1. DOLE v.

Kentex Manufacturing Corporation and Ong King Guan

GR No. 233781
July 8, 2019
 
Facts:
In 2015, factory of Kentex Manufacturing Corporation (Kentex) located in Valenzuela City, with
Ong King Guan as corporate officer and a number of workers deployed by CJC Manpower
Services (CJC), was gutted by a fire. After assessment of DOLE-NCR that CJC is a labor only
contractor, it held, through Compliance Order received by Kentex and Ong on June 27, 2015,
that the latter are principal persons liable to the injured workers for monetary awards for non-
compliance with occupation health and safety standards and labor standards. After seven days or
on July 3, 2015, Ong moved for reconsideration claiming that he is not liable. On July 7, 2015,
said reconsideration was denied on the ground that Compliance Order attained finality on July 6,
2015.

Issue:
Whether the Compliance Order becomes immutable for filing of a motion for reconsideration
instead of an appeal

Held:
Yes. Pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 131, Series of 2013, it provides that a compliance
order may be appealed to the Secretary of DOLE by filing of Memorandum of Appeal within 10
days from receipt of the said order.
Here, Ong moved for a reconsideration of the subject Order; needless to say, this did not halt or
stop the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Secretary of DOLE . Indeed, the
DOLE-NCR properly took no action at all on Ong's motion for reconsideration; in fact, it
categorically informed Ong that his resort to the filing of a motion for reconsideration was
procedurally infirm. The June 26, 2015 Order having become final, it could no longer be altered
or modified by discharging or releasing Ong from his accountability.

2. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs Honorato Hilario substituted by Gloria Hilario

and Dindo Banting
G.R. No. 193136
July 10, 2019

Fact:
• ABS-CBN is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of international
and local broadcasting of television and radio content.
• ABS-CBN's Scenic Department initially handled the design, construction and provision
of the props and sets for its different shows and programs. Subsequently, petitioner
engaged independent contractors to create, provide and construct its different sets and
props requirements. One of the independent contractors engaged by petitioner was Mr.
Edmund Ty, which in 1995, formed and incorporated CCI together with some officers of
petitioner.
• CCI was organized to engage in the business of conceptualizing, designing and
constructing sets and props for use in television programs, theater presentations,
concerts, conventions and/or commercial advertising.[
• Ty became the Vice-President and Managing Director of CCI. On or about the time of
CCI's incorporation, the Scenic Department of petitioner was abolished and CCI was
engaged by petitioner to provide props and set design for its shows and program.
• Honorato Hilario was hired by CCI as Designer. He rose from the ranks until he
became Set Controller. Dindo Banting, on the other hand, was engaged by CCI as
Metal Craftsman. He likewise rose from the ranks and became Assistant Set Controller.
• In June 2003, Ty decided to retire as Managing Director of CCI with the intention to
organize and create his own company.
• Without Ty to manage and lead CCI, and considering that CCI was not generating
revenue but was merely "breaking even", the Board of Directors of CCI decided to
close the company down by shortening its corporate term up to October 31, 2003.
• Ty organized and created Dream Weaver Visual Exponents, Inc. (DWVEI). Like CCI,
DWVEI is primarily engaged in the business of conceptualizing, designing and
constructing sets and props for use in television programs and similar projects. With the
incorporation of DWVEI, petitioner engaged the services of DWVEI.
• Hilario and Banting were served their respective notices of the closure of CCI effective
October 5, 2003. With the said termination, both respondent received the total amount of
P118,205.87 and P66,383.54, respectively and executed individual release and quitclaims in
favor of CCI.
• Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, non-payment of
meal allowances. In their position paper, respondents claimed that the closure of CCI
was not due to any of the authorized causes provided by law but was done in bad
faith for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the Labor Code, as CCI was
still conducting operations under the guise of DWVEI.
• Petitioner and CCI, represented by the same counsel, submitted their position paper
claiming that they are separate and distinct corporations. Both maintained that an
employer may close its business even if it is not suffering from losses or financial
reverses, as long as it pays its employees their termination pay.
• The Labor Arbiter found respondents to have been illegally dismissed, and ordered CCI
and petitioner to reinstate them to their former or equivalent positions and to jointly
and severally pay their full backwages and other allowances. The LA held that the
purported closure of business operation of CCI was undertaken for the purpose of
 circumventing the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 279 thereof which
guarantees the security of tenure of worker. In finding petitioner jointly and severally
liable with CCI for illegal dismissal, the LA noted that CCI appears to have been
created, organized and operated under the direction, control and management of
petitioner. CCI was principally formed to perform the functions and activities formerly
undertaken by petitioner's ABS-CBN Scenic Department whose functions and activities
of handling design, construction and provision of props and sets are necessary in
petitioner's business. CCI was also affiliated with and/or a subsidiary of petitioner and
majority of its stockholders are also the major stockholders of petitioner. As found by
the LA, petitioner had a clear hand in the purported closure of the latter and the
subsequent creation of DWVEI. It further held that the closure of operation and
consequent dismissal of the respondents was designed, orchestrated and implemented
with the participation and involvement of petitioner.
• The NRC affirmed the LA decision. While the CA, affirmed with modification the decision of
LA. MR was also denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents' termination of employment due to cessation of business
operations was valid.

Held:
No, the termination of Hilario and Banting are not valid.
One of the authorized causes for dismissal recognized under the Labor Code is the bona
fide cessation of business operations by the employer. Article 298 of the Labor Code
explicitly sanctions terminations due to the employer's cessation or business or operations
– as long as the cessation is bona fide or is not made "for the purpose of circumventing
the employee's right to security of tenure."
Art. 298. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. – The employer
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
(1) one month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall
be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay
or at least one (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole
year.
In the present case, the reason cited by CCI for discontinuing its operations was that it
was not making money but was merely "breaking even" and that the closure of business
of CCI was a business decision of which discretion lies with the CCI's Board of
Directors. Claiming good faith in the cessation of CCI's operations, petitioner claims that
CCI has faithfully complied with the procedural requirements of due process under the
Labor Code in that it has served a written notice on the worker and the DOLE and has
given the dismissed employees separation pay.

While the CCI has complied with the requirements of service of notice of cessation of
operations one month before the intended date of closure and the payment of termination
pay, it was not sufficiently proven that its closure of business was done good faith. As
correctly noted by both the LA and the NLRC, as well as the appellate court, CCI failed
to satisfactorily show that its closure of business or cessation of operations was bona fide
in character and not intended to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees.

A closure or cessation of business or operations as ground for the termination of an

employee is considered invalid when there was no genuine closure of business but mere
simulations which make it appear that the employer intended to close its business or
operations when in truth, there was no such intention. To unmask the true intent of an
employer when effecting a closure of business, it is important to consider not only the
measures adopted by the employer prior to the purported closure but also the actions
taken by the latter after the act.

Both the labor tribunals and the CA found that the purported closure of business
operation of CCI was undertaken for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the
Labor Code which guarantees security of tenure of respondents and all other employees
of CCI. We are not inclined to depart from the uniform findings which are substantially
supported by the evidence on records. The Court is not a trier of facts and will not
review factual findings of the lower tribunals as these are generally binding and
conclusive.
3. Stanfilco vs. Tequillo
G.R. No. 209735
July 17, 2019

DOCTRINE: Physical violence inflicted by one employee on another constitutes

serious misconduct, which justifies the former's dismissal. Nevertheless, the employer
bears the onus of proving that the attack was work-related and has rendered the
erring employee unfit to continue working. This burden is not overcome by the mere
fact that the act occurred within company premises and during work hours. Verily,
the employer must establish a reasonable connection between the purported offense
and the employee's duties.
FACTS:
Tequillo was a Farm Associate in Stanfilco’s plantation. During the company-initiated
employee gathering where said company required all its employees to be present,
Tequillo, instead of attending the gathering, opted to go on a drinking spree at the
farm shed area of Stanfilco's premises with several of his fellow workers. At the time,
Tequillo was expressing resentment towards petitioner's refusal to provide him with a
performance incentive. His co-worker, Resel Gayon (Gayon) told Tequillo to air his
grievances to petitioner's higher-ranking employees. Irked by the suggestion, Tequillo
proceeded to maul Gayon. Stanfilco required Tequillo to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for the drinking and mauling
incident. Administrative hearings were likewise conducted to give Tequillo the
chance to defend his side, however, Stanfilco found his explanations unsatisfactory,
and eventually terminated on the ground of serious misconduct. 
Tequillo filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal,
the latter ruling the same to be valid as Tequillo's acts constituted serious misconduct
and willful disobedience to company rules, thus justifying petitioner's decision to
dismiss him. Upon Tequillo’s appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision in that
Tequillo was illegally dismissed since he was not performing official work at the time
he mauled Gayon. The NLRC ordered the immediate reinstatement of Tequillo to his
former position.
As Stanfilco’s move for reconsideration rendered futile, it was thus compelled
to seek relief before the CA through a petition for certiorari before the CA, which
ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion and held that Tequillo's dismissal
was illegal since the act of mauling Gayon was not work-related, and at most
amounted only to simple misconduct.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion attended the
NLRC's decision declaring Tequillo's dismissal illegal. 
HELD: Yes.
In labor cases, misconduct, as a ground for dismissal, must be serious — that
is, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. In addition, the act constituting misconduct must be connected with the
duties of the employee and performed with wrongful intent.
To be sure, physical violence between and among employees may constitute
serious misconduct regardless of whether such violence occurred during working
hours and within company premises. Moreover, jurisprudence requires that the
confrontation be "rooted on workplace dynamics" or connected with the performance
of the employees' duties. The enquiry should be into the proximate cause of or the
motive behind the attack.
Therefore, while it may be true that Tequillo acted out of resentment towards
petitioner, the same resentment was essentially attributable to his own work-related
 neglect. It follows, then, that the attack was connected to the sub-standard
performance of Tequillo's duties, and that it was fundamentally rooted in his
confounded notion of workplace dynamics.

4. G.R. No. 213009

BOOKMEDIA PRESS, INC. and BENITO J. BRIZUELA
vs.
LEONARDO* SINAJON** and YANLY ABENIR
 
Facts:
Bookmedia Press, Inc. (Bookmedia) is a local printing company with Benito Brizuela (Brizuela)
as its President hired Yanly Abenir (Abenir) and Leonardo Sinajon (Sinajon).
 
On July 20, 1997, Brizuela received a report from one Larry Valdoz (Valdoz), a security guard
of Bookmedia, which claims that respondents, earlier in the day, had left the company premises
moments after punching-in their respective time cards. The report also alleges that Sinajon
returned on the evening of the same day and punched-out his and Abenir's time cards.
 
Brizuela immediately summoned the employees for explanation and on the next day, the said
employees submitted their explanation letters indicating therein that they both had to attend to
emergencies in their respective home that day. The following day after receipt of their letters,
Bookmedia fired both respondents.
 
Abenir and Sinajon filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal, the
latter finding as illegal the dismissal of the respondents due to the failure of the employer to
prove otherwise. The LA pointed out that employer really presented no evidence to support their
accusation that respondents have repeatedly been leaving work early after punching-in their time
cards.
 
Issue:
Whether the actions of the employee on that solitary incident on July 20, 1997 constituted just
causes for their dismissal.
 
Held:
Supreme Court (SC) held that the actions of the employees on July 20, 1997 do not qualify as
just causes for the latter's dismissal. Such actions, taken with the attendant circumstances of this
case, cannot be considered as serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer's lawful
order, or fraud.
 
Based on the previous decision made by the SC, the just causes of serious misconduct, willful
disobedience of an employer's lawful order, and fraud all imply the presence of "willfulness" or
"wrongful intent" on the part of the employee. Hence, serious misconduct and willful
disobedience of an employer's lawful order may only be appreciated when the employee's
transgression of a rule, duty or directive has been the product of "wrongful intent" or of a
"wrongful and perverse attitude, but not when the same transgression results from simple
negligence or "mere error in judgment." In the same vein, fraud and dishonesty can only be used
to justify the dismissal of an employee when the latter commits a dishonest act that reflects a
disposition to deceive, defraud and betray his employer.
 
Hence the act of the employees cannot be said to have the elements of willfulness or seriousness
so as to warrant their dismissal since the employees’ violative act of the company’s policy, based
on his explanation letter, was due to the emergency they had to attend to and not motivated by
the wanton desire to transgress said policy.
 
Also, the dishonesty committed by one of the employees (Abenir) when he had another person
punch-out his time card may be somewhat mitigated by the fact that he did not really worked
until 5PM but as he explained in his letter that he only forgot to do so.  Certainly, given such
background, the dishonest act of Abenir does not equate to the fraud contemplated by the law
that could warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
 
Wherefore, the petition of the Bookmedia is denied and since reinstatement would no longer be
feasible, the SC directed the Bookmedia to pay each employee separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.
5. Isabela-I Electric Coop Inc v. Vicente B. Del Rosario, Jr.
GR No. 226369
July 17, 2019
 
Facts:
Vicente B. Del Rosario, a certified public accountant, was promoted to Management Internal
Auditor of Isabela-I Electric Coop Inc. (Isabela), with salary rank 20. Sometime, a reorganization
plan was implemented causing for appointment of Vicente as Area Operations Manager, with
salary rank 19. This led to changes to his duties and decrease of salary. Deeming it as
constructive dismissal, Vicente filed a complaint. Isabela opposed on the ground that the
execution of the plan, approved by the government, led for the declaration of vacancy of all
positions and the appointment is an exercise of management prerogative with same benefits as
manager.

Issue:
Whether Vicente was not constructively dismissed

Held:
No. In several instances, the Court recognized prerogative of management. Management rights
and prerogatives, however, are not absolute. Demotion involves a situation in which an employee
is relegated to a subordinate or less important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade
or rank, with a corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied
by a decrease in salary. This was exactly what happened to Vicente.
Here, with respect to duties, the Court quoted the finding of the NLRC as affirmed by the CA
“Without question, as an Area Head his responsibilities are limited to a specific area, in contrast
to his previous position where the coverage of his responsibilities involves the entire financial
transaction of the Cooperative. Interestingly also, the position of Area Head, where he was
appointed, does not match his qualification(s) as a licensed CPA since the responsibilities
attached to it consist of supervision and implementation of activities on house connection,
collection, disconnection, apprehension, maintenance and operations and consumer services in
his area. Visibly, the Complainant was not only demoted but placed in a position where he
cannot advance and exercise his full potential and qualification”. As regards the salary, the
evidence show that after the reorganization, there was restructuring of the salary ranks. Salary
Rank 20 is paid P33,038.53, while the compensation for Salary Rank 19 is fixed at P30,963.95.
Hence, had petitioner been retained as Management Internal Auditor, he would already have
received P33,038.53, and not just P30,963.95.
In any case, even if there was no diminution in salary, there has still been a demotion in terms of
respondent's rank, responsibilities, and status. There is demotion when an employee is appointed
to a position resulting to a diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may
not involve a reduction in salary.
in effect, the Court deems it proper to grant salary differential. As correctly held by the NLRC,
Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
employment shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to his actual
reinstatement. Considering that Vicente ought to be reinstated to his former position, he must
also enjoy the salary that comes with it.
6. SM Development Corporation vs Teodore Gilbert Ang
G.R. No. 220434
Juky 22, 2019

Facts:
• Teodore Gilbert Ang was hired by SMDC as its Project Director since December 2006.
In his complaint, he alleged that sometime in January 2012, he applied for a two-week
vacation leave, from March 30, 2012 to April 15, 2012, which was approved by
SMDC’s President.
• Ang received a Notice to Explain concerning the cost status of one of his assigned
projects, the Field Residences. He submitted his explanation on the various issues and
concerns affecting and denied the alleged cost overrun in the general preliminaries and
presented the data in relation to other projects which negates the accusation of cost
overrun.
• Ang was informed in a meeting, that the management, without stating specific reasons,
wants him to resign from his current work. He was was asked through text messages to make
necessary turnover of his functions.
• On April 16, 2012 he reported back to work after his scheduled vacation leave. After office
hours at about 3:30 p.m., he was called by Hizon (SMDC’s Head of HRD) and was
made to receive the Memorandum with subject Show Cause Notice. He was charged
with gross and habitual neglect of duties and loss of trust and confidence due to various
infractions and commissions.
• On May 17, 2012, he informed Hizon that his suspension was over and he will report
back to work; but he received a phone call from the HRD Manager that he does not
need to report to work because he was already dismissed. He was then then called for a
meeting where he was served with a termination letter dated May 15, 2012. He was
surprised to learn of an alleged May 7 and 9, 2012 administrative hearing mentioned in
the said termination letter because he was never given any notice or even notified of
the said hearing.
• Ang filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims against SMDC.
• The LA dismissed the complaint. The LA found that there were substantial
documentary evidence showing that there was a just and valid cause for respondent's
dismissal on the grounds of incompetence and gross and habitual neglect of duties.
• On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the LA's
decision. His Motion for Reconsideration it was denied. Hence, he filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA.
• The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the ruling of the labor
tribunals. The CA found that respondent has been illegally dismissed and ordered the
Ang’s reinstatement and payment of backwages and attorneys’ fee.
• The CA held that the allegation of gross and habitual neglect of duty is not supported
by any substantial evidence. Aside from the Inter-Office Memorandums dated March 27,
2012, March 30, 2012 and April 16, 2012, enumerating the alleged infractions of
respondent, there were no other documentary evidence such as but not limited to audit
reports or affidavits showing that respondent was responsible for the said infractions.
• The CA also said that the basis for the loss of trust and confidence was not clearly
established because there was no evidence showing that respondent abused the trust
reposed in him by the petitioners with respect to his responsibility as Project Director.
The CA further held that the notice requirements have not been properly observed.
There was also no compliance with the imperatives of hearing or conference.
• Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, they filed
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang may be dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.

Held:
Yes. Ang was holding an executive position in SMDC as Project Director of Chateau
Elysee and Field Residences, both in Parañaque City. As Project Director, respondent was
the overall head of the project where he was assigned with the responsibility of ensuring
that the expectation and objectives set by management on the project are properly
implemented and achieved. Clearly, there is no doubt that respondent is a managerial
employee.

Due to the nature of his occupation, respondent's employment may be terminated for
willful breach of trust under Article 297(c) of the Labor Code. To justify a valid
dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the concurrence of two (2) conditions
must be satisfied: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and
confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence.

These two requisites are present in this case. The first requisite has already been
determined. Respondent, as SMDC's project director, is holding a position of trust and
confidence. As to the second requisite, that there must be an act that would justify the
loss of trust and confidence, parameters, the Court holds that respondent was validly
dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Respondent was not an ordinary
company employee. His position as one of SMDC's Project Director is clearly a position
of responsibility demanding an extensive amount of trust from petitioners. In terminating
managerial employees based on loss of trust and confidence, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required, but the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee
has breached the trust of his employer suffices.

7. Sestoso v. United Philippine Lines, Inc.,

G.R. No. 237063
July 24, 2019

FACTS:
Franciviel Derama Sestoso (Sestoso) was hired by the United Philippine Lines, Inc.
(UPLI) as Team Headwaiter on board M/V Carnival Inspiration for a period of 6
months. On board, when he knelt while doing his usual task of cleaning the dining
table, he felt a sharp pain down his right knee. The result of the test conducted at a
shore side clinic where the vessel docked showed a complex tear of the medial
meniscus and degenerative joint changes. He, nevertheless, continued working until he
finished his contract and got repatriated. Sestoso was subjected to a series of
examinations and treatments under different physicians. His disability was initially
rated as Grade 10, consequently, he was assessed to be partially and permanently
disabled/unfit to work as a seafarer.
Sestoso sued UPLI, Carnival Cruise Lines, and UPLI's owner (respondents) for total
and permanent disability benefits. The respondents countered that Sestoso was not
entitled to disability benefits since his recurrent knee pain was, a pre-existing illness,
hence, not compensable.
The Labor Arbiter awarded Sestoso Grade 10 disability benefits. On his appeal, Sestoso
was awarded permanent and total disability benefits. On respondents’ appeal before the
CA, the appellate court reversed the NLRC decision, ruling that Sestos's disability was
not compensable for it was a pre-existing illness and that he failed to allege and prove
that his illness was aggravated by his working conditions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sestoso’s illness is work-related and compensable.
2. Who has the burden of proving that petitioner's illness is work-related or has aggravated his
condition at work?

HELD:
1. Yes. In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court held that compensability of an
illness or injury does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of
employment but rather on whether the injury or illness is work-related or has aggravated the
seafarer's condition.
2. Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A…is deemed to be a "work-related illness."
Section 20 (A) (4) further provides that "Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract
are disputably presumed as work related." This provision speaks of a legal presumption of work-
relatedness in favor of the seafarer. As such, the employer, and not the seafarer, has the burden
of disproving the presumption by substantial evidence. In Racelis v. United Philippine Lines,
Inc. and David v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc., the Court held that the legal presumption
of work-relatedness of a non-listed illness should be overturned only when the employer's
refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined, is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."
It must be emphasized, though, that the presumption under Section 20-B
(4) is only limited to "work-relatedness" of an illness and does not cover or
extend to "compensability." Unlike "work-relatedness," no legal presumption of
compensability is accorded to the seafarer. As such, the seafarer bears the
burden to prove substantial evidence that the conditions of compensability have
been satisfied.

8. G.R. No. 209072

ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ
vs.
ACTIVE WORKS, INC., AND MA. ISABEL E. HERMOSA, BRANCH MANAGER
 
Facts:
Arlene A. Cuartocruz (Cuartocruz) and Cheng Chi Ho entered into a contract of employment
whereby Cuartocruz shall work as the latter’s domestic helper for two (2) years through Active
Works, Inc. (AWI), a recruitment agency for domestic helpers in Hong Kong.
 
On August 3, 2007, Cuartocruz arrived in Hong Kong and proceeded to the residence of her
employer, the following day.
 
On August 11, 2007, Cuartocruz received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is
required to improve her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which
the letter shall serve as a written notice of the termination of her employment contract effective
September 11, 2007. On the same day, Cuartocruz wrote a reply, apologizing for giving false
information by stating in her bio-data that she is single when in fact she is a single parent. She
also asked for a chance to improve so she can continue with her work.
 
However, in a letter dated August 16, 2007, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration
Department of Wangchai, Hong Kong that he is terminating the contract with Cuartocruz
effective immediately for the following reasons: "disobey order, unmatch the contract which she
submit before, [and] refuse to care my baby."
 
Cuartocruz consequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The LA rendered the decision finding the termination of Cuartocruz valid and legal. The NLRC,
however,  nullified and set aside LA’ decision stating there is insufficient proof of valid cause of
dismissal as well as compliance with the due process requirement. CA, affirming the decision of
NLRC awarding three-months’ salary in compliance with RA 8042.
 
Issues:
 
1. Whether the Cuartocruz was illegally dismissed
2. Whether the CA erred in granting the award of three-months’ salary in compliance with RA
8042 to Cuartocruz
 
Held:
The SC held that Cuartocruz was not afforded constitutional due process hence considering the
matter a case of illegal dismissal. Also, CA’s award has been modified awarding unpaid salaries
for the unexpired portion of her contract.
 
On the compliance with the substantive and procedural due process, the employer failed to
provide substantial evidence that there was a just or authorized cause for the dismissal. There
was no showing of particular instances when Cuartocruz supposedly disobeyed her employer and
refused to take care of his baby. With respect to Cuartocruz alleged misrepresentation that she
was single when in fact she was a single parent, there is also no showing how this affected her
work as a domestic helper. In fact, being a mother herself puts Cuartocruz in a better position to
care for her employer's child. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
 
Likewise, procedural due process was not complied. In this case, the August 11, 2007 warning
letter would have very well served as the first notice that satisfies the above requirement.
However, while the warning letter states that it will serve as notice of termination effective
September 11, 2007 in case Cuartocruz failed to improve her work performance, since she was
terminated immediately thereafter. Worse, the grounds stated in the August 16, 2007 termination
letter were markedly different from the ground stated in the warning letter.
 
Ruling on the monetary award, the proviso in Section 10, Republic Act No. (RA) 80422 which
prescribes the award of "salaries for the unexpired portion of [the] employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" to illegally-dismissed
overseas workers has been declared unconstitutional by the Court as early as 2009, and thus
should no longer be a source of confusion by litigants and the courts.

9. Spouses Dalen, et al. v. Mitsui OSK Lines

GR No. 194403, July 24, 2019
 
Facts: The MV Sea Prospect was chartered by Mitsui OSK Lines (Mitsui) and manned by the
filipino crew members. On its navigation carrying cargo with intermittent weather, from and to
Japan and Indonesia, the vessel sank together with a number of the crew members. The families
of the crew members got compensation and signed various documents including Settlement
Agreement, with the counsel of their choice, releasing Mistui from all liabilities including those
based on torts. Later, the families filed claim for further compensation with the labor arbiter
based on tort. Meanwhile, the trial court approved the Settlement Agreement after filing of
complaint of Mitsui with prayer therefor.
Issues: 1. Whether the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the claim of the families
2. Whether the agreement is not valid that bar families from instituting civil actions
Held:
1. No. The Labor Code provides that the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the commission
includes claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations. Similarly, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides:

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.
In deciding whether a case arises out of employer-employee relations, the Court formulated the
"reasonable causal connection rule", wherein if there is a reasonable connection between
the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the
jurisdiction of the labor courts.

In this case, the families' claim for damages is grounded on Mitsui's gross negligence
which caused the sinking of the vessel and the untimely demise of their loved
ones. Based on this, the subject matter of the complaint is one of claim for damages
arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.

According to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, "Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict."

Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.28

Here, the families argue that Mitsui is duty bound to exercise due diligence required by law in
order to ensure the safety of the crew and all the passengers therein. It was further averred that
the negligence on its part is quite apparent when they allowed the vessel to load and transport
wet cargo. For failure therefore to exercise extra ordinary diligence required of them, the Mitsui
must be held liable for damages to the surviving heirs of the deceased crew
members. Notwithstanding the contractual relation between the parties, the act of respondents is
a quasi-delict and not a mere breach of contract.

Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in
wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of
the general civil law, such claim falls outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily
ascribed to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

Therefore, the LA has no jurisdiction over the case in the first place; it should have been filed to
the proper trial court.
2. No. The families still cannot file the complaint with the trial court because the Settlement
Agreement is valid.

It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as
ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the worker's rights and that acceptance of
the benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.  The reason is plain. The employer and
employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. However, not all waivers and quitclaims
are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents
a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized
as a valid and binding undertaking.

In this case, it should be noted that when the families signed the Settlement Agreements, they did
it with their counsel of choice. It could be said that they brought their counsel along to make sure
that they would understand the contents of the agreements and that they are not tricked into
signing the same. A lawyer would know whether the agreement is unreasonable and one-sided
on its face.

Second, the agreement provides for the "release of respondents from all liabilities including
those based from torts, arising from the death/disappearance of the crewmembers as a result of
the sinking of the vessel." Hence, even claims arising from quasi-delict would be barred as
shown in the blanket waiver of right to sue.

Moreover, the families failed to substantiate their claim that they received less of what they are
really entitled to based on said Settlement Agreements. They wanted the Court to believe that
since their cause of action is for damages and what they received in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement was only those under the POEA SEC and the overriding CBA, then they
are not barred from filing the instant complaint. The families are misled. As discussed above, the
Settlement Agreement signed by petitioners are comprehensive enough to include even causes of
action arising from quasi-delict.

Having settled that petitioners may no longer pursue their claim for quasi delict based on the
grounds discussed above, it is not necessary to consider herein the issue on prescription of
action.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

10. Rodessa Quitevis Rodriquez vs Sintron Systems, Inc and or Joselito Capaque
G.R. No. 240254
July 24, 2019

Facts:
• Rodessa Rodriguez was hired by respondent Sintron Systems, Inc. (SSI) as Sales
Coordinator.
• The conflict between the parties arose when SSI received an invitation letter for a
factory visit with training from its supplier in Texas, USA. The parties had different
versions of the events succeeding this.
• According to Rodriguez, she attended the training in the USA without any condition
imposed upon her attendance. However, when she returned for work, SSI asked her to
sign a training agreement requiring her to remain with SSI for three years, otherwise,
she was to pay a penalty of P275,500.00, which she refused to sign. Thereafter, in a
meeting, Capaque (SSI President) humiliated and shouted at her vindictive words. She
then went on absences from for which she filed requests for leave. When she reported
back to work, she was surprised to learn that Capaque sent emails to clients stating
 that she had abandoned her job and accused her of intentionally hurting the reputation
of SSI to the latter's clients. Capaque also sent her an email stating that he did not
receive any request for leave and that her absence was "a ground of abandonment of
work. Embarrassed, Rodriguez filed for leave to be absent from November 22 to 29,
2013 and from December 2, 2013 to January 2, 2014. While on leave, Rodriguez filed
the present complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of Service
Incentive Leave (SIL) pay, separation pay, damages and attorney's fees and alleged that
she was forced to go on absences in order to avoid the abusive words of Capaque.
When Rodriguez went to SSI's office to obtain her half-month salary and 13th month
pay, Capaque verbally informed her that she was dismissed from employment. Moreover,
her co-workers forcibly removed the contents of her bag and confiscated documents she
intended to use as evidence in her complaint.
• According to SSI, Rodriguez was never maltreated, verbally or otherwise, and she
failed to adduce proof thereof. In contrast, SSI offered in evidence affidavits of
employees present in the meeting, who all claimed that there was no shouting that took
place. In truth, it was Rodriguez who was tardy, inefficient and disrespectful to clients.
Due to these events and the decline in sales performances, SSI reorganized the Sales
Department and hired an executive assistant (EA) and sales manager. When Rodriguez
reported back to work, SSI required her to give the newly appointed EA copies of
sales documents as well as to share the password to her company-provided email
account. She was likewise told not to tamper with the files in her assigned computer.
Rodriguez failed to follow these instructions. Hence, Rodriguez was not constructively
dismissed. She merely preempted what would have been a valid dismissal by going on
unapproved absences. As to this absenteeism, SSI denied having received requests for
leave from Rodriguez for her absence aside for her succeeding leaves from November 22
to 29, 2013 and December 2, 2013 to January 2, 2014, which was denied by SSI.
Hence, in an SSI memorandum, Rodriguez was warned that her continued absence may
be ground for termination and required her to respond to the memorandum, else her
termination would be reported to the DOLE. An IT Expert unlocked her office computer
because of her inaction when requested to turn over the same. It was then that SSI
discovered that the contents of Rodriguez's company-provided email account had been
deleted. In a letter dated June 3, 2014, SSI informed Rodriguez that the act of deleting
information and files from her company-issued computer and the removal of company
documents constitute serious misconduct, willful disobedience to a lawful order and
dishonesty or breach of trust which are just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code.
• The Labor Arbiter dismissed Rodriguez's complaint for lack of merit. According to the
Labor Arbiter, Rodriguez failed to prove by substantial evidence the unbearable working
environment which supposedly forced her to go on several absences. Hence, there was
no constructive dismissal.
• On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decisionwith the modification that Rodriguez was
held to be entitled to SIL pay.
• Both Rodriguez and SSI filed Motions for Reconsideration, but the same were denied.
Thereafter, both parties filed petitions for certiorari with the CA which were therein
consolidated.
• he CA denied both parties' petitions and affirmed the NLRC's Decision.
• Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were both denied in the Assailed
Resolution. Rodriguez then filed the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez was illegally dismissed.

Held:
No. Rodriguez was not dismissed.
In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
his dismissal from service. Obviously, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no
question as to its legality or illegality. As an allegation is not evidence, it is elementary
that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence.
Bare allegations of dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be
given credence. Moreover, the evidence to prove the fact of dismissal must be clear,
positive and convincing.

In the case at hand, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA unanimously found that Rodriguez
failed to discharge her burden of proving, with substantial evidence, her allegation that
she was dismissed by SSI, constructively or otherwise. The Court has no reason to disturb
such factual findings of the labor tribunals, as affirmed by the CA, being that they are
supported by substantial evidence on record. Indeed, it is evident that Rodriguez was not
dismissed. As the Labor Arbiter likewise found, it appears that she stopped reporting to
work and successively filed applications for leave of absence (which were not approved)
because she did not want to report to the newly appointed EA.

The Court shall not likewise reverse the credence given by the labor tribunals and CA
on SSI's version of events. Indeed, despite the mishaps of Rodriguez as substantially
proven by SSI, SSI did not have the chance to actually terminate her employment
because of her continued absences. Instead, she was warned, in an electronic mail sent
to her by Capaque, that her unauthorized absences may be regarded as abandonment of
work — a just cause for dismissal.
11. PNOC Development and Management Corp. v. Gomez
G.R. Nos. 220526-27
July 29, 2019
DOCTRINE: Loss of trust and confidence, be it a principal or an analogous ground for
dismissal, is not justified if it exists in vacuum. As a just cause, it requires an
underlying act, deed or conduct from which a reasonable belief of untrustworthiness
might be inferred. Without it, dismissals undertaken on such mere belief are arbitrary
and will be outlawed.
FACTS: Gloria V. Gomez (Gomez) was appointed by Filoil Refinery Corporation
(Filoil) as its Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel. Filoil's privatization was then
underway, hence, to facilitate the transition, its Board of Directors (Board) appointed
Gomez as Administrator of a special task-force. In the meantime, Filoil was
reorganized and renamed to PNOC Development and Management Corporation
(PDMC) and, as a result, the task-force was abolished and its members were given
termination notices. Gomez continued to serve as corporate secretary of PDMC in the
interim and was appointed as Administrator and Legal Counsel of the company. Gomez
was due to retire in 1998, however, then incumbent PDMC president extended her term
as Administrator effective until 2004. Consequently, a new Board of Directors took
over, which removed Gomez from her post as corporate secretary, as the Board
believed that Gomez's de facto tenure could be validly terminated.
While the matter was pending before the Board, Gomez' salary was withheld which
opted her to file a complaint for monetary claims. Meanwhile, the Board resolved to
terminate her services retroactive to the date of her supposed retirement. This led to the
amendment in her complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter found Gomez to have been illegally dismissed, entitling her to monetary award.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter.
Upon certiorari, the CA dismissed PDMC's petition for failure to prove misconduct on
the part of Gomez as basis for the claim of loss of trust and confidence. 
ISSUE: Whether or not Gomez's separation from office was valid.
HELD: No.
Verily, termination of employment by an employer for just causes under Article 282 of
the Labor Code implies that the employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of,
some violation against the employer — be it misconduct, neglect of duty, breach of
trust, or a crime or offense committed against the employer or his family or
representatives. Thus, it can be said that when the employee's dismissal is based on any
of these just causes, it is the employee himself that initiated the dismissal process by
giving a just cause therefor.
Jurisprudence is replete with guidelines on citing loss of trust and confidence
as ground for termination: Bravo, to reiterate, requires the employer to not only
demonstrate that the employee concerned is holding a position of trust, but also prove
the existence of an act justifying the supposed loss of trust and confidence. PJ
Lhuillier, Inc. vs. Camacho declares that there should be proof of involvement in the
events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertion and accusation by the
employer will not suffice. Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Reyes, citing General
Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, warns that it may not be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified, nor arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. More importantly, its
assertion as a ground for termination must be genuine, and not a mere afterthought to
justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. Indeed, this ground must be employed with
much caution, lest it be open to abuse in curtailment of rights to security of tenure.|
12. G.R. No. 232669
COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES
vs.
RICARDO S. MACAPAGAL, ENER A. MANARANG, REMIGIO E. MERCADO,
DANILO Z. FABIAN, ALBERT P. TAN, EDUARDO N. ABULENCIA, JR., REYNALDO
G. PINEDA, ERIC A. ABAD SANTOS, WILFREDO C. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL T.
CAPARAS, EDGARDO R. NAVARRO, NESTOR L. RAYO, AND INOCENCIO M.
ARAO,
 
Facts:
Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc.8 (Company) hired thirteen (13) employees at its
manufacturing plant as part of Product Availability Group (PAG).  In January 2011, the
Company announced its plan to abolish PAG, together with all of its warehouses and the
positions under it, including those held by involved employees, and outsource its remaining
functions to The Redsystem Company, Inc. (TRCI). After receipt of termination letter due to
redundancy, the employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal arguing that the redundancy
program was done in bad faith.
 
The Company, on the other hand, averred that it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling carbonated drinks and other beverage items nationwide while PAG's work involved
coordination with the external distribution channels. To improve operation efficiency and
effectiveness, the Company resolved to outsource all of its distribution and coordination efforts
under PAG to an independent contractor, TRCI. Notices of the redundancy program were given
to the respondents on January 31, 2011 as well as to the DOLE at least thirty days prior to the
effective date of separation. The Company added that it also gave more than the required
separation pay and other benefits to respondents, who in turn voluntarily executed their
respective notarized Deeds of Receipt, Waiver, and Quitclaim.
 
Issue:
 
Whether employees’ termination due redundancy program is valid.
 
Held:
 
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the redundancy program resulting to a valid
termination of the employees.
 
Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under Article 29832
(formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code. It exists when "the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise." It can be
due to "a number of factors, such as the over hiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of
business or the dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by
the enterprise." The determination of whether the employees' services are no longer necessary or
sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable for redundancy, is an exercise of business
judgment. In making such decision, however, management must not violate the law nor declare
redundancy without sufficient basis. o ensure that the dismissal is not implemented arbitrarily,
jurisprudence requires the employer to prove, among others, its good faith in abolishing the
redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and reasonable criteria in the selection of
employees who will be dismissed from employment due to redundancy.
 
Similarly, in this case, the Court finds that the termination of respondents was due to the
simplification of the distribution systems in the Company
 
13. G.R. No. 237246
14. Efren Julleza vs Orient Lines Philippines, Inc., Orient Navigation Corporation and
Macario Dela Pena
G.R. No. 225190
July 29, 2019

Facts:
• Efren Julleza was employed by Orient Line Philippines, Inc., as a bosun on board MV
Orient Phoenix, for a period of 9 months. His employment was covered by the IBF-
JSU/PSU-IMMAJ CBA. Meanwhile, for lack of a replacement, his employment was
extended.
• Julleza allegedly slipped while cleaning the cargo hold under bad weather condition.
• Upon his return to the Philippines, Julleza went to the company designated physician
and was found to be suffering from bilateral nephrolithiasis and lumbar spondylosis, with
disability grading of 8, i.e. loss of 2/3 lifting power of the trunk.
• He also consulted an independent physician which stated that he is unfit for further
strenuous activities. He subsequently filed a complaint for illness allowance, disability
benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses and damages.
• The LA ruled that petitioner figured in an accident, which caused his lumbar spondylosis
which entitled him to permanent total disability benefits following the IBF-
JSU/AMOSUP-IMMAJ CBA and ordered respondent to pay US$90,882.00 or its Philippine
Peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the latter's permanent total
disability benefits plus US$9,088.20 as attorney's fees.
• The NLRC affirmed en toto the LA decision.
• On appeal to the CA, reversed the NLRC decision. MR was denies, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted correctly in reversing the NLRC and LA ruling.

Held:
Yes. The CA acted correctly in reversing the NLRC and LA.
Petitioner failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the CBA which
states that:
“The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed
by the Company. If a doctor appointed by or on behalf of the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment, a third doctor may be nominated jointly between the
Company and the Union and the decision of this doctor shall be final and binding
on both parties.”
In the case at hand,,

Here, after receipt of his own doctor's medical report, petitioner did not show any proof
that he sent the medical report to respondents and signify to respondents that he would
like to refer the conflicting medical findings to a third doctor. The CA was therefore
correct that absent compliance with the conflict-resolution procedure, the findings of the
company-designated physician that petitioner has a Grade 8 disability rating should prevail
over that of the seafarer's doctor.

Also, both the LA and the NLRC ruled that petitioner's lumbar spondylosis arose from
an accident. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner was not involved in an
accident while on board the ship. A review of the records reveals that the CA was
correct.

An accident has been defined as as that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. Here, support for
petitioner's claim that he met an accident comes only from his own handwritten statement
and that of AB Magalonga who issued an unnotarized statement both of which state that
petitioner slipped and fell, with his butt, leg and back hitting the floor.

However, the Medical Report for Seafarer signed by Capt. Jeremias S. Ferrer, indicates
that petitioner complained of back pain above the waistline but that this arose from
sickness. Even petitioner's own doctor stated in his Medical Report that petitioner
experienced gradual onset of low back pain after lifting heavy objects. It did not arise
from an unusual circumstance. It did not arise from a calamity, casualty, catastrophe,
disaster, or an undesirable or unfortunate happening as it would seem to have developed
through time given the nature of his work.

Also, it was found by the CA that petitioner is entitled to the benefits under the POEA-SEC
and not from CBA since his injury did not arise from an accident.

15. Inocentes v. R. Syjuco Construction, Inc.,

G.R. No. 237020
July 29, 2019
FACTS:
Dominic Inocentes, Reymark Catangui, Jeffrey Inocentes, and Joseph Cornelio
(Complainants) filed a Complaint against R. Syjuco Construction, Inc. (RSCI) and its
owner, Ryan Syjuco (Respondents) for constructive illegal dismissal with money
claims (underpayment of salaries, night shift differential, overtime pay, rest day pay,
service incentive leave pay, ECOLA, 13th month pay as well as holiday premium pay)
as regular employees and for their allegation that they were terminated without any
valid cause and without observance of due process of law. Respondents, on the other
hand, maintained that the Complainants were engaged as project employees and that
they did not work continuously because their assignments depended on the availability
of projects. CAIHTE
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal but granted the
monetary claims in favor of the Complainants. Upon appeal, the NLRC ruled that the
Complainants were illegally dismissed from work. The Court of Appeals, however,
reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter in that, the Complainants were project
employees because they were informed of the nature and duration of their work and the
project at the time of their engagement.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Complainants are regular or project employees.
2. Whether or not the complainants were illegally dismissed
HELD:
1. Regular employees.
In Dacuital vs. L.M. Camus Engineering Corp., the Court stressed that a project
employee is assigned to a project that starts and ends at a determined or determinable
time. In this case, to ascertain whether petitioners were project employees, as claimed
by respondents, it is primordial to determine whether notice was given them that they
were being engaged just for a specific project, which notice must be made at the time
of hiring. However, no such prior notice was given by respondents.
Also, the fact that respondents did not submit a report with the DOLE (anent
the termination of petitioners' employment due to alleged project completion) further
bolsters that petitioners were not project employees. In Freyssinet Filipinas Corp. vs.
Lapuz, the Court explained that the failure on the part of the employer to file with the
DOLE a termination report every time a project or its phase is completed is an
indication that the workers are not project employees but regular ones.
Moreover, it is equally important to stress that the employer has the burden to
prove that the employee is indeed a project employee. On this, the employer must
establish that (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a particular project or
undertaking; and, (b) the duration and scope of which was specified at the time of
engagement. 
2. Yes.
 Notably, considering that respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove
that petitioners were project employees, the NLRC properly found them to be regular
employees. It thus follows that as regular employees, petitioners may only be
dismissed for a just or authorized cause and upon observance of due process of law.
As these requirements were not observed, the Court also sustains the finding of the
NLRC that petitioners were illegally dismissed.

16. G.R. No. 225586

THE PENINSULA MANILA and SONJA VODUSEK
vs.
EDWIN A. JARA
Facts:
Edwin Jara worked at the petitioner The Peninsula Manila from 2002 until his dismissal in 2011.
He became a captain waiter in 2009 who is tasked to tally actual cash count with cash transaction
receipts and match the same with the data in micros system.
 
On July 22, 2011, Jara discovered discrepancy between actual cash count and cash transaction
receipts resulting to cash overage of PhP6,500.00. He reported the same to his superior to whom
Jara later reported that the same had been reconciled knowing it is not. Instead, he made it appear
in the micros system that all amounts are reconciled. The next day, he did not report for work
but, however, dined at Escolta. He did not report again for work the net day as it was his rest day.
Upon his return to work, he reported the same to the auditor who later advised to surrender the
cash to his supervisor. Instead of complying with this directive, Jara turned over the money to the
captain waitress instead, for safekeeping in the safety deposit box.
 
After due hearing relating to the incident, Jara was informed of his termination for
misappropriation or falsification of hotel receipts and dishonesty in violation of the Hotel's Code
of Discipline. Consequently, Jara filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
 
Issue:
 
Whether Jara was illegally dismissed
 
Held:
 
The Supreme Court (SC) held in negative.
 
For dismissal due to cause under subsection C of Article 297 (formerly Art 282) of the Labor
Code, certain requirements must be complied with, viz: (1) the employee concerned must be
holding a position of trust and confidence and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss
of trust and confidence.
 
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first
class consists of managerial employees. While the second class consists of cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, etc. or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions,
regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
 
Even though Jara argues that he does not hold position of trust and confidence, Jara indisputably
comes within the second class of employees as he is tasked to handle significant amounts of
money from sales in petitioners' restaurant Escolta. Jara cannot claim otherwise for he would not
be entrusted with the duty to balance the sales transactions and actual cash on hand from
restaurant sales if he did not have the trust of the management.
 
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach
of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Here, with Jara’s actions, record bears
significant details pointing to the willfulness of Jara's action showing the breach of the trust
reposed in him by petitioner. That due to the irreconcilable cash count and transaction receipts,
Jara deliberately made it appear that the same tallied and even misrepresented such fact to his
supervisor. To be able to do this, Jara tampered with the transaction and sales receipts to come
up with a balanced cash sales record at the end of his shift. This is pure dishonesty and clearly a
violation of the trust reposed in him by his employer.
17. Marino B. Daang v. Skippers United Pacific, Inc.
GR No. 191902
July 30 2019
 
Facts: Marino B. Daang is a cook in a vessel chartered by Skippers United Pacific, Inc.
(Skippers). While rendering services, he was diagnosed with a disease rendering him
permanently disabled pursuant to POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC). Due to refusal
of Skippers, Marino filed a complaint with the labor arbiter (LA). Relying on the medical report,
the LA ruled in favor of Marino requiring payment of permanent disability benefits of $60,000.
On March 10, 2009, Marino and Skippers signed an agreement entitled “Conditional Satisfaction
of Judgment’ wherein Skippers paid Marino of said amount subject to right of Skippers for
reimbursement once liability to Marino is denied and preventing the latter from instituting claim
under all possible causes of action. After the affirmance of NLRC of liability of Skippers,
Marino moved to dismiss the appeal of Skippers with CA for being moot and contrary to public
policy. Skippers maintained that the agreement should not be taken against it as it is the only
protection to prevent execution proceedings in NLRC.
Issue: Whether the case will not prosper for being moot and academic and against public policy
Held: Yes. Following Hernandez v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., whereupon examination,
terms of the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment, the Affidavit, and the Receipt of Payment
contained provisos depriving Hernandez of all his rights to claim indemnity from the employer
under all possible causes of actions and in all available fora. Under the parties' agreement, in the
event of a reversal of the NLRC ruling, Hernandez not only committed to return what he
received, he also waived his right to judicial recourse, thereby leaving him with the proverbial
empty bag. Thus, We ruled in Hernandez that this kind of agreement is unfair and against public
policy.34 Accordingly, We held that such conditional payment of the seafarer's claim should be
treated as a "voluntary settlement" in full satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment—which
consequently rendered the employer's petition before the CA moot and academic.
In this case, the Court found that the terms of the parties' Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment
are worded similarly. Also, Skippers are in bad faith and should therefore bear the consequence
of their actions—the conditional payment of the judgment award to Daang will be treated as a
voluntary settlement in full satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment. With the judgment award
satisfied as of March 10, 2009—when the parties signed and filed the Conditional Satisfaction of
Judgment with the NLRC, respondents' petition before the CA became moot and academic. It
rejected Skippers' contention that the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment is their only
protection against the execution proceedings before the NLRC. Skippers are not compelled to
immediately pay the judgment award. In fact, they had already filed with the NLRC an appeal
bond intended as an assurance to Daang that he would receive the money judgment upon
dismissal of Skippers' appeal.

18. Ruel Guadalquiver vs Sea Power Shipping Enterprise Enterprise, Inc

G.R. No. 226200
August 5, 2019

Facts:
• Sea Power Shipping Enterprise, Inc. (Sea Power), in behalf of its principal, Mississauga
Enterprises, Inc., employed petitioner to work aboard the vessel M/V Dim.
• Petitioner alleged that his work involved strenuous manual work and narrated that after
lifting a heavy jar of paint on the vessel, he felt a "click" followed by pain on his
lower back. He initially ignored the incident but the pain persisted and he was
subsequently diagnosed him with osteoarthritis.
• Petitioner was medically repatriated on September 19, 2013 and immediately went to the
company-designated doctor, and was diagnosed with lumbo-sacral muscle strain but there
was no indication that surgery was needed. Consequently, he was advised to undergo
physical therapy.
• On November 13, 2013, the company designated doctor noted great improvement in
petitioner's pain relief. Because of this progress, he assured petitioner that he could be
given a fit-to-work certification after six sessions of physical therapy.
• However, notwithstanding the assurance, petitioner unjustifiably failed to report back to
the company-designated physician. Resultantly, in his Medical Report dated March 25,
2014, it was declared that petitioner abandoned his treatment as he failed to return for
his follow-up physical therapy.
• Meanwhile, petitioner admitted having consulted his physician-of-choice, because his
condition did not improved, which made a declaration of his unfitness to work at his his
previous occupation.
• Petitioner sought payment of disability benefits but to no avail. Thus, he filed a
Complaint on March 31, 2014 for permanent and total disability benefits and
reimbursement of medical expenses.
• The LA ruled in favor of petitioner.
• On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision.
• With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.
• The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision. The CA stressed that petitioner was
duty-bound to complete his medical treatment until the company-designated doctor
declares him fit to work or his disability was duly assessed. In addition, the CA ruled
that petitioner had no cause of action when he filed this suit emphasizing that while a
seafarer has a right to seek medical opinion from his chosen doctor, it must be
undertaken on the presumption that there was already a certification given by the
company-designated physician. Since no such certification was given here, then the
filing of the case was premature. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA decreed that
petitioner was entitled to sickness allowance or income benefit for the period from his
repatriation until the date that the company-designated doctor issued his assessment on
his condition.
• With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA err in ruling that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the LA Decision.

Held.
No, the CA did not err in ruling that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the LA Decision.
In Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc vs Hernandez, the Court enumerated the instances when
the seafarer may already pursue a case for full disability benefits, viz.: (
a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to
engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and
there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary
total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
b) )240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-
designated physician;
 c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the
120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and
the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
opinion;
d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently
disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently
disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not
compensable or work-related under the POEASEC but his doctor-of-choice and
the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise
and declared him unfit to work;
g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled
but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods.

Petitioner's cause of action had not yet accrued considering that the 240-day period had
not yet lapsed and the company-designated doctor still had a remaining period within
which to give his definitive assessment on the medical condition or the fitness of
petitioner to return to work. In fact, prior to the filing of the case, petitioner was under
the close monitoring of the company-designated physician and the latter even assured him
that after completing six physical therapy sessions, he would be given fit-to-work
certification. However, petitioner simply did not report back to the company-designated
doctor, and already filed this case against respondents.

Moreover, the opinion of petitioner's personal doctor cannot be given credence since it
did not give petitioner the necessary cause of action he lacked when he filed the
complaint. Indeed, while a seafarer has the right: to seek the opinion of other doctors,
such right may be availed of on the presumption that the company-designated doctor had
already issued a definite declaration on the condition of the seafarer, and the seafarer
finds it disagreeable. Given the lack of certification from the company-designated doctor,
petitioner cannot rely on the assessment made by his own doctor.
19. |Madrio v. Atlas Fertilizer Corp.,
G.R. No. 241445
August 14, 2019

FACTS: Rey Ben P. Madrio (Madrio) was formerly the Area Sales Manager of Atlas
Fertilizer Corp. (AFC) from 2008 unti his resignation in 2015, when he requested for
the payment of several monetary benefits, but the same remained unheeded. This
prompted Madrio to file a complaint against AFC. As proof of his claims for separation
pay, Madrio attached an unsigned and unauthenticated typewritten copy of the
Retirement Plan and Policy on Separation from Employment. The company argued that
the Retirement Plan is the retirement/separation policy it had for its employees and that
it would be unreasonable for it to pay separation benefits to an employee who has a
derogatory record therefrom. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Madrio and granted
him his monetary claims. Dissatisfied, AFC appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the
LA’s decision with modification of reducing the amount of separation benefits, among
others. On AFC’s appeal to the CA, the appellate court held that the NLRC erred in
considering the Retirement Plan as evidence to support petitioner's claim for separation
benefits, the same being unsigned and unauthenticated in such a wat that there was no
way to verify the truth of its contents. Consequently, it ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to separation benefits under AFC's Retirement Plan given that there was no
substantial evidence to prove the same. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the
Retirement Plan as evidence, and consequently, granted the award of separation
benefits in favor of petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
It is well-settled that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC,
are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However,
when it comes to admitting documents as evidence in labor cases, it is nonetheless
required that there be some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the
admission of documents. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that petitioner is automatically entitled to the
claimed separation benefits. Proving the existence of AFC's retirement/separation
policy, as well as its pertinent terms and conditions, is separate and distinct matter from
proving the fact that these terms and conditions have been complied with. The
separation benefits under the AFC's company policy is not the separation pay
contemplated under the labor code, but rather, a special benefit given by the company
only to upstanding employees under special conditions, one of which is that the
employee must not have a derogatory record.
In this case, petitioner only submitted a copy of the Retirement Plan as proof
of his entitlement to the separation benefits claimed. However, by and of itself, the
said document only proves what the retirement/separation policy of AFC is. It does
not, in any way, demonstrate that the conditions for entitlement had already been met
by the employee. Hence, unless proven otherwise, petitioner is not qualified to claim
separation benefits from AFC.
In fine, the Court is unconvinced that petitioner has proven his entitlement to
the separation benefits under AFC's company policy. As such, the CA Decision is
affirmed insofar as it set aside the NLRC's award of separation benefits in favor of
petitioner not for the reasons given by the CA but based on the above discussion.
20. G.R. No. 234346
21. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Raymond F. Bernardo
GR No. 220635
August 14, 2019
 
Facts: Raymond F. Bernardo, then 37, was a seaman who had first employment with charterer,
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (Transmarine) and was covered by a POEA-SEC. On
aboard the chartered vessel, the food provisions for the crewmembers include fruits and
vegetables. During navigation, he was diagnosed of gouty arthritis which certified by a company
physicians as not work related. An independent physician diagnosed that the disease rendered
Raymond totally unfit for his duties prompting to file claim for permanent disability benefits.
Transmarine denied the claim on the ground that i) food provision on the vessel consists of
vegetables and fruits, ii) the physicians stated that it is not work-related and, iii) according to
statistics, it is common for older men.
Issue: Whether Raymond is not entitled for permanent disability compensation
Held: Yes. In labor case, a party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and
invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. POEA-SEC provides that even those
illnesses not listed in Section 32 are still disputably presumed as work-related. Not having been
listed in Section 32 thereof, gouty arthritis, is presumed to be work-related. However, when
substantial evidence of greater weight is presented to overcome the prima facie case, it will be
decided in favor of the one who has presented the evidence against the presumption.
In this case, the following circumstances are pertinent to Raymond: (1) relatively young age, (2)
that it was only his first employment contract with Transmarine; (4) the certifications by the
physicians respondent's illness is not work-related; and (5) the list of food provisions for the
vessel consisting of fresh and frozen foods, when taken together, sufficiently overcome the
disputable presumption that gouty arthritis is work-related.
22. Danilo Lerona vs Sea Power Shipping Enterprise Enterprise, Inc
G.R. No. 210955
August 14, 2019

Facts:
• Respondent Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. employed petitioner Danilo A. Lerona
on behalf of respondent Neda Maritime Agency Co., Ltd. to work as a fitter on board
M/V Penelope.
• While on board the vessel, petitioner felt severe chest pains and dizziness, which prompted
him to request for a medical checkup. He was brought to a hospital in China, but the
doctor who examined him did not prescribe any medication or recommend
hospitalization or repatriation. Notwithstanding this, petitioner was repatriated to the
Philippines on August 13, 2009.
• He was confined at the De Los Santos Medical Center and was diagnosed that petitioner
might have Coronary Arterial Disease for which pertinent laboratory and diagnostic
examinations should be conducted.
• Petitioner's laboratory tests showed that he had a high level of triglycerides and was
found to be negative for any vessel abnormality. He was placed under observation for
another week prior to the issuance of a medical clearance., but was declared to have
absconded his medical treatment when he failed to show in his follow-up check-up on October
23, 2009.
• Unknown to respondents, petitioner consulted an independent physician on December 17,
2009, which declared, among others, that: (1) petitioner is permanently unfit to resume
work as a seaman in any capacity; (2) his illness is considered work aggravated/related;
and (3) he is not expected to land gainful employment given his medical background.
• On January 14, 2010, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical expenses and attorney's fees against respondent.
• The LA rendered a Decision ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay petitioner
permanent and total disability benefits.
• On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision. But upon petitioner’s motion for
reconsidertation, the NLRC reversed itself and reinstated the LA ruling.
• On appea, the CA, set aside the NLRC Resolution for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion and reinstated its initial decision to dismiss petitioner's complaint. It
ruled that the findings of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, are not supported by
substantial evidence. It is undisputed that petitioner's hypertension was a pre-existing
condition, yet, he did not indicate it in his PEME form. Thus, petitioner committed
misrepresentation which disqualifies him from recovering any disability benefits under
 Section 20(E) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. That even assuming that petitioner did not
conceal his condition, the CA held that a seafarer's inability to resume his work after
the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered illness is not a magic wand
that would automatically warrant the grant of total and permanent disability benefits.
None of the instances when a seafarer may be allowed to pursue an action to claim
total and permanent disability exists.
• Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Held:
No, Petitioner cannot claim disability benefits because he committed fraudulent
misrepresentation.
The contract of employment between the parties is subject to the terms and conditions of
the 2000 POEA-SEC. Section 20(E) of which provides that deliberate concealment by a
seafarer of a pre-existing medical condition in his PEME constitutes fraudulent
misrepresentation which shall disqualify him from any disability compensation and
benefits.

As correctly observed by the CA, petitioner did not indicate in the appropriate box in
his PEME form that he has hypertension, although he had been taking Norvasc as
maintenance medicine for two years. He only disclosed his pre-existing medical condition
after he was repatriated to the Philippines. Petitioner claims that he did not reveal his
hypertension during his PEME out of an honest belief that it had been "resolved."
However, this is not persuasive. That petitioner continues to take maintenance medicine
indicates that his condition is not yet resolved. Additionally, within the two years that
petitioner had been taking maintenance medication for his hypertension, he had boarded
respondents' ships four times.

The Court had on many occasions disqualified seafarers from claiming disability benefits
on account of fraudulent misrepresentation arising from their concealment of a pre-
existing medical condition. This case is not an exception. For knowingly concealing his
hypertension during the PEME, petitioner committed fraudulent misrepresentation which
unconditionally bars his right to receive any disability compensation from respondents.

Petitioner also cannot claim disability benefits because he committed medical

abandonment. Section 20(D) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provides that "no compensation and
benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the
seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties. x x
x". A seafarer is duty-bound to complete his medical treatment until declared fit to work
or assessed with a permanent disability rating by the companydesignated physician.

In this case, after undergoing several tests, petitioner was placed under observation. Dr.
Gonzales advised him to return for his medical clearance on October 23, 2009, or 71
days from his repatriation, but petitioner did not do so. He argues that he could still
feel the symptoms of his ailment despite having been cleared by respondents' cardiologist
from coronary arterial disease on October 15, 2009. Hence, he was prompted to consult
another doctor. However, while indeed a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of
other doctors under Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, this is on the presumption
that the company-designated physician had already issued a certification on his fitness or
disability and he finds this disagreeable. As case law holds, the companydesignated
physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work
or to determine his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation. The
120-day period applies if the duration of the seafarer's treatment does not exceed 120
days. On the other hand, the 240-day period applies in case the seafarer requires further
medical treatment after the lapse of the initial 120-day period. In case the company-
designated doctor failed to issue a declaration within the given periods, the seafarer is
deemed totally and permanently disabled.
When petitioner filed his complaint before the LA on January 14, 2010, or 154 days
after his repatriation, he had no cause of action against respondents because Dr. Gonzales
has not yet issued an assessment on his fitness or unfitness for sea duty. The 240-day
maximum period for treatment has not yet lapsed.

23. Verzonilla v. Employees' Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 232888 (Resolution)
August 14, 2019

FACTS: Reynaldo I. Verzonilla (Reynaldo) was employed as a Special Operations

Officer III in the Quezon City Department of Public Order and Safety since 1999 until
his death in 2012 due to "cardio pulmonary arrest, etiology undetermined" at
UniHealth-Tagaytay Hospital and Medical Center, Inc. (UTHMCI). His Records show
that Reynaldo was previously diagnosed with hypertension in 2002. Thereafter, Julieta
Verzonilla (Julieta), the surviving spouse of Reynaldo, filed a claim for compensation
benefits before the GSIS under PD 626. The GSIS denied the claim of Julieta, stating
that the ailment of Reynaldo was not connected to his work and that no evidence was
found that his duties increased the risk of contracting said ailment. Julieta moved for a
reconsideration ut the same was denied.
Julieta elevated her claims to the Employees' Compensation Commission
(ECC), where the latter affirmed the decision of the GSIS, noting that Julieta failed to
provide substantial evidence to show reasonable connection between the cause of death
of Reynaldo and his work and working conditions. On Petition for Review with the CA,
the CA agreed with the ECC that Julieta failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that
the conditions for compensability of cardiovascular diseases were met or that
Reynaldo's risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. 
ISSUE: Whether or not Julieta is entitled to claim for EC benefits in connection with
the death of her late husband Reynaldo.
HELD: Yes.
Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code provide
that to be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1)
a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
EC under the conditions it sets forth; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting
the disease is increased by the working conditions. Annex "A" of the Amended Rules
on EC lists cardiovascular disease as an "Occupational and Work-Related Disease"
subject to any (not all) of the certain conditions. Hence, the fact that cardiovascular
disease is listed as an occupational disease does not mean automatic compensability.
For the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant has
the burden of proof to show, by substantial evidence, that the conditions for
compensability are met. The Court is convinced that Julieta was able to adduce
substantial evidence to support her claims for compensation benefits in relation to her
late husband's death.
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court stresses that in determining the
compensability of an illness, it is not necessary that the employment be the sole factor
in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimant's illness to entitle him to
compensation benefits. It is enough that his employment contributed, even in a
small degree, to the development of the disease. Moreover, the degree of proof in
establishing at least a small work-connection is merely substantial evidence. Finally,
it is well to recall that the constitutional guarantee of social justice towards labor
 demands a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability.

24. G.R. No. 232522

August 28, 2019
CARISSA E. SANTO
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU

Facts:
In May 1997, University of Cebu hired petitioner Carissa E. Santo as a full-time instructor. She
continued working for respondent until she got qualified for optional retirement under
respondent's Faculty Manual, viz:
Optional Retirement
A permanent employee may, upon reaching his fifty-fifth (55th) birthday or after having
completed at least fifteen (15) years of service, opt for an early retirement (which is a resignation
with separation pay) considering that separation before reaching 15 years of full-time service
does not entitle an employee to any separation pay, except that which is contributed by the
University to PAG-IBIG), and shall be entitled to the retirement pay equivalent to a total of
fifteen (15) days for every year of service based on the average monthly salary to the employee
computed for the past three years.5 (emphasis supplied)
In April 2013, she applied for optional retirement; she was then only forty-two (42) years old but
had already completed sixteen (16) years of service with University of Cebu. The latter approved
her application and computed her optional retirement pay at fifteen (15) days for every year of
service per provisions of the Faculty Manual. She asserted, though, that her retirement pay
should be equivalent to 22.5 days per year of service in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor
Code. University of Cebu refused to accept her computation. Thus, she initiated the
complaint below for payment of retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code,
damages and attorney's fees against respondent.
Issue:
Whether Santo is entitled to retirement pay pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code
Held:
The Supreme Court (SC) held that Santo’s retirement pay should be computed based on Article
287 of the Labor Code.
Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer
and are earned under existing laws, Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA), employment
contracts and company policies. It is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain
age or length of service, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former.
Clearly, the Faculty Manual intends to grant retirement benefits to qualified employees. It
entitles an employee to retire after fifteen (15) years of service or upon reaching the age of fifty-
five (55) and accordingly collect retirement benefits. It even mandates compliance with RA 7641
such that when the computation of its retirement plan is found to be lower than what the law
requires, University of Cebu is bound to pay the deficiency. The optional retirement under
University of Cebu’s Faculty Manual, therefore, should not be taken as anything else but a
retirement benefit within the ambit of Article 287 of the Labor Code.
Now, comparing the optional retirement benefits under the two (2) retirement schemes, it is
apparent that fifteen (15) days' worth of salary for every year of service provided under its
Faculty Manual is much less than 22.5 days' worth of salary for every year of service provided
under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Obviously, it is more beneficial for petitioner if Article
287's retirement plan will be applied in the computation of' her retirement benefits.
25. Gertrudes D. Mejila v. Wrigley Philippines Inc.
GR Nos. 199469, 199505
September 11, 2019
 
Facts: In January 2007, Wrigley Philippines Inc. (WPI) located in Antipolo City engaged the
services Gertrudes D. Mejila and others as company nurses. In February 2007, WPI deliberated
the feasibility of Headcount Optimization Program for the streamlining of organization and cost
savings. On October 26, 2007, WPI sent a memorandum to Gertrudes informing that her
position, as a result of feasibility is terminated effective November 26, 2007. Aside from her,
several nurses were terminated. On November 7, 2007, WPI outsourced Activeone Health, Inc,
to take over the services rendered by the nurses. Aside from the memorandum, WPI sent notice
of the termination of personnel to the field office of DOLE at Rizal.
Deeming it as illegal dismissal in the absence of redundancy in accordance with law and proper
notice filed with regional office of DOLE, Gertrudes filed a complaint with the labor arbiter.
WPI opposed on the ground that redundancy is supported by a study and the cost savings
corresponding to the benefits of the nurses and the filing of notice with the office of DOLE in
Rizal is sufficient compliance as it is a satellite office of the regional office. The labor arbiter
ruled in favor of Gertrudes with payment of attorneys fees.
Issues: 1. Whether there is no redundancy in conformity with the law
2. Whether the notice is not filed with the proper office of the DOLE
 
3. Whether payment of attorney’s fees is proper
Held:
1. No. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Of course, a company cannot simply
declare redundancy without basis. It is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has
become overmanned. It must produce adequate proof that such is the actual situation to justify
the dismissal of the affected employees, for redundancy.
 
In this case, WPI substantially proved that its Headcount Optimization Program was a fair
exercise of business judgment. The decision to outsource clinic operations can hardly be
considered as whimsical or arbitrary. WPI had deliberated on the feasibility of the
Headcount Optimization Program as early as February 2007 for the purpose of
streamlining the organization and increasing productivity. WPI's rationale for outsourcing
its clinic operations is reasonable—it wanted to focus on the core business and clinic
operations is not an integral part of it. WPI's business projections showed a correlation
between an increase in volume and a decrease in headcount and its computation of cost
savings amounting to P522,713.79 as a result of the engagement of Activeone has not
been adequately rebutted. 
 
Gertrudes failed to prove her accusation that WPI acted with ill motive in implementing the
redundancy program. The pieces of evidence presented by Gertrudes to support her
allegation were mainly hearsay and speculative at best. WPI's prior actions showed that it
was implementing its Headcount Optimization Program without singling out Gertrudes.
.
2. Yes. In implementing a redundancy program, Article 298 requires employers to serve a
written notice to both the affected employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the
intended date of termination. Under Rook V, Rule XXIII, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code,28 this procedural requirement is "deemed complied with
upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department at least thirty days before the effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or
grounds for termination. Where termination is based on authorized causes under Article 298,
substantial compliance is not enough. Since the dismissal is initiated by the employer's exercise
of its management prerogative, strict observance of the proper procedure is required in order to
give life to the constitutional protection afforded to labor.
 
In this case, WPI has not pointed to any issuance by the DOLE authorizing the service of the
termination notice to the field offices. It appears that WPI merely assumed that this is
 allowed because certain functions have been devolved to these satellite offices. However,
this assumption is unwarranted in the absence of any clear devolution of the authority to
receive the notice of termination. The only thing WPI can palpably point to is the
Establishment Termination Report (RKS Form 5)40 which has a blank section at the
header allowing employers to fill in the appropriate regional office, district, office or
provincial extension unit. The argument, apart from being tenuous, is contradicted by the
form itself because it states that it must be accomplished "upon filing of notice of
termination."41 The form, therefore, is not the equivalent or substitute for the notice
required by law. Thus, regardless of whether DOLE allows the form to be filed with its
field offices, it does not change the rule that the notice must be filed with the regional
office. Regional Director of DOLE covering Antipolo City certified that the office did not
receive a copy of WPI's termination notice
 
3. No. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by
the court to be paid by the losing party to the winning party. The instances when these may be
awarded are enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically in its paragraph 7 on
actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the client
and his lawyer have agreed that the award shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of
compensation.44 The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient
showing of bad faith.
Article 111 of the Labor Code is another example of the extraordinary concept of attorney's fees.
The provision allows the recovery of attorney's fees in cases of unlawful withholding of
wages equivalent to the amount of wages to be recovered. Unlike in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad
faith when it withheld the wages. But there must still be an express finding of facts and
law to prove the merit of the award.46
 
In this case, there was no sufficient proof of bad faith on the part of WPI, which rules out an
award under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. However, the awarding of attorney's fees
based on Article 111 of the Labor Code by the labor arbiter is improper. The provision
only applies when there is unlawful withholding of wages. WPI did not withhold Mejila's
wages. On the contrary, WPI has, from the onset, offered to pay Mejila's salaries,
separation pay and other payments. Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees is improper
and should be deleted.
26. Genuino Agro-Industrial Dev’t. Corp. vs Romano et al.
G.R. No. 204782
September 18, 2019

Facts:
• Respondents Armando G. Romano, Jay A. Cabrera and Moises V. Sarmiento claimed
that they work as brine men at Genuino Ice Company Inc.'s ice plant in Turbina,
Calamba, Laguna branch.
• Romano was hired through the man power agency, Vicar General Contractor and
Management Services, while Sarmiento and Cabrera were hired through L.C. Moreno
General Contractor and Management Services.
• Respondents averred that sometime in September 2004, the workers were given a work
schedule where one worker was not made to report for work for 15 consecutive days
while the six other workers report for work on their regular schedules. In other words,
each worker does not work for 15 days for a period of 90 days.
• When Romano reported back to work on June 25, 2005 after his 15 days forced leave,
he was told then and there that his employment was already terminated. Sarmiento and
Cabrera also suffered the same fate. They were dismissed from work on July 10, 2005.
Thus, on August 3, 2005, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for separation pay against Genuino Ice and Vicar before the DOLE.
• Genuino Ice, for its part, claimed that respondents charged the wrong party as they
were never its employees but of petitioner, its affiliate company. They were contractual
 employees of Vicar and L.C. Moreno which deployed them to work at petitioner's ice
plant. Due to the continuous and tremendous decline in the demand for ice products
being produced by the petitioner, it shut down its block ice production plant facilities.
Its six workers were reduced to two. By reason of Genuino Ice's contention that
respondents charged the wrong party, they amended their complaint by impleading the
petitioner.
• The Labor Arbiter held that respondents were regular employees of the petitioner since
they were performing functions that were necessary and desirable to the operations of
the ice plant. The Labor Arbiter also found Vicar to be without substantial capital and
equipment to qualify as an independent contractor, and thus treated it as a labor-only
contractor, and held accountable as such. The Labor Arbitewr orderd the reinstatement and
paymenrt of backwages of respondents.
• On appeal, the NLRC affirmed he Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC held that they could
not justify respondents' dismissal on the ground of retrenchment considering that
petitioner and Vicar totally disregarded the requirements laid down in Article 298 of
the Labor Code and failed to adduce documentary proof, like an audited financial
statement, to substantiate their claim.
• Undaunted, the petitioner sought recourse before the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in: (1) not finding that
respondents were retrenched from employment and that they are not entitled to
reinstatement and backwages, but only to nominal damages; (2) not modifying the
Labor Arbiter's Decision which ordered respondents' reinstatement and payment of full
backwages to the payment of separation pay.
• The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in deciding the
case as it did and denied the petition. It held that while retrenchment is one of the
recognized authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee, petitioner failed to
discharge its burden of proving that respondents' retrenchment was valid for the reason
that petitioner not only failed to notify them and the DOLE of the retrenchment, it also
failed to prove that it was losing financially. Thus, respondents' dismissal was clearly
illegal. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court via the present petition

Issue:
Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed from employment.

Held:
Yes. Article 298 of the Labor Code laid down the authorized causes where the employer
may validly terminate the employment of its employees. It provides:
ART. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. – The employer
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall
 be entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

Petitioner is correct in saying that retrenchment is a management prerogative to downsize

its work force to avert business losses, which could either be already incurred or
impending. The three (3) basic requirements for retrenchment are: (a) proof that the
retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses or impending losses; (b) service of written
notices to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
(1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (c) payment of separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay, or at least onehalf (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In addition, jurisprudence has set the standards for losses
which may justify retrenchment, thus: (1) the losses incurred are substantial and not de
minimis; (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent; (3) the
retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing the
expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent
losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.

To justify retrenchment, petitioner claims serious business losses leading to the shutdown
of its block ice plant facilities to which respondents belong. There is, however, dearth of
evidence showing that the petitioner was indeed suffering from business losses or
financial reverses as it staunchly claimed. Petitioner could have easily proved its dire
financial state by submitting its financial statements duly audited by independent external
auditors, but it did not. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses necessarily means
that respondents' dismissal was not justified. In addition, records would bear out, as in
fact petitioner never denied, that it failed to satisfy the notice requirement under Article
298 of the Labor Code. Neither was the required separation pay to effect a valid
retrenchment given to the respondents. For these reasons, the Court must uphold the
ruling of the CA that there was absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it upheld the ruling of Labor Arbiter finding the respondents to have been
illegally dismissed by the petitioner inasmuch as retrenchment was not duly proven by
the latter.
27. Foodbev International v. Ferrer
G.R. No. 206795
September 16, 2019

FACTS:
Noli C. Ferrer (Ferrer), Jever N. Belardo (Jever), Felix Galela (Galela), Romeo Siscar,
Jr. (Siscar), Michael Baldesco (Baldesco), Rico Academia (Academia), Eduardo Dela
Cruz (Dela Cruz), Ryan Aquino (Aquino), Gaudencio Pario III (Pario), Mark Trapago
(Trapago), Mair Gomez (Gomez), and Reynaldo B. Eroles, Jr. (Eroles), are Foodbev
International (Foodbev) rank and file employees and members of Samahan ng
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Foodbev International Central (Samahan) [union
members], a labor union while Bernadette Belardo (Bernadette) is a managerial
employee and spouse of Jever. 
Meetings were held between the union members, Foodbev managers, Lucila Dela Cruz
(Lucila) as president to air the former’s grievances and reasons in establishing a union,
and threatened to close Foodbev if the union activities persist. Lucila reiterated to stop
union activities and to withdraw from the union for the sake of their jobs or for the
union members to voluntarily resign in exchange for compensation. As most of the
union members did not resign, some members of the group (Ferrer, Aquino, Trapago,
Pimentel, and Pario) were given disciplinary action which led to the eventual
termination of their services due to gross negligence. Ferrer, et al filed a complaint for
UPL with the NLRC (docketed as NLRC NCR 07-10332-08). Consequently, another
complaint for unfair labor practice was filed by Eroles, Baldesco, Gomez, Farne, Dela
Cruz, Academia, Siscar, Jimenez, and Trapago in the NLRC (docketed as NLRC NCR
07-10360-08). Said complaints were consolidated and assigned to LA Virginia
Azarraga (LA Azarraga). 
Thereafter, after receiving certain memoranda involving disciplinary action or notice of
temporary assignment to another branch, Academia, Eroles, Ferrer, Pario, and Galela
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims with the NLRC (docketed as
NLRC NCR 07-10721-08), which was assigned to LA Thomas T. Que, Jr. (LA Que). 
Foodbev issued a memo to Jever, Galela, Gomez, Baldesco, Academia, Siscar, Dela
Cruz, Jimenez, and Piad placing them on preventive suspension for 48 hours pending
an administrative hearing for insubordination for not proceeding to their designated
work assignments. 
Meanwhile, Bernadette was fired from work due to a commotion between the
management and some union members including her husband. This prompted her to file
a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims (docketed as NLRC NCR 08-
11324-08) which was later consolidated with the complaints assigned to LA Que. 
Jever, Galela, Gomez, Siscar, Farne, Baldesco, Dela Cruz, Jimenez, and Academia filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims (docketed as NLRC NCR 08-
11081-08) and was also consolidated with the complaint pending with LA
Que. Another complaint (docketed as NLRC NCR 08-11868-08) for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, and money claims was filed by Eroles and the Samahan and
was likewise consolidated to LA Que.
LA Que rendered a decision dismissing the four consolidated complaints for violation
of the rule against forum shopping. The union members appealed to the NLRC, which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaints.
As for Eroles' complaint on behalf of the union, the NLRC determined that the
complaint was filed not for the union but for the same union members, who earlier filed
the complaints and that the allegations were the same as the earlier cases. Nevertheless,
the NLRC concluded that the allegations against Foodbev did not constitute unfair
labor practice. 
As for Bernadette's complaint, the NLRC decided that her termination was warranted
and she was not entitled to separation pay. 
As for Pimentel's complaint, the NLRC declared that his termination from employment
was without valid or just cause.
Aggrieved, the union members elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed the labor
tribunal's finding that respondents committed forum shopping. On the claim of unfair
labor practice, the CA determined that Foodbev was discouraging the formation of a
union, and committed acts constituting unfair labor practice. The CA ruled that the
NLRC arbitrarily pronounced that there was no unfair labor practice despite the lack of
factual and legal bases. In partly granting the petition, the CA reversed the NLRC
Decision and Resolution, respectively, and ordered reinstatement or payment of
separation benefits, as the case may be.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in disregarding the union
members’ commission of forum shopping and in ruling that there was unfail labor
practice on the part of Foodbev.
HELD: No.
I. Procedural Issue: Forum Shopping
 It is true that the Court is strict in dismissing a case when lawyers and/or
litigants commit forum shopping. However, it is likewise true that strict imposition of
technical rules can result to miscarriage of substantial justice. The Court has the duty
to uphold the Constitution and safeguard the rights it embodies. Here, the rights of
workers to self-organization, security of tenure, and a living wage are at stake. A
dismissal of the complaints due to technicalities would defeat these valuable rights of
complaining workers, which the Constitution protects. Therefore, the CA was correct
in setting aside technical rules on forum shopping to give way to the more important
Constitutional and statutory rights of respondent workers.
II. Substantive Issues
The union members’ dismissal due to gross negligence resulting to loss and
damage to the company's reputation and image, lacks factual foundation and
disregards due process, while as to the allegation of habitual absences, the petition
fails to specifically state the dates or circumstances constituting habitual absence.
The inconsistencies in the charges, findings, and ground for termination make
the termination notice substantially and procedurally defective. Moreover, the Court
is suspicious of the integrity of the administrative hearing conducted on the charges
against the respondents. The numerous procedural violations alone make respondents'
dismissal against the law.
The Court finds that respondent's dismissal from employment is illegal due to
several violations of procedural and substantive requirements of the Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules.
As to the verbal dismissal of Bernadette, the Court held that there was no clear
reason for her dismissal. It can only be inferred that her dismissal was due to her
husband's membership in the union and participation in union activities. But that is
not among the just causes of termination under Article 294 of the Labor Code.
Bernadette's verbal termination from employment is a violation of her right to
security of tenure, and was done without just cause and due process under Articles
294 and 297 of the Labor Code. Thus, the Court rules that Bernadette's dismissal
from the service is illegal.
Lastly, Articles 258 and 259 of the Labor Code state the concept of unfair
labor practice and enumerate the unfair labor practices committed by employers.
ART. 258. [247] Concept of Unfair Labor Practice and Procedure for
Prosecution Thereof. — Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are
inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt
industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations. (Labor Code of the Philippines, Presidential
Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), [July 21, 2015])
 The records reveal several instances to support and prove that Foodbev is
guilty of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting.
28. G.R. No. G.R. No. 202851
September 09, 2019
FEATI UNIVERSITY
vs.
ANTOLIN PANGAN

Facts:
FEATI University (FEATI) hired Antolin Pangan (Pangan) as a canteen boolckeeper. Pangan
was later on promoted as Assistant Cashier and then as University Cashier in 1995.
Alleging decline in enrolment for the past 25 years, petitioner offered a voluntary early
retirement program to all its employees on August 27, 2002 of which Pangan availed the same.
On August 30, 2002, Panga’s retirement was approved and had immediately received his
retirement pay.
Meanwhile, prior to the approval of Pangan’s application to avail of the early retirement
program, he was re-hired as University Cashier on August 28, 2002. Alleging, however, that the
functions of the University Cashier was subsequently transferred to the Accounting Department
as part of the cost-cutting measures that FEATI undertook, it re-assigned respondent as Assistant
Program Coordinator of the Graduate Studies on April 15, 2004.
On August 6, 2005, Pangan was terminated from employment on the ground of redundancy.
According to petitioner, respondent's position became redundant due to the progressive decline
of enrolment in the Graduate Program and as such, the Graduate Program Coordinator can
adequately handle the tasks without a need for an assistant. Aggrieved, Pangan filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against FEATI.
Issue:
Whether Pangan was validly dismissed
Held:
The Supreme Court (SC) held in negative.
In this case, FEATI justifies Pangan’s dismissal on the ground of redundancy. Indeed,
redundancy is a recognized authorized cause to validly terminate employment. The
determination of whether the employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable, and
thus, terminable has been recognized to be a management prerogative. The employer's exercise
of such prerogative is, however, not an unbridled right that cannot be subjected to the court's
scrutiny.
The Court has laid down certain guidelines for the valid dismissal of employees on the ground of
redundancy, to wit: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2)
payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant position;
and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant.
In this case, FEATI merely presented financial audits and enrolment lists to justify Pangan’s
dismissal due to redundancy. As correctly held by the NLRC and the CA, at best, these pieces of
evidence prove only the fact of financial losses and decline in enrolment. They do not, in any
way, prove that fair and reasonable criteria were used in determining which position is to be
declared redundant or who among the employees is to be redundated.
In sum, while FEATI may have been able to prove decline in enrolment and financial losses, it
severely failed to prove that it utilized fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining that Pangan's
position as Assistant Program Coordinator, as well as his former position as University Cashier,
were redundant and/or that it was necessarily respondent who should be affected by its cost-
cutting measures. Pangan’s dismissal on the ground of redundancy, therefore, cannot be
sustained.
 

29. J. Marketing Corporation v. Fernando S. Iguiz

GR No. 211522
September 4, 2019
 
Facts: J. Marketing Corporation (JMC), seller of appliance, hired Fernando S. Iguiz as
collector/credit investigator. In the following dates, various events have transpired prior to his
termination on March 7, 2007:
 
a. December 11, 2006 – JMC found that Fernando had short remittances and instances of non-
issuance of receipts to customers.
b. December 14, 2006 - Fernando replied that the collection was lost which JMC has accepted.
Thereafter, JMC discovered through audit that Fernando also had not issued receipts.
c. February 8, 2007 - JMC sent a memorandum requiring Fernando to explain within 24 hours
why he should not be reprimanded for loss of trust and confidence. The former through
memorandum dated February 9, 2007 required Fernando to sign a report based on a hearing
conducted on February 8, 2007 without his participation, without supporting details on short
remittances and without complaints of the customers who allegedly had not received receipts.
d. February 12, 2007 – Fernando denied allegation on non-issuance of receipts.
e. February 28, 2007 – JMC gathered the affidavits of customers who have not received the
receipts.
f. March 7, 2007 – JMC sent a memorandum to Fernando informing that he is terminated from
employment due to short remittance.  
Fernando filed a complaint with the labor arbiter against JMC for illegal dismissal. The labor
arbiter denied but reversed by NLRC as affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether the dismissal based on the foregoing circumstances conforms with the
substantive and procedural requirements
Held: No. In Tiu v. NLRC,  Article 282 c) of the Labor Code provides that the loss of trust and
confidence must be based on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his
employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice; it must be willful. It must be based on substantial
evidence.
In this case, both the NLRC and the CA found out that JMC failed to provide the requisite
substantial evidence to terminate employment. The memorandum is lack of transactional details
and not supported by complaints of customers concerned. Moreover, the affidavits obtained were
belatedly obtained.
Procedurally, in King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, the proper steps which employer
should take in terminating services of an employee is:
1. The first written notice  to be served on  the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the
notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult
a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will
raise against the complaint, xxx.

2. After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and
clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their
defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against  them  by the management. During
 the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover,
this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an
amicable settlement.

3. After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall

serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2)
grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.
Here, JMC railroaded the termination of Fernando. On the first memorandum dated February 8,
2007, JMC gave Fernando 24 hours only to explain instead of the reasonable period or five days.
Iguiz received another memorandum dated February 9, 2007 asking him to sign the
administrative investigation report conducted on February 8, 2007 wherein Iguiz could not have
participated in this so-called hearing or conference. Through memorandum dated March 7, 2007,
JMC terminated Fernando on account of short remittances where, similarly, Fernando was not
even censured, reprimanded or investigated for this shortage after he had explained his side and
tendered full payment, though an employer may take into consideration an employee's past
offenses as part of his just or valid cause for termination.

30. Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft vs Ruperto S. Pasamba

G.R. No. 220904
September 25, 2019

Facts:
• On December 21, 2009, respondent boarded CMS Dusseldorf Express. He was hired as an
Able Seaman of Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, through its local manning agency Jebsens
Maritime, Inc.
• On January 24, 2010, respondent started experiencing clogged nose, dizziness, and
headache. As his illness persisted despite medications, respondent consulted an on-shore
 physician at the port, of Japan, wherein he was diagnosed with "Sinusitis, Myringitis
(both), Vascular Headache, and Unstable Angina (suspicion).", and was then
recommended to be immediately repatriated for treatment.
• On February 5, 2010, respondent was repatriated and subsequently reported to petitioners'
office and was referred to the company-designated doctors.
• Respondent was diagnosed with"Polysinusitis, Hypoplastic Frontal Sinuses, Congested
Turbinates while Mastoid Series showed Bilateral Mastoiditis.", and underwent
Mastoidectomy with Tympanoplasty procedures as advised by the company-designated
doctors.
• On July 9, 2010, the company-designated doctors issued a Certificate of Physical
Condition, declaring respondent "fit for work".
• More than a year thereafter, or sometime in November 2011, respondent was able to
obtain re-employment also as an Able Seaman from another manning agency and
principal
• On July 31, 2012, respondent consulted an independent doctor who diagnosed him to
be suffering from "Moderate Sensorineural Hearing Loss, AD, and Profound Mixed
Hearing Loss, AS." This prompted respondent to claim permanent and total disability
benefits against petitioners. Hence, a complaint before the Labor Arbiter was filed.
• For their part, petitioners countered that respondent is not entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits because he was already declared fit to work on July 9, 2010,
and pointed out that the fact that respondent was able to subsequently secure another
deployment as an Able Seaman from another company belies his claims that he is
permanently and totally disabled.
• The LA ruled that respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, it
upholds the findings of the company-designated doctors that respondent is already fit to
work and considering the fact that respondent was subsequently re-employed.
• On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's Decision. It ruled that respondent
is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits in accordance with the CBA
considering that he was unable to work for more than 120 days. The NLRC pounded
on the fact that respondent was declared fit to work only on July 9, 2010 or 154 days
after sign off from the vessel. According to the NLRC, respondent's subsequent re-
employment is of no moment as it came only after a year from the company-
designated doctors' declaration of his fitness to work. Despite such re-employment, the
fact remains that respondent was still unable to work for more than 120 days. Further,
the NLRC also found that the exceptional 240-day period is not applicable to this case
as such extension for the company-designated doctors to issue their final assessment
"requires, as a condition sine qua non, that further treatment is required beyond 120
days and the company-designated physician must declare such." The NLRC found that
the company-designated doctors made no such declaration in this case, concluding, thus,
that the 240-day extension period cannot be applied.
• The CA affirmed the NLRC's conclusion that respondent is entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits. The CA ruled that "the fact that respondent was unable to
perform his customary work as an Able Seaman for more than 120 days establishes
permanent total disability." According to the CA, "this holds true despite a declaration
by the company-designated doctors that the seafarer is fit to work; the disability is still
 considered permanent and total if such declaration is made after the expiration of 120
days from repatriation.
• Petitioners’motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability.

Held:
No, respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

In Crystal Shipping, it was ruled that the seafarer's inability to perform his job for more
than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body,
entitles him to permanent and total disability benefits. In Vergara, the Court clarified that
the doctrine expressed in Crystal Shipping cannot be applied in all situations. The
apparent conflict between the two pronouncements — based on the provisions of 120-day
period under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC on one hand, and the 240-day period
under the IRR on the other - has long been harmonized in subsequent cases.[41] In
ElburgShipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.,[42] the Court laid down the following
guidelines, to wit:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment
or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-
designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.

Clearly, as it stands now, the mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not
entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits.

The company-designated doctors' declaration of respondent's fitness to work beyond the

120-day period, or specifically on the 154th day, will likewise not work in favor of
respondent's case. Contrary to the NLRC's findings, the records clearly show that the
company doctors had sufficient justification for extending the issuance of its final
assessment beyond the 120-day period, i.e., further medical treatment and observation
were still necessary.

The NLRC and the CA failed to consider that respondent underwent a surgery for his
left ear on February 25, 2010 and that almost three months recovery period was needed
before respondent underwent the same procedure for his right ear on May 14, 2010.
Respondent's treatment did not stop after said last surgery, which notably, was on the
99th day after his repatriation. Records also reveal that five to seven weeks after said
surgery, respondent was still under observation and medication for his full recovery.
Clearly, thus, respondent's treatment necessarily went beyond the 120-day period. Hence,
contrary to the NLRC's findings, the 240-day extension period applies in this case.
Notably, the company-designated doctors' assessment of respondent's fitness to work fell
on the 154th day, which is well-within the 240-day extension.

31. University of Manila v. Pinera

G.R. No. 227550
August 14, 2019

FACTS: Yolanda Calanza (Calanza), Josephine Pinera (Pinera) and Leonora P.

Songalia (Songalia) were all hired by Atty. Ernesto Delos Santos (Atty. Delos Santos)
and his mother Cordelia Delos Santos (Cordelia), to work in Benguet Pines Tourist Inn
(BPTI) as receptionists and all-around employees, in 1984, 1993 and 1999,
respectively.
A letter-memorandum was released by the management about a reshuffling of the BPTI
employees, including Calanza, Pinera and Songalia, due to an anomaly involving
missing booklets of unused official receipts. When Calanza refused to be transferred to
the University of Manila, she was informed that her service was terminated on the
ground of insubordination, while Pinera and Songalia’s salary were both withheld upon
the same refusal from transfer.
Aggrieved, Calanza, et al. filed an illegal dismissal case against the management. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the complainants. On appeal, the NLRC found that there
was no illegal dismissal to speak about. Respondents were dismissed on the ground of
unlawful insubordination to the lawful order of petitioner for their refusal to transfer to
Manila although the procedural due process was not observed. The CA, upon the
management’s petition for certiorari reversed the findings of the NLRC and reinstated
that of the Labor Arbiter in ruling that there was no just cause for the dismissal of
respondents and that procedural due process was not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not complainants Calanza, Pinera and Songalia were validly
dismissed from work.
HELD: No.
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from
employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of
the Labor Code (substantive aspect); and (b) the employee must be given an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect). 
Records show that complainants were not accorded due process. There is procedural
due process in termination of employment for just cause if the employer gives the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment. 
Moreover, in order for willful disobedience or insubordination to be a valid cause for
dismissal, it necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites, namely: (a) the
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.
While it is the prerogative of the management to transfer an employee from one office
to another within the business establishment based on its assessment and perception of
the employee's qualifications, aptitudes and competence, and in order to ascertain
where he can function with maximum benefit to the company, this prerogative is not
without limit. The transfer order, while in the guise of legitimate business prerogative,
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
It is safe then to conclude that the allegation of insubordination on the part of
respondents was merely a fabrication made by petitioner to justify respondents'
dismissal from employment. It bears stressing that not every case of insubordination or
willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-related order of the employer or
its representative is reasonably penalized with dismissal. There must be reasonable
proportionality between, on the one hand, the willful disobedience by the employee
and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor. 
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. In the instant case, petitioner was not able to establish the existence
of causes justifying the dismissal of respondents and the observance of due process in
effecting the dismissal.
32. G.R No. 242875
August 28, 2019
AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA
vs
ABS-CBN CORPORATION
 
Facts:
 
Augorio A. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) was hired by ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS) as a video editor
for a specified hourly rate. He was allegedly rehired repeatedly and continuously for the same
position, under purported fixed-term contracts.
 
In 2013, Dela Rosa admittedly reported for work and went to ABS editing bay while intoxicated.
This led to an incident where Dela Rosa placed his hands inside a female co-worker's pants and
touched her buttocks. A show cause memorandum was given and his answer accordingly. After
hearing, he was served a memorandum informing him of management’s decision of imposing
penalty of dismissal. However, Dela Rosa claimed it can no longer effect since his program
dated August 16, 2013 had already expired on December 31, 2013 and his current program dated
March 16, 2015 to September 15, 2015 no longer covers the incident. Aggrieved, he filed a
complaint of illegal dismissal.
 
ABS averred that Dela Rosa was not illegally dismissed since he was only engaged for a fixed
period and it also claimed that even though Dela Rosa’s employment has not yet expired, Dela
Rosa was dismissed for a just cause for having been found guilty of serious misconduct.
 
Issue:
 
1. Whether Dela Rosa is a fixed-term employee
2. Whether Dela Rosa was illegally dismissed
 
Held:
 
The Supreme Court (SC) held that Dela was a regular employee but validly dismissed.
 
According to jurisprudence, for a fixed-term employment contract to be valid, it must be shown
that the fixed period was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, who dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance being exercised by the
employer over the employee.
 
Applying these standards, Dela Rosa was therefore not a fixed-term employee but rather, a
regular employee. Record shows that Dela Rosa was engaged by ABS, through various contracts,
as a video editor for the latter's several programs. While there are other contracts intermittently
spanning the years 2014 to 2015, it is nonetheless clear from the foregoing that Dela Rosa was
employed by ABS for a period of at least three (3) years without interruption. His employment
contracts during said period had been repeatedly extended or renewed covering the same
position, and involving the same duties. Case law holds that the repeated engagement under a
contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the employee's work in the
employer's business; and if an employee's contract has been continuously extended or renewed
for the same position, with the same duties, without any interruption, then such employee is a
regular employee.
 
Also, the incident involving Dela Rosa clearly constitute serious misconduct, as he not only
violated ABS’ Code of Conduct but also adversely reflected on the ethics and morality in the
company. As pointed out, Dela Rosa posed a serious threat to company property, considering
that the editing bay contained expensive equipment which he could have damaged due to his
intoxication. Further, his inebriated state at that time posed a serious peril to his co-employees, as
in fact, was manifested when he repeatedly attempted to kiss a female co-worker and eventually,
touched her buttocks.
33. ||Clemente, Jr. v. ESO-Nice Transport Corp.,
G.R. No. 228231
August 28, 2019

FACTS: Sometime in August 1998, ESO-Nice Transport Corporation (ESO) hired

Prudecio Clemente, Jr. (Prudencio) as bus dispatcher in its Baguio branch. On audit,
ESO found out that numerous collections were not deposited in its bank account. On a
meeting held by the company regarding the matter, Prudencio admitted appropriating
for himself numerous proceeds of the company. By reason of such admission, ESO
served upon Prudencio a Notice of Termination. The company likewise filed with the
Baguio City prosecutor's office a complaint against Prudencio for qualified theft, which
found probable cause therefor.
In the meantime, Prudencio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary
claims against ESO. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner had been illegally
dismissed given that respondent failed to show any valid cause for his termination,
ruling that ESO’s claim that petitioner committed qualified theft had not been duly
substantiated inasmuch as the prosecutor only found probable cause. The NLRC
affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter on appeal, holding that other than
petitioner's purported admission, respondent miserably failed to adduce substantial
evidence to justify his termination and that Prudencio’s termination cannot be upheld
for the additional ground of want of procedural due process. Upon certiorari, the CA
ruled that ESO complied with the twin-notice requirement and that Prudencio’s failure
to deposit the collections coupled with the findings of probable cause for Qualified
Theft as valid ground for the company to impose disciplinary action.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Prudencio Clemente, Jr. was illegally dismissed.
 
HELD: Yes.
For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the employer must comply with both
the substantive and the procedural due process requirements. However, violation of the
due process requirement does not automatically result to the illegality of one's dismissal
from work. ESO’s contention that to justify Prudencio’s dismissal from the service, the
finding of probable cause against him for the crime of qualified theft provided a valid
cause for petitioner's termination is not entirely correct. In Copy Central Digital Copy
Solution v. Domrique, the Court held that the fact that the investigating prosecutor
found probable cause to indict the employee for the crime of qualified theft does not
necessarily mean that there exists a valid ground for his termination from
employment. Evidence to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of
proof of substantial evidence is met to justify the petitioner's termination. 
A careful review of the records of the case would show that the purported
admission of the petitioner does not amount to substantial evidence to justify a
conclusion, as will give ground to Prudencio's dismissal from work. If at all,
petitioner's liability would only amount to negligence, which, however, is not among
the just cause under the Labor Code which would validate ESO's act of terminating
the petitioner from employment. Such being the case, the finding of probable cause
for the crime of qualified theft without more, as discussed above, does not meet the
required degree of proof of substantial evidence as would justify petitioner's dismissal
from work.
34. Skyway O&M Corp., vs Wilfredo M. Reinante
G.R. No. 222233
August 28, 2019

Facts:
• Petitioner Skyway O & M Corporation (Skyway) hired Wilfredo as Intelligence Officer
for a fixed period from June 26, 2008 to November 25, 2008. Immediately thereafter,
on November 26, 2008, Skyway renewed his services and appointed him as a
probationary employee.
• In May 2009, Wilfredo took a vacation leave and filed an application for sick leave
upon the advice of his physician due to hypertension. Skyway disapproved his
application for vacation leave and directed him to report for work to discuss his on-the-
job performance and continued absence without proper authority.
• On May 21, 2009, Wilfredo received a pre-termination notice from Skyway's Traffic
Safety Management and Security Department (TSMSD) for supposedly failing to meet
the pre-performance standards of the company based on the Performance Appraisal
Report submitted by his supervisor, Augusto Alcantara.
• On May 25, 2009, on his last day as probationary employee, Wilfredo was dismissed.
Based on the termination letter, his performance during his probationary period failed to
meet the performance standards set forth by Skyway.
• Wilfredo filed administrative complaints against Augusto, assailing the latter's authority
to assess his performance, as well as against Skyway for hiring and promoting
unqualified security officers. The parties eventually entered into a compromise
agreement/amicable settlement wherein Wilfredo agreed not to file any case against
Skyway and to withdraw the administrative cases he had filed against its security
officers. Notwithstanding demand, TSMSD failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement prompting Wilfredo to file a complaint for
constructive dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
• The LA ruled in favor of Wilfrefo.
• On appea, the NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the LA by deleting the award
of 13th month pay. According to the NLRC, Wilfredo's appraisal report has no basis and
was biased. For failure of Skyway to show by substantial evidence the basis of the
said evaluation that led to Wilfredo's termination, the NLRC found his dismissal illegal.
• Thereafter, Skyway filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed in
the assailed Decision] The CA held that Wilfredo was rehired for the same position as
Intelligence Officer after his fixed term employment had expired; hence, it can be
inferred that management was satisfied with his performance; and that he was qualified
and competent for the job; otherwise, it would not have engaged him as a probationary
employee.
• Skyway filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA , hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Wilfredo was illegally dismissed.

Held:
Yes, Wilfredo was not dismissed for a just or authorized cause, his dismissal from
employment was illegal.

A probationary employee is one who is placed on trial by an employer, during which the
latter determines whether or not the former is qualified for permanent employment.The
essence of a probationary period of employment lies primordially in the purpose and
objective of both the employer and employee during such period. On one hand, the
employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationary employee in
order to ascertain whether or not such person is qualified for regularization. The latter,
on the other hand, seeks to prove to the former that he or she has the qualifications and
proficiency to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment.

Though not on the same plane as that of a permanent employee, a probationary employee
enjoys security of tenure. Other than being terminated for a just or authorized cause, a
probationary employee may be dismissed due to his or her failure to qualify in
accordance with the standards of the employer made known to him or her at the time of his or
her engagement.

Here, the fact that Wilfredo was deliberately given an unmeritorious rating to prevent him
from attaining the status of a regular employee was acknowledged by Augusto himself,
Wilfredo's supervisor. This is corroborated by Domingo T. Hernandez, an employee of
Skyway. Both admitted rendering false and unfounded rating to Wilfredo's performance
when, in truth, he should not have been dismissed from the company. Augusto stated in
his affidavit.

Considering that Wilfredo was not dismissed for a just or authorized cause, his dismissal
from employment was illegal. As properly observed by the CA, the termination of his
employment based on his alleged unsatisfactory performance rating was effected merely as
a subterfuge after he discovered the hiring or appointment by Skyway of unqualified
security officers.
35. Talaugon v. BSM Crew Service Centre Phils., Inc.,
G.R. No. 227934
September 4, 2019

FACTS: Jerry Bering Talaugon (Talaugon) is employed as an oiler on board M/T Erika
Schulte. He got hospitalized in Saudi Arabia and was advised to be repatriated for
further treatment. Talaugon underwent series of consultations from different company-
designated physicians, which produced inconsistent results but finally rendered him a
disability grading of 11. Afterwhich, Talaugon sued BSM Crew Service Centre Phils.,
Inc., Bernard Schulte Shipmanagement Ltd., and Danilo Mendoza (respondents) for full
disability benefits. The Labor Arbiter awarded him permanent total disability
compensation, ruling that the physicians failed to make a final assessment of
petitioner's condition within 120/240 window period. Petitioner's disability had,
therefore, become total and permanent. On appeal, the NLRC modified the award to
partial permanent disability. Talaugon filed the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether Talaugon is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
HELD: Yes.
The Court agreed with the CA that the company-designated physician made an
assessment on petitioner's illness within the 120-day period, however, the medical
report hardly shows that said assessment was complete and definite. A final and
definite disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true extent of the
sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such.
Otherwise, the corresponding disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate
with the prolonged effects of the injuries suffered. Consequently, without a final and
definitive assessment from the company-designated physician on petitioner's disability,
the same is deemed permanent and total by operation of law.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather
it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. Total
disability refers to an employee's inability to perform his or her usual work. It does not
require total paralysis or complete helplessness. Permanent disability, on the other
hand, is a worker's inability to perform his or her job for more than 120 days, or 240
days if the seafarer required further medical attention justifying the extension of the
temporary total disability period, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his body.

36. G.R. No. 222710

September 10, 2019
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION
Vs
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, DIRECTOR
JOSEPH B. ANACAY AND SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA L. AGUSTIN
 
Facts
On March 25, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of
Public Health Workers, was signed into law. Section 23 thereof granted longevity pay to a health
worker, to wit:
Section 23. Longevity Pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the
monthly basic pay shall be paid to a health worker for every five (5) years of continuous,
efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the chief of office concerned,
commencing with the service after the approval of this Act.
Pursuant to R.A. No. 7305, former Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr., issued a Certification dated February 20, 2000, declaring PhilHealth officers and
employees as public health workers.
On April 30, 2012, COA Supervising Auditor Elena C. Agustin (Supervising Auditor) issued
Audit Observation Memorandum 2012-09 (11), stating that the grant of longevity pay to
PhilHealth officers and employees lacked legal basis, and thus, should be disallowed.
The Court then later affirmed the COA’s decision stating that PhilHealth personnel's functions
are not principally related to health service because their service pertains to the effective
administration of the National Health Insurance Program, or facilitating the availability of funds
of health services to its covered employees. Stated differently, PhilHealth's function is to help its
members pay for health care services; unlike that of workers or employees of hospitals, clinics,
health centers and units, medical service institutions, clinical laboratories, treatment and
rehabilitation centers, health-related establishments of government corporations, and the specific
health service section, division, bureau or unit of a government agency, who are actually
engaged in health work services. Thus, as PhilHealth's employees are not considered health
workers, they are not entitled to longevity pay under R.A. No. 7305.
 
Issue:
Whether Philhealth personnel are public health workers as defined and determined by RA 7305
Held:
Notably,  R.A.  No. 11223  provides  for a clear and unequivocal declaration regarding the
classification of all PhilHealth personnel, to wit:
SECTION 15. PhilHealth Personnel as Public Health Workers. — All PhilHealth personnel shall
be classified as public health workers in accordance with the pertinent provisions under Republic
Act No. 7305, also known as the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers, (emphasis supplied)
Plainly, the law states that all personnel of the PhilHealth are public health workers in
accordance with R.A. No. 7305. This confirms that PhilHealth personnel are covered by the
definition of a public health worker. In other words, R.A. No. 11223 is a curative statute that
remedies the shortcomings of R.A. No. 7305 with respect to the classification of PhilHealth
personnel as public health workers.
Evidently, R.A. No. 11223 removes any legal impediment to the treatment of PhilHealth
personnel as public health workers and for them to receive all the corresponding benefits
therewith, including longevity pay. Thus, ND H.O. 12-005 (11), disallowing the longevity pay of
PhilHealth personnel, must be reversed and set aside. As PhilHealth personnel are considered
public health workers, it is not necessary anymore to discuss the issue on good faith.

37. Yushi Kondo v. Toyota Boshoku (Phils.), Corporation, et al.

GR No. 201396
September 11, 2019
 
Facts: Toyota Boshoku (Phils.) Corporation (Toyota) engaged Yushi Kondo, locally hired
Japanese, as Assistant Manager for Marketing, Promotion and Accounting. In the course of
rendition of service, Toyota through verbal agreement has allowed Yushi to use a car and, for
being a co-national, a gasoline card. After a year and due to change in management, Yushi was
transferred to Production Control, Technical Development and Special Project Department for
which he did not object and the use of the car and gasoline card was discontinued. Treating the
same as constructive dismissal, Toyota terminated Yushi after non-reporting to work despite
notices. The latter filed a complaint for reinstatement with the labor arbiter. Toyota maintained
that no constructive dismissal since he is indeed not entitled for the car and, as he is not an
expatriate whom the previous user was, the gasoline card, and the reassignment is management
prerogative.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Yushi aside from violation of non-diminution of benefits with
regard to car and card, and entitlement for attorney’s fees. Later, the NLRC reverse all and ruled,
as affirmed by the CA, that there is abandonment of Yushi.
Issues: 1. Whether there is (constructive dismissal) with violation of non-diminution of benefits
2. Whether there is abandonment
3. Whether there is a need for payment of attorney’s fees
 
Held:
The primary cause for the claim of constructive dismissal is the withdrawal of assigned car and
gasoline card. To put in perspective, the Court settled the issue on diminution of benefits
and apply constructive dismissal only to his transfer to another department.
 
1. No. The Court has held that there is diminution of benefits when the following are present:
 
a. The grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into practice over a long period of
time;
b. The practice is consistent and deliberate;
c. The practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law; and
d. The discontinuance or diminution is done unilaterally by the employer.
In this case, for the car benefit, Yushi failed to present evidence that the car were also being
enjoyed by other assistant managers or the benefit was given with deliberate intent by
Toyota. On the contrary, records shows that the car was given as mere
accommodation for being a Japanese working in a foreign land. For gasoline card,
similarly, there is no evidence showing that the grant is based on a policy, contract or
company practice or given to other employees. Toyota consistently argued that it is
provided only to Japanese expatriates and not to local hires like Yushi.
With regard to transfer, Yushi did not file any objection thereto until he filed complaint with the
NLRC and did not allege and prove specific acts of his inability to function well,
discrimination or harassment in the new department. Absent of any showing of an
overt act proving that Toyota had dismissed Yuhsi negates said dismissal.
Meanwhile, Toyota justified that it is management prerogative without change in
salary and benefits being enjoyed by Yushi.
2. No. For abandonment to exist, it is necessary that an employee failed to report for work
without valid reason and there is intention to sever ee-er relationship. Here, abandonment has not
been brought as an issue and by his claim with prayer for reinstatement negates abandonment.
 
3. No. Attorney’s fees is given in cases the employee has been forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his interest. In this case, it was not established that Yushi was constructively
dismissed.

38. Celso S. Mangubat vs Dalisay Shippinh Corp., et al.

G.R. No. 226385
August 19, 2019

Facts:
• Petitioner was contracted by the respondents to work as an oiler on board the vessel
M.V. SG Capital for a period of 10 months
• While on board the vessel, petitioner met an accident, he went out of balance and fell off
with his right leg hitting the deck floor while doing maintenance work. He was brought
to a hospital in Australia and was repatriated for medical treatment.
• Complainant was referred to the company-designated physician and specialist at the
Marine Medical Services of the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. Complainant was
diagnosed to have a depressed fracture at the lateral tibial plateau of his right leg.
• He underwent Diagnostic Arthroscopy and Synovectomy in the knee joint and
Percutaneous Screw Fixation of Sagittal Split Fracture at the Proximal Tibia of his right
leg and thereafter underwent physical rehabilitation program.
• On August 8, 2014, the company-designated physician declared Mangubat as fit to work.
• Mangubat, however, presented a medical certificate dated September 23, 2014 issued by
the San Geronimo General Hospital in Morong, Rizal indicating that he was "treated"
thereat from "July 9, 2014 up to present 9/23/2014" with the remarks that he needs
further physical therapy, probably another year of intense therapy, because of muscle
atrophy in right lower extremity x x x.
• Petitioner filed the complaint against respondents Dalisay Shipping Corporation, Wealth
Shipping Limited and Danny Dadila .
• The the LA ruled that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits. The LA found that
respondents provided petitioner with medical care by addressing his injury. The LA also
found that the findings of the company-designated physician can be relied upon because
the physician acquired a detailed familiarity with petitioner's medical condition. The
medical treatment provided to petitioner was detailed and the tests conducted and their
results were likewise indicated by the company-designated physician. On the other hand,
petitioner's own doctor failed to indicate the treatment provided to him and the tests
conducted.
• The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision but directed the payment of financial assistance.
• In the assailed CA Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
CA ruled that the LA and the NLRC already conducted a painstaking review of the
evidence submitted by the parties and concluded that petitioner's injury in his knee was
only partial and already addressed and cured.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA. Hence,
this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Mangubat is entitled to diability bemefit.

Held:
No, Mangubat is not entitiled to disability benefit.

Section 20(A) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard

Employment Contract provides that, after medical repatriation, the company-designated
physician must assess the seafarer's fitness to work or the degree of his disability. After
this, the seafarer may choose his own doctor to dispute the findings of the company-
designated physician, and if there is conflict, the matter is referred to a third doctor,
whose findings shall be binding on the parties.
Jurisprudence has elaborated on the requirements for the validity and procedure for
disputing the assessment of the company-designated physician. For the companydesignated
physician's assessment to be considered valid, it must be timely made and must state the
fitness or degree of disability of the seafarer.[

Once the company-designated physician has issued the valid assessment, the seafarer may
dispute it by referring to his own doctor. The seafarer has then the duty to signify his
intent to challenge the company-designated physician's assessment and, in turn, the
employer must respond by setting into motion the process of choosing the third doctor.
The Court explained in Sunit v. OSM Maritime Services, Inc. that for the third doctor's
assessment to be valid and binding between the parties, the assessment must be definite
and conclusive.

The same standards to determine the validity of the assessment should be the same for
the company-designated physician, seafarer's physician, and the third doctor. Thus, in
order for the seafarer to dispute the assessment of the company-designated physician, the
assessment of the seafarer's doctor should state the seafarer's fitness to work or the
disability rating.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the company-designated physician found that petitioner
was fit to work. This was a valid assessment and the seafarer may dispute this by
referring to his own doctor, which he did. Petitioner's doctor, on the other hand, issued
a certification that merely stated that he was "Unfit to work for a year yet. Needs
physical therapy because of muscle atrophy." The Court finds that the assessment of the
seafarer's doctor is not definite because it failed to state the seafarer's fitness to work or
indicate his disability grade. The assessment is invalid.

Given the lack of a valid and definite assessment from the seafarer's doctor, the definite
and valid assessment of the company-designated physician stands and is binding on the
seafarer. The CA, NLRC, and LA were therefore all correct in relying on the assessment
by the company-designated physician that petitioner was fit to work, and in ruling that
petitioner is not entitled to any disability benefit.

39. G.R. No. 222455

September 18, 2019
GERRY S. MOJICA
vs
GENERALI PILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
 
Facts:
 
Gerry S. Mojica (Mojica) used to be a Unit Manager and Associate Branch Manager of Generali
Pilipinas Life Assurance Company, Inc. (the Company). The Company filed a complaint for
collection of money representing unpaid monthly allowances and unpaid premium dues.
 
The Company alleged that Mojica was an agent and independent contractor granted with
monthly drawing allowance as an advance against the Unit Manager's total expected future
override commission earning but was however subject to meeting monthly validation
requirements and performance standards and must be repaid by petitioner over a period of
eighteen (18) months or less by applying his override commission earnings and commissions on
personal business. The Company claimed that Mojica failed to comply with the premium
production and manpower requirements and 3 did not reach the targets which he himself set in
his business plan. As a consequence, respondent stopped releasing monthly drawing allowances
to petitioner, in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement.
 
Mojica then submitted his resignation which was accepted by the Company and asserted that he
was an employee of the Company, and not its agent or independent contractor. He insisted that as
an employee of respondent, he had no obligation to liquidate the monthly drawing allowances
and that he was entitled to monthly drawing allowance which was not even enough to cover all
his expenses in maintaining Company’s branch office and the recruitment of insurance agents for
respondent. Although Mojica admitted receiving the monthly drawing allowances, he claimed
that he had no obligation to return such allowances since these were his salaries as full time unit
manager.
 
Issue:
 
Whether Mojica is an independent contractor
 
Held:
 
Supreme Court held that Mojica is an independent contractor as clearly stipulated in the
contractual agreements entered into between them.
 
The Unit Manager's Agreement dated 19 January 2001 pertinently provides:
xxx. The Unit Manager in performance of his duties defined herein, shall be considered
an independent contractor and not an employee of Generali Pilipinas. He shall be free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance. However,
he shall observe and conform to all existing rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
Generali Pilipinas from time to time. Under no circumstance shall the Unit Manager
(and/or his agents) be considered employees of Generali Pilipinas.
 
The Associate Branch Manager's Agreement dated 24 January 2002 similarly states:
 
The Branch Manager, in the performance of his duties defined herein, shall be considered
an independent contractor and not an employee of Generali Pilipinas. He shall be free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance. However,
he shall observe and conform to all existing rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
Generali Pilipinas from time to time.
 
As an independent contractor, Mojica earned through commissions and was not paid a fixed
salary or wage. His remuneration on a commission basis is expressly provided under the Unit
Manager's Compensation Schedule which was incorporated in the Unit Manager's Agreement,
and the Associate Branch Manager's Compensation Schedule which formed part of the Associate
Branch Manager's Agreement.
40. Apolinario Z. Zonio v. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc., et al.
GR No. 239052
October 16, 2019
 
Facts: Apolinario Z. Zonio is a seamen covered by POEA-SEC contract and Standard Terms and
Conditions governing employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board on Ocean Going Vessels, and
deployed by 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc. (88 Aces). As ordinary seaman, it entails
voluminous works. During employment, he was diagnosed of diabetes mellitus. After arrival in
the country on April 11, 2012, Apolinario went to 88 Aces for post medical examination. The
latter refused as the former merely treated the arrival due to finish contract, without medical
issue. Considered to be a work-related disease entitled for permanent disability benefits,
Apolinario filed his claim with Single Entry Approach (SENA) at the NLRC on March 25, 2015
and filed formal complaint with the labor arbiter on May 8, 2015. In view of the latter, 88 Aces
denied the claim on the ground that his sickness is not work related as he failed to report to the
physician of 88 Aces for compliance with reportorial requirement after arrival and his action is
already prescribed. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Apolinario with order for payment of
attorney’s fees.
Issues: 1. Whether Apolinario is entitled for benefits on permanent disability
2. Whether the claim is filed within prescribed period for filing
3. Whether Apolinario is entitled for attorney’s fees
Held:
1. Yes. The POEA-SEC-approved contract provides that a disease not listed under Section 32
thereof is presumably work-related. Absent of any evidence from the employer to defeat the
legal presumption the prima facie case of work-related disease prevails.
 
Here, Apolinario was diagnosed of diabetes mellitus which is not listed under Section 32. On the
part of 88 Aces, it did not assess Apolinario who requested to undergo post-employment
medical examination for which they could have contradicted the presumption.  
 
2. Yes. The Standard Terms and Conditions governing employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board on Ocean Going Vessels provide for the termination of contract between employer and a
seafarer which is the completion of the period of contractual service aboard the vessel, signing
off from the vessel and arrival at the point of hire. The POEA-SEC contract prescribe the period
for filing of claims which is within three years from the date the cause of action arises.
 
In this case, the SC held that the cause of action of Apolinario exists upon his
arrival/disembarkation from the vessel which is April 11, 2012 with the three years
ending April 11, 2015 as filing period. As Apolinario filed a claim with SENA, an
administrative approach to provide an accessible, speedy and inexpensive settlement of
complaints arising from ee-er relationship to prevent ripening into full-blown disputes, on
March 25, 2015, is sufficient and deemed institution of action within the three year
period, notwithstanding that Apolinario filed complaint in May 2015.
 
3. Yes. Attorney’s fees is also recoverable when the act or omission has compelled the
complainant to incur expenses to protect his interest. Here, such condition exists warranting the
grant of attorney’s fees by the labor arbiter.
41. Claret School of Quezon City vs Madelyn I. Sinday
G.R. No. 226358
October 9, 2019

Facts:
• Claret School of Quezon City is an educational institution located on Mahinhin Street,
UP Village, Quezon City. Sinday is the wife of Wencil Sinday, one (1) of Claret's
longtime drivers. Their children are scholars of Claret.
• On February 18, 2014, Sinday filed her Complaint for illegal dismissal against the
school.
• Sinday narrated that in April 2010, Claret engaged her as a releasing clerk in its book
sale, afterwards, she workes as a filing clerk at the Human Resources Department. Before her
job as releasing clerk expired, Sinday applied for work at one (1) of Claret's
departments, Claret Technical-Vocational Training Center, and sytarted to work as a secretar
on July 15, 2011.
• Sinday claimed that Fr. Manubag, the institution director of Claretech, signed a January
10, 2013 letter, approving the request of Head of Operations Timmy Bernaldez and
Program Coordinator Rosario Butaran] to classify her as a regular employee. She was
classified under the hon-teaching or non-academic school employees and was paid her
salary differential. In May 2013, Claret asked Sinday to sign a Probationary
Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15, 2013.
However, she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of the
change in school administration. Desperate for work, Sinday continued to work for
Claret and was employed on August 1, 2013 as a substitute teacher aide at Claret's
Child Study Center. When the permanent teacher aide returned on October 25, 2013,
Sinday stopped working for Claret. Sinday repeatedly pleaded to be reinstated at least as
a checker at the school's water station, but Claret denied her request. Thus, Sinday
filed her Complaint, claiming that she had been a regular employee as she performed
various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of Claret.
• Claret denied Sinday's claims averring that she was merely a parttime fixed-term
contractual employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its
longtime driver.
• The Labor Arbiter found that Sinday was illegally dismissed, and directed Claret to
reinstate Sinday to her former position or a substantially equivalent designation. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that the repeated hiring of Sinday for around three (3) years conferred her
with regular employment status. Citing Brent, the Labor Arbiter explained that for a
fixed-term employment to be valid, it must have been: (1) "knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent"; or (2) "it satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the
former or the latter. The Labor Arbiter found that the conditions for a valid fixed-term
employment were absent because Sinday did "not appear to have knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to the arrangement. It was also held that Clasret failed to prove that
Sinday consented to the fixed-term arranmgement.
• Upon appeal, the NLRC, reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and found that Sinday
was not illegally dismissed. The NLRC ruled that it was clear to Sinday that her
employment with Claret was merely part-time contractual, not regular, as shown in her
biodata. Additionally, it was found that the lack of a document showing Sinday's
contractual employment did not in itself grant Sinday regular employee status, since
there are other contrary evidence such as Sinday's application letters and biodata.
• Sinday moved or reconsideration, but it was denied. Aggrieved, Sinday filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of NLRC and
found that Sinday was illegally dismissed.
• The CA, citing Brent, explained that for a fixed-term employment to be valid, there
must be a "day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and
termination of the employment." Here, since there was no "day certain" agreed upon, the
Court of Appeals said that Sinday's employment cannot be deemed to be for a fixed
period. It was also found that neither of the two (2) criteria laid down in Brent was
present in this case. It held that Claret failed to prove that it dealt with Sinday in
more or less equal terms, with no moral dominance on its part.
• Claret moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Sinday was a regular employee of Claret.

Held:
Article 295 of the Labor Code categorizes employees into regular, project, seasonal, and
casual. It further classifies regular employees into two (2) kinds: (1) those "engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer"; and (2) casual employees who have "rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken."

In 1990, Brent recognized another classification of employment: fixed-term employment.

There, this Court ruled that fixed-term employments are valid under both the Civil Code
and the Labor Code. Brent recognized that the Civil Code and the Labor Code allow the
execution of fixedterm employment contracts. But when periods have been imposed to
prevent an employee from acquiring his or her security of tenure, the contract effectively
runs counter to public policy and morals, and must, therefore, be disregarded.

In drawing the line, Brent laid down the criteria under which a fixed-term employment
cannot be deemed in circumvention of the security of tenure:
(1) When the parties have knowingly and 'voluntarily agreed upon a fixed period of
employment "without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear
upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent"; or
(2) When "it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms" with the employer not having exercised any moral
dominance over the employee.

In Paguio v. National Labor Relations Commission:

A stipulation in an agreement can be ignored as and when it is utilized to deprive
the employee of his security of tenure. The sheer inequality that characterizes
employer-employee relations, where the scales generally tip against the employee,
often scarcely provides him real and better options.

Thus, the existence of a contract indicating a fixed term does not preclude regular
employment.
This Court has held that our ruling in Brent is the exception rather than the general
rule, and a fixed-term employment is recognized as valid only under certain
circumstances, particularly when a fixed-term is an essential and natural appurtenance.

In determining the validity of a fixed-term employment, the level of protection accorded

to labor is ascertained based on the "nature of the work, qualifications of the employee,
and other relevant circumstances."

Hence, the criteria limit the application of Brent to particular cases where the employer
and the employee are on a more or less equal footing in entering into the contract. If
none of the aforementioned criteria are present, this Court will strike down a fixed-term
employment contract.

Neither of the two (2) criteria in Brent is present in this case. Petitioner did not deal
with respondent in more or less equal terms with no moral dominance on its part.

As the facts bare, respondent's whole family depended on petitioner. Her husband was the
school's longtime driver; their children, its scholars. Respondent is a high school graduate
whose ordinary qualifications compelled her to accept the various positions offered by
petitioner. Given these circumstances, respondent was not in a position to bargain on the
terms of her employment. It was a grave error for the National Labor Relations
Commission to find no moral dominance merely because both parties benefitted from the
fixed-term employment.
There is no genuine freedom to contract when a fixed-term employment is used as a
vehicle to exploit the economic disadvantage of workers like respondent. Plain wage
earners should not be faulted for tolerating jobs they desperately need. Brent recognized
the validity of fixed-term employments only within the context that employers and
employees are on equal footing.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the fixed-term employment should be
disregarded considering that petitioner and respondent did not deal with each other in
more or less equal terms.

Moreover, the absence of a contract evidencing the fixed-term employment militates

against petitioner's claims. As this Court held in Brent, the decisive determinant in
fixedterm employments is "the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of their employment relationship. Here, there was no "day
certain" agreed upon by the parties.

Petitioner persistently asserts that respondent should have known that her employment was
only for a fixed term given the circumstances and nature of her job. However, it failed
to present the contracts for the positions held by respondent. Absent any contract, it
cannot be said that respondent was informed of the nature of her employment, as well as
the duration and scope of her work. A fixed-term employment cannot be held valid based
on mere allegations and speculations.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals correctly found that respondent is a regular employee.

The acid test in determining regular employment is "whether there is a reasonable

connection between the employee's activities and the usual business of the employer."
This is corollary to Article 295 of the Labor Code, which provides that the nature of
work must be "necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" to
consider the employee as regular. Indeed, the "repeated engagement under contract of hire
is indicative of the necessity and desirability"of the employee's work in the employer's
business.

||
 

 
 
 
42. Pasay City Alliance Church v. Benito
G.R. No. 226908
November 28, 2019

FACTS: Fe P. Benito (Benito) is a licensed Christian Minister of Christian and

Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines (CAMACOP), serving as Pasay City
Alliance Church (PCAC)'s (eventually renamed as Pastoral Care and Membership)
under the supervision of the Church Ministry Team (CMT). The controversy stemmed
from CAMACOP and PCAC's policy requiring pastors or ministers without written
contracts to tender a courtesy resignation every year, and in compliance therewith,
Benito tendered her courtesy resignation. The CMT reappointed Benito to the same
position for another year. On the following year, however, the CMT decided not to
reappoint Benito. Said decision was not immediately pursued, hence, Benito held the
post for another year. Thereafter, Benito complied anew and submitted a courtesy
resignation. Finally, Benito was informed regarding the non-extension of her
engagement as PCAC's Head of Pastoral Care and Membership. Aggrieved, Benito
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney's fees before the Labor
Arbiter. On the other hand, PCAC mainly questioned the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction
and asserted that Benito's vocation and ministry are not governed by the Labor Code.
Resolving the complaint, the Labor Arbiter ruled that an employment relationship
existed between the parties in view of the various documents and other proof of
employment between the parties.
On appeal, however, the NLRC overturned the Labor Arbiter's Decision, ruling that the
non-renewal of Benito's appointment to her previous position should be treated as an
ecclesiastical matter outside of the labor tribunal's jurisdiction. When Benito challenged
the NLRC's resolutions before the CA, the latter held that the decision not to renew
Benito's appointment was secular in nature and not an ecclesiastical affair.
ISSUE: Whether or not the matter at hand is an ecclesiastical matter over which our
labor tribunals are deprived of jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. At the center of the present controversy is the enforcement of a religious
denomination's internal rules in the governance of its member churches. CAMACOP’s
contention that there was no dismissal to speak of and the matter concerns their right to
transfer or reassign one of their licensed ministers is well taken by virtue of the
enforcement of validly enacted ecclesial regulations of the CAMACOP, and not based
on any of the grounds provided in our Labor Code. Moreover, the Court finds the
claimed right to be infused with religious color because it bears down on the
relationship of a church and its members in faith-based matters. If a church or religious
association has the sole prerogative to exclude members perceived to be unworthy in
light of its doctrinal standards, all the more does it have sole prerogative in determining
who are best fit to minister to its members in activities attached with religious
significance.
 Guided by the foregoing, the Court held that the termination of a religious
minister's engagement at a local church due to administrative lapses, when it relates to
the perceived effectivity of a minister as a charismatic leader of a congregation, is a
prerogative best left to the church affected by such choice.

 
 

43. G.R. No. 234296

November 27, 2019
ERNESTO P. GUTIERREZ
Vs
NAWRAS MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., AL-ADHAMAIN CO. LTD., AND ELIZABETH
BAWA
Facts:
Ernesto Gutierrez was hired by NAWRAS Manpower Services, Inc. (NAWRAS) to work as
respondent Al Adhamain Co. Ltd.'s "driver vehicle road". He was deployed July 31, 2013.
Upon arrival, Gutierrez claimed that he was initially placed on floating status. He received his
first salary only in November 2013 and received two months' worth of salary on December 2,
2013. He received a service vehicle on December 3, 2013 but he had to personally shoulder the
gasoline expenses going to Al-Adhamain's asphalt plant. On February 15, 2014, the workshop
supervisor informed Gutierrez that he would be transferred to another site and was made to
report to Al-Adhamain's administrator. At the administrator's office, he was only given a
clearance form. In a meeting with Al-Adhamain's owner, Gutierrez was told that his contract
would be terminated and he would be repatriated as soon as he completes his clearance. He then
called NAWRAS about the pre-termination of his contract but was refrained from filing a
complaint with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office in order to allow NAWRAS to talk to Al-
Adhamain. He thus proceeded to submit the requirements for his clearance in the last week of
February 2014. On March 15, 2014, petitioner was given his remaining salary (sans 1-month
salary) and a refund of his two months' salary bond. He was then told to book his own flight back
to the Philippines and that he would be reimbursed later on. However, of the SR3,100.00 that he
spent for the airfare, Al-Adhamain's owner only reimbursed him for SR2,000.00.
 
Upon repatriation, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Although they claimed that he was
legally dismissed After his three-month probationary period, Al-Adhamain informed him of his
unsatisfactory performance. Gutierrez was thus transferred to a different site to afford him a
chance to change his working attitude. They claimed that he was given several chances to change
his work attitude to no avail. Despite extending several opportunities for petitioner to improve,
petitioner opted to request for his last salary, benefits, termination pay, and return ticket.
Issue:
Whether Gutierrez was illegally dismissed entitling him of salary of the unexpired portion,
airfare ticket, repayment of last salary.
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the NLRC and CA finding Gutierrez to be illegally
dismissed allowing him to receive the following:
1. salary equivalent to the unexpired portion of the contract
This Court struck down the phrase "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" under Section 7 of R.A. 10022 because the same phrase was already declared
unconstitutional in R.A. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.He is,
thus, entitled to "his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract" - the
operative clause of Section 7.
 
2. SR1,100.00 as reimbursement for his airfare ticket
This Court is more inclined to believe that petitioner was able to substantiate his claim of paying
SR3,100.00 for his airplane ticket. Aside from the fact that respondents kept silent on the matter
in their appeal before the NLRC, the NLRC pointed out that petitioner presented a ticket receipt
as proof that petitioner paid for the airplane ticket. This is bolstered by the LA's findings that
respondents failed to present any proof of payment for the ticket. A reading of the CA's decision,
likewise, reveals that respondents failed to present any proof to substantiate their claim that they
paid for petitioner's ticket. As such, it is proper to reinstate the LA and NLRC's order for
respondents to reimburse petitioner the excess SR1,100.00 payment.
3. Repayment of his last salary
Gutierrez was not given his November 2013 salary because Al Adhamain withheld it "as his
placement fee." The said salary deduction was improper because an illegally dismissed migrant
worker is entitled to a full reimbursement of his/her placement fee. The LA's directive to refund
petitioner's placement fee is really one for the repayment of petitioner's November 2013 salary
because petitioner never paid respondents a placement fee.

44. Jherome G. Abundo v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

GR No. 222348
November 20, 2019
 
Facts: Jherome G. Abundo is a seaman covered by a POEA-SEC contract and deployed by
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. While Jherome had securing a lifeboat during navigation of
the vessel, his forearm was suddenly snapped and hit by metal blocked. A company surgeon
classified his disability as Grade 10. An independent doctor sees him unfit in any capacity for
previous duties. For more than 240 days, Jherome had not engaged in gainful employment and
without final assessment of his disease prompting him to demand from Magsaysay payment of
benefits for permanent disability. The latter offered payment of benefits equivalent to Grade 10
maintaining that a third doctor is necessary to settle conflicting diagnosis.
Issues: 1. Whether Magsaysay is liable for the permanent disability benefits
2. Whether is the third doctor necessary for the final diagnosis
Held:
1. Yes. Article 198 (192) of the Labor Code provides that disabilities shall be deemed total and
permanent when temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred
twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules. Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the Am
(AREC) ended Rules on Employees Compensation defines permanent disability as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. Section 2,
Rule X of the AREC reads:
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on
the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it
shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where
such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond
120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in
which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid.
However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at
any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as
may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of
physical or mental functions as determined by the System.

There is no question that the referral to a third doctor as provided in POEA-SEC is mandatory in
case there are disagreements made by the company-designated physician and the
seafarer's chosen physician as to the seafarer's medical condition. However, our
jurisprudence is replete with cases which pronounce that before a seafarer should be
compelled to initiate referral to a third doctor, there must first be a final an categorical
assessment made by the company-designated physician as to the seafarer's disability
within 120/240-day period. Otherwise, the seafarer shall be considered permanently
disabled by operation flaw.
Here, it is apparent that petitioner's disability and incapacity to resume working continued for
more than 240 days without final assessment of his condition rendering the same as
permanent disability.
2. No. The absence of a final assessment by the company designated physician makes the rule on
third-doctor-referral inapplicable in the instant case. The POEA-SEC should never be read in
isolation with other laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on disability and the AREC.
Otherwise, the disability rating of the seafarer will be completely at the mercy of the company-
designated physician, without redress, should the latter fail or refuse to give one.
 

45. G.R. No. 234436

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION NETHERLANDS
B.V., and
CAPTAIN LEOPOLDO C. TENORIO,
vs
PRIMO D. QUIJANO

Facts
On July 11, 2013, Quijano was hired as Cook by petitioner Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., for
its principal Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V., on board the vessel M/V Katharina Schepers,
for a period of six (6) months. He was then declared fit for sea duty and boarded the vessel on
August 18, 2013.
On January 30, 2014, Quijano was signed off from the vessel purportedly due to completion of
his employment contract. On February 3, 2014, he reported at petitioners' office and was paid the
balance of his final wages for the period January 1 to 30, 2014, and underwent interview for
debriefing purposes. Thereafter, Quijano was hired anew for the same position, this time, under a
10-month Contract of Employment dated March 5, 2014. However, his employment did not
materialize due to his confinement at the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) on March 18,
2014, where his illness is claimed to be acquired during his last employment and that petitioners
refused to grant his request for medical assistance when he reported on February 3, 2014.
Quijano filed against the latter a complaint for disability benefits and other benefits he is entitled
thereto pursuant to CBA agreement which he was a member.
Quijano alleged that this was due to the hostile working conditions which he reported to the
Captain an was relived from his post with his contract cut short to 5 ½ months. He also added
that upon repatriation, he attempted to report for post-employment medical examination and
treatment but was unjustly refused, prompting him to seek medical attention at his own expense
at EAMC. Marlow, on their part, argued that the latter disembarked due to expiration of contract
and denied that Quijano requested for medical assistance.
Issue:
Whether Quijano is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
Held:
The Supreme Court (SC) held that Quijano is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
In this case, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA), as well as the CA, were consistent in
holding that Quijano was able to substantially prove his entitlement to total and permanent
disability benefits, considering that: (a) he was medically repatriated on January 30, 2014 and
reported to petitioners' office within the mandated three (3)-day period for· post-medical
examination; (b) he was suffering from liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, diabetes
mellitus, type II, and panophthalmitis, which were deemed work-related illnesses being listed
occupational diseases under the 2010 PO EA-SEC; and ( c) there was non-compliance by the
company-designated physician of the required final and definite assessment within the 120/240-
day treatment period resulting in the ipso Jure grant to the seafarer of permanent and total
disability benefits.
At this juncture, it bears to stress that factual findings of the PVA, which were affirmed by the
CA, are binding and will not be disturbed, absent any showing that they were made arbitrarily or
were unsupported by substantial evidence. Since petitioners failed to show any semblance of
arbitrariness or that the PVA's and CA's rulings were not supported by substantial evidence, the
Court is inclined to uphold the same.