Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, CA-G.R. SP NO. 130640

INC.,
Petitioner, MEMBERS:

SALAZAR-FERNANDO, R. A.,
- versus - Chairperson
BALTAZAR-PADILLA, P. J. &
INTING, S. B., JJ.
ELIAZAR A. SOMEROS and
all persons claiming rights Promulgated:
and interests under him,
Respondents. AUGUST 20, 2015

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BALTAZAR-PADILLA, J.:

Before US is a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 dated October 23,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 125 of Caloocan City
(hereinafter, “RTC”) in Civil Case No. C-23144.

Petitioner Carmel Development, Inc. (hereinafter, “CDI”) is a

domestic corporation engaged in mining operation which used to be
registered as Carmel Farms, Inc. It changed its corporate name in
1977 through a formal amendment of its Articles of Incorporation.

On May 11, 2012, CDI filed a complaint 2 for ejectment before

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 49, Caloocan City, (hereinafter,
“MeTC”) docketed as Civil Case No. 12-30411, against respondent
Eliazar A. Someros (hereinafter, “respondent”). It alleged that in
1958, it acquired under its former corporate name, three (3) parcels
1
Rollo,pp.37-38
2
Roll,pp.57-72.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 2
DECISION
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of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. (62603) 15631,

(62605) 15632 and (64007) 15807; that in 1973, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 293 (PD 293) which
cancelled the aforementioned TCTs and declared the properties
covered by the same open for disposition and sale to the members of
Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc.; that thereafter, the
members of Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc. as well as
several informal settlers started occupying the subject properties
which by then had been known as Pangarap Village; that on January
29, 1988, the Supreme Court declared PD 293 unconstitutional and
void ab initio in all its part in Tuason, et al. vs. Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City, et al.3 Consequently, CDI's titles over its properties
were reverted back to it. Following the pronouncement of the High
Court in Tuason, all those who directly benefited from the
promulgation of PD 293 including all the informal settlers presently
occupying its properties can no longer claim any possessory rights
thereto. CDI maintained that its claim of ownership over the three (3)
parcels of land was fortified by the decision rendered in the
consolidated cases of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
vs. Carmel Development, Inc. (G.R. No. 187876) and Malacañang
Homeowner's Association, represented by Ramoncito Perez, et al.
vs. Carmel Development, Inc. (G.R. No.187618) where the High
Court resolved the question of ownership over the said properties in
its favor.

CDI claimed in its complaint that it merely tolerated the

occupancy in its properties of the members of Malacañang
Homeowner's Association, Inc. along with the informal settlers after
the promulgation of PD 293 and even after the restoration of its title in
1988. Later, it formally advised all the said occupants in its properties,
including herein respondent who specifically occupies Block 1, Lot 3
located along Acacia St., Pangarap Village,Caloocan City covered by
TCT No. (64007) 15807, to vacate and to turn over to it the
possession thereof. However, despite the formal demand to vacate,
respondent Someros refused to leave and turn over the lot he
occupies4. The Complaint concluded with the following prayer:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that judgment be rendered ordering the Defendant and all other
persons claiming rights and interests under him:
3
G.R. No. 70484, January 29, 1988.
4
Lot 3, Block 1 of LOT 2 under the Industrial Plan covered by TCT No. (64007) 15807; Rollo,
p.180
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 3
DECISION
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1. To remove all 'structures' and to vacate the premises in

question and restore the possession thereof to Plaintiff;

2. To pay the Plaintiff the monthly rental of FIVE

THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 5,000.00) from 01 July 2011 when
defendant received the last demand letter up to the resolution of this
case;

3. To pay the Plaintiff the amount of TWENTY

THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 20,000.00) plus THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 3,000.00) per appearance as attorney's fee; and

4. To pay the cost of the suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the

premises are likewise prayed for.”5

On May 22, 2012, the MeTC dismissed the ejectment case on

the ground of lack of jurisdiction6 upon the following ratiocination:

“The material allegations in the complaint read in part as

follows:

'xxx

5. With the Presidential Decree taking into effect,

CDI's effort to continuously assert its ownership and
propriety rights over the said property was effectively
curtailed and went naught. Members of Malacanang (sic)
Homeowner's Association, Inc., thereafter started to
occupy the subject property which by then had been
known as Pangarap Village. Informal settlers/squatters
likewise took advantage of the legal restraint on CDI's
ownership and unabashedly proliferated in the area.
Having been unconstitutionally stripped of its
ownership and proprietary rights through PD 293, CDI
was therefore compelled to tolerate the influx of both
the members of Malacanang Homeowner's
Association, Inc, and informal settlers/squatters
within its property.' (Emphasis supplied)

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is

determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint.

5
Rollo,pp.69-70.
6
Id.,pp.311-315.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 4
DECISION
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A painstaking scrutiny of the above-quoted allegations in the

complaint shows that plaintiff wants to impress upon this Court that
its cause of action against the defendants is one for unlawful detainer
because it TOLERATED the occupancy of the defendants of the
subject property, but such tolerance was already terminated and
despite demand to vacate, the defendants continued and still
continue to possess the subject premises.

However, the afore-quoted allegations, particularly paragraph

5 of the complaint contradict, rather than support, plaintiff's theory
that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. It must be stressed
that mere tolerance, carries with it 'permission' and not merely silence
or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance. Thus, if
the plaintiff WAS COMPELLED to let herein defendants enter the
subject property and to occupy the same because it had no choice at
that time in view of the enactment of PD 293 stripping it of its
ownership then it cannot be said that plaintiff permitted defendants'
entry and occupation of the subject premises. In other words, if no
permission was granted by the plaintiff to the defendants at the start
of the latter's occupation of the subject property such occupation was
unlawful from its inception.

If the possession of defendants was illegal from the start,

plaintiff should have instituted a complaint for forcible entry within one
(1) year from discovery thereof. This is so because the one year
period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry to the land, except that when
entry was made through stealth, the one year period is counted from
the time the plaintiff learned thereof. 7

Since for so many years, plaintiff merely 'tolerated' the illegal

stay of the defendants, as alleged in the said paragraph 5 of the
complaint, which indicates that more than one (1) year had elapsed
from the time they learned of such illegal entry and occupation, it is
obvious that the present ejectment suit was filed far beyond the one-
year time bar.

The present case not having been filed within the one-year
time bar from the time the plaintiff learned of such illegal entry and
occupation, its outright dismissal for want of jurisdiction is proper.

The fact that plaintiff alleged in the complaint that for many
years, it was compelled to 'tolerate' the illegal stay of the defendants
in the subject property cannot convert the cause of action from
forcible entry to unlawful detainer through tolerance because it is
essential in unlawful detainer case of this kind, that plaintiff's

7
Sps. Pedro Ong and Veronica Ong vs. Socorro Parel, et al., G.R. No. 143173, March 28,
2001, citing Elane vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80638, April 26, 1989; Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Seventh Edition; Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192,
November 15, 1995; Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1997 ed., pp. 385-386; Rollo,p.313
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 5
DECISION
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supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the
start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. As
explained in Sarona vs. Villegas8, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of
Appeals9, tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action
as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Considering that
what is present in this case is the illegality of defendants' possession
and not tolerance from inception, which tolerance was given only
after the illegal entry of the defendants to the subject property, there
can be no case of unlawful detainer through tolerance to speak of. To
reiterate, plaintiff cannot convert the nature of the action from forcible
entry to unlawful detainer through tolerance by simple expedient of
alleging in the complaint that it tolerated the possession of the
defendants.”10

On appeal, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTC's

decision dismissing CDI's complaint.11 Subsequently, CDI's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13, 2013. 12

Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising two issues:

“A. WHETHER OR NOT RTC BRANCH 129 OF

CALOOCAN CITY COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE MeTC BRANCH 49
HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT
FOR EJECTMENT.

B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.”13

The main crux of the controversy is whether or not the MeTC

has jurisdiction over the ejectment suit filed by CDI against
respondent.

CDI maintains that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit it filed since its complaint sufficiently stated the
jurisdictional elements for an unlawful detainer case, to wit: (1) the
possession of respondent was lawful in the beginning but became
8
22SCRA 1257, G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 2006
Edition. pp.527-528; Rollo,p.313.
9
G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992; Rollo,p.313
10
Rollo,pp.311-314.
11
Id.,pp.37-38.
12
Id.,pp.40-43.
13
Id.,p.15.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 6
DECISION
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illegal upon withdrawal of tolerance by petitioner through a formal

demand to vacate; and (2) the complaint was filed within one year
from the last demand.

CDI adds that for the MeTC to take cognizance of the ejectment
case, the complaint should state only the ultimate jurisdictional facts
and not conclusions of law nor evidentiary facts. It contends that the
appropriate time for it to exhaustively discuss the “existence of
tolerance” is in the submission of its Position Paper and other
pertinent pleadings allowed in Summary Procedure. The complaint
does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of
a cause of action at the outset, this will have to be done at the trial on
the merits of the case.

CDI contends that the court a quo violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to adhere to the decisions rendered by this
Court and the Supreme Court recognizing the jurisdiction of the
MeTC over the ejectment cases filed by CDI. It points out that in
Miranda, et al. vs. Hon. Fineza 14 (hereinafter, “Miranda”), the Special
Twelfth Division of this Court ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 51 of Caloocan City has jurisdiction to try the case for
ejectment filed by CDI against respondents therein. The said ruling
had attained finality after therein respondents' Petition for Review on
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. 15 The pronouncement in
Miranda as to the authority or jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court to try the unlawful detainer case filed by CDI involving
properties owned by it which were declared open for disposition
under PD 293 was similarly applied by the Eleventh Division of this
Court in Rabino vs. Hon. Pe-Aguirre16 (hereinafter, “Rabino”).17 The
decision in Rabino case became final and executory on July 19,
2012.18

To further bolster its claim that the MeTC has jurisdiction over
the case it filed, CDI cites the decisions of this Court in Gimeno vs.
Carmel Development, Inc.19 (raffled off to Ninth Division); Carmel
Development, Inc. vs. Lungkop20 (assigned to Eleventh Division); and
Bartolome vs. Carmel Development, Inc.21 (decided upon by the First
Division). In these cases, it was consistently held that the material
14
CA-G.R. SP No. 66060, May 21, 2002; Rollo,pp.191-197.
15
Rollo,p.20
16
CA-G.R. SP No. 90445, October 5, 2010; Rollo,pp.203-220.
17
Rollo,pp.21-22
18
Rollo,p.23
19
CA-G.R. SP No. 85070, September 26, 2007; Rollo,pp.23-24; Rollo,pp.221-231.
20
CA-G.R. SP No. 106045, May 29, 2009; Rollo,pp.235-246.
21
CA-G.R. SP No. 108328, March 15, 2012; Rollo,pp.248-265.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 7
DECISION
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allegations contained in the CDI's complaint filed in the respective

cases, to wit: (1) the continued enjoyment and possession of the
land of therein respondents even after that PD 293 was declared
unconstitutional was by mere tolerance of petitioner; (2) that
respondents therein refused to vacate the premises despite demand;
and (3) that the complaint against respective respondents were filed
against them within one year from the date of petitioner's last
demand, sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful
detainer which confers jurisdiction on the MeTC.

CDI insists that contrary to the MeTC's conclusion which was

upheld by the RTC, its tolerance was present right from the start of
respondent's possession of the subject property. The entry of
respondent in the said lot was merely through its tolerance since the
exercise of its ownership over the subject property was illegally
curtailed by PD 293. The possession of respondent was lawful at the
beginning because of PD 293 but became illegal when after the said
decree was declared unconstitutional, they refused to vacate the
subject land despite demand.

Petitioner avers that the dismissal of its complaint based on

lack of jurisdiction without giving it the opportunity to be heard is an
outright denial of its right to due process.

WE resolve to grant the petition.

Anent the question whether or not the case filed by petitioner

against respondent was an unlawful detainer case cognizable by the
MeTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint, the pertinent
portions of which read:

“3. Plaintiff CDI is the registered owner of three parcels of

prime land with a combined area of one hundred fifty six (156)
hectares located in Caloocan City, Metro Manila . The three parcels
of land, acquired by CDI in 1958, and still registered under Carmel
Farms, Inc., are covered under three titles, namely: Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. (62603) 15631, (62605) 15632 and (64007)
15807. xxx

4. In 1973, just as CDI was starting to develop the said prime

land, having named the same Consuelo Heights Subdivision, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No.
293 (PD 293). The said presidential fiat unconstitutionally stripped
CDI of its ownership over the three parcels of land after it invalidated
and declared null and void ab initio all the titles of CDI. PD 293
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 8
DECISION
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similarly declared the property of CDI 'open for disposition and sale to
the members of Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc.' The
decree likewise had the effect of nullifying the titles of lot buyers of
CDI derived from its titles;

5. With the Presidential Decree taking into effect, CDI's effort

to continuously assert its ownership and proprietary rights over the
said property was effectively curtailed and went to naught. Members
of Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc., thereafter started to
occupy the subject property which by then had been known as
Pangarap Village. Informal settlers/squatters likewise took advantage
of the legal restraint on CDI's ownership and unabashedly
proliferated in the area. Having been unconstitutionally stripped of its
ownership and proprietary rights through PD 293, CDI was therefore
compelled to tolerate the influx of both the members of Malacañang
Homeowner's Association, Inc., and informal settlers/squatters within
its property;

6. On January 29, 1988, after almost fifteen (15) years of

agonizing with the effects of PD 293, the Supreme Court
promulgated an [sic] en banc Decision in the case of 'Roman Tuason
and Remedios Tuason, by Attorney-in-fact Trinidad Viado versus
Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice, and the
National Treasurer, G.R. No. 70484 ('Tuason Case'), declaring PD
293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts, and in effect,
restored the titles of Roman Tuason and CDI, the latter being the
rightful owner of the subject property.

xxx xxx xxx

12. Most recently, CDI had initiated plans to develop the property
which is the subject matter of the controversy. As CDI was merely
tolerating the continued stay of the illegal occupants of its property
after the passing of PD 293 and even after the Supreme Court
restored its title back in 1988, CDI had already given formal advise to
all the illegal occupants of its property, including herein defendant
who, xxx is currently occupying a portion of the said property,
specifically Block-1, Lot-3 located along Acacia St., Pangarap Village,
Caloocan City and which is covered under CDI TCT No. (64007)
15807.

xxx xxx xxx

14. Despite the formal demand to vacate given to the defendant,

defendant failed and refused to vacate and turnover possession of
the lot he occupies. Xxx”22

22
Rollo,pp.58-65.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 9
DECISION
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It is an axiomatic rule that the court's jurisdiction is determined

by the allegations in the complaint. In a complaint for unlawful
detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged to
clothe the MeTC with jurisdiction over the case. They are the
following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract

with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 23

Contrary to the findings of the MeTC and the RTC, CDI's

complaint contains allegations which clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the subject
matter on the MeTC. On its face, the complaint alleged that CDI is the
owner of the lot subject of the controversy; that respondent started
occupying the lot with its tolerance; and that respondent received its
last demand letter to vacate on July 1, 2011, 24 but refused to do so.
The complaint was filed on May 11, 2012, which is well within one
year from the time the last demand to vacate was made. Obviously,
the complaint established the basic elements of an unlawful detainer
case, sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC.

In Carbonilla vs. Abiera,25 it was held that -

“The statements in the complaint that respondent's pos-

session of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner
clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer
involves the persons withholding from another of the possession of
the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the former's right to hold possession under the con-
tract, either expressed or implied.

23
Suarez vs. Spouses Emboy, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014.
24
Rollo,p.70
25
G.R. No. 177637,July 26, 2010.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 10
DECISION
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A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer

case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such posses-
sion must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful;
hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as
in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of
the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.” (Emphasis sup-
plied)

Inasmuch as it was clearly alleged in CDI's complaint that

herein respondent's possession of its property was by mere
tolerance, said allegation was sufficient to establish a case for
unlawful detainer over which the court a quo has jurisdiction.

According to the MeTC, it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide

the instant case because the first requisite mentioned above to make
out a case for unlawful detainer is absent. CDI's act of tolerance was
not present at the inception of respondent's possession, the tolerance
having arisen only after the latter's illegal entry. Respondent was able
to occupy the subject lot not because of CDI's tolerance but because
it was compelled to let him stay thereat in view of the enactment of
PD 293. If no permission to occupy the premises was extended by
petitioner to herein respondent from the beginning, then the latter's
occupation of the subject property was unlawful from its inception.
Hence, CDI should have instituted an action for forcible entry within
one (1) year from the discovery thereof. Since petitioner filed the
ejectment suit against respondent beyond the one-year prescriptive
period after it had learned of the illegal entry and occupation, its
complaint must be dismissed outright for want of jurisdiction.

WE disagree.

In point is the case of Mirallosa, et al. vs. Carmel Development,

26
Inc. which stemmed from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
CDI (the petitioner in the present case) against Mirallosa and all
persons claiming rights and interests under him before the
Metropolitan Trial Court alleging the same facts as were averred in
the complaint filed in this case, to wit: (1) it was the registered owner
of the property until its title was voided by PD 293; (2) that because of
PD 293, it was constrained to allow Mirallosa's predecessor-in-

26
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013; Rollo,pp.393-403.
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 11
DECISION
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interest to occupy the lot; 27 (3) that after the declaration in Tuason
that PD 293 was unconstitutional, it tolerated therein respondent's
occupation of the property; and (4) that Mirallosa refused to vacate
the premises despite demand. In answer to CDI's complaint in the
said case, Mirallosa alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter since it had filed the complaint beyond the one-year
prescriptive period for ejectment cases. It was pointed-out that CDI
failed to take the necessary action to recover its property
notwithstanding that it had lost ownership and possession of the
same when PD 293 took effect on September 14, 1973. Mirallosa
also insisted that tolerance had not been present from the start of his
possession of the property since CDI extended its tolerance only after
PD 293 was declared unconstitutional. This circumstance inevitably
placed CDI’s cause of action outside the scope of unlawful detainer.
The Supreme Court rejected Mirallosa's contentions by holding, viz:

“In this case, it is clear from the facts that what was once a
legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293, later
became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was
unconstitutional. While it is established that tolerance must be
present at the start of the possession, it must have been properly
tacked after P.D. 293 was invalidated . At the time the decree was
promulgated, respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his
predecessor-in-interest to enter the property. xxx” (Underline Ours)

Adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis, WE resolve to apply

the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case at bar
and deem that the tolerance extended by CDI to herein respondent is
present at the inception of his occupation even though said tolerance
may be said to have been extended only after PD 239 was declared
unconstitutional.

In Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,28 the High

Court had the occasion to expound on the importance of the stare
decisis rule, thus:

''Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's

policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance
with the legal maxim `stare decisis et non quieta movere'
(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating
27
Mirallosa, et al. vs. Carmel Development, Inc., supra; Rollo,p.395
28
G.R. No. 110398, 281 SCRA 534, 542-543 (1997)
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 12
DECISION
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to the same event have been put forward by parties

similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided
by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason &
Corp. v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]). In Woulfe v.
Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A.
2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that where substantially similar cases to the pending case
were presented and applicable principles declared in prior
decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare
decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio
App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the
doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties
who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound
by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The
Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: `Stare
decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different' (Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118A, 394, 395 [1922].
Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa
603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa.
217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J.M. Tuason v.
Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other
cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of
a land title on the principle of `stare decisis et non quieta
movere.'(underscoring, Ours)

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, there is no need to tackle

the second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged

Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 125 of Caloocan City in
Civil Case No. C-23144 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 49, Caloocan City is hereby directed to forthwith
assume jurisdiction over the ejectment suit filed by herein petitioner
and dispose of the same with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

PRISCILLA J. BALTAZAR-PADILLA
Associate Justice
CA-G.R. SP No. 130640 Page 13
DECISION
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WE CONCUR:

REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR-FERNANDO SOCORRO B. INTING

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR-FERNANDO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division