People vs.

Manolito Lucena
G.R. No. 190623, Feb. 26, 2014

FACTS:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision of the CA dated August 24, 2009 affirming the Decision
of the RTC of Paranaque dated April 30, 2008 finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA the amount of P50, 000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.

As per AAA’s (victim) testimony, she was allegedly apprehended together with her peers for
violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors by two (2) barangay tanods, one of which was
the appellant. However, AAA’s companions managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. She
was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in
jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting
with her friends. AAA's plea, however, remained unheeded.

AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio
Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The
appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the
one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be
the one to bring AAA back to her house.

But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in
San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her
once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the
tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The
appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently
pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later
put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina despite the latter's plea not to
rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time,
the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA's vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant
stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about what happened between them.

The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who
simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant.
AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical examination by
Dr. Tan, which resulted in the findings that indeed AAA suffered sexual abuse as evidenced by her fresh
lacerations in her private part.

The appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him. And for his part could only
muster the defense of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.

ISSUE/S:
1.) W/N the Trial Court gravely erred in convicting the appellant of Rape despite the
Prosecution’s failure to prove the element of force and intimidation.

2.) Assuming that the appellant committed the crime charged, W/N the Trial Court gravely
erred in convicting him of three (3) counts of Rape.

HELD:
The SC affirmed the CA Decision affirming the Trial Court’s Decision.

1|Page
 After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, the Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse the
rulings of the lower courts. All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great
or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be viewed from
the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is
that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into
submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death.
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as
observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA's categorical, straightforward and
positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her
while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for
her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA's plea not to
rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she
tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the
former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that
force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual
intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been
instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant's
reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any
resistance to his evil desires. AAA's lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would
not in any way discredit her testimony.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case), insists
that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he
was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim's vagina; he then withdrew it
and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into
the victim's vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the
headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim's
vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the
accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no

2|Page
indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the
room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred
during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal
intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we
quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to
wit:
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape.
It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part
of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes
wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the
[appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not
motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is indubitable.
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant's conviction for
three counts of rape is proper.

People vs. Emmanuel Aaron

G.R. No. 136300-02, September 24, 2002

FACTS:
On appeal is the Decision of the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, convicting herein appellant Emmanuel
Aaron, of one count of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusions perpetua and to pay
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and
penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,[2] respectively, in three separate
criminal complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo.

Upon arraignment, accused Emmanuel Aaron pleaded not guilty.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, the private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed ("papag") inside her room on the
second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law, herein
appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that
someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside
her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck.
Jona's attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly covered her mouth with his left hand.

Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could
only manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down on the
floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife still poked on Jona's neck.
Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the headboard of the "papag"
bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a knife, and
continued making pumping motions.

After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only
after Jona told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself ("Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog
ko.") but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the incident. Jona quickly put on her panty
and hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering herself. Her cries
drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the

3|Page
apartment, to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes,
Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law, the appellant herein.

Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latter's arrival from the market
and she related the misfortune that had befallen her.

Police Officers accompanied Jona to the provincial hospital for physical examination. Thereupon,
the attending physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found "multiple
healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 o'clock position(s), incomplete type" in Jona Grajo's private part.

The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged.

ISSUE:
W/N the Trial Court erred in finding the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo,
sufficiently established all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal knowledge of a
woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. The gist of private
complainant's testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual assault started on the "papag" bed
inside her room on the second floor of their apartment unit. After going on top of the private
complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after which he made
pumping motions while poking a knife on her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into her
vagina two more times on the same occasion after transferring locations inside the room, with the knife
continuously poked on her neck.
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that he had
just changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was located when he
chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as the door was then slightly ajar. He did
not do anything further as the private complainant was awakened and she already started shouting. In
view of the positive and convincing testimony of the private complainant, however, the defense of
denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. It
may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part
of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the
appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication in the records, as
the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside
the room where the crime was committed.

People vs. Alvin and Romeo Labagala

G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018

FACTS:
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC of
Cabanatuan City, finding appellants Alvin J. Labagala and Romeo Labagala guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

On June 12, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Jun Alberto (Jun) was having dinner with the victim
under the mango tree at the latter's residence when Salve entered the yard to buy a pack of cigarettes.
As he was attending to Salve, he noticed four men enter the premises. Jun identified two of them in
open court as appellants Alvin and Romeo Labagala. Jun saw Alvin poke a gun at the victim and whip

4|Page
him with a gun while the other three held him in place. Alvin then took the victim's jewelry consisting of
two rings, a necklace and a wristwatch.

Afterwards, Jun witnessed the victim being dragged inside the house by Alvin. At the time, he was
cornered at the backyard by one of Alvin's companions. There was a commotion inside the house and
he heard someone moaning. Alvin and his companions immediately ran away. When he went inside the
house, he found the victim already dead.

Appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi.

ISSUE/S:
First, whether the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the crime of
robbery with homicide, considering that Jun's testimony narrating the incident was uncorroborated by
another witness;

Second, whether appellants, together with their co-accused who are at large, acted in
conspiracy in committing the crime charged.

HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious.

For the accused to be convicted of robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against
the person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in
its generic sense, was committed.

In robbery with homicide, it must be established that the original criminal design of the malefactor/s is
to commit robbery, and the killing is merely incidental thereto. "The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life, but the homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery."

A thorough review of the records shows that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the
crime of robbery with homicide through the testimony of Jun, who was an eyewitness to the incident.

We agree with the court a quo in upholding the detailed, clear and straightforward testimony of
Jun. That said testimony is uncorroborated by another witness is of no moment. After all, "the testimony
of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction x x x."

Besides, it is settled that "when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are accorded
finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower
court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the
result of the case."

In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial court, as they are not
clearly arbitrary or unfounded, and said findings were affirmed by the CA on appeal.

We likewise uphold the CA's conclusion that appellants, together with their co-accused who are still at
large, acted in conspiracy in committing the crime charged.

We explained in People v. De Jesus that an accused who participated as a principal in the

commission of a robbery will also be held liable as a principal of robbery with homicide even if he did
not actually take part in the killing that was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery,
unless it is clearly shown that he tried to prevent the same, viz.:

5|Page
“When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of [a] robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same.

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty
only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with
homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery.
One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his coconspirators and can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.”

Since it was not shown that appellants had endeavored to prevent the victim's killing, they are
both liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide.

6|Page