Wills&succession (Arts.840 - 923) 1

WILLS&SUCCESSION

ATTY.RISEL CASTILO-‐TALEON
ARTS.840-‐856(INSTITUTION OF HEIR)
ARTS.857-‐870(SUBSTITUTION OF HEIR)
ARTS.871-‐885(CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY DIPOSITION &
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITON WITH A TERM)

1. RABADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725 29 June 2000

FACTS:
Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he
instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee
herein is the predecessor-‐in-‐ interest of the petitioner. The codicil was duly
probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. The codicil stated that
should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be
inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver
75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina
Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation.
Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the
said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the
piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).In
1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions
of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:
1. DID THE HEIRS OF JORGE RABADILLA INHERITED HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CODICIL
2. WAS THERE A SUBSTITUTION?

RULING:
1. YES. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil
were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
2. NONE. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to
take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil
WILLS&SUCCESSION (ARTS.840-‐923) 1

sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In simple substitutions, the second heir
takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease
or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do
not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. Neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case
under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing. Under
Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not
at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

2. BORADALBA VS. CA
374 SCRA 522

DOCTRINE:
A judicial declaration of heirship is not a condition precedent in order that an
heir may validly file his/her claim in the estate of the decedent or the testator.
Issue: Whether or not an heir should show judicial declaration of heirship
before she/he can file a claim to the estate of the decedent

FACTS:

A land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-‐C) with an area of 1,853 square meters
and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot
is part of a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in
Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita Espina de Jayme.In 1947, an extra-‐judicial partition:

1)1/3 in favor of -‐(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina,
2 WILLS&SUCCESSION (ARTS.840-‐923)

Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-‐
Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and
Carmen Jayme-‐Daclan;

2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.
Bordalba; and

3)1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house,
which his family occupied since 1945.
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally
a part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an
extra-‐judicial partition.She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is
applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land
adjudicated to him by way of extra judicial partition.
petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-‐I) 11421 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-‐571 (FP) over said lot. private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaintagainst
petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural
Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-‐C) was acquired by
her through purchase from her mother who was in possession since 1947.
the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free
Patent No. (VII-‐I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-‐571 (FP), declared said patent and title void
and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug
and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee
in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale.
Appealed to CA. affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.It ruled
that since private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-‐
C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-‐C) to private
respondents.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT AN HEIR SHOULD SHOW JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
HEIRSHIP BEFORE SHE/HE CAN FILE A CLAIM TO THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEDENT

RULING:
No. Untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs
of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-‐Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to
dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate
their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property

of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. Considering
that Lot No.1242 (799-‐C), the subject land in the case at bar, is part of the parcel of
land over which private respondents’ predecessors-‐in-‐interest is entitled to 1/3
pro-‐indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free
Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents’ predecessors-‐in-‐interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-‐owners,
and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

3. HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,
Petitioners,-‐ versus -‐
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues in
Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate by virtue
of the order of the CFI Manila and said court approved the project of partition
presented by the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s will. As provided in her
will Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s testamentary dispositions contemplated the
creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to
beneficiaries specified in the will.After almost 40 years later, herein petitioners
Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned
in Clause 24 of the decedent‘s will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent‘s
estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in
violation of the the law.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE PROPERTIES LEFT BY
DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED .

RULING: YES. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a perpetual trust
for the administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for
specified beneficiaries. The trust, only insofar as the first twenty-‐year period is
concerned should be upheld however after 20 years the trust must be dissolved.
Petitioners were correct in moving for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-‐
year period,but they are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent.
The last will and testament of the decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the
properties under the void clause.Hence the case is remanded to the lower court for
the determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the decedent where
petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their
status.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trust approved by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP.

PROC. No. 51872 is DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to determine the following:
1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s will, constituting
the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as
yet; and
2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the nearest relative of the
decedent entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

4. HEIRS OF CONTI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998
Bellosillo, J:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 862. The Substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions
imposed upon the instituted heir, unless the testator has expressly provided
the contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to
the heir instituted.

SPECIFIC ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE THE HEIRS OF LOURDES
SAMPAYO AND THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO THE PARTITION OF THE LOT
AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON

RULING:
In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and
establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased
Lourdes Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein
plaintiffs [now private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a
project of partition of the residential house and lot owned in common by the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the
court xxxx Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in
declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo
and therefore entitled to inherit her property, the argument of the appellants [now
petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private respondents] are not entitled to
partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [ ] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua and Marabilles v. Quito, that
a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that
private respondents became the co-‐owners of the portion of the property owned
and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently,
entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of
ownership as provided for by law including the right to demand partition under Art.
777 of the Civil Code, and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa holding that the property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the
probative value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private

respondents and faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they
believed that she was a vital witness in the case. Hence, petitioners pursued this
case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-‐owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate
and compliance with all legal requirements, especially publication, and private
respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship with
the deceased.
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential
before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as
we explained in Quison v. Salud.
Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are
next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to
maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been
taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such
settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As
well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property
owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission
is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property
may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this
does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate,
from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had
been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the
plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of
the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-‐owner,
incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-‐
ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private
respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their
predecessor-‐in-‐interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct
had the action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were
dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary
settlement of estates of small value.But what private respondents are pursuing is
the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-‐half share which they inherited from her
through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-‐
owners.

ARTS. 886-‐914(LEGITIME)

1. MENDOZA V. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 176422 |March 20, 2013

Topic: Applicability of Reserva Troncal; First cousins of the descendant/
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and cannot be considered reservees/
reservatarios


Facts:
The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of respondent but co-‐ owned
by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-‐half of the property from petitioner Maria
Mendoza and her siblings. Petitioners who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga) alleged that the properties were part of
Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his
spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went to Gregoria when
Leonor died after. Gregoria died intestate, and thereafter, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving
heir of Leonor and Gregoria.

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by
respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891
of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. The RTC granted their action for Recovery of
Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance but on
appeal to the CA, however, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
the complaint filed by petitioners and also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. WON THE CA GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM
THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS. -‐ NO

2. WON CA GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE
OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL. -‐ NO

HELD:

1. The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on
Reserva Troncal is not applicable. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: (1)
The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title; (2) The descendant or prepositus
(propositus) who received the property; (3) The reservor (reservista), the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned
only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission
occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does
not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether

Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the
ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired
by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return. At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this
case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.

2. Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered reservees/ reservatarios as they
are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties
came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin
as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the
third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right
to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of
the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

2. BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC
G.R. No. 192531; November 12, 2014
Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of
adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.
He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his
death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio
Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1.WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ADOPTER DURING THE ADOPTEE’S
MINORITY RESULTS TO THE RESTORATION OF THE PARENTAL AUTHORITY
TO THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THE LATTER.

2.WHETHER OR NOT BERNARDINA IS CONSIDERED AS A LEGAL BENEFICIARY
OF JOHN.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship
and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored
if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike
the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption.
While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate

succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-‐à-‐vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as
a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since
the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

3. GALA vs. ELLICE AGRO-‐INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION GR No. 156819
December 11, 2003
Ynares-‐Santiago, J:

DOCTRINE:
Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom a testator has left by any title less
than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

FACTS:
On March 28, 1979, the spouses Manuel and Alicia Gala, their children Guia
Domingo, Ofelia Gala, Raul Gala, and Rita Benson, and their encargados Virgilio
Galeon and Julian Jader formed and organized the Ellice Agro-‐Industrial
Corporation.

As payment for their subscriptions, the Gala spouses transferred several parcels of
land located in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna to Ellice.

SPECIFIC ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORGANIZATION OR CREATION OF RESPONDENT
CORPORATIONS ARE ILLEGAL FOR DEPRIVING PETITIONER RITA G. BENZON
OF HER LEGITIME.

RULING:
“The reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for
settlement of estate, rather than in the present intra-‐corporate controversy. If they
are genuinely interested in securing that part of their late father’s property which
has been reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then they should
simply exercise their actio ad supplendamlegitimam, or their right of completion of

legitime. Such relief must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a
case for the settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has
taken jurisdiction over the settlement of said estate.“

4. HACBANG VS ALO
G.R. No. 191031|October 05, 2015
Topic: Transmission of Successional Right; Testate succession over Intestate

FACTS:

A petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate
was filed and was admitted thereafter to probate. Petitioner however filed a petition
to cancel the registration of the subject lot of the case because it was found out that
it was registered in the name of respondent.

The RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute
the case on the subject lot and noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been
admitted into probate; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question.
Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already
designated his heirs; thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.

The CA in turn, affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal and held that the admission of
Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was
intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the
petitioners' contention, the settlement proceedings were not dismissed but
archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were
archived, undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. The CA denied the
petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation and cannot represent
those who are hot entitled to succeed, thus, the denial paved the way for the
petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. WON THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE PROVISION OF THE
PRESENT CIVIL CODE TO THE WILL AND ESTATE OF BISHOP SOFRONIO. -‐ YES

2. WON BISHOP SOFRONIO DIED INTESTATE. -‐ NO

HELD:

1. At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts
erroneously applied the provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the
estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at the time of the decedent's death
determines the applicable law over the settlement of his estate. Bishop Sofronio
died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct
1
applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and
the 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.

In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are
vested at the precise moment of the death of the decedent. In any case, under both
the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise
moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code provides:

Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el
momento de su muerte. (Rights to the estate of a person are transmitted from the
time of his death.)

The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's
interruption. This provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of
our Civil Code.

As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the
heirs at the precise moment of death -‐ not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at
the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no
interruption between the end of the decedent's ownership and the start of the
heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.

2. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was
probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half
to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive
with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.

Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate,
whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code.

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him;
if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does
not impair their legitimes. This provision was later translated and adopted as Article
842 of our Civil Code.

Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition.
Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as
possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of
its provisions operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy
when testate succession evidently applies.

5.ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed LINDAIN vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and FEDERICO
ILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 95305;August 20, 1992

GRIÑO-‐AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-‐63540 (Exh. D-‐1). On
November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a widow and
acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses Apolonia
Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-‐66311 was issued
to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.

The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the
mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale (Exh. B for the plaintiffs and
Exh. 2 for the defendants) and although at first they were reluctant to buy the
property as the sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof being all
minors, upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the
counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the
documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the
court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and
had it registered in their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311 (Exhibit C for
the plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants
is null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court
approval.

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of
the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the
youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to
rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching
the age of majority, has already prescribed.

ISSUE: WHETHER JUDICIAL APPROVAL WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SALE OF
THE MINORS' PROPERTY BY THEIR MOTHER.
HELD:
Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed
transaction occurred, provides:

Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

3
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial)
administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to
dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The
powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's
property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and
Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the
property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89
which requires court authority and approval.

The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not
credible for they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners'
mother, without court approval could not validly convey to them the property of her
minor children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the transaction,
the private respondents acted in bad faith when they went ahead and bought the
land from her anyway.
One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title
of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the
owner of the property or for an interest therein (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).
The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took
place in 1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the
petitioners sued in 1987.

6.HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, represented by Rogelia Lopez, et al vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [Now substituted by Philippine
Investment Two (SPVAMC), Inc.
G.R. No. 193551; November 19, 2014
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Gregoria Lopez owned a 2,734-‐square-‐meter property in Bustos, Bulacan.5 She died
on March 19, 19226 and was survived by her three sons: Teodoro Lopez, Francisco
Lopez, and Carlos Lopez.7 Tax Declaration No. 613 was issued under the names of
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos.8
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos died.9 Only Teodoro was survived by children:
Gregorio, Enrique, Simplicio, and Severino.10
Petitioners in this case are Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza Lopez, and
the heirs of Gregorio and Severino.11 Enrique is deceased.12
Petitioners discovered that on November 29, 1990, Enrique executed an affidavit of
self-‐adjudication declaring himself to be Gregoria Lopez’s only surviving heir,
thereby adjudicating upon himself the land in Bulacan.13 He sold the property to
Marietta Yabut.14
Petitioners demanded from Marietta the nullification of Enrique’s affidavit of self-‐
adjudication and the deed of absolute sale.15 They also sought to redeem Enrique’s

one-‐fourth share.16 Marietta, who was already in possession of the property,
refused.17
Sometime in 1993, Marietta obtained a loan from Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) and mortgaged the property to DBP as security.18 At the time of
the loan, the property was covered by Tax Declaration No. 18727, with the
agreement that the land shall be brought under the Torrens system.19 On July 26,
1993, an original certificate of title was issued in Marietta’s name.20 Marietta and
DBP "executed a supplemental document dated 28 February 1995 placing the
subject [property]within the coverage of the mortgage."21 The mortgage was
annotated to the title.22
Sometime between 1993 and 1994, petitioners filed a complaint23 and an amended
complaint24 with the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of document, recovery
of possession, and reconveyance of the property. They prayed that judgment be
rendered, ordering the annulment of Enrique’s affidavit of self-‐adjudication, the
deed of sale executed by Enrique and Marietta, and the deed of real estate mortgage
executed by Marietta in favor of DBP.25Petitioners also prayed for the reconveyance
of their three-‐fourth share in the property, their exercise of their right of
redemption of Enrique’s one-‐fourth share, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.26
Petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the
original certificate of title.27 The annotation was inscribed on June 27, 1994.28
Marietta failed to pay her loan to DBP.29 "DBP instituted foreclosure proceedings on
the . . . land."30 It was "awarded the sale of the [property] as the highest
bidder."31 "The Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds . . . on 11
September 1996."32 Marietta failed to redeem the property.33 The title to the
property was "consolidated in favor of DBP."34

RTC: ordered the nullification of Enrique’s affidavit of self-‐adjudication, the sale of
the three-‐fourth portion of the subject property in favor of Marietta, the
reconveyance of the three-‐fourth share of the property in favor of petitioners, the
nullification of the real estate mortgage executed in favor of DBP, and the surrender
of possession of the property to petitioners.46 The trial court also ordered DBP to
pay attorney’s fees.

CA: DENIED MR

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PROPERTY WAS VALIDLY TRANSFERRED TO MARIETTA
AND, EVENTUALLY, TO DBP.

HELD:NO

We have consistently upheld the principle that "no one can give what one does not
have."61 A seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not
own but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can
legally transfer.62

5
This principle is incorporated in our Civil Code. It provides that in a contract of sale,
the seller binds himself to transfer the ownership of the thing sold, thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

The seller cannot perform this obligation if he or she does not have a right to
convey ownership of the thing. Hence, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer
the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.

Title or rights to a deceased person’s property are immediately passed to his or her
heirs upon death.63 The heirs’ rights become vested without need for them to be
declared "heirs."64 Before the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-‐owners of the
property.65

In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez’s property were automatically passed to
her sons — Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922.66 Since only
Teodoro was survived by children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to
them when Gregoria Lopez’s sons died.67 The children entitled to the property
were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.

Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-‐owners of the property, with
each of them entitled toan undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon
their deaths, their children became the co-‐owners of the property, who were
entitled to their respective shares, such that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to
Gregorio’s one-‐fourth share, and Simplicio’s and Severino’s respective heirs became
entitled to their corresponding onefourth shares in the property.68 The heirs
cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them.

Since Enrique’s right to the property was limited to his one-‐fourth share, he had no
right to sell the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective
heirs. Any sale by one heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the
other heirs who did not consent to the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the
shares of the other heirs.
Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided
one-‐fourth share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is
because Marietta obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no
title or interest over the rest of the property that he could convey.
This is despite Enrique’s execution of the affidavit of self-‐adjudication wherein he
declared himself to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Lopez. The affidavit of self-‐
adjudication is invalid for the simple reason that it was false. At the time of its
execution, Enrique’s siblings were still alive and entitled to the three-‐fourth

undivided share of the property. The affidavit of self-‐adjudication did not have the
effect of vesting upon Enrique ownership or rights to the property.
The issuance of the original certificate of title in favor of Marietta does not cure
Enrique’s lack of title or authority to convey his co-‐owners’ portions of the property.
Issuance of a certificate of title is not a grant of title over petitioners’ undivided
portions of the property.69 The physical certificate of title does not vest in a person
ownership or right over a property.70 It is merely an evidence of such ownership or
right.71
Marietta could acquire valid title over the whole property if she were an innocent
purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value purchases a property without
any notice of defect or irregularity as to the right or interest of the seller.72 He or she
is without notice that another person holds claim to the property being purchased.73
As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of
the seller.74 He or she need not look "beyond what appears on the face [of the
certificate of title]."75 However, the ordinary buyer will not be considered an
innocent purchaser for value if there is anything on the certificate of title that
arouses suspicion, and the buyer failed to inquire or take steps to ensure that there
is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the property being sold.
Marietta cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent purchasers for
value because the circumstances do not make this available to her.
In this case, there was no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the
property from Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still unregistered.
What was available was only a tax declaration issued under the name of "Heirs of
Lopez."
"The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only
where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear
title of the registered owner."76 It does not apply when the land is not yet registered
with the Registry of Deeds.
At the very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted
Marietta to inquire further as to Enrique’s right over the property. She did not.
Hence, she was not an innocent purchaser for value. She acquired no title over
petitioners’ portions of the property.

ARTS. 915-‐923(DISINHERITANCE)

1. SEANGIO v. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-‐72 27 November 2006

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Segundo Seangio. This petition was opposed by the petitioners on the ground
that Segundo left a holographic will, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause, among others. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
7
proceedings for the probate of the will. The petitioners instead filed a petition for
the probate of the holographic will.
Then private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: CAN THE DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY SEGUNDO BE CONSIDERED A
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

RULING:
YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to
no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An
intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized
as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is
contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. In this regard,
the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-‐
Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was
executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the
will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

Wills&succession (Arts.840 - 923) 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wills&succession (Arts.840 - 923) 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

WILLS&SUCCESSION

You might also like