People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Cabral, et al. its summary of the evidence presented during the hearing.
ring the hearing. Said order
states, thus:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR, respondents.
 
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA GR. No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June
14, 1996 orders 2of the lower court granting accused-respondent's Motion
for Bail and denying petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and Invalidate
Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of
May 5, 1995" confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the
complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty,
accused- respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail
which petitioner by presenting real, documentary and testimonial
evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of
the trial, this court is constrained to grant bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the amount of
P30,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence
against him was strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned
motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995
both filed by Atty. Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are
hereby denied, for lack of merit.
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the
Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition
reasoning thus:
We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of
this case, and find that the claim of the People that the
respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed
with merit. We are not inclined to declare that there was grave
abuse in respondent court's exercise of its discretion in allowing
accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not
find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the
respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the trial court,
which had the advantage (not available to Us) of having observed
first-hand the quality of the autoptic preference and the
documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant
given by the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated, in the
absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not
prepared to supplant the exercise of the respondent court's
discretion with that of Our own.
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition
submitting the following sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT
THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court
granting used-respondent's application for bail which it justified through
Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the
petition for bail filed by the accused through counsel, the court
believes that the evidence so far presented by the prosecution is
not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin
of acts between man and woman. Strong evidence and indication
of great weight alone support such presumption. It is the
teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not
necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its side but
merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has
the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an
indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177,
July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on
the evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant
(People v. Oliquino, G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so,
because in the commission of the offense of rape the facts and
circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent
thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the
commission thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065,
October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that the
evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in
the instant case, the facts and circumstances showing that they
do seem to negate the commission thereof were mostly brought
out during the cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith
and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse
(Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and
circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:
a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode
in the jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick
Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00
o'clock from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur
the former knew that it was for a joy ride. In fact, she
did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney
proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San
Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same
municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended
to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside
that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her
part, a fact which shows voluntariness on the part of
the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the
court her claim of rape should not be received with
precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an insight into
the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56
SCRA 495). And it is only when the testimony is
impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be
believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October
23, 1981). Rightly so, because the aphorism that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in
itself in conformity with the common experience and
observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance
than in cases involving prosecution of rape (People v.
Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);
b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick
Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the offended
party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first,
refused and even did not swallow it but later on
voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there
(was) no force. And as regards the claim that the
accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a
small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes
doubtful because the prosecution, however, failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette
much less did it present an expert witness to show that
inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause
dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of
narcotics is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised Penal
Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the
Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such,
the burden of proof rests with the prosecution but it
failed to do so;
c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick
Odiamar allegedly brought the offended party, Cecille
Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the
alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands
of the offended party, placed them on her knee,
separating them thereby freeing the said hand and
consequently pushed the head of the accused but the
 latter was able to insert his penis when the said
offended party was no longer moving and the latter
became tired. Neither evidence has been presented to
show that the offended party suffered an injury much
less any part of her pants or blouse was torn nor
evidence to show that there was an overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the
offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d,
March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in
the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the
age, size and strength of the parties and their relation
to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077 January 4,
1994);
d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about
3:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 21, 1994, the
offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back
to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said offended
party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of
grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of
rape until the jeepney reached the house of Roderick
Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases,
the testimony of the offended party shall not be
accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from
suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is
an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but
harder to be defended by the party accused though
innocent (People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July
15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the
courts to exercise the most painstaking care in
scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-30619, March 29,
1974);
e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself
physically examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for
medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states,
among others, that there was a healed laceration on the
hymen, her laceration might have been sustained by
the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and
even a year, prior to the said examination and that the
said laceration might have been caused by repeated
penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that
the offended party might have experienced sexual
intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an
expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court,
Moran, op.cit,vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).
f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe
accompanied by the Station Commander of Lagonoy,
Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the
suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party
submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994
but according to the said physician the lesions near the
umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused
after the sexual acts. As such, there were contradictions
on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity
(People v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the
testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 13086, March 27,
1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by
the accused subsequent to the commission of the act, it
is immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It
opined that aside from failing to include some pieces of evidence in the
summary, the trial also misapplied some well-established doctrines of
criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the following
circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:
First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the
heinous crime of rape against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83
SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 [1995]).
Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille
testified that based on her psychiatric examination of the latter,
Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as
unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive
signs and symptoms. These abnormal psychological
manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the
rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)
Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an
implied admission of guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83
[1994]).
Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered
unconscious by intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.
Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, "no bail was recommended in the information"
constitutes "clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all) the
accused" (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].
Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination
(pages 5-7, Order) that respondent succeeded in forcibly
deflowering her because she was already weak and dizzy due to
the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain
unrebutted.
Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts
manifesting her lament, torment and suffering due to the rape.
She went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained about the
incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her
and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements
of Cecille are positive statements which, under existing
jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by
respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334
[1996]).
Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena
to the effect that the lacerations suffered by Cecille "might have
been sustained by the latter a month, six (6) months or even a
year prior to the examination" (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24,
1995) thus implying that respondent could not have committed
the crime is highly misplaced.
Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell "how old is an
old hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old
laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she
"could not point the exact cause" (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9,
1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not
indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not
an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257
SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the
medical examination of the victim's genitalia is not an
indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the
crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.
(People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).
Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena
positively testified that the wounds could have been '"aused by
cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" (Page 6, TSN, December
9, 1994) which confirms Cecile's testimony (quoted in the Order
at page 9) that respondent burned her "right side of the
stomach" thrice.
The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the
merits of the instant petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and
in accordance with its rule-making powers, 3the Supreme Court, in
promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following provision:
Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution. 4 (Emphasis suppplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by
the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 5As
such, bail is discreationary and not a matter of right. The grant or denial of
an application for is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of guilt
is strong which the lower should determine in a hearing called for the
purpose. The determination of the evidence of guilt is strong, in this
regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court would
never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial
discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's
findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong.  6 "Proof evident" or
"Evident proof" in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is
the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law
is administered. 7 "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn
therefrom is strong, clear, and convinsing to an unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable probability of any other conlusion. 8 Even though
there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination
of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a
capital offense, bail should be refused. 9 (Emphasis and supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt
beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a
great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially bound to
decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above. 10
This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and
include some significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of
this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the
testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim
as well as her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic signs and
symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts,
psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive
signs and symptom." 11 This particular testimony should have been
considered and included in the summary as it was given by an expert
witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-
respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted
as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence
against the party making it. 12
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and
testimonies, this Court has likewise observed that the lower court
misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the lower court, in its
order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself in conformity with common experience and observation
of mankind."
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect
because she willingly went with accused-respondent to the resort where
she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the crime, complainant allegedly
voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise, never
protested nor cried while they on their way to accused-respondent's house.
Because of those findings, the court doubted the credibility of complainant
and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual
acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In
overcoming such presumption, much depends on the credibility of the
complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on
the part of complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-
respondent. This should have been taken into consideration. The following
rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more credible:
It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she
was forcedby respondent to drink gin with the help of his friends
by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-
7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends
blew smoke into her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating
smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave the place, she was
forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened
by Florece with a gun (Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).
The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape
are relative and must be viewed in light of the victim's
perspective and the offender's physical condition (People v.
Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need
not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon
the victim and the latter submits herself against her will because
of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA
405 [19951)
In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5) years old at the time of
the incident in question. At her age, it is reasonable to assume
that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin
must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or
reason. The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived
Cecille of reason, will and freedom must be viewed in light of her
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases,
submission does not necessarily imply volition." (Querido, 229
SCRA 745 [1994])
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with
the group of accused-respondent, she was of the impression that it was
just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the trial court that Cecille must
have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with them
in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if
not non sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride does
not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later committed against
her person.
Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of
rape relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties
and their relation to each other." The lower court enunciated this doctrine
in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual act since the
prosecution was unable to show the complainant suffered any injury nor
show any evidence that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there
any evidence that accused-respondent exerted overpowering and
overbearing moral influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the
above doctrine, it readily concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual
act disregarding testimonies lending credence to complainant's allegation
that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak and
dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not
imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or
intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or
pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have sufficed.
Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate Cecille's
claim by presenting the physician who testified that Cecille suffered
hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately,
however, the lower court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was
to smoke a small cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the
prosecution failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette
much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke
from the said cigarette would cause the said offended party to suffer
weakness and dizziness." Said ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In
fact, it is even misleading as complainant categorically asserted that what
made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the
intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke
alone. In any case, complainant could not be expected to produce that
"portion of that so-called small cigarette." Moreover, one does not need an
expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge - that four shots of
gin have a "weakening and dizzying" effect on the drinker, especially one
as young as the fifteen-year old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is
the lower court's misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate
withholding of some testimonies which would have shown a very strong
likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The following
pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order are
indications of misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate
issued after complainant's physical examination. On the contrary, it
interpreted it to mean that the offended party is already experienced in
sexual intercourse, after the examining physician had testified that the
hymenal lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or
even a year prior to the examination. Interestingly, the lower court failed
to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell "how old is
an hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old
laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she "could not
point the exact cause."
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with
and agrees with petitioner, in accordance with well established
jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in
indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the
crime. Further, in against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's
genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of
the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.  13And
contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is
not conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the
effect the cigarette burns indicated that the lesions near complainant's
umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably, however, the lower court
again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that
the wounds could have been "caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the
victim" which corroborates Cecille's testimony that respondent burned her
"right side of the stomach" thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abuse
its discretion and showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in
determining which circumstances are to be considered in supporting its
decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be
remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying
bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo 14 "is not absolute nor beyond control.
It must be sound, and exercised reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by
its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion. It is
because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise
be guided by well-know rules which, while allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from
getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion
when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law.
It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and; but legal and regular."
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been
irregularly disregarded indicate that they have not been considered at all
in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This irregularity is even more
pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines
cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help
but observe that the lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that
the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by its non
sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular
disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not
misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming
complainant's allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of
her stomach with cigarette butts, (2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating
that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations which are
"traceable to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted offer of
compromise, are indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of
accused-respondent.
enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the
prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary
is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the
prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
According to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the absence of a summary in the order
would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an
order containing an incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in
form and substance which cannot be sustained or be a semblance of
validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, 23 said order was considered defective
and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the application for
bail may be invalidated. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997
and the resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are
REVERSED and the order dated March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-
1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of
Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and thereafter,
proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This resolution is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of
two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the
information. According to Baylon v. Sison, 15 such recommendation
constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.

Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which

circumstances and pieces of evidence are to be considered, the lower court
also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise
of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalng,  16 discretion is guided
by:  first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third,
by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the
laws of the land.

The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in

crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
bail is not matter of right. This Court has reiterated this mandate in
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the
following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo  17which outlined the duties of a
judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of

whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong

based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(Emphasis supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be
denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing,

the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for prosecutions. 18 A summary is defined as "a comprehensive
and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement." 19

There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of
the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part
of procedural due process wherein the evidence presented during the prior
hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most
importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in
the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior
hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be
heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were not
considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial
of due process, for due process means not only giving every contending
party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider  every
piece of evidence presented in their favor.  20Second, the summary of the
evidence in the order is the for the basis for the judge's exercising his
judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained
in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his
discretion. 21(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a

complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence
presented during the hearing proper. The lower court cannot exercise
judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the
summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence were
enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete

People of the Philippines vs. Juan G. Escober
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking
vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y
GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE,
accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,  (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany
vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH XCVII, QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge
Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober
y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the
victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the
automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition
for review on certiorari of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-
appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final
resolution of his fate." 1
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John
Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not
Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon
arraignment on March 2, 1983.
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-
appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too,
pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by
court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had
replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.
A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence,
summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias
Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a co-security guard of appellant
Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family
corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It
is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from
the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident,
Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent
and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983;
pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).
At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of
duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He
left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved
by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by
Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo
Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three
companions, one of whom he later Identified as the appellant
Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.
After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his
office at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after
office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-
year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober
at his post. At the office, the two children watched a television
program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a
bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle
and proceeded to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting
thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant
Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after
Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to
wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions
went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].
At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left
their residence to join her husband and two children. On her
way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the
appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate
was opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot
coming from the direction of the garage; and when she looked
towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact
her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was
out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant
Escober who volunteered the information "that he was not hit."
[pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].
Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom,
when he heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her
was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic)
daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also
observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms
drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he
kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14,
1983].
Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to
bring out the car as their children was (sic) stabbed and
bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a
second one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded
children inside the two cars, they were brought to the Chinese
General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon
arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14,
1983].
It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when
Police Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate
the incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the
Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto.
When he arrived at the hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he
found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a
cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two separate
sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds
sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From
there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met
Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who
arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5,
1983].
Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a
scissor (Exhibit "E") which the former said was found beside the
pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In
the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the
drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were forcibly opened
with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with
Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00
was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police
Headquarters appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then
at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his
version of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober,
the written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and
Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic]
(Exhibit "I") the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who
wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations:
"Detained the accused all prima facie case exist(s) and that
accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. [pp.
13-23, Ibid].
Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police
apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was
readily Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one of
those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound
 during the night of the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982.
Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on
December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the
previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on
even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa
(Exhibit "K") and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of
one of the suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen,
mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein
two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant
Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial
investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement
(Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only admit his participation in
the commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan
Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].
Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic]
(Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named
the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias
Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only
the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July
6, 1983]. 2
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to
testify in his defense. His testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:
Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western
Private Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was
assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw
Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work.
When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he
cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs.
Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because
after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must
clean it. There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean
the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this
occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the
guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte
arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen,
wanted to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are
also still at large] entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan]
was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias
Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed
a gun at Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill
him. He does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He
only knows Alorte because he Alorte used to be his co-guard at
Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into
(climbed) the pick- up car inside the garage and the other man
was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion went
up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real
name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober
does not know the man who was left near the gate but he knows
him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he pointed to
the person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr.,
his co- accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing
because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At
this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that
gun when these four men entered because a gun was already
pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker
because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical
Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not
continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went
up the office, they came down and talked to the man guarding
Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able to
avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went
down from the pickup and he heard Vicente Chua calling him
and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua at the
house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed.
So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr.
Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at
the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to
call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising
Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was
shouting and he could not understand him because he was
speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car,
parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of
the office, he was bringing his son and placed him at the parked
car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he
called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his
son and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were
stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two
cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know
to what hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the
sons of the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the police.
Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave
him a directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the
telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up
himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the
police came and after that, the owner of the security agency
arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They
interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the police
precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not
then arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security
guard to guard the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the
owner of the security brought Escober to the precinct to get his
statement and there the police was forcing him to adroit he was
the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he
told them do not know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua
that she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage
is not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their
children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions
left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic) to call him (Escober). When he
was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing
something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature.
He Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for
the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there
are his. He knows the police who investigated him but he does
not know the person. Escober was at the precinct when he signed
his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he
testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3
Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense.
The gist of his testimony is found in his Brief as follows:
PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is
found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit
vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3
December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the
invitation of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place
near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two
companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several
drinks, he was requested to join the group to proceed to another
place for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the group
stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE
wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983).
ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and the security
guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security
guard) opened the door and they greeted each other;
ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for him
outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two
companions entered the compound (TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9,
1983).
PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for
the group; that while waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child
that he was then about to enter the premises but he met
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with
blood stains in their arms;' that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his
companions started running and he followed them; that in
response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he
stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and
he was brought back to our place where we are selling apples'
(TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9, 1983)
PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982
at the Monuments market. No lawyer assisted him during his
custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the
police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez
nor was he informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded
to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo
Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near
Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M
was presented for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M")
because 'many statements thereon are not correct that he
nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and
was forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected
me to water therapy and he could not endure the pain, when
they gave (him) the electric shock treatment;" and that the
portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those Identified as
Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4
On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On
February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately
after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to
this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was
opposed by the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his
appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on
August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said
accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an
exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the
trial court issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions.
Hence. the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.
In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:
 RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING
HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN
CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS
CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION"
CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE)
UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED
ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE
COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF
HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING
ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF
SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF
THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS
NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER
'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE
HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH
CONTRADICTIONS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN
CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL
UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF
JANUARY 10, 1984. 5
These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant
Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the
following grounds:
PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY
LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE
GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO
RE MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE
OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY
IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT
TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE
CRIME OF ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI
PAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY
WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE
CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS
A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND
IN BAND. 6
We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the
objection interposed to the form and substance of the decision under
review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and
void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of
the 1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the
stenographic notes of the proceedings had been transcribed.
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists
of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations
and insertions. It reads:
The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named
accused of Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or about
December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain and by means of violence and intimidation again persons
robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24
Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00
and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed
personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany
Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple
serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate deaths,
to the damage of their heirs.
Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente
Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco,
Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr.
Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while
Defense evidence consisted of the testimonies of the two named
accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1to 454 of
the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.
In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the
memoranda of both parties, the arguments and authorities cited
therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the
above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y
Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the
charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by
indispensable cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no
mitigating circumstances, and attended by aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of
the crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength,
treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and
excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory
and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this
fact, among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage
throwing reason of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of
the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-
accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the
ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit
of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the
information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober
regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide
was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted
being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to
taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as
lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the
group took some drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and
therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the crime
planned.
WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and
Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the amended information, this Court holding
firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound
under his protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and
murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and
meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission
of the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said
malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to
exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but
succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their
rediculous (sic) justifications for the brutal and merciless killing
of innocent and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery
in question, of being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being
in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting
hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful witness
would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court
after a total appreciation of all the evidence on record is
convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances present that
could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the most
heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby
sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by Article 294,
Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which
is DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of
their victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly
and severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said
heirs, jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7
Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based ...
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy
stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the
testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the
testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete
with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist
of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible
witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band,
"among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such
findings.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA
480, reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan
v. Insular Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular
Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v.
Millora, 3 Phil. 458:
Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of
the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass
upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as
when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial
controversy, it is impossible to administer justice, to apply the
law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant
who has the law on his side.
It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account
the facts brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each
question raised, and the nature and condition of the proofs
furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the
facts alleged by the contending parties which he finds to have
been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the
opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be
intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations
proper in his opinion for the due determination of the case.
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult.
Without a particularization of the evidence, testimonial or documentary,
upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for
the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were
sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial
court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the
efforts shown by respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the
most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our
admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of
stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes
of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent
judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the
transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of
the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some
delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this
Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of
courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness
which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge
lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.
The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by
another trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725,
regarding which We said:
At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently
indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder
case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body
of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three
typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-margined. While
brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is not
necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in
deciding this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in
greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by
both prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial
judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence
and the authorities supporting the court's decision.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of
authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant
include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying
declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior
strength. The issues raised are quite serious and they deserved
better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to
the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case
should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new
judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all evidence
necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused-
appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this
case in order to accord the accused-appellants their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In
support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during the
incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said
nefahous plan. These acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate
of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs.
Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the
gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that
he was not hit. The prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-
firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's
version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent
gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove
his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of
Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the
alleged mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed,
the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that
Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be
attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of
his duties as a security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum
precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises being
guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for
getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees,
Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he
should open the gate for him. In fact, even Domingo Rocero, the security
guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed
Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:
20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical
Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa
malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na
iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa
noong buwan November 1982.
21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na
iyan?
S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang
kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob
ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply. 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that
the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We
share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a
common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He
would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or
perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be
rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding
him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a
gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10
minutes, not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to
enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or
if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the
need for immediate escape.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at
Escober, the same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the
scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the
criminal plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial
statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986,
submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said
Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement
reads:
FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at
Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya
po dati yung Alorte.
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to
Escober]
PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon.
[duty]
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa
ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
 PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong
umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay
pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang
dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga
ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung
Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh. 11
On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in
part:
... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa
bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng
Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan
naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna
siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang
nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking
baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko
ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan
nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa
opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng
opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa
pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an
pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko
siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si
ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami ... 12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co-
conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted,"
deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even
responsive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid
manner by which it was given lends credence to his statement, that
Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the
statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although the
latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun
was aimed at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as
conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere ritual because the same
could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its
execution.
On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve
Escober of any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual
practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to
a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime
charged is indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person
may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without
passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of
justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his
extrajudicial confession.
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not
prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would
want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned
with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the
prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of
logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of
Escober's complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing
a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from
and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a
meter behind.
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement.
We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution
witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave her statement on
December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So,
soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have
been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of better
judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted in the tragic
event.
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte
quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from
inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other interpretations.
Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's
testimony was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his
companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was
precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of
the crime, and at which point Escober could have felt safe enough to
emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua
claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who
was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.
Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she
described having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the
pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep
closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte
and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be
difficult for her to determine for certain the distance between
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was merely walking
behind the former or in fact chasing him.
Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of
Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and
Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a
hurry]." 13This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the
impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober
walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the
'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/
Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of
the crime, and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed
chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his
criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in
the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the
accused and the actual killers, must be shown, and the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must
be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission
of the crime itself. 14
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the
criminal design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime,
such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the
case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's
testimony regarding his actuations during the incident at bar can not
improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved 15and its corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of
the crime and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be
robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind
could have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two
hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions,
however, grave and serious.
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied
his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17is prefaced by the for lowing:
PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG
SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng
pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang
PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka
tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at
pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag
magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang
abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng
abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito
maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na
kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang
pahayag na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring
karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.
 Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa
sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas,
nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusang loob ng salaysay?
Sagot — Opo.
Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit
na walang abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang
ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
Sagot— Opo.
Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi
maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang uri ng
karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?
Sagot— Opo.
Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang
ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?
Sagot— Opo.
Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's
extra-judicial statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory
statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the
part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation.
The Identical manner by which the police sought to inform Escober and
Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for
individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence
level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort was
exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told,
considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level.
The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing
more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to
attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of
compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting
the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives
the impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by
Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during the custodial
investigation.
defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was
able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of
having knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only
prejudice Punzalan might have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to
cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's
presence at the scene of the crime. 22Escober's testimony, however, was
merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo
Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty.
Mariano. 23
Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the
fact of robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions
would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along
to the scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the
perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his
companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the
police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers
further demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.
While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime
was to act as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of
the two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-
established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has
been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are
also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it
clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No.
Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from
confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused-
appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of
P60,000,00,
SO ORDERED.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver
appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial statement cannot be considered
intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was done
without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid.  19Needless to
say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during

the preliminary investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which
amounts to an absence of preliminary investigation, should have been
raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is

also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has
held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the
information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own
investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As
stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the
proper procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance. The right to a preliminary investigation, being
waivable does not argue against the validity of the proceedings,
the most that could have been done being to remand the case in
order that such investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary

investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance,
not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could
even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are
matters to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate
court. 21

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the
trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the
counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute
prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of
Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano

Maximino B. Gamido vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995
MAXIMINO GAMIDO y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed with modification  1 petitioner Maximino B.
Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial Court on eleven counts of
having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner
was accused in 11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the
Philippines in the following documents and making it appear that the
documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the
Philippines:
1. Criminal Case No. 85-40361 — Special Appointment of Maximino
Gamido as Confidential Presidential Representative dated November 30,
1984; 2
2. Criminal Case No. 85-40362 — Memorandum/Order No. 1489
informing all Heads of Ministries, Bureaus, Instrumentalities of the
Government, and Government Controlled Corporations and others on the
existence of Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS)
dated July 29, 1985; 3
3. Criminal Case No. 85-40363 — Appointment of Maximino Gamido as
Presidential Regional Executive Assistant and Executive Director of the
PRAMS dated November 7, 1983; 4
4. Criminal Case No. 85-40364 — Memorandum to Land, Air and
Navigation Transportation Operators in the Philippines dated July 11,
1985; 5
5. Criminal Case No. 85-40365 — Memorandum Order to all Heads of
Ministries, Bureaus, Government Corporations, Government Agencies and
Instrumentalities, and Government Controlled Corporations dated July
29,
1985; 6
6. Criminal Case No. 85-40366 — Memorandum Order No. 1480 — To:
Hon. Maximino B. Gamido, Presidential Regional Executive
Assistant/Executive Director PRAMS-PREMO dated November 23, 1984;  7
7. Criminal Case No. 85-40367 — Memorandum/Circular to all Operators:
(1) Transportation; (2) Shipping Transportation; (3) Air Line
Transportation dated November 30, 1984; 8
8. Criminal Case No. 85-40368 — A letter addressed to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru the Minister of the Budget, submitting the
required STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) specifying the
functions and duties of PRAMS personnel and their salaries allegedly
approved by the President on November 23, 1984;  9
9. Criminal Case No. 85-40369 — Executive Order No. 820 Creating the
Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) in all
Regions of the Philippines dated October 11, 1983; 10
10. Criminal Case No. 85-40370 — Special Presidential Certification dated
September 9, 1985; 11 and
11. Criminal Case No. 85-40371 — Presidential Permission for Free of Fare
(sic) in any Transportation in the Philippines dated February 28, 1985. 12
The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides as follows:
Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, forging the signature or stamp of the Chief
Executive. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed
upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the
Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp
of the Chief Executive.
It appears that on March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C.
Tuvera issued Memorandum Circular No. 1281 13 which read:
INFORMING ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, AGENCIES,
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PROVINCIAL AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL REGIONAL ASSISTANT MONITORING
SERVICES (PRAMS) WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT.
The Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services
(PRAMS) is a non-existent agency within the Office of the
President. Its alleged Executive Director, Mr. Maximino B.
Gamido is likewise not connected, in any capacity, with this
Office.
It is gathered that personnel from the PRAMS have been using
Presidential directives, particularly Executive Order No 819;
Memorandum Order No. 811; and Memorandum Circular No.
1278, to support its fraudulent activities. These issuances,
however, refer to the creation, designation/appointment, and
operationalization of the Presidential Regional Monitoring
Officer (PREMO) System, the duly authorized regional
monitoring arm of the Office of the President, which is charged
to provide the President with the information on development in
the region.
Furthermore, Mr. Gamido has not been given any authorization
to sign for and on behalf of the President of the Philippines. As
such, all memorandum/directives issued by Mr. Gamido on
behalf of the Office of the President are fraudulent. All
memorandum/directives issued by alleged PRAMS personnel
are likewise fraudulent.
By Authority of the President:
JUAN C. TUVERA
Presedential Executive Assistant
Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security
Command and the Office of the President, through the Malacañang
Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO), investigated petitioner.
On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO
Hearing Officer, petitioner appeared and presented the 11 documents,
claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed them in his
(petitioner's) presence.
The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz,
Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Records Office (MRO),
testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in his office
and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those of the former
President.
For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the
Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having
been appointed by then President Marcos and that his appointment and
the related documents, subject of the prosecution, had been signed by the
former President in petitioner's presence.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in finding the petitioner
guilty, held:
The defense put up by the accused, that all the subject
documents were actually signed by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, in his office at Malacañang, and in the presence of said
accused, is as preposterous as it is unbelievable, the said defense,
besides being completely negated and belied by the established
facts (that subject documents, do not exist in the Malacañang
Records Office, and therefore, are spurious) is an imposition on
human belief and all sense of propriety. Further, the accused
does not appear to the Court, and has not shown himself, to be of
such stature as to enjoy the privilege of having the former Chief
Executive sign documents in his presence. Moreover, the
testimony of the accused in support of his defense is totally
untrustworthy and unreliable.
On the basis of the foregoing factual and legal considerations,
the Court is convinced, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the
felony of the forging the signature of the President, as defined
and penalized under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code, was
committed by the accused on eleven (11) counts.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime forging the signature of the Chief
Executive, and/or violation of Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code,
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a total of eighty
(80) years up to one hundred fifty-four (154) years, with costs
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals 14 affirmed
with the modification already noted on the margin of this opinion.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in affirming his conviction for the following reasons:
(1) The fact that the documents in question are not on file in the
Malacañang Records Office does not ipso facto prove that they are forged
but only that they were lost or destroyed.
(2) The lone prosecution witness, Melquiades T. dela Cruz, is incompetent
to testify that the documents were forgeries since there is no evidence to
show that he had seen then President Marcos sign documents. Indeed, this
witness could not say with certainty that the signature on each of the 11
documents was not that of President Marcos.
(3) No handwriting expert was presented in court to give an opinion as to
the genuineness of President Marcos' signatures.
(4) The Court of Appeals and the RTC committed the fallacy of
"argumentum ad elenchi" in concluding that the signatures in the
documents were forgeries from the documents' "unusual format and
atrocious grammar" when these documents were not offered to prove their
appearance and grammar.
(5) Assuming these defects in format and grammar, there is no forgery
since the documents could not have deceived any person.
(6) A writing or instrument in order to constitute a forgery must possess
some apparent legal efficacy (36 Am. Jur. 2d 690), and if PRAMS is a non-
existent entity as Memorandum Circular No. 1281 declared, then the
documents executed under it cannot acquire such "apparent legal
efficacy."
(7) Assuming further that the signature of former President Marcos on the
document creating the PRAMS was a counterfeit (Exh. C), the criminal
liability of the author thereof absorbed all acts of forgery committed under
the fictitious office, because there was only one intent, i.e. to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office.
(8) Assuming that the signatures of then President Marcos in the
documents were spurious, petitioner, the possessor of the documents,
must be exempted from criminal responsibility because no person of
sound mind would make it appear that the President created an office and
appointed him to that office.
The petition has no merit.
First. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang Records
Office, testified that his office did not have a record of the documents. For
his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared the Presidential
Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its alleged
Executive Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected
with the Office of the President. From these premises it is rational to
conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been
signed by then President Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court
and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to be the author of the
forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and user of a falsified
document is the forger thereof . 15
Second. Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was
incompetent to testify as to whether the signatures on the documents,
purporting to be those of President Marcos, were forgeries because there is
no showing that he had witnessed President Marcos signing his name.
What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of
President Marcos and that the signatures on the documents in question
were not those of President Marcos. 16 This is sufficient to establish the
signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting of
another must have seen the latter write the document or sign it. It is
enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's]
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has been record
custodian at Malacañang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not
acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President Marcos but of
other Presidents under whom he had served.
There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the
genuineness of the challenged signatures. As this Court has once observed,
the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly technical issue in the same
sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or
molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a
questioned document can be sighted by a judge who can and should
exercise independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such
signatures." 17 Here, as the trial court observed, "the forgeries were not
only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly discernible to
the naked eye or mere ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident
from their appearance. . . . " 18
Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that forgery could not be
said to exist since the documents, because of their "unusual format,
atrocious grammar, and misspelled words" could not have defrauded or
deceived anyone, and that moreover they lack apparent legal efficacy."
That is not so. If the documents were fanciful or whimsical, as for
example, a commission appointing petitioner mayor of a mythical
kingdom, the forgery could simply be dismissed as a spoof. But as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the Office of the President had to issue a
memorandum denouncing the legality of PRAMS because of the
possibility that the less wary would be deceived, especially because that
the documents pertaining to it bear the Great Seal and were typed on
stationary which have the appearance of official stationery of the Office of
the President.
Fourth. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under
only one information because there was only one intent "to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office." The argument has no merit.
The documents in this case were forged on different dates. One act was not
done to commit another. There is therefore no basis for considering the
various acts as constituting only one crime of forgery.
Fifth. As a last-ditch effort of sorts to escape criminal liability, petitioner
claims that since "no person of sound mind would [make] it appear that
the Chief Executive created an office for him and appointed him thereto,"
he must be exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. This, again, is not necessarily so since the purpose
may be to deceive others. Moreover, this defense now invoked should have
been raised below. At all events, the presumption is in favor of sanity. 19 In
this case there is no evidence to show that petitioner was insane at the
time he committed the acts for which he is being prosecuted.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's petition for review and petition for bail
pending appeal are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.