possibly that of Galen (lost in Greek), at this stage cannot be determined. For the
latest status quaestionis about Arabic translations of Plato’s works and their paucity, see
Dimitri Gutas (2012). Al-Fârâbî’s own briefPhilosophy of Plato does not exhibit detailed
knowledge of Plato’s works.
Though al-Fârâbî’s political philosophy takes some inspiration from Plato, it much
transforms it in important and interesting ways to reflect a very different world and adapt it
to it. Instead of a monolingual and monoethnic city state, al-Fârâbî envisions a vast
multicultural, multilingual, and multireligious empire (Alexander Orwin, 2017). He also sees
the necessity to make of the philosopher king a philosopher prophet ruler.
Al-Fârâbî’s Summary of Plato’s Lawscaused much controversy, which Butterworth narrates
in the introduction to his translation (2015: 97–127). In 1995 Joshua Parens, making use of a
draft of Druart’s edition, published Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s Summary of Plato’s
“Laws”. He argued that al-Fârâbî takes metaphysics, or maybe more exactly special
metaphysics or the Neo-Platonic descent, i.e., what treats of immaterial beings rather than
ontology, as a form of rhetoric, and that such was already the case for Plato. Whether or not
we should read Plato as Parens and other Straussians claim al-Fârâbî understood him is a
hotly debated question.
Marwan Rashed (2009) introduced a new element in the controversy by putting into serious
doubt the authenticity of al-Fârâbî’s Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages.
Following an Alexandrian tradition, this treatise (for Butterworth’s 2001 English translation,
see above) argues that, despite a series of issues on which Aristotle and Plato seem to
contradict each other, there is remarkable harmony between these two sages, as one can
easily resolve such contradictions. This text also refers 1. to the so-called Aristotle’s
Theology, which in fact Aristotle never wrote, as it derives from Plotinus, and 2. to Proclus
Arabus, as Peter Adamson (forthcoming) shows. On the other hand, Cecilia Martini
Bonadeo, in her 2008 critical edition and Italian translation of this text (al-Fârâbî,L’armonia
delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele), argued for the Farabian
authenticity of this text. Whether one accepts the Farabian authorship of this text affects
one’s understanding of the whole controversy of how to read al-Fârâbî, as well as one’s
understanding of the relationship between his Aristotelianism and his Neo-Platonism. It also
makes the whole issue of the relationship between his metaphysics and his political
philosophy still more complex and convoluted.
Among the most recent developments, expressed in various articles, on the Straussian side,
let us point to Butterworth’s “How to Read Alfarabi” (2013) and “Alfarabi’s Goal: Political
Philosophy, Not Political Theology” (2011) to which I referred earlier. On the other side, we
can point to Charles Genequand’s “Théologie et philosophie. La providence chez al-Fârâbî et
l’authenticité de l’Harmonie des opinions des deux sages” (2012), which objects to M.
Rashed’s declaring the Harmonizationinauthentic, and his (2013) “Le Platon d’al-Fârâbî”.
Amor Cherni (2015), on the other hand, published a book on the relation between politics
and metaphysics in al-Fârâbî (La cité et ses opinions: Politique et métaphysique ches Abû
Nasr al-Fârâbî), which includes an appendix rejecting the authenticity of The
Harmonization.

8. Conclusion
Though we now have more decent editions of al-Fârâbî’s texts and more complete
translations, in English and in French in particular, many such editions and translations are
scattered in various books and journals. Gathering all of al-Fârâbî’s available texts is no
mean accomplishment. If Oxford University Press would publish The Philosophical Works
of al-Fârâbî, as it did for al-Kindî in 2012 (one volume, ed. by P. Adamson & P.E.
Pormann), beginning with those still untranslated or not fully translated into English, as well
as those whose English translation is hidden in rare books or unusual journals, we would be
eternally grateful, but we are well aware that it would require several volumes and much
time.
Some texts still need to be better edited. Some texts are not translated at all into any
European language or not yet into English. Scholars do not always seem fully aware of what
is available and what other scholars have said. Much more work still needs to be done, but a
clearer and more complex picture of al-Fârâbî’s works is emerging. It highlights their
breadth and sophistication, even if we still have trouble piecing together all the parts.
 Bibliography
Research Tools
Bibliographies

 Al-Mawrid (Special Issue on Al-Farabi), 4(3), 1975.

 Chavooshi, Jafar Aghayani, Al-Fârâbî: An Annotated Bibliography, Tehran, 1976.
 Cunbur, Müjgan, Ismet Ninark & Nejat Sefercioglu, Fârâbî Bibliyografyasi, Ankara:
Bashakanhk Basimevi, 1973.

th
Daiber, Hans, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy (from the 15 Century to 1999) 2
vol., Leiden: Brill, 1999 and its Supplement, Leiden: Brill, 2007, much complete and update
these pioneers works.
 Druart, Thérèse-Anne, Brief Bibliographical Guide in Medieval and Post-Classical
Islamic Philosophy and Theology, available online in yearly installments and includes a
section on al-Fârâbî.
 Rescher, Nicholas, Al-Fârâbî: An Annotated Bibliography, Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1962.
Dictionary

 Alon, Ilai and Shukri B. Abed, Al-Fârâbî’s Philosophical Lexicon, 2 volumes (volume I:

Arabic Text; volume II: English translation). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002
(provides al-Fârâbî’s own definitions of technical philosophical terms).

Primary Literature
Works by al-Fârâbî
The following are listed by editors/translators:

 al-‘Ajam, Rafîq & Majid Fakhry (eds.), 1985–87, al-Fârâbî, al-mantiq ‘inda al-Fârâbî,
in 4 volumes, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq.
 Badawi, ‘Abdurrahman, 1983, Traites philosophiques par al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn
Bajjah & Ibn ‘Adyy, 3rd edition, Beirut: Dar Al-Andaloss.
 Bonadeo, Cecilia Martini (ed.), 2008, al-Fârâbî, L’armonia delle opinioni dei due
sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele, Pisa: Plus.

nd
Bouyges, Maurice (trans. and ed.), 1983, Alfarabi, Risalat fi’l-‘Aql, 2 edition, Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique.
 Butterworth, Charles E. (ed. and trans.), 2001, Alfarabi, The Political Writings:
“Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts(Volume I), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
 ––– (ed. and trans.), 2015, Alfarabi, The Political Writings: “Political Regime” and
“Summary of Plato’s Laws” (Volume II), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
 ––– (ed. and trans.), forthcoming, Alfarabi, Book of Letters, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
 Chatti, Saloua & Hodges, Wilfrid (trans.), forthcoming, Al-Farabi, Syllogism: An
Abdrigement of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, London: Bloomsbury.
 Cherni, Amor (trans. and ed.), 2015, al-Fârâbî, Le recensement des sciences, Paris: Al
Bouraq.
 Dânishpazuh, Muhammad Taqî (ed.), 1987–89, al-Fârâbî, al-mantiqiyyât lilfârâbî, 3
volumes, Qumm: Matba‘at Bahman.
 Diebler, Stéphane (trans), 2007, al-Fârâbî, Philosopher à Bagdad au Xe siècle,
introduction by Ali Benmakhlouf, glossary by Pauline Koetschet, Paris: Seuil.
 DiPasquale, David M. (trans.), 2019, Alfarabi’s Book of Dialectic (Kitab al-Jadal): On
the Starting Point of Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Druart, Thérèse-Anne (ed.), 1998, “Le Sommaire du livre des ‘Lois’ de
Platon”, Bulletin d’Études Orientales, 50: 109–55;
 d’Erlanger, Rodolphe (trans.), 1930–35, La musique arabe: Al-Fârâbî, Grand Traité de
la Musique, vol. I–II, Paris: Geuthner, reprint (Paris: 2001).
 Ezzaher, Lahcen E. (ed.), 2008, “Alfarabi’s Book of Rhetoric: An Arabic-English
translation of Alfarabi’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, Rhetorica, 26(4): 347–91.
 ––– (transl.), 2015, Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle’s “Rhetoric”(translation,
introduction, & notes), Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press , pp. 12–49.
 Galonnier, A. (ed. and trans.), 2016, Le ‘De scientiis Alfarabii’ de Gérarde de
Crémone: Contributions aux problèmes de l’acculturation au XIIe siècle. Étude introductive
et édition critique, traduite et annotée, Turnhout: Brepols.
 van Gelder, Geert Jan & Marlé Hammond (trans. and eds), 2008, Takhyîl: The
Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust, pp. 15–23.
 Gundissalinus, Dominicus [ca. 1150] (transl.), 2006, al-Fârâbî, Über die
Wissenschaften (de scientiis), Jakob Hans Josef Schneider (ed.), Freiburg: Herder .
 Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (ed. and trans.), 2005, al-Fârâbî, “The Book of Letters”, in
his Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–
26.
 Lugal, Necati & Aydin Sayili, 1951, “Maqâla fî l-Khalâ”, Belleten (Türk Tarih Kurumu),
15: 1–16 & 21–36.
 Mahdi, Muhsin (ed.), 1968, al-Fârâbi, Utterances Employed in Logic, introduction and
notes, Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq.
 ––– (ed.), 1969a, Alfarabi’s Book of Letters (Kitab al-Huruf), Arabic text, introduction
and notes, Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq.
 ––– (ed.), 1969b, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, translated with an
nd
introduction, 2  edition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; reprinted 2002.
 ––– (ed.), 1989, Alfarabi’s On One and Unity, Casablanca: Toubkal .
 McGinnis, Jon & David C. Reisman (eds.), 2007, Classical Arabic Philosophy: An
Anthology of Sources, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, pp. 54–120.
 Najjar, Fauzi M. (ed.), 1964, Al-Fârâbî’s The Political Regime, with introduction &
notes, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique .
 Neria, Cahim Meir, 2013, “Al-Fârâbî’s Lost Commentary on the Ethics: New Textual
Evidence”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 23(1): 69–99.
 Rashed, Marwan, 2008, “Al-Fârâbî’s lost treatise On changing beingsand the
possibility of a demonstration of the eternity of the world”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy,
18(1): 19–58.
 Sawa, George Dimitri, 2009, Rhythmic Theories and Practices in Arabic Writings to
339 AH/950 CE : Annotated translations and commentaries, Ottawa: The Institute of
Mediaeval Music.
 Sayili, Aydin, 1951, “Al-Farabi’s Article on Vacuum”, Belleten (Turk Tarih Kurumu),
15: 151–74.
 Walzer, Richard (ed. and trans.), 1985, Al-Faradi on the Perfect State, with
introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Zimmerman, F.W., 1981, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s
“De interpretatione”(translation, introduction & notes), London: British Academy.
Works by other authors

 [Aristotle] Akasoy, A.A. & A. Fidora (eds.), 2005, The Arabic Version of the
“Nicomachean Ethics”, with an English translation by D.M. Dunlop, Leiden: Brill.
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of Letters”, Medioevo, 32: 15–37.
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aspera currans, Georgio Rahal & Heinz-Otto Luthe (eds.), Toulouse: Les Presses
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 –––, 2020, “What Does Music Have to Do with Language, Logic, and Rulership? Al-
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 El-Fekkak, Badr, 2017, “Cosmic, Corporeal and Civil Regencies: al-Farabi’s anti-
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et l’authenticité de l’Harmonie des opinions des deux sages”, Mélanges de l’Université
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ordre? Définitions du corpus et interprétations de Platon, A. Balansard & I. Koch (eds.), Sankt
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 –––, 2017, “Al-Farabi’s (d. 950) On the One and Oneness: Some Preliminary Remarks
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‘Laws’”, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
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the Opinions of the Two Sages Attributed to al-Fârâbî”, Arabic Sciences & Philosophy, 19(1):
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 –––, 2019, “Al-Farabi et le parachevement de l’Ethique a Nicomaque,” in Ethike
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Ilan University Press , pp. 185–254.

Chapter 35: Al-Farabi

A. Society And Its Goal
An account of the life and philosophical thought of Abu Nasr Mohammad ibn Tarkhan
al-Farabi (d. 339/950) has already been given in a previous chapter. The reader must
have noted that, while recasting the philosophical views of Plato, Aristotle, and other
Greek thinkers, al-Farabi always keeps in view the Islamic tenets which have formed
the inner links of his writings. In his political philosophy, he has followed the same line.
Under the influence of Plato and Aristotle he evolves his own system which markedly
differs from the system of the Greeks, the Iranians, as well as the Indians.
This will be shown in these pages which have been prepared in the light of 1) Kitab Ara’
Ahal al-Madinat al-Fadilah (Book on the Views of the People of the Excellent State),
2) Kitab al-Siyasat al-Madaniyyah (Book on Caution on the Path of Administration),
3) Kitab Tahsil al-Sa‘adah (Book on the Achievement of Happiness, 4) Kitab al-Tanbih
‘ala Sabil al-Sa‘addah (Book on Caution on the path of Happiness), and 5) the Bodleian
manuscript of his Fusul al-Madini (Chapters on the Civilian).

The City State

According to al-Farabi, the City State (Madinah) and the Family State are places that
contain inhabitants, no matter whether their dwellings are constructed of wood, mud,
wool or hair.1
The house or family is limited to only four relationships: husband and wife, master and
slave, father and son, and property and proprietor. He who makes them unite in co-
operation and aims at providing for them an abode with the best facilities and
maintenance, is called the master of the family. He is in the house what the
administrator of the city is in the city.2

Necessity of Society
Men are naturally so constituted that they need many things for their best
achievements. Hence, they need mutual help and co-operation – everyone doing his
best for obtaining a particular kind of object. Thus, by uniting their individual efforts for
different objects they organize different societies. 3
The greater the society, the better are the facilities it achieves for its individuals. The
grouping of men is not confined to a house. It extends to lanes, localities, villages,
towns, and cities. Men work for the welfare of society and in the long run serve the
State. The people living in a state are called a nation (Ummah). One nation can be
distinguished from another by natural character, temperament, habits, and language. 4
Human societies are either perfect or imperfect. The perfect society may be great,
middling, or small. The great human society is the one consisting of several nations
uniting themselves in one unity and helping one another. The middling one is the
society of one nation in a part of the world, and the small is the society of the people of
a city.5
The imperfect society is that of the people of a village, a locality, a lane, or a house, the
last being the smallest.
Now, the highest good and perfection are primarily achieved through volition and will.
Similarly, evil finds its scope by volition and will. The City-State can, therefore, develop
by mutual help and efforts to attain some evil purpose or to attain happiness. The city in
which the members of the society co-operate to attain happiness is in reality the ideal
City-State (al-madinat al-fadilah), the society, the ideal society, and the nation. 6 In this
State the citizens help one another to achieve qualities of the greatest life
perpetually.7 But if they help one another to obtain the bare necessities of life and its
preservation, this City-State is evidently the necessary State. 8
How to Achieve Happiness
Al-Farabi speaks of happiness both of this world and hereafter. He explains that when
human factors or the four excellences – speculative virtues (al-jada’il al-nazariyyah),
theoretical virtues (jada’il al-fikriyyah), the moral virtues (fada’il al-khuluqiyyah), and the
practical arts (al-sana‘at al-‘amaliyyah) – form the qualities of a nation or of the people
of a city, their worldly happiness in this life and the lasting happiness in the next are
insured.
Speculative virtues (al-fuda’il al-nazariyyah)represent those sciences which aim at the
highest object, knowledge of existing things including all their requirements. These
sciences are either innate in man, or they are achieved by effort and learning. 9
Now, the principal factors of existing bodies and accidents, as explained by al-Farabi,
are of six kinds with six grades: The first cause in the first grade, the secondary causes
in the second grade, active intellect in the third grade, soul in the fourth grade, form in
the fifth grade, and matter in the sixth grade. The first grade is confined to one individual
only; it cannot have more than one. But other grades can have more than one occupant.
Out of this six, three, viz. the first cause, the secondary cause, and the active intellect,
are neither bodies nor are they contained in bodies. The other three: soul, form and
matter are not bodies, but exist in bodies.
As for bodies, they are of six types: the heavenly bodies, rational animals, irrational
animals, plants, minerals and the four elements. All these six bodies as a whole form
the universe. The first to be believed in is God, the Almighty, who is the immediate
cause of the existence of the secondary causes and the active intellect. The secondary
causes are the causes of the existence of heavenly bodies and their substance. The
secondary causes should be called the spirits, the angels, and so on.
The function of the active intellect is to attend the rational animal, man, and to enable
him to attain the highest perfection he can reach. The highest perfect of man consists in
his highest happiness which he achieves when he raises himself to the stage of the
active intellect by abstracting himself from bodies, matter, and accidents, and continues
to enjoy this perfection perpetually. In essence, the active intellect is one but in
gradation it includes all that is purified from the rational animal and attains to happiness.
The active intellect should be called the Holy Spirit (al-ruh al-Amin or al-Ruh al-
Qudus) or the like and its grades be called the spiritual realm (al-malakut) or the like.
Souls have three grades: souls of celestial bodies, souls of the rational animal, and
souls of the irrational animals. The souls of the rational animal are the rational faculty,
the appetitive faculty, the imaginative faculty, and the perceiving faculty. The rational
faculty equips man with sciences and arts, and enables him to distinguish good from
evil manners and actions. Through this faculty man inclines to do good and avoid evil
and realizes the useful, the harmful, the pleasant and the unpleasant. 10
1) The rational faculty is either speculative or practical; the first is that through which
man obtains the knowledge of all that he is not at all supposed to know by his own
effort, and the second is that through which he knows all that he can know if he wills it
so. The second is again divided into that through which arts and crafts are
obtained (mahaniyyah), and that through which imagination and insight concerning
doing or not doing a thing are achieved (marwiyyah).
2) The appetitive faculty manifests the human inclination of wanting something or
running away from something, of desiring or not desiring something, of giving
preference to something or avoiding something. All psychological feelings – hatred,
affection, love, friendship, enmity, fear, anger, passion, mercy, etc. – are expressed by
this faculty.
3) The faculty of imagination retains the impression of the sensible objects after they
have disappeared from sense-perception, unites some of them with some others, or
separates some of them from some others both in wakefulness and sleep producing
true or false propositions. This faculty also perceives the useful, harmful, pleasant, and
unpleasant manners and action.
4) The faculty of sense-perception obviously perceives the sensible through the five
sense-organs – the pleasant and the unpleasant, without discriminating between the
harmful and the useful, and without distinguishing good from evil.
The three faculties other than the rational faculty are available to animals, imaginative
faculty serving them as the rational faculty serves man. Some animals, however,
possess only the sensible and the appetitive faculties.
The celestial souls are different from the animal souls in so far as the former are actual
souls that understand the intelligible, whereas the latter are at first potential and then
become actual.11
Having explained the gradation of cosmos and the relation that the different grades
have with the First, al-Farabi emphasizes the point that the whole cosmos depends for
its existence on God, the First Necessary Being.
Man, however, understands and realizes happiness only through the speculative
rational faculty. The imaginative and the sensitive faculties help the rational faculty in
moving man towards those actions which lead to happiness. The good is characterized
as “voluntary.” But if the rational faculty feels happiness only by making an effort to
perceive it, while other faculties do not perceive it, then sometimes man considers the
pleasant and the useful to the ultimate ends of life.
Again, when one becomes indifferent or slow in accomplishing the sensitive rational part
and does not feel happiness in doing so, one hastens to attain to it by exercising one’s
appetitive faculty in aiming at and making all effort to achieve things other than
happiness, and in this effort one is assisted also by the faculties of imagination and
sense-perception, and produces what may be rightly called voluntary evil.
Similarly, he produces only evil who attains to happiness which he does not recognize
as his aim, does not desire it, or desires it with the faint desire, and adopts something
other than happiness at his end, and exerts all his faculties to achieve that end. 12
Since man has been created to achieve happiness which is the highest perfection that
remains perpetually, it is possible to obtain it through the active intellect which gives
primarily the first intelligible or the first objects of knowledge. But men differ in their
capacity to receive the primary intelligible.
B. Human Nature
Human nature is not the same in all individuals; it varies in accordance with the physical
qualities of individuals. Some can easily grasp the first intelligible or the first known
things, some do not receive them directly. Again, some of them do not receive anything
from the first intelligible in a natural way at all, and some others receive them in a way
different from theirs. There are still others who receive them in respect of their own
selves.
Human beings in this third group are free from defect, their nature being homogeneous,
prepared to receive intelligible which are common to them and through which they
advance to the affairs and actions that are common to them. After this stage, they differ
from one another, as some receive those intelligible which are peculiar to them, and are
not common to others. Those belonging to this group endeavour towards a particular
genus without allowing anything else to share it.
Similarly, human beings excel one another in the faculties through which they derive the
objects of one genus, some having the ability of deriving all the individuals of a genus
and others perceiving only a few individuals thereof. Again, sometimes it so happens
that two individuals do not prove to be equal in their capacity of deriving the external
objects, one being swift and the other slow, or one being swift in deriving the genus of
the greatest excellence and the other in deriving the basest of the genus. It is also
possible that both are equal in power, but one is able enough to teach what one has
derived, and can offer guidance to others, but the other has no such power of teaching
and guiding others. They also differ in performing corporeal deeds.
Natural dispositions do not oppose one another, nor do they insist on action, but they
facilitate performance, and are not moved by anything external towards opposite
actions. Even if they are moved in opposite directions they resist and offer hindrance.
All these natural dispositions require a suitable teacher. Hence, they are trained in
matters that prepare them to be in their highest or nearly highest perfection. Some are
trained in mean things which produce excellent actions from a mean genus. 13
People have different calibres by nature, and they vary in ranks in accordance with the
ranks in genus, arts, and sciences for which they have naturally been prepared. They
also differ in the capacity of training and giving guidance. Some are stronger than
others, and, hence, they differ in receiving and training. For some can be trained for a
part of the genus only. Now, he who is an expert in imparting training and guidance is
called the chief.14

C. Education
Man has been created to attain to the highest happiness (sa‘ddah). He should,
therefore, know what happiness is and should make it the aim of his life. He, then,
needs to know those factors and arts through which he can achieve happiness. He will
have to exercise all those arts which will enable him to attain to it. But since it has been
explained that human individuals differ in nature, it is not in the nature of every man to
know happiness or those factors which enable him to reach it by himself. He, therefore,
needs a teacher, a guide.
Some people require less guidance and teaching, and some need more. It is also not
necessary that one should learn all that one is taught, or receive all the guidance one is
given. Hence, some people require constant teaching and guidance to urge them to do
what they have been taught to do.15
Teaching (ta‘lim) means creating speculative excellences in nations and cities, while
upbringing (tadib) is the method of creating and developing moral virtues and scientific
arts in nations. Teaching is possible only be expressing; tadib or discipline is to make
nations and citizens habituated to the deeds done through scientific habits. That is, their
resolutions will move them to perform those actions, so much so that these resolutions
will dominate their souls, and they will become devoted to those actions.
To exert one’s resolution to do something is possible either by expression or by
performance. While al-Farabi agrees with Plato in the system of education and in
learning from childhood, he emphasizes that speculative sciences are learned either by
kings and leaders (imams) or by those who preserve these sciences and teach kings
and leaders in several ways. First of all, they should know the primary axioms, and the
first known object in every genus of speculative sciences, and then they should know
the various forms of premises and their arrangement through which they can lead to
conclusions. After they have completed their education, and have accustomed
themselves to logical methods, they will be made kings in each of the partial States, and
will be promoted little by little until the stage of the great State is achieved.
Speculative sciences must be taught through convincing methods. Men very often
understand these sciences by a process of thinking, because they understand them
after realizing many known principles which are not corporeal. The common people can
understand their images by the method of convincing only.
The teacher should also distinguish what should be imparted to a particular nation and
how to make it common to all nations or to all the people of every city. He should also
know what should be taught to the entire nation, or city, and what only to a particular
group in the city. All these distinctions can be made by the imaginative virtue which
enables one to achieve the speculative virtues.
As for practical virtues and practical arts, people must habituate themselves to
practising them by two methods. First, the teacher should train them by convincing and
effective expressions to engender the values of these actions and habits perfectly in
their hearts so that their convictions may move them to perform them submissively.
Secondly, he should use the method of force which is employed for the disobedient and
revolutionary citizens, and those who do not move to righteousness meekly on their own
accord or by persuasion.16
The virtuous teachers and artists can be divided into two groups in respect of the
above-mentioned two methods – one group teaching and training those who are
obedient, the other group teaching the disobedient. In both respects, the king is the
teacher of nations whom he trains to achieve virtues, and the master of the house is the
teacher of the people of the house. Similar is the case with one who is in charge of
children or the youth.17

The Imaginative Virtue

The imaginative virtue enables a man to think of an exceedingly useful purpose which is
common to the comity of nations, to a nation, or to a city. This virtue is called the civil
imaginative virtue. But if this virtue is common to a group of citizens or the members of
a house only, then it is ascribed to that particular group and is called family imaginative
virtue, or State imaginative virtue. Sometimes this virtue is further divided. Since it is
derived from what is most useful and beautiful in respect of a particular art or profession
for a limited time, it is divided into the various kinds of arts and professions. The most
accomplished one in this virtue is the strongest one who succeeds in creating a great
State.
The imaginative virtue confined to different aspects of the State – defence, finance, and
so on – is followed by moral virtue which is related to the imaginative virtue as the
imaginative virtue is related to different arts, professions, or families. This virtue is, first
of all, needed for organizing and maintaining the army. The moral virtue alone impels
the warriors to display their bravery, and the best kind of valour. It also urges citizens to
earn the wealth of the State with honesty and legal means. In fact, it plays a major role
in all departments of the State.18

D. The Chief
It is evident that every man cannot be the chief. People differ in their intellectual
capacity, in physical strength, in the exercise of virtuous deeds, and in the acquisition of
excellent habits of thinking, feeling, willing, and doing. In every department of life and
arts the strongest person, of excellent manners, who also knows, acts, and directs, is
the chief of that department, the rest being the subjects. The chief is either one of the
first rank who is not sub-servient to anyone, or he is of the second rank, dominating
some, and being dominated by some others. Such ranks develop in relation to the forms
of art, e.g. cultivation, trade, medical profession, or in respect of all kinds of human
beings.19
The first chief in general is he who needs no help from anyone. Sciences and arts are
his property in actuality, and he needs no guidance from any person in any respect. 20
The first chief of the excellent (ideal) city is one who is chief in all respects. His
profession must excel all the rest in attaining to perfection, and in intending by all
actions of the ideal state to achieve the highest happiness. This man is not sub-servient
to any other. He is a man accomplished in all virtues, and, therefore, he is intellect and
intelligible in actuality, having his imaginative faculty naturally so perfected as to be able
to receive particulars from the active intellect either in themselves, or as images in
sleep, or in wakeful state. His passive intellect receives the intelligible in complete
perfection, so that nothing which has become an intellect in actuality is denied to him.
Whosoever invests his passive intellect with intelligibles becomes intellect and
intelligible in actuality. His understanding of himself is more perfect, more separable
from matter, nearer to the active intellect, and is called the derived intellect. This derived
intellect has a rank between the passive and the active intellect. The passive intellect is,
therefore, like matter and sub-stratum for the derived intellect which is like matter and
sub-stratum for the active intellect.21
The rational faculty22 which is the natural form, supplies material sub-stratum for the
passive intellect and makes it the actual intellect. The actual intellect is the first stage at
which man is called man and being human becomes common to all human beings.
When the passive intellect and the natural form become one in the same way as the
composite of matter and form becomes one and the same thing, and man receives
human form, the actual intellect is achieved; and when the natural form becomes the
matter of the passive intellect which has thus becomes the actual intellect, it becomes
the matter of the derived intellect, which in its turn becomes the matter of the active
intellect, and all of these become like one thing, then man enjoys the presence of the
active intellect in himself.
If the active intellect is present in both parts of the rational faculty – the speculative and
the practical – then man receives revelation in his imaginative faculty. Allah, the Exalted
and Sublime, sends revelation to him through the active intellect. If the active intellect
extends what it receives from Allah to his passive intellect through his derived intellect
and then to his imaginative faculty, then man, through what descends upon his passive
intellect, becomes a wise philosopher and possessor of perfect understanding, and
through what descends upon his imaginative faculty, a prophet, a warner against what
is going to take place, and an informer of what particulars exist, as he understands them
for God. This man is in the most perfect stage of humanity and in the highest place of
blessing, his soul being perfect, united with the active intellect in the manner described.
This the man who is aware of every action that would enable one to achieve grace and
is the chief, the leader, who cannot be led by anybody else.

E. Characteristics Of The Chief Of The Ideal State

The Imam or the chief of the ideal State is the chief of the ideal nation, and for the
matter of that, of the whole inhabited part of the earth. This position is only attained by a
man who naturally possesses the following 12 characteristics as his second nature:
1. Sound health, and perfect organs, performing their functions with ease and facility
and in harmony will faculties.
2. Intelligence and sagacity, so as to be able to grasp the intention of a speaker in his
particular situations and circumstances.
3. Good memory, so as to retain in his mind all that he understands, sees, hears, and
perceives.
4. Prudence and talent, to understand a problem from the perspective in which it has
been presented to him.
5. Eloquence, so that his tongue may assist him in expressing in a perfect manner all
that is in his mind.
6. Devotion to education and learning, and submission to receive knowledge with ease
without feeling any annoyance.
7. No greed for food, drink and sex, avoidance of play, and dislike of pleasures caused
by these.
8. Friendliness towards truth and truthful persons and condemnation of falsehood and
those who are inclined to falsehood.
9. Bigness of heart, loving nobility, and natural magnanimity without any trace of
meanness.
10. Indifference to dirham and dinar and other forms of wealth.
11. Devotion by nature to justice and just people, abhorrence of injustice and
oppression and unjust and oppressive people, offering half of one’s possessions and
those of one’s family to help the oppressed, and urging others to do the same, helping
everything good and beautiful, and being easy to bend to justice but difficult to
oppression and evil.
12. Strong resolution, courage, and promptitude without any sign of fear or
psychological weakness.
If a person possessed of these qualities happens to live in an ideal State he is the chief.
It is, however, impossible to have all these qualities in one man. People are scarcely
equipped with all of them. If no one having these qualities is found in the State, the laws
promulgated by the former chief or his successors should be kept in force.
The second chief who succeeds the first should fulfil at least the following six
requirements:
1. He should be wise and philosophical.
2. Learned and abreast with the laws, customs, rites and rituals adopted by his
predecessor to discharge the function of the ideal State with all perfection.
3. He should be an expert in deriving principles in case he does not find any law.
4. He should be far-sighted, possessing an insight to frame rules and regulations in
accordance with the conditions and circumstances he finds himself in, and capable of
keeping up the reforms he introduces.
5. He should also be well experienced and eloquent in giving directions to urge the
people to follow him in accordance with the Shari‘ah.
6. In addition, he should be skilful in physical display of exercises needed in warfare,
and in the use of arms, ammunition, and other equipments.
In other words, this ruler must have insight to derive inferences from the possessed
records of the customs, rites, and rituals, and accurate opinion in understanding the
events that take place and may increase the prosperity of the State. He must have the
power to convince others and struggle hard. This sovereign is called the king of the
tradition, and the State is called al-mulk al-sunnah the country of traditions and
customs.
If all the conditions described for the chief are not found in one man, and are available
in two persons – one wise and the other possessing other qualities – then both will be
the chiefs of the State. If, however, these conditions are scattered in a group of people
agreeable to work together, then these members will be the ideal chiefs. But if wisdom
does not form a part of the State while other conditions are fulfilled entirely, the city will
be best without a sovereign, but it will be exposed to destruction. The State without a
philosopher to whom it may be entrusted will perish in no time. 23

F. The Ideal State

The sovereigns of an ideal State who succeed one another are all like one soul, as if
there were one king who continued all the time. Similar is the case with a group of
people who administer the State together at a time in one or more than one city. The
whole group is just like one sovereign, their souls being like one soul. Uniformity is
found in every stage and in every part of the State, and people flourishing at different
times look as they were one soul working at all times in the same way. If there is
continuity and harmony at a particular stage, even different groups of people, whether of
one or more than one State, would appear as one soul. 24
The people of the ideal State have something common to all of them in their learning
and acting, but different groups of people belonging to different ranks and stages have
some sciences and deeds peculiar to them. Through both of these, people achieve
happiness, and by displaying these they obtain an ideal physical form. This form grows
stronger and stronger and better and better by constant performance of those deeds.
For example, the art of writing has some pre-requisite performances. The more they are
executed by the expert, the greater is the excellence of his art. Not only that, the scribe
enjoys his art by repeating his exercises, and grows in love for it.
The same is the case with happiness, which increases with the constant practice of
deeds that lead to it. The soul grows in happiness to such a degree that it becomes free
from matter. It does not perish with matter, for it is no longer required for its existence.
At this stage, being separated from matter, the soul frees itself from all corporeal
qualities so much so that even movement and rest cannot be ascribed to it. As this state
is very unusual, it is very difficult to form an idea of it.

G. Arts And Blessings

As art has three grades, happiness or bliss is also divided into three grades in respect
of species, quality, and quantity. There are such species of art as weaving, cloth-
trading, perfumery, and sweeping, or as dancing, jurisprudence, philosophy, and
rhetoric. Thus, arts excel one another in different species.
The artists of the same art excel one another in skill and efficiency. Two scribes, for
example, differ in their skill, because, besides a good hand, their art requires some
knowledge of lexicon, rhetoric, and arithmetic. Now, one may be an expert in good hand
and rhetoric, another in good hand, lexicon, and rhetoric, and yet another in all the four
arts. Again, two scribes may differ in the quality of their art, for one of them maybe
better than the other. Similarly, happiness excels in species, quantity, and quality.
The people of an imperfect State have but little virtue. They have evil psychical forms
and their actions are not good. The greater their activity, the more does their profession
display defect and imperfection. In consequence, they become ill inasmuch as they do
not enjoy edibles, and become annoyed with beautiful and excellent things. Some of
them even regard themselves as healthy and perfect, though they are actually not so,
and do not pay any heed to the advice of the physician or the well-wisher.

H. Inhabitants Of The Ideal State

The excellent or the ideal State consists of five kinds of people: the excellent, the
linguists, the secluded, the struggling, and the steady. The excellent people are the
philosophers, the intellectuals, and “the People of Opinion” in great affairs. As for
linguists, they are the orators, speakers, poets, musicians, writers, and the like. The
secluded people are the mathematicians, statisticians, physicians, astronomers, and the
like. The struggling people are the fighters, the defenders, and all those who take their
place. The steady are those who earn money in the city, for example cultivators,
traders, and those engaged in other pursuits. 25

I. Imperfect States
The excellent State as explained above is the State administered by the best and most
talented who aim at prosperity and happiness for all and sundry. If its constitution fails to
provide the people with prosperity, and the rulers do not possess the qualities of ideal
rulers, then the State ceases to be excellent and is called the evil-doing State (al-
madinat al-fasiqah), the ignorant state (al-madinat al-jahilah) or the astray going
State (al-madinat al-dallah). People in the evil doing State are like weeds in a field. They
are no better than savages and can have no organization worthy of a State. 26
As for the people of the ignorant State, they possess their own constitution and culture.
But their civic organization varies. They look after the necessities of life in a necessary
State; organize the society of the contemptible in the contemptible State, the society of
the vile in the vile State, the society of the extravagant in the extravagant State, the
society of the dominant in the dominant State, or the society of the free in the social
State.
The necessary organization is the State which endeavours to earn what is evidently
necessary for the constitution and the upkeep of the body. 27 The State of the
contemptible is the one which tries to achieve wealth in abundance, and the money
which they hoard due to the love of wealth and niggardliness is spent only for the needs
of the body. The vile state broods over sensuous pleasures and achieves the best
means for the sake of pleasure only. This State is the most coveted one.
The extravagant State is the organization of the profusely generous in which the
individuals help one another to reach nobility in expression and action. The people of
this State are called generous either by themselves or by the people of other
States.28 This is the best State among all the States of the ignorant.
The state of the dominant people tries to over-power others in power and wealth; they
shed blood, subjugate others, and indulge in all sorts of pleasures. The State of the
dominant excels the State of the generous in showing power. 29 As for the social State,
everybody is free in it to do whatever he likes, and believes that no man has any
superiority over others by any means. But independence often leads to extremes, and,
therefore, there arise in this State different rites and rituals, customs and manners, and
people are misled by evil propensities. Thus, this State splits into different groups and
parties.
In all these States there is always unrest prevailing among the people, as everybody
tries to become the chief and, by virtue of his wits, to lead the State of prosperity and
happiness.
The evil doing States differ from the States mentioned above in so far as the people of
these States believe in the principles held and the forms of happiness conceived by the
people of the excellent State, and also invite others to do the same, but they themselves
do nothing to achieve their object, nor do they try by action to attain the happiness they
believe in. On the contrary, they incline to their own whims and propensities, that is to
say, they like to enjoy power, nobility, and domination, and direct their actions towards
their achievement. In activities, these States are like the States of the ignorant. In
manners, their peoples resemble the peoples of the said States. The peoples of these
two States differ only in belief. None of these states ever achieve happiness and
prosperity.
The astray going States are those whose people suffer from some delusion. They adopt
such principles, actions, and deeds as appear to them to be those of the excellent
State, but in fact are not. The same is true of their goal of happiness and prosperity
which they conceive to be so but which actually is not so.
The offspring of societies which develop in these States are of various types and all of
them aim at personal gain and victory and not at real happiness and true prosperity. 30

J. Conclusion
According to al-Farabi, the chief of the state should be physically free from all defects,
and should have a sharp intellect, memory, and wit. He should be devoted to sciences,
truth-loving, and not easily upset by difficulties, contented, without greed for things to
eat, and disinclined towards sensuous pleasures. He should abhor falsehood and liars,
be ambitious with lofty ideals, a lover of justice, without thought of wealth or worldly
position, and should have strong resolution, boldness, and courage. Plato’s philosopher
king has also been described as truth loving, fond of the knowledge of existents, one
who keeps away from vice, is free-thinking, intelligent, sagacious, witty, and ambitious.
But the state of al-Farabi is international in character.
While the State of Plato is only a City-State, that of al-Farabi can be as vast as a World-
State. Plato wants to entrust the affairs of the State to a group of philosophers and
names the organization “aristocracy.” Al-Farabi not only calls the Head of State Imam
but identifies him with prophet. It is in the absence of the Imam or the second chief who
has the necessary qualities to follow the tradition of the Imam that he entrusts the affairs
of the State of the chief. It is, therefore, not true to say that al-Farabi has based his
theory entirely on the Republic of Plato, or that he is simply Aristotelian in his thought.

Bibliography
Al-Farabi, Fusul al-Madini, Bodleain MS.; Kitab Ara’ Ahl al-Madinat al-Fadilah; Kitab al-
Siyasat al-Madaniyyah Kitab Tahsil al-Sa‘adah;M. Horten, “Das Buch der Ringsteine
Farabis mit dem Kommento des Emir Isma‘il al-Hoseini al-Farani ubersetzt und
erlautere,” Beitruge zur Geach. des Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. 5, Munster, 1906,
with a bibliography; M. Steinschneider, “Al-Farabi des arabischen Philosophen Leben
and Schriften” in the Memoires d’Acad, imperial des Sciences de St. Perersbourg, Vol.
13, No. 4, 
Css forum

Al-Farabi

Introduction:
Abu Nasr Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Tarkhan al-Farabi was born at Wasij, a village
near Farab, a district of Transoxania. He was one of the greatest philosophers that the
Muslim world had ever produced. He mainly studied in Baghdad and after gaining
considerable proficiency in the Arabic language, he became an ardent pupil of the Christian
savant Abu Bishr Matta bin Younus, quite prominent as translator of a number of works by
Aristotle and other Greek versatile writers.

Being a first Turkish philosopher, he left behind lasting and profound influence upon the life
of succeeding Muslim Philosophers. Being a great expositor of Aristotle’s logic, he was aptly
called al-mu’alim al thani (the second teacher). According to Ibn-e-Khaldoon, no Muslim
thinker ever reached the same position as al-Farabi in Philosophical knowledge. Al-Farabi is
the first Muslim philosopher to have left political writings, either in the form of
commentaries or in treaties of his own based upon Plato.

Al-Farabi’s works was preserved from ravages of time contain five on politics as under:
1. A Summary of Plato’s Laws
2. Siyasatu’l-Madaniyah
3. Ara’u ahli’l-Madinatu’l-Fadilah
4. Jawami’u’s-Siyasat
5. Ijtima’atu’l-Madaniyah

Contribution of Al-Farabi to 

Islamic Political Thought
“In pure philosophy, Farabi became as famous as any philosopher of Islam, and it
is said that a savant of caliber of Avicenna found himself entirely incapable of
understanding the true bearing of Aristotle’s Metaphysics until one day he casually
purchased one of Farabi’s works and by its help he was able to grasp their
purport.” (Sherwani)

Al-Farabi was a renowned philosopher of his age and deeply reverenced in all ages. Al-
Farabi’s insatiated enthusiasm led him to study Philosophy, Logic, Politics, Mathematics and
Physics. He left his indelible impact upon the succeeding generations through his works,
which are still read, learnt and discussed with great passion and literal zest. His sincerity,
profound moral convictions and his genuine belief in liberty and in the dignity of human
being united with his moderation and humanitarianism made him the ideal spokesman of his
age, which was full of rivalries, corrosions and false vanities.

Sherwani was of the view, “A man with such learning had no place in the ninth-
century Baghdad and as we have pointed out, we find him regularly attached to
Saif-ud-Dowlah’s court. In 946 Saif took Damascus and Al-Farabi became
permanent resident of that delightful place, spending his time in the gardens of
the erstwhile Umayyad capital discussing philosophical questions with his friends
and writing down his opinions and compositions sometimes in a regular form,
sometimes in an irregular form, sometimes, on merely loose leaves.” Al-Farabi
renunciated from the worldly matters and he never pursued the pleasures and luxuries like
other middle class Abbasids. He led exemplary simple life with full contentment with what
he got to eat and to wear.

It can be very well asserted that al-Farabi was in the truest sense “the parent of all
subsequent Arabic Philosophers”. The great Christian scholars namely Albert the Great and
St. Thomas Aquines acknowledged their indebtedness to al-Farabi in the development of
their own political theories. Al-Farabi laid down several rules for teachers honestly striving
to train the young students in philosophy. No scholar should start the study of philosophy
until he gets very well acquainted with natural sciences. Human nature rises only gradually
from the sensuous to the abstract, from the imperfect to the perfect. Mathematics in
particular is very important in training the mind of a young philosopher, it helps him pass
from the sensuous to the intelligible and further it informs his mind with exact
demonstrations. Similarly, the study of logic as an instrument to distinguish the true from
the false should precede the study of philosophy proper.

Al-Farabi voluminously wrote mainly on pure philosophy and there is no doubt that he had
to draw on neo-Platonic ideas current in the Arab world of those days in his commentaries
on Aristotle, Porphyry and Ptolemy. Sherwani says that we might accept the proposition
that he was inspired by Plato, in this setting up of the Ideal City, but as there is a
mass of new material in his political writings not found in Plato and taken from
local sources, it is a matter of importance that such material should be analyzed
and Farabi be given his rightful place on the scene of political philosophy. Al-Farabi
died at the ripe age of nearly eighty years in 950. His name and works are everlasting and
echoed in the corridors of time.
 Al-Farabi’s Ideal Head of State

Every Islamic state is ruled by the ruler, or as later European Political scientists would call
him the Sovereign. Plato after developing the matter of the government of his ideal city in
his Republic had made the omnipotent and omniscient philosopher sovereign who should
have no other interest but that of the affairs of state. Al-Farabi starts from the nature of
the workers of leadership and impresses his readers that what is wanted for the office is
the power of making proper deductions.

According to Al-Farabi, his Rais should be such superior man, who, by his very nature and
upbringing, does not submit before any power or instructions of others. He must have the
potentialities to convey his sense to others for complete submission. Rosenthal was of the
view, “He is the Imam, the first ruler over the ideal city-state, over the ideal nation and
over the whole inhabited earth. The philosopher-prophet, in the opinion of Al-Farabi, is
alone qualified to help man, a citizen to reach his true human destiny, where his moral and
intellectual perfection permit him to perceive God, under the guidance of the divinely
revealed Shariat. Those ruled by the first ruler are the excellent, best and happy citizens.”

Al-Farabi contemplatively points out the virtuous qualities of his ideal Head of State, who
should be competent to control the actions of all in the State and must be in possession of
latest intellect as well as the gained intellect. All such refined and high qualities including
his political and literal caliber make him an Ideal Sovereign for the overall interest of the
society and the nation. He enumerated tweleve attributes of an ideal Sovereign:

1. He must possess persuasion and imagination to attain perfection as well as a philosopher

skilled in the speculative science.

2. He must be physically sound with meticulous understanding.

3. He must have visualization of all that is said.

4. He must have a retentive and sharp memory.

5. He should discuss the matters with least possible arguments and must have authority to
get the work done.

6. He must have power to convey to others exactly according to his wish and he has
profound love of learning and knowledge.

7. He must have perfect capacity for a comprehensive knowledge and prescription of the
theoretical and practical sciences and art, as well as for the virtues leading to good deeds.

8. He must shun off playfulness and control over anger and passions.

9. Al-Farabi’s ideal Rais must have love of truth, persuasion of justice and hatred of
hypocrisy, knavery and duplicity.

10. He must vie for utmost happiness to his subjects and he should do away with all forces
of tyranny and oppressions.

11. He must have power to distribute justice without any effort, fearless in doing things as
he thinks best to be done.

12. He must serve the people of his state from all internal and external dangers. He must
be in possession of considerable wealth, so that he should not prone to greed and lust.

Al-Farabi fully realizes that these fine qualities cannot be found in one single human being,
so he says that one without just five or six of these qualities would make a fairly good
leader. If however, even five or six of them are not found in a person, he would have one
who has been brought up under a leader with these qualities, and would thus seen to prefer
some kind of hereditary leadership, with the important condition that the heir should follow
the footsteps of his worthy predecessor. In case even such a person is not available, it is
preferable to have a council of two or even five members possessing an aggregate of these
qualities provided at least one of them is a Hakim, i-e one who is able to know the wants of
the people and visualize the needs of the state as a whole. This Hakim is to Farabi a
desideratum of every kind of government, and if such a one is not procurable then the
State is bound to be shattered to atoms.

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 Kinds of State

Al-Farabi describes the varieties of the states other than the Ideal States and the
remarkable contribution of this philosopher are very much alive and given serious
considerations even today. Al-Farabi divides states into following categories:

1. State of Necessity (Daruriya):

Its inhabitants aim, at the necessities of the life, like food, drink, clothing, a place to live
and carnal gratification and they generally help each other in securing these necessities of
life.

2. Vile State (Nadhala):

Its citizens strive for wealth and riches for their own sake. The account in the Siyasa
includes a description of its ruler. Ibn-e-Rushd also succinctly touches upon this state.

3. Base and Despicable State:

Its inhabitants concentrate on the pleasures of the senses, games and other pastimes. This
state is the one in which men help one another to enjoy sensual pleasure such as games,
jokes and pleasantries and this is the enjoyment of the pleasures of eating and merry-
making. This state is the happy and fortunate state with the people of ignorance, for this
state only aims at attaining pleasure after obtaining first the necessities of life and then
abundant wealth to spend.

4. Timocracy (Madina Karama):

It contains a variety of honours. Since the Arabic source of Al-farabi is lost in the wealth of
legend, we are unable to determine whether this lengthy and diffuse description goes back
to it or represents Al-Farabi’s own amplification. The latter seems to be more correct. The
citizens of these honor-loving states assist each other in gaining glory, fame and honor. The
honors fall into two groups. The first is a personal relationship between one who is worthy
to be honored because of some virtue in him, and the others who accord him honor and
respect because they recognize him as their superior. The second kind of honor is accorded
to men because of their wealth, or because of they have been victorious, exercise authority
or enjoy other distinctions. This state in the opinion of Al-Farabi is the best of all the states.

5. Tyranny (Taghallub):
It receives from the aim of its citizens; they co-operate to give victory over others, but
refuse to be vanquished by them. Al-Farabi sets out to distinguish between despotic states
and define tyranny or despotism according to aim, mastery over others and over their
possessions for power’s sake, within or externally, by force and conquest or by persuasion
and achieving enslavement. His despotic rule is a mixed one and thus often resembles
timocracy or plutocracy. Ibn-e-Rushd avoids this by following Plato’s description of tyranny
and the tyrannical man, and the transition from democracy to tyranny and of the
democratic to the tyrannical man but done to their common source both Al-Farabi and Ibn-
e-Rushd similarly define tyranny as absolute power.

Rosenthal was of the view, “Tyranny has even more variations for Al-Farabi than
timocracy; as many as the tyrant has desires, for this despotism expresses itself
in imposing his will on his subjects and making them work for his personal ends.
Al-Farabi knows of two kinds of tyranny within which these variations occur,
internal and external tyranny. The first consists in the absolute mastery of the
tyrant and his helpers over the citizens of the state, and the second is the
enslavement of another state or people.”

6. Democracy (Madina Jama’iya):

It is marked by the freedom of its inhabitants to do as they wish. They are all equal and no
body has master over another. Their governors only govern with the explicit consent of the
governed. Democracy contains good and bad features and it is therefore not impossible
that at some time the most excellent men grow up there, so that philosophers, orators and
poets come into being. It is thus possible to choose from its elements of the ideal state.

Apart from the afore-mentioned classification of the states, which seems to be idealistic, Al-
Farabi has a definite place for the trait of political character over other nations. He initiates
reasons for this mastery and says that it is sought by a people owing to its desire for
protection, ease ort luxury and all that leads to the satisfactions of these necessities. In this
powerful state, they might be able to get all the desire. There is nothing against human
nature for the strong to over power the weak, so nations which try to get other nations
under their control consider it quite proper to do so, and it is justice both to control the
weak and for the weak to be so controlled, and the subdued nation should do it for the
good of its masters.

There is no doubt that all the lapse of centuries and the international ideology which is the
current coin in politics, the psychology of the nations today is much the same as described
by the Master centuries ago. Al-Farabi said, “But the more chivalrous among them
are such that even when they have to shed human blood they do so only face to
face, not while their opponent is asleep or showing his back, nor do they take
away his property except after giving him proper warning of their intentions. Such
a community does not rest till it thinks it has become supreme forever, nor does it
give any other nation an opportunity of over powering it, always regarding all
other peoples their opponents and enemies and keeping itself on Guard.”

Colonies:
Al-Farabi is comprehensively clear about the principles of colonization. He opines that the
inhabitants of a State must scatter hither and thither in different parts of a State because
they have been overpowered by an enemy or by an epidemic or through economic
necessity. There are only alternatives to the colonists, either to migrate I such a way as to
form one single commonwealth or divide themselves in different political societies. It may
come to compass that a large body of these people are of opinion that it is not necessary to
change the laws which they have brought from their mother country; they would then
simply codify existing laws and begin to live under them. It will thus be clear to understand
that A-Farabi not only contemplates colonization but also self-Government of a republican
kind which is closer to the modern conceptions.

__________________
Kon Kehta hy k Main Gum-naam ho jaon ga
Main tu aik Baab hn Tareekh mein Likha jaon ga

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Search for an ideal state

Literati

Dr Naazir Mahmood

January 01,2017

Al-Farabi, Thomas More and utopian literature across centuries

ShareNext Story

Recently Thomas More’s Utopia turned 500. For observers and students of socialism and related
political ideologies, this quincentenary sparked an interesting rethinking about the desire to
establish an ideal society. Be it the experiment of the collapsed socialist societies in the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries or the Iranian revolution of 1979, or even the recent
attempts by the Taliban and Islamic State (IS) to establish a perfect Islamic society, all in the
process have killed thousands of people and suppressed dissent.
Hilary Mantel’s historical novel Wolf Hall(2009) beautifully captures the events leading to
More’s death but even more interesting is the detail about how the writer of Utopia himself
indulged in persecution of ‘heretics’.
Thomas More’s Utopia is probably the most cited book of the utopian literature so much so that
it introduced a new term used in almost all other languages as it is. But before discussing Utopia,
a look at the commonly overlooked but important work by one of the greatest thinkers in Muslim
history - Abu Nasr Al-Farabi’s Al-Madina al-Fadila is in order.
Al-Madina al-Fadila has been translated variously as the Perfect State or the Virtuous City --
written in the early 10th century i.e. almost six hundred years before Thomas More. Al-Farabi -
known in the West as Alpharabius (870 - 950) was a renowned philosopher and jurist who
indulged not only in ethics, logic, metaphysics, philosophy, and political science, but also in
music. Though, before Al-Farabi at least two other major writers had contributed to such
literature i.e. Plato in his Republic written in the 4th century BC and Augustine of Hippo in
his City of God nearly a thousand years later, the beauty of Al-Farabi lies in his representation of
religion merely as a symbolic rendering of truth.

Both Plato and Al-Farabi look up to the philosophers to provide guidance to the state, but to
sugarcoat his philosopher -- and perhaps not to invite the ire of religious leaders -- Al-Farabi
calls him a prophet-imam instead of the philosopher-king by Plato. When you go into the details
you find that Al-Farabi wants his imam or ruler to be more like a philosopher than a prayer
leader. He should rule by an ‘innate disposition’ and exhibit the ‘right attitude’ for such rule. The
ruler should have ‘perfected himself’ in many disciplines and with the command of good
language should be able to communicate his ideas to his subjects effectively.
A common streak in utopian literature from Plato and Augustine to Al-Farabi and More -- or even later
in Huxley and Orwell -- is an overlap of normative and at times satirical description not only of the
state but also of its ruler.

‘Active intellect’ is one of the primary traits Alf-Farabi wants to inculcate in his king, giving a
clear hint that if a religious leader does not have such an intellect he has no right to be the ruler.
In addition to good memory, the ruler should have a ‘love for learning’ and ‘good
understanding’. Here Al-Farabi prefers learning and understanding over memory, indirectly
showing that most religious leaders rely on their good memory to impress their audiences, rather
than encourage wider learning and comprehension. This rings so true even in our own age of
televangelists and quote-loving quacks.
Al-Farabi’s virtuous city embraces the pursuit of goodness and happiness where virtues abound,
just like in a ‘perfectly healthy body’ – both intellectually and physically. In contrast, his
‘corrupt city’ is ignorant (jahil), without ethics (fasiq) and directionless. He places much
emphasis on people’s cooperation to gain happiness. He clearly anticipates that the ‘virtuous
world’ will emerge only when all its constituent nations collaborate to achieve happiness. Here
he goes much broader than how two of his predecessors mentioned earlier -- Plato and Augustine
-- delve in the Republic and the City of God.

In some parts of the book, Al-Farabi mixes religion in a way that contradicts his own writing
elsewhere. It seems that he tried to confine his independent thinking within the mould of
contemporary religious thinking without antagonising the religious fanatics that were as
abundant then as they are now. Living in the 10thcentury amid the decline of the Abbasid rule and
with chaos all over the Muslim world, Al-Farabi reflected his desire for a peaceful and
prosperous world. Jumping six centuries forward, you look at Thomas More’s Europe, and you
find the early 16thcentury again mired in religious tyranny and conflicts.
The invention of press by Gutenberg in Germany had facilitated rapid spread of books and ideas.
In the second decade, at least four major pieces of writing were completed: The Prince by
Machiavelli in 1613; Utopia by Thomas More and The Education of a Christian Prince by
Erasmus, both in 1616; and the most devastating of them all, Ninety-Five Theses by Martin
Luther in 1517 against Catholic indulgences. The Prince is basically political advice to rulers on
‘realpolitik’ of that period, advocating a separation of politics from ethics, in the direction of the
‘practical’ enhancement of the state’s power.
One might argue that The Prince and Utopia are two entirely different books with dissimilar foci,
but looking closely one finds many similarities too. A common streak in most utopian literature
from Plato and Augustine to Al-Farabi and More -- or even later in Huxley and Orwell -- is an
overlap of normative and at times satirical description not only of the state but also of its ruler.
Talking about More, two pieces of recent literature must be mentioned. First,A Man for all
Seasons by Robert Bolt (1924 - 1995) is a play written in several versions in 1950s.
This play about More was made into a multi-Academy Award winning movie in 1966 with Paul
Scofield playing the lead role of Sir Thomas More. The play and the movie present More as a
saintly figure who as the lord chancellor refuses to endorse the divorce of King Henry VIII from
his wife Catherine of Aragon. He prefers death over compromising his principles and the play
leaves the audience in awe of Thomas More. The second is the novel Wolf Hall by Hilary Mantel
which presents Thomas More as a zealous heretic-hunter. It questions More’s saintly place in
Tudor history.
Interestingly, heresy-hunting became a central concern of Thomas More after writing
his Utopia that talks about an ideal state. More became increasingly against the threat of heresy
and used vehement language with a penchant for hyperbole. In Utopia, More’s imaginary
country is totalitarian par excellence without any pubs, brothels, and devoid of any place where
people can meet privately or secretly. More’s state is also against discussion of public matters
outside of the popular assembly. In Utopia, More repeatedly reminds his readers of the
importance of community to keep people united.
To him, self-interest is the destructive force that tears apart the bonds of social unity, and in his
ideal locality there are no locked doors and no personal possessions. On the positive side,
political power is shared and he suggests that the authority should reside in the body of the
people -- much in the same fashion as later experiments in various types of democracy claimed.
Councillors and their prince are elected and make decisions in regular consultation with the
people. As in Al-Farabi’s book, there is such a contrast among the various postulates of More
in Utopia that one wonders how they could be reconciled.
For example, while suggesting a sharing of power he prohibits public discussions other than in
the assembly; if anyone is found discussing the public matters outside the only legal public
forum, his crime is punishable by nothing less but death -- apparently to avoid any division and
distortion of public opinion. The same year that Utopia was written, another relatively lessor
known book came out -- The Education of a Christian Prince by Erasmus. This book is closer
to the Princeby Machiavelli than to Utopia. The difference is that Erasmus advises on ‘how to be
a good Christian prince’, whereas Machiavelli was least concerned about Christian ethics -- or
any ethics for that matter.
It needs to be clarified here that though The Prince was written in 1513, it was published much
later in 1532 so there is no chance that Erasmus could read it, rather he developed his own
independent work. Erasmus book is different from The Princeand Utopia also in its focus on
education and the qualities of a good teacher, making it a valuable contribution to pedagogical
canon too. To Erasmus, an ideal teacher is of gentle disposition and has unimpeachable morals.
That reminds us of the Chinese communist leader Liu Shaoqi ’s booklet How to be a Good
Communist used by pro-Chinese communists from 1940s to 1990s.
Despite its contradictory propositions, Utopia spawned a plethora of utopian literature in the
centuries to come. Within a century, in Italy, Campanella wrote City of the Sun (1602) -- a
philosophical work written shortly after his imprisonment for heresy and sedition. In Germany
Valentin produced Christianopolis (1619), advocating educational and social reform synthesising
science and Christian ideals -- just like Al-Farabi had tried to synthesise Islam with independent
learning. But, perhaps the most impressive work came from Francis Bacon, the founder of
modern scientific method focusing on orderly experimentation. His political science completely
separated religion and philosophy.
Bacon’s utopian novel New Atlantis was published in 1627. It begins with the description of a
ship lost at sea and carries its passengers to an unknown land. The book’s recurring themes are
enlightenment and dignity. Though in the new land, religion does play an important role, it is
mostly for cover-up; he promotes science as the new religion. But again, like Al-Farabi he held
that there were religious laws that must be obeyed. One wonders why most of the so-called ideal
states have focused excessively on ‘discipline’ regarding religion and other ideologies -- be it
socialism, capitalism, or theocracy -- touching the boundary of repression.

Even the modern states that claim to be the biggest democracies such as India and the US --
leaving aside the countries ruled by Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin - have seen periods in their
history when in the name of discipline, dissent was crushed. To conclude, one may hope that
efforts to establish an ideal society continue, with a balance in individual and societal interests
based on independent thinking, rationality, and artistic and scientific creativity, rather than with
skewed ideas about discipline and uniformity that crush individuality in the name of national and
state interests.

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