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DIALOGUE October, 2009

The Problem of Deduction: Hume's Problem Expanded

Samuel R. Burns
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
ABSTRACT: In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues strongly against
our intuitions about induction. In his view, the justification of induction relies upon the
principle of the uniformity of nature, a principle that we can only justify by an appeal to
induction. Thus, a non-circular justification of induction is impossible. This argument
has troubled philosophers ever since, especially philosophers interested in the philosophy
of science. One prominent solution to this problem comes from Karl Popper, who posited
a deductivist solution to the problem. In this paper, I will briefly summarize Hume's
argument as well as Popper's response to it. I will then argue that Popper's account twice
fails to solve the problem of induction: first, as A. J. Ayer pointed out, his account
appears to contain a built-in inductive assumption, and second, by shifting his discussion
from induction to deduction, Popper begs Hume's question, merely shifting from a prob-
lem of induction to a problem of deduction.

Hume's Problem idea that C-events cause E-events. We

Although David Hume is credited with
the first influential statement of the prob-
lem of induction, the word "induction"
never actually appears in his work. Rather,
his statement of the problem occurs within
the context of his discussion of causation
(Treatise, 1.3.6; references are to book,
part, section, and paragraph). Hume
argues that we cannot arrive at an under-
I
standing of the connection between cause
1'1 and effect by any amount of a priori
scrutiny of the independent objects. For
example, a person who has never
observed objects striking each other
would have no way of predicting that a
billiard ball, when it strikes another,
would communicate its motion to the sec-
ond ball. Even the most rational person
could imagine, prior to experience, all
sorts of possibilities: the billiard balls
might disappear, or they might burst into
flames, or they might simply stop moving.
No matter how long this experience-
deprived person examines each individual
ball , this person could never deduce that
the first ball will communicate its motion
to the second ball.' Thus, Hume claims,
we only arrive at our idea of cause and
effect after experience. That is, we
observe that an event type C is constantly
conjoined with an event type E, and this
constant conjunction suggests to us the
then feel justified in making the universal
claim that all C-events cause E-events.'
Thus, any time in the future that we
observe a C-event, we expect an E-event
to follow.
Yet we can never produce a sound
deductive argument for why we are justi-
fied in this claim. The nearest argument
we can produce is as follows:
P,: In the past, we have observed C-
events constantly conjoined with E-
events.
p,: In the future, nature will be uni-
fomily like the past.
C: Thus, in the future, C-events will be
constantly conjoined with E-events.
This argument is deductively valid.
The second premise, however (known as
the principle of the uniformity of nature),
is immediately suspect. How are we ever
to demonstrate deductively that it is true?
Hume argues that we can conceive of
nature radically changing in the future so
that everything that we have ever
observed no longer holds (Treatise,
1.3.6.5). Billiard balls no longer commu-
nicate motion but rather disappear or burst
into flames when they collide. Objects no
longer fall to the ground when they are
dropped but rather float horizontally to the
ground. And so on until everything in the
universe completely fails to resemble the
past. Of course, this is not something we

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DIALOGUE
expect to happen; yet the mere fact that
we can see no contradiction in this imagi-
nation shows that it cannot be deductively
ruled out.
How then can we justify the principle
of the uniformity of nature? Perhaps we
will try a similar argument to that which
justified our expectation that C-events will
be conjoined with E-events:
P,: In the past, we have observed that
nature is uniform from past to future.
C: Therefore, in the future, nature will
be uniformly like the past.
This argument clearly doesn't work,
since we can conceive of nature radically
changing. Thus, for this argument to work,
we need to add one additional premise:
P,: In the future, nature will be uni-
formly like the past.
But this is exactly what we were trying
to prove. This circularity is the fundamen-
tal problem of induction.
Popper's Deductivism
Any philosopher working with the phi-
losophy of science must at least attempt to
face this problem of induction, for on first
blush, it seems that scientific enquiry is
merely a specialized form of inductive
reasoning. In the common conception of
science, scientists observe the physical
world, notice regularities, and derive sci-
entific laws from these regularities. This
derivation is quite clearly an inductive
process. Thus, if the inductive method is
not justifiable, then scientific laws can
hardly be so.
Of course, the simplest counterargu-
ment to this analysis is to merely claim
that this conception of science is flawed .
This is exactly the position taken by the
20'h -century philosopher of science Karl
Popper.
Like Hume, Popper does not originally
intend that his project deal with induction.
Rather, Popper is primarily interested in
the problem of demarcation: how "to dis-
tinguish between science and pseudo-sci-
ence" ("Philosophy," 155). For Popper,
the true sciences included such fields as
Einstein's physics while pseudo-science
rt .5 • .• .. ! " •. . ...1
!I'I
October, 2009 .,
included Marxist history and Freudian I
psychoanalysis.'
Popper's contemporaries, the logical II
positivists, largely believed that verifiabil-
ity was the mark of true science. That is, a
f·
theory is scientific just in case it can be
verified by empirical evidence (Ayer
"Demonstration," 337; Vickers, §3.1).
Popper noted that this demarcation is
faulty since most pseudo-sciences are
clearly verifiable. Adherents of Marxism,
for example, find confirmations of their
theory every time they "open a newspa-
per." Evidence of "class bias" is seen even
in what the paper chooses to present.
What they cannot find, however, is a clear
falsifier of their theory (Popper
"Philosophy," 157-58). Thus, Popper
claims, the true demarcation between sci-
ence and pseudo-science is falsifiability .
A scientific theory is simply one that
"makes assertions that may clash with
observations" (Popper Conjectures, 256).
But how does this conclusion bear upon
the problem of induction? Popper claims
that by construing science as an attempt to
falsify a hypothesis rather than an attempt
to verify it, we shift our focus from the
generation of the hypothesis to the process
of testing. The method by which we come
by our hypotheses is unimportant. We can
derive useful hypotheses from observation,
from religion, from myths and folklore;
what is important is that from these
hypotheses we draw "conclusions [ . .. J by
means of logical deduction" (Popper
Logic, 32). That is, we make a deductive
prediction (P) from our hypothesis (If) and
look for empirical evidence that falsifies
the prediction. If we succeed, we have fal-
sified our hypothesis. If we do not, then
our hypothesis "has, for the time being,
passed its test" (Ibid., 33). Logically, this
process of falsification takes the form of a
simple modus tollens:
H- P
~H
IThis is, of course, a valid deductive
argument, which contains no induction.
Thus, Popper claims that those who think
that scientific enquiry is inductive are
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DIALOGUE
merely mistaken. Indeed, all of what is
commonly understood to be inductive rea-
soning actually follows a deductive pat-
tern: "Induction, i.e. inference based on
many observations, is a myth. It is neither
a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary
life, nor one of scientific procedure"
(Popper "Philosophy," 181).
Discussion
As with any prominent philosophy,
Popper' s account has attracted a good deal
of discussion. Before getting into this dis-
cussion, however, let us take a brief
detour into Feigl's distinction between the
two kinds of justification.
Validation and Vindication: Herbert
, Feigl draws a distinction between two
I kinds of justification: validation and vin-
1
dication. Validation is the justification of
a "knowledge-claim," whereas vindication
is the justification of an action (Feigl,
674). On Feig\'s account, the principles of
deduction and induction provide the vali-
dation of a claim while a combination of
our desired end and our empirical evi-
dence provides the vindication of an
action. Thus, a claim is validated if it fol-
lows deductive and inductive rules,
,,;.I: whereas an action is vindicated if it is
likely to succeed in reaching our desired
end. Hume's problem of induction, then,
is that it is impossible to give a non-circu-
lar validating justification of induction.
Ayer's criticism: A. 1. Ayer argues
against Popper's deductivist account,
claiming that it contains a built-in induc-
tive assumption. Ayer points out that the
very idea of falsifiability presupposes the
uniformity of nature, as there "would be
no contradiction in holding that a hypoth-
esis which had been falsified was the
more likely to hold good in future cases"
(Problem, 59). It is conceivable that falsi-
fication could be like an "infantile disease,
which even healthiest hypotheses could be
depended on to catch" (Ibid.) Thus, it
seems clear that there is no deductive jus-
j
tification for discarding a falsified hypoth-
esis. Discarding a falsified hypothesis
~:;.
only makes sense if we assume that it will
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October, 2009
be continue to be false in the future, which
is an inductive assumption.
Thus, Ayer concludes that the search
for a validating justification of induction
will ultimately fail; yet he claims that this
is hardly ground for rejecting induction as
irrational. Induction cannot be validated
by any higher standard, he claims,
because induction is the standard of ratio-
nality. As he says, induction must "act as
judge in its own cause" (Ibid., 81).'
The Problem of Deduction: My sec-
ond criticism of Popper' s account takes a
somewhat different approach. Let us
begin by noticing exactly what Popper's
account is attempting to do. By shifting
focus from the process of hypothesis gen-
eration to the process of testing, which is
construed as a deductive process, Popper
has shifted our focus from induction to
deduction. Yet Hume's problem with
induction is that it appears impossible to
produce a non-circular validating Justifi-
cation for it. It seems that the same exact
problem exists for deduction .
Indeed, it is difficult even to under-
stand how a validation of deduction would
be set up. Clearly, if we are to produce a
non-circular validating justification of any
claim, we cannot use that claim to set up
our validation. Yet deductive logic is the
system by which we set up all of our argu-
ments. If we cannot use deductive logic to
prove deduction , we cannot even begin to
set up an argument.
Despite this difficulty, deduction pos-
sesses a valuable characteristic that is
missing from induction: truth preserva-
tion. What this means is that for any set of
propositions with binary truth-values,
valid deductive arguments will take true
premises to true conclusions. Binary truth-
values are simply a valuation over the set
{T,F}, where T and F are exhaustive and
mutually exclusive (Cohen, 155).5 Godel's
proof of his Completeness Theorem
proves truth preservation for propositional
and predicate logic:
Note, however, that this is not a valida-
tion of deductive logic but merely a vindi-
cation. That is, if our end is to reach true
conclusions from true premises, then
DIALOGUE October, 2009

deduction appears to be a good method to identifying induction as one of the basic

use. But since Popper is interested in vali-
dation, not vindication, it seems that the
truth-preserving characteristic of deduc-
tion does not help him much. If a mere
vindication of deduction would suffice for
Popper, then why not simply attempt to
vindicate induction in the first place?'
Why spend so much time identifying
induction with deduction if the problem
remains at the end? Even if Popper could
succeed in identifying induction as a spe-
cial form of modus tollens (and Ayer's
criticism quite clearly shows that he fails
in this), Popper' s problem would now be
to validate modus tollens.
Conclusion
This discussion has shown that
Popper's deductivist account of induction
fails . That is not surprising since Popper's
project was to find a validating justifica-
tion of induction. If Feigl is correct in
standards of validation. then any project
that tries to validate induction will fail. If
by justification we mean validating justi- .i1
fication, Hume ' s problem of induction is J:
insoluble. But then so is the problem of
deduction. Our highest standards of vali-
dation cannot in themselves be validated
without circularity. As Ayer points out, r
I
this is a victory for the skeptic. However. l''.
it is not, as he claims it is, an entirely
"bloodless victory" (Problem, 81). For if
our best systems of logic cannot be vali-
dated, then even our most solid beliefs,
most carefully reasoned arguments, and
best-laid proofs could be entirely wrong.
i\
We still may have enough vindicating jus-
'!',
tification to trust them in everyday life,
but we can never reach certainty. This,
then, is the victory of the skeptic: they
show us that to be a philosopher is to be
aware of the limitations of our reason. In
short, the skeptic reminds us that an hon-
est philosopher is a humble philosopher.
Ii

Notes
II,

'The example of the billiard ball is found in Hume, Enquiry, §7 .2.

' In this case, we are only concerned with cases where every instance of a C-event is followed
by an E-event and every instance of an E-event is preceded by a C-event. It is quite clear that this
is not enough for a complete account of causation since we seem quite comfortable claiming that
an event type D causes events of type F only sometimes and also that more than one type of cause
could cause some events. For our purposes, however. this more restricted version of the constant
conjunction account is all that we need.
-'This, of course. raises another problem. Marxist history and Freudian psychoanalysis were
widely accepted as science by his contemporaries, yet Popper felt that they did not deserve the
name. This became his project of demarcation. Yet if Popper already feels that these fields are not
1
science, it is unclear what his demarcation is supposed to do; his mark is already drawn. ,t
' Note that Ayer does not explicitly make use of the distinction between validation and vindica-
tion; nor does he attempt to provide a vindication of induction.
' Whether this accurately describes the behavior of truth and falsehood in the actual world is
uncertain and is, in my opinion, highly unlikely.
"The proof of this theorem is quite complicated and is not necessary for our purposes here. A 'I
brief account of the proof is contained in Cohen, 167-70,89-97.
'This project of inductive vindication is exactly what Reichenbach undertakes. i
I
Work Cited II

Ayer, A. J. "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," Mind 431171 (1934), 333-45.

- - -. The Problem of Knowledge. New York: Penguin, 1956.
Cohen. Daniel E. Computabilty alld Logic. In Mathematics and Irs Applications, edited by G. M.
Bell Chichester: Ellis Horwood. 1987.

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DIALOGUE October, 2009
I Herbert Feigl , "Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature and Limits of Ethical
Arguments." In Readings in Ethical Theory, edited by Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952.667-80.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 2nd edition. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1993.
- - -. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 3rd edition.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1969.
- --. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Translated by Julius Freed and Lan Freed. New York:
Basic Books, 1959.
- - -. "Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report." In British Philosophy in the Mid-Century ,
1st edition, edited by Cecil Alec Mace. New York: Macmillan , 1957. 151-91.
Reichenbach, Hans. The Theory of Probahlity: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical
Foundations of the Calculus of Probability, 2nd edition. Translated by Ernest H. Hutton and
Maria Reichenbach. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.
Vickers, John. "The Problem of Induction." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2009 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. §3.1.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-probleml#VerCon>

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