Case Digest

People vs. Santiago

October 25, 2017LEGIStrata

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO

SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 17584       March 8, 1922

Nature of the Action: Appeal from the decision of the trial court

Facts: Gregorio Santiago was driving his car when he ran over Porfiro Parondo, a 7-year-
old boy, which instantly caused the latter’s death. He was then found guilty of homicide
with reckless imprudence, was sentenced to suffer one year and one day or prision
correccional, as well as to pay the costs of the trial. However, defendant contended that Act
No. 2886 is unconstitutional, and therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his
person and the complaint itself.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2886 constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. Act No. 2996 is not violative of any constitutional provision, nor does it
partake of the same character as that of the provisions of the constitution; thus, the court
did not commit any of the errors assigned. Furthermore, its main purpose is limited to
criminal procedure inasmuch as its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of law in
criminal matters.

The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced
to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both
instances.
 Case No. 18
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 – Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did
not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the

COMELEC‘s head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the
result of an ―honest misrepresentation‖ and that she has always ―maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence.

April 24, 1995 – COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that
found Montejo‘s petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos‘ corrected certificate of
candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 – COMELEC en banc denied Marcos‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.

May 11, 1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos‘ proclamation to the
office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes.
However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be
suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 – In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of
the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) 
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of
the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution‘s
residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framer‘s of the constitution)2. The
confusion of the ―honest mistake‖ made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be
attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for
the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office
immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and
Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only
actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change
residences and apply for voter‘s registration in these cited locations. When she got married
to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same
code. It is the husband‘s right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a
family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wife‘s domicile of origin.
After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed
when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral
house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2) 
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House
of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioner‘s contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-
judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having
failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr.
Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case
under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3) 
 WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the
question of the petitioner‘s qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRET‘s jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives.

Case 35
Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)
Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the
release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No.
960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central
Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without
an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or
send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies
shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of
entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase
and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of
20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he
had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his
business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they
brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by
his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R.
Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency
instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport
and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were
declarations belonging to other people. 
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Case 52
 PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG DIGEST
Posted on August 15, 2016
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530
August 03, 1935

 FACTS:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempt
ed robbery. At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who
was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe 
accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods located on the last named street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from
 the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him
under custody.

ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery
RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held gui
lty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggr
avating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arrest
o mayor.

RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete terminati
on following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the vo
luntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete off
ense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take 
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. 
In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention 
was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objecti
ve, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inma
tes, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete findi
ng.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the mat
erial damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly b
e ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (acc
ion medio).  The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the off
ense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascert
ained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of 
injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion  that the fact under 
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. A
gainst the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of night
time and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments 
for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating cir
cumstance of lack of instruction.
 Case 69
CASE DIGEST: Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 220598, July
19, 2016]

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas.

The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following:
(1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C.
Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former
members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission on
Audit (COA).
The information read:
…[the] accused…all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or
acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of
THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination
or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, · and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring
the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to
themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-
mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO’s accounts, and or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through
irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused, including
petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted except those of the
petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her
petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused
within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was sufficient
evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme Court
to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence – YES.

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of

her demurrer to evidence.

HELD: Certiorari  is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in

denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
General rule: The special civil action for  certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides, “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by  certiorari before
judgment.”
Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial” (citing Ong v. People  [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the existence of

conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in denying

GMA’s demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and committed
plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought to
show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of
their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that
the Prosecution did not allege that  the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.  This was another fatal flaw
of the Prosecution.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal charge for
plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-
conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the
wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the
main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Citing  Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,  “The gravamen of the conspiracy charge…is  that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.”
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required
such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be
fatal to the cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.

PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an

implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers.
The sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of “OK” of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests in that manner, GMA violated the
following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and
intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and
specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.

HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make her part
of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and
acquire ill gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that
effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests, even if
unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder
or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or
illegal.
a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No.
1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:
(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;
(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure;
and
(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.
The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the integrity of
its operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to
how specific the requests should be made.
b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently,
although only 15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which
the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO’s revenues, already co-mingled with
the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was available
budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would
misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her
power of control over PCSO.
HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior
officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was
legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for
all litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue (compare
to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo  [G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011]).

B. As regards Aguas
HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were
insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or
any other crime. Without GMA’s participation, he could not release any money because
there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he
might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit
plunder.

3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all the elements
of the crime of plunder – NO.

A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth

in the total amount of not less than P50 million – NO.
HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or
even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired illgotten wealth
of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information
was proved by the Prosecution – NO.

SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the
Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that
what was necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public coffers.

HELD:  The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No.
7080 together (misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds) is
that the public officer used the property taken. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.