EMINENT DOMAIN (Summarized)

EMINENT DOMAIN
I. Definition
The right of a nation or sovereign state to take or authorize the taking of private property for public use, without the
owner's consent, subject to payment of just compensation.
It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. (Moday v. Court of Appeals)
II. Limitations
Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Moday vs. Court of Appeals
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and
due process of law must be observed
Classification: Public
III. Who Exercises the Power?
Moday v. Court of Appeals

Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities.
C00 CASE TITLE: Moday v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One
(1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities."
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution with the comment, “expropriation is

unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center.”
Municipality of Bunawan, public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain
against petitioner Percival Moday
Despite Moday’s opposition, RTC granted granted respondent municipality’s motion to take
possession of the land since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves
it effective.
Case was also dismissed when elevated to the CA, affirming the RTC and also held that public
purpose for the expropriation is clear
ISSUE/S: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in the case of “Percival Moday, et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al.” (CA G.R. SP No.
26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is
LIFTED.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; Nature of Eminent Domain; Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan
or the Mayor to issue.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which
does not render said resolution null and void.
The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to
declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu
then obtaining, the Court’s pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, where we cited significant early
jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. “The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.’ Absolutely no other ground
is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance,
or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the
scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.”
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan is without authority to disapprove a municipal resolution authorizing

the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings since a municipality has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain.—The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right
of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding
and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners’ property.
The necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character—government
may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.—The limitations on the power of
eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be
observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity
of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of
exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously
choose what private property should be taken.
IV. Extent of Judicial Review
Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in
scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the
affected landowners
C01 CASE TITLE: Spouses Yusay v. CA
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land, half of it used as their residence, and the rest they rented out
to nine other families.
In 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of
1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less
privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the
annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force
and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to
initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the
property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner may avail of petition of prohibition as a remedy
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618. Costs
to be paid by the petitioners.
RULING:
Judicial Review; Eminent Domain; Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain,
the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners; Only when the
landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.—Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of
the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to
secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition
comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended
for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State.
Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes
limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be
paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the
taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the
remedy of prohibition become available.
V. In relation to Police Power
The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community
C02 CASE TITLE: Fernando v. St Scholastica’s College
FACTS:
St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) owns four (4) parcels of land located in Marikina Heights. Located
within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation
house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other... improvements.
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled
"Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, provides:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows: 1.
Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter
shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located
between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and
educational and religious institutions.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the City
Government of Marikina.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192,
Series of 1994, as amended, on the petitioners’ property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila. No pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
Police Power; Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people.— The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause, which has two
branches. “The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the
police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.”
Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the substantive requirements.—White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009),
discusses the test of a valid ordinance: The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
Rational Relationship Test; Strict Scrutiny Test; To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as
the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court―the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny
test.—To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court―the
rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances
are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.—Regarding
the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to
preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be
unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their
property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
VI. Objects of Expropriation
Any property necessary for public use or purpose.
Republic v. PLDT
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose
only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.
It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.
The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not
much different.
In -either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII,
of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in
the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
C03 CASE TITLE: Republic v. PLDT
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service
corporation holding a legislative franchise to operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the
Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and
between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries.
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic
station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the
PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
to enable government offices to call private parties.
The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines
owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. 10 Through
these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT
subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau
would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents.
Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the
Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for
the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said
violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.
When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at
midnight on 12 April 1958. 1The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the
rest of the world, except the United States
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in
its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those
severed
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in
so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a
compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of
the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of
origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
RULING:
Constitutional law; Sovereign power of eminent domain; Republic of the Philippines may require
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT; Right of way; State may require a public utility to render services in the general interest; Case
at bar.—The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit 111terconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results. in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection
between both telephone systems is not much different. In -either case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the
interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there
is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
Same; Bureau of Telecommunications; Purpose of its creation; Its functions and powers; Power to
resort to condemnation proceedings.—The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of
Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications
throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms
and conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of
all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings
where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously
hampering the operations of said Bureau.
The Bureau of Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government
offices "to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, -economy and efficiency in its
operation" (Section 1, Republic Act No. 51) and the determination of state-policy is not vested in the
Commission (Utilities Com. v. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 111 574; 124 N. E. 373).
Same; Public Service Commission; Scope of authority; Devoid of authority to pass upon actions for
the taking of private property under eminent domain.—The Public Service Commission, under the law,
has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent
domain. Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company is a public utility corporation whose
franchise, equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public
Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public
service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National Government, hence
exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.
Civil law; Estoppel; Inapplicability of estoppel against the Government; Erroneous enforcement of
law does not block subsequent correction.—Even if in its original prospectuses the officials of the Bureau
of Telecommunications had stated the service would be limited to government offices, such limitation could
not block future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the
officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in -services that are authorized by law. It is a
well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block
subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that
the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents Republic vs. Phil. Long
Distance Telephone Co., 26 SCRA 620, No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
VII. Just Compensation meaning
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell
it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the
word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
C04 CASE TITLE: Nia vs Rural Bank GR No. 185124, January 25, 2012 Sereno, J.:
FACTS:
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation
Project, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three
(3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters.
NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as
registered owners of Lot No. 3039.
NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties, after
depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P19,246.58 representing the provisional value
thereof.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim. They
alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a
sovereign political entity; that NIA's valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the
improvements on the land that should have placed its value at P5 million; and that NIA never negotiated
with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable
damages to their properties valued at P250,000.
The lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the
determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of the expropriation proceedings.
The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated should be P65 per
square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
As regards the improvement on the properties, the report recommended the following compensation:
(a.) P200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old; (b.) P150 for each gmelina tree that are
more than one (1) year old; (c.) P164 for each coco tree; (d.) P270 for each banana clump.
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the RTC to the
CA, the CA affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee tasked to determine
the fair market value of the properties and improvements for the purpose of arriving at the just
compensation, properly performed its function.
Aggrieved by the appellate court's Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming the trial court’s finding of just
compensation of the land and the improvements thereon based on the report of the commissioners.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners of the expropriated properties and
deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of
Lot No. 3080. No pronouncements as to cost
RULING:
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; The constitutional limitation of “just compensation”

is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or
the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government.—In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined
as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
The “just”ness of the compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases
for fixing the value of the condemned property.—In National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, 638
SCRA 660 (2010), this Court emphasized that the “just”-ness of the compensation could only be attained by
using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. The reliable and
actual data we referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax
declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR.
In disregarding the Committee Report assailed by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled
thus: It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable
basis. First, the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots were mere estimates and
unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned,
tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential
dwellings and commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the
community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondent’s property. Finally, the
market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.
As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any
documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. The trial court adopted
the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the
submission of the alleged “market sales data” and “price listings.”
Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September
10, 1999 or more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Clearly, the
recommended just compensation in the commissioners’ report is unacceptable.
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the
expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for
what the owner actually loses.—We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of
the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the
excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of
expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just
compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses.
Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
Expropriation; Eminent Domain; Eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.—It
should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds. In this kind of
proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the just compensation to be
awarded to the owner of the expropriated property. Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on
the Rural Bank of Kabacan’s mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the expropriation
proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors’ claim of entitlement to that payment.
VIII. Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estate and Municipal Property
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Art XII Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government.
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Art XIII Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Art XIII Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall
also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners.
City of Baguio vs. NAWASA
WATERWORKS SYSTEMS PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;

PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION NECESSARY.—The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any
public road, park, street or other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the
public but is a property owned by the city in its proprietary character. Being patrimonial property of a municipal
corporation, waterworks cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation.
Zamboanga City vs. Zamboanga Del Norte
Republic Act 3039; Effect on patrimonial project.—Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga
del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. Moreover, the fact that they are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature.
C05 CASE TITLE: City of Baguio v. NAWASA
FACTS:
On April 25, 1956 Plaintiff City of Baguio, a municipal corporation filed a complaint for declaratory
relief against defendant NAWASA, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383. It contend that
said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said
Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership, control and operation
of said waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive,
unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.
On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Republic Act No. 1383 is a
proper exercise of the police power of the State; that assuming that said Act contemplates an act of
expropriation, it is still a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain; that at any rate the Baguio
Waterworks System is not a private property but "public works for public service" over which the
Legislature has control; and that the provisions of said Act being clear and unambiguous, there is no
necessity for construction.
On November 5, 1956 the court held that the waterworks system of the City of Baguio falls within
the category of ‘private property’, as contemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated without
just compensation; and that section 8 of Republic Act No. 1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA
assets for the value of the waterworks system of Baguio is unconstitutional as this is not ‘just compensation.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1383 is a valid exercise of police power or power of eminent domain.
HELD:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TRANSFER OF WATERWORKS SYSTEMS TO THE NAWASA NOT

A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.—Republic Act No. 1383 does not constitute a valid
exercise of police power. The Act does not confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a
municipal corporation. It merely directs that all waterworks belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal
districts in the Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of placing them under the control
and supervision of one agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing it does
not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with an equal value of the assets of the NAWASA.
WATERWORKS SYSTEMS PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;

PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION NECESSARY.—The Baguio Waterworks System is not like
any public road, park, street or other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit
of the public but is a property owned by the city in its proprietary character. Being patrimonial property of a
municipal corporation, waterworks cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just
compensation.
C06 CASE TITLE: Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)
FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province.
On October 12,1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting Municipality of Zamboanga

into Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that buildings and properties which the province
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon,
located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province.
1 ................................................ Capitol Site

3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the Province of Zamboanga into two,
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the two provinces.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that – all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in
favor of the said City of Zamboanga.·
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private properties without due process and just
compensation.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:
RULING:
Municipal corporations; Test as to the extent of legislative control over properties of the
municipalities.—If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be
deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation
Properties; Classification under the Civil Code. —Articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code classify
property of provinces, cities, and municipalities into property for public use and patrimonial property.
Property for public use consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities. (free and indiscriminate use by anyone -ejusdem generis )All other property possessed by
any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was without
jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and in Municipality of
Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities
constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification
regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public.
Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except
with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
Municipal corporations; Properties; Law on municipal corporation.—Under the principles constituting

the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial . Under this norm, to be considered, it is enough that
the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education,
public health, etc.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property
be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health,
etc.
Rep. Act 3039, validity of.—Republic Act 3039 which provides that all buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga, and located within the City of Zamboanga, are transferred
to Zamboanga City free of charge, is valid insofar as it affects lots used as capitol site, school sites and its
grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites, and the high school playground sites—a total of 24 lots—since
these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity they are, therefore, subject
to the absolute control of Congress.
Lots adjoining public schools partake of the nature of the same.—The eight lots which are adjoining
each other, and in turn are between two lots wherein the Burleigh Schools, are built, constitute the
appurtenant grounds of the said Burleigh Schools, and partake of the nature of the same.
Buildings which were erected by the national government, using national fund, can very well be
disposed of by Congress in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.—Buildings built on
lots which are public in nature follow the classification of the lots on which they are built. Moreover, said
buildings, then located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they
could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then—and its successors-in-interest—are
not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
Republic Act 3039; Effect on patrimonial project.—Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. Moreover, the fact that they are registered
strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.
Municipal Corporations; Properties; Principles under Law of Municipal Corporations considered

"special laws"—Under the provisions of Art. 424 of the Civil Code, the principles obtaining under the law
of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws." Hence, the classification of municipal
property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case.
IX. Requisites of Taking
Elements of Taking (Castelvi)
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 (2010), the Court held that “the ‘time of taking’ is the
time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to
the Republic.” It should be noted, however, that “taking” does not only take place upon the issuance of title either
in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
“Taking” also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for
CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for
approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP.
However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of “taking” as it was only
during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta
“It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation
or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
C07 CASE TITLE: Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi, GR L-20620, 15 August 1974
FACTS:
The Philippine Air Force occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial
administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of
lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year).
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the
same but Castellvi refused.
When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi
wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for
sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter,
and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy.
The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of
the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means
of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President. Castellvi then brought suit in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land.
While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent
domain against Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of
San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
The Republic urges that the “taking “of Castellvi’s property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by
virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the
subject of “Eminent Domain, we read the definition of “taking” (in eminent domain) as follows:
“Taking’ under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private
property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to
a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof ."'13 Republic vs, Vda. de Castellvi,
58 SCRA 336, No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-
mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more
than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the
lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the
lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.
The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21
November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the parties. After the
parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that
the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of
the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests.
On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which
motion Castellvi and Toledo Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied on 12
July 1961.
The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-
parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial
court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby .
On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for
reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the
interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court,"
and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of
orders and pleadings specified therein.
In an order dated 19 November 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as
amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.
·
ISSUE/S: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
RULING:
Eminent domain; “Taking” of property; Elements of.—A number of circumstances must be present
in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into
the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted
from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; Momentary defined.
—"Momentary” means “lasting but a moment; of but a moment’s duration (The Oxford English Dictionary,
Volume VI, page 596); “lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring
at every moment” (Webster’s Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition). The word “momentary” when
applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to -mean “a limited period”—not
indefinite or permanent.
Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind landowner; Expropriate must be commenced in
court.—It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands at some future time,
but certainly mere notice—much less an implied notice—of such intention on the part of the Republic to
expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The
expropriation must be actually commenced in court.
Just compensation; Value of property expropriated determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.—Under section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.
Circumstances considered in determining the value of the property expropriated.—In expropriation

proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in
the market. The owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective,
in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. The owner may
also show that the property is suitable for division into village or town lots.
Provisional value cannot be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of the property
expropriated; Reason.—The amount fixed as the provisional value of the lands that are being expropriated
does not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only “provisional” or
“tentative”, to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated by the
condemnor.
Valuation fixed for assessment purposes cannot be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of
the property expropriated where the landowner did not intervene in fixing it.—The valuation fixed for
the purposes of the assessment of the land for taxation purposes cannot bind the landowner where the latter
did not intervene in f ixing it.
Report of the commissioners; Nature of.—The report of the commissioners of appraisal in comdemnation
proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned.
Right of court to change.—A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or
modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount of the award if the facts of the
case so justify. While great weight is attached to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute
therefor its estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain cases, as, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably inadequate or
excessive.
C08 CASE TITLE: Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, GR 171101, 24
April 2012, En Banc Resolution, Velasco Jr. [J]
FACTS:
Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated
December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the
very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain
obligations under the SDP.
January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to
PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock Distribution Plan(DSP).
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends that if HLI or
Tadeco is, at all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989,
the date when the SDP was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare as
this was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the FWBs will not control the majority
stockholdings in HLI.
ISSUE/S: WON there should be just compensation paid to Tadeco for the homelots given to the FWBs.
HELD”:
RULING:
Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation; Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
provides that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is
conditioned on the payment of just compensation.—Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is
conditioned on the payment of just compensation. As stated: “Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation.”
Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator.”—Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.” The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.
In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner
and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the government takes possession of the land before
the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said
possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that “the ‘time of taking’ is the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to
the Republic.”—In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 (2010), the Court held that “the
‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as
when title is transferred to the Republic.” It should be noted, however, that “taking” does not only take place
upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). “Taking” also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by
a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the
instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which
should be considered as the effective date of “taking” as it was only during this time that the government
officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
Same; Ownership; There is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the farmers
on the land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of
farmers.—There is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the farmers on the
land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers.
However, this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on
agrarian reform, which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common
people. Worth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying “the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people.” Accordingly, HLI’s insistent view that control need not be in the
hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of
agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shackles with sheer lip service to look forward to.
Brion, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation; Expropriation; View that expropriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 may take the form of either actual land distribution or stock distribution.—“Taking” for
purposes of determining just compensation necessarily took place as of 1989 not only because of the failure
of the stock distribution option under Section 31 of RA No. 6657 (whose terms require the inclusion of the
agricultural land under the law’s compulsory coverage), but also because HLI chose to comply with the
government’s agrarian reform program through the SDP. The “taking” involved here was a revolutionary
form of expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform. Expropriation under RA No. 6657 may take the form
of either actual land distribution or stock distribution. HLI was only allowed to use stock distribution
because of RA No. 6657, and it lost this privilege upon the invalid exercise of this option when its approval
was cancelled.
Same; Same; View that the judicial determination of just compensation commences when a petition for its
determination is filed with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), which has the original and primary
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 57 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.—The judicial determination of just
compensation commences when a petition for its determination is filed with the SAC, which has the original
and primary jurisdiction pursuant to Section 57 of RA No. 6657. Notably, no overlapping of jurisdiction
between DARAB and SAC occurs because, as the Court explained: x x x primary jurisdiction is vested in
the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian
reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
C09 CASE TITLE: City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" was passed by the Quezon City Council.
Section 9 of the Ordinance provided that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased residents of Quezon City who are paupers.
Said section 9 was being enforced only seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, when the
Quezon City Council, in a resolution, requested the City Engineer to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Thus, Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. Respondent Himlayang
Pilipino immediately sought to annul said Section 9 since it is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent court declared Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners then argued, among others, that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Respondent also stressed that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent pointed out that if an owner is
deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for
public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
RULING:
Local Governments; Constitutional Law; An ordinance of Quezon City requiring memorial park
operators to set aside at least six percent (6%) of their cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons
is not a valid exercise of police power, and one that constitute taking of property without just
compensation.—There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section
12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit
the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang Panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is

different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to homeowners.
X. Deprivation of Use
Napocor v. San Pedro, GR 170945, 26 September 2006
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession—the right-
of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property right over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”
US v. Causby
" Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the
Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land."
Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had
violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
PPI v. COMELEC
To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
(not less than one-half page), amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to
specify the intended frequency of such compulsory “donation:” only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March
1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent
of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use
of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES LLAMAS

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a “positive act” must first be made by the “owner-developer before the city or
municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads.” As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to
government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: “subdivision streets
belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.” Stated
otherwise, “the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as
a public road.”
Bartolata v. Republic, GR 223534
Two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under
Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right-of-way; and (2) that the enforcement of
the right-of-way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in the
property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates
or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.
CA ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due process because the landowners were thereby compelled to
cede portions of their property without just compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was
invalid because there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare; and that,
accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the absence of a separability clause.
The DTI has issued a statement to the effect that the ban against aerial spraying in banana plantations "is expected to kill the
banana industry," affects the socio-economic development of the barangays hosting the affected plantations, and has a
disastrous impact on export trading. The DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage the entry of new players in the
locality, which would have a potential drawback in employment generation.99chanrobleslaw
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,

taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property, viz.:
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
C0A CASE TITLE: CITY OF MANILA v JUDGE LAGUIO, GR 118127, 12 APRIL 2005 [PER J. TINGA,
EN BANC]
FACTS:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in
the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment.
The prohibited establishments were given three months from the ordinance’s approval to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses
to other kinds of business allowable within the area."
MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation.
The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC.
The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
·
ISSUE/S: Whether Ordinance 7783 is constitutional
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the
Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to substantive requirements.—The tests of a valid
ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Police Power; Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies, in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council.—Local government units exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city
council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality
provided under the Code. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good.—The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Due Process; Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process Distinguished.—Procedural due
process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. Substantive
due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the government’s action.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance
of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law; Due process requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
— The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.—To successfully
invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights—a violation of the due process clause.
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.—The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of
the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its own-ers/operators to wind
up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is
intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a

permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory.— The Ordinance gives the owners
and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to “wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business
operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an “allowed”
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation.—Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome”
property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning,
be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know
them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause.—The Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments
“tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.” The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the
closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping
exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this
regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.—Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.” It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
Requirements in order that Classification of the Subjects of Legislation may be Valid.— Legislative
bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; 2) It must be germane to the
purposes of the law; 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; 4) It must apply equally to all
members of the class.
C0B CASE TITLE: G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON
FACTS:
In 1993, NAPOCOR, a GOCC entered a property located in Batangas City in order to construct and
maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. On 1995,
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC in Batangas City seeking the acquisition of an
easement of right of way over a portion of the property, alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents
for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach any agreement.
The respondents maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the
property and that the entry was done without their consent.
They tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only
for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished,
if not totally lost, due to the project; and that their property was classified as industrial land.
The RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondent just compensation for the whole area,
NAPOCOR appealed to CA, wherein the CA affirmed the order and decision of the RTC with modification
that plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied portion. Hence, this appeal.
On 2012, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement;
that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that because the
public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for
expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty bound to return the property to its
owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the expropriation proceedings due to the intervening cessation of the
need for public use; REMANDS the records to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Batangas City as the
court of origin for further proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the foregoing instructions; and
ORDERS said trial court to try and decide the issues with dispatch.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Right of Eminent Domain; The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of
the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within
the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.”—The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory
requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it
is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor
to keep the property expropriated.
Public Use; Words and Phrases; Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.”
However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the
public.—Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. In Asia’s Emerging
Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications, 552 SCRA 59 (2008), Justice
Corona, in his dissenting opinion said that: To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of
the term “public use” has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use
which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public” has already been
abandoned. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and
“public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings
for expropriation.—It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout
the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA 618 (2010), to wit: More particularly, with
respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if
the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as
it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner
would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice,
fairness and equity.
To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of
the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the
absence of the essential element of public use.—Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already
been retired. Considering that the Court has consistently upheld the primordial importance of public use in
expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR’s reliance on Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles, 55 Phil.
776 (1931), was apt and correct. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings
despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid
judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Just Compensation; The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just
compensation before depriving any person of his or her property for public use.—We must point out
that NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to
the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is
explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of
his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines,
NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the transmission
lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively
rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made
liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession of the property. There should be no question about the taking.
Disturbance Compensation; Actual Damages; In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and
the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to
them because their property would not be taken by National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).
Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until
the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.—
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents,
there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by
NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time
of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages. This conforms
with the following pronouncement in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr.: In light
of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property
be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or
intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the
required factual justification.
C0C: CASE TITLE: NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Sangkay G.R. No. 165828 : August 24, 2011
FACTS:
NAPOCOR, in order to generate electricity for Mindanao, undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric
Power Plant Project in the 1970s which included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used
in diverting the water flow.
Only in 1995 did the respondents discover the adverse effect of the project brought upon their land.
On November 21, 1997, respondent landowners situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the
RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation.
In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land
was established; NPC also averred that the cause of action has already prescribed, the project having been
started on 1979.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and granted their motion issuing a writ of execution prompting
NPC to assail the writ by petition for certiorari in the CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA issued a TRO to
enjoin the RTC from implementing its decision. The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated the ruling of the CA
(G.R. No. 141447), but the Court upheld the CA on May 4, 2006.
On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation
HELD:
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; National Power Corporation; Statutes; R.A. No. 6395;
Statutory Construction; The Court of Appeals’ restrictive construal of Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 as
exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development
works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels—
when the law does not distinguish, so must we not, and when the language of the statute is plain and free
from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.—A cursory reading shows that Section
3(i) covers the construction of “works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume,
street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may
require.” It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works.
Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other
developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly
provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3. The CA’s restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of
tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily
discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation
accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, so
must we not. Moreover, when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a
single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Congress intended to convey.
Prescription; The prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation.—We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395
is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation
like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just
compensation for their land.
Inverse Condemnation; Damages; Words and Phrases; Inverse condemnation, or the action to
recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency, is different from the action for
damages—the former has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency, while the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.—The action to
recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages.
The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal
wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a
right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on
human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is
committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
Prescription; The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the action to recover just
compensation does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit
is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just
compensation; It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the
recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of
statutory prescription.—The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to
recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on
statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent
domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The
fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the
suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against
the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the
Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the
basis of statutory prescription.
Taking; Words and Phrases; It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation—the expropriator’s action may
be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking;
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value.—We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on
the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of
the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be
wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession
of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire
land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on
what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the filing of the complaint, and the CA
upheld the RTC.
Where the expropriator entered the property without the intention of formally expropriating the
land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the owners, reckoning just compensation, as a
measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, on the value at the time the owners
commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted—such manner of entry by
the expropriator denied elementary due process of law to the owners since that time until the latter
commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings.—The RTC based its fixing of just compensation
ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning
from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The CA did not dwell on the
reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided
in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC
entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the
gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally
expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s
entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the
inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from
unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of
simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time
the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
C0D National Power Corporation vs. Gutierrez [GR 60077, 18 January 1991]\ Third Division, Bidin
(J):
Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and controlled entity, in
accordance with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric
transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV
MexicoLimay transmission lines, NAPOCOR's lines have to pass the lands belonging to Matias Cruz, Heirs
of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit (covered by tax declarations 907,
4281 and 7582, respectively).
NAPOCOR initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the
aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, NAPOCOR
was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et. al. on 20 January 1965.
Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, NAPOCOR deposited the amount of P973.00 with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the land of the Malit and
Gutierrez.
And by virtue of which, NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it
could immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this
connection, by the trial court's order of 30 September 1965, the spouses were authorized to withdraw the
fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due Gutierrez, et. al., the
court appointed 3 commissioners, comprised of one representative of NAPOCOR, one for the affected
families and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular
inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to he
paid to the owners of the lots.
Hearings were consequently held before said commissioners and during their hearings, the case of
the Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way Grant executed by Guadalupe
Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of NAPOCOR.
The case against Matias Cruz was earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case against
the spouses Malit and Gutierrez still to be resolved.
Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. With the reports submitted, the
lower court rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit and Gutierrez the sum of P10 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area, which is
760 squares, or a total sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorney's fees.
Dissatisfied with the decision, NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably
acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated 10 June 1973, it amended its previous decision,
reducing the amount awarded to to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760
square meters belonging to the said spouses, in light of the classification of the land to be partly commercial
and partly agricultural.
Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but appellate
court, on 9 March 1982, sustained the trial court. NAPOCOR filed the petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the spouses are deprived of the property’s ordinary use and thus the easement of right of way
in favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking.
Held:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Property; Easements; The exercise of the power of eminent
domain does not always result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it
may only result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss
of title or possession.—The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate court show that “x x x While it
is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life
and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff
only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected
portion of their property.”
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where
the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use
(See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals,
102 SCRA 597, 1981).
The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that: “Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.”
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents
of its ordinary use.
Just Compensation; The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the
Government are the criteria for determining just compensation.—For these reasons, the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it
is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation (Province of Tayabas vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467
[1938]; Assoc. of Small Land Owners of the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742;
Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777,
14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was
taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation (National Power Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, [1984]). The above price refers to the market value of the land which may be
the full market value thereof. According to private respondents, the market value of their lot is P50.00 per
square meter because the said lot is adjacent to the National and super highways of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and
Olongapo City. Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being exercised by
NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to
payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC’s purpose is, for which expropriation was
sought, it is just and equitable that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity (EPZA v.
Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]; Mun. of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503 [1979]).
C0E CASE TITLE: Napocor v. San Pedro, GR 170945, 26 September 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with respondent for an
easement of right of way over her property. respondent executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The
payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued was then processed.
However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for
easement over agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved.
NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners.
According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project it
was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way.
The RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for
the property.
NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the lower court gravely erred in fixing
the just compensation for Respondents. the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the property is
considered a taking.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The ruling of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72860 is AFFIRMED.
RULING:
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; The constitutional limitation of “just
compensation” is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and who desires
to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.— To determine the just compensation
to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
criterion.
The lone fact that there was no available sales data on properties within the vicinity of the
landowner’s property for 1996 and 1997 and that the BIR zonal value was P60.00 per sq. m. for
residential and P30.00 per sq. m. for agricultural did not proscribe the commissioners and trial court
from making their own reasonable estimates of just compensation, after considering all the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities.— As had been
amply explained by this Court in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987):
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The
values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even
an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The
value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops.
Very often land described as “cogonal” has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms
of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than
correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. To say that
the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax
declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed
by an agency authorized to do so. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence
and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
Words and Phrases; Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transfer of title or possession—the right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or
limitation on property right over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of
the term “expropriation.”—On the question as to whether petitioner shall pay only an easement fee to
respondent’s heirs, the following pronouncement in National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-Paderanga, 464
SCRA 481 (2005), is enlightening: Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property
with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or
limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” As explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, viz.:
The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate court show that “x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is]
only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights
as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant
higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through
said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be
discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually
pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.”
C0F CASE TITLE: US v. Causby
FACTS:
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was
located near an airport used regularly by the United States military.
According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in
the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his
business.
Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and
below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the
airspace above his farm.
By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of
Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.
ISSUE/S: whether or not the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
RULING:
Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that
the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world."
Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea."
However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the
common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
" Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a
violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land."
Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court
determined that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took no part in the consideration or
decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)
C10 CASE TITLE: PPI v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide
provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space”, allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or
periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
issues and their platforms and programs of government.
Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters, to various publishers
of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all
members of PPI.
Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine

publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates
the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation.
Petitioner also contends that the letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of
involuntary servitude. And that PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution.
It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec

space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or
requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured.
However, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing
letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and
information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
At the oral hearing, respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo, stated that
Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters, were not intended to
compel those members to supply Comelec with free print space. They were merely designed to solicit from
the publishers the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the
election period.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation which
attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995 clarifying such resolution.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain? — NO
HELD:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
Election Law; Commission on Elections; A written communication officially directing a print media
company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government agency and signed by a member of
the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon
the company so addressed.—That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who
would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself
demonstrate that the Comelec’s original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of
print space from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply
free print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the
Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the
company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of,
criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties
inhering in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority
itself would be open to serious constitutional objection.
To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” of the dimensions specified in Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772, amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes.
—To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to “taking” of private personal property for
public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory “donation:”
only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once
a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is
not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily
charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec.—The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the
necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness
or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of “just compensation.”—The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized
by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an
assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to “donate” free print space for Comelec purposes, or
as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
—There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of
factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute
a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.—
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard
to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the
country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate
that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity
available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
C11 CASE TITLE: GR No. 194190 dated January 5, 2017 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS
FACTS:
On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for
expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave. (also known as Sucat Road) in what was then the
Municipality of Parafiaque, Metro Manila.
This action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case. The just
compensation for the expropriated areas was valued ₱12,000.00 per square meter.
On January 27, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a "Most Urgent and
Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors."
They claimed that they were excluded from the expropriation case despite having properties affected
by the road widening project. After a hearing on this Motion, the Regional Trial Court allowed the Llamas
Spouses to file their Answer-in-Intervention.
In their Answer-in-Intervention, they claimed that a total area of 298 square meters was taken from
them during the road widening project:
(1) 102 square meters from a parcel of land identified as Lot 4, Block 3, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 217167;
(2) 84 square meters from a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, covered by TCT No. 179165; and
(3) 112 square meters from a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, also covered byTCTNo. 179165
On August 2, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of [a]n Order
Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements.
This was opposed by DPWH in the comment filed on December 9, 1994, claiming that only 41
square meters in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 179165 was affected by the road widening project.
On May 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment of the value of
the lots of the defendants in the expropriation case.
However those subject lots of Spouses Llamas were not included in the issued Order.
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of
an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002." faulting the DPWH for failure to comply
with the RTC’s previous Orders.
In an August 8, 2005 hearing, the Department of Public Works and Highways manifested that the
non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their continued failure to comply with their
undertaking: submission of the certified true copies of the TCTs covering the lots and the certified true
copies of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots.
On October 8, 2007, the RTC issued an Order directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just
compensation at ₱12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered by TCT No. 217267.
It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were subdivision road
lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belong[ed] to the community for
whom they were made.”
In the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Llamas Spouses then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and
ordered the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses P12,000.00 per square
meter as just compensation for a total of 237 square meters across three (3) lots, inclusive of the portions
excluded by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals added that the amount due to the Llamas
Spouses was subject to 12% interest per annum from the time of the taking.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the
subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed October 14, 2010 Decision
of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104178 is AFFIRMED.
RULING:
Expropriation Proceedings; Subdivision Road Lots; The 1998 White Plains Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 547 Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains
Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 Decision’s allusion to a compulsion on subdivision
developers to cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion
as an “illegal taking.”—The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains
Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 Decision’s allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers
to cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an “illegal
taking.” It did away with any preference for government’s capacity to compel cession and instead,
emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners’ and developers’ freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces
developed as roads. In making its characterization of an “illegal taking,” this Court quoted with approval the
statement of the Court of Appeals: Only after a subdivision owner has developed a road may it be donated to
the local government, if it so desires. On the other hand, a subdivision owner may even opt to retain
ownership of private subdivision roads, as in fact is the usual practice of exclusive residential subdivisions
for example those in Makati City.
Donations; The last paragraph of Section 31, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957 requires — note the
use of the word “shall” — subdivision developers to donate to the city or municipality with territorial
jurisdiction over the subdivision project all such roads, alleys, sidewalks, and open spaces. It also
imposes upon cities and municipalities the concomitant obligation or compulsion to accept such
donations.—In insisting on a compulsion on subdivision owners and developers to cede open spaces to
government, the Highways references Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1216, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree. The first
paragraph of Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 spells out the minimum area requirement for roads
and other open spaces in subdivision projects. Its second paragraph spells out taxonomic or classification
parameters for areas reserved for parks, playgrounds, and for recreational use. It also requires the planting of
trees. The last paragraph of Section 31 requires — note the use of the word “shall” — subdivision
developers to donate to the city or municipality with territorial jurisdiction over the subdivision project all
such roads, alleys, sidewalks, and open spaces. It also imposes upon cities and municipalities the
concomitant obligation or compulsion to accept such donations.
A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or

otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are external to him or her.
—A donation is, by definition, “an act of liberality.” Article 725 of the Civil Code provides: Article 725.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it. To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the
donor’s own, unrestrained volition. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom
when it specifically states that conveyances made in view of a “demandable debt” cannot be considered true
or valid donations.
Section 31’s compulsion to donate (and concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained as
valid. Not only does it run afoul of basic legal concepts; it also fails to withstand the more elementary
test of logic and common sense.—In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act of
liberality) is an indispensable element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of the donor’s patrimony
and the corresponding increase in the donee’s patrimony. Section 31’s compulsion to donate (and
concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained as valid. Not only does it run afoul of basic legal
concepts; it also fails to withstand the more elementary test of logic and common sense. As opposed to this,
the position that not only is more reasonable and logical, but also maintains harmony between our laws, is
that which maintains the subdivision owner’s or developer’s freedom to donate or not to donate. This is the
position of the 1998 White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 547
Decision. Moreover, as this 1998 Decision has emphasized, to force this donation — and to preclude any
compensation — is to suffer an illegal taking.
As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual
transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: “subdivision streets belonged to the owner
until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.”—The
Court of Appeals correctly stated that a “positive act” must first be made by the “owner-developer before the
city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads.” As there is no such thing as an
automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the
subdivision owner: “subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until
expropriated upon payment of just compensation.” Stated otherwise, “the local government should first
acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.”
C12 CASE TITLE: Bartolata v. Republic, GR 223534, 7 June 2017
FACTS:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100523, dated July 10, 2015 and March 7, 2016, respectively.
The challenged rulings denied petitioner's claim for just compensation on the ground that the portion of his
property that was used by the government was subject to an easement of right of way. Additionally, the CA
ordered petitioner to return any payment made to him by the government in relation to the enforcement of
the easement.
Danilo Bartolata acquired ownership over a 400 square meter parcel of land in AFP Officer’s
Village, Taguig. Danilo was the sole bidder for the property during a public auction conducted on Aug 14,
1987 with an offer of Php 6,000. For the 400 sq. meter lot. This was indicated in an Order of Award from
the Bureau of Lands dated December 14, 1987.
In 1997, the respondents acquired 223 sq. meters of the Bartolata’s property for the development of
the Metro Manila Skyway project. It was agreed by the parties that the petitioner would be paid just
compensation for the appraised value of the property. The property was appraised at Php 12,265,00 by the
Municipal Appraisal Committee of Taguig. The respondents appropriated Php 1,480,000 in favour of
Bartolata as partial payment.
On numerous occasions, Bartolata demanded from the respondents the balance of the outstanding
obligation which that later refused to settle. This prompted the petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum of
money on September 20, 2006.
The respondents raised that the land was subjected to the easement and servitudes provided for in
Section 109-114 of the Public Land Law (CA 141). It was argued that pursuant to Section 112 of CA 141,
the government is entitled to an easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in width, without need of
payment for just compensation, save for the value of improvements existing.
Bartolata contended that PD 2004, which amended RA 730, allegedly removed the statutory lien
attached to the subject property which the respondents countered. Respondents claim that the petitioner
could benefit from PD 2004 as the removal of restrictions and encumbrances contained in PD 2004 only
applies to public land sold by the government for residential purposes without public auction.·
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the subject property owned by the petitioner is subject easement of right of way in
favour of the government;
2. Whether or not respondents are liable to pay just compensation to petitioner
3. Whether or not petitioner should return the initial payment made by the respondents?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The award to
respondents for the recovery of the P1,480,000 initial payment is hereby DELETED as their right to a refund
has already prescribed. Petitioner Danilo Bartolata remains the owner of the 177-square-meter portion and
can exercise all rights of ownership over the said lot.
RULING:
Civil Law; Sale of Public Lands; Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified
applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are free from any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation.—As can be gleaned, RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Secs. 61 and 67 of
CA 141. These provisions govern the mode of disposition of the alienable public lands enumerated under
Sec. 59 of the same law.
Synthesizing the provisions, CA 141 provides that public lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other similar purposes through lease or sale, in both cases, “to the
highest bidder.” The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67.
By way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands without public auction to
qualified applicants. It is through this exceptional case of purchase of public land without public auction
wherein PD 2004 would apply.
Petitioner’s assertion that both sales of public land with and without public auction are subsumed under the
coverage of PD 2004 is contrary to the very tenor of the law.
Sec. 2 of RA 730, as amended by PD 2004, is clear and unambiguous:
SEC. 2. Lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. (emphasis added) Under its
plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without public auction and for residential
purposes are free from any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to
petitioner’s property which was awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA 730, but through public
auction.
Eminent Domain; Taking; Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,” in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, “occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property
owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of his property.”—The Court affirmed the CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA
141 and ruled that the Republic was under no obligation to pay therein respondent Andaya just
compensation in enforcing its right-of-way.
Be that as it may, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of the property owner being entitled to just
compensation if the enforcement of the right-of-way resulted in the “taking” of the portions not subject to
the legal easement.
Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,” in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, “occurs not only
when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary
use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.”
As in Republic v. Andaya, 524 SCRA 671 (2007), even though the Republic was not legally bound to pay
just compensation for enforcing its right-of-way, the Court nevertheless found that its project to be
undertaken — the construction of floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project
— would prevent ingress and egress in Andaya’s private property and turn it into a catch basin for the
floodwaters coming from the Agusan River, effectively depriving him of the normal use of the remainder of
his property. To the mind of the Court, this resulted in a “taking” of what was left of Andaya’s property,
entitling him to consequential damages, awarded by the Court in the form of just compensation.
Just Compensation - Two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just
compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to
the statutory lien of right-of-way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right-of-way results in the practical
destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in the
property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
Recall that the subject property in this case is a 400 square meter parcel of land. The 223 square meter
portion of the subject property was traversed by respondents' Metro Manila Skyway Project. And as noted
by the CA, the subdivision plan shows that the covered area corresponds to the widths of 13.92 meters and
13.99 meters, well within the 60-meter width threshold provided by law. Respondents are then not under any
legal obligation to pay just compensation for utilizing the 223 square meter portion pursuant to the
Republic's right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141, and in accordance with our ruling in Andaya.
Civil Law; Quasi-Contracts; Solutio Indebiti; “Solutio indebiti” arises when something is delivered through
mistake to a person who has no right to demand it.—Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming
just compensation for the government’s enforcement of its right-of-way. The contract allegedly entered by
the parties for the government’s acquisition of the affected portion of the property in exchange for just
compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary to law.
Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government’s use of the 223-
square-meter lot.
Anent the P1,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by
the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment. “Solutio indebiti” arises when something is delivered
through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been
received through mistake. As defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, the concept has two indispensable
requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something was
received when there was no right to demand it.
As a general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents.— But as jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz.: Estoppels against the
public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may
not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where
the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and
subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as
well as against private individuals.
C13 CASE TITLE: Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose
a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. City
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. The Pilipino Banana Growers and
Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO).
They alleged that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to· the confiscation of property without due process of law.
Included in the Ordinance is the maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. The City of Davao
contends that the imposition of the 30- meter buffer zone is a valid exercise of police power, that the
maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings; that
the planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray drift;
that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their property.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
·
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the requirement relating to the 30-Meter Buffer Zone is confiscatory
RULING:
Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; To be considered as a

valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two (2)-pronged test: the formal and the
substantive.—To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged
test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
The corporate powers of the local government units (LGUs) confer the basic authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote general welfare.—The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation
thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local
government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote
and maintain local autonomy.
Police Power; Ordinances; A valid ordinance must be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.—A valid ordinance must not
only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the
following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it
must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
A local government unit (LGU) is considered to have properly exercised its police powers if it satisfies
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.—A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Ordinances; In exercising its police power the local government unit (LGU) must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose.—Substantive due
process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government’s action. This
means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically
serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The constitutional right to equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.—The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State’s duly constituted authorities.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.—Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all
persons or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality
among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.
To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three (3) levels of scrutiny, viz.: the
rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.—To determine the propriety of the
classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and
strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.
—The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the
classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in Cases
involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest
but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.—Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially
related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on
broad generalizations.
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class.—The
strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries
the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be overinclusive because its
impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose.—Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
“overinclusive” because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a
wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental

claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends.—A substantially overinclusive or
underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves
legitimate political ends. Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater
discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
Precautionary Principle; The principle of precaution involves matters of evidence in cases where there
is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect.—The principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the
courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving
and protecting the environment.
The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three (3) elements,
namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm.—The
precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty,
threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively
certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the
probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken.
The precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying should not apply if little or
nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations.—We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining
the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial
spraying may bring to the health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and
balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be
adverse even in the absence of evidence.
Police Power; Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code (LGC) accords a liberal interpretation to its
general welfare provisions.—Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to
its general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local
autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion to accelerate their
economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
Local Government Units; Because the police power of the local government units (LGUs) flows from
the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris.—
Because the police power of the local government units flows from the express delegation of the power by
Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms
used in granting the power should be construed against the local legislative units.
Municipal Corporations; Ordinances; Municipal corporations have no right to enact ordinances

dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.—Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal
corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they
definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.
The Local Government Code (LGC) is not intended to vest in the local government unit (LGU) the
blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of
serving the common good.—The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in exercising its delegated powers with the
view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State within the
constitutional and statutory restraints. The Local Government Code is not intended to vest in the local
government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in
the guise of serving the common good.
The devolved functions to the local government units (LGUs) do not include the regulation and
control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.—The enumerated devolved functions to the local
government units do not include the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
The noninclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from enacting Ordinance No.
0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial application of
pesticides in derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No. 1144.
Every local government unit (LGU) only derives its legislative authority from Congress.—For sure,
every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress. In no instance can the local
government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run against or contravene
existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid delegation from Congress.
Devoid of the specific delegation to its legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated
authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07.—Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body,
the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No.
0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City. ]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Every local government unit (LGU) only derives its legislative authority
from Congress.—For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress.
In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance cannot
run against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid
delegation from Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Devoid of the specific delegation to its legislative body, the City of Davao
exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07.—Devoid of the specific delegation to its
local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07.
Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.,
800 SCRA 313, G.R. No. 189185, G.R. No. 189305 August 16, 2016
XI.
I. Public Use
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes
“Public use” does not mean “use by the public” in expropriation cases.—However, the concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that “public use” is strictly
limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded.
Manocsca v. Court of Appeals
The term “public use,” not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its
general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization
given by various courts to the term; thus: “Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory
basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which
confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured
in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as
public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or
‘public benefit’ accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457
P.2d 769, 772, 773.”
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA

In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: this Court has
ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play . . . It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.
C14 CASE TITLE: Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes
FACTS:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag,
Cebu City.
The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration,
manifestation adopting the answer.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is
no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that
assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land
as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over
the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City
Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises
and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; The State’s power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the
Constitution.—The petitioners look for the word “tourism” in the Constitution. Understandably the search
would be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social
justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public interest, and
general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and
according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional provisions would
make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic
proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and
other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be
remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
such purposes like tourism and other development programs.
Requisites of eminent domain.—The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
The restrictive view of the term “public use” cannot be adopted in the Philippines which does not have
big and correctly located public lands and which has never been a laissez-faire State.—The restrictive
view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities
and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take
private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a
laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in
areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
Judiciary has to defer liberally to legislative discretion in the review of programs for economic
development and social progress.—Certain aspects of parliamentary government were introduced by the
1973 amendments to the Constitution with further modifications in the 1976 and 1981 amendments.
Insofar as the executive and legislative departments are concerned, the traditional concept of checks and
balances in a presidential form was considerably modified to remove some roadblocks in the expeditious
implementation of national policies. There was no such change for the judiciary. We remain as a checking
and balancing department even as all strive to maintain respect for constitutional boundaries. At the same
time, the philosophy of coordination in the pursuit of developmental goals implicit in the amendments also
constrains the judiciary to defer to legislative discretion in the judicial review of programs for economic
development and social progress unless a clear case of constitutional infirmity is established. We cannot stop
the legitimate exercise of power on an invocation of grounds better left interred in a bygone age and time.**
As we review the efforts of the political departments to bring about self-sufficiency, if not eventual
abundance, we continue to maintain the liberal approach because the primary responsibility and the
discretion belong to them.
“Public use” does not mean “use by the public” in expropriation cases.—However, the concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that “public use” is strictly
limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded.
Expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports and hotel
complex constitutes expropriation for “public use.”—The petitioners’ contention that the promotion of
tourism is not “public use” because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities
such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private
bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets and highways
do not diminish in the least bit the public-character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store
spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose.
Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use.
The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if
the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.
Petitioners failed to show that area being expropriated is a land reform area. Only 8,970 square
meters of 283 hectares affected is part of Operation Land Transfer.—The records show that the area
being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not
affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and
unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive. And
of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters—less than one hectare—is affected by Operation
Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of
land affected. And this 8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports complex proper but
forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others similarly situated would be
provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment, community centers, schools, and essential services
like water and electricity—which are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need under the facts
of this petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a
balancing of competing public interests. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the showing that the
taking of the 8,970 square meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an
inseparable transaction involving the development of the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly, the
human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectares resettlement area should prevail over
the property rights of two of their compatriots.
Contract clause cannot bar exercise of police power.—The invocation of the contracts clause has no
merit. The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise
eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) “parties by entering into contracts may
not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.”
Government may take immediate possession of land subject to expropriation proceedings upon
deposit of 10% of its value.—Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1533, the government, its agency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is
authorized to take immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the improvements, with
power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the
Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated.
Agrarian Law; Pres. Decree No. 583 which penalizes forcible ejectment of agricultural tenants has
nothing to do with and does not cover expropriation cases instituted by the government.—In their last
argument, the petitioners claim that a consequence of the expropriation proceedings would be their forcible
ejectment. They contend that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act under Presidential Decree No. 583.
This contention is not valid. Presidential Decree No. 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or implementation
of orders designed to obstruct the land reform program. It refers to the harassment of tenant-farmers who try
to enforce emancipation rights. It has nothing to do with the expropriation by the State of lands needed for
public purposes. As a matter of fact, the expropriated area does not appear in the master lists of the Ministry
of Agrarian Reforms as a tenanted area. The petitioners’ bare allegations have not been supported with
particulars pointing to specific parcels which are subject of tenancy contracts. The petitioners may be owner-
tillers or may have some form of possessory or ownership rights but there has been no showing of their
being tenants on the disputed lands.
C15 CASE TITLE: Manocsca v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was
not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; “Eminent Domain,” Explained; The
constitutional qualification that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation” is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.—Eminent domain, also often
referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an
inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of
the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as “the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government” that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature
of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for
public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that
“private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” This proscription is intended
to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property
the power is sought to be enforced.
The power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the
expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.—The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the
issue of the extent of the President’s power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire
private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It
was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in
Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should
not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
Words and Phrases; “Public Use,” Explained; The term “public use” must be considered in its
general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.—The term “public use,” not having been
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or
a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus: “Public
Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For
condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not
confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for
which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or ‘public benefit’ accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.”
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question—it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses.— The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has
long been discarded.
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant growth.—It
has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: “x x x A historical research discloses the
meaning of the term ‘public use’ to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the
individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the esources of the individual may be devoted. x
x x for ‘whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.’ ”
Separation of Church and State; Freedom of Religion; An attempt to give some religious perspective
to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not
the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.—Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat
is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be
a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that
might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
That only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.—The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character
of public use.
Just Compensation; Due Process; There is no denial of due process where the records of the case are
replete with pleadings that could have dealt with the provisional value of the property—what the law
prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard.—Petitioners contend that they have been denied due
process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that
what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard; contrary to petitioners’ argument, the records
of this case are replete with pleadings that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value
of the property.
C16 CASE TITLE: Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, GR 137285, 16 January 2001
FACTS:
On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA) initiated expropriation proceedings on
3 parcels of irrigated rice land in Rosario, Cavite. However, one of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B), is
registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite).
More than 10 years later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite upheld the right of PEZA to
expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). As a result, the Estate of Salud Jimenez sought for
Reconsideration contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl
Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose.
The trial court reconsidered and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of
Lot 1406-B was maintained. PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The
compromise agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the
Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On
the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for
damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981
up to the present. (2) That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B
with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with
lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That
the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the
estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree
that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered
based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory." The trial court approved the
compromise agreement on 23 August 1993.
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate as it was not its registered owner
but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. As a result, the Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated
August 23, 1993" which the court granted on 04 August 1997 and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot
1406-A to the Estate. PEZA moved for its reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4
August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be
surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November 1997, PEZA interposed before the CA a petition
for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify said Orders.
Acting on the petition, the CA partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial
court regarding "the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406-B" and instead ordered
the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of
just compensation over Lot 1406-B.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is for public use
HELD:
RULING:
Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Two Phases of Expropriation
Proceedings; Appeal is the remedy from the final orders issued in either the first or second phase of
the expropriation proceedings.—Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends
either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to
which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it
finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be
ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the defendant.
Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To both
orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
Expropriation; Eminent Domain; An expropriation case involves two (2) orders—an expropriation
order and an order fixing just compensation—and once the first order becomes final and no appeal
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.—
Petitioner cites cases which provide that upon the failure to pay by the lessee, the lessor can ask for the
return of the lot and the ejectment of the former, this being the lessor’s original demand in the complaint.
We find said cases to be inapplicable to this instant case for the reason that the case at bar is not a simple
ejectment case. This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an
order fixing just compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.
Public Use; Words and Phrases; The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.—This Court
holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for
a valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero, this Court has ruled that, the “public use” requirement for
a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: this Court
has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play . . . It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235 quoting E.
Fernando, the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977) The term “public use” has acquired a
more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the
public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
The authority given to the PEZA to expropriate “for the construction . . . of terminal facilities,
structures and approaches thereto” is broad enough to give it substantial leeway in deciding for what
public use the expropriated property would be utilized.—-Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was
expropriated “for the construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” The
authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the
expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the
lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA’s original charter.
Words and Phrases; The term “necessary” in condemnation proceedings does not mean absolutely
indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth
and future needs of the enterprise; PEZA cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if
inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the
private landowners to part with their properties—the purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other
facilities is better served if PEZA directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.—In Manila
Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, this Court has ruled that in the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can
be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary,” in this
connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for
the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining
and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the
mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE
and other facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.
The expropriation of a lot for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a
terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the
persons working at the industries located in PEZA, and the expropriation of adjacent areas therefore
comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law.—The contention of petitioner that
the leasing of the subject lot to banks and building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the original
charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to said purpose that Republic
Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree No.
66 created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area. According to the
comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said decree did not intend to limit re spondent
PEZA to the establishment of an export processing zone but it was also bestowed with authority to
expropriate parcels of land “for the construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches
thereto.” Republic Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad language employed by Presidential Decree
No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote the condemned lots, that is, for the
construction and operation of an industrial estate, an export processing zone, free trade zones, and the like.
The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a
terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons
working at the industries located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter
of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. In such a manner, PEZA’s goal of being a major force in
the economic development of the country would be realized. Petitioner contends that respondent is bound
lay the representations of its Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot
was to be devoted for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say that PEZA
can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use.
Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are
for public purpose.
Just Compensation; The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking-—-payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately
after the order of expropriation is issued.—We have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right
immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said
order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it
must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.
II. Government Withdrawal
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has
properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
National Power Corporation (NPC) vs. Court of Appeals and Antonino Pobre
When possession of the land is neither convenient nor feasible anymore, the aggrieved landowner may
demand payment of just compensation.—Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores
possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be
turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only
remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
C17 CASE TITLE: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu,
Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the
claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are
within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project.
The respondent heirs waived their objections.
RTC set the just compensation of the said properties at 11, 200.00 php. per square meter.
NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the
amount of just compensation, however the respondents heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's partial judgment.
Trial Court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the NHA’s motion
and of just compensation.
NHA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for
execution since the trial court moved for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.
CA dismissed petition on the ground of partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory
when petitioner failed to appeal. NHA moved for reconsideration but was denied. CA served on petitioner
for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of
the Philippines.
·
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the
exercise of its eminent domain.
2. Whether or not the funds of petitioner NHA are exempt from garnishment.
RULING:
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Actions; Eminent Domain; The right of the plaintiff to
dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with certain well-defined
exceptions.—
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with
certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was brought
for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later discovers no
longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from what he had intended, then he should be
permitted to withdraw his action, subject to the approval of the court.
The plaintiff should not be required to continue the action, subject to some well-defined exceptions, when it
is not to his advantage to do so.
Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged. Courts should not require parties to litigate when they
no longer desire to do so. Courts, in granting permission to dismiss an action, of course, should always take
into consideration the effect which said dismissal would have upon the rights of the defendant.
The very moment it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public
use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed.—It is not denied that the purpose of the
plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for a public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions
brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true,
the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use,
the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained
at all except when the expropriation is for some public use.
That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal of at any other stage of the proceedings.
If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to
dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty
and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation.—There are two (2) stages in every action for
expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an
order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be
filed or heard.”
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of “the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the
suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the
parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or
otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal
therefrom.
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final.—An order of condemnation or dismissal is final,

resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent
domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its
public use can no longer be questioned.
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened.—A final and
executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not
through repeated suits on the same claim.
Socialized Housing; Socialized housing falls within the confines of “public use.”—Housing is a basic
human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures
does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who
need it, all at once. x x x x x x x x x. In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that “socialized
housing” falls with the confines of “public use.” x x x x x x x x x. Provisions on economic opportunities
inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum
improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.
It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to go through expropriation proceedings and
then refuse to pay.—It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation
proceedings, seize a person’s property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and
then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably
used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt
such a despotic and irresponsible stance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Garnishment; Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law.—The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception; If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-
owned and controlled corporation with a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt from
garnishment.— If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation
which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its
funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation are not exempt
from garnishment.—Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of
such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public
in character, are not exempt from garnishment. This doctrine was applied to suits filed against the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration (PNB vs. Pabalan, et al., 83 SCRA 695); the National Shipyard & Steel
Corporation (NASSCO vs. CIR, 118 Phil. 782); the Manila Hotel Company (Manila Hotel Employees Asso.
vs. Manila Hotel Co., 73 Phil. 374); and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81
SCRA 314) National Housing Authority vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, 404 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 154411
June 19, 2003
C18
CASE TITLE: National Power Corporation (NPC) vs. Court of Appeals and Antonino Pobre
FACTS:
NPC, a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power
and to transmit electric power nationwide, is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of
eminent domain.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as “Tiwi Hot
Springs Resort Subdivision.” On 12 January 1966, the then Court of First Instance of Albay approved the
subdivision plan of the Property. The Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued
independent titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling the lots.
On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam
were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and
steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004
NPC became involved in the two expropriations of Pobre’s resort-subdivision.
However, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case claiming that
NPC damaged his property, praying for just compensation of all the lots affected and for payment of
damages.
NPC then filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation after it had found an alternative site and
due to Pobre’s opposition. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but ordered NPC to take and pay the
entire property of Pobre as it is no longer viable as a resort-subdivision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in holding that NPC had "taken" the entire property of Pobre.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; State; Powers; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Expropriation is the procedure for
enforcing the right of eminent domain.—Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign,
to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just
compensation. The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other
public entities and public utilities such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of
eminent domain. “Eminent Domain” was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still
found in Rule 67, but its title is now “Expropriation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Dismissal; In expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion
to dismiss took the place of the answer.—In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant
to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of
his property for the purpose specified in the complaint. In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of
Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s
matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages
at the start of the taking.—In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff ’s matter of right to
dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. The plaintiff ’s right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court
approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court
conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime.—The power of eminent domain is subject to
limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are
instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just
compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of the taking of private property through
eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the
expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some
public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims
that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose
the defendant’s right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation
case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action.—Case law holds that in
the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or
in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case. The dismissal of
the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant’s right to
recover damages either in the same or in another action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; When possession of the land is neither
convenient nor feasible anymore, the aggrieved landowner may demand payment of just compensation.—
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the
landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to
demand payment of just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.—In this jurisdiction, the Court
has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use,
after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord
with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
III. Recovery of Expropriated Land
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada,

With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for
the new purpose, and if not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same
Republic v. Lim
While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of his property
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority V CA,Chiongbian

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the
Republic of the Philippines.—The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and granted title to
Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the
effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the
same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used
other than as the Lahug airport.
C19 CASE TITLE: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, GR 176625, 25 February 2010,
En Banc, Nachura [J]
FACTS:
Spouses Lozada were the registered owners of Lot No. 88;
In the early 1960’s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation Lot No. 88, for the improvement and
expansion of the Lahug Airport;
A decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance in favor of the Government and against the land
owners, among whom was Bernardo Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom;
During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect that the
subject property would be resold to the original owner at the same price when it was expropriated in the
event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport;
However, the projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport did not materialize; Spouses
sought to repurchase their property from then CAA Director Vicente Rivera.
The latter replied by giving as assurance that priority would be given to the previous owners, subject to the
approval of the President, should CAA decide to dispose of the properties;
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino, through a Memorandum to the (DOTC),
directed the transfer of general aviation operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority;
Since the public purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the spouses assailed that property must be
returned to them.
ISSUE/S: W/N the land should be repurchased back by its former owners?
RULING:
Eminent Domain; Requisites; Legal Research; Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28

(1921), was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.—Fery was not decided pursuant to our now
sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
It is well-settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject
to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation
be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose, and if not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return
the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same; The Court now
expressly holds that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its
power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken—corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received.—With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of
the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now
expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of
eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
C1A CASE TITLE: Republic v. Lim
FACTS:
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for
expropriation with the CFI of Cebu involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Cebu City,
for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lots 932 and 939 were
registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia Denzon, respectively.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the PNB, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938,
the Republic took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the CA but it was dismissed in 1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals of the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter.
Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who
wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said
claim.
In 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but agreed to pay appraised value within a reasonable
time.
During the same year, the heirs of the Denzons', Valdehueza and Panerio filed with the CFI an action
for recover of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the AFP for the latter's failure to
pay for the lots.
The CFI ruled in their favor holding that they are the owners of said lots.
The SC affirmed the CFI decision ruling that by final and executory judgment in said proceedings,
lots were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government.
In fact, the title certificates secured by the Denzons over said lots contained annotations of the right
of the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them.
It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the
annotations upon their title certificates, the Denzons, despite being the registered owners thereof, are not
entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which
they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent Vicente Lim as security for their
loans which they later on failed to pay. Hence, the title was cancelled and transferred in favor of Lim. In
1992, Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against officers of the AFP, also impleading
Republic.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lim as the owner of said Lot. CA sustained the RTC decision holding that
the Republic's act of evading its duty of paying what was due to the landowners for more than 50 years is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. Republic, through the OSG, filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari claiming to be the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent's predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940. - NO
HELD:
Eminent Domain; Due Process; One of the basic principles in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law, and in expropriation cases, an essential element
of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use;
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair.—One of the basic
principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without
due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our
Constitution mandates: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” The
Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-
in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it
evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in
the expropriation pro ceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a
century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when
such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest were given a “run around” by the Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950, despite
the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of
the claim of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in
granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
Same; Same; Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.—The Court of
Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as “just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered ‘just.’ ” In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property
precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable
time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
Same; Same; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power and should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the
property owner.—Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution
is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual’s rights.
Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
Same; Same; Failure of the Republic to pay the landowner and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57
years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.—In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia this Court ruled
that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: “x x x The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint” x x x. The second phase of the
eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, “the process is not completed
until payment of just compensation.” Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
The Republic’s failure to pay just compensation for 57 years cannot but be construed as a deliberate
refusal to pay which makes the recovery of possession in order.—The Republic now argues that under
Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its
fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that “non-payment of just compensation (in an
expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated
lots.” This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It
bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the
expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We
cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under
such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery
of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one
claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry is made and the party
condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to
have the compensation assessed and paid.
Same; Same; It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.—The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the
military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained. It must be
emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public convenience. In Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we ruled: “One of the basic
principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not
justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need,
subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. The right covers the
person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to
his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Same; Same; The special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle the landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lot from the Republic.—We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift
and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest,
though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up
call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private
rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guard ian of the people’s right,
will not stand still in the face of the Republic’s oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in
this case.
While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where the government failed to pay
just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of his property.—In
summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,” however, in cases where the government
failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.”
To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.” Republic vs. Lim, 462 SCRA
C1B CASE TITLE: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority V CA
FACTS:
On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding to the
CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and
improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in
the expropriation case.
Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name.
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was
made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941.
Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.
Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred.
Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.
In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging,
that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug
Airport.
As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands

adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by Chiongbian.
Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their
lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners,
including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.”
It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Some of the defendants-landowners
appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their
expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the
compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of
reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged
written agreement]. Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name
of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its name.
However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-
interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to
restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon
reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer
of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff. MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which
affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.
ISSUE/S: Petioner questions whether or not:

1. THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS A
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT AND IGNORING PETITIONER’S PROTESTATIONS THAT
ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT’S ORAL EVIDENCE IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER THE STATUE OF
FRAUDS.
2. THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFIED JUDGMENT SHOULD INURE TO THE
BENEFIT OF CHIONGBIAN EVEN IF SHE WAS NOT A PARTY IN SAID APPEALED CASE, and in
RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF CHIONGBIAN TO REPURCHASE SHOULD BE UNDER THE SAME
TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE OTHER LANDOWNERS
3.Whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated entitles
CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; When land has been acquired for public use in fee
simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains
no rights in the land.—When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate
or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
Same; Same; Same; The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in
fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines.—The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and
granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed
to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the
same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used
other than as the Lahug airport.
XIV. Genuine Necessity
Municipality of Meycauyan v. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
As early as City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) this Court held that the foundation of the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor
De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 1980
There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment
of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: “Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.” It is recognized, however that the government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken.
“choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
It is based on the recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the
extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. x x x
Republic v. De Knecht, GR 87351, 12 February 1990

The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in
the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had
been completed.
Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control
problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. x x x The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said
expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from EDSA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated
supervening events after the rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht.
De La Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, GR 136349, 23 January 2006

There is a failure to establish that there is genuine necessity when the basis for passing the ordinance authorizing the
expropriation indicates that the intended beneficiary is a private, non-profit organization, and not residents of the
locality—the purpose therefore is clearly not public.—We hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued
by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are
desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available.
C1C* Municipality of Meycauyan v. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
FACTS:
In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a
length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879.
The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various
finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge
components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed
Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by
TCT 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in
turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter.
On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or
annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976,
disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan.
The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the
aforesaid parcels of land.
On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D.
Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land.
The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the
Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
VI, a special civil action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National
Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the municipality.
On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and
appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just
compensation for the property.
PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review.
On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for
reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed.
The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as
there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road.
The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal
for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for
review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.
ISSUE/S:
Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property for the purpose of a connecting road, in light of
other appropriate lots for the purpose.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned resolution
of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is limited to review of errors of law; Exceptions to the finality of findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals.—The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited
to the review of errors of law (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15, 24), factual issues not being proper
in certiorari proceedings (See Ygay, et al. v. Hon. Escareal, et al., 135 SCRA 78, 82). This Court reviews and rectifies
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals only under certain established exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts: and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee (Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
88).
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is genuine necessity therefor.—As early as City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) this Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise
the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor (Republic v. La Orden de PP.
Benedictos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413).
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.—In the recent case of De
Knecht v. Bautista, (100 SCRA 660) this court further ruled that the government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
Citing the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration (supra), the Court held: “x x x With due
recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular properly to be taken and how much thereof may
be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of
such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow.”
C1D* De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
FACTS:
In 1970 the government through the Department of Public Workmen's and Communication (now MPH) to
extend the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard.
That the proposed extension, an adjunct of building program, the Manila — Cavite Coastal Read Project,
would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this route would be a straight one taking into account
the direction of EDSA
Later the government decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
which are lined with old substantial houses.
The petitioner upon learning of the changes of the plan, he thus filed on April 15, 1977 a formal petition to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoption, the original plan of
making the extension of EDSA through Araneta Avenue instead of the new plan going through Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets
The President then referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for investigation and
recommendation; that after formal hearings it submitted a report recommending the reversion of the extension of
EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue; and that notwithstanding the said report and
recommendation, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA
go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
In defending the change of the EDSA extension to pass through Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets, the
Ministry stated that the Government would save Php 2 Million on the route change.
The government filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint for expropriation against the owners
of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them the herein petitioner.
The herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss dated March 19, 1979 and An urgent motion dated March 28,
1979 for preliminary junction.
Subsequently, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property sought to be
expropriated on the ground that said Republic had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank.
The CFI issued a writ of possession dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take
and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be condemned.
Petitioner Cristina De Knecht thus filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul the order of
immediate possession issued by Judge Pedro Bautista of the CFI Branch 3 of Rizal in favor of the Republic.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the change of alignment of the EDSA Extension from Cuneta Avenue to Del Pan Street is Justifed
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of June 14,
1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the posses sion of the properties sought to be
condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case
No. 7001-P, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, et al.” except to dismiss
said case.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Expropriation; Right of the government to expropriate property upon payment of just
compensation; Right should not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily.—There is no question as to the right of
the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section
2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.” It is recognized, however that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose what private property should be taken.
Executive Department; Ministry of Public Highways; Extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard project;
Extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to pass thru Fernando Rein—Del Pan Sts. instead of along Cuneta
Avenue, is arbitrary; Reasons; Grave abuse of discretion of judge in allowing the government to take immediate
possession of the properties to be expropriated along affected streets.—It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA
along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground so social impact. The improvements and buildings along
Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels. Even granting, arguendo, that more people will be
affected, the Human Settlements Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the
National Housing Authority and other government agencies in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely
affected. x x x From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements
Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein—Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate
possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
C1E* Republic v. De Knecht, GR 87351, 12 February 1990
FACTS:
On February 20, 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceeding proceedings against the
owners of the houses, which includes Cristina De Knecht, standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets.
On March 19, 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal,
prematureness of the complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the property.
In June 1979, the republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on
the grounds that it already made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount
of compensation stated in the complaint in which the lower court granted.
On July 1979, de Knecht filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the lower court. On October 30, 1980,
the Supreme Court rendered granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa
Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not an expropriation proceeding that was determined by final judgement may be the subject of a
subsequent legislation for expropriation
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 28, 1988 and its resolution dated March 9, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the order of Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil Case No. 7001-P dated
September 2, 1983 is hereby reinstated without pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
Political Law; Eminent Domain; B.P. 340; Expropriation of lands by the government may be undertaken not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners, but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation. B.P. 340 superseded the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in De Knecht vs.
Bautista.—There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht vs. Bautista,
G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the
EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
It is based on the recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line
of the extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. x
xx
While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it
is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws.
Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land
owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the very properties subject of
the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred
after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando
Rein-Del Pan Streets.
The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All
residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the
EDSA extension had been completed.
Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood
control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. x x x The Court finds justification in proceeding
with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from EDSA to Roxas Boulevard
due to the aforestated supervening events after the rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht.
B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And the trial
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment
of B.P. Blg. 340. Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter
(over two years later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to
the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must
yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
C1F* De La Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, GR 136349, 23 January 2006
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters
located in Pasig.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the Pasig LGU, notified Masikip of its intention to expropriate a 1,500
square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents
of Barangay Caniogan, pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of
Pasig.
On March 23, 1994, the Pasig LGU wrote another letter to but this time the purpose was allegedly " in line
with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community."
On May 2, 1994, Masikip sent a reply to the Pasig LGU stating that the intended expropriation of her property
is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, the Pasig LGU reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, the Pasig LGU filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation,
docketed as SCA No. 873. It prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the
condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation;
and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, Masikip filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint of which was denied by the RTC in an
order dated May 7, 1996 on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and
recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.
Masikip filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC which led her to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the Petition and it also denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Masikip.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not genuine necessity exists to justify the expropriation of the property of Masikip by the LGU of Pasig
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
respondent City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED.
RULING:
Eminent Domain; The motion to dismiss contemplated in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court clearly constitutes a
responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation.—Petitioner filed her
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996.
At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: “SEC. 3. Defenses and objections.—Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an
answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the
right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and
defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff’s attorney of record and
filed with the court with proof of service.” The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes
the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the
pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant’s property for the use specified in the
complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiff’s attorney of record. It is
the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.
Pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues; What the trial
court should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a
genuine necessity for taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public
use and appointing commissioners to fix the compensation.—The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint,
“specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use.”
Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues.
What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is
indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for
public use and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so considering that the purpose
of the expropriation was squarely challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss. Significantly, the
above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended
by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates
that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.
Local Government Units; The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government
which has the authority to delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and
public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations.— Local governments have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern:
(a) the adequacy of the compensation,
(b) the necessity of the taking, and
(c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
Question of Necessity; The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity.— In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,
we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must
be of a public character.
Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the
property owner consistent with such benefit.”
There is a failure to establish that there is genuine necessity when the basis for passing the ordinance
authorizing the expropriation indicates that the intended beneficiary is a private, non-profit organization, and
not residents of the locality—the purpose therefore is clearly not public.—We hold that respondent City of Pasig
has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records
shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It
can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available.
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which
is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men; The genuine necessity for the
taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.—The right to own and possess property
is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every
nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property
is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property.
Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the
property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The
genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
XV. Priority in Expropriation
JIL v. Municipality of Pasig, GR 152230, 9 August 2005
A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its members
may still be expropriated.—We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a
school for its members.
Filstream International v. CA, 283 SCRA 716 (1998)
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is
Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which
specifically provide as follows:
“Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land.—Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:
(a)Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b)Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c)Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d)Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement
and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
e)Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(f)Privately-owned lands.
“Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.—The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further,
That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated
to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
C20*^ JIL v. Municipality of Pasig, GR 152230, 9 August 2005
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Cuancos.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor
to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor, filed an
expropriation of the property under R.A. No. 7160, deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property,
filed a motion to issue a writ of possession which was granted by the RTC, constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters.
In their answer, the Cuancos claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to
JILCSFI.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-
intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.
In its answer, JILCSFI averred, that the Respondent ’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular
class.
JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was
constructed in the middle portion and that the Respondent was not the real party-in-interest.
The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the Respondent for moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the Respondents. Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated
the case to the CA. the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a
valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint;
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without
prejudice to the refiling thereof.
RULING:
Actions; Appeals; While only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Supreme
Court in petitions for review on certiorari and that findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence
on record where it is shown that the conclusions are findings grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures
or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.—It must be stressed that only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari. Findings of fact of
the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Nonetheless,
where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on record.
Eminent Domain; The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.—The right of eminent
domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.
The nature and scope of such power has been comprehensively described as follows: . . . It is an indispensable
attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance
the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition.
The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use
do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without
limit.
Thus, our own Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”
Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of
this governmental power.
Local Government Units; The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and
against the condemnor—when the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the
express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained; The condemnor has the
burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.—The exercise of the right of
eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights.
It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law.
Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given
against the agency asserting the power.
The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor.
When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication
of the statute in which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the
right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided
by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Requisites for Valid Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain by Local Government Units.— The Court
declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government
unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement;
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract; The
offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating
the essential conditions of the proposed contract.—The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory
requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires
by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the
complaint. An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It
creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a
contractual obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of
contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require,
among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and
delay of a court action; A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.— The law is designed to
give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive
litigation.
This is a substantial right which should be protected in every instance. It encourages acquisition without litigation and
spares not only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation.
It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and
enjoyment of the property.
A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable
price must be made to the owner or his privy.
A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
A letter offered only to prove the municipality’s desire or intent to acquire a property for a right-of-way does
not prove that the LGU made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road
before filing the complaint for expropriation.—In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed
its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road.
The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code
is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the
property for a right-of-way.
The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property.
Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy
thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all
the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of the owner’s certificate of title is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer.—There is no legal
and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioner’s
TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole
world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who
acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it.
Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the
complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the municipality made a definite and valid offer to all the co-
owners of the property, the declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were already notified of the
intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.—Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners were
already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road,” a
substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-
owners of the property. In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid
offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a
compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its members
may still be expropriated.—We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated
by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its
members.
As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v.
Manila Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community
is a public use.”
Easements; Right-of-Way; Where property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the
expropriator is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the
New Civil Code—case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of
eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious.—The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road.
The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New
Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain
may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public
character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
The testimony of witnesses that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no
vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the property sought to be
expropriated is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road
in the area—absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.—The
respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The
witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one
can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly
constructed Damayan Street.
This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area.
After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s
property and not elsewhere.
We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable
access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said
portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
Due Process; Ocular Inspections; An ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and
the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial—where the property owner was not notified of any
ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative
weight.—As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was
conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the
trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof.
The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of
the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial.
Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any
factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based
on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
C21*^ Filstream International v. CA, 283 SCRA 716 (1998)
FACTS:
Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II
Manila.
On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of
land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final
and executory as no further action was taken beyond the CA.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of
Deed of Exchange against Filstream.
The City of Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo
Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of
Filstream.
The said properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development
Program of the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate
lands in Antonio Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the City.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion to dismiss was
premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public
use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment
suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was too
low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution.
The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which dismissed the
petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the
petition are blurred and unreadable.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence of a final and executory judgment
ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.
2. WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.
RULING:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Where substantial rights are affected, the stringent application of procedural
rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.—A strict adherence to the technical and procedural
rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial
rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over
the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of
Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds
is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the
expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where substantial rights
are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of
substantial justice.
Eminent Domain; The exercise of local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without
limitations.—We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the
acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems.
The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9,
1987 Constitution).” Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without
limitations.
Priority
“SECTION 19. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: x x x.” (Italics supplied).
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is
Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically
provide as follows:
“Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land.—Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a)Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b)Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c)Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d)Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
e)Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(f)Privately-owned lands.
“Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.—The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among
others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation
shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this
Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a
proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
XVI. Just Compensation
Heirs of Feliciano Jr. v. Land Bank, GR 215290
While the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the
different formula created by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) since the valuation of property or the
determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts, and not with
administrative agencies, it must explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed
factors and the applicable formula
Eslaban v. De Onorio, GR 146062, 28 June 2001
Just Compensation; With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or “that sum of money which a person,
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor.”
Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss.
C22*^ Heirs of Feliciano Jr. v. Land Bank, GR 215290, 11 January 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr., namely: Lourdes Feliciano Tudla, Gloria Feliciano Caudal, Gabriela
Feliciano Bautista, Angela Feliciano Lucas, Donna Celeste Feliciano-Gatmaitan, Cynthia Celeste Feliciano, and
Hector Reuben Feliciano (Feliciano heirs) are co-owners of a 300 hectare (ha.) parcel of agricultural land situated at F.
Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur.
In 1972, a 135.2583 ha. portion of the afore-mentioned land was classified as unirrigated riceland and placed
under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The Certificates of Land Transfer were distributed to the 84
tenant-beneficiaries in 1973 who were issued Emancipation Patents in 1989.
The DAR valued the subject land at P1,301,498.09, inclusive of interests, but the Feliciano heirs rejected the
said valuation.
The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Camarines Sur fixed the value of the subject
land at P4,641,080.465.
The RTC fixed the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05 and to pay 12% interest p.a. on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from January 1, 2010 until full payment.
The CA fixed the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05, plus legal interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) p.a computed from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the Decision, or the total amount of
₱8,316,876,97.
ISSUE/S:
● Whether or not the CA's determination of just compensation is correct
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision dated October 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122761
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2001-0359 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 23 for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set
in this Decision. The trial court is DIRECTED to conduct the proceedings in the said case with reasonable dispatch,
and to submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60) days from notice of
this Decision.
RULING:
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Case law states that when the
acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 is still incomplete — such as in this case, where the
just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled — just compensation should be determined and the
process be concluded under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.”— Case law states that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete
— such as in this case, where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled — just compensation
should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
“Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.”
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of
the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.— For
purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as amended, i.e.,
(a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
(d) the owner’s sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations,
(f) the assessment made by government assessors,
(g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must
be equally considered.
Regional Trial Court; Special Agrarian Courts; While the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) since the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and
justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and the applicable formula.— In
LBP v. Kho, 793 SCRA 651 (2016), the Court had succinctly explained the “cut-off rule” in the application of
Republic Act (RA) 9700: It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO No. 1, Series of 2010 which was issued in
line with Section 31 of RA 9700 empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and regulations for its
implementation, became effective only subsequent to July 1, 2009.
Consequently, it cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation for the subject land where the claim
folders were undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, and, as such, should be valued in accordance
with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off date set under DAR
AO 2, Series of 2009 (cut-off rule).
Notably, DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 did not expressly or impliedly repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, Series
of 2009, having made no reference to any cut-off date with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands
under PD No. 27 and EO No. 228 wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners.
Consequently, the application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those where the claim folders
were received on or subsequent to July 1, 2009.
Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the subject land was received by the LBP on December 2,
1997, or prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent DAR regulations
applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance.
While the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the
DAR since the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which
is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and justify in clear terms the reason for
any deviation from the prescribed factors and the applicable formula.
Cut off Rule
In LBP v. Kho,40 the Court had succinctly explained the “cut-off rule” in the application of RA 9700:
It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 which was issued in line with Section 31 of RA
9700 empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and regulations for its implementation, became effective
only subsequent to July 1, 2009. Consequently, it cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation for the
subject land where the claim folders were undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, and, as such, should
be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-
off date set under DAR AO 2, of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 did not expressly or
impliedly repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, Series of 2009, having made no reference to any cut-off date
with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands under PD 27 and EO 228 wherein valuation is subject to
challenge by landowners. Consequently, the application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those
where the claim folders were received on or subsequent to July 1, 2009. (Emphases and underlining supplied
C23*^ Eslaban v. De Onorio, GR 146062, 28 June 2001
FACTS:
Respondent is the owner of a lot in South Cotabato.
On October 6, 1981 Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main
irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot.
Respondent’s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The
NIA then paid respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and
improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh. 2). The same
year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement pursuant to Executive Order
No. 1035,
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but petitioner refused to pay.
Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the RTC, praying
that petitioner be ordered to pay as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal
constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the
plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering National Irrigation Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of
One Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as just compensation
for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIA which
used it for its main canal plus costs.
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 31, 2000, affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just compensation for the contested property be paid to
respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the time of taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality
of the decision?
RULING:
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the
filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals.—By reason of Rule 45, §4 of
the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to Rule 42, §2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of non-
forum shopping applies to the filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, such
as the one filed by petitioner.
The requirement in Rule 7, §5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal means
that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping.—The requirement in Rule 7, §5 that the
certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against
forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition
has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by
counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.
Corporation Law; Where the real party-in-interest is a body corporate, neither the administrator of the agency
or a project manager could sign the certificate against forum-shopping without being duly authorized by
resolution of the board of the corporation.—In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr.,
in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA.
However, the verification and certification against forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the
administrator of the agency.
The real party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by resolution of the
board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-
shopping accompanying the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Land Registration; Easements; Where the easement of a public highway,
way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof is not pre-existing and is
sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.—As this
provision says, however, the only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a “public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or
lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.” This
implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to
be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings
should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.
The rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously
that the government should do is to offer to buy it.—Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for
conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the
owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary
transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the
government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private
property in order to devote it to public use.
Just Compensation; With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled
to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or “that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor.”— Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid
to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where
the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
The value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, “whichever comes first.”—Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, “whichever came first.” Even before the new rule, however, it
was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its
value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for
the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing
of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in
its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos it was also the
property owner who brought the action for compensation against the government after 25 years since the taking of his
property for the construction of a road.
XVII. Determination of Just Compensation
C24*^ EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
FACTS:
Proclamation No.1811 was issued by President Marcos reserving a certain parcel of land of public domain in
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Mactan, Cebu the establishment of an export processing zone by Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA).
Certain parcels of land under said Proclamation were, however, registered in the name of San Antonio
Development Corporation to which EPZA offered to purchase but the parties failed to reach an agreement on this
A complaint for expropriation with a prayer for issuance of writ of possession against private respondent to
expropriate said parcels of land was then filed by EPZA To which respondent judge issued a writ of possession
authorizing the same
An order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated was also issued
Said commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of 15 pesos per square
meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.
EPZA objected to this contesting that ascertainment of amount of just compensation through commissioners
were already superseded by PD 1533 and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by it
Under PD 1533 the basis of just compensation shall be fair and current market value declared by the owner of
the property or such market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower and as such, EPZA stands that
there is no need to appoint commissioners.
ISSUE/S:
● Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 valid and
constitutional - NO
● Whether the courts under PD 1533 which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor
decreased, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by
the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose - YES
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Just Compensation; Meaning of just compensation.—Just Compensation means the equivalent
for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less,
than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
Provisions of PD Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 on just compensation unconstitutional and void; Court has the power
to determine just compensation and to appoint commissioners for the purpose.—The method of ascertaining just
compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends
to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Thus,
although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it
cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking.
However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is
always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is
just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned. "Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess
the just compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the
owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as
of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages—including
attorney's fees—from which the consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on
the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of
Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60).
In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation which the Court may consider
as one of the factors in arriving at 'just compensation/ as envisage in the Constitution.
In the words of Justice Barredo, 'Respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is
nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of
the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing.' (Lina v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344,
351; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80 SCRA 117)
Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of just compensation on the
value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in
the deprivation of the landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as
mandated by the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123).
The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
C25* Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, GR 172551, 15 January 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of
agricultural land (property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
49465. On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).
Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405, the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find
this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00; it used the property’s current market
value (as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted
that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the
LBP’s valuation.
The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for
the judicial determination of just compensation. The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at
₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of
Calamba City, Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the
RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the decision dated January 26, 2006 and the resolution dated May 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87530, and REMAND Agrarian Case No. SP-064 (02) to the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Branch 30, for its determination of just compensation under the terms of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, as amended. No costs.
RULING:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; As a general rule, the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law.—As a general rule, the
Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law. A question of law arises
when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not
allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is “whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law[.]” Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Special Agrarian Courts; The determination of just compensation is
fundamentally a judicial function. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the Regional Trial Court-Special
Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.— To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its
function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine
just compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its
implementation.
The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in determining just compensation into a
basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into account.
In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the
Regional Trial Court-Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SACs) are not granted unlimited discretion and must
consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657 — enumerated factors and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
formula that reflect these factors.—These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the
computation of the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform.
This uniform system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even
contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation.
This system will likewise ensure that the just compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation
of the full and real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the
landowner.
When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the Regional Trial Court-Special Agrarian Court
(RTC-SACs), however, are not strictly bound to apply the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) formula to
its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict application;
they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before
them.—They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law
and the rules have provided. The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial discretion should at all
times be distinguished from a situation where there is utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and
by the implementing rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC’s action already amounts to grave abuse of discretion for
having been taken outside of the contemplation of the law.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Generally, courts are not authorized to “take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge.”—The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not
authorized to “take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge.” They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the
facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must
observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Administrative Agencies; National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR); The National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) was tasked to carry out the state policy of providing electricity throughout the Philippines,
specifically, “to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of
electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis.—Civil Case No. 2326-96-C, decided by Branch 35, and Civil Case No. 2259-95-C, decided by
Branch 36, were both eminent domain cases initiated by the NAPOCOR under the power granted to it by
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 120, as amended by R.A. No. 6395, i.e., to acquire property or easement of right of
way. Under these laws, the NAPOCOR was tasked to carry out the state policy of providing electricity throughout the
Philippines, specifically, “to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of
electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide
basis[.]” In its decision in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C, Branch 36 accordingly recognized the NAPOCOR’s authority to
enter the property of the defendant GP Development Corporation and to acquire the “easement of right of way” in the
exercise of its powers.
Thus, in disposing of the case, Branch 36 adopted the recommendation of the appointed commissioners and ordered
the NAPOCOR to pay easement fee of P20.00 per square meter. Similarly recognizing this authority of
NAPOCOR,Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C likewise ordered NAPOCOR to pay easement fee of P20.00 per
square meter.
Evidently, the civil cases were not made under the provisions of the CARL nor for agrarian reform purposes, as
enunciated under R.A. No. 6657.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; In ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the
expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking.—In ascertaining just compensation, the fair market
value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The “time of taking” refers to that time when
the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property
or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The decision in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C, which pegged the valuation at P20.00 per square meter, was made in 1997.
The record did not disclose when title to the land subject of that case was transferred to the State. We can safely
assume, however, that the “taking” was made in 1997 (the date Branch 36 issued its decision) or at the time of the
filing of the complaint, which logically was prior to 1997.
Special Agrarian Courts; The original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the Regional Trial Court-Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC).—
We agree that the LBP is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all private lands
acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take the
matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication. Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the
RTC-SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by law and the
pertinent DAR regulations.
C26*^ Republic v. Macabagdal, GR 227215, 30 January 2018
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) computed from the time of the taking of the property until full payment
Petitioner, Republic, represented by DPWH filed complaint against an unknown owner for the expropriation
of a 200-square meter (sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City for the construction of the C-5
Northern Link Road Project, otherwise known as North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1, traversing from
Mindanao Avenue in Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City.
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted a writ of possession over the subject lot on May 5, 2008, and
was required to deposit with the court the amount of P550,000.00 representing the zonal value thereof (provisional
deposit)
On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor Macabagdal (respondent), represented by Eulogia Macabagdal
Pascual, was substituted as party-defendant upon sufficient showing that the subject lot is registered in her name who
did not oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional deposit
RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the subject lot, which
thereafter submitted its Commissioners' Report (Re: Just Compensation) 12 dated May 23, 2014, recommending a fair
market value of P9,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject lot, taking into consideration its location,
neighborhood and land classification, utilities, amenities, physical characteristics, occupancy and usage, highest and
best usage, current market value offerings, as well as previously decided expropriation cases of the same RTC
involving properties similarly situated in the same barangay.
RTC on Oct 30, 2014, found the recommendation of the commissioners to be reasonable and just, and
accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject lot at P9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to pay the
same, less the provisional deposit of P550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment
Petitioner appealed before the CA, questioning the just compensation of P9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of
twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent (6%) p.a. as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board.
CA,on September 13, 2016 affirmed RTS’s decision.
This instant petition claims that the CA did not rule on the issue of the applicable rate of interest which, in this case,
should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six
percent (6%) p.a. until full payment
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's imposition of interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 104473 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION imposing legal interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, as determined by the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008 to June 30,
2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. The rest of the CA’s Decision stands.
RULING:
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner
for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as
upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.— The purpose
of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As
such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking,
when the loss resulted. Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the
latter’s property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration to the
circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner’s loss
is not only his property, but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of
its value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The value
of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This shall
comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with
the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain.
Legal Interest; It is settled that the delay in the payment of just compensation amounts to an effective
forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference in the amount between the final
amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the government.—In this case, from the date
of the taking of the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, until
the just compensation therefor was finally fixed at P9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in
the amount of P550,000.00 (i.e., at P2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the “principal sum of the
just compensation,” warranting the imposition of interest. It is settled that the delay in the payment of just
compensation amounts to an effective forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference in
the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the government.
Legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but from the date of the issuance of the
Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be
established.—It bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but from
the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the
deprivation of property can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from
this date. Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid,
the just compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
C27*^ Napocor v. Spouses Chiong, GR 152436, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6395, as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power, the production of
electrical power from any source, particularly by constructing, operating, and maintaining power plants, auxiliary
plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations, and similar works to tap the power generated
from any river, creek, lake, spring, or waterfall in the country and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof.
Heirs of Agrifina Angeles did not dispute the purpose of NPC in instituting the expropriation proceedings.
However, they pointed out that NPC had already entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty with
an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less (Lot "A") and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square meters of the
adjacent property (Lot "B"). Respondents averred that the fair market value for both properties was ₱1,100.00 per
square meter or a total of ₱8,800,000.00 and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay them said amount.
The trial court :
(a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the land taken without first issuing an order of expropriation;
(b) adopted the compensation recommended by the two commissioners without a hearing; and (c) directed petitioner
to pay the full market value of the property instead of a mere easement fee.
ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October
26, 2001 as well as its resolution of February 26, 2002, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60716 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RULING:
Administrative Law; National Power Corporation; Due Process; Elements; The elements of due process are well
established.—The elements of due process are well established, viz.: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant or property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.—What is repugnant to due process
is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As pointed out that the petitioner was afforded this opportunity is beyond
question. Having failed to make use of this opportunity, the petitioner cannot justifiably claim now that its right to due
process has been violated.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Commissioners; The duty of the court in
considering the commissioners’ report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant
by its final judgment in the matter.—The duty of the court in considering the commissioners’ report is to satisfy
itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its
duty in this respect, the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular
circumstances of the case may require. Rule 67, Section 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that the
trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners’ report in any of the following ways: (1) it may accept the
same and render judgment therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it may: [a] recommit the report to the commissioners for
further report of facts; or [b] set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and
reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
Market Value; In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation
to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. —In eminent domain or
expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is
entitled to is the market value. Market value is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy,
and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” The
aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the
owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion
taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the
same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.
Just compensation is determined by the nature of the land at the time of taking.— It is the nature and character of the
land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
XVIII. When Determined
Ansaldo v. Tantuico, GR 50147, 3 August 1990
Rule on determination of just compensation; Reason for the rule.—lt is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat,
that the just compensation for the property is to be established.
(W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced
by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is
filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"
Napocor v. Tiangco, GR 170846, 6 February 2017
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if
there was no actual taking prior thereto.—In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint,
if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of
the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the
respondents. So it is that in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., 254 SCRA 577 (1996), we
ruled: Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many
rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the
complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, GR 142971, 7 May 2002
Just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.—In the case at bar, the applicable law as to
the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.
C28* Ansaldo v. Tantuico, GR 50147, 3 August 1990
FACTS:
Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening of a road more than
forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners, albeit without
protest by the latter.
The lots belong to Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names, and have
an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street
and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila.
Said owners made no move whatever until 26 years later. They wrote to ask for compensation for their land
on 22 January 1973.
Their claim was referred to the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion dated 22 February 1973, that just
compensation should be paid in accordance with Presidential Decree (PD) 76, and thus advised that the corresponding
expropriation suit be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the Ansaldos.
Pursuant to the said opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial Assessor of
Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos' property in accordance with PD 76.
The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the
Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the "current
and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking."
The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. In a decision handed down on 26
September 1973, the Acting Chairman ruled that "the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots," i.e.
1947. The ruling was reiterated by the Commission on 8 September 1978, and again on 25 January 1979 when
it denied the Ansaldos' motion for reconsideration. The Ansaldos appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the valuation of just compensation should be determined at the time of taking in 1947, especially in light of
the absence of any expropriation proceeding undertaken before the said taking.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the challenged decision of the Commission on Audit is
AFFIRMED, and the Department of Public Works and Highways is DIRECTED to forthwith institute the appropriate
expropriation action over the land in question so that the just compensation due its owners may be determined in
accordance with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of
taking until full payment is made No costs.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Elements of "taking" present in the case at bar.—In the context of the
State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of
his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material material impairment of the value of his property or
when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof,
There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for
a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the
owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use,
there is taking within the Constitutional sense." Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldo's
property when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public
use.
Rule on determination of just compensation; Reason for the rule.—lt is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that
the just compensation for the property is to be established. As stated in Republic v. Philippine National Bank, "x x
(W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as
of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should be the basis for the
determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the
commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that
compensation 'be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never be operative. As intimated in
Republic v. Lara (supra), said provision contemplates 'normal circumstances/ under which 'the complaint coincides or
even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff/ " The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,
is that—"x x (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated
its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is
filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly
just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"
C29* Napocor v. Tiangco, GR 170846, 6 February 2017
FACTS:
Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and registered in
their names.
Petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose
Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way
will cut through the respondents’ land.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for
expropriation against them which the RTC issued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of
the area sought to be expropriated. Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal
Provincial Treasurer an amount representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation
prior to the possession.
The RTC rendered judgment expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area and
ordered the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by the
expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements on the land
expropriated. The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entitled “BIR
Circular of Appraisal,” which shows that for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that the lands valued at ₱30.00, ₱80.00,
₱100.00 per square meter respectively. NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate
appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters of land
affected is increased to ₱116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon is likewise
increased to P325,025.00.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED in part in that the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 14, 2005 vis-à-vis the award of P116,538.00, as and by way of just compensation for the 19,423
square meters of the respondents’ property, is SET ASIDE, and the case is ordered REMANDED to the court of origin
for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation for the portion thus taken, based on our
pronouncements hereon. The same decision, however, is AFFIRMED, insofar as it pertains to the award of
P325,025.00 for the improvements, with legal interest from the time of actual possession by the petitioner
RULING:
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the
complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto.—In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of
the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of
the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the
respondents. So it is that in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., 254 SCRA 577 (1996), we ruled:
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of
this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint
consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343
[1989]), the Court ruled that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be substantial,
ample and, as must apply to this case, real.—The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by
NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for the proper
determination of just compensation. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court ruled that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be substantial, full, ample and, as must apply to this case, real. This must be taken to mean, among others,
that the value as of the time of taking should be the price to be paid the property owner.
Words and Phrases; Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator.—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, or “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” The measure is not the taker’s gain,
but the owner’s loss. In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property
or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these values consist but
one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the
principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
Easement of Right of Way; Property; True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken.—In several cases, the
Court struck down NPC’s consistent reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential
Decree 938. True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents
would retain full
ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use
of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the
latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent
of the land taken.
Expropriation; If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the
property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the
probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the
owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.—While the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of
his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of
the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability
of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be
compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.
C2A*^ City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, GR 142971, 7 May 2002
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents
spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, for
the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.

The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower
court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on
the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
DISPOSITIVE POSITION:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; It is the Government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.—Eminent domain is a fundamental State
power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
Just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.—In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the
point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.

XIX. Manner of Payment
Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in
accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess
hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash,
the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty

(50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be
paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five

percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
Association of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1988)
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landwoner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value
DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995) –
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot
invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular
No. 9 for being null and void.
C2B*^ Association of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1988)
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of several measures like E.O. No. 228, P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229
and R.A. No. 6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In G.R. No. 7977
The petitioners in the said case are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds of
separation of powers, equal protection, due process and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Petitioners assailed the provisions of Sec. 18 of RA 6657
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is
the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a
just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45
(Emphasis supplied.)
In G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
provided in the Constitution is lodged in the Congress and not to the President. The petitioners also seek to prohibit
the implementation of Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners contend that the taking of the property
must be simultaneous with the payment of just compensation which Sec. 5 of E.O. No. 229 does not provide.
In G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said
E.O.s violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioner.
In G.R. No. 78742
Petitioner claims that they are unable to enjoy their right of retention because they cannot eject their tenants
due to the fact that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not issued the implementing rules required under
the said decree. The petitioners are therefore asking the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR
to issue the said rules
ISSUE/S:
WON the laws questioned are valid exercise of power of eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights
granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry.—In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions
for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. And as
established by judge-made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.
grarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.—The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law
has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for
the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
Pres. Aquino’s loss of legislative powers did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when she possessed it; Reasons.—The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when
the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
“midnight” enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and
the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say
that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in
force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto
become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino’s loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as
long as she possessed it.
Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure; Reasons.—That fund, as earlier noted, is
itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified
in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund,
for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits.—The
argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not
provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No.
6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by
the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents.—The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates
the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short
attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the
matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.—Finally, there is the
contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general
proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus
will lie to compel the dischrage of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In
other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a
public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the
duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by
mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an
unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a
court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in
the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose is not compensable.—There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City
of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the
NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent
domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power, deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power
of eminent domain.—The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined; Requisites of a valid classification.—Classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection.—Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have
not shown that they belong to a differ ent class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must
be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only
where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence
of the lawful subject and method.—It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less
important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.
Eminent Domain, defined.—Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there
is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case
an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot
accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to
assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to
the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that
the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Requirements for a proper exercise of power of eminent domain.—But for all its primacy and urgency, the power
of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional
injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Concept of political question.—A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political
departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in
the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Just Compensation, defined.—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but
the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
Requirements of compensable taking.—As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable
taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be
for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Determination of Just Compensation, addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other
branch.—To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may
not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to several
decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation
should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner,
whichever was lower.
The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution.—With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the
just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all
this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for
its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved
at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer’s
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money; Other modes
of payment.—Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment,
as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landwoner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are “negotiable at any time.”
The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Law repeats the requisites of registration but does not provide that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.—The complaint against the
effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that
Setion 4 of the Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration
as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register
the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary,
the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section
17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
Recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation.—The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to
retention limits; Case at bar.—In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the
appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are
factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not
covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the
Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A.
No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
C2C* DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995) - Landbank vs CA
FACTS:
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development Corporation or
AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of
DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending
summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank
to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. The CA found the
following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting
excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or"reserved" the compensation in their
names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must
be deposited in cash or in bonds.
On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making
power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e)
of RA 6657. Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos.
29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words"reserved/deposited" were also used.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has
filed for just compensation.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Statutory Construction; There is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term “deposit.”—
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to include a “trust account” among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a “trust account”
is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
“deposit.”
Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.—The conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or
the spirit of a legislative enactment.
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot
extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9.—In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of
the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being
null and void.
Social Justice; Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.—The promulgation of the “Association” decision endeavored
to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the
way for the true freedom of the farmer. But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and
clog the courts’ dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from
their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance
over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights
of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
C2D*^ Secretary of Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, 1 July 2013, Third
Division, Peralta [J]
FACTS:
Spouses Tecson were the owners of a certain land which was among the properties taken by the
government sometime in 1940 to be used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
The land was taken without their consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings.
The spouses demanded the payment of the fair market value of the same but the DPWH offered to pay at
the rate of P0.70 per square meter only which was the value of the property at the time of taking.
Consequently, the spouses filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed land with
damages.
The RTC dismissed the complaint.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the trial court for the
purpose of determining the just compensation to be awarded to the spouses.
The RTC found the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject
property which was based on its current market value. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the determination made
by the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the just compensation to be awarded is based on the current market value of the property.
RULING:
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.—Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is
applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.
This doctrine finds no application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’
claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public
use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule “that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated
sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.”
Expropriation; Just Compensation; The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not,
the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents
to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and
are estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power
was exercised.—When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the
remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the
aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question
the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from
assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left
to respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to
compensation. The only issue left for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.”—Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.”
This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property
owner who brings the action for compensation.
Just Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears
the cost of expropriation.—Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in
1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the
higher value which is P1,500.00.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be
receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding
against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property
owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears
the cost of expropriation.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation of the subject
property owned by respondents shall be P0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
C2E*^ Secretary of Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, 21 April 2015, En
Banc Resolution, Peralta [J]
FACTS:
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
In a letter dated December 15, 1994,respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of
the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering
District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants
demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value. Hence, the
complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-movants were able to
obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property
valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per
annum.
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Tecson imploring the Supreme
Court to take a second look at its Decision in their complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed
property with damages in which the said court ordered that the valuation of the subject property owned by
them shall be P0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
The spouses insist that gross injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be
based simply on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking.
Hence, they suggest that a happy middle ground be achieved by meeting the need for doctrinal
precision and the thirst for substantial justice.
ISSUE/S:
● Should the value of the property be the amount during the time of actual taking, considering the significant
difference of the value from the time of actual taking to the present?
● Does the government’s taking of private property without the proper use of expropriation proceedings nullify
the government’s use of the power of eminent domain?
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Fair Market Value; The Supreme Court (SC) has
uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of
computing just compensation.—In Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) v. Philippine National Railways
(PNR), 573 SCRA 341 (2008), PNR entered the property of Forfom in January 1973 for railroad tracks, facilities and
appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service without initiating expropriation proceedings. In 1990,
Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or damages against PNR. In Eusebio v. Luis,
603 SCRA 576 (2009), respondent’s parcel of land was taken in 1980 by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal
road without the appropriate expropriation proceedings. In 1996, respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance and/or
damages against the city government and the mayor. In Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Rodriguez,
483 SCRA 619 (2006), in the early 1970s, petitioner implemented expansion programs for its runway, necessitating
the acquisition and occupation of some of the properties surrounding its premises. As to respondent’s property, no
expropriation proceedings were initiated. In 1997, respondent initiated a case for accion reivindicatoria with damages
against petitioner. In Republic v. Sarabia, 468 SCRA 142 (2005), sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) took possession and control of a portion of a lot situated in Aklan, registered in the name of respondent,
without initiating expropriation proceedings. Several structures were erected thereon, including the control tower, the
Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal, and the Headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security
Group. In 1995, several stores and restaurants were constructed on the remaining portion of the lot. In 1997,
respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against the storeowners wherein ATO
intervened claiming that the storeowners were its lessees. These cases stemmed from similar background, that is,
government took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without initiating expropriation
proceedings and without payment of just compensation; while the landowners failed for a long period of time to
question such government act and later instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages. In these cases, the
Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of
computing just compensation.
The true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when
the loss resulted.—Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA. While disparity in the
above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-movants as they would be receiving such
outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward
the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property,
as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
When property is taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for
the property and the potential income lost.—Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner
for appropriating the latter’s property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just compensation
does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately
bears the cost of expropriation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that the owner’s loss is not only his
property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must
immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. Accordingly, in Apo
Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), we held that the rationale for imposing the
interest is to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for
their properties at the time of the taking.
The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on the part of the State — a proper
subject of interest computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation is paid —
in order to eradicate the issue of the constant variability of the value of the currency over time.—The just
compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on the part of the State — a proper subject of
interest computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation is paid — in order
to eradicate the issue of the constant variability of the value of the currency over time. In the Court’s own words: The
Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be
computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969.
This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed,
being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time.
It is important to note, however, that interest shall be compounded at the time judicial demand is made
pursuant to Article 2212 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (CCP).—It is important to note, however, that
interest shall be compounded at the time judicial demand is made pursuant to Article 2212 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, and sustained in Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), then later on in Nacar
v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), save for the reduction of interest rate to 6% for loans or forbearance of
money, thus: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
The award of interest on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment is adequate
compensation to respondents-movants for the deprivation of their property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings.—Clearly, the award of interest on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until
full payment is adequate compensation to respondents-movants for the deprivation of their property without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings. Such interest, however meager or enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and
unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence — standards that have taken
into account fairness and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forbearance of money. Thus, adding the
interest computed to the market value of the property at the time of taking signifies the real, substantial, full and ample
value of the property. Verily, the same constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain
and serves as a basic measure of fairness.
Additional compensation shall be awarded to respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees in view of the government’s taking without the benefit of expropriation proceedings.—
Additional compensation shall be awarded to respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
in view of the government’s taking without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. As held in Eusebio v. Luis, an
irregularity in an expropriation proceeding cannot ensue without consequence. Thus, the Court held that the
government agency’s illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely resulted in
pecuniary loss to the owner.
The Supreme Court (SC) is not unaware that at present, stringent laws and rules are put in place to ensure that
owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just
compensation.—This Court is not unaware that at present, stringent laws and rules are put in place to ensure that
owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.
Specifically, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 (R.A. 8974), which took effect on November 26, 2000, provides
sufficient guidelines for implementing an expropriation proceeding.
Expropriation Proceedings; To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would
certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the
greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner.—We emphasize that the government’s failure, to initiate the necessary expropriation
proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given
that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of
lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of
which is to serve the greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is neither tantamount to condoning
the acts of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in disregarding the property rights of
respondents-movants nor giving premium to the government’s failure to institute an expropriation proceeding.
—We hold that putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is neither tantamount to
condoning the acts of the DPWH in disregarding the property rights of respondents-movants nor giving premium to
the government’s failure to institute an expropriation proceeding. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine
that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic
policies — a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
As we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the case at bar, hence,
should be upheld.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
[C2F*^] Republic v. Lim, GR 161656, 29 June 2005, supra.
FACTS:
● On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines instituted a special civil action for expropriation with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, involving Lots of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City,
for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army.
● After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, the Republic took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as
just compensation.
● In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for
rentals for the two lots, but it “denied knowledge of the matter.”
● Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim.
● In 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay
the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in money
value from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6%
interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
● Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to Vicente Lim for failure to
pay. In 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and
exclusive possession of the property. In 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners
elevated the case to the CA but the Ruling of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his property when the
party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon.
RULING:
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration; A second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.—
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we reiterate that its urgent
motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited
under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: “Sec. 2. Second motion
for reconsideration.—No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained.” Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners’
petition was already denied with finality.
Eminent Domain; Due Process; One of the basic principles in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of
his private property without due process of law, and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that
there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use; Undoubtedly, over 50 years of
delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair.—One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is
that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an
essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: “Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.” The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner
with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment
in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has
passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of
delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by
bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were given a
“run around” by the Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two
lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. Even
President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to
expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
Same; Same; Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of
the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.—The Court of Appeals is correct
in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as “just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’ ” In jurisdictions
similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held
that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
Same; Same; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power and should therefore be
strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.—
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation
of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of
governmental powers to the detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be
strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
Same; Same; Failure of the Republic to pay the landowner and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years
rendered the expropriation process incomplete.—In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia this Court ruled that the
expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: “x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint” x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, “the process is not completed until payment
of just compensation.” Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Same; Same; The Republic’s failure to pay just compensation for 57 years cannot but be construed as a deliberate
refusal to pay which makes the recovery of possession in order.—The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza,
respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of
course, we are aware of the doctrine that “non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots.” This is our ruling in the recent cases
of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the
facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice,the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate
refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held
that recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent
domain or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.
Same; Same; It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public convenience.
—The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the military, as in this case,
public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained. It must be emphasized that an individual cannot
be deprived of his property for the public convenience. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we ruled: “One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights
of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and
his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added
protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.”
Same; Same; The special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle the landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic.—We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective
relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or
negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the people’s right, will not stand still in the face of the
Republic’s oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case.
Same; Real Estate Mortgages; Any person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation does so at his own
risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government; Until the action for
expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the
registered owner who can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property
subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.—Assuming that respondent had indeed
knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving
Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an
expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the
government. Here, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot
932 upon its payment of a “reasonable market value.” It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising
their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem
Investment Corporation, we recognized the owner’s absolute right over his property pending completion of the
expropriation proceeding, thus: “It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the
government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the
property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to
acquire it through expropriation.”
Same; Same; A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the principal
obligation, and one of its characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property.—For respondent’s part, it is
reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the
extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of
the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property
regardless of who its owner may subsequently be. Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately
expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code
provides: “Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the
rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or
owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with
the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the
mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person.”
Same; While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owner
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of his property.—In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is
that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots,” however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property
and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just
compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just.”
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto. The
Republic’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No further
pleadings will be allowed
[C30*^] Napocor v. Heirs of Sangkay, GR 165828, 24 August 2011, supra.
FACTS:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under RA No 6395, National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus
River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the
construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.
On Nov 54, 1997, respondents, Heirs of Sangkay, as the owners of the land with an area of 221,573m² in
Dituculan, Iligan City, sued NPC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation.
Respondents alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of the petitioners
traversed their land; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; and that
the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land.
Petitioner countered that the respondents had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of RA No 6395, and
that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been
constructed in 1979.
• RTC Ruling: NPC to pay the Heirs of Sangkay’s land (PhP500 per sqm) actual damages or just compensation,
monthly rental (PhP30,000) from 1979 to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum, moral damages (PhP200,000),
exemplary damages (PhP200,000), and attorney’s fees (15% of the total amount awarded).
o NPC has concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 from the Heirs of Sangkay and had since
continuously denied its existence;
o That NPC had acted in bad faith by taking possession of the subterranean portion of their land to
construct the tunnel without their knowledge and prior consent;
o That existence of the tunnel has affected the entire expanse of the land, and has restricted their right to
excavate or to construct a motorized deep well; and
o That they, as owners, had lost the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of the land
(because Federation of Arabic Madaris School rejected their offer to sell the land, Global Asia Mgt and Resource
Corp withdrew from developing the land into a housing project, Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the PH
refused to accept it a collateral, and respondents and their workers were forced to relocate to safer grounds due to the
danger the tunnel poses.)
• CA Ruling: Appeal is denied for lack of merit and affirmed RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an underground tunnel traversing the respondents’
land constructed by petitioner; and
2. WON the respondents’ right to claim just compensation had prescribed under sec 3(i) of RA No. 6395 or
under Art 620 and 646 of the NCC.
RULING:
Appeals; Factual findings and determinations by the Regional Trial Court as the trial court are generally binding on
the Supreme Court, particularly after the Court of Appeals affirmed them.—The existence of the tunnel underneath the
land of the Heirs of Macabangkit, being a factual matter, cannot now be properly reviewed by the Court, for questions
of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari. Moreover, the factual findings and determinations by
the RTC as the trial court are generally binding on the Court, particularly after the CA affirmed them. Bearing these
doctrines in mind, the Court should rightly dismiss NPC’s appeal.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; National Power Corporation; Statutes; R.A. No. 6395; Statutory Construction;
The Court of Appeals’ restrictive construal of Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 as exclusive of tunnels was obviously
unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the
earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels—when the law does not distinguish, so must we not, and when the
language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.—A cursory reading shows
that Section 3(i) covers the construction of “works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume,
street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require.” It is
notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works. Accordingly, we
consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that can enable or
help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3.
The CA’s restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision
applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean
works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, so must we not. Moreover, when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity,
and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that
the Congress intended to convey.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act
No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation.—
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
Same; Same; Inverse Condemnation; Damages; Words and Phrases; Inverse condemnation, or the action to recover
just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency, is different from the action for damages—the former has
the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency, while the latter action seeks to
vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
—The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong
through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is
exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations
in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is
held responsible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the action to
recover just compensation does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is
not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation; It
would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for
private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.—The two actions are radically
different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action
for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its
power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a
right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the
suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the
taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution
to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory
prescription.
Same; Same; Same; Taking; Words and Phrases; It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation—the expropriator’s action may be short of
acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking; Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.—We agree with both the RTC and the
CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical
possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the
property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly
deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or
in any respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard, the
RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of
the property was at the time of the filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.
Same; Same; Same; Where the expropriator entered the property without the intention of formally expropriating the
land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the owners, reckoning just compensation, as a measure of
simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse
condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted—such manner of entry by the expropriator denied elementary due
process of law to the owners since that time until the latter commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings.—The
RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The
CA did not dwell on the reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its
decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when
it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused
to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior
knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners
since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the
necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners.
As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at
the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
Same; Same; The award of interest—fixed at 12% per annum—on the amount of just compensation renders the grant
of back rentals unwarranted.—Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of
the land being already justly compensated. Conformably with the ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v.
Rodriguez, 483 SCRA 619 (2006), in which the award of interest was held to render the grant of back rentals
unwarranted, we delete the award of back rentals and in its place prescribe interest of 12% interest per annum from
November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. The imposition of
interest of 12% interest per annum follows a long line of pertinent jurisprudence, whereby the Court has fixed the rate
of interest on just compensation at 12% per annum whenever the expropriator has not immediately paid just
compensation.
Judgments; Damages; Failure of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to render the factual and legal
justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions immediately demands the striking
out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the
law on which it is based—without the factual and legal justifications, the awards are exposed as the product of
conjecture and speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.—The RTC did not state any factual and
legal justifications for awarding to the Heirs of Macabangkit moral and exemplary damages each in the amount of
P200,000.00. The awards just appeared in the fallo of its decision. Neither did the CA proffer any justifications for
sustaining the RTC on the awards. We consider the omissions of the lower courts as pure legal error that we feel
bound to correct even if NPC did not submit that for our consideration. There was, to begin with, no factual and legal
bases mentioned for the awards. It is never trite to remind that moral and exemplary damages, not by any means
liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine, always require evidence that establish the circumstances under which the
claimant is entitled to them. Moreover, the failure of both the RTC and the CA to render the factual and legal
justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions immediately demands the striking
out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the
law on which it is based. Without the factual and legal justifications, the awards are exposed as the product of
conjecture and speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Concepts; Ordinary and Extraordinary Concepts of Attorney’s Fees, Distinguished;
Words and Phrases; The inclusion of the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees in the trial court’s judgment among the
liabilities of National Power Corporation (NPC) converted the fees to extraordinary, and the Court expresses its
discomfort that the Court of Appeals did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.—In
assessing attorney’s fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents, the RTC casually disregarded the fundamental
distinction between the two concepts of attorney’s fees—the ordinary and the extraordinary. These concepts were
aptly distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, 579 SCRA 509 (1997), thuswise:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made,
such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. By referring to the
award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20% to 15%, the RTC was really referring to a supposed
agreement on attorney’s fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. As such, the concept of attorney’s
fees involved was the ordinary. Yet, the inclusion of the attorney’s fees in the judgment among the liabilities of NPC
converted the fees to extraordinary. We have to disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express our discomfort that the
CA did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, nor should an
adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of attorney’s fees to the winning party—no premium should be placed on
the right to litigate; The Supreme Court, in supervising the lower courts, possesses the ample authority to review legal
matters like this one even if not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.—An award of attorney’s fees
has always been the exception rather than the rule. To start with, attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit. Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of attorney’s fees to the winning party.
The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Too, such fees, as part of
damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Art. 2208, Civil Code. Indeed, attorney’s fees are in the nature
of actual damages. But even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his rights, attorney’s fees may still be withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s
persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. And, lastly, the trial court
must make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. What this demands is that the
factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo but also in the text of the
decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. Sound policy dictates that
even if the NPC failed to raise the issue of attorney’s fees, we are not precluded from correcting the lower courts’
patently erroneous application of the law. Indeed, the Court, in supervising the lower courts, possesses the ample
authority to review legal matters like this one even if not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Contingent Fees; Words and Phrases; A contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in writing
by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the
success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right—contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without
which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit; Quantum meruit—literally meaning as much as
he deserves—is used as basis for determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement;
The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from
running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on
the part of the attorney himself.—Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorney’s
fees was contingent. Yet, a contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or
defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the attorney can only
recover on the basis of quantum meruit. With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written
agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorney’s
fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit. Quantum meruit—literally meaning as much as he deserves—is used
as basis for determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of
the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing
the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Same; Same; Same; In the instant case, it is Atty. Dibaratun, not Atty. Ballelos, who is entitled to the full amount of
attorney’s fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney, given the amount and quality of his legal work, his
diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of the clients’ cause, notwithstanding
that some of the clients might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment.—In
fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of
Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients’ cause to its successful end. It is he,
not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of attorney’s fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney.
Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his
prosecution of the clients’ cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to
have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment. Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu,
Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who engaged him. The Court considers his work in the
case as very minimal. His compensation under the quantum meruit principle is fixed at P5,000.00, and only the Heirs
of Macabangkit earlier named are liable to him.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 5, 2004 by the Court
of Appeals, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit: (a) Interest at the rate of 12% per annum is
IMPOSED on the principal amount of P113,532,500.00 as just compensation, reckoned from the filing of the
complaint on November 21, 1997 until the full liability is paid; (b) The awards of P30,000.00 as rental fee,
P200,000.00 as moral damages, and P200,000.00 as exemplary damages are DELETED; and (c) The award of 15%
attorney’s fees decreed to be paid by National Power Corporation to the Heirs of Macabangkit is DELETED. The
Court PARTLY GRANTS the motion to register attorney’s lien filed by Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun, and FIXES
Atty. Dibaratun’s attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit at 10% of the principal award of P113,532,500.00.
The motion to register attorney’s lien of Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos is PARTLY GRANTED, and Atty. Ballelos is
DECLARED ENTITLED TO RECOVER from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, all surnamed
Macabangkit, the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. Costs of suit to be paid by
the petitioner.
XX. Trial With Commissioners
C31*^ Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
FACTS:
October 29, 1974 – A complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against 42
defendants with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila alleging that petitioner needs
portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters to construct a
230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal.
Petitioner offered to pay compensation but the parties failed to reach an agreement.
Respondent judge, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners, arrived at the
amount of just compensation on its own, merely basing the amount from competent evidence.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of
just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable
value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to due process.
It stressed that the respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just
compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the
Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation
proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; The principal issue in an expropriation case.—In an expropriation case
such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.
Findings of Commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the
latter may only do so for valid reason.—While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and
the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the
Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila
Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
Due Process; Trial with the aid of the Commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.—Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not
be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the
commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that
may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the
absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.
Respondent judge’s act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a
Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and is a gross
violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
C32*^ NPC v. Henson, GR 129998, 29 December 1998
FACTS:
On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation initiated with the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, a
complaint for eminent domain for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned or claimed by
respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
The respondents, 5 couples, were the owners.
The petitioner tried to fix the value of the land but was met of a price of 180 to 250 pesos due to the
respondents. The respondents also filed a motion to dismiss.
In the trial court, the motion to dismiss was quashed. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the
land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 sqm. The petitioner deposited the amount. The trial court
allowed respondents a motion to withdraw P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00 as the purchase value.
3 commissioners were then authorized by the trial court to determine the provisional value of the land for just
compensation. The values were in 350, 375, and 170 per sqm from Tiglao, Atienza and Orocio.
In May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by
petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest
from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney’s fees of P20,000.00,
and costs of the proceedings.
The CA merely deleted the attorney’s fees.
ISSUE/S:
What is the just compensation for the taking of respondents’ property for the expansion of the NPCs Mexico Sub-
station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga?
RULING:
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.—The parcels of land sought to be
expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the
Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature and character of
the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
Notes.—The general rule in determining “just compensation” in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, which normally coincides with the taking. (National Power Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577 [1996])
The Supreme Court has defined the elements of “taking” as the main ingredient in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. (Id.)
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within the recognized
exceptions. (Id.)
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of the

Court of Appeals and that of the trial court subject of the appeal are hereby MODIFIED.
C33* Napocor v. Spouses De la Cruz, GR 156093, 2 February 2007
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC/NAPOCOR) decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions
of land within Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote
230 kV Transmission Line Project.
It filed a complaint for eminent domain and expropriation against respondents as registered owners of land
totaling 84.425 sqm.
Respondents filed Answers and NPC deposited P5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in
accordance with Sec. 2 Rule 67.
Trial court granted and issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and
respondent Ferrer.
However, it dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in view of
the Motion to Intervene filed by Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land.
Trial court terminated pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that the sole issue
was the amount of just compensation. It also directed the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to
respondent SK Dynamics’ property.
As to the just compensation for Saulog’s property, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, it ordered
the latter and NPC to submit their compromise agreement.
Commissioners assessed the fair market value of the SK Dynamics’ properties to be P10,000.00/sq.m.
Records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence, nor did
they conduct hearings. In fact, they did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide them the
opportunity to argue their respective causes.
Upon submission of commissioners’ report, NPC was not notified of its completion or filing, nor given any
opportunity to file objections.
Respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the commissioners’ report with respect to the valuation of
his property. The trial court issued the Order approving the report, and granted Ferrer’s motion to adopt it.
Subsequently, the just compensation was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
Incidentally, SK Dynamics filed a motion informing the trial court that in addition to the portion of its
property sought to be expropriated by petitioner, the latter also took possession of an 8.55-square meter portion of SK
Dynamics’ property for the same purpose.
SK Dynamics prayed that said portion be included in the computation of the just compensation, which RTC
Imus granted.
NPC filed MR, which the trial court denied. Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, NPC filed an
appeal before the CA. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE/S:
WON petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present evidence on the reasonable value of the
expropriated property before the board of commissioners. – YES
WON the legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient. – YES
RULING:
Certiorari; Where issue includes expenditure of public funds, non-filing of Motion for Reconsideration with
Court of Appeals may be overlooked.—In view of the significance of the issues raised in this petition, because this
case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that
petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, and brush aside this
technicality in favor of resolving this case on the merits.
Expropriation; Evidence; Eminent Domain; In expropriation cases, appointment of Commissioners and

permitting all parties to submit evidence is indispensable.—The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant
expropriation case, where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the
commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is
true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to
the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, “trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right
that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.” In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was
conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners’ findings.
Value of surrounding lots of land to be expropriated must be stated in Commissioners’ report.—Therefore, it is clear
that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the commissioners’ ocular inspection of
the properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners’ October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the
said report is a serious error considering that the recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no
strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard
Golf and Country Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited.
Also, the report did not show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and the residential and commercial
zoning could have added value to the lots being expropriated.
“Highest and best” method determined from testimony of realtors, tax declarations, actual sales of nearby lots, BIR
zonal valuation, etc.—The trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of the “highest and best use”
method to determine the just compensation in expropriation cases. No attempt was made to justify the recommended
“just price” in the subject report through other sufficient and reliable means such as the holding of a trial or hearing at
which the parties could have had adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony of realtors in the
area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual sales of lots in the vicinity of the lot being
expropriated on or about the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, among others.
Determination of just compensation must be as of the filing of the complaint.—The commissioners’ report itself is
flawed considering that its recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the
said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or
as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the complaint (when just compensation should
have been determined), and the time when the commissioners’ report recommending the just compensation was issued
(or almost one [1] year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just compensation.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 Orders
of the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002 Decision of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is
remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just compensation in conformity with this Decision.
No costs.
C34* Leca Realty v. Republic, GR 155605, 27 September 2006
FACTS:
"On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some portions of the properties of Leca Realty Corp.
(Leca), Leeleng Realty Inc. (Leeleng), Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), and Cityland Inc. (Cityland).
The said properties would be affected by the construction of the EDSA-Shaw Boulevard Overpass Project in Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, a public purpose to be undertaken by the DPWH.
"The complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was raffled to Branch 159 of the said court.
"Attached to the complaint is, among other things, Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of
Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the construction of the project in
question. In the said resolution, the City Appraisal Committee fixed the fair market values of defendants' properties, as
follows:
All lots situated along Shaw Boulevard from Edsa going westward towards Manila up to Samat Street, that City, at
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000) per square meter[.]
All lots situated along Shaw Boulevard from Edsa going eastward towards Pasig up to San Miguel Avenue, Pasig,
Metro Manila at FORTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000) per square meter[.]
"The property of defendant-appellant Leca is approximately 297.00 meters from the intersection of Shaw Boulevard
and EDSA while that of x x x Leeleng has an approximate distance of 146 meters from the intersection of EDSA-
Shaw Boulevard.
"The property of Metrobank is approximately 200 meters from EDSA and located beside Shangri-La Plaza, within
Ortigas Center while that of BPI is approximately 237 meters from EDSA and southeast of Shangri-La Plaza, within
Ortigas Center.
"The property of Cityland, Inc. is one lot away from EDSA Plaza Hotel, Shangri-La Plaza and walking distance to SM
Department Store, within Ortigas Center.
"On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed three (3) competent and disinterested persons; namely, Atty. Benjamin
C. Angeles, Mr. Joselito E. Gunio and Mr. Melchor Savillo as commissioners to ascertain and report the just
compensation of the properties sought to be taken.
"On January 9, 1998, the commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair
market value of the subject properties as follows:
Properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m.
Metropolitian Bank and Trust Co., Bank of the Philippine Islands: P125,000 per sq.m.
Cityland, Inc.: P137,500 per sq.m. plus 10% corner influence, for a total of P137,500 per sq.m. (sic)"
"In arriving at the said Report, the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors: property location,
identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and reasonable
indication of land values within the vicinity.
The more critical issue is the determination of the amount of just compensation for the expropriated property of Leca
in GR 155605. The Republic avers that the values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by
sufficient evidence. Moreover, they were allegedly based on newspaper listings of advertisements,29 which the
commissioners deemed to be reasonable indices of the fair market value.
"On March 30, 1998, the court rendered the decision whereby the Commissioners' Report was adopted.
ISSUE/S:
RULING:
Remedial Law; Certiorari; A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—Clearly, the questioned Decision was received by
the Republic through the OSG on October 7, 2002. Accordingly, the government’s lawyers had fifteen (15) days or
until October 22, 2002, to file a motion for reconsideration with the CA; and, in case this motion was denied, another
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the denial to file a petition for review under Rule 45. But it was only on October
20, 2003, more than one year later, that the Republic filed the present Petition for Certiorari. Presumably, it resorted to
the special civil action because of its failure to file an appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Time and time
again, this Court has emphasized that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when “there is no
appeal[;] nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” That action is not a substitute for
a lost appeal; in general, it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum.
Same; Same; Mere errors of judgment cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.—It is a
hornbook doctrine that mere errors of judgment cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.
International Exchange Bank v. Court of Appeals, 483 SCRA 373 (2006), stressed this rule as follows: “x x x Where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court
to render said decision—the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Erroneous findings
and conclusions do not render the appellate court vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where the court has
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, they would, at the most, constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.”
Civil Law; Estoppel; The time-honored rule that the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its
agent is not without exceptions; The rule on non-estoppel of the government is not designed, to perpetrate injustice.—
The time-honored rule that the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agent is not without
exceptions. In Republic of the Philippines v. “G” Holdings, 475 SCRA 608 (2005), this Court held thus: “While the
Republic or the government is usually not estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents, the
Republic cannot now take refuge in the rule as it does not afford a blanket or absolute immunity. Our pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 657 (1992), is instructive: the Solicitor-General may not be excused from
its shortcomings by invoking the doctrine as if it were some magic incantation that could benignly, if arbitrarily,
condone and erase its errors.” The rule on nonestoppel of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. In
general, the rules on appeal are created and enforced to ensure the orderly administration of justice. The judicial
machinery would run aground if late petitions, like the present one, are allowed on the flimsy excuse that the attending
lawyer was grossly lacking in vigilance.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; In expropriation proceedings in general, the market value
is the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled.—In expropriation proceedings in
general, the market value is the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled. More
precisely, market value is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be, given and received therefor.”
Same; Same; Same; Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of a property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.—Just compensation, then, is the full and fair equivalent of a property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. Note must be taken that the word “just” is used
to stress the meaning of the word “compensation,” in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Same; Same; Same; Just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily but determined after an evaluation of
different factors.—Necessarily, just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation
of different factors. In the present case, the Commissioners’ Report made use of the so-called market-data approach in
arriving at the valuation of the properties. In this method, the value of the land is based on sales and listings of
comparable property registered within the vicinity. As both the Republic and Leca correctly pointed out, however, the
Commissioners' Report relied heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity.
Clearly, these offers were merely asking prices.
Same; Same; Same; In expropriation proceedings, the value of a property must be determined either as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.—Well-settled is the rule that in
expropriation proceedings, the value of a property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this case, the Complaint was filed on March 18,
1996, and the trial court issued the Writ of Possession on June 19, 1997. The offers cited in the Commissioners’
Report, though, were made between May 1996 to February 1997, a period after the filing of the Complaint on March
18, 1996. Thus, there is no evidence on record of the fair market value of the property as of March 1996.
Same; Same; Same; The zonal value may be one, but not necessarily the sole, index of the value of a realty.—The
Republic is incorrect, however, in alleging that the values were exorbitant, merely because they exceeded the
maximum zonal value of real properties in the same location where the subject properties were located. The zonal
value may be one, but not necessarily the sole, index of the value of a realty. National Power Corporation v. Manubay
Agro-Industrial, 437 SCRA 60 (2004), held thus: “x x x [Market value] is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these
values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.”
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition of the Republic in G.R. No. 160179 is DISMISSED, while that of
Leca Realty Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just
compensation. To forestall any further delay in the resolution of this case, the trial court is hereby ordered to fix the
“just compensation” for Leca’s property within six months from its receipt of this Decision; and afterwards to report
to the Court its compliance. Insofar as it affects the property of Leca Realty Corporation, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60731 is SET ASIDE. No costs.
XXI. Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases
XX. Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases
NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)
We do not see any conflict between Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any reason
to hold that the former has repealed the latter by implication.
6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just compensation for land
expropriated for public used.—It is hereby declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the
correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to
herein private respondents by the Government through the National Power Corporation.
Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, GR 146733, 13 January 2004
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the
landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages
for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It
follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of
just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation,
imposition of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did
not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by
lack of due process.
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a
trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit
accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special
Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian
Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of
the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just compensation.
C35* NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)
FACTS:
On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and
Civil Case No. 2277, respectively.
The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del
Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the
erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith.
Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After a series of hearings were held, on 15 June
1979, a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and
described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by NAPOCOR, and ordering the
latter to pay the landowners certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal
interest thereon until fully paid.
Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision were filed by NAPOCOR. The
same were denied by the court.
NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became final and executory.
Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the execution
of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands
expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by
the lower court.
Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as
adjudged in the joint decision dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR complied with said order and deposited the sums of
money with interest computed at 6% per annum.
On 10 February 1981, another landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court an ex-parte
motion praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be
computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular 416 of the Central Bank issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment
of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."
On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded
to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on 10 March 1981 and 28
August 1981 orders bearing similar import.
NAPOCOR moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated 28 August 1981, which the
court denied on 25 January 1982.
NAPOCOR filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the rate
applicable as legal interest is 6% (Article 2209 of the Civil Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular 416)
RULING:
Banks and Banking; Central Bank; The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit.—The Central
Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree
No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding
interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages.
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Amendments; Repeals or amendments by implication are not
favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled.—Repeals or even amendments by implication are not favored if two
laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication, and
they will not make such an adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at another result by any
construction which is just and reasonable. Besides, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to
decide that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal
by implication unless it is inevitable and a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. (82 C.J.S. 479-486). In
this case, Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate different situations and apply to
different transactions. In transactions involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as judgments
relating to such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, the Central Bank circular applies. It is only in such
transactions or judgments where the Presidential Decree allowed the Monetary Board to dip its fingers into.
On the other hand, in cases requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of an obligation other than those involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art. 2209 of
the Civil Code applies.
For the Court, this is the most fair, reasonable, and logical interpretation of the two laws. We do not see any conflict
between Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any reason to hold that the former has
repealed the latter by implication.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Eminent Domain; 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest
allowed in payments of just compensation for land expropriated for public used.—It is hereby declared that the
computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just
compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents by the Government through the
National Power Corporation.
DISPOSITIVE POSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders promulgated on February 11, 1981, March 10, 1981, August
28, 1981 and January 25, 1982 (as to the recomputation of interest at 12% per annum) are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. It is hereby declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal
interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents
by the Government through the National Power Corporation. The injunction heretofore granted is hereby made
permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.
C36* Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, GR 146733, 13 January 2004
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the decision of
RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of execution
and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit.
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the
land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR
offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR
to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the
just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding.
Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the
compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP.
On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just
compensation by the RTC.
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of Wycoco’s property was in
accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary
administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.
On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to
present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market
value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus
took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare
or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.
The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR
on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus
before this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge
Caspillo be compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise dismissed by the Court
of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco
the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been
previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic.
LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.
ISSUE/S:
1.Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.
2.Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at supported by evidence.
3.Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.
4.Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is
valid.
RULING:
Remedial Law; Special Agrarian Courts; Jurisdiction; Special Agrarian Courts are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657; The DAR, as an
administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases;
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special
Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies.—InRepublic v. Court of Appeals, it was held
that Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all
petitions for the determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No.
6657. Section 50 must be construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of
just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred to the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR, as an administrative agency, cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with
administrative agencies.
The Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands
placed under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking; Procedure for the
determination of just compensation.—Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank
of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform
and the just compensation to be paid for their taking. Through a notice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) submitted by
the landowner, accompanied by the required documents, the DAR evaluate the application and determines the land’s
suitability for agriculture. The LBP likewise reviews the application and the supporting documents and determines the
valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR issues the Notice of Land Valuation to the landowner. In both voluntary
and compulsory acquisition, where the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the
landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the
matter may be brought to the Regional Trial Court acting as a special agrarian court. This in essence is the procedure
for the determination of just compensation.
The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR.—Anent the third issue, the DAR cannot be
compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of
land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the
DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the
entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole
area.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; While market value may be one of the bases of
determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be
appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property, e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of
like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon; The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge
of a fact, not generally or professionally known the basis of his action.—Inasmuch as the valuation of the property
of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence
thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of
determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be
appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a
remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To
say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will
be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment of
just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application
in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits
concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioner’s right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his
property would be violated.37 The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to
compensate them pending payment of just compensation.
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the
landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages
for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance.38 It
follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just
compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of
interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure
the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due
process.39
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a
trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit
accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special
Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian
Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the
taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just compensation.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 140160 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23,
for the determination of just compensation. The petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 is DISMISSED.
XXI. Writ of Possession
C37* City of Manila v. Serrano, GR 142304, 20 June 2001
FACTS:
December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of
certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C consisting of 343.10 m , originated
from Feliza De Guia. After her death, her estate was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement. In
1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of which his estate, consisting of his share
in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of
the heirs of Alberto De Guia. Said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui in whose name a new TCT was issued.
The property was subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia, respondents’ mother.
September 1997, petitioner filed an amended complaint for expropriation against the supposed owners of the
lots.
The respondents filed a consolidated answer in which they alleged that their mother had acquired the lot from
Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the
expropriation would result in their dislocation; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because dividing
the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 m2 of land. Respondents, therefore,
prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt from expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the
notice annotated on the back of the TCT.
Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order directing petitioner to deposit the amount of
P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After making the deposit, the trial court issued
another order directing the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA alleging that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof,
landless; that Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of
residential lands not exceeding 300 m2 in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation; that respondents
would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only 343.10 m2; and
that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 m.
The appellate court granted the petition and perpetually enjoined the trial court from proceeding with
petitioner’s complaint for eminent domain. that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably
exceeds 300 m2 which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279.
However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. CA, the other modes of
acquisition of lands enumerated in 9-101 of the law must first be tried by the city being acquired; and (f) Privately-
owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned
in this section shall not apply. the local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.
SEC. 10. Modes for Land Acquisition.--- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, amount
others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation
shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this
Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a
proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by the
local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That
qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first refusal to government
before it can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave
judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the trial court erred in issuing a writ of possession – NO

2. WoN the CA erred in relying on the Filstream ruling – YES
RULING:
Remedial Law; Certiorari; A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal; Order of the trial
court granting a writ of possession is merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken.—A petition for
review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. Accordingly, it could not have been resorted to by respondents inasmuch as
the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be
taken. Rule 45, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable
remedy in view of Rule 65, §1.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Upon compliance with the requirements for
expropriation, issuance of writ of possession becomes ministerial.—Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a
court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon
deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.
In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue
the writ of possession.
Two Stages in Expropriation Proceedings.—Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation
of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 16, 1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000,
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and the order of the trial court, dated December 15, 1998, is REINSTATED.
This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
C38* Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Gingoyon, GR 166429, 19 December 2005, En Banc, Tinga [J]
FACTS:
The case has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO (2003). This decision
nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA III between the
government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments and
supplements thereto.
The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), franchise to
operate and maintenance of the said terminal for a period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the
agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities
had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal
status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities.
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation.
The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.
In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought
upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.
In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its
writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed
that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-
of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides,
as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount
which the RTC characterized as that which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this
expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually
determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of
Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed
"to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for
their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just
compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding
concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other partie
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this
case?
RULING:
Eminent Domain; Judgments; The Court in the 2004 Resolution in the case of Agan v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), 420 SCRA 575 (2004), prescribed mandatory guidelines which the
Government must observe before it could acquire the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA 3) facilities.—The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two
aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. The
parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as
the complaint for eminent domain. It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed
mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the
actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the
threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.
The case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex
constructed on land which the State already owns—there is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain
on property already owned by the State.—The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy
available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just
compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case,
whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns.
There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush,
since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for
ejectment.
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the
NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution though eminent domain may be the most
effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished.—The right of eminent domain
extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real
property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of
Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to
that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex
“stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic
of the Philippines].” Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have
acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be
the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable
immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which
just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain
proceedings in this case.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed
value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession; The staging of expropriation
proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the
NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan.—As can be gleaned from the
above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the
assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner
before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the
value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in
cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Republic Act No. 8974. Under Rule
67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession
since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary.
Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out that Republic Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case,
notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national government project.
Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the adjudication
of this case. It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive
use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes
our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.
R.A. No. 8974; It is the plain intent of Republic Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67
with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.—If
Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation
before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Such an injunction squarely
contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own
disregard or violation the prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to
PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in
this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it
does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67
would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just
compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. It is the plain intent of Republic Act
No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases
involving national government infrastructure projects.
Just Compensation; Standards of Just Compensation; Separation of Powers; The appropriate standard of just
compensation is a substantive matter, and it is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard.— It
likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the
province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Republic Act No. 8974.
Specifically, this prescribes the new standard in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases
relating to national government infrastructure project, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite
to the issuance of a writ of possession. Of course, rules of procedure, as distinguished from substantive matters,
remain the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Court by virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed,
Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it
provides “all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and
conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall
be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.”
Same; Same; National Government Infrastructure Projects; Words and Phrases; R.A. No. 8974 is intended to cover
expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Republic Act No.
8974 explains what are considered as “national government projects.”—Republic Act No. 8974 is entitled “An Act To
Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And
For Other Purposes.” Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as “national
government projects.” “Sec. 2. National Government Projects.—The term “national government projects” shall refer
to all national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by
governmentowned and controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary
activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source
offending.”
Same; Same; There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and
constructed.—As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, which pertains to infrastructure or
development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented by the
private sector. Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the
construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility. In Tatad v. Garcia, the Court acknowledged
that the operator of the EDSA Light Rail Transit project under a BOT scheme was the owner of the facilities such as
“the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant.” There can be no doubt
that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution
squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by
the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is
a concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no
impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Right-of-Way,” “Site,” and “Location,” Explained; The Court cannot accept the
Government’s proposition that the only properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of
land—R.A. No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and
constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil.—There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not, under any sensible
contemplation, a “right-of-way.” Yet we cannot agree with the Government’s insistence that neither could NAIA 3 be
a “site” or “location.” The petition quotes the definitions provided in Black’s Law Dictionary of “location” as the
specific place or position of a person or thing and ‘site’ as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of property set
aside for specific use.’ ” Yet even Black’s Law Dictionary provides that “[t]he term [site] does not of itself necessarily
mean a place or tract of land fixed by definite boundaries.” One would assume that the Government, to back up its
contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that a “site” or “location” exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles
and weeds. There is none. Indeed, we cannot accept the Government’s proposition that the only properties that may be
expropriated under Republic Act No. 8974 are parcels of land.] Republic Act No. 8974 contemplates within its
coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the law’s policy, refers to “real property acquired
for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.” Section 4 is quite explicit in
stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of “real property,” which under civil law includes buildings,
roads and constructions adhered to the soil.
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent treatment based
thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is violated—there may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic
improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for
purposes of expropriation.—The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they
are adhered. Any subclassifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of
expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is
violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto,
yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the
land itself and the improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of
pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of
improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar
means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the
buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real property
infringes the equal protection clause.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Republic Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3
facilities by the Government.—Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law’s application in this case,
the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004
Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Republic Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004
Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the
takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of
possession may issue. The utilization of Republic Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum
requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the
property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Republic Act No. 8974, one which facially
complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution. Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC
when it ruled that Republic Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take
possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act
No. 8974 states that in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property its proffered value.—Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately
ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet
Republic Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the
property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8974 states
that “in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is
no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property
its proffered value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law].” The “proffered value”
may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Republic Act No. 8974
does provide relevant standards by which “proffered value” should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial
determination of the propriety of the proffered value.
Same; Same; Same; In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3 Billion as the
amount deposited characterized in the complaint as “to be held by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC’s] orders,” should
be deemed as controlling.—Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire US$62.3 Million is
only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3
Billion as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as “to be held by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC’s]
orders,” should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to offer US$62.3
Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the wording of the Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and
credence should be given to the consistent position of the Government on that aspect. In any event, for the RTC to be
able to justify the payment of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and not P3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that
the higher amount represents the valuation of the structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the
land wherein NAIA 3 is built. The Order dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence
of contravening proof, the proffered value of P3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should prevail.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8974 plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with
the authorized government depositary—without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.—The
Government submits that assuming that Republic Act No. 8974 is applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion
should be considered as the proffered value, since the amount was based on comparative values made by the City
Assessor. Accordingly, it should be deemed as having faithfully complied with the requirements of the statute. While
the Court agrees that P3 Billion should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot deem the
Government as having faithfully complied with Republic Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to
the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment,
no writ of possession may be obtained.
Same; Same; Same; While the RTC did direct the LBPBaclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62 Million
to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the
Government shall have actually paid PIATCO, which is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of R.A. No.
8974.—The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC authorized the issuance of the writ of
possession to the Government notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had yet been made to PIATCO,
despite the clear command of Republic Act No. 8974 that there must first be payment before the writ of possession
can issue. While the RTC did direct the LBP-Baclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to
PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the Government
shall have actually paid PIATCO. This is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of Republic Act No. 8974
that requires immediate payment of the initially determined amount of just compensation should be effected.
Otherwise, the overpowering intention of Republic Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of
repossession would be eviscerated.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; R.A. No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate
prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite—R.A. No. 8974 enshrines a new
approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a
position of fundamental equity; Under the new modality prescribed by Republic Act No. 8974, the private owner sees
immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.—Republic Act No.
8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the
Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided that the Government deposit the
initial amounts antecedent to acquiring possession of the property with, respectively, an authorized Government
depositary or the proper court. In both cases, the private owner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation
of property. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation
prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government. Republic Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in
imposing the requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such
requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending
expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always
demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate
compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation
would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Republic Act No. 8974, the private owner sees
immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.
Same; Same; Same; The expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under R.A. No. 8974, is inherently more fair,
especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of expropriation in the
first place.—While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no requirement that it
undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact,
the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Republic Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to
the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place.
Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the
demand of basic fairness. The Court has the duty to implement Republic Act No. 8974 and to direct compliance with
the requirement of immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004
should be held in abey ance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the proffered value of
the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.
Same; Possession; There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and thus allow
the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.—The RTC, in its 10
January 2005 Omnibus Order, expressly stated that it was not affirming “the superfluous part of the Order [of 4
January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA [3] to other parties.”
Still, such statement was predicated on the notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until
final payment of just compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to perform such acts of ownership. In deciding this
question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored, particularly the declaration that “[f]or the government to
take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.” The obvious
import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid just compensation, the Government is barred from “taking over,”
a phrase which in the strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA 3, much less
operation of the facilities. There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and
thus allow the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. For one, the
national prestige is diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For another, the
continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it has not already. And still for another,
the economic benefits to the Government and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA 3 is put in
operation.
Same; Same; Once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are
essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal, and these would include the repair,
reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of
new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and
transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport.—Republic Act No. 8974 provides
the appropriate answer for the standard that governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to
perform upon the issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that “the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.” We hold
that accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that
are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the
existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities
pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day
international airport.
Same; Same; Republic v. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 (1998), may concede that the Government is entitled to exercise more
than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed to grant the Government
the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner.—The Government’s position is more expansive than that
adopted by the Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts de jure on the
expropriated property. It cites Republic v. Tagle, as well as the statement therein that “the expropriation of real
property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land,” and from them concludes that “its mere physical
entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised
by an owner over the subject property.” This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle, but not
from the ratio decidendi of that case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of possession in favor of the Government was
still necessary in light of the fact that it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the Government
was entitled to the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ vested not only physical possession,
but also the legal right to possess the property. Continues the Court, such legal right to possess was particularly
important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of
possession would serve to safeguard the Government from eviction. At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious,
that there is no transfer of ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede that the
Government is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it
cannot be construed to grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner. Certainly,
neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the Government’s proposition that it acquires beneficial or
equitable ownership of the expropriated property merely through the writ of possession.
Same; Just Compensation; The proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with the primordial right to just
compensation.—Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently refuse to pay just
compensation due to the private property owner whose property had been expropriated. At the same time, Lim
emphasizes the fragility of the rights of the Government, as possessor pending the final payment of just compensation,
without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed, the public policy, enshrined foremost in the Constitution,
mandates that the Government must pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial
attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right to just compensation.
Same; Same; The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Republic Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law’s avowed policy
“to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just
compensation.”—R.A. No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final determination of just compensation
may be had. Section 4 provides: “In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency’s
proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the
date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing
agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined
by the court.” We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Republic
Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law’s avowed policy “to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national
government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.” In this case, there already has been
irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the RTC to
determine the just compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint last 21
December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial
court to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the
guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules.
Same; Same; Commissioners; The appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in
expropriation proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that
regard do not conflict with the statute, but the standards to be observed for the determination of just compensation are
provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute.—It must be noted that Republic Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment
of commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. This protocol though is sanctioned under Rule
67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation
proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not
conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents
affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even
without Rule 67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under
Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be
sanctioned in expropriation proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the
determination of just compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular, the governing
standards for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in Section 10 of the
Implementing Rules for Republic Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement cost method in the valuation of
improvements and structures.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Rule 67 or Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in the
expropriation case on who should be appointed as commissioners—what Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties
to protest the appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule.—Nothing in Rule
67 or Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in the expropriation case on who should be
appointed as commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be imposed in this case. We
did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez that “there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the
recommendations of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to ensure their fair
representation.” At the same time, such solicitation of recommendations is not obligatory on the part of the court,
hence we cannot impute error on the part of the RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion in the appointment of the
commissioners. What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these
commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These objections though must be made filed within ten (10)
days from service of the order of appointment of the commissioners. In this case, the proper recourse of the
Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to file an objection with the trial court, conformably with
Section 5, Rule 67, and not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that
the expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the
commissioners, it is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days from
finality of this decision.
Courts; Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her
judicial power and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises—to be disqualifying, the bias
and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.—The disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his/her judicial power and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It
certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition,
especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature
of the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People: “To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent
judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By
themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be
disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented
and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis
for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge’s integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule
is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.”
Same; Same; Same; The motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be
sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has inherent
power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, an
inherent power that includes the right of the court to reverse itself especially when in its honest opinion it has
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.—
Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005 Order, without the benefit of notice or
hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu proprio amendment by a court of an
erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized
principle that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction. Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent power
of courts “to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice,” a power
which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order. This inherent power includes the right of the
court to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that
to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to
make the RTC’s previous order conformable to law and justice, particularly to apply the correct law of the case. Of
course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete, as the 4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply
Republic Act No. 8974 in several respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most basic
premise of the case that Republic Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased, and he/she will
gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand the judicial process but the test in
believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant’s claim of bias, but the Court’s judicious
estimation, as people who know better than to believe any old cry of “wolf!,” whether such bias has been irrefutably
exhibited.—The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a standard that a judge should be inhibited from
hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the judge. Such loss of trust on the part of the Government may be
palpable, yet inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the feelings of the party-litigants. Indeed, every losing litigant
in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends,
family, and people who do not understand the judicial process. The test in believing such a proposition should not be
the vehemence of the litigant’s claim of bias, but the Court’s judicious estimation, as people who know better than to
believe any old cry of “wolf!,” whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited. The Court acknowledges that it had
been previously held that “at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not,
the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case.” But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched
rule that “a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the Courts of
Justice is not impaired.” And a selfassessment by the judge that he/she is not impaired to hear the case will be
respected by the Court absent any evidence to the contrary.
C39* Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Gingoyon, GR 166429, 1 February 2006, En Banc Resolution, Tinga [J]
Facts:
On the newly raised arguments, there are considerable factual elements brought up by the Government. The
Government devotes significant effort in diminishing PIATCO’s right to just compensation as builder or owner of the
NAIA 3. Particularly brought to fore are the claims relating to two entities, Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and
Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation, who allegedly claim "significant liens" on the terminal, arising from their
alleged unpaid bills by virtue of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract they had with PIATCO.
The Government’s concerns that impelled the filing of its Motion for Reconsideration are summed up in the following
passage therein: "The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released
directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly to Takenaka,
Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess
of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand, ends up with the
Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not PIATCO’s obligations to third parties will affect the Decision of mandating the Government to first
pay PIATCO before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities
RULING:
Actions; Motions for Reconsideration; The Supreme Court is not wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual
premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established.—The Court is not wont to reverse its previous rulings
based on factual premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly, whatever claims or purported
liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither
Takenaka nor Asahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have not presented any claim which could be
acted upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Agan v. PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or
Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any
right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts
of the land.
Conflict of Laws; Foreign Judgments; It is recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a foreign
judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.—While the Government refers to a
judgment rendered by a London court in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82
Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is
not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a
foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Substantive and Procedural Laws; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; If
a rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so conversely, if the rule or provision creates a right, it
should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature; A matter is substantive when it involves creation of rights to
be enjoyed by the owner to be expropriated; The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of
possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter, and thus
within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.—It is too late in the day to question the constitutionality of
Rep. Act No. 8974, an issue that was not raised in the petition. Still, this point was already addressed in the Decision,
which noted that the determination of the appropriate standards for just compensation is a substantive matter well
within the province of the legislature to fix. As held in Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998), if the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right,
it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the
creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately
classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure,
yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being
superseded or amended by statute; When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of the government the
sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be understood that such
rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of substantive law.—It is possible for a substantive
matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of
substance. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right
from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact
on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well
lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of
irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution
restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of
substantive law.
Actions; Intervention; If a case originated from an original action filed with the Supreme Court, the appropriate time
to file a motion-in-intervention in such a case if ever is before and not after the resolution of the case.—We now turn
to the three (3) motions for intervention all of which were filed after the promulgation of the Court’s Decision. All
three (3) motions must be denied. Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the court. Since this case originated from an
original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was
before and not after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this juncture would be highly irregular. It is
extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed
none of them allege such lack of knowledge.
Same; Same; Requisites; Locus Standi; Members of Congress; In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to
intervene, invoking his prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to
compensate Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as that as a taxpayer, it should be
noted that the amount which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), was derived from money deposited by Manila International Airport Authority, an
agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of the
National Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress.—The requisite legal
interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing
intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially
proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be
considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. In the case of Representative Baterina, he invokes his
prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate PIATCO, as
well as that as a taxpayer, as the basis of his legal standing to intervene. However, it should be noted that the amount
which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to PIATCO was derived from the money deposited by the
Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality
separate and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved
by Congress.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners is DENThe motions
respectively filed by Takenaka Corporation, Asahikosan Corporation and Representative Salacnib Baterina are
DENIED.ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT petitioners’ motion for partial reconsideration as well as Takenaka
Corporation’s and Asahikosan Corporation’s respective motions for leave to file motion for partial reconsideration-in-
intervention and their motions for partial reconsideration-in-intervention.
C3A Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Mupas, GR 181892, 8 September 2015, En Banc, Brion [J]
FACTS:
This Civil Case was the dispute of the government against the RTC's appointment of an independent appraiser of
the NAIA-IPT III. It claims that Section 11 of RA 8974 IRR solely authorizes the implementing agency to engage the
services of an appraiser in the valuation of the expropriated property, while under Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR, it is the
implementing agency that shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be
acquired using the replacement cost method. Pursuant to these provisions, the Government engaged the services of
Gleeds, Ove Arup and Gensler for purposes of appraising the NAIA-IPT III.
The Government also argues that the appointment of an independent appraiser would only duplicate the efforts of
the existing appraisers. A court-appointed appraiser and the existing appraisers would perform the same task of
determining the just compensation for the NAIA-IPT III. Thus, the RTC should have relied instead on the opinion of
the internationally-renowned appraisers that the Government hired.
On the other hand, the petitioner, PIATCO agreed with the RTC's appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
independent appraiser. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function. The trial court's
power to appoint commissioners is broad enough to include the power to appoint an appraiser who shall assist the
commissioners in ascertaining the amount of just compensation. The latter power is inherent in the court's task to
receive evidence and to arrive at a fair valuation of the expropriated property. Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court allows the court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them consistent with law and
justice. Furthermore, nothing in RA 8974 IRR that prohibits the trial court from appointing an independent appraiser.
They asserted that the Government is estopped from assailing the appointment of an independent appraiser. The
Government voluntarily participated in the nomination of an independent appraiser, and in fact, submitted its own
nominees before the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the appointment of an independent appraiser issue has been rendered moot and academic by the RTC's
promulgation of its rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 ; and
RULING:
YES. The issue is already moot and academic. The appointment of an independent appraiser would only result in the
duplication of tasks since the BOC and the independent appraiser essentially perform the same function. The BOC
would serve no purpose since the appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III would be derived from the findings of DG Jones and
Partners. It opined that the DG Jones and Partners' appraisal fee was unjust and exorbitant. The Government also
pointed out that PIATCO manifested its willingness to share one-half of the expenses in the valuation of the NAIA
IPT-III during the valuation hearings. The Government further raised doubts on DG Jones and Partners' qualifications
since the RTC allegedly appointed the firm without disclosing DG Jones and Partners' qualifications and proposals.
Furthermore, the RTC stated that it would be grossly unfair to choose exclusively among the Government's nominees;
otherwise, the independence of the appraiser would be questionable. The Government pointed out that the government
tax assessors' valuation of expropriated property was not even conclusive on trial courts. In fact, the BOC itself
requested the appointment of an independent appraiser since it had no technical expertise to ascertain the just
compensation due to PIATCO.
The RTC also held that the Government was estopped from objecting to the appointment of an independent appraiser
since it did not previously object to the engagement of the services of an appraiser. The Government even nominated
several firms for the purpose of appointing an independent appraiser, particularly, Gleeds International, Ove Arup, and
Gensler
C3B Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Mupas, GR 181892, 19 April 2016, En Banc Resolution, Brion [J]
FACTS:
● Motions for reconsideration were filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Transportation and
Communications) and the Manila International Airport Authority (Republic for brevity); Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO); and of Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and
Asahikosan Corporation (Asahikosan) assailing the Court's Decision dated September 8, 2015. In said
Decision, the Court applied the standards laid down under Section 7, RA 8974 and Section 10 of RA 8974
IRR. The Court likewise applied equity pursuant to Gingoyon.
● The Decision stated the following: (1) that PIATCO, as the owner of the NAIA-IPT III, is the sole recipient of
the just compensation; (2) that the Republic shall only have ownership of the NAIA-IPT III after it fully pays
PIATCO the just compensation due; (3) that in computing the just compensation, the Court applied the
depreciated replacement cost method consistent with Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR and the principle that the
property owner of the expropriated property shall be compensated for his actual loss.
● The Republic argues as follows:
o the Court should declare that, upon payment of just compensation, full ownership shall be vested in
the Republic, free from liens and encumbrances.
o just compensation should not earn interest. The present case is sui generis as the expropriation
resulted from the nullification of the concession agreement; hence, the traditional notion of "just
compensation" is inapplicable
o the Court erred in not deducting from the computed just compensation the amounts pertaining to
structural defects, unnecessary areas, and rectification for contract compliance.
● The PIATCO seeks the partial reconsideration of our decision under the following arguments:
o the Court erred in applying the depreciated replacement cost method in computing just compensation
o the financial concept of depreciation is inapplicable in the determination of just compensation in
expropriation cases. An asset may still be valuable and yet appear as fully depreciated in financial
statements.
o assuming the accounting concept of "depreciation" is relevant, depreciation of an asset begins when it
is available for use. the Court erred in excluding PIATCO's computation of attendant costs
o
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 8974 (An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes) is the applicable law in determining the Government’s
payment of just compensation
RULING:
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; The payment for property in expropriation cases is enshrined in
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation. The measure of just compensation is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.
—The payment for property in expropriation cases is enshrined in Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The
measure of just compensation is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. We have ruled that just compensation must
not extend beyond the property owner’s loss or injury. This is the only way for the compensation paid to be truly just,
not only to the individual whose property is taken, but also to the public who shoulders the cost of expropriation. Even
as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly
favor him to the prejudice of the public. To this end, statutes such as RA No. 8974 have been enacted, laying down
guiding principles to facilitate the expropriation of private property and payment of just compensation.
Same; Same; The determination of just compensation is primarily a judicial function that may not be usurped by any
other branch or official of the Republic.—We must bear in mind that the determination of just compensation is
primarily a judicial function that may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the Republic. In National
Power Corporation v. Bagui, 569 SCRA 401 (2008), this Court ruled that any valuation for just compensation laid
down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it
may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
In fact, in National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation, 565 SCRA 17 (2008), we held that just
compensation standards derived from statutes such as RA No. 8974, are not binding on this Court.
Same; Same; Any finding on just compensation using the methods set forth in the statute is merely a preliminary
determination by the Implementing Agency, subject to the final review and determination by the Court.—At best, any
finding on just compensation using the methods set forth in the statute is merely a preliminary determination by the
Implementing Agency, subject to the final review and determination by the Court. While we may be guided by the
replacement cost of the property, just compensation will be ultimately based on the payment due to the private
property owner for his actual loss — the fundamental measure of just compensation compliant with the Constitution.
Further, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself, courts are not strictly bound to apply the formula to
its minutest detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict application. The
courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them.
Same; Same; Depreciated Replacement Cost Method; In the present case, we adopted the depreciated replacement
cost method as a guideline in the computation of just compensation; at the same time, we reconciled this method with
our duty to award just compensation as a constitutional mandate to compensate the owner with his actual loss.—In the
present case, we adopted the depreciated replacement cost method as a guideline in the computation of just
compensation; at the same time, we reconciled this method with our duty to award just compensation as a
constitutional mandate to compensate the owner with his actual loss. In our Decision, we compared the different
replacement cost methods, such as the replacement cost new method and the depreciated replacement cost
method. Notably, these are recognized methods in appraising properties. As we clearly explained, we did not adopt the
new replacement cost method because in doing so, PIATCO would be compensated for more than it actually lost. We
emphasize our ruling that “[i]njustice would result if we award PIATCO just compensation based on the new
replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III, and disregard the fact that the Republic expropriated a terminal that is not
brand new; the NAIA-IPT III simply does not have the full economic and functional utility of a brand new airport.”
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Depreciated replacement cost approach is defined as a “method of valuation
which provides the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all physical
deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and optima[z]ation.”—We therefore ruled that PIATCO would be
compensated for its actual loss if we adopt the depreciated replacement cost approach. It is defined as a “method of
valuation which provides the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and optima[z]ation.” Adjustments for depreciation
should be made to reflect the differences between the modern equivalent asset and the actual asset or the NAIA-IPT
III. The reason is that depreciation involves the loss of value caused by the property’s reduced utility as a result of
damage, advancement of technology, current trends and tastes, or environmental changes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Depreciation in valuation/appraisal is the “reduction or writing down of the cost of a
modern equivalent asset to reflect the obsolescence and relative disabilities affecting the actual asset” or “loss in any
value from any cause.”—Depreciation in valuation/appraisal, on the other hand, is the “reduction or writing down of
the cost of a modern equivalent asset to reflect the obsolescence and relative disabilities affecting the actual asset” or
“loss in any value from any cause.” Hence, for purposes of appraisal, an asset may not yet be available for use within
the context of financial accounting, but its value has nevertheless depreciated due to factors affecting its intended use
and function.
Same; Same; The Republic later took over the Ninoy Aquino International Airport-International Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA-IPT III) in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. By so doing, the Republic became legally obliged
to pay Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the value of the property taken. This obligation
arises from the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.—We remind the Republic that PIATCO, through its subcontractors, built the NAIA-IPT III. The
Republic later took over the NAIA-IPT III in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. By so doing, the Republic
became legally obliged to pay PIATCO the value of the property taken. This obligation arises from the constitutional
mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Subsequently, the Court
determined the monetary value of the NAIA-IPT III, which sum the Republic now owes PIATCO as payment for the
NAIA-IPT III. In short, it is currently indebted to PIATCO for the monetary value of the NAIA-IPT III less the
proffered value.
Same; Same; The Republic owes Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the unpaid portion of the
just compensation and the interest on that unpaid portion, which interest runs from the date of taking (September 11,
2006) until full payment of the just compensation.—The Republic owes PIATCO the unpaid portion of the just
compensation and the interest on that unpaid portion, which interest runs from the date of taking (September 11, 2006)
until full payment of the just compensation. Thus, any argument that wholly or partly assails this legal conclusion
must fail.
Same; Same; Depreciated Replacement Cost Method; By adopting the depreciated replacement cost method, we took
into consideration that the Republic did not expropriate a brand new airport at the time of taking on December 21,
2004.—In our Decision now on reconsideration, we simply pursued the above directive in Republic v. Gingoyon, 478
SCRA 474 (2005). Specifically, we applied the law, RA No. 8974, and equity in: (1) adopting the depreciated
replacement cost method in computing just compensation; and (2) adjusting the computed 2002 replacement cost of
NAIA-IPT III to its 2004 value. By adopting the depreciated replacement cost method, we took into consideration that
the Republic did not expropriate a brand new airport at the time of taking on December 21, 2004. Similarly, we
considered that PIATCO should be compensated for the 2004 value of the IPT III) in the exercise of its power of
eminent domain. By so doing, the Republic became legally obliged to pay Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO) the value of the property taken. This obligation arises from the constitutional mandate that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.—We remind the Republic that PIATCO, through
its subcontractors, built the NAIA-IPT III. The Republic later took over the NAIA-IPT III in the exercise of its power
of eminent domain. By so doing, the Republic became legally obliged to pay PIATCO the value of the property taken.
This obligation arises from the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Subsequently, the Court determined the monetary value of the NAIA-IPT III, which sum the
Republic now owes PIATCO as payment for the NAIA-IPT III. In short, it is currently indebted to PIATCO for the
monetary value of the NAIA-IPT III less the proffered value.
Same; Same; The Republic owes Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the unpaid portion of the
just compensation and the interest on that unpaid portion, which interest runs from the date of taking (September 11,
2006) until full payment of the just compensation.—The Republic owes PIATCO the unpaid portion of the just
compensation and the interest on that unpaid portion, which interest runs from the date of taking (September 11, 2006)
until full payment of the just compensation. Thus, any argument that wholly or partly assails this legal conclusion
must fail.
Same; Same; Depreciated Replacement Cost Method; By adopting the depreciated replacement cost method, we took
into consideration that the Republic did not expropriate a brand new airport at the time of taking on December 21,
2004.—In our Decision now on reconsideration, we simply pursued the above directive in Republic v. Gingoyon, 478
SCRA 474 (2005). Specifically, we applied the law, RA No. 8974, and equity in: (1) adopting the depreciated
replacement cost method in computing just compensation; and (2) adjusting the computed 2002 replacement cost of
NAIA-IPT III to its 2004 value. By adopting the depreciated replacement cost method, we took into consideration that
the Republic did not expropriate a brand new airport at the time of taking on December 21, 2004. Similarly, we
considered that PIATCO should be compensated for the 2004 value of the the concept of delay for purposes of the
imposition of interest on the unpaid just compensation is based on the effect on the owner’s rights of the Republic’s
nonpayment of the full amount of just compensation at the date the possession and effective taking of the expropriated
property took place. While the delay in the computation of just compensation (because of the protracted proceeding)
may also delay the payment of just compensation, we note that, in this case, the delay was not entirely attributable to
any particular party, i.e., to PIATCO and/or Takenaka and Asahikosan, as the Republic contends. The “delay” arose
because all the parties to the case had taken procedurally permissible steps in order to protect their respective interests;
the complexity, too, of appraising a specialized property like the NAIA-IPT III cannot likewise be discounted.
Same; Same; The Republic would have to pay the amount of just compensation computed as of the date of the
effective taking (December 21, 2004) plus the interest which runs from the date it took possession and actually took
over the property (September 11, 2006), regardless of the perceived delay in the determination of just compensation.
—We remind the Republic that the computation of just compensation is not always a simple affair and may take time,
particularly in the case of a specialized property like the NAIA-IPT III. Delay should not be imputed on the owner
alone unless it delayed the proceedings purposely and unreasonably. The facts of the present case do not show that
neither PIATCO nor Takenaka and Asahikosan purposely and unreasonably acted to cause delay. The more tenable
view is that all the parties took remedial measures, within legitimate and reasonable limits, to protect their respective
claims, thus, the belated determination of the just compensation. For all these reasons, the Republic would have to pay
the amount of just compensation computed as of the date of the effective taking (December 21, 2004) plus the interest
which runs from the date it took possession and actually took over the property (September 11, 2006), regardless of
the perceived delay in the determination of just compensation.
Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the
proffered value of the property to be seized.—On the prerequisites for the effectivity of the writ of possession, we
ruled that RA No. 8974 guarantees compliance with the Agan requirement that just compensation be first paid to
PIATCO before the Republic could takeover the NAIA-IPT III. Specifi-
cally, RA No. 8974 assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the
property to be seized. We also ruled that the payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of the Republic, is precisely the scheme under RA No. 8974, one that facially complied
with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Agan Resolution.
Civil Law; Interest Rates; Periods; Since our interest rate is applied on a per annum basis or per year basis, we apply
the general rule that the imposition of interest rate per annum means the imposition of the whole interest rate for one
(1) whole year, regardless if it is composed of three hundred sixty-five (365) or three hundred sixty-six (366) days.—
Notably, Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that “when the laws speak of years, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each.” Since our interest rate is applied on a per annum basis or per year basis, we
apply the general rule that the imposition of interest rate per annum means the imposition of the whole interest rate for
one whole year, regardless if it is composed of 365 or 366 days.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; A hearsay evidence has no probative value and should be
disregarded whether objected to or not.—PIATCO cannot rely on the affidavit of Atty. Tolentino who allegedly
identified the photocopied documents supporting attendant costs. The Court observed that the alleged affidavit of
Atty. Tolentino does not have any signature above his name as the affiant. Hence, his affidavit cannot be said to have
at least substantially complied with the requirements laid down in Sections 3(a), (b), and/or (d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court for the admissibility of photocopies as secondary evidence. We therefore maintain our ruling that
PIATCO’s documents allegedly supporting the attendant costs are hearsay evidence. With respect to the effect of the
alleged non-objection of the parties to the presentation of these photocopy documents, we have ruled in PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation v. CA, et al., 297 SCRA 402 (1998), that a hearsay evidence has no probative
value and should be disregarded whether objected to or not.
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; Equipoise Rule; In view of the equally persuasive arguments of the
Republic on the one hand, and Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), Takenaka and Asahikosan, on the other, the equiponderance rule applies against the Republic.—We deny
the Republic’s argument that the amount pertaining to structural defects should be deducted from the construction
cost. The Republic’s arguments on the structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III were sufficiently discussed in our
Decision. Although the Scott Wilson Report admitted that retrofit works needed to be done, the Republic failed to
submit documents before the lower courts supporting the retrofit project. Furthermore, we noted that the retrofit bid
took place in 2012, or after the promulgation of the RTC’s ruling. In view of the equally persuasive arguments of the
Republic on the one hand, and PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan, on the other, the equiponderance rule applies
against the Republic.
Same; Same; In computing the just compensation in the present case, we have included the amount allegedly
pertaining to the unnecessary areas, such as the excess concession space and the four (4)-level retail complex. We
ruled that since the Republic would expropriate the entire Ninoy Aquino International Airport-International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III), the Republic should pay for these structures.—In computing the just compensation in the
present case, we have included the amount allegedly pertaining to the unnecessary areas, such as the excess
concession space and the four-level retail complex. We ruled that since the Republic would expropriate the entire
NAIA-IPT III, the Republic should pay for these structures. We reiterate that the present case stemmed from an
expropriation case. Hence, the standards and parameters for computing just compensation should be in line with the
nature of the action before us. Notably, just compensation in expropriation cases is defined “as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to modify the meaning of the word
‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full and ample.” We therefore consider the NAIA-IPT III structure as a whole for purposes of computing just
compensation.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) grants the Republic’s prayer that upon payment of just compensation, full
ownership shall fully vest with the Republic; however, we deny its prayer that this ownership shall be free from any
liens and encumbrances.—We grant the Republic’s prayer that upon payment of just compensation, full ownership
shall fully vest with the Republic; however, we deny its prayer that this ownership shall be free from any liens and
encumbrances. We ruled in Agan that “[f]or the Republic to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.” We however clarified in Gingoyon that, “[t]he recognized rule
is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions.” In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 343 (1989), we ruled that “[t]itle to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest
[with] the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid x x x title to the property taken
remains in the owner until payment is actually made.” In view of these jurisprudential precedents, we grant the
Republic’s prayer that upon full payment of the just compensation finally adjudged in this decision, the title to the
property shall be fully vested in the Republic. However, we cannot categorically rule in the present case that the
Republic’s ownership of NAIA-IPT III — after full payment of just compensation — shall be free from all liens and
encumbrances.
Same; Same; Just compensation should be paid to the owner and it should be real, substantial, full and ample; The
mere setting aside of a definite portion of the just compensation to cover the claim of a nonowner (especially if the
nonowner’s claim is not yet fixed or confirmed by a final ruling) would defeat the constitutional mandate that full
payment be made to the property owner.—Just compensation should be paid to the owner and it should be real,
substantial, full and ample. Therefore, the Republic must pay PIATCO the full amount of the just compensation
computed in the present case. Furthermore, if we set aside a portion of the just compensation to cover Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s claims, we would also be running against our final and executory rulings in Agan and Gingoyon
mandating that just compensation should be fully paid to PIATCO as the owner of the NAIA-IPT III. Stated
differently, the mere setting aside of a definite portion of the just compensation to cover the claim of a nonowner
(especially if the nonowner’s claim is not yet fixed or confirmed by a final ruling) would defeat the constitutional
mandate that full payment be made to the property owner. We thus cannot grant Takenaka and Asahikosan’s plea even
if we can later release to PIATCO the portion that is set aside (in the event that Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claims
turn out to be excessive or totally unjustified).
Taxation; Assessments; The tax assessments should first go through the appropriate tax proceedings prescribed by
law. The present case is neither the proper venue nor the forum to determine the validity of these alleged pending tax
assessments or to declare its inclusion in the computation of just compensation inasmuch as these were not presented
before the lower courts.—We deny PIATCO’s argument that the tax assessments against it should be added to the just
compensation in the present case. The tax assessments should first go through the appropriate tax proceedings
prescribed by law. The present case is neither the proper venue nor the forum to determine the validity of these alleged
pending tax assessments or to declare its inclusion in the computation of just compensation inasmuch as these were
not presented before the lower courts.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; View that I concur, subject to the views I have expressed in the
September 8, 2015 Decision of this Court En Banc. I also reiterate my reservations in the computation of interest rates
for delayed payments for expropriated properties, as explained in my Separate Opinions in Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, 700 SCRA 243 (2013), and Heirs of Spouses Tria v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, 700 SCRA 188 (2013).—I concur, subject to the views I have expressed in the
September 8, 2015 Decision of this Court En Banc. I also reiterate my reservations in the computation of interest rates
for delayed payments for expropriated properties, as explained in my Separate Opinions in Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, 700 SCRA 243 (2013) and Heirs of Spouses Tria v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, 700 SCRA 188 (2013).
Dispositive Portion: Decision dated September 8, 2015 sustained; Republic’s motion for reconsideration partly
granted; PIATCO’s partial motion for reconsideration denied; Takenaka and Asahikosan’s partial motion for
reconsideration denied; and typographical errors rectified.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Summarized)

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EMINENT DOMAIN

Moday vs. Court of Appeals

Moday v. Court of Appeals

C00 CASE TITLE: Moday v. Court of Appeals

Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution with the comment, “expropriation is

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan is without authority to disapprove a municipal resolution authorizing

C01 CASE TITLE: Spouses Yusay v. CA

Whether or not the petitioner may avail of petition of prohibition as a remedy

C02 CASE TITLE: Fernando v. St Scholastica’s College

Any property necessary for public use or purpose.

C03 CASE TITLE: Republic v. PLDT

Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; The constitutional limitation of “just compensation”

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING

City of Baguio vs. NAWASA

WATERWORKS SYSTEMS PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;

Zamboanga City vs. Zamboanga Del Norte

C05 CASE TITLE: City of Baguio v. NAWASA

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TRANSFER OF WATERWORKS SYSTEMS TO THE NAWASA NOT

WATERWORKS SYSTEMS PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;

On October 12,1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting Municipality of Zamboanga

1 ................................................ Capitol Site

Municipal corporations; Properties; Law on municipal corporation.—Under the principles constituting

Municipal Corporations; Properties; Principles under Law of Municipal Corporations considered

Elements of Taking (Castelvi)

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:

Circumstances considered in determining the value of the property expropriated.—In expropriation

Brion, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is

Napocor v. San Pedro, GR 170945, 26 September 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES LLAMAS

Bartolata v. Republic, GR 223534

City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,

The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON

On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine

It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec

A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or

2. Whether or not respondents are liable to pay just compensation to petitioner

Sec. 2 of RA 730, as amended by PD 2004, is clear and unambiguous:

Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; To be considered as a

A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental

Municipal Corporations; Ordinances; Municipal corporations have no right to enact ordinances

Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes

Manocsca v. Court of Appeals

Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA

C14 CASE TITLE: Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO

C17 CASE TITLE: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO

The respondent heirs waived their objections.

An order of condemnation or dismissal is final.—An order of condemnation or dismissal is final,

NPC became involved in the two expropriations of Pobre’s resort-subdivision.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.