SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237337. June 6, 2018.]

MADELINE HISOLER , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND MARIGEN DE ASIS , respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 06
June 2018 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 237337 (Madeline Hisoler vs. People of the Philippines and
Marigen De Asis) . — Before this Court is a petition for review 1 led by Madeline
Hisoler (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision 2 dated June 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CEB CR No. 02492, and its Resolution 3 dated January 11, 2018 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal therein led by
the petitioner, and affirmed the Decision 4 dated November 6, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 20, convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On the basis of an Information led by the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's O ce,
petitioner and her husband Regie Hisoler (accused-spouses) were charged with the
crime of Estafa allegedly committed as follows:
That on the 2nd day of October 2004, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, with
deliberate intent, with intent to gain, abuse of con dence and by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud, and with intent to defraud MARIGEN DE ASIS, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue for value a postdated
International Exchange Bank check with branch at North Hi-way, Estancia,
Mandaue City, bearing Check No. 6000049909 in the amount of P50,000.00,
Philippine Currency, but which check when presented for encashment with the
bank, the same was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed" and despite
notice and several demands made upon them by MARIGEN DE ASIS to make
good said Check or replace the same with cash, they have failed and refused
and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of MARIGEN DE ASIS in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
The accused-spouses were arraigned on December 18, 2006, and individually
entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: private complainant Marigen De Asis
(herein respondent) and Gwendolyn Rabadon. Their testimonies tend to establish that
the respondent knew the accused-spouses since 1999, upon the introduction of Gina
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 Quiruben. 6 This meeting led to a series of successful transactions whereby the
accused-spouses would purchase rice and ready-to-wear products from the
respondent. 7
On October 2, 2004, the accused-spouses went to the house of the respondent
to have a check rediscounted, particularly International Exchange Bank (IEB) Check No.
6000049909 postdated January 2, 2005. The check was for Php50,000.00 drawn
against IEB Account No. 50403-00038-0 in the name of RMH Stone Inlay and
Fabrication, an export business owned by the accused-spouses. On the assurance by
the accused-spouses that their business was doing well, and the promise of an eight
percent (8%) rediscounting fee per month, the respondent agreed to rediscount the
check. 8
On November 2, 2004, when the interest fell due, the petitioner went to the
respondent's house to exchange the subject check with cash, only to have the same
check rediscounted again on the pretext that the same was still good until January 2,
2005, to which the respondent agreed. The same arrangement was repeated on
December 2, 2004. 9
On December 31, 2004, the respondent called and related to the petitioner her
intention to have the subject check deposited as she need the money for her rice
business. To which the petitioner allegedly agreed saying "just deposit it." Thus, on
January 2, 2005, the respondent deposited the check to her Bank of Cebu account.
Thereafter, the respondent received information from the bank that the check she has
deposited had been dishonored as the account against which it is drawn was already
closed since July 13, 2004. As proof thereof, the respondent was shown signature
cards bearing the signatures of the accused-spouses. 1 0
On January 4, 2005, the respondent met with the petitioner and showed her the
certi cation from the bank stating that the account against which the subject check
has been drawn is already closed. 1 1 The petitioner promised to replace the check for
cash, but later on reneged on her obligation. As efforts to reach the petitioner failed,
and written and verbal demands were left unheeded, the respondent led a Complaint.
12 aScITE

On the other hand, the petitioner presented evidence which tend to prove that the
underlying contract between the parties was that of a loan, and that the subject check
was issued as security. The petitioner claimed that the said agreement was among a
series of transactions between her and the respondent, all of which amounted to a total
of Php550,000.00, wherein the petitioner would pay 8% monthly interest, which the
respondent would immediately deduct from the principal. The petitioner averred that
pursuant to these transactions, she had either been paying interest in cash, for which
the respondent's representative would issue a receipt, or replace the old check with
another. 1 3
Furthermore, the petitioner averred that she gave the respondent the subject
check sometime during the rst week of July 2004 and that the account against which
it has been drawn was closed a week after. At any rate, the petitioner claimed that she
informed the respondent of the closure of her account, and that she continued paying
interest until much later when she could no longer afford it. 1 4
Finally, the petitioner submitted that after this case has been led, she and her
husband offered to pay Php550,000.00 on a staggered basis, with interest, but the
respondent refused and insisted on payment of Php2,000,000.00, an amount they
could not afford. 1 5
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 On November 6, 2012, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20, rendered its Decision, 1 6
nding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the RPC. Nonetheless, the RTC absolved the petitioner's
husband and co-accused. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, the court nds [the
petitioner] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the [RPC]. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of Six (6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
Ten (10) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
[The petitioner] is ordered to pay the [respondent] the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum,
reckoned from the filing of this case until fully paid.
Accused REGIE HISOLER is ACQUITTED.
The bail bond posted by accused Regie Hisoler for his provisional liberty
is hereby cancelled and ordered released.
SO ORDERED. 1 7
In so ruling, the RTC held that all elements of the crime of Estafa are present. On
the matter of liability, it noted that the subject check has been issued only by the
petitioner. And, while the account against which the check was drawn was co-owned by
the accused-spouses, it emphasized that the criminal liability is highly personal in
nature, thus, the petitioner should be solely held liable.
The petitioner appealed to the CA, which rendered the herein assailed Decision 1 8
affirming the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6,
2012, of the [RTC], Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City, in Crim. Case
No. CBU-78517 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED. 1 9
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari led by the petitioner, attributing the
following errors committed by the CA for the Court's consideration, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. THE CA ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE

RESPONDENT THAT THE PETITIONER HAD BEEN BORROWING MONEY FROM HER; and

2. THE CA ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT, BASED ON ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE,

THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT WAS THAT
OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. 2 0 HEITAD

In sum, the petitioner argues that she could not be held liable for Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) as the check was issued as payment for a pre-existing
obligation, that is, a contract of loan, between the parties.
The Court is not persuaded.
The elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the RPC are as
follows: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited
were not su cient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been
defrauded. 2 1
In this case, the Court finds that all of the foregoing elements are present.
First, it has been established that IEB Check No. 6000049909 postdated January
2, 2005 was issued by the petitioner in favor of the respondent as consideration for an
obligation contracted at the time of its issuance. As found by both the CA and the RTC,
the issuance of the check was the consideration for which the respondent gave the
petitioner Php50,000.00. The petitioner's allegation that the check is for payment of a
pre-existing obligation has not been proven. Other than her bare allegations, the
petitioner failed to present evidence to prove the existence of such pre-existing loan
transaction between them, which the petitioner could have done by presenting the prior
replaced check, and the receipts allegedly issued by the respondent for her partial
payments. 2 2
It must also be said that the factual ndings by both the RTC and the CA in this
regard must be respected on appeal, absent any indication that these courts ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted facts which if considered, will change the
outcome of the case. 2 3
In an attempt to prove her contention that the check was issued as payment of a
pre-existing obligation, the petitioner cites the testimony of the respondent, whereby
the latter allegedly admitted the true nature of the transaction between them. However,
an examination of the petitioner's testimony does little to prove the fact that the
subject check has been issued to pay a pre-existing obligation between the parties. On
the contrary, the alleged testimony cited by the petitioner lends support to the
conclusion that the subject check was the reason why the respondent gave the
petitioner Php50,000.00. Moreover, that there have been previous transactions that
transpired between the parties is of no moment, as it is evident that they are individual
transactions independent of one another.
Further, the Court notes with approval the CA's elucidation in response to the
petitioner's submission that the check was issued only as security for the loan, to wit:
Besides, it is against ordinary human behavior and experience for a
person to accept a check, even as a mere guaranty for a supposed loan or
obligation, if one knew beforehand that the account against which the check
was drawn was already closed. The check would not even serve its purpose of
guaranty because it can no longer be encashed. 2 4
The second element of Estafa, as aforestated, is also present. The petitioner
herself admitted and as further established by the Certi cation from IEB, the account
against which the check is drawn was closed since July 13, 2004, before the said
postdated check has been issued.
And nally, anent the last element of Estafa, the attendant facts establish that the
respondent has been defrauded. False pretense or fraudulent act as an element of the
Estafa, must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad
check. A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when the drawer of the dishonored
check is unable to pay the amount of the check within three days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor. 2 5
In this controversy, the petitioner, in transacting with the respondent represented
that the subject check was good, which then convinced the latter to part with her
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 money. Then the petitioner told the respondent to deposit the check, despite knowing
that the account against which it is drawn has already been closed. Despite demands,
the petitioner refused to pay, a fact she admitted, submitting only that she is unable to
do so as they could no longer afford to pay the interest. Ultimately, the petitioner's
failure to pay and her issuance of the subject check despite knowledge that the
account against which it is drawn is already closed, are proof of deceit.
Insofar as the penalty, the same must be revisited in view of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10951 which modi es the penalty for Swindling or Estafa. Section 100 off the
same law provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to
the accused. Thus, a comparison of the proper penalties imposable under the RPC and
R.A. No. 10951 is imperative.
The RTC and the CA sentenced the petitioner to suffer the indeterminate prison
term of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum. ATICcS

Article 315 of the RPC which provides for the penalty for Estafa or Swindling,
reads:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Considering that the penalty prescribed by law is composed only of two periods,
pursuant to Article 65, the same must be divided into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period for each of the three portions, 2 6
to wit:
Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years;
Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days; and
Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days.
In arriving at the imposable penalty, the RTC and the CA concluded that since the
subject amount of Php50,000.00 is Php28,000.00 beyond the Php22,000.00 ceiling set
by law, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner should be taken within the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed; and from the highest allowable duration
thereof should be added the incremental penalty of two (2) years. Therefore, the RTC
and the CA set the maximum period of indeterminate penalty to ten (10) years (8 years
from the range of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law plus 2 years
incremental penalty).
Then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be
within the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed, which is, prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or anywhere from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In the case of the petitioner, the RTC
and the CA deemed it proper to impose the lowest term possible or six (6) months and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 one (1) day.
On the other hand, under Section 85 of R.A. No. 10951, the penalty for Estafa or
swindling committed through false pretenses has been amended, viz.:
Section 85 . Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 315 . Swindling (estafa). —
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2 (d) hereof shall be punished by:
"4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such
amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million
two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
xxx xxx xxx
Applied in this case, since the penalty prescribed by law is a penalty composed
of only one period, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the
penalty into three portions, thus:
Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years
Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 years and 4 months
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum penalty
should be anywhere within the medium period. 2 7 While the minimum penalty should be
one degree lower from the prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, or
prision mayor in its minimum period. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under R.A. No.
10951 therefore, the petitioner is liable to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor, as maximum.
With these, the Court is now confronted with a situation wherein the imposable
penalty under the RPC, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years,
presents a lower minimum period but a higher maximum period of imprisonment than
that imposable under R.A. No. 10951, which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years and eight (8) months. TIADCc

As stated, Section 100 of R.A. No. 10951 applies only insofar as it is favorable to
the accused. While the imposable penalty under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951 both have
their advantages, the Court weighing the attendant circumstances, nds that the
penalty imposed under the RPC should apply.
Primarily, it must be emphasized that the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA
in this case is within the range of allowable penalty, and as such is valid exercise of
discretion and must be a rmed by the Court. In ne, jurisprudence dictates that the
determination of the minimum and the maximum terms is left entirely to the discretion
of the trial court, the exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
showing that there is grave abuse. 2 8
This notwithstanding, it is worth reiterating that the penalty imposable upon the
petitioner, and the incremental penalty could be added anywhere within the maximum
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 period of the penalty prescribed or somewhere from six (6) years, eight (8) months, and
twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years. In this case, the RTC deemed it wise to add the
incremental penalty to eight (8) years, thus bringing the maximum period of
indeterminate penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner to ten (10) years. In this
regard, the Court notes for the sake of illustration that had the RTC chosen to add the
incremental penalty of two (2) years to the minimum threshold of the maximum period
imposable which is six (6) years, this situation would not have arisen. As in the latter
instance, it is clear that the penalty imposable upon the petitioner under the RPC would
be more favorable to her considering that both the minimum and the maximum periods
are lower than that under R.A. No. 10951. Otherwise stated, the indeterminate penalty
imposable under the RPC in that case would be six (6) months and one (1) day to eight
(8) years as maximum, which is clearly more advantageous for the petitioner as
opposed to the six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years and eight (8) months
that is imposable under R.A. No. 10951.
At any rate, even if the maximum period imposable upon the petitioner under the
RPC in this case is higher than that under R.A. No. 10951, the Court nds that the
bene ts that would accrue to the petitioner with the imposition of a lower minimum
sentence outweighs the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with the spirit of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In xing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the accused, the Court should
be mindful that the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to "uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness." 2 9 Simply, an indeterminate sentence is
imposed to give the accused the opportunity to shorten the term of imprisonment
depending upon his or her demeanor, and physical, mental, and moral record as a
prisoner. 3 0 The goal of the law is to encourage reformation and good behavior, and
reduce the incidence of recidivism. 3 1 While the grant of parole after service of the
minimum sentence is still conditional, the exibility granted upon the petitioner to
immediately avail of the bene ts of parole considering the much shorter minimum
sentence under the RPC should inspire the petitioner into achieving the underlying
purpose behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Finally, seeing no error in the imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on
the amount of Php50,000.00 actual damages, the Court a rms the same. As adjudged,
the period of interest should run from the time of filing of this case, considering that the
same constitutes judicial demand of the petitioner's obligation which consists in the
payment of sum of money. 3 2
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED . Accordingly, the Decision dated June 23, 2017 and
Resolution dated January 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No.
02492 are hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTO

Division Clerk of Court
By:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com

 (SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 12-24.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Germano Francisco D.
Legaspi and Geraldine Fiel-Macaraig, concurring; id. at 25-37.
3. Id. at 45-46.
4. Rendered by Presiding Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; id. at 69-82.
5. Id. at 47.
6. Id. at 69.

7. Id. at 70.
8. Id. at 26, 71.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 26, 72.
11. Id. at 72.

12. Id. at 26.

13. Id. at 28.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id. at 29.

17. Id. at 82.
18. Id. at 25-37.
19. Id. at 37.
20. Id. at 12.

21. People v. Juliano, 489 Phil. 340 (2005).

22. Rollo, p. 32.
23. Sison v. People, 682 Phil. 608, 622 (2012).
24. Rollo, p. 34.
25. Id. at 32.

26. See Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 423-424 (2014).

27. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 64 (1).
28. People v. Medroso, 159 Phil. 297, 302 (1975).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 29. Vitangcol v. People, 778 Phil. 326, 343-344 (2016), citing People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109,
117-118 (1933).
30. Act No. 4103 (1965) , Section 5; People v. Nang Kay , 88 Phil. 515, 519 (1951).
31. Id.
32. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 716 Phil. 267, 279 (2013).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com