SECOND DIVISION The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and

Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation,

G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983 committed as follows:

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the
vs. municipality of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and within
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed
PHILIPPINES, respondents. accused conspiring and confederating together, with the
deliberate intent of bringing one Dr. Patrocinio Angeles into
Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners. public discredit, disrepute and contempt, after having
knowledge that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was a former
The Solicitor General for respondents. patient of the Morong Emergency Hospital was operated
thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak and utter the
following insulting and defamatory words and expressions, to
DE CASTRO, J.: wit:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz):
August 25, 1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by finding
petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of grave oral Your wife should not have been operated. If I
defamation as the former Court of First Instance has held, and imposed on were the doctor, all that I should have done was
him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to do a curretage raspa on her.
ordered them to pay complainant the amount of P1,000.00 as moral
damages. Atty. Bernardino:

On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Those doctors are incompetent. They are not
Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against surgeons. They are just bold.
honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano
Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Dr. Francisco:
Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the crime The operation was unusual.
of grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the information upon order of
the court, was amended by adding the particular statements uttered by Atty. Bernardino:
each accused allegedly constituting the crime of slander to wit:
The doctors who operated on your wife could be
AMENDED INFORMATION charged for murder thru reckless imprudence. The
doctors there are no good. They are not surgeons.

1
 thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles, the attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz
and one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital,
professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence thus
casting public contempt and ridicule upon the reputation of
the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles.
Contrary to law.
Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966,
On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision convicting the
accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral
defamation, sentenced each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum and each of the accused was directed to pay
complainant t the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court as already
stated was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander.
As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife
of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding
since November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr. Custodio
about her ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding
for two days; that thereafter her bleeding recurred that Mrs.
Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her that if her
bleeding continued she should go to a hospital; that her
bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz
entered the Morong Emergency Hospital that she was attended
by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her ailment
was tentatively diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion
and pregnancy"; that an x-ray examination conducted on Mrs.
Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy;
that Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a
transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that as the
bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the
complaint Dr. Patrocinio ; that her uterus which contained three
(3) dead foetal triplets was removed that the operation was
successful and her bleeding was arrested, that on December
26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused
Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino together with
Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of
Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused
interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her
operation; that the couple informed the two that they are
satisfied with the operation; that in the course of this interview
the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the operation was
not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been
operated on and that if he were the one he would not conduct
an operation but only curretage (raspahin); that on the same
occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino that the
physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are
incompetent and they are not surgeons and said accused told
Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through
reckless imprudence; that the accused Dr. Francisco was
formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the
Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his
private patients who needed the facility of the hospital for
proper management; that, however, on December 15, 1965 his
membership in the said staff was cancelled by the Credential
Committee of said hospital at a meeting called for that purpose
by the complainant Dr. Angeles who was then the Director of
the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the accused Harry
Bernardino, as counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the
ouster of Dr. Angeles as Director of the Morong Emergency
Hospital; that the case was bitterly contested that it even
reached the Office of the President; that, furthermore, during
the incumbency of the accused Atty. Bernardino as Mayor of
Morong, Rizal he caused the passage of a resolution wherein he
was given authority to recommend all charity cases for
admission to the Morong Emergency Hospital and that this
resolution, however, was ignored by the complaint Dr. Angeles
in accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of
Medical Services.
2
 The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics
Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, the
accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be done
with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by
complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of
triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other
accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take; that
upon the advice of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr.
Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a
Committee member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went
on December 26, 1965 to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs.
Lourdes Cruz; that they interviewed the spouses Romulo Cruz
and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on Mrs.
Cruz on December 13, 1965; that in that interview the two
accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to the
Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding
investigation; and that after the interview with the Cruz spouses
Dr. Golla and the accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, in
coming president of the Rizal Medical Society on December 27,
1965, to take up the matter with him but they were advised to
take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, which
they did.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while it is
true that the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact
finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the accused
went out of bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which are not only
derogatory but constitute a crime that can be prosecuted de oficio. It went
on to rule however that the defamation committed by the accused cannot
be considered as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was
said of the complainant was that he should not have performed the
operation, and that he could be prosecuted for murder through reckless
imprudence.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was
instituted. While the case was pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the
petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was
dismissed insofar as he is concerned.
Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal raises several
questions. In synthesis, they are:
1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals
to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed;
2. Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be
considered libelous;
3. Whether or not there was conspiracy;
4. Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that petitioners acted
with "malice" is fatal; and
5. Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already been dismissed,
We shall discuss only those matters as may be pertinent to petitioner
Francisco.
Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found that the offense
committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which prescribed in two
months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the said court should
have dismissed the case, and sustained the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that said crime had already prescribed. He pointed out the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, and the
information charging the accused of the greater offense of grave oral
defamation was filed with the court more than four (4) months later on May 3,
1966.
Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that for the purpose
of determining the proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is
the nature of the offense charged in the information which is grave oral
defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said crime was
found by the Court to constitute only simple slander. Hence, the period of
prescription here should be six (6) months.
3
Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the complaint was filed by the
offended party before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine
(39) days after the incident in question which is still within the prescriptive
period. He cited the case of People v. Olarte 1 which overruled the case
of People v. del Rosario 2 and held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on the merits. It makes no difference whether the
case was filed in the Fiscal's Office and not in the Municipal Court as in the
Olarte case, since Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not require that
the complaint be one filed in court in order to toll the running of the period.
Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense
includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser
offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction
the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of
accusing the defendant of the graver offense. The principle has the support
of overwhelming authorities in American jurisprudence:
The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is
"as a general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by
limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense which is so
barred, is entitled to discharge", and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal
Law, Sec. 343; "It frequently happens that a change of felony
includes an offense of a lower grade with a different period of
limitation so that, while the felony is not barred, the statute has
ran as to the lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is that if the
statute has not run against the felony, while the lesser offense is
barred. the bar cannot be evaded by the defendant for the
felony and convicting him of the lesser offense." 3
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities. or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco 4 held that
the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the
proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended
party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under
this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when
the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that
the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal
or conviction of the accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this
Court in the Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled
that before the Olarte case there was diversity of precedents on the issue of
prescription. One view declares that the filing of the complaint with the
justice of the (or municipal judge) does in the course of prescriptive term. This
view is found in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited
therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the
complainant or information must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People v. Coquia, L- 15456, June 29,
1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine
aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which We
find applicable to the case at bar reads:
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide
guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
4
 "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed
in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely,
or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the
interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when
such p terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the
complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or
convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal not otherwise. But it is in the
court conducting a preliminary investigation where the
proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal if
the court should discharge the accused because no prima
facie case has been shown.
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a p
investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without
conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force,
for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs.
Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or
denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office
which is required by law to conduct the preliminary
investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In
chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by
the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for
preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals,
besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct
preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of
municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of
First Instance. ... 5
Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing
against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave
oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused
interrupts the period of prescription.
Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for his statements —
Your wife would not have been operated, If I were the doctor,
all that I should have done was to do a curretage raspa on her.
xxx xxx xxx
The operation was unusual.
are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he
committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The
remarks made by Francisco were but a harmless expression of his opinion on
what should have been done in treating her, if he were the doctor managing
her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that complainant
committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient. An
impartial observer would readily note that such remarks do not degrade the
competency of a doctor, for the latter, because of human limitations cannot
be expected to be accurate at all times in the diagnosis of patients. As noted
in the case of Blende vs. Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only
required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession, and is
not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by
those reasonably skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's
wrong management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be
considered libelous. In the same American case, it was held:
It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the
mismanagement of the making of a wrong diagnosis in a
particular case is not of itself actionable. Such a charge implies
5
 nothing more, at most, than ignorance or unskillfulness in that guilt for the crime itself 7 which must be upon proof beyond reasonable
case, and does not materially affect his reputation as respects doubt. 8
his general competency to practice his profession.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were made on the
To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics
the management or treatment of an individual case is not more Committee decision" is obviously incompatible with the notion that petitioners
than to impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible had gone to the residence of the Cruz pursuant to a conspiracy to defame
human nature. The most eminent and skillfull physician or or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to Tanay, Rizal, having
surgeon may make mistake on the symptoms of a particular been accepted as a fact by the Court of Appeals, it is incongruous to allege,
case without detracting from his general professional skill or as respondents now do, that Atty. Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had
learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in that conspired to slander Dr. Angeles.
case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the
community in his general professional competency. From what has been said, there is no further need to discuss the other issues
raised in this case.
We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements
could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize them as libelous would be a WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano Francisco is hereby
dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of another acquitted, with cost de oficio.
will generate criminal liability for slander. His alleged defamatory remarks may
be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous handling of the SO ORDERED.
case.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin,
It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the JJ., concur.
statements quoted and stigmatized as defamatory are those only of accused
Bernardino. 6 That latter's statements are what the Solicitor General Aquino, J., concur in the result.
considered as "strong words that are evidently serious and damaging."
Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the statements
uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General would like to hold
Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy.
Assuming that Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held
liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor the Court of Appeals found
that they conspired with each other to commit the alleged crane. This is so
because no evidence was offered to show that there was prior consultation
on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those
words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those
words. Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and individually.

Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required

for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a finding of

6

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19272 January 25, 1967
JAIME HERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manila
and CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of
Mania, respondents-appellees.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for petitioner-appellant.
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal E. S. Arguelles for
and in their own behalf.
Valera Law Office for respondent-appellee Albano.
SANCHEZ, J.:
This case has its roots in a complaint lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano, quondam Congressman for the lone
district of Isabela, against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of
Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank —
for violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, Commonwealth Act
6261 or Republic Act 265.2 The complaint revolves around petitioner's alleged
shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of
Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim
that said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank,
through the Monetary Board, during petitioner's incumbency as presiding
officer thereof. The charges involved were docketed in the City Fiscal's
Office, as —
I.S. No. 11379 — re petitioner's holdings in Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres;
I.S. No. 11380 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of Nueva
Caceres;
I.S. No. 11381 — re petitioner's holdings in the Bicol Electric Co.;
I.S. No. 11382 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of the East; and
I.S. No. 11383 — re petitioner's holdings in the DMG, Inc.
At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent Carlos
C. Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal, complainant moved to exclude
therefrom the alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code
because the applicability of this statute was in issue of Solidum, et al. vs.
Hernandez, L-16570, at the time pending before this Court, but which had
since been resolved by us — February 28, 1963 — adversely to Hernandez.
Fiscal Gonzales granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the
averment that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the
Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be
prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and
that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature.
Dismissal was denied; reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with
a prayer for preliminary injunction.3 The decision dated October 13, 1961,
reached upon a stipulation of facts, dismissed the petition, with costs.
Petitioner appealed.
1. Stripped of inconsequential issues, the forefront question thrust upon us is
whether the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from
proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled against petitioner.
By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are
empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial
jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to
investigate postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to
investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily. Public interest — the
protection of society — so demands. Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule —
now of long standing and frequent application — was formulated that
ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or
7
injunction.4 Really, if at every turn investigation of a crime will be halted by a
court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet with an undue
setback.5 Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a
tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in hollow sound rather than as a
part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice.
We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a
prosecutor may not be shackled — under all circumstances. The rule is not an
invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where relief in
equity may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law
where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner;
(c) to avoid multiplicity of actions;6 (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; 7 and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied
upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."8
With the foregoing guidelines, we come to grips with the legal problems of
whether —
a. Violation of Art. VII, Section 11, Subsection (2) of the Constitution
punishable under C.A. 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of
the private enterprise affected by the violation; and
b. Violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is criminal in nature.
2. The constitutional prescription allegedly violated, Article VII, Section 11(2),
reads:
(2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices and
their assistants shall not, during their continuance engage in the
practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the
management or control of any private which in any way may be
affected by the function of their office; nor shall they directly or
indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the
Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of this
constitutional precept, i.e., a fine of not than P5,000 or imprisonment of not
more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one
of the essential ingredients thereof took place."9 This principle is
fundamental. 10 Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the
territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the
case. For, "the rule is that one cannot be held to answer for any crime
committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed." 11
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants — as such — may not
investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines of, say,
Camarines Norte. This proposition offers no area for debate. Because, said
prosecuting officers would then be overreaching the territorial limits of their
jurisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of those who, by statute,
are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully
encroach upon powers and prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province
aforesaid.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the constitutional
violation charged. His claim is that — except for his holdings in Manila's
University of the East — the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His
reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests
in corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres,
University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong,
Rizal (DMG Inc.); and that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is
"the situs of such shares."
In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that said
Fiscals may not be enjoined from conducting the inquiry aforesaid. We would
not hesitate to state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential
ingredient thereof was committed outside the boundaries of the City of
Manila, petitioner's argument should merit serious consideration. For, orderly
administration of justice so demands; multiplicity of criminal actions is to be
obviated; the long arm of the law cannot be used in an oppressive or
vindictive manner.
But let us take a look at the admitted facts of this case. Petitioner himself
concedes that he stands "charged with allegedly having shareholdings in the
Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres,
8
DMG Inc., and the University of the East, and a that the said corporations
purportedly obtained doll or allocations from the Central Bank thru the
Monetary Board during the incumbency of respondent as presiding officer
thereof." 12
Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy et al., 221 Pac. 425, 426,
thus —
Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike
other classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of
stock can only be exercised or enforced where the corporation is
organized and has its place of business and can exist only as an
incident to and connected with the corporation, and this class of
property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation itself.
By no stretch can the cited case be taken as germane to the controversial
point here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which can only be
enforced in the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are
not directed against the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares
is involved. Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential
components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact
that petitioner was head of a department — Secretary of Finance. So also,
the fact that while head of department and chairman of the Monetary
Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations aforesaid
which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual
capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the
crime or an essential ingredient there of, took place, it stands to reason to say
that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate
the violation complained of.
3. The other argument pressed upon us — that a violation of Section 13 of
Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature — furnishes no better foundation.
Section 13 of Republic Act 265, allegedly violated by petitioner, recites:
SEC. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. — Whenever
any person attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a
personal interest of any sort in the discussion or resolution of any given
matter, or any of his business associates or any of his relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity has such
an interest, said person may not participate in the discussion or
resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting during the
deliberations thereon. The minutes of the meeting shall note the
withdrawals of the member concerned.
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that for a violation of Section 13 of
the law aforesaid, Section 15 of the same statute provides "only for a civil
sanction." — "not a criminal sanction." Said Section 15 reads:
SEC. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or
officer or employee of the Central Bank who willfully violates this Act or
who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall
be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of
such violation or negligence. ...
The nonsequitur is at once apparent. For, Section 34 of the same Republic
Act 265, in terms clear and certain and free from the taint of ambiguity,
provides the penal sanction.13 thus —
SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. —
Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or any order,
instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, the
person or persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a
fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos and by imprisonment of
not more than five years. ...
But, petitioner draws attention to the fact that Sections 13 and 15 both fall
under "Article II — The Monetary Board," of Chapter 1. — "Establishment and
Organization of the Central Bank of the Philippines," whereas Section 34
comes under the heading "B. — Department Supervision and Examination" of
"Article IV. — Departments of the Central Bank." From this, petitioner puts forth
the claim that the penal provisions in Section 34 are "to be restricted to the
matters encompassed in that topic, that is, the supervision of banking
institutions."14 We are unable to join petitioner in this ipse dixit pronouncement.
And, for a number of reasons. First, because while Section 15 provides for the
civil liability "for any loss or injury suffered by the (Central) Bank as a result of
9
such violation," Section 34 prescribes the penalty for the willful violation of "this
Act," irrespective of whether the bank suffered any loss or not. Second, the
entire statute is not in piecemeal style — but as a whole. Effort be exerted "to
make every part effective, harmonious sensible." 15 And so construing we find
that the one refers to the civil liability at the same time that the other specifies
a separate criminal liability. Indeed, it could well be said that the penal
sanction in Section 34 is an "additional incentive toward obedience of the
mandates of the law." 16 One does not preclude the other. Third, We observe
that the penal provisions of Republic Act 265 were placed in three successive
sections thereof, Sections 32, 33 and 34. Section 32 penalizes any owner,
agent, manager or other officers in charge of any banking who willfully
refuses to file the required reports to have the bank's affairs examined.
Section 33 penalizes the making of a false statement to the Monetary Board.
Section 34 provides for the penalty to be imposed upon any person who
violates, among others, the provisions of said Act. This grouping of penalties
obviously was intended to present a clearer picture of the liabilities which the
Central Bank Act specifies, and thus avoid confusion. 17
All else failing, petitioner summons to his aid the Congressional Record on the
deliberations on House Bill 1704 (which later became Republic Act 265), to
wit:
Mr. Topacio Nueno. On page 6, Section 13 - prohibiting relatives from
transacting business. I should like to insert a punishment, a penal
clause. On line 11, add the following: "Violation of this section is
punishable by dismissal and fine of from five thousand to ten thousand
pesos."
The Speaker. What does the Committee say?
Mr. Roy. We cannot accept the amendment.
The Speaker. When we come to the provision with regard to the
penalties, the gentleman from Manila may propose that amendment,
in order that they may be included in the same section.
Mr. Topacio Nueno I reserve that amendment later on.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Laurel. May we be informed which of the three offenses mentioned
in Sections 32, 33, and 34 is regarded to be the most serious? I am
asking this question because I notice that the penalties imposed are
not the same. Which of the three offenses covered by the three
sections I have mentioned is the most serious?
Mr. Roy. Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be punishable are
specified. It is in Section 34 where the law is very broad. It provides:
'Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or any order,
instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, ....' I
think the court will determine the gravity of the offense. Mr. Speaker,
because there are many provisions of law; and the rules and
regulations of the Monetary Board will vary in their importance and in
the seriousness of the consequences of the violation. So we will leave
to the Court the determination of the gravity of the offense. That is why
the range of penalties provided under Section 34 is not more than ten
thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years. ...
Congressional Record, First Congress, Third Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1259, 1281.
Petitioner notes the failure of Congressman Topacio Nueno to reiterate his
proposed amendment to Section 13 by providing therein a penal clause.
Paying full respect to the congressional intent as it may be reflected in the
debates, nonetheless it seems to us that nothing in the quoted transcript of
the congressional record may be reasonably deemed as foreclosing criminal
action. That the announced amendment was not submitted, is perfectly
understandable. There was no need therefor. For, as Congressman Roy aptly
puts it (in the aforesaid record), "Under Section 32 the offenses intended to be
punishable are specified. It is under section 34 where the law is very
broad, which simply means that any person — and this includes the
Chairman of the Monetary Board — who "wilfully violates this Act," shall be
punished.
The respondent Fiscals, indeed justifiably relied or Section 34 in pursuing their
investigation for a violation Section 13. For Section 15 is not intended to write
off from the said Section 34. To do so is to sanction pointless rigidity in statutory
construction.
10
In the light of the considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under
review. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

11
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61323-24 June 29, 1984
RICHARD C. HOEY, petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Carlos Vergabera and Richard C. Hoey, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In October 1980 and November 1980, petitioner Richard C. Hoey filed
complaints with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against Raul
Leveriza, Jr., and Henry Unson, Jr., officers of Manotoc Securities, for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating fiscal found probable cause
and filed the informations in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549.
Accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration in both cases
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, after a reinvestigation of the two
(2) cases was made, corresponding Motions to Dismiss, dated June 7, 1982,
were presented in court for the reason that —
xxx xxx xxx
4. After analyzing all the allegations of the accused in the
Motion for Reconsideration and the oppositions filed thereto by
the offended party, the undersigned finds that the subject
matter in this case is a guarantee check and as such is not
covered by Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, hence the Information
filed in this case does not charge an offense and should
therefore be dismissed, a copy of the Resolution of the
undersigned dated May 31, 1982 duly approved by Provincial
Fiscal B. Jose Castillo recommending for the dismissal of this
case is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral
part hereof;
5. Although it was only accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. who filed the
instant Motion for Reconsideration since the Information filed in
this case does not charge an offense the Information should be
dismissed not only against Raul Leveriza, Jr. but also against his
co-accused Enrique Unson, Jr. (p. 24, Rollo)
Petitioner Richard C. Hoey, complainant in the two (2) Criminal Cases Nos.
44548 and 44549, opposed the Motion to Dismiss, stating among others that
—
Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson. Jr. were officers of Manotoc
Securities Inc. That Raul Leveriza, Jr. had diverted and
converted the public funds entrusted to the corporation by the
public as Manotoc Securities was engaged in the business of
soliciting money from the public to finance client accounts in
their stockmarket operations who wanted to buy or margin
viable securities. That through his position as Executive Vice-
President, he was able to divert those funds to the amount of
P10,422,573.00 to finance his own, his family's and
friends/projects and or corporations to the prejudice and
damage of the public investors such as RICHARD C. HOEY the
complainant herein.
That as part of his scheme he and accused Henry Unson
caused to issue and signed two (2) checks to the order of the
complainant herein which bounced due to a "closed account."
That IBAA Check No. HO-01293423 dated 6 November 1979 for
the amount of P59,508.00 bounced due to a closed account as
well as IBAA Check No.
HO-01293422 dated November 14, 1979 for the amount of
P82,634.20.
The signatories were Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson, Jr. for
both checks files as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549.
12
 Though the accused Raul Leveriza Jr. suddenly moved out of his
known residence at Marbella I Condominium, Roxas Blvd.,
without leaving a forwarding address in order not to be found,
his lawyers were furnished copies as to the Rejoinder- Affidavits
of the complainant during the preliminary investigation. The
accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. chose to remain unrepresented in
that proceeding
Upon termination of the preliminary investigation and after the
filing of the information, in order to delay proceedings, his
lawyers suddenly appeared and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was granted.
That there were two issues raised in the re-investigation namely:
1. Whether or not a crossed check is a check;
2. Whether or not a check issued for guarantee is punishable
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (pp. 30-30-A. Rollo)
Before the lower court could act on the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Richard C.
Hoey filed this petition with prayer that a writ of mandamus with prohibition
be issued ordering the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to prosecute the
two cases for violation of the Bouncing Check Law and to desist from
pursuing or "to withdraw the two Motions to Dismiss thereby preventing the
dismissal of the cases and causing the continuation of the trial on the merits. "
(p. 5, Rollo)
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." Thus, it is clear that
the question of instituting a criminal charge in court is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating fiscal; and, the assumption is, the
information he lodges in court is supported by facts brought about by an
inquiry made by him. On the other hand, this Court has ruled in Alberto vs. de
la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406, that "a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced
that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof. Although this power
and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at
hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an
offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be
embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a
case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not
have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced
of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the
Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor."
However, in cases where informations have already been filed in court, the
latter acquires jurisdiction over them. Otherwise stated, the jurisdiction of the
court became vested upon the filing of the information and, once acquired,
its jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case.
In the two (2) criminal cases in question, it is a fact that the informations have
already been filed in court. It should therefore dispose of them, one way or
the other, resolving all motions brought before it including the Motions to
Dismiss, dated June 7, 1982, filed by the Fiscal, or deciding the cases on the
merit. The prosecuting fiscal has no more control over said cases, the same
having been transferred to the court. We have a situation where, akin to the
pronouncement made by the present Chief Justice in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42
SCRA 452, whenever a formal complaint is presented in court against an
individual, the court steps in and takes control thereof until the same is finally
disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.
Escolin and Aquino, JJ., took no part.
13
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO
TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit
Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan.
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc.
Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quimbo for petitioners Librado
Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido.
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-
Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private
prosecutors.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the
annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-
L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying
petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from
hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying
petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental
Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of
the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters,
Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa,
Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge
to desist from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was
required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection
therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent
from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition
was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and
thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People
of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor
General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are
bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his
resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the
evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge
"appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition
addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment"
and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the case should he
remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with
instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the
right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted"
and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the
aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by
another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced such additional
evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this
Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in
justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected
to the remand of this case.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit
Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the
ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings
before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any
paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
14
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before
this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in
contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to
intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand
inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present
proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and
take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution
in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1,
1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the
Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate
means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or
in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State
should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et
al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an
absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the
pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence,
to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to
all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to
the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that
the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and
responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the
offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil
action or reserves to institute it separately.5 Thus, "an offended party may
intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of
offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the
offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party
waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after
the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon
the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And
in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a
criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and
control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz,
supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by
section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section
4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene,
they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to
those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right
which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in
the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the
criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As
explained in People v. Orais: 11
... the position occupied by the offended party is
subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal
because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to
represent the public prosecution, or the People of
the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of
offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as
15
 it is discretionary with him to institute and
prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty
to commence it or not, depending upon whether
or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, except when the case is
pending in the Court of First Instance, the
continuation of the offended party's intervention
depends upon the continuation of the
proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal
desists from pressing the charge or asks the
competent Court of first Instance in which the
case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said
court grants the petition, the intervention of the
person injured by the commission of the offense
ceases by virtue of the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as
the offended party is not entitled to represent the
People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution
of a public offense, or to control the proceeding
once it is commenced, and as his right to
intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's
right of control, it cannot be stated that an order
of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor
fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his
right to appeal from an order overruling a
complaint or information, which right belongs
exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the
provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58.
To permit a person injured by the commission of
an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a
criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance
upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be
tantamount to giving said offended party of the
direction and control of a criminal proceeding in
violation of the provisions of the above-cited
section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the
Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of
Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478,
"Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General",
provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It
shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is the party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before
any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or
proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to
represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private
prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to
take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal
16
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the
matter.
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the
remand of the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification.
Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the
resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free
from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated:
In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of
respondent judge, petitioners assert that:
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was
illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the
decision of the two cases against petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in
progress, respondent judge received, through one of his court
stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki
Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims Feliciano
and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with
respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of
the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a
newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly
contained "something else inside";
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases
based on the memorandum of the prosecution which was
literally copied in said decision although with some corrections;
and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal,
respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in
the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty
of double life sentence for the double murder charge against
the petitioners to the death penalty.
The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an
affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano
Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban
City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in such
affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the
instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that
it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in
the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a
copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court
stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of
respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs.
Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
(1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts
alleged as constituting the grounds for disqualifying the
respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed.
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in
support or in denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge,
we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National
Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at this
time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this
Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges.
An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps
precede the making of categorical conclusions. But we are
persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of
respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions
for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice
(See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature
of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that
respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to the oft-
reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even
the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J.,
Concurring opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ...
17
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws
uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or
the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice
of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always
been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of
mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential
manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be obvious, therefore, that while judges
should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe
and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial

service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified
from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already
become moot.

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to
the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion
for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the
evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ., concur.

18
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO REGALA y robbery with rape transpired at Consuelo's house.
ABRIOL, Accused-Appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th
Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by
2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows:
That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay
Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon
persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said
Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob
and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth
P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo Arevalo in the
total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the
granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or
intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the
incident. He was identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her
grandmother.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal
Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim;
Nerissa Tagala the rape-victim, 17 years old, a third year high school student;
and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the
The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay
Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her
grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando
Regala and his two other companions entered the former's house. (pp. 6-7,
TSN, August 26, 1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by
removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room of
Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after
the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his
companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in
bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant and
his two companions counted the money they took from the "aparador." (pp.
9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of
ring valued at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN,
August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic
of Aroroy, Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report
presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown
that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00 o'clock and 7:00
o'clock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the
victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September
11, 1995, he was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay
Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning
19
business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified
and corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his
house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay Bangon.
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive
identification of the accused. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando
Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the victim Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and
value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa Tagala the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the cost. 3
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that:
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4
which alleged errors were discussedintly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged.
He claims that the complaining witness could not have positively identified
him as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the incident which
took place at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to
identify accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by Nerissa, and
made contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-
appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that
accused-appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-
legal officer, Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either
voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
The appellee insists that appellant's lame defense of alibi cannot stand
against the positive identification made by the victim, and avers that the
victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed, was
motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor General
also recommends an additional award of compensatory damages of
P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime.
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was
sleeping with her grandmother in the latter's house when the accused-
appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the
house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and
then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took of her panty and her
shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse
("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the
floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could
not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two
companions of the accused-appellant entered the room as she was being
raped. Two rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko"
and the other "Citizen") and money was taken by the accused-appellant and
his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant
counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to
the kitchen, still hogtied, and rape again, 5 On cross-examination, Nerissa
stated that although there was no electricity, and the light in the house was
already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time
Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the
flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was "some reflection" on the
face of Regala. 6 She remembered the face of Regala because of an earring
on his left ear 7 which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up. 8
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her
granddaughter. Nerissa Regala entered the house with two companions,
hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual
intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from
her aparador, and got a stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued
20
at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala because of his earring on his
left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She
was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a
piece of cloth by
Regala. On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was
9 appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of
able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the mask
he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his flat
top hair cut. 10
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the
evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala as
the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of robbery
accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala
positively identified Armando Regala because at the time he was counting
the money on her bed, the other companion of the accused beamed the
flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of
Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered
the house, they removed their masks later. 11
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight
may, in proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the
credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious. 12
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the
contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala
removed his mask "before" 13 or "after" 14 she and Nerissa were hogtied
exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant.
The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact
that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a
flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there
was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo
remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time
of the police line-up inside the police station.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday's testimony does not support the contention of
accused-appellant that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances
of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings point to the fact
that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not prove
that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that
there was suggested evidence of penetration as shown by the two
lacerations at 4 o'clock and at 7 o'clock which were fresh wounds. That the
act was involuntary was clearly established by the facts that Nerissa was
hogtied when she was sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by
the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate
accused-appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by
this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a
victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. 15
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was
already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now
provides, under paragraph 1 thereof:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,
or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the
robbery. There are cases 16 holding that the additional rapes committed on
the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.
Martinez, 17 accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who
remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery
with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of
death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances,
namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did
not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he
special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed
by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on
that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."
There are likewise cases 18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed
could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs.
Candelario 19 where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who robbed the
victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People
21
vs. Obtinalia, 20 ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery SO ORDERED.
with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several rapes
committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account
raising the penalty to death."

It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the
same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific
paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide
on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation"
where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one
rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. 21 However,
the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor
of the offender 22 and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not
clearly made so by the statute. 23

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-

appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.

As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the

Solicitor General that compensatory damages should be awarded in the
amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an award of civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended
party in
rape. Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages
24

to the victim since it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with
and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per se an
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 25

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an
additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

22
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95893. July 6, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO PEREZ, and LUIS
MELENDRES, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ruperto C. Gonzaga for accused Leo Perez.
Pedro C. Buhion for accused Luis Melendrez.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; EVALUATION OF THE
TRIAL COURT IS GIVEN MUCH WEIGHT; REASON. — We have said often
enough that when it comes to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
much weight must be given to the conclusions of the trial court. The reason is
its direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand
and to detect those tell-tale signs in their testimonies that attest the truth or
expose the lie. In the case at bar, the trial court saw fit to believe Marlene
rather than the defendants, observing that she would not have undergone
such "tribulations" if she were not really telling the truth. We accept its
assessment that the "complainant’s version is more consistent with the truth.
Her testimony is clear and free from serious contradiction; her sincerity and
candor likewise free from contradiction." The Court is convinced that when
the three men came upon the naked Marlene, who apparently had just
been violated, their own lusts were aroused. Given the defenselessness of the
girl and the secluded place, they saw an opportunity to ravish her also,
thinking cynically that another slice or two would not much matter to the cut
loaf. Thus persuaded, they carried out their wicked plan, one after another
and each assisting the others, in the defilement of the girl.
2. ID.; AS BETWEEN THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE TESTIMONY IN COURT ON THE SAME
SUBJECT, IT IS THE TESTIMONY THAT SHOULD PREVAIL. — It is true that she made
no mention of having been raped by the defendants in the affidavit she
executed on June 1, 1987, and presented by Perez as his Exhibit 1.
Nevertheless, we hold that as between that affidavit and her testimony in
court on the same subject, it is the testimony that should prevail. The rationale
of this ruling is explained in People v. Andaya, thus: The contradictions, if any,
may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose the
whole facts, and will oftentimes and without design, incorrectly describe,
without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated, and
being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of
suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable
to recall the corrected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction
of the first suggestions of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
that belongs to the subject.
3. ID.; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN NARRATION DO NOT DETRACT FROM ITS
ESSENTIAL VERACITY; DELAY IN REPORTING THE INCIDENT; EASILY EXPLAINED. —
The minor inconsistencies in Marlene’s narration do not detract from its
essential veracity. We have said often enough that total recall of an incident
is not expected of a witness, or even possible, especially if it is the victim
himself who is testifying. The traumatic effect of the successive rapes on
Marlene evidently caused not a little confusion in her mind and prevented
her from recollecting every single detail of her harrowing experience. Her
delay in reporting the incident — for only 3 days — is easily explained. She
was under threat of death. And it was not unnatural that she did not tell Nelly
23
Perez that her brother had raped her, as she was in the rapist’s own house
and surrounded by his family.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SUCCESSIVE
RAPES PROVE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY. — The circumstances of the
successive rapes by the defendants prove that there was a conspiracy
among them. A common plan, concerted action, and cooperation among
the three attended the ravishment of the helpless victim. As one raped the
woman, the others restrained her legs or stood guard and watched. The act
of one was the act of the others, who were therefore equally guilty with him.
However, the third accused not having been tried and found guilty, the
conspiracy must apply only to Perez and Melendres with respect to the rapes
they each committed.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The woman was raped five times in one night, and by two sets of rapists. After
the first two men had raped her, she sought the help of three other men who
had appeared on the scene. They also raped her.
This was the finding in general of the trial court on the basis of the evidence
of the prosecution against the herein appellants. (Their co-accused, Leo
Amolong, has not been tried and remains at large.)
The information against them reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That in the evening of May 27, 1987, in the municipality of Nabunturan,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, by means of force and intimidation, using a
handgun and a hunting knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take turns, one after the other, in having carnal knowledge of
Marlene Jaictin.
Marlene Jaictin was 20 years old when the incident happened.
She testified that on May 27, 1987, at about seven o’clock in the evening, she
and her boyfriend, Nestor Sarpamones, were on their way to her house when
they were confronted by three men near the Nabunturan Central Elementary
School. One of them took Nestor away while the other two stayed with her.
They took her to the grandstand, then to the garden, where they boxed and
kicked her and then threw her to the ground. Then they took turns in raping
her. One of the men wanted to kill her, but the other dissuaded him. 1
It was at this point that the three other men came, and she cried out to them
to save her. The men who had raped her fled. Two of the three men chased
them but they escaped. The third man who stayed behind was Luis
Melendres. He pointed a knife at Marlene and then dragged her to the oval
ground, where he made her lie down. His two companions came back then
and, seeing what was afoot, immediately concurred in his plan. 2
The first of the three to rape her was Melendres, who forced himself on her
while Perez held her legs. Perez followed suit, with Melendres assisting this
time. Amolong stood guard and watched the outrage to the helpless
24
woman. Then he himself pulled her to the back of the grandstand and raped
her there. 3
After a lengthy discussion of the evidence, Judge Eugenio R. Valles of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao disposed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Their lust satisfied, the three men took Marlene to the house of Perez, where
she stayed the night. The following morning, they took her to the house of her
employer, threatening her with death if she spoke about the incident. Two
PREMISED ON ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding both
days later, the three men again saw her and told her that her sweetheart
accused Luis Melendres and Leo Perez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Nestor was already dead. They repeated their threat and warned her to
the crime of RAPE, the Court hereby imposes on each one of them, TWO (2)
keep quiet. 4
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by
law.

She said she knew Leo Amolong by face and name. 5 She knew the other
two because she frequently saw them at the store where she was working
Further, both accused are hereby condemned to pay the complainant,
and came to know later that their names were Leo Perez and Luis Melendres.
Marlene Jaictin, jointly and severally the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
6 She said she was able to recognize them on the night in question because
(P75,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and another Twenty-Five Thousand
there was an electric light in the building nearby and the moon was bright. 7
(P25,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages.

Despite the threat, she decided to report the incident to the police three
Let alias warrant of arrest issue for the apprehension of the remaining
days later and submitted to a medical examination. She was found with inter
alia "contusions and abrasions . . . on the upper and lower extremities, accused, Leo Amolong. Meanwhile, pending his arrest, send the records of
this case to the archives.
buttocks and anterior cervical region (neck)" and "laceration of the vulvar
mucous membrane." 8

In their separate briefs, the appellants ask for reversal of their conviction on
the ground that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Both Perez and Melendres denied the charge. They claimed that as members
Melendres faults the trial court for disregarding his defense and giving
of a rover patrol, they went out that night in search of certain suspected
credence to Marlene’s testimony, especially as it is flawed by Exhibit 1. Perez
robbers and chanced upon Marlene and the two men who had apparently
just raped her. They ran after the men but failed to catch them. Thereafter, also focuses on Exhibit 1 and his sister’s testimony and claims no conspiracy
had been proved between him and the other defendants.
they took the girl to Perez’s house, where she spent the night with his sister.
The following morning they took her to her employer’s house. 9 Nelly Perez
testified to corroborate her brother. 10

25
We have said often enough that when it comes to the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, much weight must be given to the conclusions of the
trial court. The reason is its direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand and to detect those tell-tale signs in their testimonies
that attest the truth or expose the lie.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In the case at bar, the trial court saw fit to believe Marlene rather than the
defendants, observing that she would not have undergone such "tribulations"
if she were not really telling the truth. We accept its assessment that the
"complainant’s version is more consistent with the truth. Her testimony is clear
and free from serious contradiction; her sincerity and candor likewise free
from contradiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is true that she made no mention of having been raped by the defendants
in the affidavit she executed on June 1, 1987, and presented by Perez as his
Exhibit 1. Nevertheless, we hold that as between that affidavit and her
testimony in court on the same subject, it is the testimony that should prevail.
The rationale of this ruling is explained in People v. Andaya, 11
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The contradictions, if any, may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will
not always disclose the whole facts, and will oftentimes and without design,
incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the
occurrences narrated, and being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes
from the want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the corrected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.
The minor inconsistencies in Marlene’s narration do not detract from its
essential veracity. We have said often enough that total recall of an incident
is not expected of a witness, or even possible, especially if it is the victim
himself who is testifying. The traumatic effect of the successive rapes on
Marlene evidently caused not a little confusion in her mind and prevented
her from recollecting every single detail of her harrowing experience.
Her delay in reporting the incident — for only 3 days — is easily explained. She
was under threat of death. And it was not unnatural that she did not tell Nelly
Perez that her brother had raped her, as she was in the rapist’s own house
and surrounded by his family.
Marlene’s supposed motive in accusing the defendants, viz, that she was
prodded by Nestor’s parents on pain of being charged with his death, is also
not acceptable. If she had not really been abused by the defendants, she
would not have exposed herself to the stigma of a raped maiden and
implicated persons she hardly knew in a charge that could forfeit their liberty
for life.
In light of the evidence for the prosecution, the defense must fail for lack of
credibility. The bare denials of the appellants are not convincing. Neither is
the testimony of Nelly Perez, who was obviously manifesting her loyalty to her
brother rather than the truth.
The Court is convinced that when the three men came upon the naked
Marlene, who apparently had just been violated, their own lusts were
aroused. Given the defenselessness of the girl and the secluded place, they
saw an opportunity to ravish her also, thinking cynically that another slice or
two would not much matter to the cut loaf. Thus persuaded, they carried out
26
their wicked plan, one after another and each assisting the others, in the
defilement of the girl.
The circumstances of the successive rapes by the defendants prove that
there was a conspiracy among them. A common plan, concerted action,
and cooperation among the three attended the ravishment of the helpless
victim. As one raped the woman, the others restrained her legs or stood
guard and watched. The act of one was the act of the others, who were
therefore equally guilty with him.
However, the third accused not having been tried and found guilty, the
conspiracy must apply only to Perez and Melendres with respect to the rapes
they each committed.
Rape is an inherently detestable crime, but it became even viler in the case
at bar because of the defendants’ callousness to the helpless woman’s
plaintive cry for assistance. They did not help her; they attacked her instead.
Even as she was already agonizing over the first two rapes, they heartlessly
ignored her despair and instead deepened it further by imposing their own
animal lusts upon her. This was not mere libido. It was a shameless act of
lechery that degraded them to the level of the beast.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
WHEREFORE, the appeals are DISMISSED and the challenged decision of the
trial court is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award for moral
damages is changed to P50,000.00 for each of the two rapes, and the award
for exemplary damages is disallowed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-38392. December 29, 1975.]
CRISANTO MATILDE, JR. Y CRUZ, Petitioner, v. HON. RAMON B. JABSON, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Prudencio Cruz for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T .
Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C . Guerrero for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In three criminal cases, respondent court imposed upon petitioner, for the
crime of simple theft, the penalty prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133,
instead of that imposed by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal
Code. The information charged that petitioner and his co-accused, being
then laborers, conspired and confederated with, and mutually aided one
another, with intent of gain and without knowledge and consent of their
employer, in stealing the articles mentioned therein belonging to their
employer. Although the preamble of said informations stated that petitioner
was charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree
No. 133," nowhere was it alleged in the body of said information that the
articles stolen were materials or products which petitioner was "working on, or
using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant, as provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 133.
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment,
and directed that another one be rendered. It held that since the objective
of Presidential Decree No. 133 is to place a strong deterrent on workers from
sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, it
is essential, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the heavier
penalty prescribed by said Decree, that the information should aver that the
27
articles stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on
or using or producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the
information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," does not suffice for the purpose
envisioned by the constitutional guarantee that the accused should be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION;
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION. — The
Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To give
substance to this constitutional guarantee, Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be stated in an ordinary and concise language so as (a) to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged; and (b) to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
The statement need not necessarily be in the language of the statute. What is
important is that the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the
offense charged; or stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide
the matter according to law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT. — The main purpose of this
requirement is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to be innocent and has, therefore, no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense with which he is charged.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF A HIGHER OFFENSE THAN
THAT WHICH IS CHARGED IN COMPLAINT. — Concommitant with the rule that
an accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him is the rule that an accused person cannot be convicted of a
higher offense than that with which he is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be
convicted in the courts of any offense unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried or necessarily included therein. He has a right
to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged
before he is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THEFT; PURPOSE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 133. — The clear
import of Presidential Decree No. 133 on the basis of its recitals is to eradicate
"graft and corruption in society, and promote the economic and social
welfare of the people" by placing a strong deterrent on workers and laborers
from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they were
employed, through the imposition of heavier penalties for the theft of "any
material, spare part, product, or article that he is working on, using or
producing." Hence, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the
heavier penalty prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 133, it is essential and
necessary to aver in the body of the information that the articles stolen were
materials or products which the accused was "working on, using or
producing." And a statement in the preamble of the information that the
accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 133," is insufficient for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional
guarantee that the accused should be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, considering that it is well-settled that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital in the complaint or information.
28
5. CRIMINAL LAW; THEFT; PENALTY FOR SIMPLE THEFT. — The penalty prescribed
by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code for simple theft is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
Where there is one mitigating circumstance without an aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the aforesaid penalty in its minimum period should
be imposed, namely, six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
Certiorari to nullify the judgment of respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXVI, in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554, imposing upon the
accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, for the crime of simple theft, the penalty
prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133 1 instead of that imposed by Article
309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. 2
On December 14, 1973, an Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed three (3)
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554 against Crisanto
Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, Patricio Guiruela y Luna, Ricardo Abener y San Pascual,
Edgardo Cape y Atienza, Servando Calpo y Caballero, and Ireneo Belver y
Bale.
Except for the dates of commission and the amounts involved, the aforesaid
three (3) informations uniformly stated that said accused were charged with
the crime of qualified theft, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133,
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then laborers working at
the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises, conspiring and confederating
together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still at large, all of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of
confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the said firm, its
President and General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to
wit: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Criminal Case No. 9552, the articles allegedly stolen consisted of ten (10)
boxes of Malathion E-57 Insecticide, and eight (8) boxes of Endrin Insecticide,
with a total value of P9,414.00, belonging to the Markes Agro-Chemical
Enterprises.
Criminal Case No. 9553 involved the qualified theft of thirteen (13) boxes of
Malathion Insecticide, valued at P1,802.00, while that of Criminal Case No.
9554 involved five (5) boxes of Susathion Insecticide, valued at P1,116.00, all
belonging to the same company.
It appears that the afore-mentioned informations were amended twice —
the first, on the value of the article involved in Criminal Case No. 9552, and
the second, on the nature and character of the offense, changing it from
"qualified theft" to "simple theft" by deleting therefrom the phrase "with grave
abuse of confidence." In view of said amendments, petitioner withdrew his
previous plea of not guilty to the afore-mentioned amended informations.
29
On February 18, 1974, respondent court promulgated its judgment,
convicting the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When these cases were called for hearing this morning, Trial Fiscal Francisco
C. Rodriguez, Jr., for the reasons cited by him, moved for the amendment of
the information from Qualified Theft to Simple Theft and deleting from the
body of the Information the phrase "Grave abuse of confidence", which
Motion was granted by the Court.
"Accordingly, Accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, thru counsel, Atty.
Prudencio Cruz, moved for the withdrawal of his former plea of not guilty in
each of the aforesaid cases and to substitute the same with a plea of guilty in
the three cases, which was granted by the Court.
"Upon re-arraignment, Accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr., assisted by same
counsel, voluntarily and spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime of Simple
Theft alleged in each of the three Amended Informations.
"WHEREFORE, the Court renders Judgment as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Crim. Case No. 9552 — The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Theft. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance but considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in
his favor, in relation with Presidential Decree No. 133, the Court hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1I) DAY of Prision Correccional as minimum to SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum, without any
pronouncement as to civil liability it appearing that the articles subject matter
of the said case were recovered and to pay the costs.
"Crim. Case. 9553 — The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Theft. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance but considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in
his favor, in relation with Presidential Decree No. 133, the Court hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P2,808.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"Crim. Case No. 9554 — The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Theft. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance but considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in
his favor, in relation with Presidential Decree No. 133, the Court hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P2,226.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited
with the preventive imprisonment he has already suffered in accordance with
law.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner sought from the court a quo a reconsideration of its judgment,
contending that in the absence of any allegation in the body of the
30
information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 133, he cannot be convicted and
penalized under the aforesaid decree. This was, however, denied by said
court on March 5, 1974, hence, petitioner instituted the present petition.
Raised in issue by the petitioner is — whether on the basis of the averments of
the afore-mentioned informations, the respondent court can validly impose
upon petitioner the penalty prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 133.
The Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3 To
give substance to this constitutional guarantee, Section 8 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court requires that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in an ordinary and concise language
so as (a) to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged; and (b) to enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. The rule states that the statement need not necessarily be
in the language of the statute. What is important is that the crime is described
in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. In other words, the crime is
stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately
know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law.
4 Inasmuch as "not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at
stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised
of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible
surprises which may be detrimental to their rights and interests." 5 The main
purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to be innocent and has, therefore, no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense with which he is charged.
6 As aptly explained by Justice Fernando in People v. Mencias: 7
"2. Nor was the lower court any more justified in quashing the five informations
on the ostensible ground that private respondents had been denied the
constitutional right ‘to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. . .’ Here again its process of ratiocination is difficult to
follow. Certainly it ought to have been aware that all that this constitutional
right signifies is that an accused should be given the necessary data as to
why he is being proceeded against. He should not be left in the unenviable
state of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution. As was so
aptly pointed out in the same sponsorship speech of Delegate Laurel: ‘It is the
right of a person accused of crime to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He should know for what cause and of what crime
he is being charged. The Petition of Rights denounced the former practice in
England of imprisoning freeman by the King’s special command, without any
charge.’ The act or conduct imputed to him must be described with sufficient
particularity so that he would be in a position to defend himself properly. If it
were not so, then there is an element of unfairness. Due process is in fact
denied him.. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Concommitant with the foregoing is the rule "that an accused person cannot
be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he is charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive
and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be
convicted in the Courts of these Islands of any offense, unless it is charged in
the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with
which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher
offense than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried would be an authorized denial of that right." 8
The informations in these cases charge the accused simply with the crime of
theft. Thus, while alleging that the accused were laborers working in the
Markers Agro-Chemical Enterprises, these informations charge them with
having conspired and confederated with one Renato Matuto, and having
mutually aided one another, with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of said Company, in taking, stealing and carrying away the
articles mentioned therein belonging to said Company. Nowhere is is alleged
in the body of the afore-mentioned informations that the articles stolen were
materials or products which the accused-petitioner was "working on or using
or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant. The clear import of
Presidential Decree No. 133 on the basis of its recitals is to eradicate "graft
31
and corruption in society, and promote the economic and social welfare of
the people" by placing a strong deterrent on workers and laborers from
sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed,
through the imposition of heavier penalties for the theft of "any material,
spare part, product, or article that he is working on, using or producing." It is
obvious that the averment of those facts in the body of the complaint or
information is essential and necessary to qualify the offense and to justify the
imposition of the heavier penalty prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 133. It
is true that in the preamble of the aforesaid informations, the petitioner is
charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No.
133." This is, however, insufficient for the purpose envisioned by the afore-
mentioned constitutional guarantee, considering that it is well-settled that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 9

The appropriate penalty that should have been imposed is that prescribed
by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for
the "penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos." Considering the plea of guilty, the court a quo should have
imposed the aforesaid penalty in its minimum period (SIX [6] MONTHS and
ONE [1] DAY to ONE [1] YEAR, EIGHT [8] MONTHS and TWENTY [20] DAYS) for
each of the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases.

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted and the questioned judgment

should be, as it is hereby set aside and another one should be rendered in
accordance with the foregoing. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

32
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT
CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO
PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO
PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and
EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan
A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed
by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the
order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent
motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First
Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such
transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on
barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire
to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in
barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential
houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of
various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state
prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him,
on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two
informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson)
charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82
other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
burn or cause to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said
houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed
informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition,
Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished
bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge
Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28
and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued
Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San
Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July
1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued
Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest
of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer
of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the
Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the
circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking
transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio
City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits.
The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the
respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that
33
Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more
expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to
subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at
the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside
the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First
Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-
V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the
fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below,
but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the
Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified
any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez
from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the
Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific
cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of
executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the
Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of
their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the
accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result
in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic
Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates
an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit
courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such
intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in
Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the
same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit
Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should
be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal.
The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by
Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely
authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V
(People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of
imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge
Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive
and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated
neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department
Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory
respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the
prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should
be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District
because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the
prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where
they felt their lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by the
affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their
fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their
willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they
can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus
expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is
taken of the circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the
burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of
Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of
the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential
family in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the
first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses
are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have
reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not
shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full
34
security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if
armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no
guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant
witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H)
show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have
been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21 were
solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent
Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by
Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo
(Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses,
who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the
investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring
the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially
inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is
to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be
made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands
that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction
where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan,
26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a
Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined
territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one
offense committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110,
Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149,
150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was
"not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court
from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause
him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that
of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should
have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience
lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the
exigencies of truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to
trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they
know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very
purpose for which courts have been established. Since the rigorous
application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result
here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the
case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the
general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional
exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor
of the law would become the highest injustice — "summum jus, summa in
juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site
where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know
would be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction. Because
regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will
be always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being
given full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of
the charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither
challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind
now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of
justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court
and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13),
and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts
"can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain
every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring
the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
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preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early
recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the
eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord
Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759,
said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back as it can be
traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and
all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court,
Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants
and prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper county,
then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the
proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an indifferent
county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been
exercised by this court from a very early period. We have
reported cases, where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic
language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench
in England independently of any practice of our own court ...
The general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be
the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised
through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed
to the State Supreme Courts of the American Union.1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs.
Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the
place of holding trials —
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long
before the independence of this country; and from that time
forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of
England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of very
many if not all of our states, either by force of express statute or
the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the
same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts
admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern
with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901,
by the Philippine Commission, then composed by a majority of able
American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the
common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine
Reports, numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has
been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common
law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the
legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since they
passed under American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after
the establishment of Civil Government under American
sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No.
136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the
Philippine Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the then
existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided
therein. It sets out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties,
privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges. The
majority of the members of the body which enacted it were
able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed, and
indeed its very language and terminology would be
unintelligible without some knowledge of the judicial systems of
England and the United States. Its manifest purpose and object
was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and
traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system
modeled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial
systems of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore,
that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the
essential principles and settled doctrines on which the new
system rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law
organizing the new system.
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While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that
the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and
particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by
the English and American courts under their common law heritage to transfer
the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice,
by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from
liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts
established by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to
transfer the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is
equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis,
the words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the
doctrine is based are not less forceful and imperative in these
Islands than in the countries from which the new judicial system
was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned ...
leaves no room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an
incident to the new judicial system would materially impair its
usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it
was established. (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement,
by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power
discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal
Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative
recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere
within their respective districts: Provided, however, that cases
shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of
the offense was committed. And provided further, that when
the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the
Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province
within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing
of the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in
which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the
informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a
matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice
can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in
the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty
reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring
their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to
another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed
by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of
cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in
Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the
advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the
defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the
adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if
resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion that the same
was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the
Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court
in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that
which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the
most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to
transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the
parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to
restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but
to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which
can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the
exercise of the court's power by technicalities that part of its
authority effective for justice between the parties is many times
in inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
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 procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means
by which the powers of the court are made effective in just
judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on
that of the other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523,
529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not,
and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified
and individual cases;
but only directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave
abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to
transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court
within the district; and said respondent Court is accordingly
directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases
aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District for hearing of the evidence for the prosecution either in
Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available
date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court
may determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at
the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial
District, in the same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as
their present bail bonds, which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all
within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.

(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by
the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power
and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a
Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within
the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial
trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the
transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, in the interest of truth and justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs

of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20
July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative
Order No. 221 of the Department of Justice is not mandatory,

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