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In-Service Inspection of Welds in Atmospheric Ammonia Storage Tanks
In-Service Inspection of Welds in Atmospheric Ammonia Storage Tanks
Giuseppe Franceschini, Arie de Bruijne, Johan Thoelen, Vianney Amrhein, Olav Storkaas
Yara International
I
nspection of atmospheric ammonia storage
tanks has always posed a challenge since in-
trusive inspection requires decommissioning
of the tank and it allows oxygen ingress in-
side the tank increasing the risk of Ammonia
Stress Corrosion Cracking (NH3-SCC).
Based on Risk Based Inspection (RBI) assess-
ment and critical crack size evaluation for the
definition of the acceptance criteria, Yara estab-
lished a specific inspection process for non-
intrusive inspection of single and double wall
ammonia storage tanks.
This paper summarizes Yara’s non-intrusive in-
spection process for in-service inspection of Figure 1. Double wall ammonia storage tank
double wall ammonia storage tanks designed as
“cup in a tank”. These tanks are designed with
an insulated outer steel tank and an open inner
steel tank holding the liquid ammonia. The an-
Depth, a Length, 2c
Crack configuration POF
(mm) (mm)
A 12 487 <10-5
B 11 20 <10-5
C 11 20 <10-5
D 10 176 <10-5
Figure 8. Monte Carlo FAD analysis
E 11 82 <10-5
Table 1. Maximum allowable defect sizes Calculated maximum allowable defect sizes are
considered valid if the associated POF is less
Because there is a randomness or uncertainty than 10-5. If this condition is not satisfactory, the
associated with several input variables, calcula- analysis is repeated: maximum allowable defect
tion of maximum allowable defect sizes should sizes are decreased until the target POF equal to
be viewed probabilistically rather than deter- 10-5 is obtained.
ministically. In particular, for ammonia storage
tank application, the uncertainties associated 3.3. Applicability of non-intrusive inspection
with the following variables have been consid-
ered: According to FE Guidelines [1], non-intrusive
inspection of the tank can be considered if the
Material yield strength two of the following conditions are obtained:
Material fracture toughness
Estimate of residual stress RBI assessment places the tank in the in-
spection frequency area of at least 10
The Monte Carlo and FAD methods are well years. In other words, the tank cannot be
suited to one another for the calculation of prob- in the High risk area (Figure 4);
ability of failure (POF) associated with the max- Structural integrity calculations conclude
imum allowable defect sizes above estimated that the maximum allowable defect sizes
(Table 1). are much higher than detectable defect
Figure 8 shows the results of a Monte Carlo sizes.
FAD analysis. Each Monte Carlo trial results in
a single assessment point. Uncertainty in the in- If these two conditions are both satisfied, non-
put parameters (fracture toughness, residual intrusive inspection can be considered instead of
stress, and yield strength) lead to uncertainty in the traditional internal inspection of the tank.
the fracture ration, Kr, and in the load ratio, Lr:
uncertainty in the input parameters is reflected
in scatter of the assessment points. The POF is
then defined as the number of points that fall
outside of the FAD curve divided by the total
number of trials.
Figure 19. NH3-SCC growth rate model [4] To date seven ammonia storage tanks have been
successfully inspected with the inspection robot.
Yara Ammonia Storage Tank n° XXX
Based on inspection results, critical crack size
evaluation and NH3-SCC growth rate model,
EFMA Probability Of Failure (Figure 4) 29 Yara determined new inspection intervals that
EFMA Consequence Of Failure (Figure 4) 40 are shorter than the ones recommended by
EFMA Risk (Figure 4) Green, Low risk EFMA [1] for the traditional internal inspection
EFMA Inspection interval (Figure 4) 15-20 Years of the tank.
2clim (Table 1) 20mm
Non-intrusive inspection indications No 5. References
NDT technique detection limit 5mm
RL (Figure 19) 16 Years [1] Guidance for inspection of atmospheric
Yara non-intrusive inspection interval 8 years
refrigerated ammonia storage tanks,
2008, EFMA
Table 3. Inspection interval determination: Non-
[2] BS7910:2005, Guide to methods for as-
intrusive (Yara) Vs traditional internal (EFMA)
sessing the acceptability of flaws in me-
tallic structures
4. Conclusion [3] API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, JUNE 5, 2007
[4] Nyborg, R., Bruk, KASP modell for
Yara established a specific inspection process ammoniakk spennings korrosjon
for non-intrusive inspection of ammonia storage sprekkvekst, 1999, IFE
tanks based on Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as-
sessment and critical crack size evaluation.
On this basis Yara International asked FORCE
Technology to develop a robot for non-intrusive
inspection of inner tank welds in double wall
(cup in tank) ammonia storage tanks where the
inspection can be carried from the vapour filled
annular room between the inner and the outer
tank.
The technique was qualified by producing a
number of test plates with artificial defects. The
qualification proved that even small defects,