1. Yes, Alpha should be disciplined. Based on Rule 3.

02 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility,

Alpha violated the language of the provision, wherein he failed to indicate in their communications
that Beta is deceased, where in this case, which may be used to advance trickery. The prohibition
is firmly grounded and founded on the very basic principles of liability, where as a matter of fact
and truth, the deceased partner ceases liability upon death. This is in line with the decision of our
Supreme Court (SC) in the case of People v. Baluyot, which reiterated that ‘’Death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability’’. In re Petition of Sycip, the Supreme Court said ‘’ In view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards
demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name’’. The possibility of
deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out.

2. No, Attorney should not be disciplined. There was no violation regarding the advertisement of legal
services. Publication of services was never proscribed nor prohibited by law, so long as it is within
the ambit of public morals and good taste. The inclusion of professional services in their banner,
in this case, as Lawyer and Accountant, is a material factor to gain potential clients, which is
detrimental to the success of the business. In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, the Supreme
Court said that ‘’the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made
in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar’’. The
same contention applies had it been Attorney and Accountant put up a corporation, of the same
business, with the same advertisement. Hence, there was no violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

3. Yes, Blue should be disciplined. Blue violated the language and the spirit of Rule 3.04 of Canon of
Professional Responsibility. In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, the Supreme Court said that ‘’the
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.’’ A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods.

In the same vein, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between
a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. Furthermore, the
act done by Blue is not akin, nor within the bounds expected from a member of the legal
profession. Corollary, he acted as if he was just a vendor selling products, which was evidently
aggravated through the manifestation of providing discount coupons to potential clients, which
clearly evinces that his true intention is money-making, not public service. Hence, the act done by
Blue merits a disciplinary warrant.

4. The cases cited under Canon 9 of the COS mutually shares a contravention of a provision of the law
which proscribes a lawyer from participating, directly or indirectly, in the unauthorized practice of
law. It should remembered that the practice of law is only lodged in the province of those who
were able to satisfy the stringent requirements needed in the profession. Clearly, the
respondents’ common denominator is that they all appeared before a tribunal and manifested
legal undertakings, as a ‘’lawyer’’, which in fact, and in truth, a falsity of some heights. In the case
of Aguirre v. Rana, the Supreme Court reiterated that ‘’ the right to practice law is not a natural
or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.’’, by which such qualifications are expressly
stated in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of
the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill, which means that the exercise of such entitlement is only within
the ambit of true lawyers. The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Audibly,
the cases mentioned in the COS greatly transgressed the rule on practice of law, which calls for a
disciplinary action.