Deutsch, Distributive Justice PDF

DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Morton Deutsch
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Haven and London
Copyright © 1985 by Yale University.
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Deutsch, Morton, 1920—
Distributive justice.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Dsitributive justice—Psychological aspects.
2. Social justice. 3. Equality. 1. Title.
HM216.D43 1985 305 84-19695
ISBN 0-300-03290-0 (alk. paper)
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence

and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines
for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
10 987654321
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments vii
1. Introduction 1
PART I. THEORY
2. A Critique of Equity Theory 9

3. Distributive Justice More Broadly Conceived 31
4. Awakening the Sense of Injustice 46
5. Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice 64
"6. Interdependence and Psychological Orientation 74
7. Theoretical Overview of Area: Relation to Other Theorizing and
Research 96
PART II. RESEARCH
8. Cooperation-Competition: Earlier Studies of Different Distribution

Systems 113
^9. Conflict and Bargaining Studies: Conditions for Establishing a System
of Justice 120
10. Experimental Studies of the Effects of Different Systems of Distributive
Justice 133
11. The Choice of Distribution System 164
12. The Sense of Injustice 180
13. Research Overview 196
VI Contents
PART III. APPLICATIONS
14. Education and Distributive Justice: Some Reflections on Grading

Systems 207
15. Suppose We Took Egalitarianism Seriously? 222
16. Justice in the Crunch 250
17. Preventing World War III: A Psychological Perspective 262
References 289
Index JOS
Preface and Acknowledgments
This book is concerned with the social psychology of distributive justice. My

objective is to present my own thought and work in this area rather than to
survey the literature. Although my students and I have been researching and
theorizing on this topic for a number of years, we have not published much
of our work; what has been published has appeared in widely scattered
journals and books. This volume assembles for the first time the results of
our program of research in this area. I am grateful to the National Science
Foundation for its sustained support of our work. I also wish to thank the
Cattell Fund and the Russell Sage Foundation for enabling me to spend a
sabbatical year preparing this volume. In addition, for permission to use
material that first appeared elsewhere, I wish to thank the American Psycho-
logical Association, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues,
Academic Press, Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, and Plenum Press.
I also wish to acknowledge my considerable debt to the many students
and colleagues who have contributed to the work reported here. Among my
recent and current students whose research is directly represented in this
volume are: Rebecca C. Curtis, Michelle M. Fine, Sandra V. Horowitz, Ivan
Lansberg, Brian L. Maruffi, Louis Medvene, Dolores M. Mei, Marilyn Seiler,
Janice Steil, Bruce Tuchman, Janet Weinglass, William A. Wenck, Jr., and
Cilio Ziviani. Other students in my work group on justice who have contrib-
uted to this volume include: Lorinda R. Arella, Adrienne Asch, Susan K.
Boardman, Ellen Brickman, Ellen Fagenson, Martha Gephart, Cheryl Koop-
man. Jay Kantor, Eric Marcus, Susan Opotow, Jorge da Silva Ribeiro, Rony
Rinat, Shula Shichman, and Rachael Solomon.
1 wish to give special thanks to Eorinda R. Arella who was helpful, at all
stages, in arranging to get my handwritten scribbles transformed into a read-
able, typewritten manuscript and to Joyce Coulson for typing it.
Vll
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
John Rawls, the moral philosopher, has written: “Justice is the first virtue of
social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant
and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or
abolished if they are unjust” (1971, p. 3).
The significance of justice to social life has until recently largely escaped
the notice of social psychologists. The term justice received hardly any men-
tion in the indices of the successive editions of the Handbook of Social
Psychology. However, by the middle of the 1970s, this situation had radically
changed. In the past decade, enough research and theorizing had taken place
to stimulate several integrative volumes on the social psychology of justice
(Lerner, 1975; Berkowitz and Walster, 1976; Walster, Berscheid, and
Walster, 1978; Mikula, 1980a; Lerner and Lerner, 1981; Greenberg and
Cohen, 1982; Messick and Cook, 1983; Folger, 1984).
This book is concerned with the social psychology of distributive justice.
The concept of distributive justice centers on the fairness of the distribution of
the conditions and goods that affect individual well-being. Issues of distribu-
tive justice pervade social life. They occur not only at the societal level but also
in intimate social relations. They may arise whenever something of value is
scarce and not everyone can have what he wants, or whenever something of
negative value (a cost, a harm) cannot be avoided by all. They also may be
brought into play whenever there is an exchange in a relationship.
In the family, the younger brother’s cry that his older brother is getting “a
bigger piece of cake than me,” the housewife’s complaint that her husband
spends too much of his time preoccupied with his work (to the neglect of his
family), the elder daughter’s feeling that she has too many house chores piled
on her: all these involve questions of distributive justice. In the schools, such
questions arise in connection with who gets the teacher’s attention, who gets
what marks, how much of a school’s resources are to be allocated for stu-
1
2 Introduction
dents who are physically handicapped or socioeconomically disadvantaged.

Similarly, distribution of pay, promotion, benefits, equipment, space, and so
forth, are common problems in work settings. Also, these issues are involved
in health care and medical practice: How is a scarce or expensive medical
resource, such as a mechanical heart, to be allocated? Who should bear the
cost of treating illnesses related to excessive smoking, drinking, or eating?
Should more money be allocated for research on AIDS or for preventing the
death of elderly people from hypothermia?
With regard to any system of distributive justice, one may ask a number
of questions to identify its key features. I list below a number of such charac-
teristics and associated questions with each that we have employed in some
of our research on distributive systems.
1. The nature of the good or harm being distributed: its content, quality, and
quantity. What is being distributed, how much of it is available for distri-
bution, and what is its quality? Consider, for example, the distribution of
grades in a classroom. What is the meaning and value of a given grade? Is
there a limited supply of high grades available so that only a few students
can get high grades no matter how many excellent students there are? Has
there been grade inflation so that the quality of an A has been debased?
2. Roles involved. To whom is it being distributed and by whom? Grades
are generally distributed by teachers to students and students usually do
not grade their teachers. Clearly, there are other possibilities; for ex-
ample, students might grade one another, the students and teachers could
grade each other. It is evident that one’s role in the distribution process—
receiver, distributor, or receiver-distributor—can play an important part
in one’s reaction to and evaluation of the process.
3. Styling and timing of the distribution. How and when it is distributed?
Secretly or publicly? With or without explanation of its meaning and possi-
ble consequences? Wittingly or unwittingly? Some teachers provide grades
to their students only at the end of a term; others provide their students with
a more continuous evaluation of their work. Sometimes students are given
information only about their own mark; other times students have access to
information about all students. In some courses, the factors determining a
student’s grade are clearly defined and explicitly communicated to the stu-
dents, whereas in others the whole procedure is clouded in mystery.
4. Values. What are the values underlying the distribution? In the scholarly
discussions of the substantive values that underlie distributive justice, a
number of key values have repeatedly been identified (Rescher, 1966).
Justice has been viewed as the treatment of all people:
(a) so that they can have equal “inputs” (for example, so that each
student has equal educational resources available to him);
(b) so that they have equal “outputs” (for example, so that each
student has the resources necessary to enable her to achieve a
given level of educatiqnalTattaiiiment even if some students re-
quire more inputs than others); —
(c) according to their needs;
(d) according to their ability or potential;
Introduction 3
(e) according to their efforts and sacrifices;

(f) according to their performance or their improvement in perfor-
mance;
(g) according to the social value of their contributions;
(h) according to the requirements of the common good;
(i) so that none fall below a certain minimum;
(j) according to what others choose to do for them; and
(k) according to the principle of reciprocity.
A teacher could use any of the values above, singly or in combination,
in distributing grades among students. He or she might, for example, de-
cide to give grades so as to produce equal j)utputs of student motivation,
giving a high-abilitv student a Im^r âde jJian-JiLs performance war-
rantedj^nd a student with low ability a higher gra^ than his performance
^^^ranted. The teacher might believe thaFtIus woulHê the i^st effective
means of juotr^tin^_ma,ximum learning from each of the two types of
students. Orthe teacher might decide to give high grades to those who
need them most: for example, to those who needed them to avoid military
conscription. Or the teacher might decTdeTo^ve them to those who work
the hardest, those who accomplish the most, or those who help others the
most. Similarly, in the distribution of resources for education among differ-
ent students, any one or more of several of the basic values might be
employed. It might, for example, be decided that all children—no matter
what their initial educational assets or handicaps—be allocated equal in-
puts such that all schools would receive an equal amount of funds per
pupil. Or it might be decided that children with special handicaps because
of physical disability, social background, or language differences be pro-
vided with extra educational resources so that they could achieve educa-
tional success (outputs) equal to that of children without these handicaps.
Or it might be decided that those pupils who were considered most apt to
contribute to the well-being of the community should be given preferred
consideration. Or it might be decided that those with most ability or those
who had worked hardest should be given the most resources.
It is evident that these different values may conflict with one another.
The most needy may not be the most able; those who work the hardest
may not accomplish the most; giving everybody equal inputs may not
result in their having equal outputs; treating everyone equally may not
maximize the common good.
5. Rules or criteria for defining the values. Suppose, for example, it is widely
accepted that “merit” should be the basis for distributing “grades” or some
other valued good; what are the criteria for defining “merit”? Shall it be
defined in terms of the quality or quantity of work, in terms of the actual
accomplishment, in terms of the improvement over prior accomplishment?
Whether the distributive value is “merit,” “equality,” “effort,” “abil-
ity,” “need,” or almost any other value, for this value to be implemented,
there has to be specification of which of the relevant potential criteria shall
be employed to represent the particular value. Although there may be a
high degree of consensus within a group about which value shall be the
basis of a distribution, there may be a considerable sense of injustice about
the criteria or rules that are used to define the value.
4 Introduction
6. Measurement procedures. How are the rules or criteria operationalized and

implemented? The implementation of the criteria, the measurement, may
be invalid (for example, instead of testing “ability,” one measures “ef-
fort”); it may be unreliable, so that one can have little confidence that
similar results would be obtained if the measurement procedures were
repeated; or it may be insensitive, so that differences in the amounts of the
value cannot be readily distinguished. The sense of injustice is often
aroused because one feels that a value (that one accepts) has not been fairly
implemented.
7. Decision-making procedures. What are the procedures for making deci-
sions about any of the foregoing? Even if one feels that a distribution is
fair, one may feel an injustice with regard to the procedures by which the
values, the rules, or the measurement were determined. An adolescent may
like the decisions his parents make about his schooling, his allowance, his
use of the family car, and so on, but may resent the fact that he is not a
part of the decision-making process. There is considerable social psycho-
logical research to suggest that people are more apt to accept decisions and
their consequences as being fair if they have participated in making them.
8. Scope of the moral community. What is the scope of the distribution
system? To whom does it apply? Who is included, who is excluded? For
example, how far are we willing to extend the value of equality of educa-
tional opportunity? To include the child of a migrant worker? To the child
of a Mexican peasant? The narrower one’s conception of one’s community,
the narrower will be the scope of situations in which one’s actions will be
governed by considerations of justice.
9. Effects. What are the effects of the distribution system on individuals
within it, on different categories or groups of individuals, on the interrela-
tions among different individuals and groups, and on the cohesion and
productivity of the entire system? What kinds of distributive systems tend
to produce high individual self-esteem, friendly relations with other mem-
bers, and high productivity? What kinds result in considerable interper-
sonal strife, a sense of personal insecurity, and low productivity?
Much of the theoretical and empirical work presented in this book is

concerned with developing some understanding of the social and psychologi-
cal effects of distributive systems that differ in their basic distributive value.
We seek to answer the multifaceted question: How are self-esteem, attitudes
toward work and relations with fellow group members, as well as individual
and group productivity, affected by the way a group’s earnings are distrib-
uted within the group? We also seek to throw some light on which social and
psychological factors determine preferences for one or another distributive
value. Here, we are interested in the question: What are the conditions that
lead people to prefer egalitarian rather than meritocratic values?
My work on the social psychology of justice was initiated by an invitation

from Melvin Lerner, a social psychologist who has made many important
contributions to this area. Early in 1972, he invited me to write a paper for a
Introduction 5
conference on injustice in North America. In preparation for the 1972 confer-

ence, I read widely—delving into the literature of the moral and legal philoso-
phers, sociologists, and political scientists, and rereading the relevant work of
social psychologists. The more I read the more dissatisfied I became with the
existing literature in social psychology: it seemed too narrowly focused, too
parochial, and too unwittingly reflective of the dominant. Western ideology.
The focus was limited mainly to how subjects in laboratory experiments
attempted to restore their psychological equilibrium after experiencing or
observing an inequity. There was little research or theorizing on such topics
as the conditions necessary for awakening the sense of injustice, procedural
justice, retributive justice, the sociopsychological determinants and effects of
different systems of distributive justice, and so on. The parochial emphasis of
equity theorists on “proportionality” as the sole canon of distributive justice
suggested that these theorists were neglecting other distributive principles,
such as “equal shares to all” or “to each according to his need,” which have
been the rallying slogans for different political ideologies. Beyond this, the
economic and market orientation of equity theory appeared to reflect, unwit-
tingly, the implicit assumption in much of current Western ideology that
economic “rationality” and economic values should pervade all social life
and are appropriate in noneconomic social relations (for example, between
lovers, between parent and child).
My first theoretical essay in part I of this book, chapter 2, presents an
exposition and a critique of “equity theory.” Equity theory was the clear
starting point of theorizing and research in the social psychology of justice
and until recently has been the dominant approach in this area. The second
essay, chapter 3, is a modified and expanded version of a published paper,
“Equality, Equity, and Need” (Deutsch, 1975), which states my perspective
about distributive justice and applies my crude law of social relations to
develop hypotheses about the conditions that lead to the preference for one
or another distributive value: equity, equality, or need. Chapter 4, “Awaken-
ing the Sense of Injustice,” is a revised version of the major portion of my
paper prepared for Lerner’s 1972 conference (Deutsch, 1974). Deutsch’s
crude law was developed in my earlier theorizing and research on conflict
resolution, which is summarized in chapter 5, “Conflict Resolution: Theory
and Practice.” Chapter 6, “Interdependence and Psychological Orientation,”
characterizes the psychological orientations associated with different types of
social relations, depicting a psychological orientation as being composed of a
moral as well as cognitive and motivational components; it is a more general-
ized application of Deutsch’s crude law. The final theoretical essay provides
an overview of current theorizing in the social psychology of justice.
Part II presents the research we have done that bears upon the social
psychology of justice. I note that as I became more involved in this area and
started to think about my research—past and present—in the context of
“justice” I found myself in the position of the bourgeois gentleman of
Moliere’s play who was delighted to learn that he had been speaking prose all
the time. 1 was delighted to recognize that much of my research under other
6 Introduction
labels could be labeled as “justice” research quite properly. Thus, my early

study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group processes
(Deutsch, 1949b) could be considered a study of the social psychological
consequences of two contrasting distributive values (“rewarding group mem-
bers equally” or “rewarding them in terms of their relative rank in their
contributions to group performance”). Similarly, the many studies of conflict
and bargaining done in my laboratory (Deutsch, J973) are centrally related
to the social psychology of justice. They all were focused on the important
question: Under what conditions are people with conflicting interests able to
work out an agreement (that is, a system of justice defining what each shall
give and receive in the transaction between them) that is stable and mutually
satisfying?
The first chapter in part II, chapter 8, summarizes my earlier research on
cooperation-competition as well as some more recent research. Chapter 9
summarizes our work on conflict as it relates to justice; chapter 10 describes
a number of our more recent studies on the effects of different systems of
distributive justice; the next one, chapter 11, presents our recent studies on
the choice of different systems of distributive justice; chapter 12 describes
research related to the sense of injustice; and the final chapter in this section,
chapter 13, presents an overview of how some of the major findings of the
research reported in the preceding chapters relate to the research reported by
other investigators.
Part III presents some papers in which I have applied some of the ideas
that arose in connection with my theoretical or research work to one or
another social issue. Chapter 14 discusses education and distributive justice.
It starts with the unusual assumption that it may be possible to allocate merit
and then raises the question of how merit shall be distributed: Who merits an
increase in merit? This question is the springboard for a discussion of dis-
tributive justice in education that focuses on the distribution of symbols of
educational merit, grades. Chapter 15, “Suppose We Took Egalitarianism
Seriously?” examines the existing research on economic egalitarianism to see
whether there is the trade-off between equality and efficiency in the sphere of
work that is so often assumed. “Justice in the Crunch,” chapter 16, raises the
questions: What conditions lead to individual and social disruption in the
face of an economic crunch, and what conditions foster the effective mobil-
ization of self and community to deal with adversity? My answers place
considerable emphasis on the significance of justice in the sharing of adversity
if individual self-esteem and group solidarity is to be preserved during a
crunch. One final chapter, “Preventing World War III: A Psychological Per-
spective,” is included because there will be no justice if we have a nuclear
war. It offers a different perspective, placing emphasis on the malignant
social process between the superpowers that has enmeshed the United States
and the Soviet Union in a web of interactions and defensive-offensive man-
euvers that has worsened, rather than improved their situations, and that
threatens us all with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.
PART I
Theory
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CHAPTER TWO
A Critique of Equity Theory
Although equity theorists differ in important ways, they share the view,
espoused by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics, that injustice is propor-
tional. They hold in common the basic psychological assumption that people
believe that,Jm a just distribution, rewards will be distributed among indi-
viduals in proportion to their contributions: people who contribute more to a
relationship, to a group, to an organization, or to society should get propor-
tionally more than those who contribute less. This assumption underlies the
meritocratic ideology, derived from the Protestant ethic, which provides the
value framework of Western capitalism. The slogan of this ideology, “to each
according to his merit (contribution),” is the basic theme of equity theory.
In this chapter, I shall discuss primarily the work of Homans, Adams, and
Walster, Berscheid, and Walster. Homans introduced the basic ideas of equity
theory, Adams developed the ideas further and initiated innovative experi-
mental research on them, and Walster, Berscheid, and Walster have system-
atized and extended equity theory with the aspiration of providing a general
theory for social psychology.
GEORGE C. HOMANS
The concept of justice, in the form of distributive justice, first entered the
literature of modern social psychology in the 1961 publication of G. C.
Homans’s Social Behavior: Its Elementary Eorms. Homans was concerned
with justice, or rather injustice, in the distribution of rewards among indi-
viduals or groups. His basic ideas can be expressed as a set of interrelated
propositions:
1. Distributive injustice occurs when a person does not get the amount of
reward he expects in comparison with the reward some other person gets:
the distribution of reward may result from direct exchange between the
9
10 THEORY
two or more parties or may be made by some third party such as a boss,
an organization, or even a market. Relative deprivation is the form of
distributive injustice that occurs when a person gets less than he expects;
relative advantage* is the form in which a person gets more than he
expects.
2. A person expects rewards to be distributed in such a way that the propor-
tion between (a) the reward^ each receives and (b) the contributions and/or
investments each makes in a social exchange are equal. Hence, a person
would expect to get more reward from a social exchange than the other
participants if he has given more to it than the others and less if he has
contributed less. Further, if a person gets more reward than others, he is
expected and expects to contribute and/or invest more than the others; if a
person gets less, he is expected and expects to contribute and/or invest less.
3. A person who experiences relative deprivation, and therefore views himself
as a victim of injustice, will feel some degree of anger and express some
degree of hostility toward the others who caused the injustice or who
benefitted from it (if the two are different).
4. A person who experiences relative advantage, and therefore views himself
as a beneficiary of injustice, is apt to feel some degree of guilt and to
increase what he gives in a social exchange and thus increase what the
other gets—if he is able to do so and it doesn’t cost too much to do so.
5. Although people may agree on the rule of distributive justice (that rewards
ought to be proportioned to contributions), they may still disagree as to
whether the distribution of rewards is just in particular circumstances be-
cause they do not agree on what kinds of rewards, contributions, and
investments are to be considered relevant in applying the rule or because
they do not agree on their assessments of the values of the relevant
1. Homans (1974) uses the terms distributive justice and relative deprivation as synonyms,
explicitly borrowing the phrase distributive justice from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and
relative deprivation from Merton and Kitt (1950). His equation of distributive justice and rela-
tive deprivation is confusing, since he also now distinguishes between being a victim and a
beneficiary of injustice: a distinction he did not emphasize in his 1961 publication on this topic.
To reduce confusion, I restrict the meaning of relative deprivation to the disadvantaged form of
injustice and add relative advantage to refer to the advantaged form.
2. Homans employs the terms reward, cost, contribution, and investment mainly as they are
used in everyday language. However, his usage implies not some absolute measure of reward,
cost, and so on, but rather a perceived social ranking of different kinds and amounts of rewards,
costs, and so on. Thus, the cost of doing responsible work in an important job may be ranked
higher than the costs of doing monotonous, drudgery work in an unimportant job. Generally,
Homans employs cost as being an element in contribution, but sometimes he uses it to suggest
that it reduces rewards. Thus, in 1961, Homans defined the rule of distributive justice as follows:
“A man in an exchange relation will expect that the rewards of each man be proportional to his
costs—the greater the rewards, the greater the costs—and that the net rewards, or profits, of
each man be proportional to his investments—the greater the investments, the greater the profit”
(p. 75). Homans defines profit to be equal to rewards minus costs.
The term investment is used very broadly to refer to various background characteristics of
the person that are considered relevant to the social exchange. Education, intelligence, experi-
ence, age, sex, ethnic background, social status, and seniority are often considered as relevant
investments. The types of investments may have different evaluative rankings so that, for ex-
ample, being white or male is considered to be a superior investment to being black or female.
According to such rankings of investments, whites would expect more pay than blacks and men
more than women.
A Critique of Equity Theory 11
rewards, contributions, or investments. In judging whether one has re-

ceived a just reward or whether one has been relatively deprived or advan-
taged, one is apt to compare oneself with others who are in some respects
close or similar to oneself—with others of one’s own nation, own organiza-
tion, own group rather than with others who are different.
Homans (1974) has illustrated the workings of the rule of distributive

justice in the relations between “cash posters” and “ledger clerks” in an
accounting department he studied. The ledger clerks thought they were being
treated unjustly in comparison to the cash posters. Although the ledger clerks
liked their work and were satisfied with the absolute amount of their pay (in
the sense that they acknowledged they could not get better pay for compara-
ble jobs elsewhere in the city), they complained that they and the cash posters
received the same pay even though they had more seniority and theirs was the
more “responsible” job. The ledger clerks were “superior” to the cash posters
in investments (“seniority”) and in costs (the concerns associated with doing
a more responsible job) but only equal to them in pay. The fact that their
relative rewards were out of line with their relative rank on the dimensions of
investments and costs or contributions led them to feel relatively deprived,
which in turn led them to seek a change in their pay and to complain to both
management and their union. It was natural for the ledger clerks to compare
themselves with the cash posters who were similar in important respects: not
only were they in the same department doing interrelated work but also
many of the clerks had formerly served as posters.
Homans introduced the rule of distributive justice to social psychology
and illustrated its implications in a variety of social contexts. However, he
did not attempt to extend his propositions or develop their implications in
any systematic way nor did he formulate new lines of research based upon his
propositions. These tasks were assumed by other equity theorists—most no-
tably by Adams and by Walster, Berscheid, and Walster—who expanded the
power of the ideas of equity theory by joining them with the ideas of the
theory of cognitive dissonance.
J. STACY ADAMS
Adams (1963, 1965, 1968) employs the term inequity in the same way as
Homans defines distributive injustice, and his usage gives currency to the
phrase equity theory to characterize the ideas originally articulated by Ho-
mans and elaborated further by Adams. Inequity is used instead of injustice
to avoid some of the connotations of justice and to emphasize equity theory’s
focus on exchange relations. Although employer-employee relations are ex-
tensively used by Adams in exposition of equity theory, he conceives its ideas
to be applicable to social exchanges of all kinds—between teacher and stu-
dent, parent and child, lovers, and even enemies.
Adams substitutes the term outcome (0) for Homans’s term profit (“re-
12 THEORY
ward minus cost”) and input (/) for Homans’s terms of investments and
contributions. Inequity exists between two persons, A and B, in an exchange
if the ratios of outcomes to inputs for A and B are unequal:
QA ^ ^
IA IB IA 1B ■
Adams, like Homans, is dealing with perceived inequity as well as per-

ceived outcomes and inputs rather than with “objective” reality as conceived
by a competent, impartial observer. The perceptions of two parties to an
exchange may not coincide. A and B may have quite different perceptions of
one or more of the four components of the equity formula: OA, U? OB? IB- A
may perceive their exchange as equitable while B does not, or vice versa.
The emphasis on perception leads Adams to distinguish between recogni-
tion and relevance. Do, for example, both the recipient and giver of an
exchange recognize its existence? If A gives B respect, does B recognize that
this is what is occurring? And if he recognizes it, does he consider respect to
be a relevant or appropriate outcome in the exchange between them? Perhaps
B wants more money rather than more respect from A, his boss. Similarly,
recognition and relevance apply to the perception of inputs or investments.
One party to an exchange. A, may be unaware of the other’s, B’s, education,
skill, expenses, training, seniority, age, social status, or effort which B is
investing in the exchange even though B is very much cognizant of his invest-
ment. Even if A recognizes JB’S attributes, he may not consider all of them to
be relevant inputs to their exchange: B’s and A’s views of which of B’s
attributes are relevant may differ. B may think that having obtained a Ph.D.
in history from Harvard entitles him to higher pay, whereas A may consider
this attribute of B an irrelevant input to his work as a travel agent.
Although Adams views the principal inputs to social exchanges to be
similar to the attributes Homans characterizes as investments, unlike Homans
he does not believe that people make their assessments of either inputs or
outcomes only on ordinal scales—on scales limited to comparative judgments
such as “more,” “equal”, or “less.” He believes that the work of Jacques,
Equitable Payment (1961), indicates that people make more precise, quanti-
tative judgments in assessing the equity of their wages.
Adams, like Homans, is not very specific in characterizing the different
types of inputs and of outcomes, nor does he specify the kinds of interrela-
tionships that might exist, psychologically, among the different types of in-
puts or of outcomes or the expected relationships between specific inputs and
specific outcomes. However, he makes the rather specific assumption that
each of the varied, relevant outcomes an individual thinks he receives in an
exchange are weighted in importance by the individual and then summated to
give the total outcome. Similarly, the total input an individual makes to a
social interaction is assumed by Adams to be the sum of the weighted inputs
that are viewed as relevant by the individual. Adams further goes on to
assume that the magnitude of the experienced inequity will be a monotoni-
cally increasing function of the perceived size of the discrepancy between the
ratios of total outcomes to total inputs of the two parties in an exchange.
Like Homans, Adams suggests that the threshold for experiencing a discrep-
ancy in ratios as inequitable may be higher when one is being advantaged
rather than disadvantaged.
Adams’s definition of inequity and his statement of the antecedents of
inequity are, he acknowledges, very much indebted to Homans’s theorizing
about distributive justice. His discussion of the consequences of inequity,
which goes beyond Homans’s discussion of these issues, is very much influ-
enced by Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. Inequity, in his
view, has consequences that are similar to those of cognitive dissonance. As
with dissonance, the presence of inequity in a person creates tension that is
proportional to the magnitude of the inequity. And as with the tension
aroused by dissonance, the tension aroused by inequity will motivate the
person to eliminate or reduce it, the strength of this motivation being propor-
tional to the tension.
Adams discusses a number of different modes of reducing the tension
created by an experienced inequity which are potentially available to a person
experiencing inequity. The psychological possibilities include: (1) action to
alter the value of any of the four items in the equity formula (own outcome,
own input, other’s outcome, or other’s input); (2) distorting one’s perceptions
so as to alter the perceived value of any of the four items in the equity
formula; (3) leaving the field by quitting the relationship (in employment
situations this may be expressed in absenteeism or seeking a transfer); and (4)
changing the object of one’s comparison so that one compares oneself with
someone whose ratio of outcome to input is more similar to one’s own than
is the case for the inequitable comparison. In his theoretical discussion,
Adams (1965) considers the alternative of altering one’s own inputs (one of
the four alternatives in the first category above) at greatest length, and his
research on equity has been primarily concerned with this alternative.
Much research has been done by Adams and others to test the hypothesis
that inequity will be reduced by altering one’s inputs. The most interesting of
the experiments done by Adams and his coworkers (Adams and Rosenbaum,
1962; Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobson, 1964) were designed to test an
implication of their hypothesis which predicts that someone who is overpaid
by his employer will experience inequity and attempt to reduce it by increasing
relevant inputs. In these experiments, students were hired to proofread galley
pages. In a high inequity condition, the students were induced to perceive that
they were unqualified to earn the standard proofreader’s rate of pay but that
they would, nevertheless, be hired and paid that rate. In low inequity, they
were led to believe that they were fully qualified to earn the standard rate. In
reduced inequity, they were told they were unqualified and would be paid a
reduced rate. In one experiment (Adams and-Jacobson, 1964), the students
were paid on a piece-rate basis; in earlier experiments (Adams and Rosen-
baum, 1962; Adams, 1963), the students were paid on an hourly basis.
The results were in line with the prediction. Subjects who were to be
14 THEORY
overpaid (those in the high inequity condition) increased their inputs compared
to the subjects who were to be equitably paid (those in either the reduced or
low equity conditions). Those who were being paid by the piece increased the
quality of their work (as measured by the average number of errors detected
per page); those who were being paid by the hour increased the quantity of
their work (as measured by the average number of pages proofed per hour).
The overpaid subjects, in other words, reduced the inequity by increasing their
relative inputs in the way that was available to them.
Subsequent research by other investigators provides strong evidence to
support the prediction that those who experience an inequity because they
are underpaid are likely to reduce their inputs (as reflected in the quantity
and/or quality of their work) in order to reduce the inequity. The evidence
does not consistently support the prediction that those who are overpaid will
increase their inputs. This is not surprising since Adams and also Homans
have indicated that those who are advantaged rather than deprived by an
inequity will experience less pressure to reduce it.
Choice among modes of inequity reduction. Given the fact that a person
has potentially available to him a number of different modes of reducing
inequity (altering any of the four items in the equity formula, changing his
cognition about any of the items, leaving the field, or changing his compari-
son), what determines which mode a person will employ? Adams sets forth a
number of propositions about the determinants of such choices, which have
been influenced by Steiner’s work on alternative methods of dissonance re-
duction (Steiner, 1960; Steiner and Johnson, 1964; Steiner and Peters, 1958;
Steiner and Rogers, 1963). His propositions are presented below, reworded
to make them clearer.
A person will choose that mode of reducing inequity that:
1. Maximizes his positive outcomes
2. Minimizes the necessity of increasing any of his own inputs that are effort-
ful or costly to change
3. Minimizes the necessity of real or cognitive changes in inputs or outcomes
that are central to his self-concept or self-esteem
4. Enables him to change his cognition about the other rather than about
himself
5. Minimizes the necessity to leave the field or to change the object of social
comparison once it has become stabilized
The propositions are based on the notion of “economic man”: people
seek to maximize profits (rewards minus costs) and will choose the mode of
reducing inequity that maximizes their expected profits. His propositions
include the idea that it is less costly to change one’s view of the other than of
oneself. They also include the thought that the costs of changing one’s self-
concepts are likely to be unacceptable costs as are the costs of leaving the
field or changing one’s object of self-comparison. It is not obvious that the
latter costs will necessarily be so high as to usually preclude employment of
these two modes of reducing inequity.
Adams, in presenting his version of equity theory, was well aware of its
gaps and its unfinished quality. He pointed to the crudity of his propositions
about the choice of mode of reduction of inequity; he indicated the need to
know more about what determines with whom one will choose to compare
oneself; and he stressed the need for psychometric research to determine how
people actually aggregate their own as well as other’s elemental outcomes
and inputs. More recently, Adams and Freedman (1976) reviewed the current
status of equity theory and pointed out additional areas requiring clarifica-
tion. They indicate that the nature of the tension or “distress” of inequity is
poorly understood; they suggest that the instrumental uses of creating in-
equity (for example, as a technique of social influence) should be studied;
they propose that the complexities of moving from a situation of inequity to
one of joint equity are poorly understood; and they stress that equity theory
is a quantitative theory that has not yet developed methods of quantifying the
key variables (“inputs,” “outputs,” “inequity tension”) in the theory.
WALSTER, BERSCHEID, AND WALSTER
Adams’s major contributions to the development of equity theory were to

employ Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance in characterizing the pro-
cesses involved in reducing the tensions associated with perceived inequity
and to initiate the experimental investigation of some of the implications of
equity theory. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster have, more ambitiously,
sought to systematize and to extend equity theory “in the hope of providing
the glimmerings of the general theory that social psychologists so badly need”
(1978, p. 2). Their version of equity theory, as they see it, “attempts to
integrate the insights of reinforcement theory, cognitive consistency theory,
psychoanalytic theory, and exchange theory.” From a set of four interlocking
propositions, which they consider to be the heart of their theory, they have
developed a series of implications which they apply to the phenomena in-
volved in exploiter-victim, helping, business, and intimate relationships.
The basic propositions of the theory are:
Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where

outcomes equal rewards minus costs).
Proposition II: Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving ac-
cepted systems for “equitably” apportioning rewards and costs among mem-
bers. Thus, members will evolve such systems of equity and will attempt to
induce members to accept and adhere to these systems.
Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably and
generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat others inequitably.
Proposition III: When individuals find themselves participating in inequit-
able relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable the relation-
ship, the more distress individuals feel.
16 THEORY
Proposition IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable rela-

tionship attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. The greater
the inequity that exists, the more distress they feel, and the harder they try to
restore equity.
The propositions are grounded in a particular view of human nature and

of human society. Proposition I, according to Walster et ah, assumes explic-
itly that “man is selfish.” Proposition II has condensed within it a theory of
the origin of society and a theory of social control. It assumes that selfish
individuals, who are in competition with one another for the “good things in
life,” will collectively (as a group) seek to maximize their total reward as a
collective. It further assumes that these selfish individuals will be able to
organize a society and agree upon the principles of equity as a basis for
apportioning rewards and costs among themselves because they believe that
the principle of equity, when it is applied, (1) will stimulate these selfish
individuals to act in a way that will maximize their collective outcome and
(2) will also motivate them to act equitably toward one another. In other
words, the assumptions underlying the first two propositions are that men
are intrinsically asocial but rational and that they have employed their ration-
ality to create external arrangements, a society with enforceable rules of
equity, which curb the expression of their selfish tendencies in order to max-
imize the collective good.
Like Homans and Adams, Walster et al. define equity in terms of propor-
tionality, but their formula is slightly different than the one articulated previ-
ously. In their definition, equity exists when:
QA ~ IA _ QB ~ IB
|IA| KA |IB| KB
{A and B are the two people involved in the relation; O refers to outcome, I
to input; |I| refers to the absolute value of the input, disregarding its sign; the
exponent, K, takes on the value of +1 or —1, depending on whether the
product of / times (O —I) has a plus or minus sign.) Their formula has
advantages over the simpler formula of Adams when the input of either A or
B is negative.^
The inputs that a participant contributes to a relationship can be either
assets, entitling him to rewards, or liabilities, entitling him to costs. Out-
comes are defined as the positive and negative consequences (rewards and
costs) that a participant is perceived to have received in the course of his
relationship with another. Like Adams, Walster et al. emphasize that equity
or inequity is in the eye of the perceiver; it is the perceiver who identifies
and evaluates outcomes and inputs and makes the calculations necessary to
3. For a debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the Walster et al. formula, see W.
Samuel and G. W. Walster in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2, 1976, 36-46.
conclude that the relationship between A and B is or is not equitable. Two

persons viewing the same relationship may, of course, perceive it differently."^
Let us look at some of the implications of the four basic propositions
of the Walster et al. theory. The first proposition indicates that a person
who expects to advantage himself by behaving inequitably toward another
will do so. That is, he will do so if he thinks he can get away with it:
man is amoral but rational. The second proposition suggests that most
people in most circumstances will think they can’t get away with it, believ-
ing that they will be caught and punished if they try to take advantage of
another. With the threat of punishment for inequitable behavior and/or
reward for behaving equitably, the person will usually perceive that he can
maximize his total self-interest by resisting the temptation to get more
than his due. But there may be occasions when such temptation is not
deterred because the potential punishments or rewards are not sufficiently
strong or salient; on such occasions, an inequity will occur. Or the ineq-
uity may be accidental rather than intended.
What happens once an inequity occurs? According to the third proposi-
tion, the inequity will (to the extent that it is perceived) produce distress, as a
function of its magnitude, in both the person who has been advantaged and
the one who has been disadvantaged. And the fourth proposition indicates
that the distress of perceived inequity will motivate those who experience it
to try to restore equity; the more distress they feel, the harder they will try.
Most of the Walster et al. theory is concerned with the implications of their
third and fourth propositions, particularly the latter.
There is a considerable amount of evidence that is consistent with the third
proposition. Much of it is of an indirect kind: research indicates that people act
to restore equity in an inequitable relationship, and it is inferred that their action
must be motivated by the distress they experience because of the inequity. Much
of the evidence is anecdotal and based upon personal observation. Most of us
can remember experiences in which we felt we were unfairly treated and reacted
with indignation, anger, resentment, hurt, or some other emotion that might be
labeled as distressing. Similarly, many of us can remember situations in which
we felt we were unfairly advantaged and reacted with such distressing emotions
as fear of retaliation, guilt, shame, or embarrassment.
The direct research evidence about distress in response to inequity is
sparse, as Adams and Freedman (1976) have indicated. Studies by Thibaut
(1950), Homans (1953), and Ross, Thibaut, and Evenbeck (1971) have dem-
onstrated that those who feel that they get less than they deserve often get
angry. Austin and Walster (1974) showed that students who were compen-
sated more or less than they were told they would be for participation in an
experiment indicated less favorable moods on the Mood Adjective Check List
4. There are almost an infinite variety of combinations when considering how A and B
perceive their relationship. Their perceptions may differ with regard to recognizing any of the
elements that go into OA, 1A-. OR, or IR; they may differ on how these elements are to be evaluated (in
magnitude and whether it is positive or negative); they may differ in their computational accuracy;
they may or may not recognize correctly whether they differ or how they differ; and so on.
18 THEORY
and more dissatisfaction with how they were paid than subjects who were
paid what they were led to expect; those who received less than they expected
were more distressed than those who received more than they expected.
Walster et al. identify two types of distress that the advantaged person
may feel in an inequitable relationship: retaliation distress (fear of retalia-
tion) and self-concept distress (loss of self-esteem). They do not specifically
label the types of distress that will be experienced by a victim, but presuma-
bly it will be anger or resentment or some variant of these emotions. As has
been indicated above, the research on equity theory has not as yet provided
much characterization of the types of distress that occur in inequitable
relationships and what, for example, gives rise to retaliation distress rather
than self-contempt distress or what evokes resentment rather than anger.
Distress, as Adams and Freedman (1976) have pointed out, has been most
frequently used as a hypothetical construct linking “the perception of par-
ticipating in an inequitable relationship” with the “tendency to restore eq-
uity” rather than as an intervening variable that is reflected directly in
observable phenomena. The need to reduce distress, in other words, is pos-
tulated to produce the driving force to restore equity; distress is evidenced,
indirectly, in the processes involved in reducing inequity. Thus, support for
the Walster et al. third proposition has largely come indirectly from the
research evidence supporting their fourth proposition.
The fourth proposition and its derivatives have been the source of
much research. The interesting derivations come from two related ideas.
The first idea, which Adams had developed earlier in his supplementation
of equity theory with dissonance theory, is that the distress of inequity can
be reduced through the restoration of either actual equity or psychological
equity: one can change the reality that is distressing or one can change
one’s perceptions of the reality so that it is no longer viewed as having the
characteristics that evoke distress. The second interesting idea is contained
in the Walster et al. elaboration of the notion that the choice of mode of
restoring equity will be determined by economic (cost-benefit) considera-
tions; namely, the adequacy of an equity-restoring technique in completely
restoring actual equity (or the credibility of a technique of justification in
restoring psychological equity) will be a factor influencing whether or not
the technique is chosen. We shall see below that these ideas have some
surprising implications.
In presenting the evidence relating to their fourth proposition, Walster
et al. describe various types of equity-restoring responses that are available
to those who are advantaged by an inequity (“exploiters”) and those who
are disadvantaged (“exploited”) and provide research evidence illustrating
their usage. Walster et al. employ the terms exploiter and harmdoer for
the person who is relatively advantaged by an inequity; they employ the
terms exploited and victim for those who are disadvantaged. Their termi-
nology shall be used even though the implicit moral judgments may be
inappropriate at times.
Relieving the Distress of the Exploiter:

(A) Restoration of Actual Equity
1. Compensation of the victim. The exploiter may increase the victim’s out-
comes or enable the victim to reduce his inputs. An experiment by Brock and
Becker (1966) is cited as an illustration. In this experiment, the student
subjects were convincingly led to believe that their carelessness had damaged
the apparatus being used in the experiment: half of the students were led to
believe that the damage was extensive and half that it did not amount to
much. As the distressed student was leaving the experimental laboratory, the
experimenter asked the student to do him a favor by signing a petition
endorsing the doubling of student tuition at the university in order to im-
prove its faculty and its physical condition. Few of the students who thought
they had done slight damage were willing to sign the petition; in contrast,
over half of those who thought they had done severe damage signed it.
2. Self-deprivation. An exploiter can renounce his undeserved outcomes or he
can volunteer additional inputs. The clinical literature indicates that people
will sometimes punish themselves or seek punishment from others to re-
duce their guilt. Walster et al. cite an experiment by Wallington (1973) as
an illustration. She led some high school boys to cheat on a test and then
when they were allowed to try a few electric shocks to see how they felt,
studied how much shock they administered to themselves. She compared
students who were led to cheat with students who were not led to cheat on
the test; the former exhibited far greater self-aggression than the latter.
3. Retaliation. A victim may get even with a harmdoer by retaliating, and the
harmdoer’s distress at his harmdoing will be relieved if “the punishment
fits the crime.” If the punishment is excessive, the harmdoer will feel ex-
ploited; if it is inadequate, it will not restore equity and the harmdoer will
have to resort to other techniques to relieve his distress. Berscheid et al.
(1968) employed high school students to work as experimenters; it was
their job to severely shock a fellow student, presumably to find out how he
would respond to shock. Some of the experimenters knew when they ad-
ministered the shock that the victim would not be able to retaliate, whereas
others knew that the victim would be allowed to shock them in return.^ As
expected, students denigrated the victim only when he could not retaliate.
Walster et al. suggest that the timing of the retaliation may be an impor-
tant determinant of the harmdoer’s reaction to it. If the victim has already
been denigrated by the harmdoer and then retaliation occurs, the retalia-
tory action may be considered as being unwarranted and even unjust.
Relieving the Distress of the Exploiter:

(B) Restoration of Psychological Equity
Instead of restoration of actual equity, an exploiter may relieve his distress by

restoring psychological equity. He can convince himself that the inequitable
5. Unbeknownst to the student experimenters, they were not really administering shock,
even though they thought they were. This is almost always the case when subjects are presuma-
bly administering shock or some other noxious stimulus to another person.
20 THEORY
relationship is in fact equitable. He can do this by reducing his own perceived

outcomes (“I did not get so much as it seems”), increasing his own perceived
inputs (“I did more than it seems”), increasing the perceived outcomes of the
other (“he got more than it appears”), or reducing the perceived inputs of the
other (“he did not do as much as it seems”). Walster et al. cite research
illustrating how harmdoers will blame their victims, or minimize the victims’
suffering, or deny their own responsibility for the harmdoing. Thus, Sykes
and Matza (1957) found that juvenile delinquents will defend their victimiza-
tion of others by arguing that their victims are homosexuals or bums or
possess other traits deserving of punishment; the delinquents will consistently
underestimate how much harm they have done; or they will deny their re-
sponsibility for the harmdoing. Experimental research, similarly, has demon-
strated that students who were asked to humiliate other students ended up
convincing themselves that they deserved to be humiliated (Davis and Jones,
1960), or that the electric shock they administered to other students was not
so painful (Brock and Buss, 1962), or that they were not responsible for the
pain that the others experienced.
Walster et al. discuss “apology” as a mixed case. It can be an attempt to
restore actual equity by humbling oneself before the victim; it may attempt to
restore psychological equity by denying responsibility for the harmful act (“it
was an accident,” “I was forced to do it”); or it may be an appeal to “forgive
and forget” the inequity so that the relationship can begin anew since the
original inequity cannot be undone.
The Choice of Technique to Restore Equity

Of the many ways of restoring equity available to an exploiter, what deter-
mines which he will choose? Walster et al. conclude that exploiters tend to
use either justification techniques (restoration of psychological equity) or
compensation techniques (restoration of actual equity) to restore equity
rather than some combination of the two. They cite two studies (Walster and
Prestholdt, 1966; Lincoln and Levinger, 1972) in support of this conclusion:
in both studies, helping the victim was negatively correlated with derogating
him. However, it is by no means self-evident that the conclusion is universally
valid. The reader may be able to recall accidents in which the harmdoer is
ready both to offer the victim some small compensation for his loss and to
minimize the harm that has been done.
Walster et al. offer two corollaries (the first is to their fourth proposition,
the second to their first one) as a basis for predicting which technique will be
chosen to restore equity:
Corollary 1: Other things being equal, the more adequate an exploiter
perceives an available equity-restoring technique to be, the more likely he is
to use this technique to restore equity.
Corollary 2: Other things being equal, the less costly an exploiter per-
ceives an available equity-restoring technique to be, the more likely he is to
use this technique to restore equity.
The “adequacy” of a technique is defined as the extent to which it will

exactly restore equity.
Berscheid and Walster (1967) conducted an ingenious experiment whose
results provide support for the adequacy corollary. In their experiment,
women from various church groups were led to cheat fellow parishioners out
of trading stamps in a vain attempt to win additional stamps for themselves.
When the women were later given the chance to compensate the victims (at
no cost to themselves), it was found that the adequacy of compensation was a
critical determinant of whether or not they chose to compensate. Women
who could exactly restore the number of books their partners had lost were
much more likely to make restitution than women who could offer only the
insufficient compensation of a few stamps or the excessive compensation of a
great many stamp books. From this experiment, Walster et al. draw the
provocative conclusion that a victimized group, such as blacks in the United
States, is more apt to get some compensation for the wrongs it has suffered if
its demands for compensation are small enough so that an adequate, rather
than insufficient, compensation can be made in response to the demand. They
do not consider the possibility that the victim might not feel satisfied with the
compensation that the victimizer considers to be adequate.
“Justifications,” if they are to restore psychological equity, must also meet
the criterion of adequacy: they must neither underjustify or overjustify the
exploitation. In addition, the justification must be credible. A justification is
more likely to be credible if it is not exposed to a contradicting reality. The lack
of contradiction may occur because the justification is consistent with reality
or because the reality and the justification are not in contact with each other.
Thus, it is more difficult for an exploiter to come up with a credible justifica-
tion that distorts the victim’s characteristics if he has repeated contact with
him. Research by Davis and Jones (1960) and Ross (1965) indicate, for ex-
ample, that it is easier for subjects to derogate someone they have ridiculed or
electrically shocked if they do not expect to see the victim again. Walster et al.
draw the conclusion that the geographical and social segregation of exploited
groups enable the exploiters to reduce their guilt through justifications that are
not subject to challenge through direct contact with the exploited.
The second corollary, which indicates that cost considerations will affect
the choice of technique to restore equity, suggests that self-punishment, com-
pensation, and other costly techniques are less likely to be chosen by an
exploiter or harmdoer than justification techniques if these have any credibil-
ity. One might also infer from this corollary that the victim is more likely to
demand compensation than the victimizer is likely to grant it. This inference
also follows from a derivation that Walster et al. state from their first three
propositions, and it is, of course, similar to a proposition offered by both
Homans and Adams: a participant will be more distressed by inequity when
he is a victim than when he is a harmdoer. This derivation implies, in con-
junction with their fourth proposition, that victims will try harder to restore
equity than harmdoers. There is, in fact, much more research evidence to
indicate that those who are relatively disadvantaged by an inequity will seek
22 THEORY
to restore equity than there is that those who are relatively advantaged will
do so (Adams and Freedman, 1976).
Relieving the Distress of the Exploited
Walster et al. describe three techniques employed by victims to restore equity:

(1) demand for compensation, (2) retaliation, and (3) justification. Demand
for compensation is likely to be the most popular because it benefits the
victim as well as restoring equity. When compensation is not given willingly,
the victim may seek it illicitly. Thus, Stephenson and White (1968) have
shown that equitably treated boys were less likely to cheat to win a prize than
inequitably treated boys; by cheating, the latter sought to compensate for
their inequitable treatment.
Retaliation by the victim against the harmdoer may restore equity and, in
the process of so doing, may forestall the exploiter from justifying the exploita-
tion. As has been noted in the earlier discussion of retaliation, there is some
research evidence to suggest that exploiters will tend to derogate victims if they
do not expect them to retaliate. Walster et al. speculate that a victim might well
consider retaliating in order to forestall derogation if he does not expect com-
pensation from the harmdoer, but they caution that this would be a disastrous
strategy if the exploiters consider themselves innocent of exploitation.
Victims who are not sufficiently powerful to retaliate or to demand and
obtain compensation may justify their own victimization if they seek to be-
lieve in a just world. They may distort their own outcomes upward (“poor
but happy”), distort the outcomes of the exploiter downward (“rich but
miserable”), distort their own inputs downward, or distort the exploiter’s
inputs upward.
Walster et al. suggests that whether a victim seeks justice or justification
will largely be determined by two variables: the victim’s original expectations
and his hope for change. As evidence of the effect of expectations, they report
an experiment by Austin and Walster (1974) which found that when subjects
were given less than an equitable payment for their performance during an
experiment, they felt considerably less discontent about their inequitable
treatment if they had been forewarned that they would receive the low pay-
ment than if they had not been forewarned. With regard to hope, they cite
some experimental evidence (Thibaut, 1950; Ross, Thibaut, and Evenbeck,
1971) that suggests that when subjects feel themselves to be competent or
effective rather than incompetent and ineffective, they are more likely to
protest inequitable treatment. Presumably, the sense of competence raises
one’s hopes or expectations about the possibility of protesting effectively
against the inequitable treatment.
Reactions of observers. Walster et al. have been concerned not only with
the reactions of the participants in an inequitable relationship but also with
the reactions of impartial observers and outside agencies. They have indicated
that in many societies, social norms and institutional arrangements (for ex-
ample, the judicial system) have been developed to try to persuade, or if this
is not successful, to force a harmdoer to make restitution to his victim, with

punishment as an alternative if restitution does not occur. They cite research
by Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) and Berkowitz and Conner (1966) to illus-
trate the point that observers will sometimes, if necessary, help to restore
equity through their own contributions. This research indicates that students
will work hard to help a fellow student get the rewards he deserves even
when there is little chance that anyone will ever realize that they were the
ones who helped.
When actual equity cannot be restored, Walster et al. suggest that the
observers will restore equity psychologically. As Lerner (1971) has pointed
out, people are motivated to believe in a just world. When existing wrongs
cannot be righted in actuality, people will tend to right them psychologically:
people who are harmed somehow deserve to suffer; people who are relatively
advantaged somehow are entitled to their gains.
Equity Theory and Intimate Relations
Although many theorists (for example, Fromm, 1956; Rubin, 1973) would
assert that marital and romantic relationships are not appropriately viewed as
exchange relations in which traditional considerations of equity are applica-
ble, Walster et al. contend that equity considerations do apply in intimate
relationships. They propose that important characteristics of mate selection,
the quality of the relationship that develops between a couple, the amount of
happiness experienced in the relationship, and the stability of the relationship
are understandable in terms of equity theory.
Mate selection. Various equity theorists have proposed a matching hy-
pothesis that suggests: (1) the more socially desirable an individual is (the
more physically attractive, personable, famous, or rich), the more socially
desirable the person will expect a suitable romantic partner to be, and (2)
couples who are similar in social desirability will more often continue to
date each other and will better like each other than will couples who are
markedly mismatched. This hypothesis has stimulated a good deal of re-
search. In one study (Walster et ah, 1966), college freshmen were invited
to attend a “computer dance.” Each freshman’s physical attractiveness was
rated by four students. It was hypothesized, and the results confirmed, that
students would expect to be assigned a computer date who was similar in
attractiveness to themselves. Students were actually assigned randomly to
their dates, and it was predicted that the students who were, by chance,
matched with dates of similar attractiveness would be more satisfied with
their dates than those matched with dates who were rated as far superior
or inferior to themselves. The results did not confirm the prediction; it
was found that the more physically attractive the date, the more the per-
son was liked.
Kiesler and Baral (1970), however, found indirect support for the
matching hypothesis in an experiment in which male students were led to
experience success (“high self-esteem”) or failure (“low self-esteem”) on a
24 THEORY
new intelligence test and then, in another context, were introduced to a girl
(a confederate of the experimenters) who was dressed and made-up to ap-
pear “attractive” or “unattractive.” The results, as predicted, indicated that
the high self-esteem subjects were more attracted to the attractive confeder-
ate; the low self-esteem subjects were more attracted to the unattractive
confederate.
Berscheid et al. (1973) have proposed that if persons have vastly “su-
perior” inputs to their partners in one sphere, they could use that to attract
and keep partners who contributed more than their share in other spheres.
Using a questionnaire filled out by 62,000 Psychology Today readers on their
current dating, mating, or marital relations, they classified respondents in
terms of whether they considered themselves to be more, equally, or less
physically attractive than their partners. As predicted, they found that the
more attractive a person considers himself to be compared to his partner, the
richer, the more loving, and the more self-sacrificing the partner was de-
scribed as being compared to the respondent.
On the basis of the preceding sort of evidence, Walster et al. conclude
that although individuals may prefer romantic partners who are more desir-
able than themselves, they tend to end up choosing partners of approximately
their own social worth. Thus, most couples start off in relationships that they
perceive to be equitable. In the course of a marriage, however, the marital
balance may shift so that an originally matched couple may become mis-
matched. They hypothesize that mismatched relationships are unhappy rela-
tionships and summarize a variety of evidence that is consistent with this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, they go on to suggest that when an imbalance
occurs in a marriage, both the “superior” and “inferior” partners will make
readjustments in the attempt to restore actual or psychological equity to the
relationship. They hypothesize, however, that the “inferior” partner will have
to try harder (recalling the advertising slogan, “if you are number 2, you have
to try harder”).
The “inferior” partner will offer more to the other (for example, by
seeking to appear more attractive, more charming, more affectionate, or
more agreeable) or will sacrifice more (by doing more of the unpleasant
chores or assuming more of the costs of the relationship). The “superior”
partner will offer less to the other (by being less careful about appearance, by
being more demanding, less agreeable, or less generous) or will sacrifice less
(by assuming fewer responsibilities, or by doing less of the chores). If actual
or psychological equity cannot be restored, the continuing distress produced
by the imbalance may lead to an actual or psychological severing of the
relationship. Walster et al. were unable to find much research data that were
directly relevant to their ideas about the effects of imbalance in intimate
relationships.
A recent study by Lujansky and Mikula (1983) of dating relationships
concludes that “neither the quality nor the stability of relationships could be
predicted on the basis of the equity indices” (that is, on the basis of various
measures of the perceived equitableness of the relationship). The researchers
also found that the different measures of the perceived equitableness of the
relationship did not correlate strongly with one another, so that the validity
of the measures is called into question.
CRITIQUE OF EQUITY THEORY

Equity theory has been applied to a wide range of phenomena. As recently
formulated by Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1978), it has relevance to the
intimate relationships of lovers as well as to the more formal relations in-
volved in impersonal business exchanges. Walster et al. have applied equity
theory to the reactions of bystanders in emergencies, to helping relationships,
and to the decisions made by jurors and judges in the courtroom. The sweep
of equity theory is truly impressive—as is the ingenious experimentation it
has stimulated. Nevertheless, equity theory has many crucial weaknesses.
Some of the weaknesses it shares with other theories in social psychology;
for one, equity theory is a quantitative theory only in appearance, not in
reality. It assumes a common currency underlying diverse rewards and costs,
which permits addition, subtraction, and division. Such a psychological cur-
rency, of course, has not yet been identified, and it is still an unsolved
problem of how to add such rewards as a good dinner, a mediocre concert,
and a kiss. Until such problems are solved, the equity formula is not so much
a symbol of mathematics as a symbol of scientific aspiration. A second prob-
lem that equity theory shares with other social psychological theories is the
nature of the evidence it has generated. The experimental evidence for equity
theory has been illustrative rather than demonstrative. It has shown what
could happen rather than what must happen. Too often what could happen
does not happen and after-the-fact explanations must be generated to explain
what has occurred. Third, like most theories in social psychology, the basic
concepts of equity theory—“outcomes” and “inputs”—are deplorably vague.
It is hard to know in advance whether something will be viewed as an input
or an outcome, and the theory does not specify from whose perspective the
perceiver is evaluating inputs and outcomes—from his own or from the other
person’s perspective. That is, is the perceiver saying “how I would feel if I
were the other person” or “how the other person does feel”?
These sorts of problems are by no means unique to equity theory; like most
theories in social psychology, it is an incomplete theory and has the vulnera-
bilities intrinsic to incompleteness. My objections to equity theory, however,
center not so much on its incompleteness but rather on several other concerns:
the nonstrategic characterization of the relationship between the parties in an
exchange relationship; its motivational and cognitive assumptions; and the
conception of justice that is implicit in the equity formulation.
The nonstrategic characterization of the relationship between parties in
an exchange relationship. Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be
leveled at equity theory is that it ignores the interactional aspects of the
exchange relationship. Equity theory focuses on what goes on in the isolated
head of one or the other of the participants in the relationship (or an observer
26 THEORY
of the relationship). It neglects the possibility that each person’s thoughts and
behavior in the relationship are very much influenced by his recognition that
the other is thinking about and acting in reference to him. Each person is not
only concerned with what is going on inside his own head but also with what
is going on in the other’s head, and each is trying to influence the other’s
thoughts and actions.
Consider, for example, two people in an exchange relationship who are
selfishly motivated, as conceived by Walster et al. In such a situation, each
will want the relationship to be relatively advantageous to himself and will
want the relationship to be perceived by the other as equitable. Each will
maneuver strategically to affect the other’s conception of the factors deter-
mining the values of the key components of the equity formula: own and,
other’s inputs and outcomes. Under the constraint of coming to a mutual
agreement that the exchange relationship is an equitable one, the participants
will be seeking to negotiate not only the objective value but also the perceived
value of the various components of the equity formula.
The equity theorists, in ignoring the interactional character of the ex-
change relationship, have neglected the negotiating, or bargaining, aspects
involved in the participants’ coming to a mutually acceptable definition of
equity. This is a strange omission for social psychological theorists to make.
It neglects the basic social psychological processes of interaction involved in
arriving at an equitable exchange. This neglect fosters the one-sided emphasis
on the socially isolated, intrapsychic processes in the individual participant.
The bargaining relationship that is involved in establishing an equitable
exchange will, of course, be very much determined by the orientation of the
participants (see Deutsch, 1973, and chapters 5 and 9). If their orientations
are selfish, as some of the equity theorists posit, then the bargaining is likely
to be oriented toward self-advantage and tactics of fraud and deception, and
attitudes of suspicion are apt to characterize the communication processes.
On the other hand, if the participants in an exchange have a cooperative
orientation to each other, the bargaining may have a rather different char-
acter: communication may be open and honest and trusting attitudes may
prevail.
The motivational assumptions implicit in equity theory. Equity theory
(particularly in the Walster, Berscheid, and Walster version) implicitly makes
several motivational assumptions that need closer examination. Eirst, humans
are “maximizers” and “selfish”; second, they are primarily motivated by
extrinsic rewards; third, the qualitative relationship between the nature of the
individual’s motives and the nature of the extrinsic rewards can be ignored;
and fourth, an individual’s motivation to contribute to a group’s outcome
will be greater if his share of the outcome is proportional to his contributions
than if all contributions share the outcome equally. Each of these assump-
tions is challenged by a considerable body of research evidence.
The first proposition of Walster, Berscheid, and Walster’s version of
equity theory states that individuals will try to maximize their outcomes
(where outcomes equal rewards minus costs). It is evident that the proposi-
tion has no clear meaning if it does not specify the time span in which
maximization is to occur. Does one maximize outcomes for every action,
or for the actions related to one objective, or for the actions related to one
relationship or to the outcomes of a given day, a given year, a lifetime?
The proposition is meant to refer to subjective rather than objective out-
comes. But it is apparent that often, subjectively, “enough is enough” and
that there can be “too much of a good thing.” People can reject more of a
good thing (such as an external reward like food, money, affection, es-
teem, goods, or services) because having more than enough does not in-
crease their sense of well-being or may even decrease it. Or they may
reject more of a good thing because they do not want to get accustomed
to a level of pleasure or satisfaction they feel cannot be sustained in the
future. Thus, it is apparent that individuals do not necessarily, always, try
to maximize their objective outcomes or even their momentary subjective
pleasures.
In what sense, then, are people maximizers? Only in the tautological sense
that if an individual chooses one alternative rather than others, it is assumed
that he must consider the chosen one to be the best of the available alterna-
tives. What determines what a person considers when he evaluates various
alternatives is an empirical question; by definition, the alternative chosen by
the individual is the one he considers to be the best to achieve his ends. He
may not be correct, and he, himself, may even think it is self-destructive to do
what he is doing, for example, to continue smoking despite his awareness of
its harmful effects; but, by definition, smoking must have more positive
appeal than not smoking if he continues to smoke. If the bases of the appeal
are not obvious, then one must search for them.
The maximization assumption in Walster et al.’s version of equity the-
ory, although not a testable proposition, does serve a heuristic purpose—to
account for results that are inconsistent with their empirically testable
propositions. Propositions III and IV. The maximization assumption is a
rather indirect way of expressing the truth that Weick (1966) has stated:
“Man does not live by equity alone.” People have other motives besides
the justice motive, and sometimes these other motives give rise to feelings
and behavior that are in contradiction to those that would arise purely
from equity considerations.
In connection with their first proposition, Walster et al. make the unnec-
essary assertion that “man is selfish.” Here, I believe they are expressing a
common confusion. Man is selfish only in the tautological sense that all
behavior of the self is defined as motivated by the self. People may be moti-
vated to seek the well-being and happiness of others as well as their own;
some may even sacrifice their own well-being to protect the well-being of
others. Walster et al.’s third proposition is, in fact, inconsistent with their
statement that man is selfish. Proposition III builds “morality” into the pos-
tulated amoral man of their first proposition; purely “selfish” behavior at the
expense of another is not free of internal cost (distress) and the more inequit-
able one’s behavior is toward another, the more distress an individual will
28 THEORY
feel. Presumably, the anticipated distress of inequitable behavior may serve to

inhibit this form of selfish behavior.
The view that “man is selfish” often also assumes that “man is lazy” and
that he has to be motivated by extrinsic rewards. Presumably, he is too lazy
or self-centered to want to work or to do things that are helpful to others;
hence, he needs external outcomes to motivate his contributions. However, a
growing body of research (see chapter 13 and also Lepper and Greene, 1978)
demonstrates that extrinsic rewards may impair the sustained motivation to
engage in an activity even though such rewards may temporarily foster the
activity while they are present as an incentive. In other words, research shows
that the intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity may be lowered by
offering external rewards for the activity; the external reward demeans the
activity or makes it seem less valuable in its own right.
I have pointed out earlier that the concept of outcome assumes a
common currency to which different types of outcomes can be reduced.
The proportionality thesis of equity theory similarly assumes that it makes
no difference what type of outcome is matched with what type of input,
or, it makes no difference how one is rewarded, what counts is how much
one is rewarded. Foa and Foa (1974) have done extensive research which
indicates that the qualities of inputs and outcomes must have a high de-
gree of correspondence if an exchange is to be considered a satisfactory
one. If one contributes a great deal of time and energy to the care of a
sick friend, payment in money rather than in affection or esteem is likely
to be viewed as a demeaning outcome.
Implicit in equity theory is the assumption that groups will be more
productive if group members are rewarded in proportion to their contribu-
tions. It is posited that equitable rewards will increase productivity by de-
livering high rewards to good performers and low rewards to poor per-
formers. While it is apparent that groups will be more productive if those
who perform well are encouraged to be active and those who perform
poorly are discouraged, it is by no means self-evident that it is necessary to
use a system of rewarding people in proportion to their contributions to
achieve these objectives. Considerable evidence from research reported in
part II of this book indicates that work groups who share their rewards
equally may be more productive than work groups whose members are
individually rewarded in terms of their relative contribution to the group’s
product.
The cognitive assumptions implicit in equity theory. Although the equity
theorists are not explicit about their cognitive assumptions, their basic model
appears to be that of a rational, economic man who has sufficiently accurate
knowledge of himself and the others with whom he is engaged in an ex-
change relationship, so that he can correctly appraise his own and the others’
interests and contributions to their relationship. His knowledge must be not
only reasonably valid but also reasonably precise if he is to make any useful
assessment of whether he and the others involved in the exchange are each
obtaining outcomes from the exchange that are proportional to their relative
contributions/ Superimposed on this rational model of coming to an equity

judgment is a second rational model of how the individual will reduce the
distress of experienced inequity: namely, by choosing the mode of response
that has the highest expected utility in reducing the distress.
Despite its widespread acceptance in economic theory, the model of ra-
tional, economic man is clearly deficient. Human rationality is adversely
affected by limitations in human cognitive capabilities—for example, most
people cannot perform implicitly or explicitly the calculations that equity
theory assumes they make in order to form an equity judgment. In addition,
there is considerable evidence that rationality is limited and distorted by
characteristic human biases in decision making (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichten-
stein, 1977; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky,
1982).
Although equity theory assumes more human cognitive capacity than
appears warranted, it seems to have too simple a view of the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in assessing equity and in relieving the distress of inequity. As
Utne and Kidd (1980) and Cohen (1982) point out, the cognitive processes
involved in the attributions of cause and responsibility are central to under-
standing the conditions under which an exchange will be experienced as
inequitable as well as understanding the conditions under which the distress
of inequity will be reduced. Yet equity theorists have paid little attention to
such processes. For insightful discussions of attribution processes as they
relate to the perception of injustice, see the papers by Fltne and Kidd and by
Cohen.
The conception of justice implicit in equity theory. Equity theory assumes
that the universal value underlying systems of distributive justice is that
people believe that outcomes should be distributed among individuals in
proportion to their inputs or contributions. Various other social psychologi-
cal theorists (Sampson, 1969, 1975; Lerner, 1974, 1975; Lerner, Miller, and
Holmes, 1976; Leventhal, 1976a, 1976b; Deutsch, 1974; Mikula and
Schwinger, 1978) have indicated that equity is only one of many values that
underlie systems of distributive justice. Sampson (1975, 1980, 1981, 1983),
for example, has discussed the equity norm in a historical framework and
stresses that the implicit character or model of human functioning that is
required by equity theory may be dominant only for a particular sociohistoric
period and for a particular social class (the upper middle class) during that
period. He suggests that the emphasis on equity reflects a particular historical
and cultural pattern that presently dominates Western civilization, in particu-
lar the United States, with its capitalistic economic system. He argues that the
capitalistic system fosters such values as agency (instrumentalism, individual-
ism, and competition) which are conducive to an equity principle of justice.
Elsewhere (Deutsch, 1975, and subsequent chapters in this book), 1 have
6. Although Homans’s version of equity theory requires the people involved in an exchange
to make only ordinal comparisons, most of the other versions require the ability to make
cardinal, quantitative assessments.
30 THEORY
suggested that “need” may be the predominant value of distributive justice in

the family or other caring institutions, that “equality” may be the predomi-
nating value in friendships and other solidarity relationships, and that “win-
ner-takes-all” may be the key value in competitive relationships. I have also
hypothesized that “equity” tends to be the predominant value in impersonal,
economic relations. I have further suggested that, as more and more social
life comes under the sway of economic values in the large-scale industrial
societies, equity as a value becomes more and more applicable to noneco-
nomic relations. Although the process of casting diverse social relations into
an economic mold has gone quite far, it is a scientific error to believe that
economic values have always pervaded social relations and that they charac-
terize all social relations now.
It is only by stretching the concept of equity beyond recognizable and
reasonable bounds that equity can be considered to be the value underlying
the allocation of resources within a family—as, for example, when a family
spends a disproportionate share of its resources on an ill child. One can
stretch equity theory by asserting the inputs of all family members are equal
because they are all, equally, family members and the outcome of the ill child
is low because of his illness; hence to raise his outcome he deserves more
resources than the others. This kind of ad hoc stretching of the terms input
and outcome make them completely devoid of meaning. Beyond that, how-
ever, it assumes that the family members are making the sort of economic
calculations presupposed by the theory and that they view the family rela-
tions as similar to a market exchange. Although there can be heuristic value
even in inappropriate images or analogies, the danger of conceiving of per-
sonal relations in terms appropriate to marketplace exchanges is that it hast-
ens the depersonalization of personal relations by fostering the intrusion of
economic values into such relations.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
I have presented this detailed exposition and critique of equity theory because
of its importance; not only has it had a major influence in social psychology
but it reflects the dominant ideology with regard to distributive justice in
Western society. It was the clear starting point of theorizing and research in
the social psychology of justice and has been a dominant influence on work
in this area. Although it has been much criticized in recent years, it is appro-
priate to recognize its extraordinary stimulative value to research and the
unusual research creativeness of its adherents. As a reflection of the dominant
ideology in Western society, it warrants detailed examination.
CHAPTER THREE
Distributive Justice
More Broadly Conceived
Until recently, the research literature of psychology that dealt with justice
was largely dominated by equity theory. This focus was natural in a society
in which economic values tend to pervade all aspects of social life. Neverthe-
less, it is a limiting perspective, since it is obvious that issues of justice may
arise in noneconomic social relations (for example, between parent and child)
and may be decided in terms of values that are unrelated to input-output
ratios. In this chapter, I shall present a broader social psychological perspec-
tive on distributive justice. In addition, I shall consider three basic distributive
values—equity, equality, and need—and discuss what determines which
value will be used as a basis of distributive justice.
THE CONCEPT OE JUSTICE
Broadly viewed, the concept of distributive justice is concerned with the

distribution of the conditions and goods that affect individual well-being. I
use well-being broadly to include its psychological, physiological, economic,
and social aspects. The sense of injustice with regard to the distribution of
benefits and harms, rewards and costs, or other things that affect individual
well-being may be directed at (1) the nature of the good or harm being
distributed; (2) the roles involved in the distribution process; (3) the styling
and timing of the distribution; (4) the value underlying the distribution; (5)
the rules or criteria employed to represent the values; (6) the measurement
procedures used to implement the criteria; and (7) the way decisions are
made about any of the foregoing.
1. Injustice in relation to the nature of the good or harm being distrib-
uted. There are a great variety of goods and harms that get distributed:
Adapted from “Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as
the Basis for Distributive Justice?” Journal of Social Issues 31, no. 3 (1975): 137—50.
31
32 THEORY
abuse, affection, dirty work, education, grades, honors, medical care, money,
office, ostracism, power, property, punishment, transplants, and so on. As
several moral philosophers (for example, Rescher, 1966; Galston, 1980; and
Walzer, 1983) have indicated, there is no reason to believe that the canons of
distributive justice are the same for different types of goods or harms. Injus-
tice may occur when an inappropriate distribution value is applied to a given
social good, as, for example, when “merit” is involved in the distribution of
welfare or basic education or medical care or when “need” is employed for
the distribution of honors or office.
It also can arise when the type of good being distributed is inappropriate
to the social relation. Although there is as yet no satisfactory system of
classifying the various sorts of distributive goods and harms, Foa and Foa
(1974, 1980) have grouped the resources distributed through interpersonal
encounters into six categories: love, status, information, money, tangible
goods, and services. They have suggested that the resources differ from one
another along two major dimensions: particularism (“love” is high while
“money” is low in this dimension) and concreteness (“goods” and “services”
are high while “information” and “status” are low in this dimension). Their
research has indicated that dissimilar types of resources are not likely to be
viewed as exchangeable. Thus, to offer only money for someone’s love is an
unfair exchange: the lack of reciprocation of love will be injurious to the
self-esteem of the one offering it and this will not be compensated for by the
receipt of money; the one offering money will receive fraudulent love and,
hence, will have gotten very little value for his money.
Injustice occurs not only with regard to the type of good being distributed
but also with regard to its quality. A common form of such injustice has to
do with fraudulent goods: the good being distributed is not what it is repre-
sented to be. Fraudulence can occur with regard to any of the six categories
of Foa and Foa: money (a bad check); information (lies or misinformation);
tangible goods (a “Picasso” painting done by an imitator); services (an auto
mechanic does not do the repairs for which he was paid); status (a Ph.D. is
awarded by an institution that is not accredited); and love (the expression of
love as a means of manipulating the other).
Injustice can also occur in relation to the quantity of the good or harm
being distributed: the punishment may not fit the crime, being too lenient or
too harsh; an honor may be too much or too little for an achievement; a
worker may be overpaid or underpaid; and so on.
2. Injustice of the roles involved in the distribution process. Injustice
can arise because the roles involved in the distribution process are not filled
by appropriately qualified people. Thus, if an important literary prize is
awarded by a committee composed of people not competent to make liter-
ary judgments, or if admissions to medical school are determined by a
capricious clerk in the admissions office, or if the grading of term papers is
done by teaching assistants who do not know the course subject matter,
then justice is not likely to ensue. Similarly, one’s sense of injustice is apt to
be stimulated if one considers the procedures in deciding who should be in
Distributive Justice More Broadly Conceived 33
the allocator role to be poor ones—that is, the procedures do not reasona-
bly assure competence, personal disinterestedness, and lack of bias among
those selected for this role.
3. Injustice in relation to the styling and timing of the distribution. The
sense of injustice can be elicited or intensified by the timing of a distribution
of a social good or harm: the honor is too long delayed in relation to the
achievement or the punishment is administered long after the crime has be-
come irrelevant. Also, a distribution process that is shrouded in secrecy en-
courages the suspicion that the secrecy is hiding something that would arouse
dissent or disagreement if it were revealed; it stimulates doubts about the
justice of the distribution as well as the justice of the procedures employed.
4. Injustice in relation to the values underlying the distribution. Let us
consider, for illustrative purposes, a dean who has to assign annual salary
increases among members of her faculty. There are various values she could
use as a basis for determining salary increases: “equality”—giving each fac-
ulty member an equal share of the total money available for increases;
“need”—-giving each a salary increase that is related to the professor’s need
for the money; “equity” or “merit”—giving each an increase that is related to
the value of the faculty member to his university; “marketability”—giving
each an increase that is related to the salary the faculty member could get in a
position elsewhere; and so on. Suppose the dean decides to assign salary
increases on the basis of equity or merit. This value, itself, may become the
focus of perceived injustice—not only by the faculty members who are disad-
vantaged by it but also by others who prefer that increases be assigned
according to different values.
5. Injustice of rules. Even if, by rare circumstance, the faculty and the
dean completely agree on the values to be employed in assigning salary
increases (the conditions under which this is likely to occur will be considered
later), there may be lack of agreement on how these principles should be
operationalized. What should be the rules or criteria for defining “equality,”
“need,” “merit,” and so on? Thus, suppose “need” is the agreed-upon value,
how shall it be measured—by the number of people dependent on the faculty
member’s salary? By his total, unreimbursed expenses during the prior year?
Should it take into account other sources of income? Or suppose “merit” is
the accepted distribution principle. Should it be assessed by the number and
quality of publications in the preceding year? By student ratings of his teach-
ing? By peer judgments of his contributions to his area of specialization?
Should “merit” be operationalized as an increase in merit over the preceding
year or as accumulated merit? “Equal shares” is often easier to operationalize
than other values when there is a specified quantity of a social good to
distribute, but it is not unambiguous: Should the salary increases be distrib-
uted so that everyone gets the same dollar amount, or should they be distrib-
uted so that each gets an equal percentage raise and those with higher prior
salaries would get a higher dollar amount?
From this incomplete listing of different rules or criteria that could be
used to define the various distributive principles, it is evident that there is
34 THEORY
considerable ambiguity in the meaning of the different principles. The sense

of injustice in a given distributive system may focus not so much on the
underlying distributive value such as “merit” but on how “merit” is defined
in the particular system.
6. Injustice of measurement procedures. The sense of injustice may be
aroused by the implementation of the accepted rules for defining the chosen
distributive principle. The implementation of thex criteria, the measurement,
may be invalid, unreliable, or insensitive. Let us suppose, for instance, that
“scholarly merit” has been selected as the distributive principle for faculty
salary increases and that it is defined in terms of “number and quality of
publications during the preceding year.” Although “quality” seems to raise
measurement problems, “quantity”—at first glance—appears easy to mea-
sure: just count. But do you count each publication, in a different journal, of
a different version of essentially the same article? Does a brief article have the
same weight as a long one? Does an orally presented paper count as a
publication? Does a paper in a nonrefereed journal count? Clearly, the prob-
lems involved in the measurement of the “quality” of publications are even
greater.
Measurement is often a difficult and complex procedure in which the
objective of a relevant, unbiased, consistent, representative, and sensitive
measurement is rarely fully attained. To the extent that it is not, someone
who has been disadvantaged by the measurement may feel that he has been
appraised unfairly.
7. Injustice of decision-making procedures. Finally, even if a professor
feels that he has been benefited by the dean’s procedure for assigning salary
increases (he has gotten a good one), he may feel an injustice in the proce-
dures by which the values, rules, or specific salary increases were determined.
He may believe that the faculty rather than the dean should select the princi-
ples and rules for assigning salary increases and should, through its represen-
tatives, also make the actual assignments. In his view, the injustice lies in the
methods by which the decisions are made rather than in the substance of the
decisions.
Much social psychological research would suggest that the last-men-
tioned type of injustice is the most fundamental. The research to which I am
referring indicates that people are more apt to accept decisions and their
consequences if they have participated in making them. Although participa-
tion in the decisions that affect one’s well-being helps to legitimize such
decisions, particularly in a society with democratic values, this is by no
means the only source of legitimacy for the decision-making procedures
involved in the distribution of benefits and harms. Legitimacy can also be
derived from such factors as tradition, authority, or respect for the decision
maker’s expertness or power. However, whenever it is perceived that the
decision-making procedures are themselves not legitimately based, then the
values, rules, and specific practices in distributing rewards and costs will all
come into question.
Procedural Justice
“Procedural justice,” as traditionally conceived, refers to the fairness of the

various procedural components of the system that regulates the distributive
process. It includes not only what I have included under the above heading of
“Injustice of decision-making procedures” but also much of what has been
considered under “the roles involved in the distribution process,” “the styling
and timing of the distribution,” “the rules or criteria employed to represent
the values,” and “the measurement criteria used to implement the criteria.”
Procedural justice is a key aspect of distributive justice, and it is reasonable to
believe that the sense of injustice is more often aroused by complaints about
the procedures involved in a distributive process than about the distributive
values governing it: the distributive values are commonly taken for granted
while the procedures are not.
Despite its importance, I shall not consider procedural justice further. My
theoretical and empirical work in the area of distributive justice has focused
primarily on distributive values, not procedure. For social psychological dis-
cussions of procedural justice, see Thibaut and Walker (1975), Leventhal,
Karuza, and Fry, (1980), Leventhal (1980), and Lerner and Whitehead (1980).
The Natural Values of Justice
In the first chapter, I listed a number of values that have been identified in
scholarly writings as underlying distributive justice. Many more distributive
principles could be listed. It is clear that the different canons of distributive
justice will often be in conflict with one another in any given distributive
situation. Among the many conflicting values for defining justice, are there
any that have a claim for an inherent or natural priority? Is there anything in
the nature of individuals in society that connects justice to one rather than
another set of values so that people will always react with a sense of injustice
until the social order exemplifies these values of natural justice? Such ques-
tions as these have preoccupied scholars throughout history, and so far no
completely satisfying answer has been given.
I believe that there is no simple, satisfactory answer to such questions.
Justice is complex and variable: the canons of justice that are appropriate to
one type of social good in a particular social situation may be inappropriate
to another type or to the same type in a different situation.
The concept of justice is intrinsically concerned with both individual well-
being and societal functioning. The “natural values of justice” are thus the
values that foster effective social cooperation to promote individual well-
being. Flere, I am using the term cooperation broadly to include working out
ways of not interfering with or bothering one another and also developing
accepted procedures for engaging in conflict and competition.
It is evident that the specific ways of interrelating so as to foster social
cooperation most effectively to promote individual well-being (and, in my
36 THEORY
view, a “just world” will do this) depend upon the external circumstances
confronting the group and upon the specific characteristics of the individuals
composing it. Thus, the distributive values operative in a just world will and
should depend upon circumstances. Under some conditions, distributing re-
wards according to individual need will be more just; under other conditions,
allocating in terms of individual productivity will be more just. Similarly, the
use of group quotas may be viewed as an unjusE practice when it is used to
exclude and thus to discriminate against members of disadvantaged groups,
but it may be considered a desirable practice when it is used to include, and
to prevent continued discrimination against, a group that has been previously
subjected to bias.
The foregoing is not meant to imply that justice is completely situational.
There are undoubtedly some minimal conditions of individual well-being and
human dignity that are necessary to sustain continued cooperative participa-
tion in a group’s activities, and vice versa. The standards for determining
minimality are both absolute and relative: an individual can survive physi-
cally with a certain minimum of food and shelter but, perhaps, not psycho-
logically if that minimum is below the socially defined level of “livability.”
Similarly, the minimum standards for human dignity and the will to live
competently are both absolute and relative: an individual can tolerate only a
certain degree of inconsistency, rejection, isolation, abuse, or terror from his
group before he no longer will be willing or competent to cooperate; his
threshold of tolerance for such practices will undoubtedly decrease if he sees
that others are not treated similarly.
Earlier, I proposed that justice requires effective social cooperation. There
are undoubtedly some minimal conditions of social order and group integrity
that are necessary to individual well-being and human dignity. Famine, thiev-
ery, civil disorder, and violence are often prevalent in societies that are char-
acterized by lack of planning, ineffectual leadership, chaotic organization,
poorly developed communication networks, and insufficient allocation of
resources to the development and utilization of its productive capabilities.
Just as one finds that emotional stress and disturbances are most prevalent in
those areas of society that are the most neglected and most poorly organ-
ized—that is, among the old, the poor, the victimized—so one would expect
that physical disorder and emotional disturbances would be most prevalent in
ineffectual, disorganized societies.
The Scope of Justice
My preceding discussion has limited the concept of justice so that it is appli-

cable only to social relations or social systems in which there is perceived to
be at least a minimal degree of actual, normatively expected, or potential
cooperation. Thus, unless one shares Albert Schweitzer’s reverence for all
living creatures, one would not feel it to be unjust if one killed an annoying
mosquito or caught a fish to eat for dinner. Similarly, justice is not involved
in relations with others—such as heathens, “inferior races,” heretics, “per-
verts”—who are perceived to be outside one’s potential moral community or

opposed to it. An implication of this line of reasoning is that the narrower
one’s conception of one’s community, the narrower will be the scope of
situations in which one’s actions will be governed by considerations of jus-
tice. It has been reported that Eichmann, a mass murderer of Jews in the Nazi
era, was a good family man. Similarly, the New England captains of the ships
that raided the African coasts for slaves and transported them to the Ameri-
cas under the most brutal conditions were commonly leaders of their local
churches.
On the other hand, if one takes all mankind as one’s community, it is
evident that the scope of the applicability of one’s concept of justice will be
wide—as wide as those advanced by the many moral philosophers who have
written from a universalistic rather than parochial perspective. A still wider
scope of applicability is inherent, as I have suggested above, in the Schweitzer-
ian reverence for life. The widest scope is perhaps the one contained in the
perspective that views all of nature as one community.
Cooperation and Justice
Is it unduly limiting to restrict the concept of justice to situations in which

there is at least a minimal degree of actual or potential cooperation? Cannot
injustice occur even in bitter combat between deadly enemies? In my view, it
can occur in such a situation only if the enemies exist within a community
that has defined the rules and procedures for the conduct of the strife, as, for
example, in a duel of honor. The broader community may feel that the way
the struggle is being conducted may threaten general well-being or undermine
values that are important to the maintenance of the community.
To sum up so far, the concept of justice is concerned with the distribution
of the conditions and goods that affect the well-being of the individual mem-
bers of a group or community. The essential values of justice are those values
that foster effective social cooperation to promote individual well-being. It is
evident that particular sociohistorical circumstances will play a role in deter-
mining the individual and social effectiveness of the many possible alternative
values that could be employed as a basis for the distribution of benefits and
harms. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly minimal conditions of individual
well-being and dignity that are essential to effective social cooperation as well
as minimal conditions of social order and coherence that are necessary to
individual well-being. The sense of injustice can be aroused in relation to the
values underlying the distribution of benefits and harms, the rules by which
the values are operationalized, the implementation of the rules, or the pro-
cedures for determining which values, rules, or practices shall be employed.
The scope of applicability of one’s concepts of justice is determined by the
scope of one’s perceived community.
Three basic questions emerge from these considerations. What conditions
determine which values will be employed as the basis of justice? What deci-
sion-making procedures about values, rules, implementation, and so on are
38 THEORY
likely to be accepted as just? What factors affect the scope of justice? I will
here consider the first question only.
Determinants of the Value Base
Lerner (1974), Leventhal (1976b, 1980), and Sampson (1975, 1980) have
indicated that there are a variety of principles or values that can be used as a
basis for distributing outcomes, and they have stated a number of hypotheses
about the conditions that give rise to the different values. I have proposed
(Deutsch, 1973) similar ideas. Namely:
• In cooperative relations in which economic productivity is a primary goal,
equity rather than equality or need will be the dominant principle of dis-
tributive justice.
• In cooperative relations in which the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable
social relations is the common goal, equality will be the dominant principle
of distributive justice.
• In cooperative relations in which the fostering of personal development and
personal welfare is the common goal, need will be the dominant principle of
distributive justice.
I shall outline briefly the theoretical underpinnings of these propositions:

1. In cooperative relations in which economic productivity is a primary
goal, equity rather than equality or need will be the dominant principle of
distributive justice. The rational allocation of resources to achieve desired
ends, given a condition of scarcity such that not all desired ends can be
achieved by the available means, results in a competition among ends for the
available limited means. In a cooperative system that is trying to maximize
production, the end that can produce the highest return from the use of a
given means should be assigned that means. By similar reasoning, one could
deduce that a person who can more effectively utilize a given scarce resource
as a means of production than another person should have greater claim to
its use. Assigning scarce resources of production to those most able to use
them is likely to result in the largest production and is socially equitable in
the sense that those who receive the largest input of resources from a co-
operative system should be the ones who produce the largest amount for that
system.
This turns the usual equity formulation upside down. The input to the
individual is of resources of production and his output to the system consists
of activities involved in producing things of intrinsic value (consumer goods)
or of instrumental value (economic goods or means of production). The usual
equity formulation states a proportionality between the individual’s outcome
of rewards and costs (that is, of things of intrinsic value) and his inputs or
contributions of assets or liabilities. The implication in the customary formu-
lation is that the individual’s relative input to the group outcome will deter-
mine his relative share of it (to each according to his contribution). The
present formulation suggests that in pure, self-contained cooperative systems
a person’s share of economic goods should be determined by his relative skill

in using such goods for the commonweal and that he should share in the
consumer goods with others according to his need when there are sufficient
consumer goods to satisfy the legitimate needs; equality should be employed
in distributing the surplus beyond “needs.The needs arising from different
occupations and positions in a society may, of course, vary considerably; a
head of government may require more consumer goods (with regard to ac-
commodations, communication, travel, entertainment, and so on) to carry
out all the responsibilities of his office than does a letter carrier. Here, I am
referring to the requisites rather than the perks of position.
The assumption underlying the customary formulation is that people will
be unwilling to make relatively high inputs unless they can look forward to
relatively high individual outcomes. Presumably, their reluctance is based in
part on some inherent notion of what is fair and unfair: it is unfair for
someone to get either more or less than his contribution deserves. Sometimes
the fairness rationale for greater compensation to those who contribute more
is based on the view that the costs are higher to higher contributors: their
work involves more responsibility and hence, stress. To the extent that this
perspective is involved, “need” rather than “contribution” is being used as
the value justifying the distribution; they need more compensation so as to
have the material comforts necessary to provide buffers against the stress
involved in their productive activities. Another related “fairness” rationale is
that the better contributors have worked harder or longer than the lesser
contributors. The latter have chosen to work at a more leisurely pace or have
chosen to work less and have more leisure; hence, the former should be
compensated for their loss of leisure. Here the underlying value justifying
higher compensation for higher contributions is “equality” rather than “eq-
uity”: to equalize the rewards of those who work harder and forgo the
rewards of leisure, they should receive higher pay. Sometimes the rationale
for higher compensation to those who contribute more centers on the notion
that those with high ability, talent, or special gifts deserve more than those
who are not so fortunate because their talents are a sign of divine favor. This
is a view more likely to be accepted by those who are gifted.
Mostly, the rationale for higher compensation to those who contribute
more rests on the assumption that, in a free, mobile labor market, higher
contributors or those with more talent can sell their labor for a higher price
than those who are less capable and that they will withhold or not make their
full contributions unless they are paid its full or fair market value. The notion
that “labor” is a “commodity” and that its fair value is ascertainable because
there is a “free market” for labor which impartially sets the market price for
different qualities and quantities of labor has been repeatedly questioned and
challenged. Challengers have questioned the intellectual appropriateness of
the free market image. Labor is not like other commodities; it is inseparably
1. See chapter 16 for a discussion of allocation principles when there is not a sufficient
amount to satisfy needs.
40 THEORY
linked to a person who cannot be bought or sold or used without regard to

his rights as a person, and the market is by no means free (for example, the
mobility of workers is limited; buyers, or employers, have a market advan-
tage over sellers, or workers, because there are relatively few buyers com-
pared to sellers, and so on). Further, the great inherent difficulties of assess-
ing the relative contributions to society of people within different occupations
(sanitation worker, mathematician, nurse, teacher, artist, housewife-mother)
suggests that the assignment of a monetary value to their work is more a
matter of social convention than of economic rationality. Beyond all the
foregoing, there is little evidence to support the underlying assumption that
people labor primarily or only for economic gain.
Additionally, some moral philosophers have questioned the appropriate-
ness of paying more to those who are more capable simply because they can
command a higher market price for their labor. Several ethical systems would
not consider it fair for someone to be given a relatively greater or smaller
reward simply because he possesses greater resources for contributing to the
group’s productivity. Such systems assume that it is the obligation of all
members to contribute as fully as they can, and if they do so, they are all
entitled to equal shares or to shares that are proportionate to their needs.
What, then, gives the individual who contributes more to a group’s prod-
uct the seeming legitimacy for a greater share of the group’s economic re-
wards? Much research has documented this legitimacy (Walster et ah, 1973;
Adams and Freedman, 1976; Leventhal, 1976a, 1976b), and everyday obser-
vation is consistent with this research. The question has two related answers.
Inherent in economic rationality is a tendency for economic values to spread
throughout a culture with the consequence that people come to be regarded
primarily in terms of their economic utility (Diesing, 1962). The evaluation of
people in terms of their usefulness leads to the view that it is more optimal
economically to compensate more those who are more rather than less useful.
A second basis of the legitimatization of differential rewards for differential
contributions inheres in the potential power available to those who have the
capability of contributing much to the group’s welfare. They may be tempted
to use their superior productivity to obtain power over other group members
and over the group decision-making processes. Under some conditions, such
attempts will be successful and will enable those who succeed to determine
what principle of justice will be employed in allocating the group’s product.
It seems likely that those who have been tempted to accumulate power will
find this version of the equity principle congenial to their interests since it can
be readily interpreted to justify greater rewards to those who have greater
power.
To recapitulate, it is suggested that if a cooperative system is oriented
toward increasing its economic productivity, its rational tendency will be to
allocate its economic functions and goods to use them effectively, but to
allocate its rewards (consumer goods) according to need or equality (if more
than a bare necessity is available). However, it is also suggested that inherent
pathologies in the extension of economic values throughout a society or in
the temptation to accumulate personal power may give rise to an equity

principle that allocates economic rewards and political power as well as
economic functions and goods to those who appear to contribute the most to
the group. This equity principle, over the long run, is likely to be dysfunc-
tional for groups, economically as well as socially. Economically, by allocat-
ing rewards and power disproportionately, it enables those who are in power
to bias the system of allocation to perpetuate their disproportionate rewards
and power even when they are no longer making relatively large contribu-
tions to the group’s well-being. Socially, it tends to foster the introduction of
economic values in all aspects of social life with a resultant loss to the quality
of life. As Diesing has written: “A person becomes alienated from his posses-
sions and creations when he learns to regard them as utilities which have
value because other people desire them; he becomes alienated from other
people when they are perceived as competing with him for scarce goods; and
he becomes alienated from himself when he sees his own value as a utility
based on the desires of others” (1962, p. 93).
2. In cooperative relations in which the fostering or maintenance of en-
joyable social relations is a primary emphasis, equality will be the dominant
principle of distributive justice. An enjoyable social relation presupposes that
one feels respected and esteemed by the other persons involved in the rela-
tionship; and if the primary purpose of the relationship is its intrinsic enjoy-
ment, then mutual esteem is a necessary condition for its survival. I suggest
that allocation of economic rewards and political power according to the
principle of equity tends to be disruptive of social relations because it under-
mines the bases for mutual respect and self-respect necessary for enjoyment
of such relations. It does this by signifying that the different participants in
the relationship do not have the same value. A relatively low evaluation may
lead to envy, self-devaluation, or conflict over the valuations—all of which
may destroy the enjoyability of the relationship for those who are favored by
equitable allocations as well as those who are not. Moreover, respect and
esteem are more valuable if they are received from those whom one respects;
equal status relations represent the optimum distribution of status for the
mutual support of self-esteem. Thus, the principle of equality is more congen-
ial to the fostering of enjoyable, personal relations. It supports the basis for
mutual respect that underlies such relations, and it does not evoke the dele-
terious emotions that undermine them.
The concept of equality has been discussed extensively by moral and
political philosophers (Berlin, 1955—56; Tawney, 1964; McCloskey, 1966;
Wilson, 1966; Benn, 1967; Pennock and Chapman, 1967; Oppenheim,
1968; Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b; and Walzer, 1983). In the vast
literature dealing with equality, it is defined in various ways. I shall not
attempt to summarize or critically examine this literature. My sense of it is
that advocates of equality and egalitarianism are primarily opposed to invid-
ious distinctions among people but do not assume that all distinctions are
invidious. Invidious distinctions are ones that promote (1) generalized or
irrelevant feelings of superiority-inferiority (if I am a better tennis player or
42 THEORY
more good-looking than you, I am superior to you as a person); (2) general-

ized or irrelevant status differences (if I am a manager and you are a worker
in a factory, I should have a higher standard of living than you); (3) general-
ized or irrelevant superordinate-subordinate relations (if 1 am a captain and
you are a private, I can order you to shine my shoes); or (4) the view that the
legitimate needs and interests of some people are not as important or do not
warrant as much consideration as those of other people (this may be because
of my sex, race, age, national or family origin, religion, political affiliation,
occupation, or physical handicap, or because of special talents or lack of
talent).
From an egalitarian perspective, one is not making an invidious distinc-
tion and thus creating inequality when one recognizes, approves, applauds,
honors, or shows appreciation of an unusually good performance, of a coura-
geous action, or of a well-accomplished difficult task. Equality does not
imply identical treatment of everyone without regard to particular circum-
stance. Honoring another’s performance does not diminish those who are not
honored unless they consider themselves to be in a competitive or zero-sum
relationship; if they view themselves as part of a cooperative community,
they are enhanced by another’s honor. The insistence on treating people
identically, without regard to circumstance, is a pseudoegalitarianism, which
often masks basic doubts or ambivalence about one’s commitment to egali-
tarian values.
Equality frequently is based on a sense of the equal, divine value of every
person. It implies a deliberate avoidance of generalized, situationally irrele-
vant evaluative comparisons of people with the purpose of keeping invidious
distinctions to a minimum. The desire to keep such distinctions to a mini-
mum will vary with social conditions. Here, I am proposing that the desire
will be particularly strong in solidarity-oriented groups.
3. In cooperative relations in which the fostering of personal develop-
ment and personal welfare is the primary goal, need will be the dominant
principle of distributive justice. The duty to help another who is in need or in
jeopardy, providing one can do so without excessive loss or risk to oneself, is,
as Rawls has pointed out, one of the natural duties of the members of a
group: “In each single instance the gain to the person who needs help far
outweighs the loss of those required to assist him” (1971, p. 338). As Rawls
suggests, the primary value of the principle is not measured by the help we
might receive if we were in need or danger but rather by the sense of confi-
dence and trust in other people’s good intentions. It is hard to conceive that a
group could be regarded as cooperative if it were publicly known that the
duty to help another who was in need or danger was rejected by its members.
It is evident that the duty to help another is intensified in relation to those
for whose personal development and welfare we are responsible, such as
those who are considered to be legitimately dependent upon us. It is also
intensified in groups and institutions that have as a primary concern the
personal development and welfare of their members or charges—the family,
hospitals, schools, and so on. Hence, we are more likely to follow the princi-
pie of need than that of equality or equity in allocating resources in such

relations. More of the family resources will be spent on a sick child than on a
well one; a critically ill patient will draw more attention from hospital per-
sonnel than a not-so-ill one; and so on.
To allocate resources equally or according to the relative contributions of
its members rather than according to need would obviously be disruptive of
any group that has a primary concern for the development and welfare of its
members. It is apparent that individual needs fluctuate, and it is unlikely that
the needs of members will always be equal to one another or proportionate
to their relative contributions. Thus, if at a particular time an individual has a
need that is important to his survival, development, or well-being, he must
have access to the resources for satisfying his need independently of whether
doing so is socially equitable or equal in the short run. If he does not, he may
suffer an irremediable harm or loss. If he does suffer such a harm, this would
be obviously detrimental to the group’s concern about his well-being and also
detrimental to his future ability to participate in the group as a competent
member.
“Need” and “equality” as distributive values are closely linked and some-
times not distinguished. It is commonly assumed that individuals, equally,
deserve the basic human goods that are required to fulfill their fundamental
needs; they do not have to earn them. As Galston indicates, “the moral force
of need-claims is highly insensitive to differences among individuals, although
the content of justified need-claims will of course reflect these differences”
(1980, p. 170).
Galston defines needs as “the means required for the attainment of urgent
ends that are widely if not universally desired” (p. 163). He indicates that one
has a need for something if it is objectively required either for the mainte-
nance of one’s life or for the adequate development of one’s capacities. He
distinguishes material needs from social needs that are produced by social
conventions, and these are distinguished from luxury needs which exceed the
requirements of natural needs; all may be urgently wanted by the individual
but only natural needs have a moral priority.
It is evident that the concept of need has many ambiguities; it is often
difficult or impossible to specify what is objectively required for the mainte-
nance of life (for example, how to prevent premature death from cancer) or
the development of one’s capacities. This is true when considering need at the
personal level of providing the necessities for nutrition, shelter, medical care,
and so on, but it is even more true when considering need at the communal
or societal level; for example, what is needed to produce and distribute the
social goods that are involved in supplying individuals with adequate nutri-
tion, shelter, and medical care? In addition to the ambiguities, problems arise
in applying need as a distributive value in connection with establishing priori-
ties when all legitimate needs cannot be satisfied; for example, which capaci-
ties are more important to develop when not all capacities can be developed
fully with the available resources? which people should be given priority
when the needs of all people cannot be met? Despite the ambiguities and
44 THEORY
problems, there are many situations in which it is not difficult to identify that
some people have legitimate, urgent needs that are not being met while others
do not; in such situations, the application of the distributive value of need
would not be problematic.
Our discussion has suggested that the tendency ^ for economically oriented
groups will be to use the principle of equity, for solidarity-oriented groups to
use the principle of equality, and for caring-oriented groups to use the princi-
ple of need as the basic value underlying the system of distributive justice.
Most actual groups have more than one orientation, and insofar as they do,
they will experience conflict between them unless they can segregate the
contexts and situations in which the different orientations come into play or
unless they can make one orientation dominant over the others.
When is one orientation rather than another likely to predominate in a
group or social system? Let me offer a very crude and tentative hypothesis
which I have developed in a different context—the explanation of the deter-
minants of constructive and destructive processes of conflict resolution
(Deutsch, 1973; see also chapter 5). The hypothesis is that the typical conse-
quences of a given type of social relation tend to elicit that relation.
Among the typical consequences of an economic orientation (Diesing,
1962) are (1) the development of a set of values that include maximization, a
means-end schema, neutrality or impartiality with regard to means, and com-
petition; (2) the turning of man and everything associated with him into
commodities—including labor, time, land, capital, personality, social rela-
tions, ideas, art, and enjoyment; (3) the development of measurement proce-
dures that enable the value of different amounts and types of commodities to
be compared; and (4) the tendency for economic activities to expand in scope
and size. The crude hypothesis advanced above would imply that if a social
situation were characterized by impersonality, competition, maximization, an
emphasis on comparability rather than uniqueness, largeness in size or scope,
and so on, then an economic orientation and the principle of equity are likely
to be dominant in the group or social system. Specific experimental hypo-
theses could readily be elaborated: the more competitive the people are in a
group, the more likely they are to use equity rather than equality or need as
the principle of distributive justice; the more impersonal the relations of the
members of a group are, the more likely they are to use equity; and so forth.
In the same manner, one could detail the typical consequences of a soli-
darity-oriented group or society. These include (1) the development of a set
of values that emphasizes personal ties to other group members, group loy-
alty, mutual respect, personal equality, and cooperation; (2) uniqueness of
attachments to people, activities, and objects associated with the group so
that they are unexchangeable and therefore of absolute value; and (3) the
development of integrative procedures to reduce role conflicts, misunder-
standing, and other sources of interpersonal hostility within the group. With
such typical consequences in mind, one could elaborate a variety of experi-
mental hypotheses: the more face-to-face contact that members of a group

have, provided none of them is considered to be in a dependent status, the
more likely they are to use equality rather than equity or need, the greater the
degree of friendship that exists within the group, the more likely they are to
use equality; and so on.
The caring and the solidarity orientations have much in common and
both differ in similar ways from the economic orientation. However, the
caring orientation is characterized by a more direct and explicit responsibility
for the fostering of the personal development and personal welfare of others
in the group. Additionally, the caring relationship may involve dependents of
unequal status as well as others of equal status. Typical consequences of a
caring orientation include: (1) the development of a set of values that stresses
responsibility for the other, permissiveness toward the other’s expression of
his needs, heightened sensitivity to the other’s needs and stage of develop-
ment, support and nurturance in relation to the other’s legitimate needs, and
nonreciprocity in relation to the other’s hostility as he suffers frustrations
during the caring relationship; and (2) the development of intimate ties which
may reflect and express one’s own early experiences in caring relationships.
Thus, experimentally, one would predict that heightening the salience of the
relative needs of group members, heightening the sense of responsibility in
relation to the needs of the others, and so on would lead to the use of need
rather than equality or equity as the principle of distributive justice.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the thesis of this chapter. Given the
nature of Western society, whose characteristics predispose it to have an
economic orientation, it has been natural for social psychologists to focus on
equity as the central principle of distributive justice. This is, however, too
limited a perspective. Equity is only one of the many possible principles of
distributive justice. I have here attempted to outline some of the issues relat-
ing to a broader conception of distributive justice and to discuss briefly the
question of what determines which of several basic principles of distributive
justice—equity, equality, and need—will be employed by a group.
CHAPTER FOUR
Awakening the Sense of Injustice
This chapter is concerned with the sense of injustice of the victim and the
victimizer. In it, I shall consider the conditions necessary for awakening the
sense of injustice in these different participants in an unjust relationship. My
discussion, for illustrative purposes, will focus on race relations in the United
States, one of the major sources of injustice in North America.
THE DIFFERENTIAL SENSITIVITY TO INJUSTICE OF THE

VICTIM AND THE VICTIMIZER
Bierce, in The Devil’s Dictionary, defined injustice as “a burden which of all

those that we load upon others and carry ourselves is lightest in the hands
and heaviest upon the back.” Everyday language, similarly, in referring to
injustice suggests that injustice is “suffered” by the victim, not the victimizer.
Although it may be morally “better to be sinned against than to sin” it is
generally accepted that the immediate pain is usually greater for the one who
is sinned against than for the sinner.
In this section, I wish to consider briefly why there is this asymmetry in
the sensitivity to injustice and also some of the circumstances in which the
asymmetry is reversed: where the victim identifies with the victimizer and
where the victimizer identifies with the victim. The explanation for the asym-
metry seems straightforward. The victims usually have relatively little power
compared to the victimizers; the latter are more likely to set the terms of their
relationship and, through their control of the state and other social institu-
tions, to establish the legal and other reigning definitions of justice.
Thus, the victimizers—in addition to their gains from their exploitative
actions—commonly have the reassurance of the official definitions of justice
and the support of such major social institutions as the church, the press, and
the schools to deaden their sensitivities to the injustices inherent in their
46
Awakening the Sense of Injustice 47
relations with the victim. The victim may, of course, be taken in by the
official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions
and, as a result, lose his sensitivity to his situation of injustice. However, the
victim is less likely than the victimizer to lose his sensitivity to injustice
because he is the one who is experiencing the negative consequences of the
injustice. He is also less likely to feel committed to the official definitions and
indoctrinations because of his lack of participation in creating them.
The explanation of the differential sensitivity in terms of differential gains
and differential power is not the complete story. There are, of course, rela-
tions in which the victimizer is not of superior power, and yet, even so, he
will not experience guilt for his actions. Consider a traffic accident in which a
car hits a pedestrian. The driver of the car will usually perceive the accident
so as to place responsibility for it upon the victim. Seeing the victim as
responsible will enable the driver to maintain a positive image of himself.
Projecting the blame on to the victim enables the victimizer to feel blameless.
If we accept the notion that most people try to maintain a positive con-
ception of themselves, we can expect a differential sensitivity to injustice in
those who experience pain, harm, or misfortune and those who cause it. If I
try to think well of myself, I shall minimize my responsibility for any injustice
that is connected with me or minimize the amount of injustice that has
occurred if I cannot minimize my responsibility. On the other hand, if I am
the victim of pain or harm, to think well of myself, it is necessary for me to
believe that it was not my due: it is not a just dessert for a person of my good
character. Thus, the need to maintain positive self-esteem leads to opposite
reactions in those who have caused an injustice and those who suffer from it.
Although the need to maintain a positive self-regard is common, it is not
universal. The victim of injustice, if he views himself favorably, may be
outraged by his experience and attempt to undo it; in the process of so doing,
he may have to challenge the victimizer. If the victimizer is more powerful
than he and has the support of the legal and other institutions of the society,
he will realize that it would be dangerous to act on his outrage or even to
express it. Under such circumstances, in a process that Anna Freud (1937)
labeled “identification with the aggressor,” the victim may control his dan-
gerous feelings of injustice and outrage by denying them and by internalizing
the derogatory attitudes of the victimizer toward himself.
Thus, he will become in Lewin’s terms (1935) a “self-hater” who attri-
butes blame for his victimization upon himself or his group. If he attributes
the blame to his group, he often will seek to dissociate himself from it and to
ingratiate himself with the victimizers in order to curry favor and avoid
blame. These reactions are defensive, and not uncommonly, the defenses are
directly inculcated by parents in their children. As Grier and Cobbs point
out: “Black mothers say as they punish rebellious sons: ‘I’d rather kill him
myself than let the white folks get him. He’s got to learn’ ” (1968, p. 172).
Such child-rearing practices among blacks are a residue from slavery, when
black children, in order to survive, had to be taught to view themselves as
worthy only to be a slave. Child-rearing practices are slow to change.
48 THEORY
Nevertheless, training for masochistic submission and for identification with

the oppressor seems less prevalent than it was earlier in this century. Blacks,
Jews, women, and other oppressed groups have begun to learn that they are
not as powerless and weak as they thought and that their psychological
situation is improved by teaching self-respect rather than self-abasement.
Just as the victim can identify with the oppressor, a member of the op-
pressing group can identify with the victim. There are political, social, and
psychological factors that predispose to an “identification with the under-
dog.” In a political struggle among different factions of a ruling group, one of
the factions may seek to increase its political power by obtaining the alle-
giance of an oppressed group, by identifying with its interests, and by using
the injustices perpetrated against it as a means of weakening the position of
the ruling clique and displacing it. Examples of this are legion in domestic
politics in the United States and elsewhere. Despite the political opportunism
which may give rise to identification with the underdog, it can heighten the
awareness of injustice among the oppressors by the increased political and
intellectual attention paid to it: injustice fares poorly in the spotlight.
Some clues as to the social factors that predispose to a sympathetic atti-
tude toward the underdog are revealed in White Attitudes toward Black
People (Campbell, 1971). Whites, in the United States, are more sympathetic
to blacks if: they were born in the East or West rather than in the South or
Midwest; they live in a city rather than on a farm or in a small town; their
ancestors were Irish or Italian rather than Polish; they are not religious or
Jewish rather than Catholic or Protestant; they have higher rather than lower
income; they went to college during the past twenty years rather than not
having gone to college at all or having gone at an earlier period. Least
favorable attitudes of whites toward blacks are found among whites who feel
a threat to their status, economic position, or general welfare from the ad-
vancement of blacks. Most favorable attitudes are found among those who
have relatively secure socioeconomic positions, have been exposed to the
influence of the social sciences during their college days, and have had non-
threatening equal-status contacts with blacks.
Although the findings just cited are in relation to white attitudes toward
black people, it seems to be more generally true that the willingness to
question and challenge the ideologies and practices of oppressive ruling
groups is more likely to rise from those: (1) whose social positions do not
make them feel threatened by advances of the oppressed group; (2) whose
ages and social positions are such that they are not deeply ensnared in the
existing organization of society; (3) whose backgrounds are such that they
have been sensitized to the meaning of injustice by having been exposed to
it as members of a minority group; and (4) whose education or social milieu
has revealed to them new modes of thinking about society that appear to
provide better .ways of organizing society than those traditionally supported.
As has been well documented, the typical revolutionary of the past two
centuries has been of middle-class origin, with better education than most,
often in a marginal social-economic position that is not commensurate with
his education, and frequently in a marginal ethnic group that has little
reason to feel a commitment to the traditional ideology and practices of the
dominant groups in the society.
Personality, as well as political opportunism and social position, can pre-
dispose to identification with the underdog. Christian Bay after surveying the
research literature on student activists and conformists came to the following
conclusions:
The more secure and sheltered a person’s infancy and childhood, and the
more freedom that educational and other social processes has given him to
develop according to his inner needs and potentialities, the more likely that a
capacity for political rationality and independence will develop, simply be-
cause the likelihood of severe anxieties is relatively low. In addition, the better
the individual has been able to resolve his own anxieties, the more likely that
he will empathize with others less fortunate than himself. A sense of justice as
well as a capacity for rationality is, according to this theory, a likely develop-
ment in relatively secure individuals, whose politics, if any, will therefore tend
toward the left—toward supporting the champions of the underdog, not the
defenders of established, always unjust, institutions. And young people, with
the proverbial impetuousness of youth, are likely to seek extremes of social
justice, or militant means, simply because their emotions, and more particu-
larly their sense of elementary morality and justice, have not yet been dulled
by daily compromises and defeats to the extent that most older persons’
emotions have done. (1967, p. 90)
Bales (1970) describes a somewhat different personality type that is also

characterized by identification with the underprivileged. This type is depicted
as a somewhat passive, likable individual who is concerned about the lack of
emotional supportiveness and warmth in his environment. He blames this on
an autocratic authority oriented toward power rather than nurturance. His
own aggression and power needs are inhibited except as they are indirectly
expressed in criticism and lack of trust of authority. His self-conception and
his conscious wishes toward the underprivileged are on the positive altruistic
side. In Bales’s terms, “He wants a bloodless revolution—a compassionate
reform” (p. 373). His vulnerability is his innocence—his innocence of his
own repressed aggressiveness toward authority and his innocence of the hos-
tility among the underprivileged. To foster greater egalitarianism in his soci-
ety, he may join with leadership of the radical Left and then be dismayed by
its aggressive, militant, and often autocratic character. Bales characterizes this
type of person as being relatively stable and mature, with a relatively low
sense of internal conflict.
Other, more pathological types of identification with the underdog, have
been described by psychoanalytically oriented writers. One type is character-
ized by a pervasive sense of guilt and deeply rooted masochistic tendencies
(Fenichel, 1945). When this type is at its most extreme, the person feels guilty
in relation to any injustice anywhere, and in an attempt to undo his guilt, he
sacrifices himself by identifying with the victims of injustice. The self-defeating,
pathological quality of this type is reflected in the person’s need to have the
50 THEORY
victim remain in a state of being victimized so that he can continue to feel

guilty and continue to sacrifice himself. Despite his outward sympathies, he is
neurotically attached to the status quo; social change would be threatening to
him.
Another type is the left-wing authoritarian personality (Adorno et ah,
1950). Like their right-wing counterparts, they perceive the world as made up
of a glorified in-group and despised out-groups,'hierarchically arranged by
power relationships. Unable to establish warm human relationships, they
adopt a moralistic condemnatory attitude toward those who differ with
them. The right-wing authoritarian takes the establishment as his in-group,
whereas the left-wing authoritarian takes the antiestablishment as his in-
group and reference group, which are often perceived to be the groups who
are oppressed by the establishment. The left-wing authoritarian is opposed to
social reforms that would lessen the degree of difference and opposition
between the haves and have-nots. His psychological interest lies not so much
in a just society as in rebelling against those in power as an end in itself or in
overthrowing them so that he could take their place as leader-father. The
pathology lies in the continuous need to rebel and in the need to replace one
form of authoritarianism with another: the needs of the oppressed group are
subordinated to these inner compulsions.
Conditions That Awaken and Intensify the Sensitivity to Injustice
In the social science literature, discussion of these conditions has centered

almost exclusively on the victim’s sense of injustice. Few attempts have been
made to understand the conditions that make the victimizer feel his actions
are unjust. I shall discuss both, with the realization that more is known about
the former than the latter.
The major explanatory theme advanced by social scientists for the sensi-
tivity to injustice among victims is that of deprivation. It is commonly as-
sumed that it is relative rather than absolute deprivation that is critical in
stimulating dissatisfaction. Research (see Crosby, 1982, for an excellent sum-
mary) has demonstrated that people who are well-off by absolute standards
may feel more discontent than those who are much worse off if they feel
relatively more deprived because their aspirations are high or they are sur-
rounded by people who are even more well-off than they are.
There are two somewhat different emphases in the usage of the term
relative deprivation. One, which comes from Lewin’s level of aspiration the-
ory (see Deutsch, 1968, for a summary), stresses the discrepancy between the
individual’s aspirations and his attainments. The other, derived from the
concept of reference groups developed by Hyman, Merton, and Stouffer (see
Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, for a summary), focuses upon the discrepancy
between the individual’s attainments and the attainments of others whom he
uses as references with which to compare himself. These two usages are not
contradictory, and, in fact, in Lewinian discussions of factors determining the
level of aspiration there is explicit mention of the standards of groups that an
individual employs for comparison; these standards, it is asserted, are derived

from the groups to which the individual belongs as well as other groups that
he employs as models for establishing standards.
Runciman (1966) has made a distinction between two types of relative
deprivation: egoistic and fraternal. Egoistical deprivation occurs when an
individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals; fraternal depriva-
tion occurs when a person feels his group is disadvantaged in relation to
another group. An individual may feel doubly deprived: as an individual and
as a group member. As Tajfel (1982) has pointed out, the two kinds of
deprivations have different implications for how an individual may improve
his situation. To remedy fraternal deprivation, social change (change in the
position of his group) is necessary; to remedy egoistic deprivation, only
change in his individual situation is entailed.
Consonant with the Lewinian tradition, I shall employ relative depriva-
tion to refer to the perceived discrepancy between what a person obtains and
what he believes he is entitled to obtain in the distribution of goods and
harms. The relative deprivation may be focused on something very specific
and temporary (such as how soon one is served in a restaurant) or something
as general as one’s life situation. It is useful to distinguish separate areas of
relative deprivation, since the individual’s sense of relative deprivation in one
area (for example, in relation to work, in relation to his family) may be
uncorrelated with what he feels in another area. The total amount of relative
deprivation that an individual experiences in any given area (such as work)
would be the weighted sum of the relative deprivation in each of the subareas
the person perceives to be relevant to evaluating his work situation (for
example, his salary, rate of promotion, work conditions, treatment by his
supervisor); each subarea would be weighted by its importance to the individ-
ual and by its salience. Importance can be defined as the strength of the
desire to get what one thinks one is entitled to in the given subarea. Salience
is the prominence of the subarea in one’s thinking. This is determined by its
relevance to the immediate situation and how much greater its magnitude of
relative deprivation is than the average relative deprivation in all subareas
(each being weighted by its importance).
One of the major determinants of the arousal of the sense of injustice in
any given area is the magnitude of relative deprivation in that area: the
greater the magnitude of relative deprivation the more likely and the more
intense will he the arousal of the sense of injustice. The intensity of the sense
of injustice is also undoubtedly influenced by the prior experience and future
anticipation of relative deprivation. I suggest that it will be more intense the
more sharply the relative deprivation has increased in the recent past and the
more sharply it is expected to increase in the future; it will be less intense the
more sharply it has decreased in the recent past and the more sharply it is
expected to decrease in the future. Thus, I propose that the sense of injustice
is determined by the perceived current magnitude of relative deprivation and
the perception of how it is changing.
I turn now to a consideration of some of the conditions that affect these
52 THEORY
perceptions. The magnitude of relative deprivation can be affected by influ-

encing any of its value components in any of several ways. One can influence
(1) what the individual believes he is entitled to with respect to that value, (2)
what he obtains of it, (3) its importance, and (4) its salience. It is evident that
relative deprivation can be increased by either increasing what the individual
perceives he has a right to or by decreasing what he gets. Similarly, the
intensity of the sense of injustice can be decreased either by increasing what a
person gets or by decreasing what he thinks he ought to receive. Also, by
increasing the perceived importance and salience of the values in which the
individual feels a discrepancy between what he is getting and what he is
entitled to, one can heighten his sense of injustice. I shall consider here only a
person’s conception of what he has a right to expect and obtain.
Conditions Affecting the Conception of What One Is Entitled To
An individual’s conception of what he is entitled to is determined by at least

five major kinds of influence: (1) the ideologies and myths about justice that
are dominant and officially supported in his society, (2) his amount of expo-
sure to ideologies and myths that conflict with those that are officially sup-
ported and are supportive of larger claims for him, (3) experienced changes in
his satisfactions-dissatisfactions, (4) his knowledge of what others who are
viewed as comparable to him are getting, and (5) his bargaining power.
The influence of ideologies and myths. The official ideology and myths of
any society help define and justify the values that are distributed to the
different positions within the society and, thus, codify for the individual what
a person in his position can legitimately expect. Examples are legion of how
official ideology and myth limit or enhance one’s views of what one is enti-
tled to. The American poor offer an instance of the potency of myth in
creating an identity that promotes docility in the face of deprivation (Edel-
man, 1971). Americans are taught by their schools, the mass media, and their
political rhetoric that America is the land of equal opportunity. Given such
pervasive indoctrination, the poor are apt to attribute their condition to their
own failings. This view of themselves as unworthy is further supported by.
cues from governmental practices toward them which place in question their
morality, ambition, and competence. As a result, the poor in America have
typically been meek and acquiescent, requiring less coercion and less in bene-
fits than has been true in other developed countries. Analogously, the ideol-
ogy and myth of white supremacy has led whites to expect that they are
entitled to deferential behavior from blacks and blacks to expect that they are
not entitled to equal treatment from whites. Similarly, men and women under
the influence of a sexist mythology and ideology have defined gender entitle-
ments that give the woman supremacy in the narrow confines of the kitchen
and the nursery while the men have supremacy in the broad world outside
the home as well as in many areas within it.
The weakening of official ideologies. It is difficult not to accept the official
myths and ideology of one’s society even if they are to one’s disadvantage
unless: (1) there is a breakdown of consensual norms and the inability or

unwillingness of the ruling elite to act in such a way as to restore these norms;
this is likely to occur during a period of rapid social change or intrasocietal
conflict, either of which could bring into question the legitimacy of traditional
myths and values; (2) there is a failure of the society to deliver the entitlements
that it has defined as legitimate for one’s position so that the magnitude of
one’s relative deprivation is increased; this could be due to natural or social
disasters that worsen the conditions of daily life; or (3) there is exposure to
new ideologies and new examples that are accepted as legitimate by many
people, which stimulate consciousness of new and better possibilities for one-
self; this could happen as the result of increased communication arising from
new technological developments such as books, newspapers, radio, and televi-
sion, or it may reflect an increased urbanization and the resulting exposure to
more diversity of people, ideas, and experience. Obviously, one would expect
that the receptivity to new ideologies and examples would be heightened by the
breakdown of legitimacy of the existing ideology and by the worsening of
one’s own living conditions.
Experienced changes in satisfactions-dissatisfactions. Modifications in the
conception of what one is entitled to derive not only from alterations in the
ideology and myths that one accepts but also from changes in one’s experi-
ences of satisfactions. A period of gain creates expectations about further
improvement. As Tocqueville in L’Ancien Regime commented: “Only a great
genius can save a prince who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long
oppression. The evil, which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unen-
durable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. All the abuses
then removed seem to throw into greater relief those which remain, so that
their feeling is more painful’^ (1947, p. 186).
Many social scientists, before and after Tocqueville, have written insight-
fully about the “revolution of rising expectations” to explain the paradox
that social discontent and even revolutionary activity is more likely to occur
after social conditions have improved, when there is rising hope, not bleak
despair. The explanation generally follows two major lines. First, improve-
ment of social conditions increases aspirations by increasing what is per-
ceived to be possible to attain. Demand may increase at a faster rate than the
actual gains received, with a resulting increase in relative deprivation and in
the sense of injustice. The increased discontent is most likely to occur if the
gains are discontinued or reversed after the initial gains have heightened
future expectations (Davies, 1962). Pettigrew (1964, 1967), as well as many
others, has suggested that blacks’ protests for change in the United States in
the 1960s reflected this dynamic. A rapid betterment of the social situation of
blacks during and after World War II resulted in a sharp rise in expectations,
which led to increasing discontent and protest as these expectations were
frustrated by a slowdown and even reversal of relative social and economic
gains in the 1960s.
The second explanation of the effects of gains is similar to that advanced
hy Tocqueville. Namely, the increase is not uniform in all areas in which the
54 THEORY
victimized are disadvantaged. Improvement in one area, such as education,

only makes one more sensitive to the injustice one is experiencing in other
areas such as employment, police protection, and housing. Many social sci-
entists have advanced the proposition that status-disequilibrium (such that
there are differences in one’s relative statuses in income, education, social
prestige, and the like) is a source of tension and discontent. Thus, for this
reason as well as for others advanced above in the discussion of exposure to
new experience, a very effective way of enhancing the sense of injustice of the
victimized is to increase their education and little else.
Comparing oneself to others. Alterations in the conception of what one is
entitled to result not only from changes in the level of satisfaction but also
from modifications in one’s views either about how comparable others are
being treated or about who should be considered as comparable. There is
considerable research evidence that one’s attitudes, one’s evaluations of one’s
abilities, and one’s emotions are very much influenced by one’s perceptions of
these attributes in others who are used for comparison purposes (see Petti-
grew, 1967, for a summary). Thus, it is not surprising that one’s views of
what one is entitled to will be affected by what happens to comparable
others. If the firemen in New York City get a salary increase, the policemen
will certainly feel that they are entitled to one also. Although the evidence is
by no means conclusive, it has been suggested by Festinger (1954), Gurr
(1970), and others that comparison tends to be primarily with similar others,
and Gurr further suggests that the comparison will be with the similar other
whose gains are most rapid. Thus, if someone else who is perceived to be
similar is already better off, then one will feel it is unjust, and if, in addition,
that person advances rapidly in status, salary, or the like, one will experience
a substantial increase in relative deprivation unless one receives a comparable
increase. This proposition implies that a person selects among similar others
for comparision so as to justify a maximum increase in one’s own entitle-
ments. This is most likely to occur when one’s perceived bargaining power is
high or when one’s alienation is high so that one wishes to maximize the
sense of injustice. In any case, a potent way of arousing the sense of injustice
is to make the victim more aware that comparable others are being treated
better or to increase his feeling that it is appropriate to compare himself with
others whom he previously considered to be incomparable to himself.
Increasing the victim’s bargaining power. One’s perceived bargaining
power is undoubtedly a factor determining what one is entitled to and with
whom one compares oneself to establish one’s entitlements. If a victim or
victimized group is dealing with an unresponsive exploitative group, it is
faced with either the possibility of resigning into apathy and depression or
attempting to increase its bargaining power sufficiently to compel the other
to negotiate. Bargaining power is increased by either of two means: increas-
ing one’s own power or decreasing the other’s power. Attempts to change
power can be directed at altering the resources that underlie power (such as
wealth, physical strength, organization, knowledge, skill, trust, respect, and
affection), or it can be directed toward modifying the effectiveness with
which the resources of power are employed. Potential power may not be
converted into effective power because those who possess such power may
not be aware of their power, or they may not be motivated to use it, or they
may use their power inefficiently and unskillfully so that much potential
power is wasted. Thus, effective power depends upon the following key
elements: (1) the control or possession of resources to generate power, (2) the
awareness of the resources one possesses or controls, (3) the motivation to
employ these resources to influence others, (4) skill in converting the re-
sources into usable power, and (5) good judgment in employing this power so
that its use is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation in which it is
used.
By operating on one or more of the key elements listed above, a victim-
ized low-power group can work to increase its own power or to decrease the
power of the high-power group opposing it. There are, of course, endless
ways in which each of the key elements can be affected; which of the ways
are suitable to employ at any given time will be determined by particular
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that victimized groups gener-
ally lack control over the resources, such as money, guns and official posi-
tion, that are immediately related to economic, military, and political power.
Their primary resources are discontented people and having justice on their
side.
The utility of people as a resource of power is a function of their number,
their personal qualities (such as their knowledge, skill, dedication, and discip-
line), their social cohesion (as reflected in mutual trust, mutual liking, mutual
values, and mutual goals), and their social organization (as expressed in
effective coordination and communication, division of labor, and specializa-
tion of function, planning, and evaluation). Numbers of people are obviously
important but undoubtedly not as important as their personal qualities, social
cohesion, and social organization. A large, inchoate mass of undisciplined
ineffectual people are at the mercy of a small, dedicated, disciplined, well-
organized, cohesive group. Most large groups are controlled by less than 10
percent of their membership.
If one examines such low-power minority groups as the Jews, Chinese,
and Japanese that have done disproportionately well in the United States and
in other countries to which they have migrated, it is apparent that these
groups have been characterized by high social cohesion and effective social
organization combined with an emphasis upon the development of such per-
sonal qualities as skill, dedication, and discipline. Similarly, the effectiveness
of such guerrilla forces as the Vietcong has been, in part, due to their cohe-
sion, social organization, and personal dedication. Clearly, the development
of these characteristics is of prime importance as a means of increasing the
power of one’s group.
Elsewhere (Deutsch, 1973), I have considered some of the determinants of
cohesion. Here 1 add that groups become cohesive by formulating and work-
ing together on issues that are specific, immediate, and realizable. They be-
come effectively organized as they plan how to use their resources to achieve
56 THEORY
their purposes and as they evaluate their past effectiveness in the light of their
experiences. It is apparent that the pursuit of vague, far-in-the-future, grandi-
ose objectives will not long sustain a group’s cohesiveness. Nor will the
exclusive pursuit of a single issue be likely to sustain a long-enduring group
unless that issue proliferates into many subissues. Those intent upon develop-
ing social cohesion and social organization should initially seek out issues
that permit significant victories quickly; they will set out on a protracted
indeterminate struggle only after strongly cohesive and effective social organ-
izations have been created.
So far, I have stressed personal qualities, social cohesion, and social
organization as resources that can be developed by low-power groups to
enhance their power. Typically, such resources are vastly underdeveloped in
victimized groups; however, they are necessary to the effective utilization of
almost every other type of resource, including money, votes, tools, force,
and the like. Low-power groups often have two other key assets that can be
used to amplify their other resources: discontent and the sense of injustice.
If intense enough, these may provide the activating motivation and the
continuing determination to change the status quo. They are the energizers
for individual and social action to bring about change. Moreover, to the
extent that the basis for discontent and the nature of the injustice can be
communicated to others so that they experience it, if only vicariously, then
supporters and allies will be attracted to the side of the low-power group.
And increasing the number of one’s supporters and allies is another impor-
tant way of increasing one’s power. Thus, in a circular way, bargaining
power and the sense of injustice mutually reinforce each other: an increase
in one increases the other.
Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than manifest in a
subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or
disadvantaged nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disad-
vantaged may exist psychologically. If this be the case, consciousness-raising
tactics are necessary precursors to the developing of group cohesion and social
organization. The diversity of consciousness-raising tactics have been illus-
trated by the variety of techniques employed in recent years by women’s libera-
tion groups and black power groups. They range from quasi-therapeutic group
discussion meetings through mass meetings and demonstrations to dramatic
confrontations of those in high-power groups. It is likely that a positive consci-
ousness of one’s disadvantaged identity is most aroused when one sees some-
one, who is considered to be similar to oneself, explicitly attacked or disad-
vantaged and sees him resist successfully or overcome the attack; his resistance
reveals simultaneously the wound and its cure.
By raising to consciousness the discontent and sense of injustice, a power-
ful and persisting energy for change is activated. If this energy can be har-
nessed through skilled and disciplined action by dedicated individuals in
effectively organized, cohesive groups, then a very powerful instrument for
social change has been forged and the situation of the low-power group has
been radically altered. It is now in a position to offer significant positive or
negative incentives to those in high power. The positive incentives are those
deriving from enhanced cooperation, while the negative incentives are those
of noncooperation, harassment, obstruction, or destruction.
Negative incentives are the losses that the high-power group, or haves,
expect to experience as a consequence of a power struggle with the low-
power group, or have-nots. As Alinsky has pointed out: “The basic tactic in
warfare against the Haves is a mass political jujitsu: the Have-Nots do not
rigidly oppose the Haves, but yield in such planned and skilled ways that the
superior strength of the Haves become their own undoing” (1971, p. 152).
As in physical jujitsu, the inertia, momentum, and imbalance of the adversary
are used as weapons against him.
Thus, as Alinsky further suggests, “Since the Haves publicly pose as the
custodians of responsibility, morality, law and justice (which are frequently
strangers to each other), they can be constantly pushed to live up to their
own book of morality and regulations. No organization, including organ-
ized religion, can live up to the letter of its own book.” Alinsky cites many
examples of tactics in which bureaucratic systems were ensnarled in their
own red tape by pressuring them to live up to their own formally stated
rules and procedures. Tactics of this sort may center upon demanding or
using a service that one is entitled to, a service that is not ordinarily used so
massively and that the institution is not prepared to provide a large volume
of, with excessive cost to itself. For example, banks may be disrupted by a
massive opening and closing of accounts, department stores by massive
return of purchases, airports by a massive use of their toilets and urinals by
visitors, and so forth. Or the tactics may center upon disobedience to a rule
or law that cannot be enforced in the face of massive noncompliance. Thus,
landlords cannot afford to throw out all tenants who refuse to pay rents in
a cohesive rent strike nor can schools dismiss all students who disobey an
obnoxious regulation if the students are united in their opposition.
Related to the tactic of clubbing the haves with their own book of rules
and regulations is the tactic of goading them into errors such as violating
their own rules or regulations. If they can be provoked into an obvious
disruption of their own stated principles, then segments of the high-power
group may become disaffected with the resultant weakening of the haves. In
addition, previously neutral third parties may in response to the violations by
those in power swing their sympathies and support to the have-nots.
In general, it is a mistake to think that a high-power group is completely
unified. Most groups have internal divisions and conflict among its most
active members, and further, only a small proportion of its members are
likely to be active supporters of current policy. The conflicts among those
who are active in the high-power groups and the distinction between active
and passive members provide important points of leverage for the have-nots.
The internal conflict can be exacerbated by fostering mutual suspicion and by
playing one side against the other. The passive compliance of the inactive
majority of the haves may disappear as their leaders are provoked into errors
and as they are subject to ridicule and embarrassment by their inability to
58 THEORY
cope effectively with the persisting harassments and nuisances caused by the
have-nots.
The power of the haves, as is true for any group, depends upon such
tangibles as control over the instruments of force, an effective communication
system, and an effective transportation system and upon such intangibles as
prestige and the aura of invincibility. Although a low-power group may not
be able to interfere seriously with the tangible 'bases of power of the haves
without engaging in illegal, destructive actions of sabotage, it has many legal
means of tarnishing and weakening their intangible sources of power. Ridi-
cule and techniques of embarrassment are most effective weapons for this
purpose. Here, as elsewhere, inventiveness and imagination play an impor-
tant role in devising effective tactics. Alinsky, a master at inventing such
tactics, illustrates with the following hypothetical example:
Imagine the scene in the U.S. Courtroom in Chicago’s recent conspiracy

trial of the seven if the defendants and counsel had anally trumpeted their
contempt for Judge Hoffman and the system. What could Judge Hoffman,
the bailiffs, or anyone else do? Would the judge have found them in con-
tempt for farting? Here was a tactic for which there was no legal prece-
dent. The press reaction would have stunk up the judge for the rest of
time. (1971, p. 141)
Other tactics of embarrassment and ridicule include picketing slum land-

lords, key stockholders and management personnel of recalcitrant firms, and
other such wielders of power in situations that are embarrassing to them—at
their homes, at their churches or synagogues, or at their social clubs, for
example. The advantage of such tactics as ridicule and embarrassment is that
they are often very enjoyable for those in low power and very difficult for
those in high power to cope with without further loss of face.
In the preceding several pages, I have discussed some of the strategies and
tactics available to low-power victimized groups in their attempt to compel a
resistant high-power group to agree to a change in their relations. My discus-
sion was meant to be suggestive rather than comprehensive. It was also
intended to indicate that apathetic resignation and destructiveness are not the
only responses available in the face of a contrary authority. It is possible to
increase the power of the have-nots by developing their personal resources,
social cohesion, and social organization so that they have more influence.
And in jujitsu fashion, it is possible for the have-nots to employ some of the
characteristics of the haves to throw them off balance and to reduce their
effective opposition.
Let me sum up the discussion of activating the sense of injustice in the
victim. I have suggested that the process basically entails falsifying and delegi-
timizing the officially sanctioned ideologies and myths that “justify” the in-
justices; exposing the victim to new ideologies, new models, and new refer-
ence groups that justify and give life to the possibilities of a change in his
status; stimulating hope by successful efforts to improve his situation; and
reducing fear by increasing his relative bargaining strength.
Conditions for Awakening the Sense of Injustice in the Victimizer
Melvin J. Lerner (1980), in a very interesting paper, has asked a key

question: given the weight of research evidence that demonstrates that
considerations of justice and deserving play an important role in our lives,
how then is it possible to explain why we tolerate injustice toward inno-
cent victims in our community, society, and world? The research evidence
to which he refers comprises a variety of ingenious experiments by social
psychologists during the past decade, which show in may ways that people
seek justice for others as well as for themselves (for example, see chapters
2 and 7).
In response to his important question of why there is failure to act on the
behalf of victims, Lerner proposed several answers: (1) the victimizer may
find justification for thinking that the victim deserves his fate, (2) he may
think that the victim’s situation is improving and equity will soon be estab-
lished, (3) he believes that he is doing all he can without making himself into
a victim, and (4) he believes that he is doing as much as can be expected of
him, equal to or more than others who should be doing at least as much as
he.
Several additional answers that can be suggested are (5) the victimizer is
ignorant of the injustice experienced by the victim because of his lack of
contact with victims, (6) he thinks that the situation is hopeless so that
nothing adequate can be done to redress and alleviate the victim’s situation,
(7) he excludes the victim from his definition of the community in which his
moral standards are applied, (8) he may fear that he may be humiliated or
harmed by the victim or by other victimizers if he acts favorably toward the
victim, and (9) he may feel that his personal interests and the interests of the
victimized are directly opposed. The opposition may be in terms of external,
material interests or it may reflect the victimizer’s psychological needs. He
may have the need to feel superior or the need to deny any evil in himself by
projecting it onto and attacking the victim. In addition, of course, he may not
believe in a just world, believing instead that man is inherently amoral: those
on top will always take advantage of those on the bottom; the victims would
be victimizers if they had the chance.
This list of reasons why victimizers may fail to act on the behalf of victims
is, in effect, a catalog of the obstacles and resistances to activating their sense
of injustice. How can they be overcome? Basically, the process of activating the
sense of injustice in the victimizer is similar to that of activating it in the victim.
It entails removing the victimizer’s ignorance of the injustices experienced by
the victim through education and contact with the victim; falsifying and delegi-
timizing the officially sanctioned ideologies and myths that “justify” the injus-
tices through education and governmental action; exposing the victimizer to
new ideologies, new models, and new reference groups that support action to
undo the disadvantages of the victims; stimulating his hope that he can act
effectively to reduce injustice; reducing his fear that his new actions will have
costly, harmful consequences for him at the same time that one enhances his
60 THEORY
prospect of material and psychic gains from a positive change in his relation-
ship with the victim; and increasing his belief that continuation of his old
relationship will no longer produce the material benefits or psychic gains he
has experienced in the past from it and that its continuation may have costly,
harmful consequences for him.
It is apparent that those victimizers who are content with their superior
roles and who have developed a vested interest'in preserving the status quo
and appropriate rationales to justify it will have to have their interests chal-
lenged and their rationalizations exposed as false before their sense of justice
will be activated. (My earlier discussion of increasing the bargaining power of
the victim is relevant here.) However, even if the victimizer understands how
unjust the situation of the victim is and desires to remedy it, he is not likely to
be activated to do something unless he sees the possibility of taking actions
that will contribute significantly to correcting the injustice. Even then he is
unlikely to act if he thinks that by so doing he will place himself in economic
or social jeopardy.
Fear and lack of hope are two central obstacles to activating the sense of
injustice among even well-disposed and well-informed victimizers. Once vic-
timization has become deeply embedded in social institutions, individual ac-
tion to overcome it is frequently seen to be futile and costly. Institutionalized
racism persists in the United States despite the very substantial reduction of
prejudice among individual whites in all segments of the U.S. population in
recent years. The doctrine of white superiority has lost its appeal for the
typical white. The pervasive victimization of blacks still occurs because it is
the natural consequence of a competitive ethos of every man (or group) for
himself under rules that assume that competitors start more or less at the
same initial point.
It is evident that blacks, as a result of their legacy from slavery and a
century of discrimination, are more likely to be poor, uneducated, ill, un-
stable, criminal, and otherwise “socially undesirable” in terms of middle-class
standards than are whites. As a consequence, blacks are likely to be poorer
“risks” as employees, tenants, borrowers, students, and law-abiding citizens.
Employers, landlords, banks, stores, teachers, and the police—even if they are
acting purely in terms of economic self-interest—are apt to discriminate
against those they consider to be poor risks. Not to do so would place them
at a competitive disadvantage or expose them to the possibility of danger or
failure. Moreover, others who are affected by their decisions, such as other
employees, other tenants, shareowners, and so on, are likely to protest if the
risks are taken since they are apt to feel they would be adversely affected. In
addition, the American myth of equal opportunity provides a rationale for
discriminating against those who are poor risks. In the land of equal opportu-
nity, poverty must be due to the deficient character and motivation of those
who are poor. Thus, self-interest, social pressure, and ideology combine to
perpetuate the victimization of those who are poor risks.
Even if a victimizer, with a keen sense of injustice, were able to perceive
the self-fulfilling prophecy in discriminating against poor risks, he might

nevertheless consider it a futile, hopeless gesture to disregard the common
beliefs about the greater riskiness of transactions with blacks. Doing so
would not make a significant impact upon the situation of the blacks unless
many other whites were also engaged in similar actions. Moreover, failure—a
housing development tipping so that it becomes all black, nonpayment of
loans, and so on—would make his action demonstrate to others that nondis-
crimination is unwise.
It has long been recognized that without governmental action to pass and
enforce laws to prohibit racial discrimination, the unbiased landlord or em-
ployer would find it difficult to survive unless he conformed to the practices of
his business rivals and also discriminated. More recently, it has also begun to be
recognized that if discrimination is against the poor (as in the zoning regulations
of many suburbs or the inadequately supported schools in poor districts) or
against those who are poor risks (as in the case of inadequately prepared high
school graduates seeking admission to college), then many blacks will remain
disadvantaged despite strict enforcement of laws prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion. Here too, governmental action is necessary to spread costs and risks
equitably so that those who have an active sense of injustice are not themselves
unduly disadvantaged by working to aid the disadvantaged.
From what I have stated, it follows that the focus of attention and activity
of the victimizer who wishes to remove the injustices suffered by the victim
should be directed at other victimizers. He should seek to stimulate concerted
action to ban racial discrimination and to enforce positive compliance with
such bans. In addition, since elimination of racial discrimination will not
eliminate discrimination against the poor or against poor risks, he should be
trying to develop collective programs of action to achieve these ends.
It has been a too common assumption of victimizers (even those of good
will), as well as of many social scientists, that the social pathology has been
in the ghetto rather than in those who have built the walls to surround it,
that the disadvantaged are the ones who need to be changed rather than the
people and the institutions who have kept the disadvantaged in a submerged
position. It is not that we should detach ourselves from Head Start, Vista,
and other useful training and remedial programs for the disadvantaged.
Rather, we should have an appropriate perspective on such programs. It is
more important to change educational institutions and economic and politi-
cal systems so that they will permit those groups who are now largely ex-
cluded from important positions of decision making to share power than to
try to inculcate new attitudes and skills in those who are excluded. After all,
would we not expect that the educational achievements of black children
would be higher than they are now if school boards had more black members
and schools had more black principals? Would we not also expect that the
occupational attainment of blacks would be higher (and their unemployment
rate lower) if General Motors, AT&T and General Electric had black board
members and company presidents as well as white ones?
62 THEORY
SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN INSTIGATING SOCIAL CHANGE
I shall not elaborate here my views on social action necessary to end racism.
My views are hardly unique. In essence, I suggest that we need vigorous
enforcement of existing legislation and, if necessary, new legislation to obtain
positive compliance with nondiscrimination policies in all areas of commu-
nity life. These legal actions should be supplemented by a continuing educa-
tional effort in the schools and in the mass media, as well as by governmental
leaders, to support favorable attitudes toward positive compliance. In addi-
tion, we need economic policies that will foster full employment and substan-
tially increase the share of the total national income that is received by those
in the bottom third of the income distribution. And last, we need policies to
provide remedial and other help, as well as a decent minimum income, for
those who are unable to work.
It is evident that the attempt to effect such policies will stimulate conflict
and that such policies will be adopted only as the result of productive social
conflict. Some common sense truisms about social conflict have been sup-
ported by social science research, and these are worth bearing in mind.
Consider this well-established proposition: any attempt to introduce a
change in the existing relationship between two parties is more likely to be
accepted if each expects some net gain from the change than if either side
expects that the other will gain at his expense. One obvious implication is
that a redistribution of income so that there is an increase in the relative
share received by blacks is more likely to be accepted by whites if their
absolute income also increases. In other words, when the total income pie is
increasing, changing the relative shares is easier. This, of course, means that a
policy of economic growth rather than the one of no growth advocated by
some ecologists is more favorable to the disadvantaged.
There are other implications of this proposition. Those white who are not
content or are only barely content with their share of the income pie are most
likely to feel threatened by any relative gains by blacks. These are the poor
whites and the blue-collar and other workers who feel that they are just
making it financially. If they can be led to recognize that policies that will
improve the situation of blacks will also improve their situation, they are
more likely to be supporters than opponents of such policies. They are more
likely to recognize this if the policies being advocated are cast in broad
populist terms rather than in terms of narrow group interests. And, of course,
if they see themselves as forming a coalition against a third party (“the rich”),
they are more apt to perceive the congruence of their interests.
Another implication of this proposition is that the employment of in-
timidating, coercive tactics in pursuit of one’s objective is likely to suggest
an opposition rather than a complementarity of interests and, as a conse-
quence, to provoke resistance. If concessions imply a loss of face, a humilia-
tion, a loss of legitimacy, a loss of self-respect, they are not likely to be
made. On the other hand, tactics that emphasize the gains to the other—
even if these gains are primarily nonmaterial (such as prestige, moral recti-
tude, respect, or the power to elicit authentic cooperation)—are more likely

to lead to agreement.
The power of a victimized minority to compel social change by itself is
limited. It can rarely afford to be without allies. To be effective, it must be for
others as well as for itself. Being for oneself is the first responsibility of every
person and every group: unless one is for oneself, others are not likely to be.
However, one can define being for oneself so that one is either for or against
others. As a permanent definition of self, the latter is inherently self-defeating
for a group that needs allies.
CHAPTER FIVE
Conflict Resolution:
Theory and Practice
This chapter is based on my inaugural lecture in 1982 as Edward Lee Thorn-

dike Professor of Psychology and Education at Teacher’s College, Columbia
University. In this lecture, I traced the course of my intellectual work over my
scholarly career. The lecture was divided into three parts and an epilogue.
The first part dealt with my work on cooperation and competition, the
second concerned my work on conflict resolution, and the third briefly sum-
marized work on distributive justice, which is presented more fully in this
book; the epilogue presented the practical implications of the first two parts.
My work on cooperation and competition and on conflict resolution provides
the intellectual framework for my approach to distributive justice. The first
two parts of this chapter correspond to the first two parts of the inaugural
lecture, but a portion of the epilogue is here presented as the third part.
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION
This part starts when I was a graduate student at Kurt Lewin’s Research
Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
After serving in the air force during World War II, I resumed my graduate
study not long after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and my work
in social psychology has been shadowed by the atomic cloud ever since. For
my dissertation research, I undertook a theoretical analysis and experimental
study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process
(Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b). The study of cooperation and competition was
initiated under two major influences, one of which shaped its substantive
focus and the other of which determined its form and its scientific goals. The
substantive focus grew out of my concern about nuclear war. Like many
Adapted from “Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice.” Political Psychology 4, no. 3
(1983): 431-53.
64
Conflict Resolution; Theory and Practice 65
others at the time, I thought that mankind would not long survive unless the
nations of the world cooperated with one another. This thought focused on
the newly formed United Nations Security Council and crystallized into two
contrasting images: the members of the council working together coopera-
tively with a problem-solving attitude or the members competing with one
another to obtain a relative advantage for their own nations. I suspect that
my initial concern crystallized this way because the Security Council was in
the public spotlight and also because of my studies at the Research Center for
Group Dynamics. There it was natural to think of group process and group
productivity and of factors influencing them.
As my attention shifted from the relations among nations to the relations
within a group, the problem took on a more generalized form. The problemN
was now transformed into an attempt to understand the fundamental fea- ^
tures of cooperative and competitive relations and the consequences of these /
different types of interdependencies in a way that would be generally applica- /
ble to the relations among individuals, groups, or nations. The problem had
become a theoretical one with the broad scientific goal of attempting to
interrelate and give insight into a variety of phenomena through several
fundamental concepts and several basic propositions. The intellectual atmos-
phere of Kurt Lewin’s Research Center for Group Dynamics was such as to
push its students to theory building. The favorite slogan at the center was
“there is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
My initial theorizing on cooperation-competition was influenced by the
Lewinian thinking and research on tension systems, but even more, it was
indebted to the ideas that were in the air at the center. Ways of characterizing
and explaining group processes and group functioning, which employed the
language of Lewinian theorizing, were under constant discussion among the
students and faculty. The preoccupation at the center with understanding
group processes pressed me to formulate my ideas about cooperation and
competition so that they would be relevant to the psychological and interper-
sonal processes occurring within and between groups. This pressure forced
my theory and research (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b) to go considerably beyond
the then-existing social psychological work on cooperation-competition. My
theorizing and research were concerned not only with the individual and
group outcomes of cooperation and competition but also with the social
psychological processes that would give rise to these outcomes.
Thus, I turned my social concern about the possibilities of nuclear war
into a theoretically oriented investigation of cooperation and competition.
My research employed an experimental format that incidentally involved a
systematic comparison of two types of classroom grading systems: coopera-
tive and competitive. The research employed this educationally related format
because, to tell the truth, it was a very convenient way for me to get subjects
for my experiment. I was teaching a large introductory psychology course at
MIT, and by breaking it down into many small groups of five students each, I
could randomly assign groups to either a cooperative or a competitive grad-
ing system so as to test the implications of my theory of cooperation and
66 THEORY
competition. In the cooperative grading system, all students within a given

group received the same grade; their grades were determined by the level of
the group’s performance in comparison with other similar groups. In the
competitive groups, each student’s contribution to the group’s performance
was ranked in comparison with contributions of the other group members;
each student’s grade was determined by his relative rank in his group. The
research format had no direct relevance to the prevention of a nuclear holo-
caust, but I believe the theoretical ideas are relevant (see chapter 17).
Let me briefly summarize the main ideas of the theory. To oversimplify it
somewhat, my theory has two basic notions; one relates to the type of inter-
dependence among goals of the people involved in a given situation and the
other to the type of actions by the people involved. I identify two basic types
of goal interdependence: promotive interdependence, where the goals are
positively linked in such a way that the amount of his goal a person obtains
or the probability of his obtaining his goal is positively correlated with the
amount of their goals that others obtain or with the probability of their
obtaining their goals; and contrient interdependence, where the goals are
negatively linked in such a way that the amount or probability of goal attain-
ment is negatively correlated with the amount or probability of the others’
goal attainments. To put it more colloquially, when you are promotively
linked with another, you “sink or swim together”; when you are contriently
linked, if the other “sinks,” you “swim,” and if the other “swims,” you
“sink.”
I also characterize two basic types of actions by an individual: effective
actions, which improve the actor’s chances of obtaining his goal, and bungling
actions, which worsen the actor’s chances of obtaining his goal. (For purposes
of simplicity, I use dichotomies for my basic concepts; the dichotomous types
of interdependence and the dichotomous types of actions are, I assume, polar
ends of continua.) I then combine types of interdependence and types of action
to posit how they jointly will affect three basic social psychological processes:
substitutability (how one person’s actions can satisfy another person’s inten-
tions), cathexis (or attitudes), and inducibility (or influence).
Thus, my theory predicts that when you are in a promotively interdepen-
dent relationship with someone who bungles, his bungling will not be a
substitute for effective actions you had intended and the bungling will be
cathected negatively. In fact, when your net-playing tennis partner in a
doubles game allows an easy shot to get past him, you will have to extend
yourself to prevent yourself from being harmed by the error. On the other
hand, if your relationship is one of contrient interdependence, and the other
bungles (as when your tennis opponent double-faults), your opponent’s
bungle will substitute for an effective action on your part, and it will be
cathected positively or valued. The reverse is true for effective actions. An
opponent’s effective actions are not substitutable for yours and are negatively
cathected or valued; a teammate can induce you to help him make an effec-
tive action, but you are likely to try to prevent or obstruct a bungling action
by your teammate. In contrast, you will be willing to help an opponent
Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice 67
bungle, but your opponent is not likely to induce you to help him make an
effective action (which, in effect, would harm your chances of obtaining your
goal).
My theory of cooperation and competition, then, goes on to make further
predictions about different aspects of intrapersonal, interpersonal, intra-
group, and intergroup processes from the predictions about substitutability,
cathexis, and inducibility. Assuming that the individual actions in a group are
more frequently effective than bungling, among the predictions that follow
from the theory are that cooperative groups (those more promotively interde-
pendent) as compared with competitive groups will show the following cha-
racteristics:
1. More effective intermember communication will be exhibited. More ideas

will be verbalized and members will be more attentive to one another and
more acceptant of the ideas of other members and more influenced by
them. They will have fewer difficulties in communicating with or under-
standing others.
2. More friendliness, more helpfulness, and less obstructiveness will be ex-
pressed in the discussions. Members will also be more satisfied with the
group and its solutions and more favorably impressed by the contributions
of the other group members. In addition, members of the cooperative
groups will rate themselves higher in desire to win the respect of their
colleagues and in obligation to the other members.
3. More coordination of effort, more division of labor, more orientation to
task achievement, more orderliness in discussion, and higher productivity
will be manifested in the cooperative groups (if the group task requires
effective communication, coordination of effort, division of labor, or the
sharing of resources).
4. More feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a greater sense of
basic similarity in beliefs and values, and more confidence in one’s own
ideas and in the value that other members attach to those ideas, will be
obtained in the cooperative groups.
5. A cooperative process leads to the defining of conflicting interests as a
mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort. It facilitates the recog-
nition of the legitimacy of each other’s interests and of the necessity of
searching for a solution that is responsive to the needs of all. It tends to
limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests. Attempts to
influence the other tend to be limited to processes of persuasion.
In contrast, a competitive process stimulates the view that the solution of

a conflict can only be one that is imposed by one side on the other. The
enhancement of one’s own power and the minimization of the legitimacy of
the other side’s interests in the situation become objectives. It fosters the
expansion of the scope of the issues in conflict, so that the conflict becomes a
matter of general principle and is no longer confined to a particular issue at a
given time and place. The escalation of the conflict increases its motivational
significance to the participants and intensifies their emotional involvement in
it; these factors, in turn, may make a limited defeat less acceptable or more
68 THEORY
humiliating than mutual disaster might be. Duplication of effort, so that the
competitors become mirror images of each other, is more likely than division
of effort. Coercive processes tend to be employed in the attempt to influence
the other.
The above predictions, which are described more fully in my article, “A
Theory of Cooperation and Competition” (Deufsch, 1949a), have been sup-
ported by my own research (Deutsch, 1949b), as well as by the studies of
many other investigators (Back, 1951; Berkowitz, 1957; Gerard, 1953; Gott-
heil, 1955; Grossack, 1954; Levy, 1953; Margolin, 1954; Mintz, 1951; Mi-
zuhara and Tamai, 1952; Raven and Eachus, 1963; Thomas, 1957; Workie,
1967). More recently, research done in classrooms by Johnson and his co-
workers (1979a, 1979b), by Slavin and his associates (1977a, 1977b, 1977c),
and by Aronson and his students (1978) have provided further support for
the theory. See Johnson et al. (1981) for a review of 122 studies of the effects
of cooperation and competition upon achievement.
My own early work on cooperation and competition in the classroom,
combined with the more systematic research of recent investigators, have
considerable implications for educational practice. More about this in the
third part of this chapter.
THE RESOLUTION OE GONELICT
This part starts with a question that is a complement to the question motivat-
ing the work described earlier. Instead of asking “What are the effects of
cooperation and competition?” it asks “What are the conditions under which
a cooperative or competitive relationship will evolve?” I found it convenient
to address this question by studying conflicts; these are typically situations
containing a mixture of cooperative and competitive elements. In studying
conflict, my students and I, along with a number of other social psycholo-
gists, pioneered in developing a methodology of experimental games and
simulations that has become widely used in the social sciences for both re-
search and training. Our research has studied not only laboratory-created
conflicts but also marital conflicts, divorce negotiations, and labor manage-
ment mediation.
As our research focused on conflict, I revised my query to read “What are
the conditions that give rise to a constructive or destructive process of con-
flict resolution?” This question has been the center of the research conducted
by my students and myself for many years at Teachers College and before.
Students who have worked with me include, in a temporal ordering: Leonard
Solomon, Robert M. Krauss, Harvey A. Hornstein, Peter Gumpert, David W.
Johnson, Barbara Bunker, Donnah Canavan, Jeffrey Rubin, Bert Brown, Roy
Lewicki, Yakov Epstein, Lois Beiner, Madeline Heilman, Katherine Garner,
Kenneth Kressel, Rebecca Curtis, Charles Judd, Sherry Deren, Michelle Eine,
Janice Steil, Cilio Ziviani, William A. Wenck, Jr., Lori Mei, Shula Shichman,
Louis Medvene, Ivan Lansberg, Sandra Horowitz, Susan Opotow, Brian
Maruffi, Jay Kantor, Eric Marcus, and many others. I list these students, and
I am proud of them, because they have been important contributors to the
work I am describing.
Our research started off with the assumption that if the parties involved
in a conflict situation had a cooperative rather than competitive orientation
toward one another, they would be more likely to engage in a constructive
process of conflict resolution. In my earlier research on the effects of coopera-
tion and competition upon group process, I had demonstrated that a co-
operative process was more productive in dealing with a problem that a
group faces than a competitive process. I reasoned that the same would be
true in a mixed-motive situation of conflict; conflict could be viewed as a
mutual problem facing the conflicting parties. Our initial research on trust
and suspicion employing the Prisoners’ Dilemma game (described in chapter
9) strongly supported my reasoning, as did subsequent research employing
other experimental formats: I believe that this is a very important result with
considerable theoretical and practical significance.
At a theoretical level, it enabled me to link my prior characterization of
cooperative and competitive social processes to the nature of the processes of
conflict resolution that would typically give rise to constructive or destructive
outcomes. That is, I found a way to characterize the central features of
constructive and destructive processes of conflict resolution; doing so repre-
sented a major advance beyond the characterization of outcomes as construc-
tive or destructive. This was not only important in itself but also opened up a
new possibility. At both the theoretical and practical levels, the characteriza-
tion of constructive and destructive processes of conflict created the very
significant possibility that we would be able to develop insight into the condi-
tions that initiated or stimulated the development of cooperative-constructive
versus competitive-destructive processes of conflict. Much of the research of
my students and myself has been addressed to developing this insight.
A good deal of our early research on the conditions affecting the course of
conflict was done on an ad hoc basis. We selected independent variables to
manipulate on the basis of our intuitive sense of what would give rise to a
cooperative or competitive process. We did experiments with quite a number
of variables: motivational orientation, communication facilities, perceived
similarity of opinions and beliefs, size of conflict, availability of threats and
weapons, power differences, third-party interventions, strategies and tactics
of game playing by experimental stooges, the payoff structure of the game,
personality characteristics, and so on. (I shall not give the specific results of
our various experiments here; for a summary, see Deutsch, 1973.) The results
of all these studies fell into a pattern I slowly began to grasp.
These studies seemed explainable by the assumption, which I have im-
modestly labeled “Deutsch’s crude law of social relations,” that the charac-
teristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also
tend to elicit that type of social relationship. Thus, cooperation induces and is
induced by a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, a readiness to be
helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitiv-
70 THEORY
ity to common interests and deemphasis of opposed interests, an orientation

toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on.
Similarly, competition induces and is induced by the use of tactics of coer-
cion, threat, or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between
oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of the awareness
of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspi-
cious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of the issues in
conflict; and so on.
In other words, if one has systematic knowledge of the effects of coopera-
tive and competitive processes, one will have systematic knowledge of the
conditions that typically give rise to such processes and, by extension, to the
conditions that affect whether a conflict will take a constructive or destruc-
tive course. My early theory of cooperation and competition is a theory of
the effects of cooperative and competitive processes. Hence, from the crude
law of social relations, it follows that this theory provides insight into the
conditions that give rise to cooperative and competitive processes.
The crude law is crude. It expresses surface similarities between effects
and causes; the basic relationships are genotypical rather than phenotypical.
The surface effects of cooperation and competition are due to the underlying
type of interdependence (promotive or contrient) and type of action (effective
or bungling), the basic social psychological processes involved in the theory
(substitutability, cathexis, and inducibility), and the social medium and social
context through which these processes are expressed. Thus, how positive
cathexis is expressed in an effective, promotively interdependent relationship
will depend upon what is appropriate to the social medium and social con-
text; that is, presumably one would not seek to express it in a way that is
humiliating or embarrassing or likely to be experienced negatively by one’s
partner. Similarly, the effectiveness of any typical effect of cooperation or
competition as an initiating or inducing condition of a cooperative or com-
petitive process is not due to its phenotype but rather to the inferred genotype
of type of interdependence and type of action. Thus, in most social media and
social contexts, “perceived similarity in basic values” is highly suggestive of
the possibility of a promotive linkage between oneself and the other. How-
ever, we are likely to see ourselves as contriently linked in a context that
leads each of us to recognize that similarities in values lead us to seek some-
thing that is in scarce supply and available for only one of us. Also, it is
evident that while threats are mostly perceived in a way that suggests a
contrient linkage, a threat that is perceived as intended to compel you to do
something that is good for you or that you feel you should do is apt to be
suggestive of a promotive linkage.
Although the law is crude, it is my impression that it is reasonably accu-
rate; phenotypes are often indicative of the underlying genotypes. Moreover,
it is a synthesizing principle, which integrates and summarizes a wide range
of social psychological phenomena. Not only do the typical effects of a given
relationship tend to induce that relationship, but also it seems that any of the
typical effects of a given relationship tends to induce the other typical effects.
For example, among the typical effects of a cooperative relationship are

positive attitudes, perception of similarities, open communication, and an
orientation toward mutual enhancement. One can integrate much of the
literature on the determinants of positive and negative attitudes in terms of
the other associated effects of cooperation or competition. Thus, positive
attitudes result from perceptions of similarity, open communication, and so
on. Similarly, for effectiveness of communication, many of its determinants
can be linked to the other typical effects of cooperation or competition, and
so on.
The research and theorizing that my students and I have done on con-
flict resolution, combined with the work of many other social scientists in
this area, have cumulatively contributed to the emergence of a new mode of
thinking about conflict with an array of concepts that highlight some of the
central processes involved in disputes and that provide a coherent basis of
organizing the details of such processes. This has served to reduce the
mystical aura of the inevitability of destructiveness often associated with
conflict, and it has provided new insights about how to manage conflicts
more productively at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels.
I also believe that there is emerging from this work significant knowledge
on how to educate people to handle the inevitable conflicts of everyday life
more productively.
EPILOGUE
I turn now to a consideration of some of the implications of our theorizing

and research on conflict resolution. Underlying our approach to this area has
been the view that conflict can be constructive or destructive for the partici-
pants: there is a useful distinction to be made between lively controversy and
deadly quarrel. This perspective stresses that conflict and controversy is an
inevitable aspect of life and that it has valuable individual and social func-
tions. The question is not how to avoid or suppress conflict; doing so usually
has harmful or stagnating consequences. Rather, the question is how to cre-
ate the conditions that encourage constructive, enlivening confrontation of
the conflict.
David Johnson and his colleagues have realized the valuable educational
potentials in constructive conflict. They point out that constructive contro-
versy regarding an issue being discussed in the classroom will usually increase
student motivation, facilitate the ability to take the perspective of the other
side, promote the development of more complexly differentiated and inte-
grated reasoning, increase the mastery and retention of the information re-
lated to the issues of controversy, stimulate more innovative and creative
problem solving, and enhance the sense of camaraderie and pleasure in class-
room activities (Johnson and Johnson, 1982, pp. 249—52). They have also
characterized the norms and rules of interaction in controversies that are
likely to make them constructive and enlivening rather than destructive and
72 THEORY
deadly (pp. 256—58). From the extant theory and research, it seems to me
that the knowledge now exists or could be readily developed that would
enable teachers to learn how to stimulate and structure constructive contro-
versy in the classroom to the benefit of their students.
These benefits not only would relate to the subject matter of a contro-
versy but also would be relevant to students learning how to engage in
controversies and conflicts so that their processes and outcomes are more apt
to be constructive than destructive. It is to this last matter that I now wish to
turn. A sizable number of my former students—David Johnson, Peter Gum-
pert, Barbara Bunker, Harvey A. Hornstein, Jeffrey Rubin, Roy Lewicki, Bert
Brown, Kenneth Sole, Madeline Heilman, Kenneth Kressel, and others—have
been involved in diverse settings in training teachers, administrators, negotia-
tors, mediators, divorcing couples, married couples, diplomats, interracial
groups, men and women, parents and children, and so on in how to deal with
conflict constructively rather than destructively. The intellectual underpin-
nings of much of this work come from the theorizing and research that have
been conducted in the Social Psychology Laboratory at Teachers College as
well as from the work of such scholars as Richard Walton, Roger Fisher,
Irving Janis, Anatol Rapoport, Muzafer Sherif, Kenneth Boulding, Dean Pru-
itt, Daniel Druckman, Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, Herbert Kelman, and
John Burton. From the theoretical and practical work on conflict resolution,
there has begun to emerge a coherent set of ideas and a systematic technology
for teaching people how to foster the constructive rather than destructive
potential in conflicts. These ideas as well as the technology need considerably
more research, however, before they will be firmly grounded.
There are a number of key features in this emerging new perspective on
conflict; I have space to mention only several:
1. Few conflicts are intrinsically and inevitably win-lose conflicts. A common

tendency is to misperceive conflicts of interest, as well as other conflicts in
which the parties have become invested in their positions, as being win-lose
in nature. A technology has been developing of how to help people main-
tain an awareness of their common interests even as they deal with their
opposing interests.
2. If the conflict is not by its nature a win-lose conflict, one should develop
and maintain a cooperative problem-solving orientation that focuses on the
interests of the different parties (and not their positions) and seeks a solu-
tion that is responsive to the legitimate interests of both sides. Procedures
for fostering the development of such an orientation have been described
by Johnson and Johnson (1982), Gumpert (1982), Fisher and Ury (1981),
and many others.
3. A full, open, honest, and mutually respectful communication process
should be encouraged so that the parties can clearly express and under-
stand each other’s interests with empathetic understanding; such a process
will discourage the misunderstandings that lead to defensive commitments
and to a win-lose orientation. In recent years, a highly developed social
psychology technology has emerged for fostering such a communication
process and for reducing the misunderstandings and provocations that

often characterize the communications between parties in conflict.
4. A creative development of a wide range of options for potentially solving
the problem of the diverging interests of the conflicting parties should be
fostered. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of techniques to
help people broaden the variety, novelty, and range of alternative possi-
bilities that are available to them as they attempt to solve problems—
brainstorming and synectics are among the many procedures for stimulat-
ing creativity that have emerged in recent years (see Stein, 1974, 1975).
5. A sophisticated awareness should be developed of the norms, rules, pro-
cedures, and tactics—as well as the external resources and facilities—that
are available to support good-faith negotiations and to deter dirty tricks,
refusals to negotiate, and exploitativeness on the part of any of the negotia-
tors involved in a conflict. The point is that there are resources and effec-
tive procedures for dealing with many of the common problems and im-
passes that often lead a conflict to degenerate into a destructive process.
There are potentially helpful third parties—counselors, mediators, concilia-
tors, and arbitrators—and there are often effective ways of inducing some-
one to negotiate despite an initial reluctance.
I believe the development of a coherent set of ideas and a systematic

technology for training in conflict resolution has profound significance for
promoting individual and social well-being. Conflict is a pervasive aspect of
life, but most people have developed only meager skills for handling the
difficult conflicts they confront in the course of their lives. This is true for
conflicts in our personal and family lives, in groups and organizations, and
even in international relations. The emerging theory and technology in the
area of conflict resolution provide the possibility of teaching students in
schools how to manage conflicts more productively. I suspect that this, along
with fostering a more cooperative school environment, may be the most
fruitful contribution that schools can make to the promotion of positive
mental health and to the prevention of a number of psychological disorders.
It might also mean that when these students assume adult responsibilities
they might handle organizational and international conflicts in more con-
structive ways than they have been traditionally managed.
Schools are, I suggest, particularly important institutions for training in
the skills of constructive conflict resolution because of the strategic value of
educating children and young people: preventive work is often both less
costly and more effective than remedial work. This is not to say that such
training for adults is futile or not worth the effort; there is considerable
evidence of the beneficial effects of such training on people involved in con-
flicts in specific settings.
CHAPTER SIX
Interdependence and
Psychological Orientation
In this chapter, I shall examine the relations between types of psychological

interdependence and psychological orientations/ I shall employ the term psy-
chological orientation to refer to a more or less consistent complex of cogni-
tive, motivational, and moral orientations to a given situation that serve to
guide one’s behavior and responses in that situation. In brief, my theoretical
analysis posits that are distinctive psychological orientations associated with
the distinctive types of interdependence. I also assume that the causal arrow
concerning psychological orientations and types of interdependence is bidirec-
tional: a psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of
interdependence. Implicit in this view is the further assumption that each
person has the capability to utilize the various psychological orientations and
their associated cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations. Although in-
dividuals may differ in their readiness and ability to use the different orienta-
tions as a result of their cultural backgrounds, their personal histories, and
their genetic endowments, people participate in diverse social relations in com-
plex societies and these varied social relations require and, hence, induce dif-
ferent psychological orientations. Thus, my basic assumptions is an evolution-
ary one: namely, to cope with the psychological requirements of assorted types
of social relations, people have developed the capacity to utilize psychological
orientations as they are necessary in different situations.
This chapter is structured into four sections: (1) a discussion of types of
interdependence; (2) a characterization of psychological orientations; (3) a
discussion of the relationship between types of interdependence and psycho-
logical orientations; and (4) a brief consideration of some relevant research.
Adapted from “Interdependence and Psychological Orientation,” in V. Derlega and J. L.

Grzelak, eds., Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research (Orlando, Fla.; Aca-
demic Press, 1982).
1. The term psychological interdependence is used as the equivalent of social relations or
interpersonal relations as perceived by the participants.
74
Interdependence and Psychological Orientation 75
At the outset, I give notice to the reader that my presentation is not as

ambitious as it may appear. I shall not attempt to discuss the full range of
types of interdependence or psychological orientations. My aim is the more
modest one of illustrating the potential fruitfulness of an idea that is still in
the process of being formed in the hope that doing so will stimulate other
investigators to contribute to its development.
TYPES OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Several years ago, I collaborated with Wish and Kaplan (Wish, Deutsch, and
Kaplan, 1976) in research that sought to identify the fundamental dimensions
of interpersonal relations.^ Judging from this research, as well as earlier
research by Triandis (1972) and Marwell and Hage (1970) and later research
by Wish and Kaplan (1977), it seems reasonable to assert that the fundamen-
tal dimensions of interpersonal relations include the following:
1. Cooperation-competition. This dimension is referred to variously in the
social psychological literature. I have characterized it as “promotive versus
contrient interdependence” (Deutsch, 1949a), or a “pro-con” dimension
(Deutsch 1962a). Triandis (1972) referred to it as “association-disassocia-
tion”; Kelley and Thibaut (1978) used the term “correspondence-non-
correspondence”; and it has been labeled as “love-hate,” “evaluative,” “posi-
tive-negative interpersonal disposition,” “friendly-hostile,” and so on by
other investigators. In the Wish et al. (1976) study, scales of the following
sort were strongly weighted on this dimension: “Always harmonious versus
always clashing,” “very cooperative versus very competitive,” “very friendly
versus very hostile,” “compatible versus incompatible goals and desires,”
“very productive versus very destructive,” “easy versus difficult to resolve
conflicts with each other,” “very altruistic versus very selfish,” and “very
fair versus very unfair.” Such interpersonal relations as “close friends,”
“teammates,” and “coworkers” are on the cooperative side of the dimen-
sion, whereas “political opponents,” “personal enemies,” “divorced
couple,” and “guard and prisoner” are toward the competitive end. The
social psychological processes and consequences associated with this dimen-
sion have been extensively investigated in my theorizing and research
(Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b, 1962a, 1973).
2. Power distribution (equal versus unequal). This dimension has been given
various labels: Triandis (1972) characterized it as “superordination-
subordination,” Kelley (1979) described it in terms of “mutuality of inter-
dependence,” and others have used such terms as “dominance-submis-
sion,” “potency,” and “autonomy-control.” Such scales as the following
are strongly weighted on this dimension: “exactly equal versus extremely
unequal power,” “very similar versus very different roles and behaviors,”
and “very democratic versus very autocratic.” “Business partners,” “close
friends,” and “business rivals” are at the “equal end”; “master and ser-
vant,” “teacher and pupil,” “parent and child,” and “guard and prisoner”
2. Although this research studied the perceptions of interpersonal relations, I see no reason
to doubt that the identified dimensions are fundamental aspects of interpersonal relations.
76 THEORY
are at the “unequal end.” The social psychological processes and conse-
quences associated with this dimension are reviewed in Cartwright and
Zander (1968).
3. Task-oriented versus social-emotional. This dimension has been labeled
“intimacy” by Triandis (1972) and Marwell and Hage (1970) and “per-
sonal” by Kelley (1979); others have identified it as “personal-
impersonal,” “subjective versus objective,” “particularistic versus univer-
salistic,” or “emotionally involved versus emotionally detached.” The two
following scales are strongly weighted on this dimension: “pleasure-
oriented versus work-oriented” and “emotional versus intellectual.” Such
interpersonal relations as “close friends,” “husband and wife,” and “sib-
lings” are at the “social-emotional” end of the dimension; “interviewer
and job applicant,” “opposing negotiatiors,” “supervisors and employees,”
and “business rivals,” are at the “task-oriented” end. Bales’s (1958) dis-
tinction between “social-emotional” and “task-oriented” leaders of groups
is relevant; the former focuses on the solidarity relations among group
members, and the latter focuses on the external task and problem-solving
activities of the group. Earlier, I (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b) had made a
similar distinction between “task functions” and “group maintenance”
functions, which was elaborated in a paper by Benne and Sheats (1948).
The sociological distinction between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft”
groups also reflects this basic dimension of social relations.
4. Formal versus informal. Wish and Kaplan (1977) have shown that this
dimension can be separated from the preceding one. It appears to be the
same as the dimension of “regulation” identified by Marwell and Hage
(1970). In an informal relationship, the definition of the activities, times,
and locations involved in the relationship are left largely to the participants;
in a formal or regulated relationship, social rules and norms largely deter-
mine the interactions among those involved. Such scales as “very formal
versus very informal” and “very flexible versus very rigid” reflect this di-
mension. Relations within a bureaucracy tend to be formal, whereas rela-
tions within a social club tend to be informal; also, relations between equals
are more likely to be informal than relations between unequals. Formal,
bureaucratic relationships have been the subject of extensive discussions by
such sociological theorists as Weber (1957) and Merton (1957).
5. Intensity and importance. This dimension has to do with the intensity or
superficiality of the relationship. Kelley (1979) suggests that it reflects the
degree of interdependence (or dependence) in the relationship. Such scales
as the following are strongly weighted on it: “very active versus very
inactive,” “intense versus superficial interaction with each other,” “intense
versus superficial feelings toward each other,” and “important versus un-
important to the individuals involved.” “Casual acquaintances,” “second
cousins,” and “salesman and customer” are on the “superficial” side,
whereas “parent and child,” “husband and wife,” “psychotherapist and
patient” are on the “intense” end of this dimension.
Several other dimensions of interpersonal relations have been identified.

These include the enduring or temporary nature of the relationship, its volun-
tary or involuntary character, its public versus private nature, its licit or illicit
quality, and the number of people involved. It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to consider these other dimensions.
Table 1 presents the first four dimensions in dichotomous form and pro-
vides illustrations of the types of interpersonal relations and types of interper-
sonal activities that could occur in each of the sixteen regions of this four-
dimensional space. (I have selected illustrations from the “more intense”
rather than “less intense” side of the intensity dimension.) It is, of course, an
oversimplification to dichotomize each of the dimensions, but it is a reason-
able place to start. If you were to blank out the illustrations in table 1 and
attempt to provide your own examples, you would probably discover that the
dimensions are correlated; it is easier to find illustrations for some of the
sixteen regions than others, because some of the regions are undoubtedly
more heavily populated than others.
Thus, social-emotional relations or activities are more likely to be infor-
mal than are the task-oriented ones, especially if there are relatively more
people involved in the task-oriented ones. Also, there appears to be a positive
linkage between the informality of the relation or activity and its equality so
that it is more difficult to find unequal, informal relations and activities than
equal, informal ones. Moreover, there is evidently a positive association be-
tween the cooperativeness and informality of a relation or activity. Similarly,
there appears to be a positive connection between the equality of an activity
or relation and its cooperativeness. Additionally, there is likely to be a posi-
tive association between the social-emotional nature of a relation or activity
and its cooperativeness. Further, one can expect that social-emotional rela-
tions and activities will more frequently be intense than task-oriented ones
and also that interpersonal relations or activities that are extremely coopera-
tive or competitive rather than moderately so will be more intense.
The foregoing, hypothesized correlations among the dimensions suggest
which regions of the interpersonal space will be heavily populated and which
will not.^ (See Wish and Kaplan, 1977, for some support for the hypothesized
correlations.) Thus, one would expect more interpersonal relations and ac-
tivities (particularly, if they are stable and enduring) to be clustered in the
“cooperative, equal, informal, and socio-emotional” region (cell 1 in table 1),
which I shall label the “intimacy” region, than in the “competitive, equal,
informal, and socio-emotional” region (cell 3), which I shall label the “an-
tagonistic” region. Intense competitive relations or activities are more likely
to be stable and enduring if they are regulated or formal rather than unregu-
lated. Thus, one would expect cell 7 (“rivalry”) to be more populated than
cell 3 (“antagonism”), and similarly, for cell 8 (regulated “sadomasochism”)
and for cells 15 (“regulated economic competition”) and 16 (“regulated
power struggle”) compared to their respective unregulated cells.
Intense, cooperative, task-oriented relations or activities are more apt to
3. INDSCAL, the multidimensional scale analysis procedure, used in the Wish, Deutsch, and
Kaplan, 1976, and the Wish and Kaplan, 1977, studies does not force the identified dimensions
to the orthogonal.
Table 1. Sixteen Types of Social Relations^
SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL TASK-ORIENTED
Informal Formal Informal Formal
1 5 9 13
a. “intimate” a. “fraternal” a. “problem-solving a. “organized coop-
eration”
„ , b. (lovers) b. (club members) b. (colleagues) b. (members of a
Equal
task force)
c. love-making c. social party c. staff meeting c. working together
with differenti-
> ated responsibilities
H
< to solve a problem
oi
pj
6 10 14
a. “caring” a. “protecting” a. “educational” a. “hierarchical
organization”
b. (mother- b. (policeman- b. (professor- b. (supervisor-
child) graduate stu- employee)
Unequal
dent)
c. nursing c. helping c. working together c. supervisor assign-
informally on a ing employee to
research project a certain task
under professor’s
direction
3 7 11 15
a. “antagonistic” a. “rivalry” a. “competition” a. “regulated com-
b. (divorced b. (contestants in petition”
Equal b. (personal couple) an informal b. (business rivals)
enemies) c. contesting for game) c. bidding against
c. fighting child’s atten- c. trying to score each other
COMPETITIVE
tion points against for a contract

the other
4 8 12 16
a. “sadomaso- a. “dominating” a. “power struggle” a. “regulated power
chistic” b. (expert- b. (authority- struggle”
Unequal
b. (bully- novice) rebel) b. (guard-prisoner)
victim) c. intimidating c. guerrilla warfare c. ordering the
c. tormenting prisoner
to keep in step
Êach type of social relation is: (a) given a label; (b) illustrated in terms of people who might be in such a
relationship; and (c) illustrated in terms of a kind of activity might occur in such a relationship.
78
be equal and informal than otherwise unless there are clear status differences
among the people involved (that is, to be located in cell 9 rather than in cells
10, 13, or 14). However, the demands of large-scale cooperative tasks involv-
ing more than small numbers of people are apt to require a formal, hierarchi-
cal (“unequal”) organization for the tasks to be worked on effectively and
efficiently. Thus, one could expect many hierarchically organized cooperative
relations and activities to be found in cell 14 (“hierarchical organization”).
Yet the nature of such unequal relations as superordinate-subordinate ones in
organizations, especially when they are not strongly legitimized for those in
the subordinate position, is such as to produce conflict over the power differ-
ences, and hence, this type of relation is rarely free of strong competitive
elements. It follows then that some superordinate-subordinate relations in
hierarchically organized systems will have the character of power struggles,
and these would be more appropriately classified as belonging to cell 16.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS
In writing an earlier draft of this chapter, I entitled this section “Modes of
Thought.” This title did not seem to be a sufficiently inclusive label, however.
It appeared to me evident that cognitive processes differ in different types of
social relations, and I wanted to sketch the nature of some of these differ-
ences. Moreover, I also thought that the psychological differences among the
different types of social relations were not confined to the cognitive pro-
cesses: different motivational and moral predispositions were also involved. It
has been customary to consider these latter predispositions as more enduring
characteristics of the individual and to label them as “personality traits” or
“character orientations.” Since my emphasis is on the situationally induced
nature and, hence, temporariness of such predispositions such labels also did
not seem fitting for the material in this section. Thus, I settled on the term
psychological orientation to capture the basic theme of this section, namely
that people orient themselves differently to different types of social relations
and that the different orientations reflect and are reflected in different cogni-
tive processes, motivational tendencies, and moral dispositions.
The Cyclical Relation between Psychological Orientations and Social

Relations
Figure 1 depicts in schematic form my view of this association between

psychological orientations and social relationships as well as some other
factors influencing them. It was stimulated by Neisser’s (1976) conception of
the perceptual cycle but is a radical modification of it. My emphasis, like
Neisser’s, is on the cyclical and active process involved in the connections
among the elements. In characterizing this cyclical, active process, one can
start at any point in the cycle. In practice where one starts will usually be
determined by what one manipulates as one’s independent variable; the non-
manipulated variables will be considered to be the dependent ones.
80 THEORY
Fig. 1. The circular relation between an individual’s psychological orientation and

the type of social relationship in which he is involved.
Let us suppose, for example, that, as an experimenter, I lead a subject to

have the psychological orientation toward another typical of a mutually
promotive interdependent relationship. This, in turn, will lead the subject to
have some characteristic interactions with the other, and these, in turn, will
have some effects upon both the subject and the other that will provide
evidence as to the type of relationship that exists between them. This, in
turn, will validate as appropriate or invalidate as inappropriate the subject’s
psychological orientation and will require its modification. Here the cycle is
A ^ B C -Â. Or I might begin at a different point, C, inducing the
subject to believe that he was in a mutually promotive interdependent rela-
tion. This would, in turn, lead the subject to a psychological orientation
toward the relationship that has specifiable characteristics, and this, in turn,
would lead to certain interactions with the other, and so on. Here the cycle
is C ^ A ^ B —^ C. Or I might commence by leading the subject to

interact with the other in specified ways that, in turn, would produce cer-
tain consequences that, in turn, would produce evidence as to what kind of
relationship the subject was in, and so on. Here the starting point is B and
the cycle continues.
Several other features of figure 1 merit comment. I assume that the two
parts of each triangle can affect each other. First one’s psychological orien-
tation to one’s present social relationship can be affected by and can also
affect one’s desires with regard to that relationship. Thus, if one has a
desire for a cooperative relationship but one has a contrient orientation to
the other, one may either change one’s desire or one’s orientation, depend-
ing upon which is less strongly rooted. Second, one’s present social relations
with another can influence or be influenced by the potential one sees for the
development of the relationship. If I experienced the present relationship as
a destructive one, I might not see it as having a future; on the other hand, if
I see the potential of developing a warm, loving relationship, I might be
more positive toward an initially difficult relationship than I might other-
wise be. Third, the nature of one’s actions and reactions in a relationship
can affect as well as be affected by the normative definitions that exist
regarding interactions in a given social relationship. Although early in a
relationship, culturally determined normative definitions often govern the
meanings of social interactions, relations tend to build up their own indio-
syncratic normative definitions as a result of repeated interactions that may
be peculiar to the particular relationship.
There is, of course, a tendency for the two parts of each triangle to be
consistent with each other; when they are not, one can expect more complex
psychological structures than the one depicted in figure 1. For example, if the
present and future characteristics of the social relationship are perceived to be
inconsistent with each other, the “time perspective” dimension of the rela-
tionship will be very prominent. Similarly, if there is an inconsistency be-
tween the desired social relationship and the present psychological orienta-
tion, the “reality” dimension will be very prominent. It is beyond the scope of
this chapter, however, to consider these important psychological aspects of
social relations; Lewin (1951) has suggestive remarks about these dimensions
of the life space in his writings.
Surrounding the triangles of figure 1 is the objective world of the partici-
pants; this includes the characteristics of the individual participants, of their
immediate situations, and of the environment within which their relationship
is embedded. I have characterized this objective world as sending causal
arrows to all the elements involved in the psychological orientation—social
relations cycle and also as receiving causal arrows from these elements: the
nature of the participants and their immediate situations as well as their
environment affect their social relations, their psychological orientation, and
their interactions, and these, in turn, affect the participants and the realities
confronting them. In this larger cycle, what one considers to be the indepen-
dent variables are the ones that one manipulates.
82 THEORY
The Nature of Psychological Orientations
Cognitive orientations. In recent years, scholars in a number of disciplines—

cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, linguistics, anthropology,
and artifical intelligence—have utilized such terms as schema, script, and
frame to refer to the structures of expectations that help orient the individual
cognitively to the situation confronting him. I shall employ the term cognitive
orientation as meaning essentially the same thing. In the view being presented
here, the person’s cognitive orientation to his situation is only one aspect of
his psychological orientation to a social relationship. Other aspects include
his motivational orientation and his moral orientation.
The term schema goes back to Bartlett (1932) who, much influenced by
the work of the neurologist Sir Henry Head (1920), emphasized the construc-
tive and organized features of memory as opposed to the notion of memory
as passive storage. The term script derives from the work of Abelson (1975,
1976) and Schanck and Abelson (1977) who also stress that people have
organized knowledge of a stereotypic form about most recurrent situations
they encounter. Abelson defines a script as a “coherent sequence of events
expected by the individual, involving him either as a participant or as an
observer” (1975, p. 33). He goes on to postulate that “cognitively mediated
social behavior depends on the joint occurrence of two processes: (a) the
selection of a particular script to represent the given social situation and (b)
the taking of a participant role within that script” (pp. 42-43). The term
frame was introduced by Bateson (1955) to explain how individuals ex-
change signals that allow them to agree upon the level of abstraction at
which any message is intended—for example, whether the message is in-
tended as serious or playful. Goffman (1974) has generalized Bateson’s dis-
cussion of frames in an extended analysis of how individuals, as they attend
to any current situation, face the question “What is it that’s going on here?”
Underlying the concepts of schema, script, and frame is the shared view
that people approach their social world, actively, with structured expecta-
tions about themselves and their social environments that reflect their orga-
nized beliefs about different social situations and different people. Our struc-
tured expectations make it possible for us quickly to interpret and respond to
what’s going on in specific situations, and if our expectations lead us to
inappropriate interpretations and responses, then they are likely to be revised
on the basis of our experiences in the situation. Or if the circumstance con-
fronting us is sufficiently malleable, our interpretations and responses to it
may help to shape its form.
Schemas, scripts, or frames may be concrete and specific—for example,
how to work together with a particular person on a given task—or they may
be rather abstract and general—for example what is involved in a competitive
as compared to a cooperative relationship. In any society that provides a
variety of situations in which different areas in the multidimensional space of
social relations, are well-represented (the space being composed from the
dimensions described above), then it is likely that rather abstract schemas or
scripts will develop to characterize the types of relations depicted in table 1.

Such scripts or cognitive orientations are a central component of what I am
here calling psychological orientations.
It is important for the participants in a particular social relationship to
know “what’s going on here”; to know the actors, the roles they are to
perform, the relations among the different roles, the props and settings, the
scenes, and the themes of the social interaction. However, everyday social
relations are rarely as completely specified by well-articulated scripts as is
social interaction in a conventional play in the traditional theater; ordinary
social interactions have more the qualities of improvisational theater in which
only the nature of the characters involved in the situation are well-specified,
and they are largely free to develop the details of the skeletonized script as
they interact with one another.
The improvisational nature of most social relations and the fact that given
types of social relations occur in widely different contexts and with many
different kinds of actors make it likely that relatively abstract or generalized
cognitive orientations, schemas, or scripts will develop for the different types
of social relations. I assume that people are implicit social psychological
theorists and have as a result of their experience developed cognitive schemas
of the different types of social relations, which, though usually not articu-
lated, are similar to those articulated by theorists in social psychology and the
other social sciences. Undoubtedly, at this early stage of the development of
social science theory, the unarticulated conceptions of the average person are
apt to be more sophisticated than the articulated ones of the social scientists.
Motivational orientations. Just as different cognitive orientations are as-
sociated with the different types of social relations, so also are different
motivational orientations. A motivational orientation toward a given social
relationship orients one to the possibilities of gratification or frustration of
certain types of needs in the relationship. To the cognitive characterization
of the relationship, the motivational orientation adds the personal, subjec-
tive features arising from one’s situationally relevant motives or need-
dispositions.
It gives rise to the cathexis of certain regions of the cognitive landscape,
making them positively or negatively valent, and highlights the pathways to
and from valent regions: it gives the cognitive map a dynamic character. It
predisposes one to certain kinds of fantasies (or nightmares) and to certain
kinds of emotions. It orients one to such questions as “What is to be valued
in this relationship?” or “What do I want here and how do I get it?”
It is evident that different types of social relations offer different possibili-
ties of need gratification. It would be unreasonable, for example, to expect
one’s need for affection to be gratified in a business transaction and inappro-
priate to expect one’s financial needs to be fulfilled in an intimate relation-
ship. In the third part of this chapter, I shall attempt to characterize briefly
the motivational orientations associated with the polar ends of the different
dimensions of interpersonal relations.
Moral orientation. A moral orientation toward a given social relationship
84 THEORY
orients one to the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of the people
involved in the relationship. It adds an “ought to,” obligatory, quality to a
psychological orientation. The moral orientation implies that one experiences
one’s relationship not only from a personal perspective but also from a social
perspective that includes the perspective of the others in the relationship. A
moral orientation makes the experience of injustice more than a personal
experience. Not only is one personally affected but so are the other partici-
pants in the relationship because its value underpinnings are being under-
mined. The various participants in a relationship have the mutual obligation
to respect and protect the framework of social norms that define what is to
be considered as fair or unfair in the interactions and outcomes of the partici-
pants. One can expect that the moral orientations, and hence what is con-
sidered fair, will differ in the different types of social relations.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPES OF

INTERDEPENDENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS
In this section, I shall characterize the psychological orientations that are

associated with the dimensions of “cooperation-competition,” “power,”
“task-oriented versus social-emotional,” and “formal versus informal.” For
each of the four dimensions depicted in table 1, I shall describe the cognitive,
motivational, and moral orientations that typify the dimension.
1. Cooperation-Competition
a. Cognitive orientation. The cooperative-competitive dimension seems so

fundamental to social life that one would assume a well-developed innate
predisposition to develop abstract cognitive orientations to help an individual
define quickly whether “what’s going on here?” is “good” for him or “bad”
for him. With additional experience and further psychological differentiation
and integration, the basic cognitive schema of cooperation-competition
should emerge: we are “for” each other or “against” each other; we are
linked together so that we both gain or lose together or we are linked to-
gether so that if one gains, the other loses. This basic schema has many
implications (see Deutsch 1949a, 1949b, 1962a, 1973, 1979, for an elabora-
tion of these implications). It leads an individual holding it to expect that in a
cooperative relationship the other will be pleased by his effective actions and
will be ready to help him be successful; he will expect the opposite to be true
in a competitive relationship. If he believes he is in a cooperative relationship
and the other is displeased by his effective actions, he will wonder: “What’s
going on here?” “Am I in the kind of relationship that I think I am in?”
“What can I do to find out what is going on here?”
b. Motivational orientation. In a cooperative relationship, one is predis-
posed to cathect the other positively, to have a trusting and benevolent atti-
tude toward the other, to be psychologically open to the other, to be giving as
well as receptive to the other, to have a sense of responsibility toward the

other and toward the mutual process of cooperation; to see the other as
similar to oneself, and so on. One is also predisposed to expect the other to
have a similar orientation toward oneself. Murray’s (1938, pp. 175—77)
description of the need for affiliation captures much of the essence of this
motivational orientation. It is clear that its specific quality will be very much
influenced by what type of cooperative relationship is involved: social-
emotional or task oriented, equal or unequal, formal or informal, intense or
superficial.
In a competitive relationship, one is predisposed to cathect the other
negatively, to have a suspicious, hostile, exploitative attitude toward the
other, to be psychologically closed to the other, to be aggressive and defen-
sive toward the other, to seek advantage and superiority for self and disad-
vantage and inferiority for the other, to see the other as opposed to oneself
and basically different, and so on. One is also predisposed to expect the other
to have the same orientation. Murray’s (1938) description of the “need for
aggression” (pp. 159—61) and “need for defendance” (pp. 194—95) as well as
the associated needs for “infavoidance” (pp. 192—93) and “counteraction”
(pp. 195—97) seem to characterize much of the basic features of this motiva-
tional orientation. Its specific quality will be determined by the type of com-
petitive situation: task oriented or social emotional, equal or unequal, formal
or informal, intense or superficial. In addition, it will be colored by one’s
conception of one’s chances of winning or losing.
c. Moral orientation. Although the specific character of the moral orienta-
tions associated with cooperation and competition will also depend upon
other features of the social relationship, it seems evident that cooperation and
competition elicit different types of moral orientations. The moral orientation
linked with cooperation is a tendency toward egalitarianism. This tendency
underlies a general conception of justice that Rawls has expressed as follows:
“All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribu-
tion of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (1971, p. 62).
The moral orientation connected with cooperation fosters mutual respect and
self-respect and favors equality as a guiding value to be breached only when
inequality brings greater benefits and advantages to those less fortunate than
they would otherwise have been if all were treated equally. Given this moral
orientation, Rawls points out, “Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are
not to the benefit of all” (p. 62).
In contrast, the moral orientation linked with competition sanctions in-
equality and legitimizes a win-lose struggle to determine who will have superior
and who will have inferior outcomes in a competitive relationship. Depending
upon other features of the relationship, the struggle may be regulated so that the
competition takes place under fair rules (as in a duel of honor) and one’s moral
orientation will include an obligation to obey the rules, or the struggle may be a
no-holds-barred one in which any means to defeat the other can be employed.
An active state of competition implies that the competitors do not mutually
86 THEORY
perceive and accept a superior-inferior relationship between them; if they do

and they continue to wage competition, then they are violating the moral
imperatives of competitive justice. Thus, it is part of the moral orientation of
competition for a victor to accept the defeat of someone who acknowledges
being vanquished without continuing to beat the defeated one.
2. Power (Equality versus Inequality)
a. Cognitive orientation. The basic schema of relationship power (Deutsch,

1973) has to do with the relative power of the participants in a relationship to
benefit or harm or persuade each other and, hence, their relative power to
influence each other. In a relationship of unequal power, it is expected that the
more powerful member will be advantaged and the less powerful one will be
disadvantaged whenever their interests are opposed: hence, it is considered
better to be in the more powerful rather than the less powerful position in a
competitive relationship. The competitive branch of the unequal power
schema highlights the roles of victor and vanquished; the equal power schema
orients more to continuing struggle. In both competitive branches, the use of
tactics of coercion, intimidation, and power bluffs are made salient. Even in a
situation wherein the more and less powerful members have congruent inter-
ests, the less powerful member is expected to be more dependent upon the
other and, hence, more likely to engage in ingratiating behavior. The coopera-
tive branch of the unequal power schema emphasizes the orientation toward
responsibility in the high power position and of respectful compliance from the
low power position; the equal power schema orients more toward mutual
responsibility and respect. Both cooperative branches make salient the use of
the more positive forms of power; persuasion rather than coercion, benefits
rather than harms, legitimate rather than illegitimate power.
b. Motivational orientation. In an equality relationship, one is predis-
posed to consider that the other is entitled to the same esteem and respect as
oneself. The equality of power is likely to signify that the different partici-
pants in a relationship have the same value. Respect and esteem are more
valuable if they are received from those whom one respects; equal status
relations represent the optimum distribution for the mutual support of self-
esteem. The need-dispositions related to self-esteem and self-respect seem to
underlie this motivational orientation. The need for self-esteem involves the
need to have a sense of the worthiness of one’s goals and a sense of confi-
dence in one’s ability to fulfill one’s intentions; the need for self-respect
involves the need to have a sense of one’s moral worth, of one’s equal right to
justice and fair treatment. It undermines one’s sense of belonging to a moral
community to be treated more fairly or less fairly than others, and this, in
turn, weakens the foundations of self-respect. Hence, one’s self-respect is
more firmly grounded in relationships wherein one can feel the others are
also entitled to respect. Similarly, the confidence in oneself that is connected
with a secure self-esteem is fostered by association and comparison with
people who are similar in status rather than those who are higher or lower.
In an unequal relationship, one is predisposed either to take a more

dominant or a more subordinate role or to resist the inequality. Murray
(1938, pp. 152—54) has characterized the different aspects of the “need for
dominance.” It is manifest in the desire to control, influence, direct, com-
mand, induce, dictate, supervise, instruct, or lead. In a competitive situation,
the need for dominance will often be fused with the need for aggression and
lead to attempts to coerce and force the other to comply with one’s desires. In
a cooperative situation, it will often be fused with the need for nurturance
and lead to a protective, guiding, and caring orientation toward the other.
The submissive role has different needs associated with it, depending upon
whether it occurs in a cooperative or competitive context. In a cooperative
context, Murray’s description of the “need for deference” seems appropriate
(pp. 154—56). It involves a readiness to follow, to comply, to emulate, to
conform, to obey, to defer, to admire, to revere, to be suggestible, to heed
advice, and otherwise to accept the superior authority of the other.
In a competitive relationship, the need-disposition associated with the ac-
ceptance of the inferior role is well characterized in Murray’s description of the
“need for abasement” (pp. 161—64). This disposition is reflected in the ten-
dency to submit passively, to accept blame, to surrender, to seek punishment
or pain, to be servile, to be resigned, to acquiesce, to be timorous, to give in,
and to allow oneself to be bullied. It is evident that the subordinate role in an
unequal relationship may be difficult to accept and be resisted. The resistance
to an unequal relationship will be evidenced in aspects of what Murray has
termed the “need for autonomy” (pp. 156—59) and the “need for rejection”
(pp. 177—80). The need for autonomy is characterized by the tendency to resist
coercion and restraint, to be defiant and rebellious in relation to arbitrary
authority, to be independent of social ties, to be a nonconformist. The need for
rejection is reflected in the tendency to separate oneself from a negatively
cathected other; to reject a disliked superior other, to outsnub a snob; to
exclude, abandon, expel, or remain indifferent to an inferior other.
c. Moral orientation. As the preceding discussion of motivational orienta-
tions would suggest, there are a number of different moral orientations con-
nected with equality and inequality: other features of the relationship, in
addition to the distribution of power within it, will determine the nature of
the moral orientation that will be elicited. Thus, in a cooperative, equal
relationship one would expect the kind of egalitarian relationship described
previously. In a cooperative, unequal relationship, the moral orientation obli-
gates the more powerful person to employ his power in such a way as to
benefit the less powerful one, not merely himself. In such a relationship, the
less powerful one has the obligation to show appreciation for and to defer to
and honor the more powerful person. These obligations may be rather spe-
cific and limited if the relationship is task oriented, or they may be diffuse
and general if the relationship is a social-emotional one.
In an equal, competitive relationship, one’s moral orientation is toward the
value of initial equality among the competitors and the subsequent striving to
achieve superiority over the others. This orientation favors equal opportunity
88 THEORY
but not equal outcomes; the competitors start the contest with equal chances to
win, but some win and some lose. In an unequal competitive relationship, the
moral orientations of the strong and the weak support an exploitative relation-
ship. The strong are likely to adopt the view that the rich and powerful are
biologically and hence morally superior; they have achieved their superior
positions as a result of natural selection; it would be against nature to interfere
with the inequality and suffering of the poor and^weak; it is the manifest destiny
of superior people to lead inferior peoples. The beatitude of those in powerful
positions who exploit those in weaker positions appears to be: “Blessed are the
strong for they shall prey upon the weak” (Banton, 1967, p. 48). In an unequal
competitive relationship, the weak are apt to “identify with the aggressor”
(Anna Freud, 1937), adopting the moral orientation of the more powerful and
feeling that their inferior outcomes are deserved. Or they may feel victimized. If
so, they may develop a revolutionary moral orientation directed toward chang-
ing the nature of the existing relationship or they may develop the moral
orientation of being a victim. The latter orientation seeks to obtain secondary
gratification from being morally superior to the victimizer: “it’s better to be
sinned against than to sin,” “the meek shall inherit the earth.”
3. Task-oriented versus Social-Emotional
a. Cognitive orientation. The basic schema here has to do with the focus of
involvement. In a task-oriented relationship, one expects the attention and
the activities of the participants to be directed toward something external to
their relationship, whereas in a social-emotional relationship, one expects
much of the involvement to be centered on the relationship and the specific
persons in the relationship. This difference in focus leads one to expect a
relationship that is primarily task oriented to be impersonal in the sense that
who is involved in accomplishing the task and the nature of the personal
relationships among those working on the task are of less importance than
the actual accomplishment of the task. In a task-oriented relationship people
who can perform equally well on the task are substitutable for one another;
the personal identity and the unique individuality of the performer have little
significance in such a relationship.
In contrast, in a social-emotional relationship, the personal qualities and
identity of the individuals involved are of paramount importance; people are
not readily substitutable for one another. In Parsonian terminology (Parsons,
1951), in a task-oriented relationship, one is oriented to the other as “com-
plexes of performances”—that is, in terms of what the other does; whereas in a
social-emotional relationship, one is oriented to the other as “complexes of
qualities”—that is, in terms of what the other is. Also, in a task-oriented
relationship, one’s orientation toward the other is “universalistic”—that is,
one applies general standards that are independent of one’s particular relation-
ship with the other; whereas in a social-emotional relationship, one’s orienta-
tion is “particularistic”—that is, one’s responses to the other are determined
by the particular relatedness that exists between oneself and the other.
In a task-oriented relationship, one is oriented to making decisions about

which means are most efficient in achieving given ends/ This orientation
requires an abstract, analytic, quantifying, calculating, comparative mode of
thought in which one is able to adopt an affectively neutral, external attitude
toward different means in order to be able to appraise precisely their compar-
ative merit in achieving one’s ends. Other people are oriented to as instru-
mental means and become evaluated in comparison or competition with
other means. In contrast, in a social-emotional relationship, one is oriented to
the attitudes, feelings, and psychological states of the other as ends. This
orientation requires a more holistic, concrete, intuitive, qualitative, apprecia-
tive-aesthetic mode of thought in which one’s own affective reactions help
one to apprehend the other from the inside. Other people are oriented to as
unique persons rather than as instruments in which aspects of the person are
useful for particular purposes.
b. Motivational orientation. A task-oriented relationship tends to evoke
achievement-oriented motivations. Achievement motivations have been dis-
cussed extensively by Murray (1938), McClelland et al. (1953), Atkinson and
Feather (1966), and Weiner (1974). Here, I wish merely to indicate that it cons-
ists not only of the egoistic motivations to achieve success and to avoid failure;
motivations related to using one’s capabilities in worthwhile activities may also
be involved. Additionally, since achievement motivation is often instrumentally
oriented to serve an adaptive function in relation to an external environment
characterized by a scarcity rather than an abundance of resources, it usually con-
tains an element of motivation that is oriented toward rational, efficient accom-
plishment of the task. Further, since task-oriented relationships are primarily
instrumental rather than consummatory in character, they require a motiva-
tional orientation that accepts delay in gratification and that obtains satisfaction
from disciplined activity oriented toward future gratification.
A number of different motivational orientations are likely to be elicited in
social-emotional relationships: affiliation, affection, esteem, play, sentience,
eroticism, and nurturance-succorance. The primary feature of these different
need-dispositions as they are manifested in social-emotional relationships is that
they are focused on the nature of the person-to-person (or person-to-group)
relationships: They are oriented toward giving and receiving cathexes, toward
the attitudes and emotions of the people involved in the relationship, and
toward the pleasures and frustrations arising from the interaction with the
particular others in the given relationship. Although past experiences and future
expectations may affect how one acts toward others and how one interprets the
actions of others in a social-emotional relationship, such a relationship—if it is a
genuine one—is not instrumental to other, future goals; it is an end in itself. In
this sense, the need-dispositions in a social-emotional relationship are oriented
toward current rather than delayed gratification.
4. I caution the reader not to conclude from this sentence or anything else in this chapter that
relationships that are exclusively task oriented will be more productive than those that have a mix-
ture of task orientedness and social-emotional orientedness. Effective group functioning on tasks,
for example, require attention to group maintenance as well as task functions (Deutsch, 1949b).
90 THEORY
c. Moral orientation. The moral orientation in a task-oriented relation-

ship is that of utilitarianism. Its root value is maximization: people should try
to get the most out of situations. Good is viewed as essentially quantitative,
as something that can be increased or decreased without limit (Diesing, 1962,
p. 35). A second element in this moral orientation is the means-end schema in
which efficient allocation of means to achieve alternative ends becomes a
salient value. A third element is impartiality in the comparison of means so
that means can be compared on the basis of their merit in achieving given
ends rather than on the basis of considerations irrelevant to the means-end
relationship. In Parsonian terms (Parsons, 1951), the moral orientation in a
task-oriented relationship is characterized by the values of universalism, af-
fective neutrality, and achievement. In contrast, the moral orientation of a
social-emotional relationship is characterized by the values of particularism,
affectivity, and ascription (Diesing, 1962, p. 90). Obligations to other people
in a social-emotional relationship are based on their particular relationship to
oneself rather than upon general principles; they are strongest when relations
are close and weakest when relations are distant. In a task-oriented relation-
ship, one strives to detach oneself from the objects of one’s actions and to
treat them all as equal, separate interchangeable entities; in a social-emo-
tional relationship, one is the focal point of a myriad of relationships that one
strives to maintain and extend since action takes place only within relation-
ships (Diesing, 1962, p. 91). Ascription is the opposite of achievement value:
it means that one’s actions and obligations toward people spring solely from
their relationship to oneself rather than as responses to something they have
done.
4. Formal versus Informal
2L. Cognitive orientation. The basic element in the schema related to this
dimension has to do with whether one expects the people involved in the
social situation to have their activities, forms of relationship, demeanor, and
the like largely determined and regulated by social rules and conventions or
whether one expects them to have the freedom to make and break their own
rules to suit their individual and collective inclinations. In a formal relation-
ship, one expects that the latitude for deviation from conventional forms of
behavior is small and that when one violates the rules, others will react
negatively and one will be embarrassed (if the violation is unwitting). Since
the rules are usually well known and well articulated in a formal relationship,
it is apt to be characterized by more predictability and less surprise than an
informal one. Hostile rather than friendly relationships, unequal rather than
equal ones, and impersonal rather than formal ones are more likely to be
regulated than are informal relationships.
b. Motivational orientation. Formal social relationships appear to be re-
lated to a cluster of psychological tendencies. Murray (1938, pp. 200—04)
has described various elements of this cluster: the need for order, conjunctiv-
ity, sameness, deliberateness, and placidity. Although Murray’s emphasis is
on the enduring character of these psychological predispositions, it seems

likely that the psychological tendencies underlying the “bureaucratic person-
ality” (Merton, 1957) can be elicited by bureaucratic structures. These ten-
dencies have been well described by Merton in his classic paper on bureau-
cratic structure and personality and have been amply characterized in the
literature on the obsessive-compulsive personality. The emphasis here is on
how formal situations can temporarily induce in otherwise nonbureaucratic
and nonobsessive personalities psychological predispositions to value order,
regulation, predictability, sameness, lack of surprise, and the like.
Informal relationships tend to be more open, more particularistic, more
frank, more flexible, more emotional, and more personal than formal ones.
They have a more relaxed, improvisational character in which quickly
formed, intuitive, and impressionistic reactions to the specific other in the
particular situation largely determine one’s behavior. In an informal relation-
ship, one’s motivational orientation is more directed toward the person
whereas in a formal relationship, it is more directed toward rules and author-
ity. Emotion and conflict are more apt to be openly expressed in informal
relationships and avoided in formal ones. The more enduring psychological
predispositions that are characteristic of the hysterical personality and the
field-dependent person resemble the situationally induced motivational orien-
tations to be found in informal relationships.
c. Moral orientation. In many respects, the moral orientations to task-
oriented and formal relationships are similar as is also the case for social-
emotional and informal relationships. Formal relationships go beyond the
values of universalism and affective neutrality or impartiality to include a
moral orientation to the rules and conventions that guide social relations: one
has an obligation to respect them and to conform to them. One’s obligation
is to the the form of the relationship rather than to its spirit. In contrast, in
an informal relationship, one is morally oriented to the spirit rather than the
form of the relationship, it is the relationship to which one is obligated rather
than to the rules that are supposed to regulate it.
In the preceding pages, for brevity’s sake, I have discussed the psychological
orientations characterizing each of the four dimensions of interpersonal rela-
tionships as though the dimensions existed in isolation from one another. In
doing so, I have of course not adequately characterized the psychological
orientations characterizing the different types of interpersonal relationships:
each type reflects a combination of different dimensions. The psychological
orientation associated, for example, with an intimate relationship fuses the
orientation connected with the particular positions on the cooperative, social-
emotional, equal, informal, and intense dimensions. Here, the psychological
orientations arising from the different dimensions of the relationship are all
concordant with one another. The threat to an'intimate relationship might
arise from a discordance on any of the dimensions: for example, a competi-
tive orientation rather than a cooperative one (“I am more giving than you
are”); a task-oriented rather than a social-emotional one (“you don’t accom-
92 THEORY
plish enough”); a dependent rather than a equal one (“I need you to protect
me and to take care of me”); or a formal rather than an informal one (“I get
upset in a relationship unless I always know what is expected, unless it has
no surprises, unless it is always orderly and predictable”).
From our earlier discussion of the correlations among the different dimen-
sions in the first part, it is evident that there is more or less discordance
among the psychological orientations related to the different dimensions in
the different types of social relations. Thus, the psychological orientation
associated with cooperation is more concordant with the psychological orien-
tations associated with equality rather than inequality, informality rather
than formality, social-emotional rather than task-oriented activities. How-
ever, many cooperative relationships are task-oriented and/or unequal and/or
formal. Where there is discordance among the different dimensions character-
izing a relationship, it seems likely that the relative weights or importance of
the different dimensions in the given type of relationship will determine the
relative weights of their associated psychological orientations. That is, if the
task-oriented character of the relationship has stronger weight than the coop-
erative aspects, it will have more influence in determining the governing
psychological orientation. It also seems likely that the more extreme the
location is on a given dimension, the more apt that dimension is to have the
key role in determining the nature of the psychological orientation; in a
situation that is extremely formal and only slightly cooperative, the psycho-
logical orientation will be determined more by the situation’s formality than
by its cooperativeness.
SOME RELEVANT RESEARCH
In the opening paragraph of this chapter, I stated that the causal arrow
connecting the psychological orientations and types of interdependence is
bidirectional: a psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given
type of interdependence. Here, I would go further and indicate that the
cognitive, motivational and moral components of a psychological orientation
can each induce one another—hence, they are likely to be found together—
and each of the components can induce or be induced by a given type of
interdependence. The foregoing assumptions proliferate into a great number
of testable, specific hypotheses, which do not need to be elaborated here. To
illustrate, however, these hypotheses would predict a two-way causal arrow
between specific modes of thought and specific types of social relations.
Thus, a bureaucratic social situation will tend to induce obsessive-compulsive
modes of thought, and obsessive-compulsive modes of thought will tend to
bureaucratize a social relationship. They would also predict that a competi-
tive social relationship will tend to increase the psychological weight or im-
portance of the differences in values between oneself and one’s competitors,
whereas a cooperative relationship will tend to increase the psychological
importance of the similarities in values between oneself and one’s fellow
cooperators; also, that a tendency to accentuate the differences in values

between oneself and others is apt to induce a competitive relationship,
whereas a tendency to accentuate the similarities is likely to induce a coop-
erative relationship. Further, it can be predicted that different principles of
distributive justice will be associated with different types of social relations: a
fraternal relationship will be connected with the principle of equality, a car-
ing relationship with the principle of need, a hierarchical organization with
the principal of equity, a power struggle with the principle of winner-take-all.
Each of these different principles can induce different modes of thought and
different types of social relations when experimentally introduced into an
otherwise unstructured social situation. For all the various hypotheses that
entail two-way causal arrows, from an experimental point of view the inde-
pendent variables are the ones that are manipulated by the experimenter and
the dependent variables are the ones that are affected by the manipulated
variables.
Some of the hypotheses suggested by the theoretical ideas presented in
this chapter have been tested in prior work in my laboratory (Deutsch, 1973)
and by the work of many other social psychologists working in a variety of
areas in social psychology. However, many of these ideas have not yet been
systematically investigated. Here, I wish to describe briefly a dissertation
study (Judd, 1978) conducted in our laboratory that illustrates our interests
in the relation between types of interdependence and modes of thought; other
more recent studies are discussed in greater detail in part II of this book.
In Judd’s study, he argued that competitive processes in attitude conflicts
are characterized by a tendency to accentuate the evaluative differences be-
tween one’s own position and the position of the person with whom one is
arguing. One of the ways in which this might be done is by emphasizing
those conceptual dimensions along which there are larger differences. Hence,
Judd hypothesized that in a competitive conflict, the conflicting parties will
come to see their positions as being relatively dissimilar, and this will be
accomplished by heightening the evaluative centrality of those conceptual
dimensions that best distinguish between their positions.
For cooperative processes, he argued that parties have the mutual goal of
learning more about the issues under dispute. An emphasis upon conceptual
dimensions along which positions differ significantly may well lead to a more
competitive conflict; therefore, Judd hypothesized that a cooperative orienta-
tion will motivate individuals to deemphasize those dimensions that best
discriminate between the positions and to emphasize dimensions along which
there is less of a difference. Thus, a cooperative orientation between conflict-
ing parties will lead to the heightened perception of position similarity as a
result of lowered evaluative centrality of the most discriminating dimensions
and heightened evaluative centrality of less discriminating dimensions. Judd’s
hypothesis can be deduced from Deutsch’s crude law of social relations (see
chapter 5).
Judd came to the interesting conclusion that the perceptions of similarity/
dissimilarity of positions induced by one’s orientation (competitive or coop-
94 THEORY
erative) to a conflict will be mediated by conceptual changes in the way we

look at the issue under dispute. We will come to place more evaluative
emphasis upon some dimensions and less upon others, and these changes may
be relatively long-lasting.
Judd’s research was designed to test the above hypotheses. Pairs of sub-
jects were assigned positions on how national health insurance should be
organized, an issue about which they did not liave strong opinions. These
positions differed along three dimensions, positions of pairs of subjects being
highly distant on one dimension, less distant on a second, and identical on
the third. The dimensions related to how comprehensive the health insurance
plan should be in its coverage, how much of a deductible (if any) there should
be, and at what level of government it should be administered. Subjects were
asked to debate the issues under either a cooperative or a competitive orienta-
tion. Following this, judgments of similarity of positions as well as a measure
of dimensional evaluative centrality were gathered in order to test the hypothe-
ses under investigation.
The results of the experiment strongly confirmed its underlying hypo-
theses: competition led to decreased perceived similarity between the positions
and the dimension on which positions differed most was most evaluatively
central; cooperation had opposite effects. In other words, the competitive
orientation led the competitors to develop conceptual structures, related to the
issue under dispute, that accentuated the differences between them and made
these differences more attitudinally significant to them; in contrast, the coop-
erative orientation led the disputants to develop conceptual structures that
emphasized the similarities in their positions and made the similarities more
emotionally important to them.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this chapter, I have advanced several theses. First, different types of social
relations can be characterized in terms of their positions on a number of basic
dimensions of interpersonal relations. Second, each of the different types of
social relations has associated with it a distinctive psychological orientation.
A psychological orientation is a complex, consisting of interrelated cognitive,
motivational, and moral orientations. Third, the causal arrow connecting
psychological orientations and types of social relations is bidirectional: a
psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of social
relationship. And, fourth, the various elements (cognitive, motivational, and
moral) of a psychological orientation tend to be consistent with one another.
My argument is not that social relations determine psychological orienta-
tions without regard to the personalities of the individual participants, nor is
it that psychological orientations induce distinctive social relations without
regard to the nature of the social situation confronting them. My thesis is
rather that there is a tendency for consistency between psychological orienta-
tions and social relations that will lead to change in one or both until congru-
ence between the two has been largely achieved. In some circumstances, it
will be easier to change psychological orientations; in others, social relations
can be more readily altered. In this chapter, I have not addressed the problem
of what determines how a conflict between one’s psychological orientation to
a relationship and the nature of the relationship will be solved. This is an
important problem for future work.
One final comment: my discussion throughout has been of ideal types of
social relations. Actual social relations are inevitably more complex than my
discussion of ideal types would suggest. An intimate love relationship, for
example, is often characterized by considerable ambivalence; there are not
only strong positive elements manifest in the relationship, but also intense
anxieties latent within it; there are quarrels as well as embraces. In addition,
it must be recognized that relationships develop and change. Apart from my
brief discussion of figure 1, I have not attempted to characterize the dynamics
of relationships. This, too, is an important problem for future work.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Theoretical Overview of Area:

Relation to Other
Theorizing and Research
A number of years ago, I wrote a review of the theorizing and research in the
social psychology of justice (Deutsch, 1977b). I made several critical points
about the literature I surveyed:
1. It has been heavily dominated by the assumption that equity is the sover-
eign principle of distributive justice; only recently has this assumption been
strongly challenged.
2. Some of the key assumptions underlying equity theory have not been sys-
tematically examined, particularly the notion that economic productivity
is fostered by application of the equity principle.
3. The literature has placed its primary research focus on reactions to ineq-
uity, on studying the process by which psychological equilibrium is re-
stored once an inequity is experienced. This is a very important but quite
limiting focus for investigating the range of social psychological phenom-
ena related to distributive justice.
4. There has been a lack of systematic investigations of the different attributes
of distributive systems.
5. Neither the consequences nor the determinants of different types of dis-
tributive systems have been systematically studied.
6. As a result of the overemphasis of research on equity, with its implicit
context of the market economy, there has been insufficient research on
distributive justice in other institutional contexts such as the family, the
school, or the hospital. Other principles than equity may more strongly
come into play in these other contexts.
7. Adams and Freedman (1976) have noted that there has been little investi-
gation of the nature of the distress experienced as a result of an inequity.
More generally, the phenomenology and experience of injustice in different
settings has been studied hardly at all.
Recently, a number of books have been published that indicate that my

1977 review is largely out of date. Six are edited collections of specially
96
Theoretical Overview 97
prepared articles (Gergen, Greenberg, and Willis, 1980; Mikula, 1980a;

Lerner and Lerner, 1981; Greenberg and Cohen, 1982; Messick and Cook,
1983; Folger, 1984), and one is a report of an extended program of research
(Lerner, 1980). From these books, as well as other publications, a number of
conclusions can be drawn.
A. Equity theory is still an important but no longer dominant theoretical
influence in the area. There have been many substantive criticisms of this
theory from different sources. The equity theorists Austin and Flatfield (for-
merly Walster) (1980) have responded that the criticisms do not require the
discarding of equity theory, only its elaboration. Their major suggestions for
elaboration involve developing a theory of negotiations that specifies how
differences in power determine the value of the perceived inputs and out-
comes in the equity formula and developing a theory of how the social
context determines what canons of justice will be perceived as fair in an
interpersonal exchange. The tone of equity theory in the 1980s is much more
subdued than it was in the 1970s. The change in tone appears to reflect a
response to:
1. The rejection of proportionality as a sovereign principle in favor of a
situationally appropriate, multiprinciple approach by such people as
Deutsch (1975), Lerner (1975), Leventhal (1976a, 1976b), Mikula and
Schwinger (1978), Sampson (1975), and even Homans (1982).
2. The criticism of the ideology implicit in equity that reflects particular so-
ciohistorical conditions (Sampson, 1975).
3. The criticism of equity theory that it ignores the interactional aspects of the
exchange relationship. It focuses on what goes on in the isolated head of
one or the other of the participants and ignores the bargaining process
involved in the participants arriving at a mutually acceptable definition of
equity (Deutsch, 1977b).
4. The criticism that the economic model underlying equity theory, while
appropriate to economic relations, is inappropriate to intimate relations.
Holmes (1981) presents a very insightful analysis of the problems that
result when a close relationship is considered to be similar to an economic
exchange relationship. He points out that distressed couples often have a
social exchange orientation in their relationship to each other: their ex-
changes are monitored over short-term spans and are examined for equiva-
lence; they assume that benefits are given conditionally with the expecta-
tion that similar benefits will be returned; tangible and other measurable
benefits, which facilitate the assessment of the equivalence of exchange,
have greater value; and the relationship tends to be rule governed with a
relatively explicit social contract. Such an orientation undermines the trust
and intimacy that are central to close relationships.
5. The criticism that equity theory does not take adequately into account the
attributions that people make in regard to the inequities that people experi-
ence: the nature of the attributions will affect not only the degree of distress
experienced but also how and whether they will attempt to respond to the
inequity. Utne and Kidd (1980) and Cohen (1982) discuss causal attribution
in relation to justice very insightfully, adding a new perspective to work in
98 THEORY
this area. Thus, they point out that it makes a difference in both the percep-
tion of and the response to an injustice whether the injustice is considered to
be intentional or unintentional, whether it is viewed as resulting from transi-
ent or enduring causes, and whether it is regarded as being due to factors
that are intrinsic or extrinsic to the self or other. Different individuals are
likely to agree in their perceptions of and response to an injustice to the
extent that they agree about its causes and abqut who is responsible for it.
The source of much disagreement about justice often resides in differing
causal and responsibility attributions.
B. There has been general acceptance of the view that there are a variety
of distributive principles, and systematic knowledge is beginning to accumu-
late about the sociopsychological effects of several common principles.
Knowledge is also starting to be acquired about the factors leading to prefer-
ences and choices of one or another principle. In addition, a number of
theorists have developed theories in this area.
1. There appears to be an emerging consensus, as a result of both theoretical
analysis and empirical studies, that distribution of group rewards among
members according to their relative contributions to the group outcome is
less likely to foster group harmony and solidarity than distributing rewards
equally. Papers by Mikula (1980b), Schwinger (1980), Leventhal, Karuza,
and Fry (1980), Cohen (1982), and Cohen and Greenberg (1982) provide a
thorough, insightful coverage. The assumption is made in a number of
papers (for example, by Leventhal et al., 1980), and by the equity theorists)
that rewarding members according to their contributions to the group
product is more apt to enhance group productivity than is rewarding them
equally. So far as I can tell, no valid experimental evidence supporting this
assumption has been presented. My own earlier research on the effects of
cooperation and competition upon group processes (see chapter 8)
counters this assumption, as does more recent research in my laboratory
(see chapter 10), which compared individual and group productivity under
four different distributive principles (winner-take-all, in proportion to con-
tributions, equality, and in proportion to the need for the benefit being
distributed).
2. Knowledge is developing of the individual differences as well as the situa-
tional factors affecting the preferences for different distributive principles
and allocation behavior. Major and Deaux (1982) have written an excel-
lent summary and critique of the literature dealing with such individual
differences as sex, age, nationality, and personality: it is evident that these
variants do systematically affect “justice behavior.” Sampson (1980) has
presented a stimulating theoretical paper on the role of personality and
social character as it relates to justice behavior, suggesting that the con-
ceptions of justice that are dominant in any given sociohistorical period
are a function of what type of social character is elicited by that period.
In brief, some of the consistent findings are that, if sex differences do
appear (and they often do not), women tend to allocate less to themselves
than men do (presumably because they place less value on their contribu-
tions than do men) and their allocations are more directed at fostering
interpersonal harmony (that is, they are more likely to allocate equally
than are men). In Western societies, there appears to be a systematic shift

with increasing age from allocations conforming to self-interest to equality
and then from equality to proportional equity: these shifts reflect in part
cognitive development (proportional allocations require more computa-
tional skills than equal ones) and in part socialization effects. The polite-
ness ritual frequently leads subjects who have contributed less to their
group’s outcome than their partners to apply the equity or contribution
principle, and those who have contributed more to favor the equality prin-
ciple (Schwinger, 1980).
3. A number of systematic positions have been developed about the condi-
tions fostering the application of one or another distributive principle. I
have presented my views in chapters 3 and 6, and I shall later discuss the
viewpoints of other prominent theorists.
C. There is no clear consensus on how important justice is in the func-

tioning of individuals and groups. On the one hand, the equity theorists
(compare Austin and Hatfield, 1980) consider that justice plays a central role
in social behavior, so much so that equity theory could be the basis for a
general theory of human interaction. Similarly, Lerner’s justice motive theory
assumes that the concern with justice seems to provide a central and guiding
theme in our lives, as well as in our societies. Jasso asserts: “How long a
group lives; the proportion of daily time that individuals spend within a given
group; the degree of ‘social distance’ within each pair of members; the exis-
tence of factions or subgroups, ... all these group characteristics are the
product of the particular combination of the experiences of distributive jus-
tice among the members of the group” (1983, p. 243).
In contrast, Leventhal (1980), Leventhal et al. (1980), Mikula (1980b),
Schwinger (1980), Greenberg and Cohen (1982), and many others active in
the social psychology of justice indicate that allocation decisions and other
justice behavior could be influenced by many considerations other than a
concern for justice: one might choose equality because it will reduce conflict
rather than because it is just; one might give high rewards to outstanding
performances because one believes doing so will enhance group productivity
rather than because it is just; one might overreward low performers to
encourage them, and so on. Allocations may be self-serving: to curry favor,
to enhance one’s popularity, to benefit oneself, to conform with the desires
of those who are more powerful. These theorists do not deny that people
may be motivated by considerations of justice; their position is that other
motivations may be stronger and, hence, more important influences on an
individual’s behavior even when he is aware that justice is at stake.
My own position, presented in the preceding chapter, is that the moral
orientation is one of the three major components of the psychological orien-
tation with which each person orients himself to any social relationship; the
other two components are the cognitive and motivational. One can expect
that the moral orientation, and hence what is considered fair, will differ in
the different types of social relations. Some social relations provide strong,
clear normative frameworks and evoke strong, clear moral orientations, but
100 THEORY
others do not. Even when strong, clear normative frameworks exist, some
individuals will be more strongly motivated by other concerns than by their
moral obligations. This might reflect a weak commitment to the relationship
or it might indicate other concerns that are sufficiently strong to override a
moral commitment.
D. There is an expanding, rich, diversified application of the ideas related
to the social psychology of justice. At the same time, this area has become
enriched by contact with work in other areas of social psychology, in moral
philosophy, and in the other social sciences. In other words, the social psy-
chology of justice is no longer narrow and parochial.
E. There are still major gaps and weaknesses in the literature dealing with
the social psychology of justice.
1. There is practically no research relating to the phenomenology of injustice,

to the actual experiences of people who inflict injustice or of those who
suffer injustice. My students and I have done a minor study (Steil, Tuch-
man, and Deutsch, 1978) comparing the experience of injustice and that of
frustration. Hochschild (1981), a political scientist, has conducted in-depth
interviews with a small number of rich and poor people about their con-
ceptions and experiences of injustice in relation to socializing agencies (the
family and education), the economy, and the polity.
2. The approach to justice has been too psychological and insufficiently
social psychological; that is, it has focused on the individual rather than
on the social interaction in which justice emerges. Justice emerges from
conflict: the procedures and values that define justice develop through
negotiation among the conflicting parties. Much current work ignores the
relationship between conflict and justice and the process by which justice
is negotiated.
3. There are too few empirical studies of the sociopsychological effects of
different systems of distributive justice. How do different systems work
under different conditions: for example, as a function of the amount avail-
able for distribution, the type of value to be distributed, the size of the
group, the nature of their interdependence? The literature in social psychol-
ogy does not seem cognizant of the important related research being done
on the kibbutzim (compare Rosner, 1982).
4. Procedural justice and retributive justice are undoubtedly as important
areas of study as distributive justice, but as yet relatively little research has
been done in these areas. Thibaut and Walker (1975) have done interesting
research comparing advesarial procedures with other procedures during
litigation, but the amount of research and the range of topics being investi-
gated in these areas have been very limited.
5. The dethroning of equity theory as the sovereign theory of justice has led
to a proliferation of many alternative perspectives. The perspectives of a
number of leading theorists who have presented viewpoints different from
the equity theorists are discussed below, the work of the equity theorists
has been considered in chapter 2.
THE LEADING THEORISTS
Leventhal
Leventhal (1976a) and Leventhal et ah (1980) have brought an interesting
and new emphasis to the social psychological study of justice by a focus on
the role of the allocator, the one who decides how the rewards and resources
will be distributed. The allocator, Leventhal points out, will not select alloca-
tion norms primarily in terms of abstract conceptions of justice but rather in
terms of their perceived utility in achieving such objectives as enhancing
long-run group productivity or fostering group solidarity. Depending on his
objectives and on circumstances, one or another allocation norm may be
considered by the allocator to have greater instrumental value and will, as a
consequence, be used as the basis for allocations.
This very productive theorist and researcher has recently left academic
psychology (one hopes not permanently), but before doing so, he developed a
systematic theory of allocation preferences, which he also applies to proce-
dural preferences. His theory is basically an adaptation of the expected utility
model, which is commonly employed in theories of economic decision mak-
ing. He points out that an individual usually has several goals in any choice
situation that vary in importance to him; he also has expectations about how
the chances of obtaining his respective goals will be affected by making one
choice rather than another. Erom knowledge of the proportional strength of
the individual’s various goals and his expectancies about the various distribu-
tions (as they relate to obtaining the different goals), one can calculate the
strength of preference an individual will have for each of the distributions he
is contemplating employing in his allocation; he will choose the one with the
highest strength (the one with the highest expected utility). Leventhal sub-
sumes his earlier justice judgment model (Leventhal, 1979, 1980) under his
theory of allocation preference by assuming that fairness may be one of the
individual’s goals; it influences the choice of distributive (or procedural) prin-
ciple in a manner completely analogous to that of the other relevant goals of
the individual (for example, to maximize productivity, to preserve group
harmony).
With minor modifications, Leventhal employs his expectancy model to
predict procedural preferences. He identifies seven procedural components of
the allocation process (selection of agents, establishing ground rules, informa-
tion gathering, decision making, safeguards, appeals, and change mechan-
isms). Lor each component, there are alternative procedural arrangements,
and an individual can obtain the expected utility of each alternative by con-
sidering both the strength of relevant goals and the subjective probabilities
that the relevant goals will be obtained by the given procedural alternative.
Leventhal’s theory has the many merits of an expected utility theory, the
most prevalent type of theory in the social sciences. It is clear, precise, and
has the elegance of simplicity. However, the basic issues for a substantive
102 THEORY
theory of allocation preferences are: what determines the relative importance

an individual assigns to the various goals that could be served by any given
allocation and what determines his expectations about his chances of obtain-
ing these various goals through a given allocation? In his writings, Leventhal
discusses these issues insightfully, but his theory bypasses them.
In their research, Leventhal and his collaborators have mainly employed
hypothetical situations in which the allocator had no strong, vested personal
interest and position. The allocator was, in making his decisions, mainly re-
flecting prevailing cultural beliefs about the effects of different norms of alloca-
tion rather than basing the decisions on his own personal, vested interests and
his concrete experiences with the particular reality about which he was decid-
ing. Undoubtedly, prevailing cultural beliefs are important determinants of
real allocation decisions, but so are the particularistic beliefs resulting from
personal interest, position, and the specific characteristics of the concrete real-
ity in which the allocation decision has to be made. Research, supplementing
that of Leventhal and his collaborators, is needed to determine how the per-
sonal positions of the allocator and the various recipients shape their ideology
and reaction to different allocation norms and how groups actually function
under the influence of different allocation systems. Are equitable norms actu-
ally more conducive to group productivity than equality norms, as allocators
in Leventhal’s experiment appear to believe? Our research (see chapters 8 and
10) raises questions about the validity of their beliefs.
Lerner
Lerner (1980) rejects the view, presented by some equity theorists, that the
concern for justice and deserving is a veneer that masks the more basic
attribute of egoistic self-interest. He considers justice and deserving to be
central organizing themes in people’s lives. In Lerner’s view, the sense of
deserving arises as the child forgoes immediate gratification of his impulses in
favor of deferred gratification. As part of the process of doing so, the child
makes a personal contract with himself whereby he becomes entitled to or
deserves more desirable future outcomes because of the invested efforts and
the costs of frustration associated with postponing his gratification. As the
child learns that his world is a place where additional investments entitle him
to better outcomes, he places greater portions of his goal-seeking activities
under the rules of deserving until gradually his life is organized on the basis
of deserving his outcomes.
There are two types of threats to any person’s personal contract: (1) the
threat coming from his impulses, which seek immediate gratification, and (2)
the threat coming from the environment, which may deny him his deserved
outcomes despite his prior self-restraints. If the environment isn’t sufficiently
orderly or trustworthy and if there is evidence that deserving efforts are not
appropriately compensated, as when others as well as himself do not get
what they deserve, the viability of the individual’s personal contract becomes
questionable. A crucial psychological link between the individual’s personal
contract and another’s personal contract is the individual’s recognition of an

equivalence between himself and others; self and other exist in the same
environment and are part of each other’s milieu, and if the environment
threatens the other’s personal contract, one’s own is also not secure.
The point that Lerner is making is that the individual’s personal contract
can only be maintained if he believes in a just world. Evidence that others do
not get what they deserve calls into question one’s own prior commitments,
efforts, investments, and beliefs and allows one’s immediate impulses and
desires to surface in such a way as to threaten one’s personal contract. Thus,
the individual will be strongly motivated to believe in a just world, and when
faced with evidence that appears to violate this belief, he will tend to reinter-
pret the evidence to make it congruent with his belief. Like equity theorists,
Lerner assumes that an individual will experience dissonance when he is
exposed to circumstances that are incongruent with his belief in a just world
and will engage in dissonance reduction to remove the dissonance. He has
not elaborated his views about the conditions leading to the selection of one
or another mode of dissonance reduction, but one can assume that his posi-
tion is similar to that of the dissonance and equity theorists.
Lerner’s 1980 book describes a large number of studies bearing upon the
just world hypothesis (the hypothesis that people are motivated to maintain
the belief that they live in a just world). A typical research format had
students ostensibly observe a human learning experiment over closed-circuit
television in which an undergraduate woman is receiving severe electric
shocks while trying to learn pairs of nonsense syllables. The results of experi-
ments showed that: (1) most observers would vote to end the electric shock
or to see to it that the person being shocked received adequate compensation;
(2) if they believed that they could end the shocks or that the victim would be
compensated, they did not develop a negative view of her; and (3) if they
could not help the victim and the victim was not compensated, the more the
victim appeared to suffer, the more she was devalued by the observers. If the
observers could not make the situation a just one in actuality, they derogated
the victim so that it would appear to them that she deserved her fate: the
more she suffered, the more she deserved to suffer. Similar research findings
have been reported by many other investigators.
Although one could find flaws in some of the Lerner experiments—for
example, one wonders why samples of the subjects were not asked if the
“victim” were being treated unjustly—the results are too consistent to be
questioned on this basis. Yet I find myself unconvinced by the just world
hypothesis. 1 know the world is not a just one and so, of course, does Lerner.
However, I do not usually derogate the victims of injustice unless I feel person-
ally responsible for the victim’s condition or for rectifying it and am unable to
do something about it. Since I do not necessarily feel defensive about myself
because I am aware of injustices, I do not have to defend myself against this
awareness. Perhaps this reflects a moral flaw in my character. But I still
wonder why Lerner’s subjects were so defensive that they could not tolerate
the awareness of an injustice—if that indeed was what they were observing.
104 THEORY
Lerner’s view that the personal contract is central to the sense of deserv-
ing is an interesting, original idea, but I don’t think it is correct. It does not
seem to fit with the studies of the development of the sense of justice in
young children (compare Isaacs, 1946; Damon, 1977). The sense of power
and self-efficacy appear to be more associated with reaping delayed rewards
than does the sense of deserving; although these may be related, the relation-
ship is by no means that of identity.
In addition to his extensive research on the just world hypothesis, Lerner
has articulated a framework for characterizing different forms of justice as
they occur in different types of interpersonal relationships. He identifies three
classes of interpersonal relationships: identity (perception of the other as
being the same as self, as being psychologically indistinguishable from one-
self), unit (perception of similarity and a cooperative bond with the other),
and nonunit (perception of antagonistic interests and perspectives, compari-
sons between self and other are invidious). He also characterizes three classes
of processes, defined in terms of the relationship among the goals of the
participants: vicarious dependency (identity), convergent goals (unit), and
divergent goals (nonunit). Each type of process can occur in each type of
relationship, and in any given situation, either the process or relationship can
be dominant. For each of his eighteen subcategories (three relationships types
X three process types x two dominant types), he lists a distinctive justice
norm. Thus, when the relationship is dominant and it is an identity relation-
ship and the participants’s goals are related by vicarious dependency, the
need principle will be used. When the relationship is a unit relationship and
the goals are convergent, then equality will be employed if the relationship is
dominant and equity will be preferred if the process is dominant.
The taxonomy is intriguing, but it has no well-developed rationale that
has been articulated nor has it generated much research until now. Its fruit-
fulness remains to be demonstrated.
Lerner takes justice seriously as a focus of both intellectual work and
moral concern. He has stimulated many others, including myself, to do the
same. His own work is original and evocative, even if not entirely persuasive.
His work seems to have considerable momentum, but its direction is not
clear.
Mikula and Schwinger
Mikula, from Graz, and Schwinger, from Mannheim, have together and sepa-
rately been making important contributions to the social psychology of jus-
tice since the early 1970s. Since many of their publications have been in
German, their theorizing and research have not been quickly absorbed into
the American-dominated literature on the social psychology of justice. This
has been unfortunate, because of the high significance of their work. Fortu-
nately, the book edited by Mikula (1980) makes summaries of much of what
they have done available to non-German readers.
Schwinger and Mikula have been critics of what they have termed the
single-principle approach of equity theory; they favor a multiprinciple ap-

proach. As Schwinger points out, the two approaches are based on different
images of man: economic man as compared to social man. Mikula and
Schwinger have also done much to establish recognition of the importance of
the politeness ritual in allocation behavior. Mikula analyzes the processes of
making an allocation decision and articulates a three-stage decisional frame-
work involving:
1. Choosing an allocation goal: Mikula, like Leventhal, indicates that there is

almost an unlimited number of goals that an allocator could strive to
realize, for example, increasing productivity, avoiding conflicts, rewarding
or punishing certain behaviors, ingratiating himself, achieving justice.
However, unlike Leventhal, he does not offer a formal model for weighing
the importance of different goals as they affect allocation decisions.
2. Choosing a justice principle according to which the allocation shall be car-
ried out: Here, Mikula indicates that the different distribution principles
vary in the prerequisites required for their application (for example, the
contribution principle requires the assessment of a contribution, the need
principle the assessment of need), in their socially recognized appropriate-
ness for certain types of social relations and allocation situations, and fi-
nally, in the consequences resulting from their employment. His position on
appropriateness and consequences is similar to my position (see chapter 3).
3. Translating this principle into a concrete mode of allocation: The third
stage of Mikula’s decisional framework is not elaborated beyond indicating
that equality is the least complex distributional rule to implement. He
suggests that models for the weighting and combination of variables that
are implicit in his decisional framework can be found in Anderson’s infor-
mation integration theory (Anderson, 1976) or in Leventhal’s approach.
Sampson
Sampson (1969, 1975, 1981, 1983) has discussed the norms of equity and
equality in a historical framework. He suggests that the preference for equity
over equality reflects a particular historical and cultural pattern that presently
dominates Western civilization, in particular the United States, with its capi-
talistic economic system. He argues that the capitalist economic system
fosters such values as agency (instrumentalism, individualism, and competi-
tion), which are conducive to an equity principle of justice. An alternative set
of values—communalism, collectivism, and cooperation—are conducive to an
equality principle of justice.
Sampson (1980) also stresses that the implicit character or model of
human functioning that is required by the equity theorists (for example, the
self-interested, the other-directed, the socially comparative, the present-
oriented, the rational-calculating types) may he dominant only for a particu-
lar sociohistorical period or only for upper-middle-class college students. He
further suggests that the primary use of experimental methods, as compared
to systematic naturalistic observation and depth interviews, leads to an over-
emphasis on the more rational and calculating qualities of people.
106 THEORY
Sampson discusses the differences in value orientation and justice perspec-

tives of the other-directed, tradition-directed, and inner-directed types of
character described by Riesman (1950). He indicates that in a tradition-
oriented society, the concept of justice would embody beliefs that those with
particular lineage and kinships are entitled to special standing. Traditions
regarding what one may expect and deserve from life would be considered
sacred, and hence, presumably the violations of traditions would be unjust. In
an inner-directed society, hard work is its own reward; nothing extrinsic is
required to provide the motivating force. The inner-directed person does not
think about justice in comparative terms (“they are getting more or less than
I”) but in terms of inner standards of a more absolute sort. Sampson con-
siders the other-directed, socially comparative type characteristic of our time,
but suggests that a new, narcissistic, entitlement-oriented character is begin-
ning to emerge. Such a person. Coles writes, “has much, but wants and
expects more, all assumed to be his or hers by right—at once a psychological
and material inheritance that the world will provide” (1977, p. 55). The
narcissistic character fuses his wants and needs, experiencing his wants as
urgent and feeling they must be satisfied if he is to survive. Any frustration is
felt to be unjust, an oppression. In a further discussion, he indicates that the
fear of success personality may lead some people to favor cooperation and
equal sharing because of basic fears and anxieties rather than because of
humanitarian or solidarity orientations. Such a success-avoidant personality
runs counter to the assumption of equity theorists that all persons prefer to
maximize their outcomes.
Sampson’s perspectives are a good antidote to the narrow, parochial,
ahistorical, individualistic tendencies in social psychology in general and,
more particularly, in the social psychology of justice. There is every reason to
believe that different sociohistorical periods, different cultures, and different
personality types may have different conceptions and orientations to justice.
We can be helped to overcome our unwitting biases by being more aware of
the governing biases that exist in our historical period, in our culture, and in
our types of personalities.
Sampson’s (1983) own view of justice is based upon an interpersonal
formulation of psychological processes; here he draws heavily upon the
works of G. H. Mead, Vigotsky, C. W. Mills, and H. S. Sullivan. His key
notion is the address frame, which is oriented toward the whom that people
address in their external or internal conversation of gestures. In address-
frame terms, justice is a way peoples’ actions become intelligible and evalu-
ated by themselves and others; it does not refer to an internal state of need.
The sense that one has been treated unfairly emerges by virtue of its evoking
a response from one’s social group or from certain others (who may be
internalized) that indicates this is the meaning to be attributed to the way one
has been treated. The address frames that are involved in understanding and
evaluating peoples’ actions differ in different sociohistorical periods, and
hance, the psychological experience of justice will vary as a function of
historical circumstances.
Sampson further suggests that since people do not address the same
others in their thinking, they may not share the same view of social reality;
hence, all social interaction (including issues of justice) have a potentially
negotiated quality. Negotiation, however, is rarely a matter between equals;
it involves power and control over meanings. For justice as an ideal to be
achieved, conditions must permit the kind of dialogue among the participants
that Habermas (1973, 1975) has described as the “ideal speech situation.” In
the ideal situation, justice would emerge from a dialogue among equals that
was free from external force or threat and free from ideological and other
distorting influences. The discourse process is one in which people are free to
examine critically the context of interaction in which they are involved and
arrive at an unforced agreement concerning the validity of the claims that
have been made.
Sampson’s presentation of his own views about justice is programmatic
rather than specific. His own theoretical position, as expressed in the concept
of the address frame, apart from its terminology, is hardly novel; the Freud-
ian concept of superego, the psychoanalytic theory of object relations, as well
as the work of many other theorists are directly relevant. Given the extensive
prior work on related ideas, it is surprising that his own theoretical position
is not more developed and specified.
Tornblom
Tornblom is a Swedish sociologist whose work on distributive justice was

unknown to me and I daresay to most scholars in this area until I received a
collection of reprints from him in the fall of 1983. He has done significant
theoretical and empirical work in this area (Tornblum, 1977a, 1977b, 1982;
Tornblom, Jonnson, and Knowles, 1982; Tornblom and Foa 1983;
Tornblom, Jonsson, and Foa, 1983; Tornblom and Fredholm, 1983), but has
published in journals not likely to be read by parochial American social
psychologists. Two important foci of his work have been: (1) a typology of
distributive justice and propositions about the different types; and (2) the
nature of the resource being allocated as a determinant of the principle ac-
cording to which distribution takes place.
Tornblom’s classification scheme, like that of the equity theorists,
centers on two people in a relationship (P and O) and is concerned with
their outcomes and inputs. However, in addition to the local comparisons
between P and O, he introduces referential comparisons (similar to Berger et
al., 1972): comparisons of P and O with typical others in the same category
as, for example, when a carpenter compares his pay with the pay of a
typical carpenter. Tornblom indicates that by comparing the inputs and
outcomes of P versus O and of P and O versus RP (the typical other used as
a reference person), an exhaustive typology of just and unjust situations
may be constructed.
With respect to RP, P’s outcome may be an overreward, underreward, or
a just reward; similarly for O: the three types of outcomes for P combined
108 THEORY
with the three types of outcomes for O give nine types of situations in terms
of outcomes. With regard to inputs, P’s inputs may be greater than, equal to,
or less than RP’s; similarly for O: producing nine types of situations in terms
of inputs. The nine outcome situations combined with the nine input situa-
tions produce eighty-one main types of justice and injustice situations. Sub-
types of justice can be developed by comparing the possible input levels of P
relative to O that can exist in each of the nine input situations previously
described (where P’s and O’s inputs are compared to RP’s). Minor types of
injustices can be differentiated within subtypes by specifying the outcomes of
P relative to those of O.
In essence, Tornblom is asserting that the direct comparisons between the
outcomes and inputs of P and O (the kinds of comparisons highlighted by
Adams and Walster, Berscheid and Walster) lead to minor injustices; the
major types are comparisons of P and O in relation to each other as mediated
by the comparisons of each with RP (the reference person). Tornblom adds
an interesting complexity to equity theory by his introduction of comparisons
with the reference person, but he has not as yet done sufficient research with
it to demonstrate its value. Moreover, many of the criticisms advanced with
regard to equity theory (see chapter 2) can equally well be applied to the
assumptions involved in his typology of distributive justice.
Tornblom, in collaboration with Jonsson and Foa (1983), has done inter-
esting cross-national research, employing questionnaires about hypothetical
group situations, on how the type of resource being distributed affects the
preferences for different rules of allocation. The research has employed the
taxonomy of resources developed by Foa and Foa (1974) that classifies re-
sources into six categories: love, status, information, money, goods, and
services. Love is an expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort;
status indicates an evaluative judgment that conveys prestige, regard, or es-
teem; information includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment;
money is any coin, currency, or token that has some standard unit of ex-
change value; goods are tangible products, objects, or materials; and services
involve activities that affect the body or belongings of a person and that often
constitute labor for another person.
Tornblom and Foa (1983) have also summarized related research in six
studies done in three countries: the United States, Sweden, and Germany.
Although the studies vary considerably in procedure and also in quality, the
results are interesting. Equality is the most preferred rule for the allocation of
love; the contribution rule or equity is most preferred for the allocation of
status; equality and need are equally preferred for information; equality and
contribution are equally preferred for money; and equality is most preferred
for goods and services. The Swedish subjects prefer equality over need and
need over equity for the allocation of all resource types; the American sub-
jects prefer equity for the allocation of money, equity or need for the alloca-
tion of status, and need for information; otherwise equality is preferred. The
German subjects prefer equity for the allocation of status, equality for the
allocation of money, and need for the allocation of love, information, goods.
and services. All three nationalities rate equity as least desirable for love,
information, goods, and services. As Tornblom and Foa assert; “The contri-
bution rule is not as universally preferred as assumed by equity theorists”(p.
166).
Crosby
In a series of theoretical and research papers, Crosby (1976, 1982) has taken
the lead in both systematically analyzing the concept of relative deprivation
and in doing innovative research on this topic. Relative deprivation was
initially introduced by Stouffer and his coworkers (1949) to explain why
military policemen were more satisfied with the promotional system than
were men in the air corps, even though promotions were much more rapid in
the air corps. It was suggested that airmen compared themselves with their
many promoted peers and as a result felt relatively deprived, while military
policemen had fewer promoted peers to compare themselves with and so did
not feel unjustly treated. Hyman (1942) earlier had employed the concept of
reference group to explain analogous findings. Merton and Kitt (1950) and
Merton (1957) did much to make the concept of relative deprivation a com-
mon phrase among social scientists by their elaboration of it in their develop-
ment of the theory of reference groups.
As Crosby (1982) has stated, at least five distinctive models of relative
deprivation have been developed. She has described and compared models
advanced by Davis (1959), Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and Williams
(1975) with her own model (Crosby, 1976). Her model builds upon the work
of the earlier scholars, especially Runciman; it equates felt deprivation with
resentment or sense of grievance and specifies that felt deprivation is one type
of anger. According to Crosby (1976), egoistical deprivation is experienced
when and only when five preconditions are met. To feel deprived of some
object or opportunity (X), people who lack X must: want X; see that another
has X, feel entitled to (deserving of) X; think it feasible to attain X; and not
blame themselves (disclaim personal responsibility) for failing to have X now.
In a recent revision of her 1976 model, Bernstein and Crosby (1978) replace
the emphasis on feasibility with the suggestion that (given the other precondi-
tions) deprivation varies as a positive function of past expectations and as a
negative function of future expectations: the most aggrieved individual is one
whose high hopes are dashed.
Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan, in their 1977 review of the then existing
research relevant to relative deprivation, conclude: “First, as yet no study
directly permits a validation of egoistic relative deprivation as we understand
it. Second, all the components of relative deprivation seem to be related in the
predicted manner to their theoretically specified consequences” (p. 325).
They go on to suggest some needed research that would provide a more
direct test of relative deprivation theories and that would enable one to select
among the different approaches to relative deprivation. Crosby, in her recent
book (1982) on relative deprivation and working women based on a survey
110 THEORY
study and recent laboratory work (Bernstein and Crosby, 1980), has con-
ducted research with these objectives in mind.
Taken together, the findings of the survey and laboratory studies suggest
the need to revise her earlier model of relative deprivation. Her revised model
emphasizes wanting (the discrepancy between what one has and what one
wants) and deserving (the discrepancy between what one has and what one
feels entitled to) as the two essential preconditions of felt deprivation. Com-
parisons to others and past and future expectations can influence the sense of
grievance by affecting what people want and what they feel they deserve or
by enhancing or reducing feelings of grievance once these feelings are estab-
lished. Similarly, blaming oneself, for not getting what one wants may lead to
a sense of lack of deserving, or it may reduce feelings of grievance that have
been developed earlier.
Crosby has been a dispassionate critic of her own version of relative
deprivation theory as well as the versions of other theorists. In the process of
confronting the different versions with relevant data, she has found consistent
support for the basic notion of relative deprivation theory: people’s feelings
of deprivation are not simply a function of their objective circumstances, but
are affected by a number of psychological variables. She has tentatively iden-
tified the necessary and sufficient conditions for feelings of grievance and
some of the variables that serve to enhance or reduce their feelings once they
are established.
Crosby and other theorists concerned with relative deprivation highlight
some factors that tend to be neglected by the theorists concerned with dis-
tributive justice. Their focus on such variables as wanting, expectations, com-
parison others, and self attitudes provides a framework for understanding the
determinants of the intensity of the sense of injustice (see chapter 4 for my
approach to this topic). However, relative deprivation theorists have largely
ignored many of the issues that have been the center of attention of the
distributive justice theorists. Thus, they have paid little attention to the rela-
tively advantaged and the conditions under which they experience their ad-
vantage as an injustice. They have also been unconcerned with the many
questions related to the social psychological determinants of the preferences
for different distributive values (that is, different rules of entitlement) or to
the social psychological consequences of different distributive systems.
PART II
Research
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Cooperation-Competition:
Earlier Studies of Different
Distribution Systems
Although I was unaware of it as I conducted my dissertation experiment on

the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process (Deutsch,
1949b), this study has direct relevance to basic issues in the psychology of
distributive justice. As originally formulated, the experiment was meant to
test my theory of cooperation and competition, which focused on the social
psychological effects of different types of goal interdependence in combina-
tion with different types of instrumental actions (see chapter 5 for a sum-
mary). It was only much later, as my attention centered on distributive justice
that I realized that this early experiment was a study of the effects of two
different distributive principles: a competitive form of equity and equality.
1 conducted the research in the spring semester of 1948 with MIT
undergraduates who were enrolled in sections of an introductory psychol-
ogy course that I was teaching. I subdivided the sections into ten groups,
each composed of five students, and met with each group for three hours
once a week for six weeks. Each group followed the same routine at its
meetings. First, the members were given the task of solving together a
rather tricky intellectual puzzle as rapidly as they could. (For example:
There must have been a dearth of eligible young ladies in Kinsleydale, for
each of five men there has married the widowed mother of one of the
others. Jenkin’s stepson, Tomkins, is the stepfather of Perkins. Jenkin’s
mother is a friend of Mrs. Watkins, whose husband’s mother is a cousin
of Mrs. Perkins. What is the name of the stepson of Simkins? Answer:
Watkins.) During the next fifty minutes, they were designated a “board of
human relations advisers” and were asked to formulate, after group dis-
cussion, a written response to a letter asking their advice about a personal
problem. They discussed such problems as how- to respond to an incident
involving prejudice in a barbershop and what to recommend to a returning
soldier who felt guilty about being unfaithful to his wife while overseas.
During the remainder of the period, 1 led the group in a discussion of
114 RESEARCH
psychological concepts and principles relating to such topics as learning,

perception, cognition, and motivation.
After the first week of such meetings, the groups were divided into
equated pairs based upon their group performances in the first meeting. One
group in each equated pair was then assigned at random to a competitive
grading system and the other group to a cooperative grading system. Half of
the groups (the competitive groups) were told that their discussions of the
human relations problem would be graded in the following manner: each
individual’s contribution to the group’s discussion and group product would
be compared with the contributions of each of the other group members, and
the best contributor would get an A, the next best a B, and so on. The other
half of the groups (the cooperative groups) were told that they would be
graded so that every person in the group would get the same grade, the grade
being determined by how well the group’s discussion and product compared
with those of four other similar groups; all the members in the best group
would get As, those in the next best group would get Bs, and so on. The
students accepted the grading procedures in both types of groups without
question or protest. Since grades were quite important at MIT, the students
were highly motivated to achieve a high grade in both conditions.
All groups were observed systematically by three research assistants, who
categorized and rated such different aspects of the discussions as their friend-
liness, orderliness, and quality. They also noted who spoke to whom and
how much attentiveness and mutual understanding there was during the
discussions. In addition, the students filled out questionnaires after each dis-
cussion in which they rated various aspects of the discussion, their own
reactions during it, and their attitudes toward other group members.
The results of the experiment showed striking differences between the
cooperative and competitive groups. As compared with the competitively
graded groups, the cooperative ones showed the following characteristics:
1. More effective intermember communication. More ideas were verbalized,

and members were more attentive to one another and more acceptant of
and influenced by one another’s ideas. They had fewer difficulties in com-
municating with or understanding others.
2. More friendliness, more helpfulness, and less obstructiveness was expressed
in discussions. Members were also more satisfied with the group and its
solutions and more favorably impressed by the contributions of the other
group members. In addition, members of the cooperative groups rated
themselves higher in desire to win the respect of their colleagues and in
obligation to other members.
3. More coordination of effort, more division of labor, more orientation to task
achievement, more orderliness in discussion, and higher productivity were
manifested in cooperative groups. (The group tasks required effective com-
munication, coordination of effort, division of labor, and the sharing of re-
sources).
4. More feeling of agreement and similarity in ideas and more confidence in
one’s own ideas and in the value of other members attached to those ideas
were obtained in the cooperative groups.
Cooperation-Competition 115
It is evident that the two distributive principles had profoundly different

consequences. The students in the groups that operated under the equality
principle (the cooperative groups) were not only more productive; they also
developed friendlier interpersonal relations and felt more esteemed and more
self-confident as compared to those in the groups that functioned under the
competitive equity principle.
It should be noted that the equity principle is not always competitive; it is
so only when a fixed amount (a constant sum) is being allocated: hence, the
more one person gets, the less is available for another. An individualistic
form of the equity principle occurs whenever the amount to be allocated is
variable and dependent upon the level of the total contributions: here, the
allocations the individuals receive are independent of one another. Thus, the
results of this early experiment had no direct relevance to the individualistic
form of equity.
Since my 1949 study of cooperation and competition, many hundreds of
related studies have been conducted. Researchers have investigated individu-
alistic as well as cooperative and competitive groups; they have studied coop-
erative and competitive relations between groups as well as within groups;
they have conducted research in classrooms and in work settings as well as in
the laboratory; they have studied groups whose compositions were homoge-
neous and groups that were composed of individuals of diverse ability, or of
diverse racial and ethnic background, or of people who were physically dis-
abled and not disabled. David Johnson, a former student of mine, and his
colleagues have been the leading researchers in this area and have presented
integrative summaries of the research that has been conducted during the past
thirty-five years (see Johnson and Johnson, 1983, for such a summary and for
references to their research). Much of what follows is directly indebted to
their work.
Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, and Skon (1981) report a statisti-
cal analysis of all available and relevant studies conducted in North America
(122 were found) containing achievement or performance data that com-
pared two or more of the four goal structures: cooperation, cooperation with
intergroup competition, interpersonal competition, and individualistic effort.
From their analysis of the 122 studies, they conclude:
1. Cooperation is superior to competition or individualistic efforts in promot-

ing achievement and productivity. These results hold for all subject areas
(language arts, reading, math, science, social studies, psychology, and
physical education), for all age groups, and for such diverse tasks as con-
cept attainment, verbal problem solving, categorizing, spatial problem solv-
ing, and retention and memory. For rote-coding and correcting tasks, no
differences were obtained for the three types of groups.
2. There is no significant difference between interpersonal competitive and

individualistic goal structures on achievement and productivity.
3. The results also suggest but do not consistently support the proposition
that cooperation without intergroup competition promotes higher achieve-
ment than cooperation with intergroup competition.
116 RESEARCH
Johnson, Johnson, and Maruyama (1983) have also done a statistical

analysis of all existing research (98 studies) conducted between 1944 and
1982 on the relative impact of cooperative, competitive, and individualistic
learning experiences on interpersonal attraction among homogeneous and
heterogeneous samples of students. The results of their statistical analysis
provide strong support for the proposition that cooperative experiences, com-
pared with competitive or individualistic ones, promote greater interpersonal
attraction within groups of homogeneous students, within groups composed
of students from different ethnic groups, and within groups composed of
physically disabled and nondisabled students.
Johnson and Johnson (1983) summarize other findings of the research on
cooperative, competitive, and individualistic goal structures:
1. Helping. There is more frequent cross-ethnic and cross-handicap helping

and tutoring, and generally more facilitative and encouraging interaction,
among students in cooperative than in competitive or individualistic learn-
ing situations.
2. Peer support and acceptance. Similarly, cooperative experiences result in
stronger beliefs that one is personally liked, supported, and accepted by
other students and that the others are caring and helpful.
3. Perspective-taking. The ability to understand how a situation appears to
another and how the other is reacting cognitively and emotionally can be
contrasted with a more self-centered orientation where one’s own view-
point so dominates one’s perceptions that it is difficult to take the perspec-
tive of others. Cooperative experiences have been found to promote greater
cognitive and affective perspective-taking than competitive or individualis-
tic ones.
4. Self-esteem. Cooperative, as contrasted with competitive or individualistic,
experiences promote higher levels of self-esteem. Cooperativeness is posi-
tively related to numerous indices of psychological health, whereas com-
petitiveness is positively related to only a few; individualistic attitudes are
related to numerous indices of pathology, such as social maladjustment,
alienation, and self-rejection.
5. Expectations toward future interaction. Cooperative, as contrasted to com-
petitive or individualistic, experiences promote greater feelings that past
interactions with others have been rewarding and enjoyable and that future
interactions will be too.
INTERGROUP COOPERATION AND COMPETITION
Most of the studies compared by Johnson and Johnson involve comparisons

of intragrowp cooperation and intragroup competition. There have been rela-
tively few studies comparing the effects of intergroup cooperation with
intergroup competition. Workie (1967), one of my former students, did his
dissertation study on this topic. His research indicates that whether the units
being looked at are groups or individuals, the same basic findings are ob-
tained. The total productivity of a system of interdependent groups is smaller

when the reward structure orients the groups toward intergroup competition
rather than cooperation. Not surprisingly, more intergroup goal blocking and
deceptiveness occur between groups that are in competition with each other
than between groups that are cooperatively interdependent.
The most detailed investigations of intergroup cooperation and competi-
tion to date have been conducted by Sherif (1966; Sherif et ah, 1961) and by
Blake and Mouton (1961a, 1961b, 1962a, 1962b). These studies are notable
for their ingenious use of natural rather than laboratory settings. Sherif and
his associates conducted their now classic “robbers’ cave” study at a specially
arranged campsite in which the campers (boys of eleven and twelve) inter-
acted in activities that appeared natural to them; they were not aware of the
fact that their behavior was under observation
The experiment proceeded in three stages. The first stage was designed to
produce groups with distinct internal structures and group norms so that they
could be confronted with intergroup problems. This stage of group formation
lasted about a week. It was initiated by having each of two groups of campers
come to camp in a separate bus and then live in a separate cabin. The boys in
each cabin engaged in a variety of cooperative activities: camping out, cook-
ing, improving swimming places, transporting canoes over rough terrain to the
water, and so on. Each group developed an organization and specific customs,
and each manifested the signs of “we-feeling” and the joint accomplishments
that mark a cohesive group. In the second stage of the experiment, tension and
conflict were produced between the two groups by introducing conditions
conducive to competition between them. A series of situations was created in
which one group could achieve its goal only at the expense of the other
group—for example, through a tournament of competitive events with desir-
able prizes only for the winning group. As a result, members of each group
developed hostile attitudes and highly unfavorable stereotypes about the other
group and its members. Conflict was manifested in derogatory name calling
and invectives (“stinkers,” “sneaks,” and “cheats”), flare-ups of physical con-
flict, and raids on each other’s cabins. At the same time, there was an increase
in in-group solidarity and cooperativeness and a significant change in the
status relations within groups, such that those who were particularly effective
in intergroup competition rose in status. Clearly, intragroup cooperation and
harmony does not inevitably lead to intergroup harmony.
In the third stage, different approaches to reducing intergroup conflict
were evaluated: contact between groups in activities highly pleasant to each
group but not involving interdependence between them (going to the movies,
eating in the same dining room, shooting off fireworks on July 4), and in
contrast, the introduction of superordinate goals, which had a compelling
appeal for each group but which neither group could achieve without the
cooperation of the other. Such other techniques as “disseminating favorable
information about the other group” and “summit conferences between
leaders of the two groups” were rejected on a priori grounds as ineffective.
Intergroup contacts without the existence of superordinate goals were ineffec-
118 RESEARCH
tive in reducing conflict. But joint efforts toward accomplishing superordi-

nate goals (such as repairing the water supply system of the camp after the
experimenters covertly arranged to have it break down, raising the funds
necessary to go to a highly desired movie, moving a camp truck that had
“broken down”) gradually and cumulatively changed the relations between
the two groups from a pattern of hostile to one of friendly interaction.
Sherif’s findings have been supported by the work of other investigators,
particularly Blake and Mouton (1961a, 1961b), who have been especially
interested in the effects of win-lose conflicts on the negotiations between
groups. They have studied intergroup conflict in human relations training
laboratories among ad hoc, temporary groups as well as between union and
management in industry. In findings similar to Sherif’s, they report that
intergroup competition has characteristic effects on in-groups’ relations (an
increased in-group cohesion, a shift to a conflict-oriented leadership, more
personal identification by members with their group), on perception of the
out-group (an increase in negative stereotyping and in perception of dissimi-
larity), and on negotiations between the groups to resolve their differences.
Between highly competitive groups, negotiations are characterized by a ten-
dency to overvalue the recommendations of one’s own group and to dispar-
age those of the other group; mutual misunderstandings of positions, such
that common values are overlooked and differences emphasized; a tendency
to prize victory more than agreement, so that a negotiator who compromises
is seen as a traitor and one who is unyielding is seen as a hero; a tendency to
discredit a neutral third party if he makes a recommendation that is not
clearly favorable to one’s own group; and frequent deadlocking rather than
arrival at a mutually satisfying agreement.
Clearly, there is a marked parallel in the results of the research on both
cooperation and competition within groups and between groups. The re-
search findings, as well as the theoretical analysis, indicate that the differ-
ences between the processes involved in cooperation and competition (com-
paring them in their pure or extreme forms) can be summarized as follows:
1. Communication
a. A cooperative process is characterized by open and honest commu-
nication of relevant information between the participants. Each is interested
in informing, and being informed by, the other.
b. A competitive process is characterized by either lack of communica-
tion or misleading communication. It also gives rise to espionage or other
techniques of obtaining information about the other that the other is unwilling
to communicate. In addition to obtaining such information, each party is
interested in providing discouraging or misleading information to the other.
2. Perception
a. A cooperative process tends to increase sensitivity to similarities
and common interests while minimizing the salience of difference. It stimu-
lates a convergence and conformity of beliefs and values. It enhances the
ability to take the perspective of the other.
b. A competitive process tends to increase sensitivity to differences

and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. It stimulates the
sense of complete oppositeness: “You are bad; I am good.” It interferes with
the ability to take the perspective of the other.
3. Attitudes toward each other
a. A cooperative process leads to a trusting, friendly attitude, and it
increases the willingness to respond helpfully to the other’s needs and requests.
It promotes mutual acceptance and the expectations of being accepted.
b. A competitive process leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude, and it
increases the readiness to exploit the other’s needs and respond negatively to
the other’s requests. It promotes mutual rejection and the expectation of
being rejected.
4. Task orientation
a. A cooperative process enables the participants to approach a com-
mon task in a way that utilizes their special talents and enables them to
substitute for each other in their joint work so that duplication of effort is
reduced. It enables them to share resources and coordinate their efforts so
that productivity is enhanced on tasks involving interdependent activities. It
leads to the defining of conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved
by collaborative effort. It facilitates the recognition of the legitimacy of each
other’s interests and of the necessity of searching for a solution that is respon-
sive to the needs of both sides. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope
of conflicting interests. Attempts to influence the other tend to be limited to
processes of persuasion. The enhancement of mutual power and resources
becomes an objective.
b. A competitive process interferes with the sharing of resources, divi-
sion of labor, and coordination of activities with the result that productivity
is impaired on tasks that can best be done through interdependent work. It
stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can only be one that is
imposed by one side on the other. The enhancement of one’s own power and
the minimization of the other side’s become objectives; this fosters the expan-
sion of the scope of the issues in conflict. Coercive processes, tactics of
intimidation, and deception tend to be employed in the attempt to influence
the other.
This sketch of some aspects of competitive and cooperative processes

suggests that each process tends to be self-confirming, so that the experience
of cooperation will induce a benign spiral of increasing cooperation, whereas
competition will induce a vicious spiral of intensifying competition. This is
true to some extent, but there are restraints that usually operate to limit the
spiraling of both processes. Not the least of these restraints arises from the
fact that a person or group is usually involved in many situations and rela-
tionships simultaneously, and his other involvements and relationships usu-
ally prevent or contain what might be termed an obsessive intensification of
any particular relationship.
CHAPTER NINE
Conflict and Bargaining Studies:

Conditions for Establishing \
a System of Justice
A bargain is defined in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary as “an agreement

between parties settling what each shall give and receive in a transaction
between them”; it is further specified that a bargain is “an agreement or
compact viewed as advantageous or the reverse.” When the term agreement
is broadened to include tacit, informal agreements as well as explicit agree-
ments, it is evident that bargains and the processes involved in arriving at
bargains (bargaining) are pervasive characteristics of social life.
The definition of bargain fits under sociological definitions of the term
social norm. In this light, it may be seen that the experimental study of the
bargaining process and of bargaining outcomes provides a means for labora-
tory study of the development of certain types of social norms. It is well to
recognize, however, that bargaining situations have certain distinctive fea-
tures, which, unlike those involved in many other types of social situations,
make it relevant to consider the conditions that determine both whether a
social norm will develop and its nature if it does develop. Bargaining situa-
tions highlight for the investigator the need to be sensitive to the possibility
that, even where cooperation would be mutually advantageous, shared pur-
poses may not develop, agreement may not be reached, and interaction may
be regulated antagonistically rather than for mutual gain.
Everyday examples of a bargaining situation include such situations as:
the buyer-seller relationship when the price is not fixed; the husband and
wife who want to spend an evening out together but have conflicting prefer-
ences about where to go; union-management negotiations; drivers who meet
at an intersection where there is no clear right of way; and disarmament
negotiations.
From the description of the essential features of a bargaining situation, it
can be seen that, in terms of our prior conceptualization of cooperation and
competition (see chapter 8), it is a situation in which the participants have
mixed motives toward each other. On the one hand, each has an interest in
120
Conflict and Bargaining Studies 121
cooperating so that they can reach an agreement; on the other hand, they
have competitive interests with regard to the nature of the agreement that
they reach. In effect, to reach agreement the cooperative interest of the bar-
gainers must be strong enough to overcome their competitive interests. How-
ever, agreement is contingent not only upon the motivational balance of
cooperative and competitive interests but also uponTEe situational and cogni-
tive factors that would facilitate or hinder the recognition or invention of a
Bargaining agreement that would reduce the opposition of interest and en-
hance the mutuality of interest
Over a number of years, we conducted a series of experiments that fo-
cused on this important question: under what conditions are people with
conflicting interests able to work out an agreement (that is, a system of
justice deiimng what each shall give and receive in the transaction between
them) that is stable and mutually satisfying? In these experiments we have
used several different research formats, among them the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game, the Acme-Bolt Trucking game, and the Behavioral Strategy game. In
this chapter, I shall describe briefly the research and its results that bear upon
the preceding question.
THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
The first research format we employed is a version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma,

which Luce and Raiffa have described as follows:
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is
certain they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate
evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner that each
has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have done
or not to confess. If they both do not confess then the district attorney states
that he will book them on some very minor trumped-up charge . , . ; if they
both confess, they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the
most severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the
confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence whereas
the latter will get the “book” slapped at him. (1957, p. 95)
The game, in its abstract form, is illustrated below. Person I has to choose
between rows X and Y; person II has to choose between columns A and B.
The amount of (imaginary) money each person wins or loses is determined by
the cell he gets into as a result of his respective choices. For example, if
person I chooses row X and person II chooses column A, they both get into
the AX cell, and they each win $9.00.
A B
X +9, -h9 -10, +10
Y +10,-10 -9,-9
If you examine the possibilities of choice for person I, you will notice that
he can win most and lose least by choosing B. However, if I chooses Y and II
122 RESEARCH
chooses B, they both lose $9.00. Both can win only if they end up in the AX
cell. If I is reasonably sure that II is going to choose A, he can win more by
choosing Y. Analogously, if II is confident that I is going to choose X, he can
win more by choosing B rather than A!
The essential psychological feature of the game is that there is no possibil-
ity for rational individual behavior in it or of the development of a just
agreement unless the conditions for mutual trust exist. If each player chooses
Y (whether out of fear that the other will choose Y or out of greed in the
expectation that the other will choose X), both will lose. But it makes no
sense to choose X (which assumes that the other will agree to cooperate)
unless one can trust the other player; doing so could result in maximum loss.
If one cannot trust, it is, of course, safer to choose so as to suffer minimum
rather than maximum loss, but it is even better not to play the game. If one
cannot avoid playing the game and if one cannot trust, there may be no
reasonable alternative except to choose the lesser of two evils and/or attempt
to develop the conditions that will permit mutual trust.
There are, of course, many social situations that are like that of the game
in the sense that they do not permit rational individual behavior or social
agreements unless the conditions for mutual trust exist. Any social situation
in which an individual may enhance his own satisfactions to the disadvantage
of another by not adhering to the moral expectations or social rules govern-
ing the situation is of this sort—for example, buyer-seller transactions, hus-
band-wife relationships, pedestrian-driver interactions, a crowd in a theater
when there is a fire. In everyday situations, mutual trust and social agreement
are predicated upon the existence of socialized motives (for example, an
interest in the welfare of others, a desire for social approval), conscience,
external authority, or other external arrangements that will provide the par-
ticipants with an incentive for adhering to the rules.Generally, if people who
are willing to adhere to the rules cannot trust that other participants in the
situation will also adhere to the rules, there is little possibility for rational
behavior or the development of a social contract except to attempt to develop
the conditions under which mutual adherence to the rules will occur.
Our research with the Prisoners’ Dilemma game began with the assumption
that there were three basic types of motivational orientation that an individ-
ual would be likely to have in an interpersonal situation: cooperative—the
person has a positive interest in the welfare of the others as well as his own
welfare; individualistic—the person has an interest in doing as well as he
can for himself and is unconcerned about the welfare of others; and competi-
tive—the person has an interest in doing better than the others as well as in
doing as well as he can for himself. It seemed reasonable to hypothesize that
mutual awareness of a shared cooperative orientation would be very likely to
help establish a relationship of mutual trust and facilitate a just agreement,
whereas mutual awareness of a shared competitive orientation would be very
likely to lead to a relationship of mutual suspicion. More generally, one could
assume that any factors that foster cooperation would increase the likelihood
of mutual trust and a fair agreement. Such factors might include bonds of
friendship, awareness of similarity in values, common group membership and
allegiance, normative pressures to be cooperative in the broader culture or in
the experimental situation, and personality predispositions favoring coopera-
tion. Similarly, any factors that would stimulate the development of a com-
petitive orientation would decrease the chance of developing a mutually trust-
ing relationship and agreement. Such factors might include negative attitudes
toward each other, awareness of dissimilarity in values or opposition of
interest, normative pressures for competition, and personality predispositions
favoring competition.
By definition, the person with an individualistic orientation obtains no

intrinsic satisfaction from the other’s gains or losses. The character of the
relationship does not predispose the individualistic person to be either trust-
worthy or untrustworthy. Under what circumstances can a person with this
orientation be trusted to fulfill his part or an implicit or explicit social con-
tract? Clearly, one such circumstance is when the contract or exchange is
enforceable by the superior power that one possesses or by third parties such
as the police, the courts, or one’s allies. Another circumstance is when the
individualistic person has committed himself to the contract by allowing
something that is valuable to him, such as his reputation, a deposit, or a
hostage of some sort, to be lost if he does not fulfill his part of the contract.
But there are many circumstances in which neither binding commitments nor
enforcement of agreements can be arranged. In such circumstances, one can
trust the individualistic other if one can control the timing of the exchange
between oneself and the other so that the other gets what he wants from you
only as or after he gives you what you want. The problem is somewhat more
complicated when both parties to an exchange see the other as being indi-
vidualistically oriented. In this case, to engage in an exchange each party
must be in the position of knowing that the other is making his contribution
to the exchange simultaneously with his own contribution. Physical simulta-
neity—that is, the occurrence of the decisions at the same physical time—is
not crucial; what is required is psychological simultaneity—the mutual
awareness of what the other is doing as each decides what to do.
The implication of the above reasoning is that trusting behavior can
occur, even when the participants are solely interested in their own welfare, if
their implicit social contract can be enforced or guaranteed by third parties, if
commitments can be made that make untrustworthiness too costly, or if the
timing of an exchange permits each part to withhold or withdraw his contri-
bution provided the other does likewise. In other words, one can expect that
an agreement can be developed under an individualistic orientation only if
external circumstances provide the support for it. Without such external
support, there is little basis for trust or a social contract between those who
are concerned only with their own welfare.
To test some of the ideas advanced in the preceding pages, we conducted
124 RESEARCH
a series of experiments using the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. In these experi-

ments, we studied the impact of different motivational orientations, the ef-
fects of simultaneity of choice, the consequences of different ways of commu-
nicating, the influence of third parties, the effects of personality dispositions
toward trust and trustworthiness, the influence of different types of power
relationships between the parties, and the consequences of different strategies
of playing the game (see Deutsch, 1973, for more^details). The results of these
various experiments can be summarized briefly as follows:
1. Mutual trust and the development of stable, fair agreements are most
likely to occur when people are positively (cooperatively) oriented to each
other’s welfare and least likely to occur when they are negatively (competi-
tively) oriented to each other’s welfare.
2. Stable, fair agreements can occur even under circumstances in which
the people involved are clearly unconcerned with each other’s welfare, pro-
vided that the characteristics of the situation are such that they lead one to be
confident that the agreement will be fulfilled. Some of the situational charac-
teristics that may facilitate the development of such confidence appear to be
the following:
a. The opportunity for each person to know that the other person will
do before he commits himself irreversibly to a trusting choice.
b. The opportunity and ability to communicate fully a system for
cooperation that defines mutual responsibilities and also specifies a procedure
for handling violations of their agreement and returning to a state of mutual
cooperation with minimum disadvantage if a violation occurs.
c. The power to influence the other person’s outcome and hence re-
duce any incentive he may have to violate their agreement. It is also apparent
that exercise of that power, when the other person is making untrustworthy
choices, may elicit more trustworthiness.
d. The presence of a third person whose relationship to the two
players is such that each perceives that a loss to the other player is detrimen-
tal to his interests vis-a-vis the third person.
THE ACME-BOLT TRUCKING GAME
We also conducted an extensive set of experiments employing the Acme-Bolt

Trucking game. In this game, the two participants play the role of truck
drivers carrying merchandise over a road to a destination. Their profits are
based on the time it takes them to complete a trip; the shorter the time the
greater their profit. If they take too long, they can lose money. Eigure 2
illustrates their routes. One player (“Acme”) travels from the left side of the
map to the right; the other (“Bolt”) goes from right to left. One segment of
their main routes is common to both—the middle portion labeled “one-lane
road.” As the label implies, this section is only wide enough for one truck to
go through at a time. Thus, in order to use the main routes efficiently, the
players must work out some method of sharing the one-lane section. Of
course, the player who is the first to go through the one-lane section ends up
with greater profits, since he is able to complete his trip in less time. As the
road map indicates, there is another way for the players to reach their desti-
nations, the alternate route. However, the length of the alternate route is such
that its use precludes the players making a profit.
It would appear, on the surface of it, that the problem posed by our
game, coming to fair agreement, is a reasonably simple one. An obvious
solution is for the players to agree to take turns preceding each other through
the one-lane segment and thus to maximize and equalize their profits over the
long run. The essential question on which our research has focused is, then,
what are the factors that affect the ease or difficulty with which bargainers
conclude such simple, fair agreements?
Our first experiment considered the manner in which a threat potential
affected the behavior of bargainers. By a threat potential, we mean a device
by which one player can inflict harm or damage upon the other. In the game,
this consisted of gates located at the end of the one-way segment nearest the
starting point of the player under whose control it was. The location of the
gates is illustrated in figure 2. By closing the gate, a player could prevent the
126 RESEARCH
other from going through the one-lane segment. Our bargainers played for
twenty trials in one of three conditions: bilateral threat—both players con-
trolled gates; unilateral threat—only one player (Acme) controlled a gate; or
no threat—neither player controlled a gate.
Since the task of the players was to make money and since in order to
make money it was necessary for them to work out some implicit agreement
about sharing the one-lane segment, we take as a measure of their success in
doing so their joint (summed) payoffs over the twenty repetitive trials. The
results clearly indicated that players in the no-threat condition were best able
to resolve the bargaining problem, whereas considerable difficulty was en-
countered by players in the unilateral-threat condition and, even more, by
players in the bilateral-threat condition. In the unilateral-threat condition, the
player with the threat potential (Acme) did better than the player without it
(Bolt); however, both players in this condition did worse than their counter-
parts in the no-threat condition. We assume that introducing threat into a
bargaining situation affects the meaning of yielding. To allow oneself to be
intimidated, particularly by someone who does not have the right to expect
deferential behavior, is to suffer a loss of social face and, hence, of self-es-
teem. The culturally defined way of maintaining face and self-esteem in the
face of attempted intimidation is to engage in a contest for supremacy vis-
a-vis the power to intimidate. The foregoing assumptions about the impor-
tance of face were tested and supported in a subsequent experiment con-
ducted by Brown (see Deutsch, 1973). Thus, in effect, the use of threat under
certain circumstances strengthens the competitive interests of the bargainers
by introducing or enhancing the competitive struggle for face, and this in turn
makes it difficult for them to arrive at fair agreements.
One may question the significance of our initial findings since the subjects
in our first experiment were not permitted to communicate verbally. It is, of
course, less efficient to communicate one’s intentions and expectations
through the moves permitted by the game than it would be to state them
explicitly. Thus, it might be hypothesized that the deleterious effect of a
threat potential would be minimized if our subjects were permitted a means
of verbal communication. We ran a second experiment to test this hypothesis.
All conditions were the same as in the first experiment, except that the
subjects were permitted to talk over an intercom. Subjects were told that they
could say anything they wanted to the other player, of if they wanted, they
could say nothing at all.
How did the communication facility affect the players’ ability to conclude
agreements? The outcomes in the first experiment (“no communication”) and
in the second experiment (“permissive communication”) did not differ signifi-
cantly. Interestingly enough, our subjects chose to talk least in the very condi-
tion where one would expect communication to be most helpful—the bilateral-
threat condition. Thus, one may conclude that the opportunity to converse, per
se, does not have a marked effect on the bargaining behavior of subjects
playing our experimental game. Certainly this result may be attributable to the
fact that our subjects failed to use the channel of communication open to them.
What then would have been the outcome if our subjects were compelled to
communicate? We ran a third experiment (“compulsory communication”) to
determine this.
In the third experiment, subjects were again told that they could say
anything they wanted to the other player. However, they were additionally
instructed that they “mws? say something to the other player on every trial.”
In all other respects, the situation was the same as in the previous experi-
ments. Only in the unilateral-threat condition was an improvement observed
as a result of being required to communicate.
How may we explain this result? Consider our initial assumption—that
the outcome of a bargaining encounter depends upon the balance of coopera-
tive and competitive motivations. As the first experiment showed, the threat
potential introduces a competitive element into the players’ relationships. In
the bilateral-threat conditions, the competitive motivation that is present so
overbalances cooperation that untutored communication results largely in an
exchange of threat. In the no-threat conditions, communication appears not
to improve the bargainers’ performance, apparently because without com-
petitive pressure, it is relatively easy to coordinate efforts in the absence of
communication. In the unilateral-threat conditions, the balance of coopera-
tive to competitive motivations is such that compulsory communication does
promote the bargainers’ ability to reach agreements.
Up to this point, it seemed quite clear that none of the measures we had
taken encouraged agreement in the bilateral-threat situation. We decided,
therefore, to examine some procedures that might be expected to help bar-
gainers reach agreement in the presence of bilateral threat. It seemed to us
that one way of accomplishing this would be to allow the parties in conflict
to discuss, before the trip began, their plans for the forthcoming trip. In this
way, the bargainers could work out the conflict verbally before coming to
grips with it in the game. However, our previous studies suggested quite
strongly that the mere existence of a communication channel did not guaran-
tee that it would be utilized effectively, even when our subjects were com-
pelled to use it. This reasoning led us to compare the effects of two orienta-
tions toward communications, induced through our experimental instruc-
tions. In one condition (“untutored communication”), subjects were simply
told that they would be given an opportunity to talk before the trial began,
that they could talk about anything they wanted to, but that they would be
expected to say something to the other player before each trial. In the second
condition (“tutored communication”), the instructions were more explicit:
subjects were told that they would be given an opportunity to talk before the
trial began and that they should use this opportunity to make a proposal to
the other player about what they should do on the forthcoming trial. More-
over, they were instructed to try to make proposals that were fair, both to
themselves and to the other player. All subjects were also told that they
would be permitted to talk during the trial if they so desired.
The results of this experiment indicated that communication that is ex-
plicitly directed at producing fair proposals is superior to communication
128 RESEARCH
that is not so directed; and the sorts of agreements that develop as a result of
tutored communication seem sufficiently stable that they can be maintained
over a series of subsequent trials on which the opportunity for communica-
tion has been withdrawn.
A further experiment with the bilateral-threat condition was conducted.
Communication was permitted only before or during the initial set of seven
trials of the game (which was usually before prolonged deadlocks between
the players had developed) or only before or during the second set of seven
trials (which was usually after such deadlocks had occurred). “Post dead-
lock” communication, even when untutored, was more effective than “pre-
deadlock” communication in eliciting effective cooperative agreements be-
tween the players during the third and final set of trials.
In addition to our experiments on communication and threat, several
other experiments conducted in our laboratory with the Acme-Bolt Trucking
game bear upon the question of what factors influence the ease or difficulty
of arriving at fair agreements in situations in which the people involved have
conflicting interests. In one experiment (Krauss, 1966), we created attitudes
of liking or disliking between our subjects by giving them a questionnaire
that purportedly had been filled out by their partner, but that actually had
been prepared by the experimenter. Positive attitudes were induced by lead-
ing the subject to believe that the other’s opinions about various issues were
similar to his own; negative attitudes were elicited by perceived dissimilarity
of opinion. In this experiment, we also employed a system of bonuses to
induce either strong motives for cooperating (each player received a certain
percentage of the other’s payoff) or for competing (each subtracted from his
payoff a percentage of the other’s payoff). Our findings indicated that coop-
erative as compared to competitive subjects used their gates fewer times and
achieved better bargaining agreements; similarly, subjects with mutually posi-
tive attitudes did better than those whose attitudes were mutually negative.
In another experiment, we studied the size of the conflict between the
bargainers by varying the length of the one-lane-wide section of the road on
the main road (see figure 2). In low-conflict conditions, this one-lane section
was only four units in length, whereas in middle- and high-conflict condi-
tions, it was ten and eighteen units long, respectively. The total length of the
main route was held constant in all conditions. On any given trial, the maxi-
mum earning for the first one to go through the one-lane section in the
low-conflict condition was twenty-three cents versus a maximum of eighteen
cents for the one to go through second; for the middle-conflict condition, it
was twenty-seven cents versus fourteen cents; and for the high-conflict,
thirty-two cents versus nine cents. The results indicated that, as the size of the
conflict increased, the bargainers experienced significantly greater difficulty
in reaching a cooperative agreement about how to use the one-lane path. We
also found that the subjects (male undergraduates), when run by an attractive
female (rather than male) experimenter, behaved in a more macho manner
(for example, employing their gates more frequently) and were less able to
come to effective cooperative agreements.
From these and other experiments conducted in our laboratory with the
Acme-Bolt Trucking game, we can conclude:
1. In a situation in which the participants have conflicting interests, they are

more able to work out a fair agreement if they have a cooperative rather
than a competitive orientation toward each other.
2. If the size of the conflict between them is seen to be small rather than large,
the conflicting parties are more able to work out a fair agreement between
them.
3. The mere existence of channels of communication between parties with
conflicting interests is no guarantee that communication will indeed take
place; and the greater the competitive orientation of the parties vis-a-vis
each other, the less likely they will be to use such channels as do exist.
4. Where barriers to communication exist, a situation in which the parties are
compelled to communicate by a neutral third party will be more effective
in stimulating agreement than one in which the choice to talk or not is on a
voluntary basis. However, if the orientation of the conflicting parties are
competitive, communication that is not directed at changing this orienta-
tion is unlikely to elicit cooperative agreements.
5. Pressure from an influential third party to communicate proposals for fair
agreements can help facilitate the development of fair agreements between
conflicting parties, even when circumstances would usually foster competi-
tive interactions.
6. Strongly rooted positive attitudes between parties with conflicting interests
can lead to fair agreements, even when their situation would normally be
conducive to competitive interactions.
7. The availability of weapons may stimulate the use of threats in a conflict
situation, and this in turn makes it more difficult to reach an agreement.
THE BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY GAME
We conducted several experiments to see which of several behavioral strate-

gies would be most effective in eliciting cooperation from someone whose
behavior is not initially and persistently cooperative. The question here is: if
you wish to establish a fair, cooperative system of interaction with another
who is not inclined toward cooperation, what is the best strategy to employ?
The effectiveness of several different strategies was investigated in a two-per-
son laboratory game that permitted players to act altruistically, coopera-
tively, individualistically, self-protectively, or aggressively toward each other.
One of the players in each game was always an accomplice of the experi-
menter; he followed a predetermined strategy in response to the true subject’s
behavior in the game. The true subject, of course, did not know that he was
playing with an experimenter’s accomplice.
One strategy, “turn the other cheek,” had the accomplice respond to
attacks or threats by exhibiting altruistic behavior (doing something that
rewarded the other) and by showing cooperative behavior otherwise. The
130 RESEARCH
“nonpunitive” strategy has the accomplice react self-protectively rather than

with counterthreats or counterattacks when the subject threatened or at-
tacked; otherwise, he reciprocated the subject’s behaviors. The “deterrent”
strategy had the accomplice respond threateningly to any noncooperative acts
of the subject and also had him counterattack when attacked; he responded
cooperatively to any cooperative behavior from the subject. The remaining
strategies were different types of “reformed-sinner” strategies. Elere, the ac-
complice played in a very threatening and aggressive manner during the first
fifteen trials of the game, but then dramatically changed his behavior by
disarming on the sixteenth trial. In one form of the reformed-sinner strategy,
the accomplice followed a turn-the-other-cheek strategy after the sixteenth
trial; in another, he followed a nonpunitive strategy; in the third, he used a
deterrent strategy.
The three basic strategies (turn the other cheek, nonpunitive, deterrent)
were selected in an attempt to represent, even if only crudely, three widely
held positions regarding how to elicit cooperation. The turn-the-other-cheek
strategy seeks to elicit cooperation by appealing to the social conscience and
goodwill of the subject; such an approach has characterized many religious
groups and the advocates of nonviolence. The deterrent strategy attempts to
elicit cooperation by use of the carrot and the stick—by rewarding coopera-
tion and punishing noncooperation; it appeals to the economic motives of the
subject by increasing the costs of noncooperative behavior. In so doing, it
does not distinguish between the psychological effects of reward and those of
punishment. The implication is that rewards and punishments exist on a
psychologically unidimensional continuum. Such an approach often charac-
terizes viewpoints that have been described as rationalistic, utilitarian, au-
thoritarian, tough-minded, disciplinarian, and militaristic; these viewpoints
are, of course, not necessarily similar in other respects. The nonpunitive
strategy places its emphasis on rewarding cooperation and on neutralizing or
nonrewarding aggressive behavior; it appeals to the self interests of the sub-
ject through positive rather than negative incentives and thus attempts to
avoid the misunderstanding and hostility that may result from the subject’s
experience of punishment. This type of strategy is often popular among pro-
gressive educators, psychotherapists, liberals, the “tender-minded,” and the
like.
We assumed that the subjects, who were individualistically oriented,
would tend to exploit the accomplice if he employed the turn-the-other-cheek
strategy; all were told “to earn as much money as you can for yourself
regardless of how much the other earns.” Thus it could be anticipated that
the subjects’ game outcomes in this condition would be relatively high,
whereas those of the accomplices would be relatively low, with the discrep-
ancy between their outcomes being quite large. In addition, the subjects,
being individualistically oriented, could be expected to have difficulty in un-
derstanding why anyone would use such a strategy, and they might think that
its use was stupid or bizarre. In contrast, we expected the nonpunitive strat-
egy to elicit cooperation from the subjects and, hence, to result in relatively
high outcomes for both the accomplices and the subjects. The deterrent strat-
egy, in comparison with the nonpunitive one, was expected to be relatively
ineffective in eliciting cooperation, and it was anticipated that the game
outcomes for both the subjects and the accomplices would be relatively low.
It was expected that the deterrent strategy would produce the most competi-
tive behaviors (defensive and aggressive) of any of the strategies.
The reformed-sinner strategies were expected to elicit aggresive and defen-
sive behavior from the subjects during the first fifteen trials when the accom-
plice was being threatening and aggressive (being a “sinner”). However, we
had no clear expectations as to how the subjects would respond to the accom-
plice who reformed and then adopted a turn-the-other-cheek strategy. On the
one hand, we thought it possible that the subjects would seek revenge and
might exploit the accomplice even more than in the condition where the turn-
the-other-cheek strategy was not preceded by aggressive behavior. On the
other hand, it seemed possible that the reform would be accepted as genuine
and its form as appropriate and, further, that the accomplice’s earlier display
of aggressiveness would serve to deter the subjects’ temptation to exploit. The
former reaction would produce even more exaggerated differences than we
were predicting for the simple turn-the-other-cheek strategy. The latter reac-
tion would make the results for the reformed-sinner version of this strategy
resemble the results predicted for the nonpunitive strategy—that is, both sub-
jects and accomplices would do relatively well. We also expected that, after the
reform had been clearly established, the reformed-sinner / nonpunitive strategy
would be effective in eliciting cooperation and would result in relatively high
outcomes for both players.
Several different experiments were conducted (see Deutsch, 1973, for
details). The first compared the effectiveness of five different strategies in a
relatively noncompetitive situation. The strategies compared were: turn the
other cheek, nonpunitive, deterrent, reformed sinner / turn the other cheek,
and reformed sinner / nonpunitive. A second experiment studied the effective-
ness of these strategies in a more competitive situation and also investigated
the reformed-sinner / deterrent strategy. A third experiment examined two
different versions of the deterrent strategy. The last experiment studied the
three basic strategies in a situation in which the temptation to take advantage
of the other was high. In one condition in this situation, the different strate-
gies were employed vis-a-vis another who had higher power; in the second
condition, both participants had equal power.
The results of the different experiments were very consistent, and they can
be summarized as follows:
1. The nonpunitive strategy was most effective in eliciting cooperative behavior
from the subjects and, overall, resulted in the highest joint outcomes as well as
the highest outcomes for the accomplice. The effectiveness of this strategy
varied least from situation to situation. In none of the experiments was any of
the other strategies more effective than the nonpunitive one in eliciting
cooperation and reducing aggression from the subjects. Only under the
extremely competitive conditions of the fourth experiment was this strategy
132 RESEARCH
no more effective than the deterrent one, and even then, when the accomplice
had equal power with the subject, he elicited less competitive behavior when
he employed a nonpunitive rather than a deterrent strategy.
2. The effectiveness of the turn-the-other-cheek strategy was very much influ-
enced by the competitiveness of the situation; the more competitive the
incentives of the subjects, the more massively they exploited the accomplice
who employed this strategy. This strategy was consistently exploited in all
our experiments except when it had been preceded by a show of strength
(the reformed-sinner variant) in the first experiment.
3. The deterrent strategy elicited more aggressive and self-protective, as well as
less cooperative, behaviors from the subjects than the other strategies. The
deterrent accomplice was rated as the most uncooperative, least kind, and
most selfish of the accomplices; he was also considered to be relatively unst-
able and almost as aggressive as the reformed sinners. However, under the
highly competitive conditions of the fourth experiment, the deterrent accom-
plice was less aggressive than real subjects (paired with other real subjects):
the latter, having no systematic strategy, tended to be less forgiving and more
vindictive in response to the other person’s prior aggressive behavior.
SUMMARY
We have summarized a variety of experiments in the preceding sections that
bear upon the question stated in the introduction to this chapter: under what
conditions are people with conflicting interests able to work out an agree-
ment (that is, a system of justice defining what each shall give and receive in
the transaction between them) that is stable and mutually satisfying? Can any
summarizing, integrating principle be stated as an answer to this question? I
believe that such a principle is inherent in what I have termed Deutsch’s
crude law of social relations: the typical effects of a given social relation tend
to induce that social relation (see chapters 3, 5, and 6).
The typical effects of a cooperative system of interaction that is experi-
enced as fair by its participants provide the basic conditions for the develop-
ment of such a system of interaction, whereas the typical consequences of a
competitive system of interaction have the opposite influence: they inhibit the
development of such a system. Thus, in terms of some of the research results
presented in this chapter, the ability to work out a fair agreement is enhanced
when the conflicting parties have a positive interest in each other’s welfare,
they see themselves as having similar values, they perceive the differences
between them to be small, their communication indicates a positive respon-
siveness to each other’s needs, they view themselves as equal, they have
positive attitudes toward one another, and so on. In contrast, the ability to
work out such an agreement is inhibited by the use of threats and coercive
tactics, the perception that opposed values and large differences exist between
self and other, exploitative behavior, minimal communication, attempts to
gain superiority over the other, and so on. Thus, to the extent that the social
and psychological conditions favor cooperative interaction, they increase the
likelihood of fair agreements that are stable and mutually satisfying.
CHAPTER TEN
Experimental Studies of the Effects of

Different Systems of Distributive Justice
A basic assumption that is shared by equity theorists, the proponents of a

meritocratic society, and many personnel managers who design wage systems
is that individuals and groups will be more productive if the individuals are
rewarded in proportion to their contribution. The research described in
chapter 8 clearly indicates that this assumption is not correct when individu-
als are working on tasks or in circumstances in which it is helpful for them to
cooperate, to share information and resources, or to coordinate their activi-
ties. Perhaps the assumption has validity only when the individuals are in-
volved in noninterdependent tasks, in work that is not facilitated by effective
cooperation.
In fact, careful thought about the circumstances under which rewarding
members in proportion to their contribution to a group (or rewarding indi-
viduals in proportion to their performance) would most likely induce rela-
tively high productivity suggests that there are a number of basic requisites.
These include the following: (1) the task to be accomplished must be clearly
defined and specified; (2) the individuals involved must believe that their
performance can be measured reliably, validly, and with sufficient precision;
(3) achievement must be readily susceptible to continued improvement by
increased effort and this is believed to be so by the individuals involved; (4)
the type of reward offered for performance must be desired by the individual
and its value to the individual must increase with the amount of reward he or
she receives; (5) the dependence of an individual’s reward upon his accom-
plishment must be known to the individual and subjectively salient during his
work; and (6) neither individual nor group task performance should depend
upon effective social cooperation.
These combined prerequisites for the valid application of the proportional-
ity principle (people should be rewarded in proportion to their contributions)
are rarely found in social reality: it is often difficult to measure accomplish-
ments reliably, validly, and precisely; tasks, especially the ones involving much
133
134 RESEARCH
responsibility and varied activities, are often difficult to specify and define
clearly; on many tasks, beyond a certain minimum, increased effort does not
improve performance; after a certain amount, additional rewards may have
little significance to the individual; other factors are commonly more salient as
one works than one’s potential pay; and the tasks to be accomplished often
require effective cooperation among many individuals. Although everyday
work situations may not usually embody the circumstances necessary for the
valid application or test of the proportionality principle, it is possible to create
the conditions required to do so in the laboratory.
In this chapter, I describe a number of experiments that contrast different
principles of distributive justice; some of these studies were fashioned to
create the six task and situational characteristics listed earlier in order to
maximize the chance of finding support for the asssumption of the equity
theorists that performance will be enhanced by the expectation of being
rewarded in proportion to one’s contribution. The first two were designed
with this purpose in mind. In them, the subjects worked in separate cubicles
on identical tasks that were neither interesting nor difficult. Both experiments
systematically varied the type of distributive system, using the same task; the
second also varied the magnitude of the rewards available to the subjects and
used female as well as male subjects. In the third experiment, the subjects
worked face-to-face on several types of very brief tasks under different dis-
tributive systems. In contrast to the first three where the subjects worked in
three-person groups, in the fourth study the subjects worked alone under one
or another reward system similar in character to the different distributive
justice systems. In a fifth, the subjects worked face-to-face on a highly inter-
dependent, extended task. In a sixth, the good being distributed within the
group was grades rather than money; the grades were distributed according
to either the equality or the proportionality principle and were based upon
either the amount of effort or the level of performance.
Each of the experiments had unique attributes. However, in most, mea-
sures were taken of the subjects’ initial attitudes toward the different distribu-
tive systems; their expectations regarding their effort, their motivation to
work, and their performance under the different systems; their attitudes to-
ward themselves, the other group members (in the group experiments), and
the task; their actual performances; their reported effort and motivation
while they worked; and their attitudes toward the distributive systems at the
end of the experiment.
The subjects in the various studies were undergraduate and graduate
students at Columbia University. They ranged in age from seventeen to over
forty but were mostly in their early twenties. The vast majority indicated that
they were participating in the research because of the money they could earn.
Although there was a sprinkling of students from other countries, most were
born in the United States. All students were paid a fee for participating in the
experiment, and they knew they could get additional bonus money of a
significant amount: in the group experiments, how much money a subject
was paid was a function of how much money his group earned and how that
Different Systems of Distributive Justice 135
money was distributed within his group. Four different principles of allocat-
ing the group’s earnings to its members were used in a number of the studies.
These were described as follows:
Winner takes all: Under this system, whoever performs the task best in
the group wins all the money the group is paid.
Proportionality: Under this system, each person is rewarded in proportion
to his contribution to the group score. In other words, the person who
contributes 50 percent of the group’s total output will get 50 percent of the
money to be distributed within the group; a person who contributes 10
percent of the group’s total output would get 10 percent of the money to be
distributed within the group, and so on.
Equality: Under this system, each person in the group will get an equal
share of the money to be distributed within the group. In other words, each
person will get one-third of the group’s total earnings.
Need: Under the need distribution system, each group member will be
rewarded according to the need expressed on a biographical data sheet. In
other words, the person who needs the money most will get proportionately
more money; the person who needs the money least will get the least amount
of money.
In the fourth experiment (the one in which the subjects worked alone, not in
a group), these principles were modified to make them appropriate to the
individual situation while retaining the basic differences among the four dis-
tribution principles. The modifications will be described below when the
fourth experiment is summarized.
EXPERIMENT I
As in all the experiments reported in this chapter, the subjects were volun-
teers who were recruited through advertisements in the Columbia newspaper,
the Spectator, and through notices placed on bulletin boards throughout the
university. In this study,^ only male students were used; their mean age was
twenty years. When asked to label their political orientation, 9 percent chose
“left,” 35 percent chose “liberal,” 29 percent chose “moderate,” 13 percent
chose “conservative,” 1 percent chose “right,” and 13 percent chose “other”
(“don’t know,” “none” and so on).
Subjects were recruited so that three came to our social psychology labo-
ratory for any given experimental session. The recruitment material indicated
that they would be participating in research related to group productivity. On
arrival, each subject was ushered into a separate, small (nine-by-six-foot
experimental room and filled out a biographical data sheet. The three sub-
jects, although they were referred to as a group, did not have contact with
1. This summary is based upon an unpublished report prepared by Delores M. Mei (1978)
who conducted this experiment and analyzed its data while she was my research assistant.
136 RESEARCH
one another during the experiment. After the three were in their separate
rooms, they listened to standard, tape-recorded experimental instructions,
which described the decoding task that each would work on, how their
separate, individual task performances would be scored, how their group
score would be derived from the sum of the three individual scores, and how
the group score would be converted into group earnings (a group could earn
up to nine dollars over and above the three dollars each subject was paid for
participating in the experiment). They, then, were told that their group would
be working under one of four distribution systems, to which their group had
already been assigned by a random procedure.
After hearing a description of the four distribution systems, but before
knowing to which system they were assigned, the subjects filled out question-
naires about their attitudes toward the different systems. They were then
given detailed instructions about the decoding task on which they were to
work. The task required them to decode Japanese poems (haikus) from sym-
bols into numbers and then from numbers into words using a symbols and
than a numbers dictionary. Subjects were given two five-minute practice
sessions to familiarize them with the task. They were then assigned to one of
the four distribution systems and were asked to fill out a questionnaire deal-
ing with their attitudes toward the task.
Next, the subjects worked on decoding the haikus for two ten-minute
periods. After each work period, they were provided with their own scores,
the scores of the other two members of their group, the total amount of
bonus money earned by the group, and their respective shares according to
the operative distribution principle. Questionnaires were administered fol-
lowing the feedback after the first work period to discern attitudes toward
the different distribution systems, their fellow group members, the task, the
amount of money they received, and so on.
Nine groups, each composed of three randomly assigned subjects, were
run under each of the four distribution principles: winner takes all, propor-
tionality, equality, and need. In addition, nine groups were run in each of
the two control conditions: one was called “the veil of ignorance” (after
Rawls, 1971) and the other “the known performance.” In both control
conditions, the groups themselves selected the distribution principle to be
employed in their group by a voting procedure. Each subject rank ordered
his preferences for the different principles and each principle was given a
score based on its rank; the scores were then totaled for the three subjects
and the principle with the most favorable total score was used as the distri-
bution principle for that group. In the veil-of-ignorance condition, the sub-
jects voted prior to working on the decoding task; that is, they were behind
a veil of ignorance with respect to whether they, as individuals, would earn
relatively more or less if one rather than another principle were employed.
In the known-performance condition, the votes were taken only after they
had received feedback following the second work period about their own
performance scores, the scores of the other two members, and the total
group earnings.
Results
Attitudes toward the distributive principles. At the start of the experiment, the
subjects most strongly preferred to work under the proportionality principle:
their second preference was equality; and need and winner takes all were least
preferred.^ The ratings of fairness indicate that the winner-takes-all principle
was considered to be significantly less fair than each of the other principles; the
proportionality principle received the highest ratings for fairness, but its rat-
ings were not significantly higher than the ratings of the equality and need
principles. On a number of other measures related to anticipated performance
(motivation to work, expected individual task performance, expected group
earnings, and individual contribution to group output), the subjects gave sig-
nificantly higher ratings to the proportionality and winner-takes-all principles
than to the equality and need principles.
In other words, at the start of the experiment, the subjects had highly
favorable attitudes toward the proportionality principle and thought it would
strongly motivate them and the other group members to work productively
so that they would have high group earnings. Although they had rather
unfavorable attitudes toward the winner-takes-all principle, they believed
that it would also stimulate them to work productively. In contrast, the
subjects thought they would be less productive under the equality and need
conditions, even though they had favorable attitudes toward equality and
mixed attitudes toward need (disliking it but not considering it unfair).
Task performance. There were no statistically significant differences
among the performances of the individuals under the different distribution
principles in either or both work periods. In contradiction to their own
expectations at the start of the experiment, the subjects in the winner-takes-all
and proportionality conditions were not more productive than those in the
need and equality conditions. In all conditions, performance improved from
the first to the second work period. Also, individual differences in perfor-
mance that were evident during the practice sessions significantly predicted
individual performance during the two work periods.
Self-perceptions of effort and performance after performing. After the
first work period, the subjects completed a number of rating scales related to
their performance (“how much effort did you put into the decoding task?”
“how well do you feel you performed?” and “how satisfied are you with
your performance?”). The data, as with the actual performance results, re-
vealed no differences among the various experimental conditions. The sub-
jects, in all conditions, reported that they put in almost as much effort as
possible; they viewed their performance somewhat positively but were not
satisfied with it. Also, after the first work period, the subjects in the different
2. The reported results (unless otherwise indicated) are statistically reliable in the sense that
there was less than a 5 percent likelihood that they could have occurred by chance. This is the
case for each of the experiments reported in this chapter.
138 RESEARCH
conditions did not differ in how hard they expected to work in the second
work period. Additionally, they did not differ in how satisfied they were with
their earnings.
Attitudes toward the task. No differences emerged among the conditions
with regard to the subjects’ views of the task: it was considered to be a
somewhat easy task that was rated as falling between “boring” and “interest-
ing” and between “pleasant” and “unpleasant.” In all conditions, the sub-
jects considered effort a very important determinant of how well one per-
formed the task.
Atttitudes toward other group members. From the first measurement of
attitude toward other group members (after the subjects knew their distribu-
tion principle but before they worked on the task) to the final measurement
(after the first work period), the subjects became significantly more competi-
tive and less friendly, and felt less equal, more intense, and more personal in
their relations with the others in their nominal group. The subjects in the
equality and need conditions felt significantly more cooperative toward the
others than did the subjects in the winner-takes-all and proportionality condi-
tions; as could be expected, the winner-takes-all subjects felt the most competi-
tive throughout. The subjects in the two control conditions, who chose their
distribution principle, felt significantly less impersonal toward their group
mates than did the subjects in the other conditions.
Attitudes toward the different distributive principles after the first work
period. The subjects’ attitudes toward the several distributive principles did
not change from the attitudes they reported at the beginning of the experiment.
The two choice conditions. In the veil-of-ignorance, or “full-veil” control
condition, under which the groups voted on the distribution principles prior
to working on the task, five of the nine groups chose proportionality and the
other four chose equality. In the known-performance condition, under which
voting took place after knowledge of performance was obtained following
the second work period, four of the nine groups voted for equality, three for
proportionality, and two for need. That is, when the subjects knew they had
a choice about the distributive system, their individual as well as collective
preference for equality became stronger and the strong favoring of the pro-
portionality system was reduced or disappeared. We speculate that the voting
not only led the subjects in the two choice conditions to have a greater sense
of personal involvement with one another than did the subjects in the more
impersonal, nominal groups but also the greater personal involvement in-
creased the attractiveness of the equality principle. We further speculate that
the politeness ritual was more operative in the known-performance than in
the full-veil condition.
The subjects in the full-veil and known-performance conditions rated
their own conditions on fairness, expected enjoyment, performance expecta-
tions, and satisfaction with monetary outcomes about as favorably as the
subjects in the proportionality condition rated their system. These results for
the two choice conditions were not affected by whether they choose equality
or proportionality. Although the small number of groups involved do not
permit definitive conclusions, the results suggest that having the opportunity
to chose how the group’s earnings would be distributed led to relatively
favorable attitudes no matter which principle was chosen.
Preference for distributive principles as a function of task performance.
The subjects in each group were classified in terms of their actual relative
task performances as being a high, medium, or low performer in his group to
see whether differences in attitudes were correlated with task performance.
Prior to performing on the decoding task, the higher one’s subsequent perfor-
mance, the more likely one was to prefer the winner-takes-all principle and
the less likely one was to favor equality and need; no matter what one’s
future performance, proportionality was the most preferred principle. The
patterns of preferences were maintained after the subjects learned about their
actual performance.
Summary
It is evident that despite their preferences for the proportionality principle and
despite their expectations that they would work harder and be more produc-
tive under this principle, the subjects’ actual performances were not signifi-
cantly better nor did they report that they actually worked harder when they
were being rewarded in proportion to their contribution than when being
rewarded on the basis of the equality, need, or winner-takes-all principles.
EXPERIMENT II
This study^ was similar to the preceding one except in the following respects:
(1) nominal groups of female as well as male subjects participated; (2) the
bonus system differed and was varied so that half the groups were in a
high-affluent condition, the other half were in a low condition; (3) only three
distributive systems were employed—the need condition and the control,
choice conditions, were not run; (4) only one ten-minute work period was
used to measure performance; (5) the three subjects in each nominal group
were given an opportunity to redistribute their bonuses if they so desired; (6)
when recruited, subjects were told they would be paid five dollars for partici-
pating but might earn considerably more; and (7) the subjects were older;
their mean age was twenty-seven years (a range of eighteen to fifty-two) and
75 percent were in graduate school.
Five groups of male and five of female subjects were run in each of the six
experimental conditions: each of three distributive systems (winner takes all,
proportionality, and equality) were studied under each of two bonus systems
(high and low affluence). The instructions for the distribution systems were
the same as in the preceding study of the haiku decoding task.
3. This study was conducted by William A. Wenck, Jr., and Cilio Ziviani. The summary
presented here is based on unpublished reports prepared by Wenck (1979) and Ziviani (1979).
140 RESEARCH
In the high-affluent bonus condition, the subjects were told that their
group could earn up to 270 roulette chips; in the low condition, they were
told their group could earn up to 30 roulette chips. (In other words, the same
group score would earn nine times as many chips in the high- as compared to
the low-affluent condition.) Group scores were, as in the first experiment, the
transformed sum of the individual performance scores during the work pe-
riod. The group earnings, in the form of chips, were distributed to the indi-
vidual members of a group in accordance with the distribution principle
under which the group worked. Subjects could place the chips they had
earned on one or more of the numbers from one to one hundred that were on
the face of a roulette board. They were told that a card would be drawn, by a
subject they elected, from a deck of cards containing the one hundred num-
bers. The number that was drawn would be the winning number. Each
subject who had previously placed one or more of his chips on the winning
number would be paid $4 for each winning chip; otherwise the chips would
be worthless. It can be seen that the maximum earning of a subject in the
high-affluent, winner-takes-all condition (if he had the best individual per-
formance) was $1,080 (if all 270 chips had been placed on the winning
number), whereas the maximum earning in the low-affluent, winner-takes-all
condition was $120 (30 X $4). Analogously, the maximum earnings in the
high-affluent, equality condition was $360 ($1,080 3), and in the low
condition, it was $40 ($120 ^ 3). We paid all the subjects whatever they
won; fortunately for us, none of the subjects ever won the maximum.
Results
The basic results of this experiment were the same as in the preceding one.
Namely, despite their preferences for the proportionality principle and de-
spite their expectations that they would work harder and be more productive
under this principle (and also under winner takes all), the subjects performed
as well and worked as hard under the equality system as under the other two
principles. These results were obtained for the female as well as male sub-
jects. As in the initial experiment, the subjects in the second one also were
significantly more likely to feel cooperative rather than competitive, equal
rather than unequal, and giving rather than receiving if they were in the
equality rather than winner-takes-all or proportionality conditions.
The degree of affluence of the reward system, the distribution system, and
the sex of the subject had no influence, per se; this was also true of interac-
tions on task performance. However, there was a significant three-way inter-
action so that performance of the subjects appeared to be affected by the
combination of the three variables: distribution principle, affluence, and sex.
In the high-affluent condition, males performed better under the proportion-
ality than the equality principle: the reverse was true under the low-affluent
condition. In contrast, the women in the high-affluent condition performed
better under equality than under proportionality, whereas the reverse was
true under the low-affluent condition. In the winner-takes-all conditions, the
males performed about the same whether they were in the high- or the
low-affluent condition; the females, in contrast, performed better in the low-
rather than the high-affluent condition when working under winner-takes-all.
Two other significant findings will be noted here. Subjects in the high-
affluent as compared to the low affluent conditions were even more negatively
disposed toward the winner-takes-all principle. When given the opportunity to
vote for or against redistributing the group’s earnings, subjects in the winner-
takes-all condition were most apt to vote in favor of redistribution as com-
pared to the subjects in the other conditions. In this and several subsequent
studies, various significant correlates of the subjects’ attitudes toward the dif-
ferent distributive principles were obtained. Since the results of the later studies
are consistent with these results, those findings will be presented later.
Summary
The major results of the first experiment were supported by the second study:
no consistent performance differences were obtained as a function, per se, of
the distribution principle the subjects worked under, whether the subjects
were male or female. However, a complex three-way interaction among level
of reward, distribution principle, and sex was found in our data in relation to
performance. This finding is not readily interpretable. Since it was one of the
few three-way interactions that were statistically significant, it may be a
chance result.
EXPERIMENT III
Although our third experiment was also concerned with the effects of the
four distribution principles and employed both male and female subjects, it
differed substantially from the preceding experiments."^ The three-person
groups in this experiment were face-to-face groups, who sat around a circular
table in the same room as they worked on their tasks in contrast to the
nominal, noninteracting, physically separated groups of the preceding experi-
ments. In addition, the groups worked on five different types of tasks, some
of which had associated subtasks. The tasks varied in terms of whether or not
they allowed interdependent work and whether or not they required interde-
pendent work. They also varied in the type of interdependence and the type
of intellectual activity required by the task. A brief description of the tasks
follows, listed in the order in which they were administered.
1. Estimation task, (a) Independent activity: subjects were given thirty
seconds to estimate individually, by secret ballot, the number of jelly beans in
a jar that was placed in the center of the table around which they sat; and (b)
interdependent activity: subjects were then given two minutes to reach by
consensus one group estimate of the number of jelly beans in the jar.
4. This experiment was Cilio Ziviani’s (1981) doctoral dissertation study. For details regard-
ing the experimental procedures and the statistical analysis of the data, it should be consulted.
142 RESEARCH
2. Card-sorting task, (a) Independent activity: prior to the card-sorting

task, the subjects were given fifty seconds to perform individually twenty-five
sums of digits, each sum ranging from two to five digits; and (b) interdepen-
dent activity permitted: subjects were asked to sort standard playing cards
into twenty-five different piles on a board; each pile had to add up to a
designated number of points and had to contain at least one card of each of
the designated types of suits (spades, hearts, or clubs). Each subject was given
four decks of eight cards numbered from two to nine; three were the same
suit and one was of a different suit: a total of 32 cards with face values
adding up to 176. The subject’s individual score was the sum of the values of
the cards that he or she had placed in correct piles on the board. Four
different types of piles existed on the board (the subjects were not informed
of this): high interdependence—seven piles required all three group members
to contribute cards to the pile; medium interdependence—six piles required
cards from at least two of the members; low interdependence—nine piles
could be done by individual group members alone, but others could contrib-
ute; and no interdependence—three piles could only be done by the three
group members working alone. In the first trial, four minutes were allowed
for working on the task (and the individual’s score was determined by the
total of his placed cards in correctly completed piles); in a second trial, the
subjects were allowed to work as little or long as they wanted: the score was
how long the subject worked with three seconds added to the elapsed time
for each card that was not correctly placed or not placed at all.
3. Model-replication task. This task included five separate trials: (a) inde-
pendent activity: subjects had to reproduce a model pattern by sticking forty
labels of three different colors on an eight-inch square grid; each subject had
all the resources necessary to complete the subtask individually; (b) exchange
required; subjects were unable to reproduce correctly up to fourteen of forty
labels on their own grids unless they exchanged labels among themselves; (c)
high exchange required: correct placement of up to twenty-six of forty labels
was dependent upon exchanges of labels among the subjects; (d) receiving
required: subjects needed to obtain fourteen of forty labels from another
group member who had them to spare; the potential giver of these labels did
not need any of the labels that the potential receiver had to spare; and (e)
high receiving: the same as (d) except that twenty-six of forty labels were
needed by the potential receiver. The subjects were told their score would be
a function of time and accuracy: the less time they took and the fewer
unplaced or incorrectly placed labels, the better their score would be (three
seconds were added on their elapsed time score for every unplaced or incor-
rectly placed label).
4. Concept-formation tasks: Only an interdependent activity: each sub-
ject was given a different sentence that had a missing word; the same word
could fit into all three sentences. Without telling the others anything about
his sentence, a subject could state a word that might fit his sentence and the
others could indicate whether it was suitable for their sentences. The subjects
were timed to see how long it would take them to agree on a correct word
that would fit all three sentences. They were allowed a maximum of two
minutes. Two trials of this task were administered.
5. Picture-interpretation task, (a) Independent activity: subjects were
given four minutes to write a story about an out-of-focus photograph depict-
ing three males (for male groups) or three females (for female groups) sitting
around a table; the photograph was intended to suggest the scene of the
experiment; and (b) interdependent activity: the subjects were then given six
minutes to write one group story together about the same photograph.
We selected the various tasks, with their types and degrees of interdepen-
dence, because we expected that the distribution principles might affect group
interaction differently in the different types of task structure. In the noninter-
dependent types of task, we anticipated that the distribution principles would
result in no systematic differences; in the tasks requiring interdependence, we
assumed that only the winner-takes-all orientation would impair effective
cooperation; and in the tasks permitting but not requiring cooperation, coop-
eration would more likely ensue from the equality than from the proportion-
ality principle.
Questionnaires were administered at various points during the experiment
to assess the subjects’ attitudes toward the different distribution principles,
toward the tasks, toward one another, toward the self, and so on. In this
experiment, eight male and eight female three-person groups were run in each
of the four distribution conditions (winner takes all, proportionality, equal-
ity, and need).
Results
Task performance. Overall measures of individual and group task perfor-

mances were obtained by summing eleven individual performance scores on
the various tasks/subtasks of the experiment (the picture-interpretation task
was not scored), and a group score was taken from the actual money earned
by the group that included tasks on which a group score only was obtained.
Although both measures were reasonably reliable (that is, individuals and
groups tended to have relatively consistent performances across the tasks/sub-
tasks), there were no reliable overall differences in task performance as a
result of the distribution principle that the subjects worked under nor as a
result of the gender of the subjects. The groups, on the average, earned a
bonus of $25.36.
An examination of the results for the different tasks reveals that there
were no significant effects of the distribution principle nor of gender upon
individual or group performance for the estimation task, the additions prob-
lems (prior to the card-sorting task), and the concept-formation task. How-
ever, on the group-estimation task, the winner-takes-all groups did relatively
poorly (but the differences are not quite statistically significant). On the first
trial of the card-sorting task, where the subjects worked under a time limit of
four minutes, there were no reliable differences as a function of distribution
144 RESEARCH
principle; however, the male subjects made significantly more points than the
females.
On the second trial of the card-sorting task (where no time limit was
imposed), the males obtained significantly better scores than females, and the
subjects working under the proportionality principle performed significantly
better than those in the equality and need conditions. Detailed analyses of
these results indicate that the proportionality subjects did not make more
total correct points than did the subjects in the other distribution conditions,
but, rather, they worked more quickly. The males worked more rapidly and
made fewer errors than the females. The data also indicate that the better
performances of the proportionality subjects, and the poorer performances of
those in winner takes all, were manifested primarily in relation to the card
piles of medium interdependence, requiring the cooperation of two of the
three subjects to do the pile. Where all three subjects had to cooperate to do
the pile, the female groups did better under the proportionality then under
the equality principle whereas the male group did better under the equality
than under the proportionality canon. It is important to note that the propor-
tion of correct points received to the number of possible points decreased
markedly as the degree of task interdependence increased: the subjects tended
to work on the piles requiring little or no interdependence before working on
the one requiring greater interdependence.
The results on the model-replication task reveal no significant differences
in overall performance scores as a function of either distribution principle or
sex for each of the five trials in this task or for the sum of the five trials.
However, on the four trials involving interdependent work, winner-takes-all
subjects consistently had the poorest performance; this was particularly true
for the females. In addition, when the overall score is broken down into its
two components, errors and elapsed time, significant differences do emerge.
The subjects in the equality groups made fewer errors on each of the five
trials than did the groups in any other condition, as did the female compared
to the male subjects. The subjects in the need condition made fewer errors
than the proportionality and winner-takes-all subjects in the exchange and
receiving trials. The proportionality subjects worked more rapidly than the
subjects in the other conditions, particularly in contrast to those in the win-
ner-takes-all condition; this result was more marked for the female than the
male subjects.
Initial attitudes toward the distribution principles. The initial attitudes of
the subjects toward the different distributive principles was much the same as
reported for the first two experiments. Also, similar to what has been previ-
ously described, the performance rank of the subjects within their own
groups (high, middle, or low), based upon the subjects’ scores on all eleven
tasks/subtasks employed in the experiment, was significantly related to the
subjects’ initial attitudes toward the distributive principles. High as compared
to low performers gave relatively more favorable ratings of the fairness of
winner-takes-all and proportionality principles, whereas the reverse was true
for the ratings of the equality and need principles.
Task-related attitudes prior to and after working on the task. Prior to and
following each task, the subjects filled out several rating scales. These scales
measured how well they expected to do on the task, how much effort they
expected to exert, how well they thought they had actually done, how much
effort they had exerted, how well their group had performed, and how bor-
ing, difficult, and enjoyable the task was. Although there were systematic
differences in the ratings as a result of the task being rated, there were no
reliable differences that were due to distribution principle. There were some
significant differences in the ratings made by the female and male subjects:
the ratings made by the women were generally more positive than those of
the men except when rating how well they expected to perform. The subjects,
in all conditions and on all tasks, reported that they expected to put a
considerable amount of effort into the task, and after completing the tasks,
they indicated they had exerted a strong effort.
Attitudes toward other group members after completion of the tasks.
After receiving feedback about the individual scores and their group’s earn-
ings following completion of all the tasks, the subjects filled out a question-
naire in which a variety of questions were asked to obtain information about
attitudes toward fellow group members. The results indicate that the subjects
in all conditions, at the end of their work together, had rather favorable
attitudes toward one another. They viewed their fellow group members as
highly competent, very cooperative, extremely helpful, very friendly, and as
hard workers. Although the differences were not statistically reliable, the
females tended to give more favorable ratings to their fellow group members
than did the males; the subjects in the winner-takes-all condition consistently
gave the least favorable ratings of all the subjects.
Other results from the posttask questionnaire indicate that males were
significantly more concerned about how much money they were earning and
their group was earning than were females as they worked on the tasks.
High-performing males were significantly more concerned with how much
money they were earning than were low or medium performers; for females,
similar differences were found among performance levels only in the winner-
takes-all condition
Votes to redistribute. After receiving feedback relating to their individual
scores and their group’s earnings, subjects filled out questionnaires relating to
their posttask attitudes toward the different distribution principles. Immedi-
ately following, they were told that they would be allowed to vote by secret
ballot on whether they wished to redistribute the group payment money; if
they chose to redistribute, they were also asked to indicate how they would
do so. In addition, they were told that if anyone voted to redistribute, they
would be given time to decide whether they wanted to redistribute and, if so,
how. The subjects did not know they would be allowed to redistribute their
group’s earnings until they were given the chance to vote on whether they
wished to do so.
Overall, the results indicate that, after receiving feedback, the subjects
had a slightly more favorable view of the fairness of the distributive principle
146 RESEARCH
under which they operated (except for those assigned to the need principle
who had a slightly more negative view) than when they came into the experi-
ment: the changes only reached significance for those working under equal-
ity. The subjects who worked under equality changed their preference from
proportionality to equality during the course of the experiment, whereas
those who worked under proportionality became somewhat more committed
to proportionality as a distributive principle.
The overwhelming majority (96 percent) of' the subjects who were as-
signed to the equality system voted not to redistribute their group’s bonus. In
sharp contrast, only 56 percent of those assigned to proportionality, 33 per-
cent of those assigned to need, and 10 percent of those in the winner-takes-all
condition decided not to redistribute. The preponderance (80 percent) of
those who chose to redistribute indicated that they wanted the three members
of their group to share the group’s earnings equally; 14 percent suggested a
redistribution that, in effect, was a compromise between an equality and
proportionality distribution; and the remainder, all of whom were in the
winner-takes-all condition, suggested that the group’s earnings should be
distributed in proportion to the scores of the three group members. Of those
who did not vote for equality for the final distribution, 70 percent conformed
with the principle to which they had been assigned by the experimenter; the
subjects in winner-takes-all were least likely to stay with the principle to
which they had been assigned. The conformers reported themselves to be
significantly more submissive and cooperative toward the experimenter than
the nonconformers.
It is interesting to note that those who voted for equality or need as the
final distributive system in their group were those whose attitudes toward
their fellow group members became signficantly more cooperative over the
course of the experiment; the five subjects who stayed with winner takes all,
in contrast, reported feeling more competitive; and the subjects who chose
proportionality did not change one way or the other. Similar differences were
revealed in the posttask attitudinal measures. Those who chose winner takes
all as their final distributive system reported feeling most competitive and
hostile toward other group members. Those choosing equality perceived
themselves as being very friendly, close, helpful, and responsible in relation to
the other group members at the end of the experiment. Those preferring
proportionality or mixed equality-proportionality distributions fell between
the attitudes of those who voted for equality and those for winner takes all,
with those preferring the mixed distribution being somewhat less close to the
attitudes of those selecting equal sharing. Subjects who selected need as their
final distributive principle reported feeling most giving, most helpful, and
most responsible for other group members.
Apart from four of the five subjects who stayed with winner-takes-all
as their final distributive choice (these were the high performers in their
groups), there was no evidence that the vote for distributive principle
reflected self-interest: voting was uncorrelated with performance level. Nor
was it correlated with the subjects’ rank on need for money. Also, there
were no reliable differences between the males and females in their redis-
tribution choices.
Summary
The results of this experiment are, in respect to task performance, similar to

the results of our first two experiments: relatively few differences emerged as
a function of the distribution principle that the subjects worked under. The
few differences strongly suggest that the winner-takes-all distributive system
impaired performance on the interdependent tasks. There is also a much
weaker suggestion that the proportionality system led subjects to work faster,
and the equality system led them to work more carefully.
The lack of confirmation of our expectation that strong differences would
develop among the different distributive conditions on the interdependent
tasks is, we believe, due to two factors. First, the interdependent tasks were
too brief; the subjects were not working on any given task structure suffi-
ciently long for their initial orientations induced by the different distributive
principles to become engaged with and expressed through the interaction
possibilities allowed by the task structure. Thus, the cooperative potential
implicit in the equality condition could not be developed and expressed fully
in the brief, intermittent periods available for interdependent work. An ex-
periment to be reported later, experiment V, bears upon this issue. Second,
the total ambience of the experiment (the face-to-face interaction, the empha-
sis on group earnings, the requirement that they work together on several
tasks) led most subjects to develop a cooperative, egalitarian orientation
toward their fellow group members. This was strongly evidenced in the redis-
tributive votes: 80 percent of those who voted to redistribute indicated they
preferred the group earnings to be shared equally. Thus, in a sense, over the
course of the experiment most groups became egalitarian even though that
was not their initial orientation.
EXPERIMENT IV
In this study,^ we examined how individual performance, where individuals

were working solely as individuals (not even in a nominal group, as in the
first two experiments), would be affected by three different reward systems
that were analogs to the winner-takes-all, proportionality, and equality dis-
5. This experiment was conducted by several research assistants, and its data were analyzed
by Louis Medvene. My summary is indebted to an unpublished report by Medvene (1981).
148 RESEARCH
tributive systems employed in the preceding experiments. The sixty male and
sixty female students who participated in the study worked individually on
four different tasks during their experimental session. They were all paid four
dollars for participating in the experiment and were told they could earn
additional bonus money.
In the “high-low” reward system (the analog to winner takes all), the
subject earned either six dollars in bonus money if they reached a predeter-
mined performance criterion or no bonus mon'ey if they failed to reach this
criterion. In the “proportionality” reward system (the analog to proportion-
ality), subjects were rewarded in proportion to how closely their performance
score approximated the preestablished maximum: the higher their score, the
higher their pay. They could earn up to six dollars. And in the “flat-rate”
system (the analog to equality), participants received a fixed amount of bonus
money, four dollars, regardless of their performance; they were told that this
was equal to what others were being paid.
In addition to type of reward system, the experiment varied whether or
not the subjects received information about the comparative task perfor-
mance of other comparable Columbia students; half the subjects received this
social-comparison information, and half did not. In the high-low, social-
comparison condition, the subjects were told that they would receive all the
bonus money (six dollars) only if their overall performances were in the top
third of scores made by Columbia students (that is, only if their scores were
better than the score of two out of three students). In proportionality, the
subjects were told that the more points they made in comparison with the
average Columbia student, the more they would be paid. In flat rate, they
were told that they would be paid the same as all other Columbia students
working under this system; their pay would be determined by the average
performance of all students working under this system so far. They were also
told that their performance would help determine the level of future pay for
participants in the study.
The four tasks employed in this study were individualized versions of
tasks employed in preceding experiments: the haiku decoding task used in the
first two experiments, the card-sorting task, the model-replication task, and
the jelly bean estimation task. The three latter tasks were adapted from the
third experiment. After completing the four tasks, each subject was shown a
picture of a group (as in the picture-interpretation task of the third experi-
ment) and asked to write a story about the people and events in the picture.
In addition to performance measures, a variety of other measures were
obtained relating to self-attitudes toward the task, and attitudes toward the
different distributive principles.
Results
Task performance. Scores were derived for each of the four separate tasks, as
well as subtasks within each task, and a combined score was computed for all
four tasks. The subjects raw performance scores, as well as their standardized
performance scores/ were subjected to statistical analyses for the total sample
and for the males and females separately. For all four tasks combined, the data
indicate no reliable differences that were due only to the reward system under
which they worked, nor were there any reliable differences simply as a function
of social comparison. However, males consistently performed better than fe-
males under the flat-rate pay; similar results are found in the separate analysis
of the estimation task, the haiku decoding task, the card-sorting task, and the
model-replication task. In the card-sorting task, the high-low subjects per-
formed better than the proportionality and flat-rate subjects.
In both the haiku decoding and card-sorting tasks, the female subjects did
better than the male subjects under the proportionality reward system but
worse under the flat-rate system. On the estimation, haiku, and card-sorting
tasks, females tended to perform better under the high-low and proportional-
ity systems if the subjects had been given information encouraging social
comparisons with other Columbia students than if they had not been given
such information; the reverse was true for the male subjects: they performed
better in the high-low and proportionality conditions when they did not have
social-comparison information.
Attitudes toward the reward systems. Questions similar to the ones em-
ployed in the previous studies were also used to measure the subjects’ atti-
tudes toward the four individual reward systems (a need system was also
described in which subjects would be rewarded in proportion to their need
for the bonus money as indicated in a pretask questionnaire). The results
were very similar to those of the earlier experiments: proportionality was
considered the fairest system and flat rate the second fairest; high-low was
viewed as least fair. Both proportionality and high-low were expected to be
highly motivating for work, but this was not so for the other two reward
systems. The female in comparison with the male subjects rated the propor-
tionality system less favorably and the need system favorably. They also
thought they would be less motivated to work by the high-low and propor-
tionality systems than the male subjects.
Self-descriptions. The subjects responded to twenty self-descriptive rating
scales before and also after finishing the experimental tasks. Prior to working
on the tasks, the males described themselves as significantly more work ori-
ented, more self-confident, more daring, tougher, and feeling more like win-
ners than did the females; these differences were largely eliminated by the
posttask ratings except in the flat-rate condition. After completing the tasks,
compared to their pretask self-ratings, the subjects generally rated themselves
as more competitive, self-confident, and daring but less friendly.
Compared to the subjects who were rewarded under the flat-rate system,
those in high-low and proportionality systems came to view themselves as
more daring, powerful, and intense. Females who performed under propor-
6. For each task/subtask, standardized scores were developed so that all tasks would have a
mean score of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Standardizing scores reduces the variability of
scores and permits a more meaningful combination of scores on different tasks.
150 RESEARCH
tionality described themselves as more dominant, more daring, more self-

confident, and more like winners than they did initially; in contrast, males in
proportionality became less dominant, daring, and self-confident as well as
less like a winner.
Subjects who had relatively high satisfaction with the way they performed
their tasks described themselves as more motivated, self-confident, and domi-
nant than they did initially; those with a relatively low level of satisfaction
described themselves as less friendly, social, effective, self-confident, domi-
nant, active, and work oriented as well as more intuitive and more like a
loser than they did initially.
Picture interpretations. The social relations depicted in the stories written
by the subjects were rated on four basic dimensions of interpersonal relations
(see chapter 6):^ cooperative versus competitive, social emotional versus task
oriented, informal versus formal, and equal versus unequal. The data reveal
that subjects assigned to the flat-rate system wrote stories that depicted social
relations that were significantly more equal in power, less competitive, more
oriented to the social-emotional aspects of the relationship, and less formal
than those in the high-low and proportionality systems. The stories of the
proportionality subjects were the most task oriented. The male subjects wrote
stories that were significantly more competitive than those of the females.
Summary
The results of this experiment were consistent with those of the earlier experi-
ments. Although the proportionality reward system was rated most favora-
bly, overall the subjects did not perform better under this reward system than
under the flat-rate or high-low systems. However, there was a clear tendency
for the female students to do least well under the flat-rate system and to do
significantly less well than the men did under this system. We speculate that
these differences in response to the flat-rate system between men and women
were related to their initial differences in self-attitudes. At the beginning of
the experiment, the men felt more work oriented, more self-confident,
tougher, and more competitive than the women. The self-esteem of the typi-
cal male subject was more engaged in task performance, and he felt more
confident that he would perform relatively well; his sense of his own motiva-
tion and ability to perform well was more securely established internally than
was the case for the women students. The men, in a sense, had less need for
an external evaluative standard (where one’s reward would be conditioned
upon one’s performance) than the women to become engaged in the task.
Thus, the men performed as well under the flat-rate system where external
reward had no relation to performance as they did under the systems where
one’s reward was dependent upon one’s performance. Under the pressure of
an external evaluative standard, the women became more engaged than they
did without such pressure (and once actively engaged, they probably per-
7. These data were analyzed by Brian Maruffi (1984).

formed better than they expected and became more self-confident and felt
more daring). Lacking this pressure in the flat-rate condition, they did not get
strongly involved in the task nor did they get the feedback following their
performance—which would have enhanced their self-esteem.
EXPERIMENT V
This experiment^ used face-to-face, three-person groups of Columbia male

students (mean age was 20.6 years) who did not know one another before-
hand; each group was randomly assigned to one of three distribution sys-
tems: winner takes all, proportionality, or equality. Their task was structured
rather differently than in the studies reported earlier. Subjects were required
to work as a group on a single, highly involving task for a continuous period
of time; they were not only linked interdependently in terms of the reward
system but also linked instrumentally. Each subject took the role of the
owner of a garbage-hauling company, and his objective was to gain points by
moving counters representing his trucks on a board representing a city; each
was given a specific name (Mike, Joe, or John), as was his garbage-hauling
company, and a uniform (including a hat with his name on it). The group
received a financial reward for the total area the subjects covered with their
counters; the distribution of the reward within the group was determined by
the distribution system to which the group had been assigned. The more
points the group earned, the more money there was available to be distrib-
uted. Subjects moved their counters in sequence and could help or hinder one
another.
Task performance was measured by the number of points a subject ob-
tained by placing his trucks on the grid squares, representing city blocks; the
values of the blocks differed so that more points were made by covering
certain blocks than others. Performance data were obtained at two points
during the experiment. After the subjects had worked on the task for thirty
minutes, they were interrupted by the experimenter and asked to complete
several measures. As they were doing this, the experimenter took a photo-
graph of the board; from the photograph, the performance scores at this
point could be assessed. Next, the subjects were told they had ten minutes to
complete the task. After this, a final questionnaire was administered to the
subject. The experimenter at this time took a final photograph of the board
and calculated the points acquired by the group and by each subject. He then
distributed the money to the subjects.
After the thirty-minute work period, each subject was asked to write a
brief autobiography about the character he had been assigned to play in the
task; including a description of his past, present, and future as well as a
characterization of his philosophy of life. Each was also asked to draw a
8. This study was William A, Wenck, Jr.’s (1981) doctoral dissertation; for details of proce-
dures and data analysis, it should be consulted.
152 RESEARCH
picture of a three-person group and to title it; pens and crayons of the same
six colors were provided to all subjects. They also filled out a thinking-and-
feeling questionnaire, which consisted of thirty-four rating scales relating to
how they had been thinking and feeling during the experimental session, and
a relationship questionnaire of twenty-five rating scales concerning their rela-
tionship with the other subjects in their group. In addition, they filled out the
Adjective Check List (Gough and Heilbrun, 1952), consisting of three hun-
dred adjectives, in which they were asked to describe themselves in the role
they had enacted. A concluding questionnaire measured their attitudes to-
ward the distribution system and toward their task performance.
Results
Task performance. Striking differences occurred in the number of points

earned by the groups working under different distributive systems in the two
work periods; the winner-takes-all groups earned significantly less than the
proportionality groups, and the latter earned significantly less than the equal-
ity groups. These differences occurred despite the fact that the subjects in all
three conditions similarly reported themselves as having been considerably
involved, as having enjoyed working on the task, and as being strongly
motivated to work on the task. However, as one would expect, subjects in
the equality groups engaged in significantly more helpful actions during the
task than did the subjects in the other two types of groups, and subjects in
winner-takes-all groups engaged in significantly more hindering actions than
the others.
Psychological orientations. A number of paper-and-pencil measures of
psychological orientations were employed. The short autobiographies of the
garbage hauler in the context of the experimental situation were categorized
globally by three judges, without awareness of the distributive conditions to
which the subjects had been assigned, as being winner-takes-all, proportion-
ality, or equality in psychological orientation: their categorization was based
upon our earlier description (Deutsch, 1977) of the psychological orienta-
tions that are connected with the different distributive principles. The corre-
spondence between the judges’ categorization and the subjects’ distribution
condition was significant. Besides the global categorization, a content analy-
sis was used on each phrase in the autobiographies. Subjects in the equality
condition wrote significantly more phrases that were judged to be coopera-
tive in nature than those subjects working under winner takes all. Winner-
takes-all subjects wrote significantly more statements judged to reflect com-
petitiveness and statements judged to be unequal in nature than those in the
other two conditions.
Three judges were able to categorize the themes of the subjects’ drawings
of the three-person group into three categories: hostile/competitive, neutral/
indeterminate, and friendly/cooperative. Winner-takes-all subjects drew more
hostile/competitive pictures, whereas equality subjects drew more friendly/co-
operative pictures. Also, the winner-takes-all subjects used more space and
were more likely to use both pens and crayons in their drawings than the
others.
On the thinking-and-feeling questionnaire, the winner-takes-all students
were found to be more suspicious, more inconsiderate of others, and more
competitive than those in the other two conditions. Winner-takes-all subjects
also described their thoughts and feelings as more risk taking, ruthless, self-
ish, cruel, rougher, unsharing, and changeable than those in equality. Those
in proportionality were less suspicious than those in winner takes all, but
were not as trusting as equality subjects. A factor analysis revealed a strong
cooperative-competitive factor with winner-takes-all subjects falling at the
competitive end and equality subjects falling at the cooperative end.
The relationship questionnaire revealed that those in the equality condi-
tion saw their relationship to be more productive than those in the other two
conditions. Equality subjects viewed one another as more cooperative and
altruistic than those in the other two conditions. Winner-takes-all subjects
saw their goals to be more incompatible and the situation more hostile than
the others. They were more tense, competitive, and selfish than the others
and were more clashing than those in equality.
The results of the Adjective Check List showed equality subjects to be
higher on self-control than the other two and more nurturant, more affiliative,
and more deferent than winner-takes-all subjects. Winner-takes-all subjects
were higher on the autonomy and aggression scales than those in equality. A
factor analysis showed that winner-takes-all subjects scored significantly
higher than equality subjects on an aggressive, macho dimension.
In general, there was a strong linear trend such that the results for the
subjects in the proportionality condition fell between those for the winner-
takes-all and equality conditions on the various measures of psychological
orientation as well as on the measure of task performance.
Attitudes toward the distributive systems. At the end of the experiment,
the subjects rated the fairness of the distributive principle under which they
worked. The winner-takes-all condition was considered unfair by the subjects
exposed to it, whereas those exposed to equality or proportionality principles
considered them to be quite fair. The best performing subject in the winner-
takes-all condition rated it less unfair than the others in his group; in con-
trast, in the equality groups, equality was rated as most fair by the worst
performers. Performance rank did not affect the fairness rating of proportion-
ality by those exposed to this principle.
Summary
The results of this study, which employed an extended, highly interdependent

task, are quite different from the four earlier ones; striking task performance
variations were found to flow from the three distinctive distribution principles.
The subjects, working under the equality principle, cooperated and helped one
another; the consequence was that their total scores were relatively high. In
contrast, the subjects in the winner-takes-all condition were competitive and
154 RESEARCH
interfered with one another, and hence, they ended up with relatively poor
scores. The subjects in the proportionality conditions were more individualis-
tic, neither consistently cooperating with the others in their group nor interfer-
ing with them; their results were significantly better than those in the winner-
takes-all groups but significantly worse than those in equality groups. The
distributive principles not only affected task performance but also very much
influenced the psychological orientations of the subjects; their views of them-
selves and of the others in their group were considerably different as a function
of the distributive system under which they worked. These results are consis-
tent with the findings described in chapter 8.
EXPERIMENT VI
The final experiment to be reported in this chapter‘d changed the type of

reward employed (a symbolic reward, grades, rather than a tangible reward,
money, was used) and introduced another basis for evaluating individual and
group performance (effort and achievement were used). It could be argued
that the meritocratic principle of rewarding people according to their accom-
plishments is most aptly applied when the reward to be distributed is sym-
bolic or honorific rather than material in nature. Eurther, since the effort
component of achievement is more under volitional control than the ability
component, it could also be argued that it is more appropriate to reward
effort rather than achievement according to the distribution principle of to
each in proportion to his contribution.
To investigate these and other notions, our sixth experiment contrasted
the proportionality and equality principles when the basis of the group’s
score was either the individual achievements or efforts of the three members
of the group and the reward being distributed was the symbolic reward of
grades. The groups were nominal, non-face-to-face groups in which the mem-
bers, who were in separate cubicles, did not interact with one another except
on one set of tasks (and then only through an intercom system). Each task
was worked on individually; it involved figuring out the correct number to
complete a given series of number (for example, 14, 19, 17, 22, 20, ). To
determine an individual’s final grade, the three individual scores in a group
were summed and transformed into group points, which were then divided
among the three group members according to the distributive principle under
which they had worked; these were then converted into individual letter
grades based upon norms established in a pilot study.
Ten groups of three male Columbia students were run in each of four
grading systems, which were described to the students as follows:
1. The effort equality grading system. Under this system, effort (the amount
of time spent working on the task) will be the sole criterion by which
9. This experiment was Bruce Tuchman’s (1982) doctoral dissertation; it should be con-
sulted for details about procedures and the data analysis.
individual performance will be evaluated. Success at the task is irrelevant.

The total amount of points allocated to the group will be distributed
equally among the three group members.
2. The achievement equality grading system. Under this system, achievement
(the number of problems solved correctly) will be the sole criterion by
which individual performance will be evaluated. The amount of effort
expended is irrelevant. The total amount of points allocated to the group
will be distributed equally among the three group members.
3. The effort proportionality grading system. Under this system, effort (the
amount of time spent working and studying) will be the sole criterion by
which individual performance will be evaulated. Success at the task is
irrelevant. The total amount of points allocated to the group will be dis-
tributed in proportion to each member’s contribution to the group score.
4. The achievement proportionality grading system. Under this system, achie-
vement (the number of problems solved correctly) will be the sole criterion
by which individual performance will be evaluated. The amount of effort
expended is irrelevant. The total amount of points allocated to the group
will be distributed in proportion to each member’s contribution to the
group score.
The subjects were given a brief practice period with the problems and
then a study period in which the problem solutions, and the principles under-
lying them, were given to them to study. They then had their first individual
work period in which they were given twenty problems; they were instructed
to signal the experimenter when they no longer wished to work on the
problems. After the work period, they had another brief study period. They
then had a group work period in which they were told they could work
independently or together (via the intercom); the sets of problems assigned to
the three members were based on the same principles of solution but required
different answers. A second individual work period followed next. Finally, in
a third individual work period, unbeknownst to the subjects, they were given
twenty unsolvable problems.
In the third work period, the subjects were allowed to work as long as
twenty minutes; in the other work periods, they were allowed only up to
eight minutes: in none of the work periods were they informed that a time
limit existed. In each work period, the subjects were to let the experimenter
know when they no longer wished to work on the problems. The experi-
menter was able to observe from behind one-way mirrors how long the
subjects actually worked: the difference in time between when the subject
was observed to be no longer working and when he reported himself as no
longer working was defined as “simulated effort.”
Questionnaires were administered to the subjects at various points
throughout the experiment.
Results
Task performance. Two different measures of task performance were ob-
tained: the amount of time worked and the number of problems solved
correctly. The results indicated that the subjects who were told they would be
156 RESEARCH
evaluated in terms of their effort (as measured by the amount of time

worked) worked significantly longer, as well as simulated more effort, on the
insoluble problems in the third work period than did the subjects who were
told they would be evaluated by their achievement. During the group work
period, the subjects working under the equality principle worked longer than
those working under the proportionality principle.
With respect to task achievement, the subjects who were being graded on
the basis of achievement solved more problerhs overall than did those who
were graded on the basis of effort; this result primarily reflects differences
that occurred in the group work period, the only work period in which
significant performance differences were found. There was also a nonsignifi-
cant tendency for the groups working under equality to request help more
frequently and do less well than those working under proportionality during
the group work period.
Attitudes toward the different distributive systems. Only the subjects who
were to be graded in proportion to their achievement on the task initially
considered their grading system to be a fair one. The subjects in the equality
as well as the proportionality achievement conditions thought they would be
strongly motivated to work; this was not the case for those in the two effort
treatments. Subjects, in all conditions, rated their motivation “to perform
well for the sake of performing well” as being very high; this was rated
higher than any of the other motivations listed for performing well. Ratings
of effort expended, amount of success, and satisfaction with performance
taken after each work period were not affected by the basis of grading or the
distribution principle under which the subjects worked.
Attitudes toward the task. Subjects who were evaluated in terms of their
performance rather than effort rated the tasks as being more interesting at the
end of the experiment. However, they were less satisfied with their individual
and group performances, as well as their grades.
Attitudes toward other group members. It is interesting to note that, at
the end of the experiment, the subjects who were working under the equality
principle had more favorable attitudes toward their fellow group members if
they were being graded by their effort than by their achievement; the oppo-
site was true for those working under the proportionality principle. Similar
results were found in ratings of the fairness of their group grades and of the
distribution system under which they worked. That is, the ratings of the
subjects working under the equality-effort and proportionality-achievement
conditions were similar to one another and more favorable than those work-
ing under the equality-achievement and proportionality-effort conditions: the
“proportionality-effort” condition was the least positive.
Summary
Although our subjects strongly favored the meritocratic over the egalitarian
principle for distributing grades, their preferences were not reflected in differ-
ences in task accomplishments. In contrast, the basis by which they were
graded—their effort or achievement—did affect the subjects’ performances.

When effort, as measured by amount of time worked, was the criterion, the
subjects worked longer and also pretended to work longer; when achieve-
ment was the criterion, they accomplished more. The differences were not of
substantial magnitude but were reliable.
Some of the attitudinal data suggest that the system of grading people in
proportion to their effort leads people to have a relatively unfavorable view
of one another. This may be because such a grading system implies that some
people may be shirkers: all presumably can give equal effort even if they
cannot contribute equal ability to a group.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SIX

EXPERIMENTS
The overall results of the six experiments will be presented in terms of a

number of key questions asked of all the data.
1. Did the different distributive systems have differential effects on
performance^ There is clear and consistent evidence in all the relevant experi-
ments that there are no reliable effects of the distribution system on individ-
ual or group productivity when neither individual nor group task perfor-
mance depends upon effective social cooperation. This result is obtained
when the individual is working in a group context and also when he is
working alone. That is, there is no evidence to indicate that people work
more productively when they are expecting to be rewarded in proportion to
their performance then when they are expecting to be rewarded equally or on
the basis of need. However, when task performance is aided by effective
social cooperation or can be hindered by the obstructive actions of others,
there is clear evidence that the winner-takes-all distributive system leads to
relatively poor performance compared to the other distributive systems, and
the equality system leads to relatively high performance.
Two forms of the proportionality system should be distinguished: the
competitive form in which a constant sum is allocated and an individualistic
form in which a variable sum (depending upon the level of the total produc-
tion) is allocated. The competitive form appears to be more detrimental to
performance in an interdependent task than the individualistic form; neither
form induces as much intragroup cooperativeness as equality. There is a
suggestion that the greater intragroup cooperation induced by the equality as
compared to the proportionality system can be detrimental to individual
performance on mental tasks requiring sustained individual concentration:
the attempts to communicate and coordinate work appear to interfere with
individual concentration of thought.
2. Were there initial differences in attitudes toward the different distribu-
tive systems^ The subjects initially strongly preferred proportionality over the
other distributive systems. The second most favored was equality; need was
disfavored; and they had the most negative reaction to the winner-takes-all
158 RESEARCH
system. Similar results were obtained for the subjects’ ratings of the fairness
of the systems and also for how much they expected to enjoy working under
the systems, except that the differences between proportionality and equality
largely disappeared. However, on scales relating to performance expectations
under the different systems, the winner-takes-all and proportionality systems
were both rated quite high and significantly higher than the equality and need
options. This latter result was also true for ratings made of “how motivated
they would be to work on a task,” “how good their task performance would
be,” “how many points they expected their group to earn,” and “what por-
tion of the group’s total output they expected to contribute” under the differ-
ent systems.
3. What is the relationship between the subjects’ attitudes toward the
distributive system under which they worked and their performance^ Al-
though the subjects expected that their judgment of the fairness of the dis-
tributive system would be positively related to their own performance and to
their group’s total output, the data show no relationships between how fair
they considered a distributive principle to be and their actual performance
under that principle. There was also no relationship between whether or not
the subjects worked under a preferred system and their performance. Simi-
larly, the subjects’ expectation that they would exert more effort under the
proportionality and winner-takes-all systems than under the equality and
need systems was not confirmed by their ratings of how hard they worked on
the task made immediately after finishing the task; in all conditions, they
reported working very hard. There was a low but significant correlation (.33,
p ^ .01) between the subjects’ reported effort and their performance; in
contrast, the correlation between the subjects’ anticipated effort and their
performance was insignficant.
4. Were attitudes toward other group members affected by the different
distributive principles^ Even when the groups were nominal rather than inter-
acting groups (as in the first two experiments), there were some significant
effects of the distributive system on attitudes toward other group members.
The subjects in the equality and need conditions reported having cooperative
feelings toward one another; those in the winner-takes-all and proportional-
ity conditions reported having competitive feelings toward one another; and
those in the two control or choice conditions felt more personal involvement
with the other group members than did subjects in the other conditions.
In the nominal groups, the subjects became more competitive toward one
another in all conditions by the end of experiment. In contrast, in the face-
to-face interacting groups of the third experiment, the subjects became con-
siderably more friendly and cooperative toward one another in all conditions.
However, even in this experiment, the winner-takes-all subjects felt less
helped by their groupmates and less friendly toward them than did the other
subjects. In the fifth experiment, where the subjects worked on a single,
highly interdependent task for forty minutes (a task in which the subjects
could relate to one another’s activities in a facilitating, obstructive, or unre-
lated manner), a variety of measures indicated the development of very strong
positive attitudes toward one’s groupmates under equality and somewhat

negative attitudes under winner-takes-all; under proportionality, the attitudes
fell in between those in the other two systems.
5. How were attitudes toward the tasks and work affected by the differ-
ent distributive systems^ Under the equality system, the subjects found the
tasks more interesting and more pleasant than in the other systems. They also
reported (when rating the importance of various of the components of the
motivation to perform well on the task) the highest intrinsic motivation to
perform well, the highest motivation to perform because of task enjoyment, a
high desire to increase the group’s performance, and the lowest desire to
outperform the other group members. Subjects, in all conditions, indicated
very high intrinsic motivation to perform well, and this was universally rated
as the strongest component of their motivation to perform well.
6. How were attitudes toward the different distributive systems affected
by participating in the experiment^ In the two experiments that utilized
nominal groups rather than interacting ones, there was little change in atti-
tudes toward the different distributive systems from the beginning to the end
of the experiment. In contrast, there were marked changes in the attitudes of
the subjects in the interacting, face-to-face groups of the third experiment.
Associated with the development of friendly, cooperative group atmospheres
in the latter groups was the emergence of an increased favorableness toward
equality as a distributive principle, so that it came to be viewed as not only
the most enjoyable but also as the fairest and most preferred principle in all
but the proportionality condition. Similarly, when given the opportunity to
vote, by secret ballot, to redistribute their earnings at the end of the experi-
ment in any way they wished, the subjects overwhelmingly chose an equality
distribution in all but the proportionality condition. The majority of the
subjects in the proportionality condition continued to favor proportionality
over the other distributive systems but a sizable number voted to redistribute
so that all would get equal shares.
7. What effects, if any, resulted from giving the groups the opportunity
to choose the distributive system under which they would work rather than
assigning them to a given distributive system^ When the subjects knew that
they had a choice about the distributive system, their individual as well as
collective preference for equality became stronger and the stronger favoring
of the proportionality system was reduced or disappeared. We speculate that
the voting led the subjects in the two choice conditions to have a greater
sense of personal involvement with one another than did the subjects in the
more impersonal, nominal groups. This greater personal involvement is apt
to increase the attractiveness of the equality principle.
The subjects in the choice conditions rated their own conditions favorably
on fairness and expected enjoyment—about as favorably as the subjects in the
proportionality condition rated their systems. The subjects in the tv/o choice
conditions along with those in the proportionality conditions were relatively
less dissatisfied with their monetary outcomes than those in the other condi-
tions and were less apt to feel that their individual payments were too small in
160 RESEARCH
relation to the work they did. These results for the two choice conditions were
not affected by whether they chose equality or proportionality.
8 Does it makes a difference if effort rather than achievement is the basis
of evaluating individual and group performance^ One study addressed this
question. The results indicate that in the groups where rewards were to be
distributed on the basis of achievement significantly more problems were
solved per unit of time; in the groups that were rewarded on the basis of
effort, the groups worked for significantly longer periods of time. In terms of
attitude toward their grading system, their groups, and their performance,
more favorable attitudes occurred when achievement was linked with the
proportionality rather than with the equality distributive system; also, more
favorable attitudes occurred when effort was linked with an equality rather
than proportionality distributive system.
9. Were there any consistent differences in the reactions of the male and
female subjects in our experiments^ In general, the differences that emerged
were small rather than large. The women’s initial self-ratings as compared to
the men indicated that they were less self-confident, less tough, and more
pleasure oriented. The women also tended to have more negative attitudes
toward the winner-takes-all system than the men but had more positive atti-
tudes toward equality and need. There was a surprising interaction between
gender and distributive system on two of the tasks: the women performed
better than the men under the proportionality system but worse than the men
under an equality or flat-rate system.
10. Did the amount of money to be distributed have significant effects^
In the second experiment, in the high-reward condition, the subjects could
make nine times the amount of money they could make in the low-reward
condition (for example, the maximum amount of money that a winning
subject in a winner-takes-all group could make in the high-reward condition
was $1,080, and in the low-reward condition, it was $120; the objective
probability of obtaining the maximum reward was 1 percent). The magnitude
of reward had few simple effects. It had no effect upon the level of perfor-
mance by itself nor in interaction with the distributive systems. There was a
tendency, however, to consider whatever distribution they had been assigned
to as being less fair and less enjoyable, the higher the reward condition in
which the subjects were.
11. Did the high, medium, and low performers in the various condi-
tions differ from one another in their preferences and attitudes^ Even
before task performance had occurred, those who were to have different
performance ranks in their groups had different preferences regarding the
distribution principles: the better one’s future performance, the more one
preferred the winner-takes-all principle and the less one preferred the need
and equality principles; the medium performers (those whose performance
was neither best nor worst) preferred the proportionality principle more
than either the low or the high performers. In the nominal groups, the
relationship between task performance and preference for distributive prin-
ciple remained essentially the same from the pretask to the posttask mea-
surement. Parallel results were obtained for the ratings of the fairness of
the distributive principles.
However, in the face-to-face interacting groups, the relationship between
task performance and preferences for the different distributive systems
changed during the course of the experiment. After performing the various
tasks, the proportionality, equality, and need systems were in each case just
as likely to be chosen by high and low performers. Only the choice of the
winner-takes-all system appeared to reflect self-interest; being chosen by win-
ners only.
12. What were the correlates of individual productivity^ First of all, it
should be noted that there was a substantial degree of consistency in the
relative performances of the individuals within groups; the reliability coeffi-
cient of within-group ranks across nine tasks/subtasks in the third experiment
was alpha = .70. Similarly, there was a substantial degree of consistency in
the relative performance in the various tasks of the face-to-face groups within
each experimental condition (alpha = .69). There were a number of measures
taken prior to the performance, and before the subjects knew which distribu-
tion systems they would be working under, that showed low but significant
correlations with a measure of overall individual productivity. The more the
male subjects felt they were powerful, a winner, or unemotional, the higher
was their performance score; the more the female subjects considered them-
selves to be intuitive, logical, or lucky, the higher their performance scores.
Partialling out the effects of the differences in the initial self-rating scales,
it is interesting to note that it was only the high-performing women and not
the men who consistently felt better about themselves (more daring, self-
confident, and like a winner) and their groupmates (more cooperative, socia-
ble, friendly, and so on) as a result of their good performances.
13. What were the preexperimental correlates of initial attitudes toward
the different distributive systems^ Preferences for winner takes all and, to a
lesser extent, for proportionality were associated with a sense of power,
toughness, self-confidence, and a more conservative political orientation, a
feeling of competitiveness and a tendency to downplay one’s groupmates. In
contrast, preferences for the equality and need principles were correlated with
more favorable attitudes toward one’s fellow group members and less favor-
able views of one’s own chances and capabilities. The greater the tendency to
be Machiavellian, the higher the subject’s preference for winner takes all and
the lower the preference for equality.
CONCLUSIONS
Our results provide little support for the equity theory assumption that pro-
ductivity would be higher when earnings were closely tied to performance.
Despite the fact that the tasks were neither particularly interesting nor de-
manding, and despite participating in the experiment primarily to earn
money, the subjects seemed more motivated to perform well by their own
162 RESEARCH
needs to do as well as they could rather than by the greater amount of pay
they might earn from higher performance in the proportionality and winner-
takes-all conditions. Their motivation to perform was determined more by
self-standards than by external reward.
These results are not surprising if one takes into account that the subjects
were college students who were not alienated from themselves, their col-
leagues, or the experimenters. They had no reason not to do as well as they
could whether or not they would earn more money by so doing. If they had
felt alienated from themselves and their capabilities and had little pride in
their own effectiveness, then their performances might have been more influ-
enced by the external reward. It is possible that the assumption that people
will be more productive if they are rewarded in proportion to their contribu-
tion is valid only when people are alienated from their work.
Our results also indicate that the distributive system under which a group
functions can significantly affect the social attitudes and social relations that
develop within the group. This effect is likely to be enhanced if the task or
social context of the group has characteristics that enable the incipient social
relations induced by the distributive system to be nurtured and expressed in
interactions among the group members; it is likely to be reduced if the task or
social context of the group has demand characteristics that are incongruent
with the social relations induced by the distributive system.
Thus, in our first two experiments, the task characteristics permitted and
required no interaction and the social context was that of a nominal group:
the incipient social relations developed by the distributive systems did not
have the opportunity to develop and the task provided no opportunity for
them to be expressed in interaction. Hence, the distributive systems produced
no significant effects upon task performance in these experiments. In our
third experiment, which employed a variety of tasks (the ones involving
interdependent activity coming at the end), the social context of face-to-face
interaction induced an increasingly friendly and cooperative atmosphere that
was sufficiently robust to nullify the weak, incipient competitive tendencies
instilled by the individualistic proportionality system, but was not powerful
enough to eliminate the stronger competitive tendencies induced by winner
takes all. The result was that performance in the winner-takes-all system was
poorest, compared to other systems, on the interdependent tasks.
In our fifth experiment, the distinctive psychological orientations and
social relations induced by the equality, winner-takes-all, and proportionality
systems were congruent with the cooperative, competitive, and individualistic
modes of functioning on the task. These different modes of functioning pro-
duced strikingly different results in performance, since cooperative work fa-
cilitated performance; the different modes of task functioning further
strengthened the incipient attitudes and social relations induced by the differ-
ent distributive systems. In the sixth experiment, the nature of the task was
such that cooperative as compared to individual work seemed to interfere
with performance; here the social relations induced by an equality as com-
pared to a proportionality system were possibly detrimental to performance.
Thus, our results provide strong evidence that the effects of different
systems of distributive rewards within a group are not independent of the
type of task confronting the group. Facing a task in which they must work
independently of one another, unalienated subjects will perform about as well
whether they are working under the equality, proportionality, winner-takes-all,
or need system. However, if the task is such that performance is improved by
effective cooperation, equality gives the best results and the competitive win-
ner-takes-all system gives the poorest results. Finally, we suggest that the
cooperative tendencies induced by equality may stimulate social interaction,
which, in turn, may be disruptive to individual work on tasks requiring
sustained individual concentration.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
The Choice of Distribution System
In the preceding chapter, I reported some of the correlates of the students’ initial
attitudes toward the different distribution systems. Favorable attitudes toward
winner takes all and proportionality were associated with a sense of self-confi-
dence, power, and toughness, a more conservative political orientation, and a
feeling of competitiveness as well as a tendency to downplay one’s groupmates.
In contrast, preferences for equality and need were correlated with more positive
attitudes toward one’s fellow group members and less favorable view of one’s
own chances and capabilities. Also, it was evident that as members of a group
had more cooperative and direct contact with one another, they became more
favorably disposed toward equality than they had been initially.
In this chapter, four experiments are described in which we systematically
manipulated variables that we expected to affect the students’ preferences for
the different distributive principles. The first was mainly designed to test the
hypothesis that economically oriented groups would prefer the proportionality
principle, and solidarity-oriented groups would prefer equality. The second, in
addition to testing a related hypothesis, also sought to test the implications of
some ideas advanced by Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971). The third
experiment was similar to the second in a number of respects but used female
rather than male subjects. In the fourth, we aimed to create different psycho-
logical orientations in order to test some of the notions advanced in chapter 6.
EXPERIMENT I
Eighty male undergraduate students participated in the study in two-person
groups.^ When the two subjects who were scheduled for the same time ar-
rived at our laboratory, they were brought into a small room and seated at
1. Marilyn Seiler conducted this experiment and analyzed the data. See Seiler and Deutsch
(1973) for a fuller description. The reported results for the experiments described in this chapter
are statistically significant (p<.05) unless otherwise stated.
164
The Choice of Distribution System 165
either end of a table. Dyads who had been assigned to the “economic orienta-
tion” condition were told that the purpose of the research was to determine
how productive people were on tasks that called for concentration and effi-
ciency when they worked in various sized groups. They were also told that
they could talk while they worked, although it was stressed that the goal of
the task was to work efficiently. In the “solidarity orientation” condition, it
was explained that the research was concerned with the process of friendship
formation and how it is affected by the context in which people interact. It
was further explained that their particular session was concerned with how
two people form friendships when they are involved in a group task. They
were told to get to know each other as well as possible as they worked.
Half the dyads in each condition were told their group would be paid a
lump sum of four dollars for the time they worked, and the other half were
told their group payment would be a function of their group’s output. All
dyads were told that their group performance had to be above a certain,
specified minimum for them to receive any payment at all.
The dyads worked in any manner they wished for ten minutes on four
hidden word puzzles; each consisted of a matrix of letters in which approxi-
mately forty words were embedded. Above each matrix was a topic word or
phrase {spices, drinks, fish, or city sounds)-, subjects were instructed to find
and circle only words related to the topic. They were also told that the
amount of points earned for finding a word varied with its difficulty; this was
left unspecified so that the experimenter could credibly assign the subjects
their performance scores. By having each dyad member use a different color
pencil, the experimenter was presumably able to score each member’s perfor-
mance separately. Actually, she gave the subjects false feedback, always indi-
cating that the person using the red pencil had made 240 points and the other
had earned 160 points.
After the subjects worked on the task, the experimenter presumably
scored the performance and then reported the results to the dyad; she also
indicated to the dyads, who were to be paid according to their group’s
output, that their dyad had earned four dollars (which was the amount given
the lump-sum dyads). The subjects then separately filled out a questionnaire
whose primary purpose was to find out how each person thought the group’s
earnings should be divided. Next, she asked the dyad to discuss and decide
how they would distribute the group’s earnings.
Results
Although there were statistically significant differences between the economi-

cally oriented and solidarity-oriented dyads in the expected direction, the
differences were not striking. Furthermore, the differences that emerged ap-
pear to have been due entirely to the low scorers.
The economically oriented as compared to the solidarity-oriented dyads
allocated slightly but significantly more of the group’s earnings to the high
scorer (an average of $2.12 versus $2.02). However, only seven of the twenty
166 RESEARCH
economically oriented dyads deviated from an equality distribution; only one

of the twenty solidarity dyads varied from equality. Prior to the group discus-
sion and decision, all the high scorers chose the equality distribution whereas
only fifteen of the forty low scorers chose equality.
Interestingly, although all the high scorers proposed to divide the money
equally in their prediscussion questionnaires, only 57.5 percent indicated that
equality was the most just distribution principle. In addition, when asked to
rate their partner on several scales, the high as compared to low scorers rated
them as less friendly, less democratic, and less interesting. The high scorers
were apparently less pleased by the equality distribution than the low scorers.
Although the results were not statistically reliable, there was a tendency
for a more egalitarian distribution of the group’s earnings to occur in the
lump-sum as compared to the determined-by-group-output payment condi-
tion. The former mode of payment led to significantly more friendliness
between the teammates. Among solidarity-oriented dyads, there was more
satisfaction with the lump-sum mode of payment than the payment as a
function of group output; the reverse was true for the economically oriented
dyads.
Summary
Although the results support the hypothesis underlying the study, it seems
evident that the face-to-face cooperative context in which the subjects inter-
acted induced a high degree of solidarity sentiment even in the economically
oriented dyads. Thus, the differences between the two types of dyads were
not marked and egalitarianism was favored in both. We conducted this ex-
periment prior to the experiments reported in the preceding chapter; had we
known the results of those subsequent studies, we would have designed the
present one so that the distinctiveness of the economically oriented and soli-
darity-oriented dyads would have been maintained.
Several interesting, unexpected findings emerged from the present study:
the striking tendency of the high scorers to choose an equality and the ten-
dency of the low scorers to choose a nonegalitarian distribution (choices that
were counter to their respective monetary self-interests); the strong tendency
for differences in the distributive choices of the high and low scorers to be
resolved in favor of the egalitarian choice of the high scorers; and the rela-
tively less favorable attitudes toward their teammates of the high versus low
scorers. These findings suggest that the cooperative context of the experiment
led the subjects to engage in a politeness ritual in which teammates each
made smaller claims upon the group’s earnings than their respective mone-
tary self-interests would suggest: the politeness ritual leading the high scorers
to favor equality (which favors the low scorers) while leading the low scorers
to favor a merit principle (which favors the high scorers). Eiowever, the
resulting conflict between the proposed egalitarian and meritocratic princi-
ples—given the highly cooperative context—led to a resolution in favor of
the egalitarian distribution suggested by the high scorer—slightly to his dis-
gruntlement. The offer of equal shares was apparently made more out of
politeness than out of conviction of its fairness and made, perhaps, with the
hope that the low scorer would refuse it.
EXPERIMENT II
Like the preceding one, this study is also concerned with what determines an
individual’s choice of distributive principle.^ Its focus was on issues related to
those of the first experiment: how one’s attitude toward the other and how
one’s self-interest affects one’s choice. It also addresses itself to the issue of
whether subjects prefer to distribute higher amounts if the allocation between
the subjects is unfair or whether they prefer fair allocations of smaller
amounts.
In the experiment, each subject was randomly assigned to have either a
positive or negative attitude toward the other and either to be given the belief
that he was the high or low scorer or to be left uncertain about who was the
high and low scorer. Given the highly impersonal, individualistic context of
the experiment (see below), we expected that: (1) when scores were known,
the proportionality principle would be the favored rule for making alloca-
tions; (2) behind the veil of ignorance—that is, when there was no knowledge
of one’s relative score—the equality principle would be the guiding rule; (3) a
positive attitude toward the other would lead to deviations from proportion-
ality allocations so as to favor the other (in keeping with the politeness
ritual); (4) a negative attitude toward the other would lead to deviations from
proportionality allocations so as to favor oneself (that is, the high scorer
would move toward increasing the differences in allocation and a low scorer
toward decreasing the differences); and (5) subjects would prefer a larger
total allocation even when that total had to be allocated in a manner that
deviated from their preferred distribution principle, providing either both
gained or the gain of one was large, relative to the loss of the other.
This experiment differed from the first in many respects. Although the
subjects were always led to believe that another subject was present and
participating in the experiment with them (this was not necessarily the case),
they did not see or otherwise interact with the other subject; nor were the
two subjects ever told that they were a group or that their earnings were
dependent upon the performances of both subjects. Unlike the preceding
experiment, the overall experimental context did not suggest or promote a
cooperative orientation.
Ninety male students were recruited through newspaper advertisements
and asked to participate in two studies of opinions and attitudes. They were
told they would be paid $1.25 for each study and that in the second study
they could get extra money—from nothing to $3.00, depending on chance
and their skill at a game.
2. This experiment was the dissertation study of Rebecca C. Curtis. For further details,
consult Curtis (1973, 1979) on which the present summary is based.
168 RESEARCH
The subject was taken to his individual cubicle upon arrival and given an
attitude survey about his political and religious beliefs. He was told that the
other participant had already arrived and begun work. Shortly after the
questionnaire was collected, the experimenter revealed to the subject the
survey supposedly completed by the other participant. In the positive condi-
tions, the experimenter showed a survey in which eight out of the ten ques-
tions were answered in the same way the subject had answered. In the nega-
tive condition, the experimenter handed the subject a survey in which eight
out of the ten questions had been answered differently.
After the subject had looked over the other person’s (bogus) attitude
survey for some time, he was given an envelope labeled “Interpersonal Judg-
ment Scale” (IJS) and told that the other participant had completed this form
about the subject on the basis of his attitude survey. The scale included items
concerning how much the subject was liked, his intelligence, and so on. In the
positive condition, the bogus IJS the subject received had been completed
favorably, whereas in the negative condition it had been completed unfavor-
ably. The subject was then asked to complete a similar IJS about the other on
the basis of the information he had received about him.
The subject was then told that the second experiment involved playing a
game. He would also receive $1.25 for this experiment, but in addition, he
could win up to $3.00 depending upon his skill and chance.
The subject was then taken to a room where his score for the first five
practice trials at a game was recorded. The game used was a motor skills
game called Labyrinth.
A short time after the subject returned to his cubicle, he heard that one
person had made a score at the eightieth percentile and the other had per-
formed at the fortieth percentile. In the “high scorer” condition, the subject
was led to believe that he had made the eightieth percentile score; in the “low
scorer” condition, he was informed that he scored at the fortieth percentile.
In the “uncertain” condition, the subject heard the scores but was told that
he would not learn who made which score until later. The subject was
assured he and the other participant would perform at about the same per-
centile level when they played the actual game as they had during the practice
trials. Thus, the subject in the high scorer and low scorer conditions had
knowledge of whether he was the high or low scorer, whereas a subject in the
uncertain condition did not.
The subject was then told that a flip of a coin would determine which of
the two players, himself or the other, would decide how to divide the $3.00
between the two participants. The subject was informed that he had been
selected by the coin toss to make the division of the three dollars to the
persons who would probably score in approximately the eightieth and forti-
eth percentiles.
The subject received a questionnaire that asked him to distribute the three
dollars between the high scorer and the low scorer. The questionnaire stated
that the subject would never see the other participant and explained that the
experimenter was interested in the subject’s attitudes about what was fair.
The questionnaire requested that the subject indicate which distribution in

each of the thirty-nine pairs of distributions he thought was fairer for the two
players in his session.^
These choices provided the opportunity for subjects to deviate from their
original ratio of allocations if another ratio allocated a greater total amount
of money. After the subject made his choices between the thirty-nine pairs of
distributions, he was given another questionnaire asking him questions about
the principles he had used in distributing the three dollars and, in making
choices between distributions, about who would score higher and about the
relative inputs of each participant.
Results
As expected, subjects in the positive attitude conditions rated the other as

being significantly more intelligent, cooperative, considerate, and similar in
values and goals than did the subjects in the negative conditions. They also
liked the other person more and reported that they would like the other more
as a friend. In the self-high scorer, self-low scorer, and uncertain conditions,
subjects expected mean percentile scores of 82, 47, and 58, respectively.
The results with regard to the actual allocation of the three dollars by the
subjects were very much as predicted. In all knowledge-of-performance con-
ditions, both the high and low scorers gave more money to the high scorer,
indicating that the subjects were taking relative performances into account
when making their distributive decision. When the subjects had a negative
attitude toward the other, they took relatively more for themselves and gave
relatively less to the other. In other words, here the high scorers shifted
somewhat toward winner takes all from proportionality, and the low scorers
shifted considerably toward equality from proportionality. In contrast, when
the subjects had a positive attitude toward the other, the high scorers took
relatively less for themselves than proportionality would have indicated and
shifted toward equality as a basis for allocation. The positive-low scorer did
not shift as much toward equality as the negative-low scorers, but they also
deviated from proportionality in the direction of equality.
The subjects who were behind the veil of ignorance with regard to their
relative performance scores (the uncertain condition) were most apt to allo-
cate the three dollars equally to themselves and the others; this was more
marked for those with positive as compared to negative attitudes. Only 20
percent of the uncertain subjects who had positive attitudes toward the others
3. The thirty-nine pairs of distributions consisted primarily of five basic allocation ratios
awarding a total of $2.40 ($1.20, $1.20; $1.35, $1.05; $1.60, $0.80; $2.00, $0.40; $2.40,
$0.00) and the same ratios allocating a total of $3.00. There were ten combinations of the five
distributions having the same total, and there were twenty-five combinations of the five distribu-
tions having the same total of $2.40 with the five distributions having a total of $3.00. There
were also three distributions allocating the low scorer more money than the high scorer, a choice
comparing equal allocations with a distribution allocating an increase for the high scorer but no
change for the low scorer, and a distribution allocating a total of $3.50.
170 RESEARCH
deviated from the equality principle; 53 percent of the comparable subjects

with negative attitudes selected a nonegalitarian principle.
In the negative attitude as compared to the positive attitude conditions, for
the subjects who knew their scores, the ratings of how important it was to give
the other what the other thought he deserved were significantly lower; parallel
results were found in how they expected to be treated by the other. It should
also be noted that only a few subjects reported that they had decided not to act
in the fairest manner possible; hence the finding that the subjects with negative
attitudes believed that the other’s sense of desert was not as valid as their own
suggests that they also doubted the other’s moral worthiness.
Given the choice, subjects in all conditions preferred a larger total alloca-
tion to a smaller one when the ratio of outcomes for self and other remained
the same (for example, 1.50:1.50 was preferred to 1.20:1.20). This was also
the case when the larger total allocation benefited both self and other even
though it reduced the differences between the two. In contrast, larger total
allocations that increased the differences between the high and low scorers
were responded to favorably only by the high scorers with negative attitudes
toward the other. However, when the gains for the high scorer were very
large and the losses for the low scorer were very small, the subjects with
positive attitudes also responded favorably. Other comparisons indicate that
the subjects with positive attitudes were willing to sacrifice some money to
benefit the other (particularly when the benefit was large in relation to the
sacrifice); this was true for subjects with negative attitudes only when the
initial allocation that was presented to the subjects was grossly dispropor-
tionate to the high and low performances.
Summary
Given the impersonal, somewhat competitive character of the experimental

situation, it is not surprising that relative performance was taken into ac-
count when the subjects allocated the money between themselves and the
other. However, it is clear that several factors in the experiment served to
modify the readiness of the subjects to employ an unaltered proportionality
principle. Positive attitudes toward the other led the subjects to shift toward
an egalitarian choice. Negative attitudes produced more self-serving alloca-
tions, such that the high scorers shifted toward winner takes all and the low
scorers shifted toward equality. Behind the veil of ignorance, the subjects
were highly egalitarian in their choice of distribution principle. In addition, it
was evident that subjects deviated from the principle they considered most
fair if doing so would increase the outcomes of themselves or the other.
The egalitarianism of the subjects behind the veil of ignorance, even in the
negative attitude condition, probably reflected two factors. On the one hand,
they were less confident that they would be the high scorers than were the
subjects who were, in fact, told they were the high scorers, and they did not
expect as large differences in scores between themselves and the other in the
actual game as did the other subjects. Thus, uncertainty reduced the per-
ceived differences between self and other, thus favoring egalitarianism. In
addition, if the subject’s attitude toward the other was negative, firm as
compared to uncertain knowledge that he was a high or low scorer led him to
feel that the other was less deserving of fair treatment. Presumably, the firm
knowledge enhanced the negativeness of the other. This suggests the possibil-
ity that firm knowledge that there is a difference between self and other on a
socially desired attribute, so that an invidious distinction can be made, may
make one feel more distant and negative toward the other, particularly if
one’s preexisting relationship is not a positive one.
EXPERIMENT III
This study"^ is similar to the previous one in that pairs of subjects were led to
have positive or negative attitudes toward each other and subjects were as-
signed to be either a relatively high or low performer or were placed behind a
veil of ignorance with regard to their performances. However, there were
several important differences between the two studies. In the present study,
the subjects were females; a control condition was run in which the subjects’
attitudes toward each other were not manipulated; the bonus available for
distribution was to be determined by the performances of both subjects; and
there were differences in the task employed and in measurement procedures.
In brief, in the present study, 216 female students participated in pairs,
and they were led to believe that they had very similar or very opposed
attitudes on women’s issues or they were given no information about each
other’s attitudes. In the knowledge-of-performance conditions, they were also
led to believe that one of them had performed considerably better and one
considerably worse than the other; in the veil-of-ignorance condition, they
were told they would not be informed of their individual performances until
the end of the experiment. The two paired subjects were in separate cubicles
throughout the experiment and did not interact. To induce positive or nega-
tive attitudes toward each other, after filling out questionnaires regarding
their attitudes toward several topical women’s issues, the experimenter then
presumably had each subject examine the other’s questionnaire, but, in fact,
the experimenter arranged for the subject to receive a questionnaire whose
responses were quite similar or quite opposed to hers. Subjects worked sepa-
rately for two three-minute periods on a “selection-perception” task and then
briefly on a “memory” task. The former was similar to the hidden-words
task employed in the first experiment except that the hidden words all were
germane to women’s issues; in the latter task, the subjects were asked to
recall exactly their own and the other’s responses on the attitudinal question-
4. This experiment was conducted by Ivan Lansberg as his doctoral dissertation study; for
details, consult Lansberg (1983).
172 RESEARCH
naire; the control groups recalled only their own responses since they had not
been given the other’s questionnaire.
After completing the two tasks, the subjects filled out a brief question-
naire about their feelings toward the other. Next, if they were in knowledge-
of-performance conditions, they were given “information” about their re-
spective performances, which indicated that the high performer had done
much better than average and the low performer only average. All dyads
were told that they had earned a group bonus of eight dollars. Following this,
the subjects were asked to rate how fair they considered each of four different
ways of dividing the bonus money. Immediately afterwards, they were pro-
vided with a “secret ballot” on which to indicate how they preferred to
divide the bonus money and how they thought the other would vote to divide
the money. The same four principles were used in the fairness and preference
judgments: “all to self,” “allocated proportional to performance,” “divided
equally,” and “all to other.”
Results
The data relating to the effectiveness of the attitudinal manipulation clearly

indicated that the subjects in the positive attitude conditions felt very much
more similar and positive to their pairmate than the subjects in the negative
conditions, with the control subjects falling in between on similarity and
similar to the positive attitude group with regard to positive evaluation of the
other. The subjects in the positive attitude conditions considered their rela-
tion to their pairmate to be relatively more of a social-emotional one,
whereas those in the negative and control conditions viewed theirs to be
relatively more task oriented.
As expected (when performance scores were known), the subjects with
positive attitudes displayed the politeness ritual that was observed in the
preceding experiment: the high performers rated equality as significantly
fairer than proportionality, but for the low performers, the reverse was true.
That is, the subjects with positive attitudes thought it was fairer to take the
position that responded more favorably to the other’s interests than to their
own. The control subjects, particularly the high performer, responded simi-
larly to those in the positive attitude conditions. In contrast, the subjects with
negative attitudes rated proportionality and equality as about equally fair
whether they were high or low performers. That is, the ratings of the subjects
with negative attitudes, while not generous toward the other, were not self-
serving at the expense of the other. The preference and fairness ratings made
by the subjects correlated highly and significantly.
Behind the veil of ignorance, the subjects in both the positive and negative
attitude conditions significantly preferred equality to proportionality (more
so than in the knowledge-of-peformance conditions), but this was not so for
the control subjects. For the control subjects who lacked knowledge of their
performances, there was no significant differences in their preference or fair-
ness ratings of equality and proportionality.
It is interesting to note that most subjects in the knowledge-of-performance

conditions expected their pairmate to choose so that she, the pairmate, would
benefit the most. In the lack-of-knowledge conditions, only the subjects in the
positive attitude condition thought the other would significantly prefer equality
to proportionality; in negative attitude and control conditions, the other was
expected to be as likely to prefer proportionality as equality.
Finally, the great majority of the subjects in all conditions expected that
equality would be the principle that would emerge from the discussion with
the other participant.
Summary
Overall, the female subjects of this experiment were more generous in the
positive attitude conditions and less self-serving in the negative attitude con-
ditions than the male subjects in the preceding experiment in their fairness
and preference ratings of equality and proportionality. Even more so than in
the second experiment, the distributive principles employed in positive, soli-
darity relations seem more appropriately classified as generous or polite
rather than as egalitarian: they become strongly egalitarian only under condi-
tions of lack of knowledge of performance.
Although our female subjects were more generous and less self-serving
than our male subjects of the preceding experiment, they expected the other
to be self-serving in their distributive preferences. In this regard, their expec-
tations about the other were not more generous than the expectations held by
our male subjects in relation to their pairmates. This suggests that the female
students in making their allocations and their judgments about distributive
principles were more concerned about the social impression that they would
make on their pairmates (and the experimenter) than were the males. Given
the procedural differences between the two experiments (the present one was
somewhat less impersonal and more cooperative in general atmosphere than
the earlier study), it is impossible to know whether these differences reflect
the differences between the procedures of the two studies or the differences
between our two types of subjects.
EXPERIMENT IV
Previous studies in our laboratory by Judd (see chapter 6) and by Wenck (see
experiment V in chapter 10) have clearly demonstrated that the nature of the
distributive system under which one is working can strongly influence one’s
psychological orientation so that one’s mode of thought, the personality traits
that one manifests, and one’s moral orientation are all very much affected.
The present study^ was in a sense the reverse of the previous ones: psycho-
logical orientation was the independent variable and the choice of distributive
principle was the dependent one. The dependent variable involved the choice
5. This study was conducted and analyzed by Sandra Horowitz. For a more detailed exposi-
tion, see Horowitz (1983).
174 RESEARCH
of how to distribute scarce tickets to an interesting social affair and also how
to distribute a new, scarce drug that is effective in treating cancer. The
independent variable was the economic or solidarity psychological orienta-
tion and social relation to which the subjects were assigned.
The economic orientation was induced by a character profile given to
subjects, who were professional actresses, and by a bargaining interaction
between the subject and an accomplice of the experimenter. The intent was
to induce a psychological orientation that fell on the competitive, task-
oriented, formal, not intense, and equal end of the dim.ensions of interper-
sonal relations described in chapter 6. The psychological orientation asso-
ciated with a bargaining, economic relation would, it was assumed, emphas-
ize a detached, analytical, impersonal viewpoint. It was also expected that
universalistic values, logical reasoning, objectivity, and a future-time per-
spective would characterize these subjects. From ideas advanced in chapters
3 and 6, one could predict that the moral component of this economic
psychological orientation would lead the subject to prefer proportionality to
equality as a principle of distributive justice.
The psychological orientation most consistent with the solidarity or
friendship relation emphasizes qualities of intuition, personal feeling, em-
pathy, a personal orientation, a present-time perspective and the proclivity to
apprehend the reality of others from within rather than from the outside.
Associated with a friendship relationship are the social-emotional, informal,
intense, cooperative, and equal ends of the dimensions of interpersonal rela-
tions. It was to be induced by a character profile given to subjects that
emphasized the foregoing characteristics and by an interaction with the ex-
perimenter’s accomplice that emphasized the friendship character of the rela-
tion. Here, one would predict that subjects with such a solidarity orientation
would prefer equality to proportionality as a principle of distributive justice.
In chapter 6, I have suggested that improvisational theater provides the
best analogue for the ordinary interaction of social relations and psychologi-
cal orientations. In an improvisation, only the individual characterization is
known fully by the actor, and the skeletonized script that is used achieves full
body only through interaction with other actors. Different types of social
relations that are encountered in life ordinarily occur in widely different
contexts and with many different kinds of actors. This supports the idea that
quite generalized schemas or cognitive orientations develop for the different
types of social relations. Thus, the emphasis here was on the situationally
induced nature of psychological orientations.
The decision to use actresses as subjects was made for two reasons: (1)
actresses are capable of becoming highly involved more quickly than the
nonactor in the role to be played, and (2) any self-consciousness or evalua-
tion apprehension that actresses may feel will concern their performances and
not focus on the task (Mixon, 1976). The actresses who participated in the
study ranged in age from seventeen to fifty-eight years with an average age of
twenty-eight. The average number of years spent studying acting was 8.2 and
the average number of years that had been spent in actual professional work
was 6.8. They were professional actresses recruited from an advertisement

placed in Backstage, a professional weekly publication, and signs tacked to
acting school bulletin boards throughout New York City. Subjects were given
five dollars for their participation as well as the opportunity to watch a video
playback of their work.
Subjects were told that they were participating in a study of “improvisa-
tional work” with another actress like themselves who had responded to one
of the advertisements. The “other” actress was actually one of two confeder-
ates from a nearby college theater department who randomly alternated their
participation so that they were equally represented in both conditions. Con-
federates had the role of helping to maintain similar improvisational situa-
tions for all subjects. When it came to decision time, the confederate was
always very indecisive. However, once the subject had voiced her choice in
the matter, the confederate then stated that she had been thinking that was
the right choice, too.
The confederate contrived to arrive five minutes later than the appointed
time to give credibility to her status as another actress having to fight trans-
portation difficulties to get there. Both the confederate and the subject were
then asked to “draw” for their roles in the study. In reality, both slips of
paper in the box contained the experimental role name, and the confederate
merely stated that she had drawn “Julie.” Subjects in the economic condition
were given the name “Ellen,” and subjects in the solidarity condition were
given the name “Sue.”
Before doing anything else, subjects were asked to read a two-
and-one-half-page character profile that provided a sketch of what the
character was like. These sketches did not contain any statements related
to the distributive choices, the key dependent measures of the study. In
both conditions, the characters were presented in a positive way, for ex-
ample, both were described as being intelligent and attractive. Both were
given examples illustrating their “general” behavior. Ellen was told that
she was someone who planned ahead and had high standards; she was
also analytical, unsentimental, responsible, intellectual, and orderly. Eor
each abstract adjective used to describe the character, an example of the
behavior that might be involved was given. Eor example, to illustrate
analytical, a brief statement was made that Ellen carefully inspected politi-
cal candidates’ records before deciding how to cast her vote in an election.
Sue was described as a person who was interested in people and involved
with them. Her response to situations and people was intuitive and immedi-
ate. Here, too, examples of the type of behavior that might occur as a
consequence of these characteristics were given. Eor instance, intuitive was
specified through the explanation that she would know right away whether a
friendship would result from meeting someone new, on the basis of the
strength of her first impressions. (At all times, the confederate was suppos-
edly busy with the same task as the subject.)
When subjects had completed the character profile, they were instructed
to open the first packet of material on the table to discover a description of
176 RESEARCH
the first improvisational task. The different character profiles and the asso-
ciated first improvisations were means used to induce the two contrasting
psychological orientations.
In the solidarity condition, subjects were instructed: “Lately, your good
friend, Julie, has been depressed, moody, alienated. She doesn’t want to go
out—hasn’t even wanted to talk with you. You want to break through her
withdrawn mood and establish contact.”
The confederate was told to behave in the manner described above, but
gradually to allow Sue to break through her depression and alter her mood in
a positive way.
In the economic condition, subjects were told: “You are bargaining for an
antique pearl and white gold necklace at a flea market in the Village. You
know that the item is authentic, and that a comparable piece of jewelry sells
for $350 in a shop uptown. You know that the item should run $75 to $100
cheaper at a flea market.”
The confederate’s instructions were to begin bargaining at $350, but
ultimately to come down in price so that the subject could successfully ac-
complish her aim.
All subjects read a description of an Actors’ Equity All-Stars Benefit, an
event in which they were to serve as cochairperson with Julie. Part of the
duties associated with the project involved organizing a committee of five
people who sold tickets to the performance. The cochairpersons and commit-
tee members were given specially engraved silver key rings to thank them for
their work. For the superstar cast, there was to be a special cast party. In
their capacity as organizers, the cochairpersons would attend the cast party
to make sure the whole affair ran smoothly. However, at the last minute, it
was discovered that there would be room for two more people to attend. The
task for the subject, and ostensibly Julie, was to decide how they would cast
their votes as to who among the committee should be invited to go. All five
committee members would also be given a vote as to how to distribute the
two invitations. All votes would be anonymous.
The only information given about the committee members was their
names and the numbers of tickets each had sold. Subjects could choose to
vote for a lottery or for giving the invitations to the two people who had sold
the most tickets, or they could give both invitations to the one person who
had sold the most tickets. First, the subject and confederate were to discuss
and come to a decision about how to vote regarding the distribution. Then
each subject was asked to indicate her distribution choice on an appropriate
form. The distribution choice was one of the dependent measures.
Taped instructions at the end of the second improvisation informed sub-
jects that, as their final improvisation of the day, they were each to aid a
friend who, as a graduate student in psychology, needed help in completing
some measures for a personality assessment procedures course. The subject’s
job was to cooperate fully in helping her friend fulfill her requirements. At
this point, the confederate was taken to a second room, presumably to aid
her friend: actually, this ended her role in the study.
When the subject had finished the assessment procedures (the Adjective
Check List and draw-a-picture tasks), the experimenter reentered the room to
interview the subject according to a structured, open-ended format. The sub-
ject was asked to talk about two important events in her life, describe her
family, discuss her likes and dislikes, and, finally, predict what she would be
doing five years from the present. Each subject was cautioned to respond to
these questions within role. When the interview was finished, the experi-
menter instructed the subject to open a third packet of materials on her desk
and follow the instructions in relation to a second distribution task.
This task presented a situation in which each subject was portrayed as
having participated in volunteer work at a local hospital. Subsequently, she
was being asked to serve on a committee to determine who among five
terminally ill cancer patients should receive an extremely expensive and rare
new treatment that had shown good results in effecting recovery from the
disease. There was enough medication for only one person and no one knew
when more would be available.
The information available to the subject regarding each patient was a
name, employment history, and two or three lines itemizing characteristic
activities. Two were represented as having contributed much to the people
around them through personal relationships; that is, one worked hard to keep
up his fellow patients’ spirits even when feeling badly himself and the other
had been responsible for helping local senior citizens deal with landlord ha-
rassment and heating problems. Another two were portrayed as either having
the potential for providing the community with considerable material benefits
or as already having done so. For instance, one man’s father proposed giving
$5 million to the hospital for cancer research if his son would be given the
currently available medication. The other patient was seen as owning a manu-
facturing company employing five hundred local people. Finally, the fifth man
was represented as someone who had made no discernible impact upon others
either through the quality of his personal relationships or through providing
material resources for the general well-being of the community; that is, he was
seen as unemployed, easygoing, and interested in just getting along in the
world with as few problems as possible. Various other factors were held con-
stant: all patients were males in their mid-forties with a poor prognosis.
After reading the descriptive material about the patients, subjects were
asked what rule they thought ought to be used to determine how the medica-
tion should be distributed as well as which patient might benefit if that rule
was followed. Then they were directed to open an envelope that provided
them with a forced-choice measure. This measure required them to check a
single, preferred method for determining the recipient from among four dis-
tribution principles listed: the first patient admitted to the hospital from
among the five, the patient who could pay the most for it (thus providing
more money for further research), the patient who had contributed the most
to the community, or a patient to be chosen by a lottery.
Following this, the subjects filled out a brief questionnaire, were paid,
debriefed, and allowed to watch the videotape of their performance.
178 RESEARCH
Results
The actress-subjects were clearly able to take on the roles to which they
were assigned and to maintain them throughout the course of the experi-
ment. On the procedures (the personality assessment techniques and the
interview) meant to check whether they had successfully adopted their roles,
the solidarity and economic subjects significantly differed as expected. Solidarity-
oriented Sue was high on the personality scales measuring “nurturance,”
“change,” “lability,” “heterosexuality,” and “affiliation,” whereas economi-
cally oriented Ellen was high on “achievement,” “dominance,” “order,”
“endurance,” and “self-control.” Similarly, ratings of the interviews by
coders indicated that the actresses cast into the role of Ellen were more
“competitive,” “formal,” and “task oriented” than those in the role of Sue.
The results for the distribution choices were as predicted. Solidarity-
oriented in comparison to economically oriented subjects chose to distri-
bute the invitations to the All-Stars Benefit significantly more frequently on
the basis of the egalitarian lottery principle (65 percent versus 25 percent).
Seventy percent of the solidarity-oriented subjects cited egalitarian values
as the basis for their choice; 75 percent of the economically oriented
subjects stressed performance values (effort or achievement) as underlying
their choice.
When asked to generate a distribution principle suitable for the problem
of giving an extremely rare drug to only one among several terminally ill
patients, 85 percent of the solidarity-oriented subjects came up with an egali-
tarian principle and 80 percent of the economically oriented ones responded
with a contribution or social utilitarian principle. When asked to choose
among four distributive principles, two of which were egalitarian (“lottery”
and “first admitted”) and two of which were nonegalitarian (“payment” and
“contribute most”), the solidarity-oriented subjects made significantly more
choices of the egalitarian principles.
Summary
Applying theatrical improvisations as an analogue of the way people address

everyday events in their lives, the study supports the belief that there is a
tendency for consistency between psychological orientations and social rela-
tions. A solidarity psychological orientation defined by intuition, empathy,
personal feeling, a present-time perspective, and the proclivity to apprehend
the reality of others from their inside rather than from the outside was
associated with a social-emotional, cooperative, and informal social relation.
Conversely, a psychological orientation comprised of a detached, economic,
and analytical viewpoint, universalistic values, objectivity, logical reasoning,
and a future-time perspective was found to be most consistent with a com-
petitive, task-oriented, and formal social relation. Additionally, different
principles of distributive justice were associated with these different social
relations. Those subjects assigned to the economic condition chose, in a
significant number of cases, an equity principle of distribution where the

reward was divided in proportion to the contribution of each person. Those
who were assigned to the solidarity condition significantly preferred an
equality principle of distribution where the reward was divided equally
among the people involved.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have described four studies in which the psychological

orientations of the subjects were systematically varied through our experi-
mental procedures so as to create either solidarity-oriented or non-solidarity-
oriented subjects. In the first experiment, this was done by assigning the
subjects, who were working together, different objectives that were oriented
either to friendship formation or to task accomplishment. In the second and
third experiments, this was achieved by creating positive or negative atti-
tudes between the noninteracting subjects. And, in our fourth experiment,
we employed actresses who were asked to play characters who had clearly
different personalities: one had a personality associated with a solidarity
psychological orientation and the other with an economic orientation.
No matter how induced, the solidarity psychological orientation led to a
tendency to employ generous or egalitarian distributive principles, whereas
the economic, task-oriented, or impersonal nonsolidarity psychological ori-
entation led to a tendency to prefer some sort of relative contribution or
self-serving distributive principle. In other words, the politeness ritual and
the desire to make a good impression operated among people who were
well-disposed toward each other so that they allocated less to themselves
and more to others than self-interest would have dictated. In contrast,
among people lacking positive bonds to each other, self-interest led to de-
viations from the merit principle in the direction favoring self: pseudoegali-
tarian in low performers and winner takes all in high performers.
Behind the veil of ignorance, where uncertainty existed with respect to
one’s relative performance, the politeness ritual was inappropriate and self-
serving was muted: here, ignorance of how to be generous or how to advant-
age oneself resulted in a clear favoring of equal sharing. However, this clear
preference for equality over proportionality did not develop among subjects
behind the veil of ignorance when the experimenter did not make salient to
the subjects the attitudinal similarity or dissimilarity that existed between
themselves and their pairmates.
CHAPTER TWELVE
The Sense of Injustice
In this chapter, I describe several studies related to the sense of injustice. The first
was concerned with the subjective meaning of injustice and the feelings asso-
ciated with it; in this study, students responded to a number of different sorts of
procedures to discover how they viewed injustice and reacted to it. The second
and third studies were experiments in which the subjects were disadvantaged or
advantaged unfairly, and we were interested in investigating under what condi-
tions the subjects would acknowledge the injustice and attempt to do something
about it. In the final study described here, a survey was conducted of a group of
Orthodox Jewish women to determine what factors were associated with a sense
of injustice regarding the unequal opportunities for participation in religious
activities between Orthodox Jewish men and women.
STUDY I
This study^ was an exploratory investigation of the subjective meanings of

injustice and, for comparison purposes, also of frustration. We selected these
concepts for comparison because we believed they have interesting differences
as well as similarities and that their comparison will shed light on each other.
Both frustration and injustice imply conflict. The conflict, however, asso-
ciated with frustration does not necessarily have a social character; a person
may be thwarted by his own inability to achieve something. Moreover, an
individual’s frustration does not necessarily have implications for others. It is
a personal experience in the sense that the frustrated person does not neces-
Adapted from “An Exploratory Study of the Meanings of Injustice and Frustration,” Person-
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4, no. 3 (1978): 393-98 by permission of the publisher.
Copyright 1978 by the American Psychological Association.
1. This study was conducted by Janice Steil and Bruce Tuchman; for further details, consult
Steil, Tuchman, and Deutsch (1978).
180
The Sense of Injustice 181
sarily expect that others should or would be affected by his frustration. In

contrast, the experience of injustice always seems to have a social character
because the social norms (the values, rules, and procedures) defining what is
just and unjust have been violated. As a consequence, the experience of
injustice is more than personal; injustice is also experienced psychically as a
member and representative of one’s group or community. Not only is one
personally affected but so is one’s group whose norms are being flouted.
Others who share these norms with oneself are also implicated by the injus-
tice. With regard to injustice, “no man is an island entirely unto himself.”
Members of a group who accept common norms of justice also share obliga-
tions to protect these norms and to respond to their violation. Although one
might anticipate that the experience of frustration is often “lonelier” than
that of injustice, the experience of an injustice that is not acknowledged and
responded to by one’s fellow group members is apt to leave one feeling very
alien and alienated.
Frustration and injustice are associated with similar emotions. Yet there
appear to be suggestive differences in the emotional terms associated with
each concept. Consider, for example, the following pairs: rage-outrage,
anger-indignation, feelings of inadequacy—feelings of worthlessness, and sad-
ness-resentment. We assume that most readers would agree that the first
emotion in each pair is more likely to be associated with frustration and the
second with injustice. The emotions associated with injustice appear to have
more of a moral aspect while those connected with frustration seem more
linked with personal efficacy.
Our discussion of frustration and injustice so far would suggest that,
although the subjective experiences of frustration and injustice would overlap
considerably, there would be characteristic differences between them. These
differences hinge on the more social-moral aspect of injustice and the more
personal-efficacy nature of frustration. Given this distinctive feature, one
would expect the greatest differences in subjective reactions to emerge when
the person experiencing a frustration or injustice is someone else rather than
oneself. Our discussion would also suggest that the greater social-moral as-
pect of injustice would make it more obligatory to do something about
injustice than would be the case for frustration and that this difference would
be reflected in the subjective meanings of the two types of experience. Finally,
it could be expected that the more personal nature of frustration as compared
to the relatively more social quality of injustice will lead to a greater feeling
of personal vulnerability in connection with the experience of frustration
except when injustice is perceived to be inflicted on one by one’s own group.
The present study was undertaken to investigate the subjective meanings
of frustration and injustice. Because the study was considered to be an
exploratory one, a variety of techniques were employed: word association,
incident description, questionnaire, and drawings. The techniques were se-
lected so as to provide data relevant to the major ideas advanced in our
preceding discussion and also to allow unanticipated findings to emerge
from the data themselves.
182 RESEARCH
Subjects were ninety-seven exurban high school students from four En-
glish honors classes. They were forty-four males and fifty-three females; fifty-
three were sophomores and forty-four were seniors; they ranged in age from
fourteen to eighteen years. The study was conducted in the students’ class-
room during scheduled class times. The two investigators told the students
they were interested in learning “What people think and how they feel about
two concepts: frustration and injustice.” Students were assured there were no
right or wrong answers and that what they wrote would remain anonymous.
Students were randomly assigned to one of the two concepts—frustration or
injustice.
The four instruments were administered as follows:
Word association. Separate forms (containing the appropriate stimulus
word for the condition) were distributed to the fifty-three subjects in the
injustice condition and forty-four subjects in the frustration condition. These
forms directed the subjects to “write down as many words as come to mind
when you think of the word injustice (frustration).'^ Approximately three
minutes were allotted to allow all students to complete their lists.
Incident description. Separate forms were distributed asking subjects to
“please write a short description of an incident in your school in which your
sense of injustice (frustration) was aroused. Indicate what happened, how
you felt about it, and why you think what happened was unjust (frustrating).
If you can’t recall an incident try to imagine one, but please indicate that the
incident is imaginary.”
Three-condition questionnaire. Subjects in both conditions received the
same three-page questionnaire. The first two pages contained the same
forced-choice completion items. The third page contained eleven of the same
twelve items. The first page of the questionnaire asked:
If you experience a frustration or an injustice,
a. Which would you feel as: more painful more depressing

more immoral more harmful to society
If you experience a frustration or an injustice,
b. Which would make you feel: more ugly more angry

more ashamed more alienated more guilty
c. Which happens to you more often? frustration or injustice
Subjects were directed to indicate their response by filling in the blank with
either an F (for frustration) or an I (for injustice).
The second page contained the same twelve forced-choice completion
items and asked the same questions about the subject’s feelings but in the
context of someone else experiencing the frustration or injustice. Thus, the
subject was asked, “If someone else experiences a frustration or an injustice,

a. which would you feel as. . The third page of the questionnaire omitted
question c, but contained the same other eleven items and asked the same
questions but in terms of how the subject’s “best friend” would feel in
relation to the subject’s experience of a frustration or an injustice. Students
were explicitly encouraged to take the time required in order to complete the
exercise carefully and thoughtfully.
Drawings. Boxes of eight crayons (containing the colors brown, red, blue,
black, purple, yellow, orange, and green) and pieces of eight-by-twelve-inch
white construction paper were distributed to the students, who were then
asked to remember the concept to which they had been assigned and to
“draw something that expresses what comes to mind or how you feel when
you think of the concept you’ve been working on—frustration or injustice.”
Students were told that they did not have to draw a picture but could express
themselves abstractly and were discouraged, though not prohibited, from
drawing the incident they had described in exercise two.
Results
Word association. The word anger was associated with frustration by the
largest percentage of subjects in the frustration condition (47 percent), fol-
lowed by mad (24 percent), confused (18 percent), anxiety (15 percent), and
hate (13 percent).^ Anger was also the most frequently appearing first word
(listed first by 22 percent of the subjects in the frustration condition). The
word unfair was associated with injustice by the largest percentage of subjects
in the injustice condition (48 percent), followed by wrong (28 percent), court
(26 percent), crime (25 percent), and prejudice (21 percent). Unfair was also
the most frequently appearing first word (listed by 28 percent of the subjects).
Subjects wrote more words in association to injustice than to frustration.
Incident description. Conflict: Conflict was rated as present in all the inci-
dents whether descriptions of frustration or descriptions of injustice. Frustra-
tion stories, however, were more frequently coded as describing internal conflict
(twenty-seven of the forty-four), whereas injustice stories were more frequently
coded as describing external conflict (fifty-one of the fifty-three stories).
Moral Evaluation: Moral evaluation was present in all the injustice
stories but less than half of the frustration stories. In the frustration stories in
which moral evaluation was present, the evaluation was most often implicit
rather than explicit (fifteen out of twenty), whereas the moral evaluation in
injustice stories was more often rated as explicit than implicit (forty out of
fifty-three).
Outcomes: Failure to receive outcomes that were wanted, needed, ex-
pected was more associated with frustration stories than with injustice
stories. Failure to receive outcomes one deserved or receiving outcomes one
2. Unless otherwise stated, all reported comparisons between injustice and frustration are
statistically significant.
184 RESEARCH
did not deserve was more associated with injustice stories than with frustra-
tion stories.
Agents: The perpetrator of injustice was always portrayed as “other” or
“others,” never “self” or “self and others,” and was more frequently coded
as “general” rather than “specific.” In contrast, “self” or “self and others”
were the agents in forty-three percent of the frustration stories, and agents
were more often coded “specific” than “generaj.”
Subjects: “Self” was coded as the subject of the situation in ninety-one
percent of the frustration incidents, but “self” as well as “self and others”
were the subject of the situation in only fifty-two percent of the injustice
incidents.
Type of Injustice: As one might expect, over half of the frustration stories
were coded as having no relation to injustice; in contrast, all the injustice
stories were coded as being related to injustice. Of the injustice stories, “in-
justice of implementation” appeared most frequently (in 34 percent of the
stories), followed closely by “injustice of decision making” (32 percent), and
“injustice of values” (30 percent). “Injustice of values” and “injustice of
decision making” were more associated with injustice stories than with frus-
tration stories.
Foci: The most frequent foci of injustice stories were unfair treatment by
teachers (32 percent of the stories), unfair implementation of rules (25 per-
cent), and unfair grades (15 percent). The most frequent foci of frustration
stories were poor performance on tests (18 percent) and conflicts in peer
relationships (16 percent).
Drawings. One person was most frequently present in drawings of frus-
tration, and more than one person was most frequently present in drawings
of injustice. While drawings from both conditions were more often concrete
than symbolic or abstract, drawings of injustice were rated as more symbolic
than drawings of frustration, and drawings of frustration were rated as more
abstract than drawings of injustice. Neither size nor use of colors was dis-
criminating. Drawings of frustration were rated as more disorganized, more
excited, more active, and more emotional than drawings of injustice. Strong-
weak, light-dark, and simple-complex were not discriminating.
Three-condition questionnaire. In all conditions (whether condition I, you
experience, you feel; condition II, someone else experiences, you feel; or
condition III, you experience, your best friend feels), injustice was reportedly
viewed as more immoral, as more harmful to society, and as making subjects
feel more motivated to do something about it. Frustration, as compared to
injustice, made the subjects feel weaker and was perceived as happening more
often in all three conditions. However, only in relation to their own experi-
ences did the subjects feel more alienated by the experience of injustice than
by the experience of frustration.
In addition, subjects reported experiencing many more emotions in rela-
tion to “someone else’s” encounter with injustice than to “someone else’s”
encounter with frustration. Thus, in condition II, when someone else experi-
enced an injustice rather than a frustration, subjects reported that they felt
the injustice as more painful, more immoral, and more harmful to society;
they reported that it made them feel more ugly, more angry, more guilty, and
more motivated to do something about it. However, they reported feeling
weaker in relation to another’s experience of frustration and believed that
others experience frustration more often than injustice. In condition III, one’s
best friend was also expected to feel more negative emotions to one’s experi-
ence of injustice than of frustration. Injustice elicited the widest range of
negative emotions in condition II, the next widest in condition III, and the
least wide in condition I, where the subject was responding to his own
experience of injustice. Frustration and injustice to the self were equally
distressing; but injustice to others was more distressing to self than was
frustration to others.
Summary
The high school sophomores and seniors in our sample differentially charac-
terized their experiences of frustration and injustice in a way that seems
internally consistent and that is congruent with the ideas advanced in our
introductory discussion. Our subjects experienced injustice as more social
and frustration as more personal. Injustice evoked more motivation “to do
something about it” than frustration; frustration was experienced as more
weakening and disorganizing then injustice. Of particular interest was the
broader range of emotions subjects said they personally experience on behalf
of another, when another experiences an injustice as compared to a frustra-
tion. Thus, feeling “ugly” which subjects associated more with frustration
when an injustice or frustration happens to themselves, shifted to injustice
when an injustice or frustration happens to someone else.
The prime features that appear to underlie the contrasting responses of
our subjects to injustice and frustration are: (1) an experienced injustice,
whether to oneself or to another, involves one not only personally but also as
a member of a moral community whose moral norms are being violated, and
it evokes an obligation to restore justice; and (2) an experienced frustration
(which is not viewed as unjust) makes salient the limitations of one’s power
to obtain what one wants or needs and, as a consequence, makes one feel
weaker.
Both concepts imply conflict. The experience of injustice implies conflict
between oneself and the violator of one’s moral norms. Frustration implies
conflict between one’s desires or needs and what limits one’s possibilities for
obtaining what one wants. If one’s possibilities for gratification are limited
unjustly, the experience of injustice and of frustration will co-occur. But the
two experiences need not coincide. I may be unjustly deprived of something
to which I am entitled but which I do not want; the consequence is that 1
experience injustice but not frustration. Or 1 may lose a fair competition that
I desire to win and feel frustrated but do not experience an injustice.
186 RESEARCH
STUDY 11
This experiment investigated the effects upon the subject’s response to an

injustice of varying the levels of social support that he received for ac-
knowledging an injustice and of varying whether he was disadvantaged or
not by the injustice. We assumed that an injustice is more likely to be ac-
knowledged, the more social support there is for doing so, and also assumed
that someone who has been relatively disadvantaged by an injustice is more
likely to acknowledge it than someone who has been relatively advantaged.
The subjects were seventy-two female and forty-eight male students in the
fifth and sixth grades of an elementary school in a lower-class neighborhood
who volunteered to do a special project on “secret codes.” The children were
run in pairs. They were told that two different decoding methods would be
used in this project, and that in order to decide who would use which
method, the experimenter would flip a coin. One subject (the “disadvan-
taged”) in each pair was assigned to the “whole-message” decoding system,
which made it more difficult, and the other (the “advantaged”) to the “word-
by-word” system, which made it easier for them to earn points. The advan-
taged subject received one point for each word correctly decoded; the disad-
vantaged subject received one point for each word correctly decoded only if
the whole message was correctly decoded. Subjects were required to earn a
minimum of five points to earn a prize. Five to fifteen points entitled them to
one fifty-cent gift certificate to McDonald’s, and fifteen to twenty-five points
entitled them to two fifty-cent gift certificates.
The decoding task, which was a simpler version of the haiku decoding
task described in experiment I of chapter 10, was worked on for four minutes
after some tutored practice decoding messages. Before the first work period,
the subjects filled out a questionnaire to check their comprehension of the
instructions and to assess the subjects’ attitudes toward the task and toward
the fairness of the two point systems. At the end of the first work period, the
experimenter counted up and announced the number of points each subject
received.
After this announcement, varying levels of social support for acknowledg-
ing the injustice were introduced. In all three support conditions, the subjects
were given an opinion sheet, which included statements of how other stu-
dents felt. They were told that they might agree or disagree with what other
students said and that they could add anything else they wished. Included on
the opinion sheet given to all students were the statements: “I feel tired,” “1
feel awake,” “I feel nervous,” and “I feel calm.”
In the “no-support” condition, these were the only statements included
on the opinion sheet. In the “peer-support” condition, three additional
statements presumably from other students were included: “I think the way
things were done in the first work period were all right just the way they
were,” “I think the decoding time should have been longer,” and “I think
3. This study was Janice Steil’s doctoral dissertation; for more details, consult Steil (1981,
1983).
the whole-message person should have gotten points for words changed into
English whether or not the whole message was finished.” In the “authorita-
tive-support” condition, the subjects received the same opinion sheet as in the
preceding condition, but in addition, the experimenter said: “Now you are
going to have the chance to affect how things are done in the second work
period. Is there anything you think should be done differently? Should any-
thing be changed or should everything remain the same? If a suggestion for
change is made by either one of you, it will be implemented in the second
work period if at all possible.”
After being exposed to one of the support conditions, the subjects filled
out a questionnaire in which they rated the fairness of the point system and
answered several questions relating to their own performance. Next, the
subjects had a second work period of seven minutes in which both subjects
worked under the more favorable word-by-word point system. A final ques-
tionnaire was then administered. All children received prizes at the end of the
experiment.
Results
Before working on the task, subjects in all conditions reported that they felt it
was important to do well on the task, they would try hard, and they wanted
very much to earn a prize: that is, they were strongly motivated. However,
the girls felt that they would perform less well than the boys, and they did
not want the prize quite as strongly. The boys rated the fairness of the easier,
word-by-word scoring system more favorably than did the girls. The boys, as
compared to the girls working under the easier system, rated the harder
system as fairer, and the reverse was true for the boys and girls working
under the harder system. The children working under the harder scoring rules
expected the task to be less difficult and require less intelligence than those
working under the easier rules.
Although the average number of points earned under the easier rules in
the first work period was 6.45, compared with 0.50 under the more difficult
rules, the actual number of words decoded did not vary as a function of
whether the subjects were working under easier or more difficult rules. After
being informed of the points they earned, and after exposure to authoritative,
peer, or no support for acknowledgment of the unfairness of the difficult
scoring system, a second rating of the fairness of the difficult system was
made by the subjects. As expected, there was little increase in the readiness to
acknowledge the unfairness of the more difficult scoring system by either the
disadvantaged or advantaged subjects when the subjects received no support,
but such an increase did occur for both groups when they received authorita-
tive support. Peer support led the disadvantaged subjects to become more
sensitive to the injustice, but not the advantagd ones.
Disadvantaged subjects in the no-support condition not only were less
ready to acknowledge that they had worked under an unfair system; they
were also the group most inclined to assume personal blame for their lower
188 RESEARCH
outcomes. Sixty-nine percent of the children in this group who responded to

the question attributed their poorer outcomes to their own lack of ability or
effort; only 31 percent attributed it to the system under which they worked
or to the positive characteristics of their pairmate. These figures were re-
versed for the disadvantaged who received some support; only 25 percent of
these children attributed their poor outcomes to themselves.
While social support significantly reduced the tendency for self-blame as
reflected in the disadvantaged children’s explanations as to why they had
poor outcomes, responses on other measures indicate even those receiving
some social support were not completely immune to the tendency to derogate
themselves. Despite a lack of differences in the actual number of words
decoded by the disadvantaged and advantaged groups, the former were more
likely than the latter to indicate they had not tried hard, that they didn’t fully
understand the task, and that they were less personally satisfied after the first
work period.
It is interesting to note that the girls performed better than the boys, and
as a result made more points, in the second work period despite their initial
expectations of lower performance. Perhaps they have already learned to
derogate their capabilities in an anticipatory socialization to being disadvan-
taged in work when they become adult women.
Summary
The findings of the study indicate that one’s response to an injustice is influenced
both by whether one is disadvantaged by it and whether there is social support to
recognize and acknowledge the injustice. Without such social support, the chil-
dren who were put in a disadvantaged position were less sensitive to the injustice
and more apt to blame themselves than the situation in which they had been
placed for their poor outcomes. When the social support was mixed as in the
peer-support condition (one message indicating support for change to eliminate
the injustice and another indicating support for the status quo), the advantaged
children showed little increase in sensitivity to the injustice being inflicted upon
their pairmates, but those who had been disadvantaged showed a considerable
increase in the awareness of the unfairness of their own situation. When the ex-
perimenter made salient the possibility of social change in the authoritative-sup-
port condition and by so doing implicitly pressured the children to recognize the
unfairness, even the advantaged children became more sensitive to the unfair-
ness of the disadvantaged position.
STUDY III
The present experiment,"^ like the preceding one, was concerned with how
one’s role in relation to an unjustice and how the possibility of altering an
unjust situation would affect one’s sensitivity to the injustice. In this s-tudy.
4. This study was Michelle M. Fine’s doctoral dissertation; for more details, see Fine (1980).
subjects were randomly assigned, unbeknownst to them, to be either a “vic-

timizer,” “nonvictim,” or “victim” in the experimental situation. In addition,
they were assigned to one of five “option” conditions with regard to altering
the unjust situation: (1) they had knowledge that an appeal to the judge (who
was also the victimizer) to undo the injustice was possible, but they did not
have the right to appeal; (2) they had knowledge that an appeal to the group
(composed of the victimizer, nonvictim, and victim) was possible, but they
did not have the right to appeal; (3) similar to (1), but they had the right to
appeal; (4) similar to (2), but they had the right to appeal; and (5) they were
in a control condition with neither knowledge nor the right to appeal.
It was expected that the victims would be more sensitive to injustice than
the nonvictims and that subjects who had the right to appeal the injustice
would be more sensitive to an injustice than subjects without such a right.
The subjects were 150 college women, recruited from three New York
colleges, who were formed into fifty three-person groups and randomly as-
signed to one of the five option conditions. The groups were told that this
was a study of how different factors affect how groups discuss important and
controversial social issues. One person was randomly assigned to be the judge
(and victimizer) who would moderate two ten-minute discussions that would
be held between the other two group members and would, at the end of each
discussion, allocate between zero and ten tokens to each group member
(including herself) on the basis of her evaluation of their performance. The
judge’s job during the discussion was to keep track of time, to evaluate the
members in terms of their contributions to the discussion and the group
product, and to make sure both discussants got an opportunity to speak. In
the first round of discussion, the topic was to be the “all-volunteer army
versus the draft.” Prior to the discussion, all three subjects read a statement
giving pro and con arguments with regard to both positions; they then filled
out rating scales giving their opinions on the issue and showed their ratings
to one another.
Unbeknownst to the other two subjects, the judge had been given special
instructions by the experimenter. These instructions included the following
rationale for the behavior she was instructed to adopt by the experimenter:
“The role of the judge in this study is complicated and very important. We
are interested in understanding how people react to positive reinforcement.
That is, we want to understand how people respond to being rewarded. The
judge is the person who does the rewarding, the person who judges individual
performance and then determines how much reward each person deserves.
The only way to test the influence of rewards in this situation is to control
some factors while others are left to vary. For example, we have to control
who is rewarded so that we can measure how the reward has influenced that
person’s later behaviors. Also, we have to control how the judge selects a
person to be rewarded so that we can avoid a situation in which only the
‘smarter’ people are rewarded. For these reasons, we are going to instruct you
how to act as judge. We will describe, below, what positions you should take
on the social issues and how you should allocate rewards to the two mem-
190 RESEARCH
bers. In order to ensure that we get authentic, that is real, responses to the
rewards, you cannot tell the other group members why or how you are
determining the rewards (until after the study is completed, at which point
everyone will be debriefed—all will be informed about the role of the judge).
Now, as judge, you are to complete the first personal opinion form in a
particular way. You will, through the opinion scales, indicate that you are
entirely for the all-volunteer army and critical of the draft as an alternative.
We want you to take this position because you are then going to reward,
consistently and disproportionately, the person who agrees more with you.
You will learn more about the reward system in the next section of your
instructions. It is important for you to realize how important your role is.
The group members think that you are evaluating their performance and
assigning rewards to them on that basis. In fact, we are studying something
rather different. We are studying whether or not rewards cause people to
change their opinions. So, your role is central to our research. You must
make the reward allocation as credible as possible, and make them in the way
prescribed on page two of your instructions, DO NOT TELL THE GROUP MEM-
BERS THAT THE ALLOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED. JUST SAY THAT THESE
ARE THE ALLOCATIONS YOU FEEL ARE MOST APPROPRIATE, CONSIDERING ALL
FACTORS.”
At the end of the first discussion period, the judge (victimizer) created the
roles of victim and nonvictim by rewarding the person whose opinions were
more favorable to the all-volunteer army (that is, more similar to the ratings
made by the judge) with seven out of ten tokens; this was the nonvictim. The
victim was given only four out of ten tokens. The judge took eight tokens for
herself. At the end of a second discussion period (here the issue was whether
a college education should be available for everyone whether or not the
person could afford the tuition), the judge gave nine tokens to herself, eight
tokens to the nonvictim, and four to the victim.
The option conditions were created by having all subjects (except those in
the control conditions) rate their agreement with each of two or three state-
ments about how much power the judge should have. This was done before
the first discussion period. Just following the first allocation of tokens, the
group members received false feedback about the average ratings of all sub-
jects in all groups being run at that time (subjects had reason to believe that
several groups were being run simultaneously in our laboratory); no subject
could deduce the ratings of her fellow group members. The false feedback
informed the groups which option condition they were in: presumably this
had been determined by the subjects, not the experimenter.
Thus, for example, in the “knowledge only, appeal to judge” option
condition, the subjects rated two statements: (a) “The judge should have the
final say,” and (b) “Any member can appeal the decision of the judge to the
judge, who then has the final say about the allocations.” In the “knowledge
only, appeal to group” option, the second statement read: “Any member can
appeal the decision of the judge to the group, with a majority vote determin-
ing the allocations.” In the “right to appeal” conditions, both the “appeal to
judge” and “appeal to group” as well as “judge should have final say”
statements were rated. By giving the subjects feedback that the average sub-
ject favored “The judge should have the final say,” the subjects were put into
a “knowledge-only” option; if they were told that the subjects favored one of
the “right to appeal” statements, they were placed in a “right-to-appeal”
condition.
After the allocations were made, subjects were asked to rate the fairness
of the allocations to the judge, to themselves, and to the other. They also
filled out other rating scales about themselves, the other discussant, and the
judge after each round. Several additional measures were taken relating to the
desire to reallocate the tokens and also with regard to appealing the judge’s
decision.
Results
Overall, the victims, compared to the nonvictims, were significantly more

sensitive to the injustice of the allocations made by the judge. This differen-
tial sensitivity was more pronounced after the second than after the first
allocation and was more definitive for the assessment of the fairness of the
judge’s self-allocations than of the judge’s allocations to the victim. Victims
were also significantly less favorably disposed toward the judge than non-
victims. Additionally, nonvictims, as compared to victims, were significantly
more likely to think that the judge’s decisions were actually based on differ-
ences in the two group members’ participations during the discussions. Fur-
ther, the self-allocations of tokens that the subjects would have made to
themselves were higher for the nonvictims than for the victims; however,
the victims would have significantly increased the amount of tokens they
themselves received, whereas the nonvictims would not have done so.
There was no evidence of derogation of the victim by the judge, and when
asked how they would reallocate the tokens if they could, they allocated
comparably to the victims and nonvictims. However, judges in the “right to
appeal to the judge” were least critical of the injustice of their allocations,
whereas those in the “knowledge only, appeal to the judge” and “right to
appeal to the group” conditions were most critical.
Unlike the results of the preceding experiment, having the right to appeal
did not increase the victim’s sensitivity to the injustice; but compared to the
control condition, it did lessen the tendency to self-derogation. However,
nonvictims who had the right to appeal to judge’s decision were significantly
more sensitive (after the second round) to the victim’s plight than the nonvic-
tims who were in the control condition. Nonvictims with the “right to appeal
to the group” to change the judge’s decision were also significantly more
negative about the judge’s self-allocations than the nonvictims in the control
group. Also, nonvictims in the “right to appeal” group, compared to the
control condition, were significantly more favorable in their ratings of the
victims.
The nonvictims in the “right to appeal to the group” condition were
192 RESEARCH
significantly less likely to shift their opinion on the all-volunteer army issue
so as to conform to the opinion of the judge than were the control nonvic-
tims. Although no reliable differences occurred in the use of the appeal pro-
cedures by the victims and nonvictims (the former did so more frequently),
significantly, more appeals were made in the “right to appeal to the group”
as compared to “the right to appeal to the judge” condition (55 percent
versus 20 percent of the subjects made appealsN in the two conditions). Vic-
tims as compared to nonvictims in the knowledge-only conditions indicated
that they would be significantly more likely to consider using an appeal
procedure if one were available.
The subjects rated, before the first discussion period, how they would like
“the appeal to the group,” “the appeal to the judge,” and “no-appeal” pro-
cedures. “Appeal to the group” was significantly preferred, whereas “appeal
to the judge” was significantly less liked than “no appeal.” After the second
discussion, the subjects in the “right to appeal to the group” condition as
compared to those in the “right to appeal to the judge” condition viewed
their procedure as significantly more likely to create change, to benefit the
members, and to influence the allocation decision and as more fair and less
frustrating.
Of the twenty nonvictim and victim subjects in the ten “right to appeal to
the group” groups, eleven subjects (six victims and five nonvictims) in eight
groups appealed the judge’s decision with the result that eight of the ten
victims in this condition got increased tokens. In comparison, in the “right to
appeal to the judge” groups, only four subjects (three victims and one nonvic-
tim) in three groups appealed, but no victims got more tokens. Subjects in the
“appeal to the group,” as compared to the “appeal to the judge” condition,
viewed each other as more fair, more effective, and more allied with the
judge.
Summary
The generally friendly atmosphere of the experimental context and the lack
of substantive significance of the injustice undoubtedly muted the responses
that occurred to the injustice in this experiment. Nevertheless, the differences
that were manifest as a result of the experimental variables were in the
expected direction. The victims were more sensitive to the unfairness of the
allocations made by the judge, less positive to the judge, and also more
self-derogating than the nonvictims. Also, the availability of the most effica-
cious option for undoing the injustice (“the right of appeal to the group”) led
to more sensitivity to the victim’s plight, more criticalness of and less confor-
mity to the judge, and less derogation of the victim among the nonvictims
when compared to the nonvictims in the control condition. Additionally, this
option as compared to the “right to appeal to the judge” also resulted in
more protests against the injustice and more redress of it.
We were initially puzzled by the result showing that the victims did not
become sensitive to the injustice as a result of having the right to appeal to
the group. We were slow to realize that the situations of the victim and the
nonvictim in the “right to appeal to the group” condition were quite differ-
ent. The nonvictim could, of course, expect that the victim would agree with
an appeal to change the judge’s allocations; she could be sure that even if the
judge did not agree, there would be a majority vote for undoing the injustice.
On the other hand, the victim could not have a similar confidence about
getting a majority support; the nonvictim might want to maintain a superior
status. Thus, for the victim, the “right to appeal to the group” was not as
potent an option as for the nonvictim.
STUDY IV
In this study,^ 121 Orthodox Jewish women participated in a survey. This

group was selected because Orthodox Jewish customs prescribe clearly differ-
ent and unequal opportunities for participation in religious activities on the
basis of sex. Orthodox custom requires that men study Talmud (religious
legal texts) but discourages women from doing so. Pretesting indicated exten-
sive variability in the attitudes of Orthodox Jewish women about whether
these differences in access to Talmudic study were perceived as unfair. This
variability presented a unique opportunity to study the relationship between
ideological positions and the perception of whether the differences in oppor-
tunity were perceived as unfair.
To assess the psychological preconditions for the experience of relative
deprivation or unfairness specified by Crosby (1976), we asked respondents
to rate the extent of their awareness of sex differences in Talmudic study, the
extent to which they deserved to be permitted to study Talmud, the feasibility
of their effecting changes in this area, the extent to which a gap existed
between the amount of Talmud they had studied and the amount they would
like to have studied, and the extent to which they attributed this gap to
circumstances beyond their control.
Ratings of the extent to which respondents attributed the gap between
desired and actual levels of Talmudic study to unfair treatment provided us
with a measure of perceived egoistic unfairness. Respondents’ ratings of the
extent to which sex differences in access to Talmudic study are fair or unfair
to women were used to measure perceived fraternal unfairness. Finally, each
respondent indicated the extent to which she favored changes in existing
practices prescribing sex differences in access to Talmudic study.
Ideological measures included measures of both a liberal feminist ideology
and a conservative religious ideology. Endorsement of a feminist ideology
was expected to be associated with increased perceptions of unfairness and
the desire for change; religious conservatism was expected to be associated
with diminished perceptions of unfairness and a lack of desire for change.
5. This study was conducted by Janet Weinglass and Janice M. Steil. For further details, see
Weinglass and Steil (1981).
194 RESEARCH
Items assessing feminist ideology were adapted from Spence’s attitudes-

toward-women scale (Spence and Helmreich, 1978), which measured respon-
dents’ attitudes regarding sexual equality in the domestic, social, educational,
and occupational spheres. Religious ideology was assessed by items that mea-
sured both fundamentalism (for example, the extent to which any changes in
religious practices are viewed as a threat) and religious role differentiation,
(for example, the extent to which men and women are believed to have
different or similar religious needs).
Results
Each of the five preconditions of the sense of relative deprivation as specified

by Crosby (“awareness” of differences, “wanting‘ more, “deserving” more,
“lack of self-blame” for differences, and “feasibility” of change), was signifi-
cantly and positively correlated with the desire for change; the sense of
egoistic unfairness and of fraternal unfairness were each significantly and
positively associated with all the preconditions except feasibility: here, the
correlations were positive but not significant.
Differences in feminist ideology were significantly associated with deserv-
ing, or entitlement, but not with any of the other preconditions; the more
feminist women thought they were more entitled to study Talmud than the
less feminist women. Religious fundamentalism and the view that the reli-
gious needs of men and women are different were significantly and negatively
associated with wanting, deserving, and feasibility. That is, the more funda-
mentalist their religious beliefs and the greater the differences they perceived
in the religious needs of men and women, the less likely they were to want to
study Talmud more, to believe they were entitled to study more, and to
believe that change in these matters was feasible.
Statistical analysis, controlling for differences with respect to the precondi-
tions, was done to see whehter ideological differences had any independent
effect on the perception of unfairness and the desire for change. The data
revealed that feminism was not only associated with a greater sense of entitle-
ment but also (when entitlement was controlled for) a significantly greater sense
of personal unfairness and a greater desire for change; the correlation with
fraternal unfairness was positive but not significant. After controlling for differ-
ences in the preconditions, those who were more as compared to less fundamen-
talist in their religious beliefs did not significantly differ in their perceptions of
unfairness or desire for change. In contrast, those who were more inclined rather
than less inclined to believe that men and women differed in their religious needs
continued to be significantly different; those more inclined to this view were less
likely to perceive unfairness or to desire social change.
Finally, the results also indicated a strong correlation between perceived
unfairness and a desire for change. However, even when differences in per-
ceptions of unfairness were statistically controlled, there was a significant
independent effect of ideology upon the desire for change. The Orthodox
Jewish women in our sample who felt that sex differences in Talmudic study
were unfair were more likely to desire change if they endorsed a feminist
view, if they did not perceive changes in religious traditions as a threat, or if
they felt that the religious needs of males and females were similar.
Summary
The Orthodox Jewish women in our sample were aware of the sexual inequali-
ties in opportunities for religious study, but how they responded to this aware-
ness was very much a function of their ideological position. Those endorsing
feminist views saw themselves as entitled to equal treatment, perceived the in-
equalities as unfair, and desired a change. Those affirming a religious fundamen-
talism or believing that the religious needs of men and women were different did
not want equality, did not believe they were entitled to it, and did not believe it
was feasible; they were also less likely to consider the inequality unfair, and even
if they did, they were less apt to desire a change.
As specified by Crosby (1976), the sense of unfairness was significantly
associated with the preconditions of awareness, wanting, entitlement, and
lack of self-blame. However, feasibility, although not significantly associated
with perceived unfairness, was significantly correlated—along with the other
preconditions—with the desire for change.
CONCLUSIONS
Four studies relating to the sense of injustice were described. The first study
revealed that an experienced injustice, whether to oneself or another, involves
one as a member of a moral community whose moral norms are being
violated, and it evokes an obligation to restore justice. Because it implicates
one socially as a member of a community, it leads to more intense emotional
responsiveness when another experiences an injustice as compared to frustra-
tion; it also leads to the expectation that others will respond more intensely
when one experiences an injustice than a frustration.
Our second and third studies, however, found that not all will experience
an injustice, whether inflicted upon oneself or another, as unjust. The evi-
dence from these two studies is that the sensitivity to an injustice is greater
among those who are disadvantaged than among those who are advantaged
by it. The findings of these studies also suggest that the sensitivity to injustice
can be increased by providing social support for its acknowledgment and
viable options for its remedy.
The fourth study highlights the importance of ideological factors in affecting
whether one will perceive inequalities as unfair and, also, their importance in
influencing one’s readiness to support social change to eliminate the inequali-
ties. The religious inequalities between Orthodox Jewish men and women are
not considered unfair by women who support religious fundamentalism and be-
lieve that the religious needs of men and women differ basically. The same in-
equalities are viewed as rather unfair for self and other Orthodox Jewish women
by women who have been exposed to and endorse a feminist ideology.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Research Overview
In the preceding chapters of this second part, I have described a considerable

number of experiments and reported many significant results. Here I high-
light, briefly, five of our most important findings and place them in the
context of other relevant research.
1. Cooperative, as compared to competitive, systems of distributing re-
wards—when they differ—have more favorable effects on individual and
group productivity, individual learning, social relations, self-esteem, task atti-
tudes, and a sense of responsibility to other group members. This conclusion
is consistent with the research results obtained by many other investigators in
hundreds of studies. It is by now a well-established finding, even though it is
counter to widely held ideologies about the relative benefits of competition.
Some of its implications will be developed in the chapters in the next part of
the book.
In interpreting this result, it is important to keep in mind that my theory
of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949) explicitly and most of the
research settings implicitly involve individual accountability in the context of
cooperative incentives. As Slavin (1983) has pointed out, in his review of
research on cooperative learning and student achievement, individual ac-
countability is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient for effective individual
learning in cooperative contexts employing group rewards. He states, “The
best learning efforts of every member of the group must be necessary for the
group to succeed, and the performance of each group member must be clearly
visible and quantifiable to the other group members” (p. 441).
Without individual accountability, as Latane and his coworkers (Latane,
Williams, and Harkins, 1979, 1980) have demonstrated, “social loafing” and
the “free rider” effect may occur. That is, when cooperation entails a cost or
a pleasure foregone or postponed, less conscientious individuals (when their
efforts cannot be observed) may shirk their cooperative responsibilities. How-
196
Research Overview 197
ever, on theoretical grounds as well as on the basis of research evidence, there

is reason to believe that one of the consequences of successful cooperation is
the induction of a heightened sense of responsibility toward one’s fellow
group members. If this is the case, one might speculate that the repeated
experience of successful cooperation will reduce the need for explicit individ-
ual accountability; the induced individual conscientiousness will inhibit social
loafing. Considerable more research is needed to identify the conditions that
foster the sense of responsibility to others and deter free riding, when social
loafing is difficult or impossible to detect.
2. In a situation of conflict, the ability of the conflicting parties to work

out a just agreement that is stable and mutually satisfying is enhanced by the
conditions that typically foster cooperation and are reduced by the conditions
that typically foster competition. We have also shown that the usual effects of
a cooperative system of interaction that is experienced as fair by its partici-
pants provide the basic conditions for the development of cooperation,
whereas the usual consequences of a competitive system have the opposite
influence. The relevant research studies by other investigators (for summaries,
see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Deutsch and Shichman, 1984) are
entirely consistent with our conclusions.
It should, however, be noted that there are critical gaps in our knowledge
at both ends of the continuum with regard to reaching fair agreements. On
the one hand, it is evident from research as well as everyday observation that
occasionally people in conflict will reach premature agreement; they will not
sufficiently explore their differences nor strongly enough express their indi-
vidual interests. They will cooperate too soon and concur before they have
adequately understood their situation, and as a consequence, their agreement
may be superficial and unstable, breaking down when a previously uncon-
fronted issue emerges. This sometimes, for example, happens with divorcing
couples who “flee into agreement” rather than face the difficult emotions
involved in a full discussion of child custody and visitation, alimony, and
property division (see Kressel and Deutsch, 1977). Insufficient research has
been done to understand sufficiently the conditions that promote premature
agreement or to develop knowledge of how to intervene successfully to pre-
vent such agreements.
At the other end of the continuum, there appears to be little systematic,
research-based knowledge of how to promote agreements between parties
who have been engaged in bitter, protracted disputes. There has been much
insightful discussions of the potential role of third-parties as the mediator in
industrial negotiations (Douglas, 1962; Stevens, 1963; Kressel, 1972;-
Kochan, 1980), the intervenor in community disputes (Cormick, 1971), the
psychotherapist doing marital therapy (Bach and Wyden, 1969), the divorce
mediator (Coogler, 1978; Haynes, 1982; Folberg and Taylor, 1984), the
human relations consultant working with conflicts of various sorts (Chalmers
and Cormick, 1971; Walton, 1969; Fisher and Ury, 1981), and the interna-
tional conciliator (Ikle, 1964; Jackson, 1952; Bailey, 1971; Edmead, 1971;
198 RESEARCH
Pechota, 1971; Rubin, 1980). In addition, several social scientists have devel-
oped intervention procedures and strategies for dealing with difficult, pro-
tracted conflicts—for example, the “problem-solving workshop” (Burton,
1969; Doob, 1970; Walton, 1969; Kelman, 1972) and the GRIT (“Gradu-
ated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction”) strategy of Osgood (1959, 1962,
1966). Although some research has been done on third-party interventions
(for summaries, see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Rubin, 1980; and Pruitt, 1981)
and on GRIT (see Lindskold, 1978, for a summary), there has been surpris-
ingly little, given the number of people who are functioning as third parties in
disputes and the costly consequences of the many protracted, embittered
disputes throughout the world.
3. There is no reliable or consistent evidence to indicate that people work

more productively as individuals or as group members when they are expect-
ing to be rewarded in proportion to their performance than when they are
expecting to be rewarded equally or on the basis of need. This is, perhaps,
our most controversial finding. It flouts common beliefs that tangible incen-
tives such as money rewards or bonuses stimulate better performance. It is
not our contention that this common belief is completely wrong but rather
that it is true only under special circumstances. Our research has not identi-
fied these circumstances. However, this common belief seems clearly wrong
when people have intrinsic motivation to perform well and when they are not
alienated from work or from the social context in which they are working.
Until fairly recently, American psychology had been dominated (but with
considerable dissent) by the curious view that human beings were rather
passive, inert creatures who had to be pushed by biological needs such as
hunger or pulled by incentives such as money to become active and produc-
tive. This view is implicit in the notion that people have to be motivated to
work by external incentives and that they will work harder, the greater the
incentive. Currently, this outlook has been largely rejected and replaced by
the conception that human beings are intrinsically curious and are intrinsi-
cally motivated to be active in employing their capabilities productively.
Accompanying this changing perspective among many psychologists has
been an altered view of the effects of incentives and rewards upon motivation
and performance (see Lepper and Greene, 1978, and Schwartz, 1982, for
fuller discussions). It is now recognized that incentives and rewards not only
have control effects on behavior but also they communicate information and
they affect what one attends to. Thus, a father who wishes his daughter to do
well on a math test may promise her ten dollars if she gets an A. This
incentive, if sufficiently desired by the girl, will lead her to choose to focus
her behavior on getting the A; that is, it may control what she chooses to do.
Additionally, the offer of the incentive communicates a variety of possible
messages to the girl. These include messages about her own motivation (for
example, “I am not strongly motivated by my own desires to do well in
math; I need external incentives”), about math (“It is not the sort of subject
that people like me would find interesting to study”), about her father (“It’s
important to him that I get a good grade; does he care about what is impor-
tant to and so on. Further, the incentive will tend to focus attention
on the potential reward (the ten dollars) and the most pleasant, direct, and
assured means of obtaining it. Thus, attention will be focused on getting the
A rather than on studying and learning math; this may lead to cheating or to
special methods of study oriented toward test performance rather than acqui-
sition of enduring knowledge.
Increasing awareness of the multiple effects of incentives and rewards
has stimulated important new research that challenges the popular assump-
tion that incentives and rewards have only positive effects on human moti-
vation and performance. The general import of this recent research is well
captured in the title of a book (Lepper and Greene, 1978), The Hidden
Costs of Reward, that summarizes much of this work. In a series of inge-
nious experiments conducted by many researchers in a wide variety of ex-
perimental contexts, it has been shown that the hidden costs of rewards and
incentives include their tendencies to decrease intrinsic motivation and to
impair performance.
The classic experimental paradigm employed to demonstrate the deleteri-
ous effects of reward upon the intrinsic motivation (for example, Deci, 1971;
Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss, 1972; and Lepper, Greene, and Nesbitt, 1973)
has involved leading or not leading subjects to expect a reward for an activity
in which they were intrinsically interested. When the expectation of reward
was salient as they engaged in the activity, the rewarded subjects were subse-
quently less likely to engage in the activity spontaneously; this was not true
for the subjects who were not led to have a salient expectation of reward,
whether or not they were subsequently rewarded. Psychological explanations
of the decrement in intrinsic motivation place emphasis on how people ex-
plain to themselves the reasons for their own behavior. The stronger they
perceive the external reason (the external reward) for their engagement in an
activity to be, the less likely they are to attribute a strong internal reason
(their own interest) to the activity. It is also commonly assumed that the
external attribution leads to a devaluation of the activity more or less along
the lines that “it can’t be interesting or worthwhile to do if they are promis-
ing me a reward for doing it.”
It should be emphasized that rewards do not necessarily have a deleteri-
ous effect on intrinsic motivation. Such an effect (see Deci and Porac, 1978)
is most likely when the control rather than the performance feedback aspect
of the reward is more salient. To the extent that the reward is experienced
primarily in terms of the information it provides about the quality of one’s
performance rather than in terms of who is controlling what one does, there
is likely to be no decrement in intrinsic motivation. When intrinsic motiva-
tion for an activity is lacking, incentives and rewards may lead one to engage
in the activity—something one might not otherwise do. In the course of doing
so, one may discover how interesting the activity is and develop one’s own
intrinsic motivation to continue engaging in it.
In addition to the possible harmful effects of incentives and rewards on
200 RESEARCH
intrinsic motivation, a second hidden cost relates to the possible adverse

consequence of incentive and rewards on task performance. Several early
theorists recognized this possibility (McCullers, 1978). As far back as 1908,
Yerkes and Dodson indicated that increasing the intensity of motivation will
enhance performance up to certain optimal levels of motivation; beyond this
optimum, further motivation will result in poorer performance: the more
difficult or complex the task, the lower the optimal level. With easy tasks,
performance generally improves with increasing motivation. Hull and Spence
in their comprehensive behavior theory (Hull, 1943, 1951; Spence, 1956)
similarly to the Yerkes-Dodson law predicted an enhancing effect of reward
on performance in simple tasks but a detrimental effect on complex ones.
They reasoned that in difficult as compared to simple tasks the desired cor-
rect responses are not as dominant as error tendencies initially. According to
the Hull-Spence theory, increasing the motivation in complex difficult tasks
will enhance the tendency to make errors and thus lower the quality of
performance. Another early explanation for possible harmful effect of incen-
tives on performance arose from the work of Crespi (1942) and Zeaman
(1949) on incentive contrast effects. They found that a decrease in rewards
from the previously expected level resulted in performance decrements, even
though substantial rewards were being administered.
Most of the early studies on detrimental effects of reward were done with
rats and pigeons. More recently, many studies with humans have demon-
strated the same effect (see McGraw, 1978; Condry and Chambers, 1978;
Schwartz, 1982, for summaries). McGraw in his conclusion states:
In addition to discrimination learning, evidence of detrimental effects of re-

ward comes from concept attainment, insightful learning, functional fixed-
ness, incidental learning, and creativity tasks as well. In establishing generality
for the phenomenon of reward’s effect, as important as the variety of tasks is
the variety of subject and procedural variables over which the phenomenon
appears to hold. Neither the age of the subjects, the method of presenting the
reward (trial-by-trial or upon completion of the task), the contingency of the
reward on performance, nor the type of extrinsic reward (tangible or intangi-
ble . . .) appears for the moment to be a critical variable in producing a
detrimental effect, (p. 40)
McGraw goes on to suggest that the key task conditions that determine
whether incentives and rewards will have beneficial or harmful effects on
performance relate to the task’s attractiveness and whether the individual has
readily available a well-rehearsed solution or routine for proceeding on the
task. If the task is uninteresting or aversive, incentives and rewards encourage
performance; if the task can be readily solved by stereotyped behavior or if it
does not require new or complex thought, then incentives and rewards may
foster better performance. (Here I would add that incentives are likely to
increase speed but not quality of performance.) If the task is interesting or if
it requires nonstereotyped behavior or new or complex thought, incentives
and rewards are apt to be detrimental to performance.
Hackman and Oldham (1980) make the important point that the use of
rewards to encourage performance on uninteresting or unpleasant tasks may
have the consequence of putting the individual under considerable stress and
conflict. The individual is pressured to do something he dislikes, and as a
result he may feel dissatisfied, irritated, and tired as he works against his own
inclinations.
Several different explanations have been offered for the harmful effects of
incentives and rewards upon performance. The Yerkes-Dodson law and the
Hull-Spence theory suggest that high motivation is disruptive of performance
because it may induce errors that would not occur under less intense motiva-
tion. Although such impairment of performance may occur under strong
motivation, much of the recent research (see McGraw, 1978) suggests that
the incentives and rewards need not be of large magnitude. Even modest
incentives and rewards can produce this effect.
The results of a very interesting set of experiments by Schwartz (1982)
suggest that rewards will lead subjects to develop stereotyped routines to
obtain the rewards, even when it is possible to obtain them through a variety
of behaviors. These routines will be efficient in circumstances in which
merely doing what has succeeded in the past is an effective strategy but
detrimental in situations in which future repetition of past successes is in-
appropriate to the present situation. Schwartz’s 1982 studies also suggest that
the experience of prior rewards for particular successful actions may interfere
with the discovery of general rules that are applicable to new situations as
well as the prior situation in which one has been rewarded. Schwartz indi-
cates that the reward-induced stereotyping of behavior may result in a passive
rather than active engagement with new tasks if the stereotyped units created
by the rewards are sufficiently simple that they can be accurately produced
without monitoring (p. 41). It appears that this passivity, engendered by a
history of reward, interferes with effective performance on subsequent tasks.
Research indicates that future incentives as well as past rewards may be
harmful to effective performance (McGraw, 1978). This research suggests
that incentives may narrow the focus of attention, so that one centers one’s
attention on matters immediately relevant to obtaining the potential reward.
Doing so reduces one’s attention to a wide variety of material that is percep-
tually or cognitively peripheral to the reward. The result is decreased inciden-
tal learning and fewer resources for dealing with nonroutine tasks. McGraw
has suggested that this may be an explanation for the detrimental effects of
incentives and rewards upon performance in such tasks (p. 55).
To sum up, our finding that our subjects did not work more productively
when their earnings were contingent upon their performance is consistent
with a large body of research on the effects of rewards. Our subjects had a
strong intrinsic desire to perform well, and no matter what distributive prin-
ciple they worked under, they worked hard despite the fact that the tasks
were not very interesting. The incentives we offered were apparently not
strong enough to undermine their intrinsic motivation nor so salient, as they
worked, to interfere with their concentration upon the tasks confronting
202 RESEARCH
them. However, it should be noted that intrinsic motivation to perform well

and interest in the task were higher in our subjects when they worked under
the equality principle than when they worked under principles where poten-
tial individual earnings were linked to individual performance (the propor-
tionality and winner-takes-all systems).
4. The preference for sociocentric principles of distributive justice (such as
egalitarianism and generosity) is associated with positive, social-emotional,
solidarity-oriented social relations, whereas the preference for individual-
centered principles (such as porprotionality or equity) is associated with im-
personal, task-directed, economic-oriented social relations. These findings are
consistent with the theoretical and empirical work of other social psycholo-
gists who have investigated allocation preferences (for example, Lerner, Le-
venthal, Mikula, and Schwinger, whose perspectives and research results are
presented in Mikula, 1980a). However, it must be realized that these findings
have, for the most part, been based on research in which money was the
resource being allocated and the social context of allocation was of work
rather than, for example, family or health care. There is good reason to
believe that allocation preferences are affected by the type of resource being
distributed and institutional context in which distribution takes place, as well
as by the ideological values prevalent in one’s culture and also by one’s
personality dispositions. In a sense, our findings relating to the conditions
favoring preference for sociocentric distributive principles were mostly ob-
tained with a resource (money), in a social context (work), and with subjects
(American college students ideologically disposed toward individual-centered,
meritocratic distributive principles) that worked against the emergence of a
preference for egalitarianism; the fact that significant results were obtained
suggest that the variables affecting distributive preferences in our experiments
were robust ones.
There has, as yet, been little research on how allocation preferences are
affected by the types of resource being distributed (for example, love, status,
information, money, goods, and services: as benefits or harms), by the insti-
tutional context in which the resource is being distributed (for example,
work, family, school, hospital), by the national culture, and by various per-
sonal characteristics. Tornblom and his associates in Sweden have summa-
rized some exploratory research on the effects of type of resource and of
nationality (Tornblom and Foa, 1983); Hochschild (1981) has reported in-
tensive interviews with a small number of wealthy and poor men and women
that show important differences in the way people think about distributive
justice in the socialization, economic, and political domains; and Major and
Deaux (1982) have summarized existing research on individual differences in
justice behavior. These are promising beginnings, but it is evident that much
additional research is required if we are to develop systematic understanding
of the conditions that determine how people answer the question Hochschild
uses as her book’s title: “What’s fair?”
Although the relevant research reported in chapter 11, which relates to
preferences among different principles of distributive justice, as well as that

presented by other investigators (see Mikula, 1980a), is sparse, the avail-
able research findings are consistent with our crude hypothesis of social
relations (see chapters 3 and 5). That is, the typical social-psychological
effects of a given system of distributive justice tend to lead to a preference
for the principle employed in that system. Thus, the usual social and
psychological consequences of an egalitarian, solidarity-oriented system (for
example, positive social relations, a sense of similarity, feelings of personal
closeness, unique attachments, a particularistic orientation) tend to induce
preferences for egalitarianism, whereas the common results of a merito-
cratic, economic-oriented system (for example, impersonal social relations,
a sense of difference, feelings of detachment, replaceable attachments, a
universalistic orientation) tend to produce preferences for a meritocratic
principle. Our hypothesis is, as we have indicated in chapter 5, crude, but
nevertheless, it appears to have considerable heuristic value.
5. The sensitivity to injustice can be increased by providing social support
for its acknowledgment and viable options for its remedy. Surprisingly little
research exists that is directly relevant to this conclusion. Kidder, Boell, and
Moyer (1983) report a pilot study that indicates that women become more
aware of their rights not to be victimized and to feel angry rather than
helpless or frightened when they are subjected to sexual harassment if they
have participated in personal defense and assertiveness classes. Coates and
Winston after surveying the literature on peer support groups for victims,
indicate that: “Although it is rather limited, the available evidence suggests
that participation in peer support groups does help victims to feel less devi-
ant” (1983, p. 187).
There is, however, considerable research evidence to support the state-
ment by Taylor, Wood and Lichtman that: “victimization is personally aver-
sive to the victim because he or she experiences loss of control and low
self-esteem, and because labelling oneself as a victim is threatening. More-
over, others perceive victims as threatening or frightening and defensively
derogate them. . . . Thus, anticipation of negative social consequences as a
result of one’s victimization is an important impetus for victims’ minimiza-
tion of their status as victims” (1983, p. 26). In other words, as Lerner’s
(1980) just world hypothesis would imply, there are often strong social and
personal motivations to be insensitive to injustice or victimization. Our re-
search, which is only a small beginning in this area, suggests that authorita-
tive and peer social support for acknowledging an injustice will reduce the
pressures to minimize it or to blame the victim for its occurrence. Presumably
this, in turn, would facilitate action to remedy the injustice.
The perception that viable options exist to remedy the injustice also ap-
pears to make it easier to acknowledge the occurrence of an injustice and to
take actions to undo it. This finding is consistent with a considerable amount
of theoretical and research studies in psychology. Thus, psychoanalytic the-
ory and clinical research (Fenichel, 1945) suggest that the need to employ the
204 RESEARCH
defense mechanism of denial would be lessened if the anxieties stimulated by

a sense of helplessness in the face of harm are reduced; having viable means
of remedying or preventing the harm would reduce the sense of helplessness.
Similarly, the passivity and emotional numbness associated with learned help-
lessness in the face of victimization are less apt to occur if the conditions that
have given rise to the victimization are perceived to be alterable (Peterson and
Seligman, 1983).
Also, the theorizing and research by Bandura (1977, 1982) on the impor-
tant role of perceived self-efficacy in effective coping with one’s environment
are relevant. As Bandure has stated:
Efficacy expectations determine how much effort people will expend and how
long they will persist in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. The
stronger the perceived self-efficacy, the more active the efforts. Those who
persist in subjectively threatening activities that are in fact relatively safe will
gain corrective experiences that reinforce their sense of efficacy, thereby elimi-
nating their defensive behavior. Those who cease their coping efforts prema-
turely will retain their self-debilitating expectations and fears for a long time.
(1977, p. 194)
Knowledge that viable options are available for correcting an injustice is

likely to increase the sense that one will be efficacious in one’s actions to
remedy it. If one acts successfully to right the injustice, one’s success will
strengthen one’s expectations of self-efficacy and make it more likely that one
will not deny or passively acquiesce to injustice in the future.
Part III
Applications
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Education and Distributive Justice:

Some Reflections on Grading Systems
Let me begin by asking you to project yourself into a hypothetical future in

which biopsychologists have arrived at a deep understanding of the relation-
ship between brain processes and behavior. Also suppose that they have
developed a technology that permits brain processes to be altered by complex
training procedures that can be employed with anyone who is willing to
undertake the training, provided that the individual’s brain is not substan-
tially defective or impaired. Further suppose that three basic types of training
procedures have been developed: one that approximately doubles the cogni-
tive capabilities of the trained individual, one that doubles the strength of the
individual’s drive or motivation to be effective, and one that instills a high
level of commitment to the dominant moral values held within the individ-
ual’s society. Two additional suppositions are necessary: each of the three
types of training procedures is very costly when done properly, and when the
procedures are not done properly, they lose their effectiveness and have
harmful side effects. Imagine now that you are the philosopher-king in this
hypothetical world of the future. How do you assign these costly and, hence,
scarce training resources? To paraphrase a legal scholar, M. H. Shapiro
(1974), to whose ideas I am much indebted: who merits an increase in merit?
Ability, drive, and character are among the most common criteria identi-
fied as underlying the judgment of merit. For our present purposes, let us say
simplistically that each of these contributes to the socioeconomic merit of the
individual. How would you distribute the training programs and, hence,
merit within a given population? Would you award it according to the princi-
ple of equal opportunity—so that everyone has the same chance of getting
merit—by using a lottery, or first come, first served, or some other ran-
domizing procedure? Or would you award it to those most in need of merit—
Adapted from “Education and Distributive Justice,” American Psychologist 34, no. 5
(1979): 391—401 by permission of the publisher. Copyright 1979 by the American Psychologi-
cal Association.
207
208 APPLICATIONS
to those who had the least initial ability, motivation, or character? Or would
you award merit to those who had the most initial merit? Or would you
auction merit or sell access to it in the market place, allowing those who are
willing and able to pay the most to get the training? In making your choice
among different principles of distribution, what values would you be trying
to optimize? These and other related questions are intimately related to the
topic of distributive justice in education, the larger context in which I wish to
consider the subject of this chapter; grading systems.
Before turning to a discussion of different aspects of distributive justice,
let me draw out some of the implications of our hypothetical situation for
education. Three of the most important objectives of formal education are
cognitive development, the development of motivation to be effective and the
related sense of personal effectiveness, and the development of social and
moral values. The three hypothetical training methods were selected to be
relevant to these three important goals of formal education. It is apparent
that current training methods are not as effective as we expect our future
methods to be. Nevertheless, even our present ones can be said to distribute
merit. Considerable evidence indicates that one’s occupational status and, to
a lesser extent, one’s income are influenced by the amount and kinds of
schooling one has had (Hauser and Daymont, 1977; Juster, 1975).^ More-
over, there is some suggestion that initial merit prior to formal schooling, as
indexed by early IQ and family background, may interact with the merit
derived from schooling to augment the total merit one ends up with; those
with high IQs have a higher net return in occupational status and income for
each additional year of education than those with low IQs (Hause, 1975;
Turner, 1978). This may be in part because those with high IQs receive a
better quality of education and more education than those with low IQs
(Rosenbaum, 1976), but it is likely that those with high IQs gain more from a
given amount of education than those with low IQs. Here, too, the rich get
richer.
The term resource attractors has been employed by Shapiro (1974) to
characterize attributes that tend to attract other resources because they give
the possessor an advantage in competition for these other resources. The
attributes of merit—ability, drive, and character—are clearly resource attrac-
tors. A student with a high rather than a low degree of these attributes is
more likely to get into a top-notch university, to work with a first-rate
professor, and so on, and is thus more likely to enhance his relative advan-
tage to collect further resources. The result of such an accumulation of attri-
butes that function as resource attractors is to give those who have accumu-
lated these valuable resources the power to determine how further resources
will be distributed. They may decide who will be awarded the conditions that
favor the development of the attributes of merit, or they may redefine the
1. Note that this is not so true for blacks and females; they are subjected to much greater
economic than educational discrimination. Also note that about half of the socioeconomic merit
derived from schooling appears to be “pseudomerit,” which is due to credentials rather than
increased capabilities resulting from increased education (see Juster, 1975).
Education and Distributive Justice 209
attributes of merit so that race, class background, sex, and other ascribed
characteristics rather than ability, drive, and character become the indicators
of merit. They may reshape the system of distributive justice to maintain their
relative advantage or to pass it on to their children, even when they or their
children no longer merit the advantage. In brief, the accumulation of power
tends to corrupt.
The twin tendencies of the rich to get richer and of power to corrupt pose
key problems for a system of distributive justice based on the value of indi-
vidual merit. Yet an opposing problem arises when one contemplates the
possibility of doing without a merit system. Will those who have high merit
use and make available the results of their meritorious capabilities if the
system of rewards within a society is not responsive to their individual merit?
Other dilemmas arise when other distributive principles are employed.
Educational systems distribute many different rewards and costs to many
categories of people—students, teachers, administrators, parents, taxpayers.
Different values and procedures may underlie the distribution of different
goods. Thus, some of our preliminary research with teachers indicates that
they use different values in distributing attention and grades to their students.
In the present chapter, it will be impossible to consider the great variety of
distributive systems that exist in education. Eor illustrative purposes, I focus
on something so widely distributed in our schools that it might be considered
the basic currency of our educational system; I am referring to grades.
Let us consider the distribution of grades among students in a classroom
in relation to some of the features of distributive systems that were discussed
in chapter 1.
WHAT IS BEING DISTRIBUTED, HOW MUCH OE IT IS

AVAILABLE, AND WHAT IS ITS QUALITY?
There are numerous definitions of what a grade or mark is, but most agree
that it is an evaluative symbol meant to be of motivational significance to the
student, apart from whatever other institutional functions it performs for
parents, school systems, and teachers. The student would presumably be
motivated not only by immediate approval or disapproval from his teacher,
family, classmates, and others who are significant to him as a result of his
grades but also by the more distal consequences of the grades—the perceived
improvement or worsening of his chances to get into desired future educa-
tional settings and occupations that employ grades as part of their selection
procedures. Of course, if no one in the student’s family or peer group cares
about grades, or if they are only concerned that he obtain passing marks, or
if the student’s educational and vocational aspirations do not require high
academic qualifications, then he may not be very motivated by grades.
Grades are meant to be of value to students, and because of their value,
they are meant to influence students to behave in ways that conform to the
views of those who control our educational institutions. It is, of course,
natural that the schools serve as a socializing influence on children to accept
210 APPLICATIONS
the dominant values within their society. Grades, by serving as a motivating

value dispensed by a controlling authority, enormously facilitate the social-
ization of the young without resort to excessive violence or bribery by those
having authority over students.
What are the values that marks are meant to inculcate? The best way to
answer this question is in terms of the correlates of grades. The major per-
sonal correlates of grades appear to be cognitive ability (as measured by IQ
and other aptitude-achievement tests), effort, educational ambition, a pleas-
ing personal style, and personal values similar to those who dispense the
grades. However, it appears from research reported by Boyle (1969) that
although a creative personal orientation in a student may enhance growth in
cognitive capabilities and academic learning, it leads to a relative deprivation
in the grades he receives. A reasonable degree of conformity to the values of
those who dispense grades appears to be a necessary, though not a sufficient,
condition for high marks.
If we examine the individual correlates of grades, of educational merit, it
seems evident that they are similar to the characteristics of socioeconomic
merit described above: ability, drive, and social character. Now, in the con-
text of merit, there is a strange thing about the distribution of grades in most
American school systems; there is an artificially created shortage of good
grades to be distributed. High grades are typically limited by grading curves
or norms that, in effect, restrict the total number of high grades to be distrib-
uted within a group of students.^ These distributions are not simply reflec-
tions of the “natural” normal distribution of educational achievement among
students. I believe the opposite is true: educational achievement is measured
so as to conform to an assumed underlying distribution. The social context of
most educational measurement is that of a contest in which students are
measured primarily in comparison with one another rather than in terms of
objective criteria of accomplishment. If educational measurement is not
mainly in the form of a contest, why are students often asked to reveal their
knowledge and skills in carefully regulated test situations designed to be as
uniform as possible in time, atmosphere, and conditions for all students?
Individuals vary enormously in terms of the amount of time they need and
the kind of atmosphere and circumstances that facilitate or hinder the expres-
sion of their knowledge and skills; it is only the comparison of students with
one another that requires measures of educational achievement to take the
form of contests.
2. The movement toward criterion-referenced testing is, of course, an attempt to get away
from comparative grading. I very much favor such an approach to testing. Whenever possible,
accomplishments should be measured in relation to objective criteria rather than by comparing
students with one another. However, it is my impression from discussion with many teachers and
knowledge of many school systems that criterion-referenced testing still plays only a very minor
role in the grading in our schools and colleges. It must be recognized that the aims of criterion-
referenced testing are not easy to accomplish. It is often extremely difficult to specify the objec-
tives of an educational program in measurable terms without making these objectives trivial.
Additionally, it takes the highest technical and scientific skills to develop valid, reliable, and
generally usable criterion-referenced measures. These skills are rare and are unlikely to be avail-
able for use in day-to-day activities in individual classrooms.
What function is served by the artificially created scarcity of high marks?

On the face of it, such an artificial shortage flouts what we know about the
cultivation of ability, drive, and character; namely, if these are manifested,
recognizing and rewarding them well are apt to foster their development.
Disappointing rewards, induced by an artificial scarcity, are likely to hamper
the development of educational merit and the sense of one’s own value. A
strange thing, this artificially induced scarcity of rewards: its effects are prob-
ably quite opposite to its ostensible purpose, discouraging rather than en-
couraging the growth of educational merit.
Yet perhaps the artificial scarcity of good grades in the educational sys-
tem can be justified as a preparation for the realities of adult life in the
economic system. Occupational prestige, high earnings, and fulfilling jobs are
in scarce supply in the world of work.^ In the contest for individual success,
grades are to the student what occupational status and income are to the
adult. The student’s struggle for high grades should presumably prime him
for the battle for economic success. Although a student’s success in obtaining
good marks may indirectly contribute to his economic success by enabling
him to get into a “college track,” then into a good college, then into a good
medical school, and so on, there is little evidence to support the proposition
that college students who get better grades have more economic success than
those who obtain poorer grades. The skills in making one’s mark economi-
cally do not appear to be very similar to those involved in making one’s mark
educationally.
Perhaps one of the main functions of the artificial shortage of good grades
is, as Bowles and Gintis (1976) suggested, to contribute to a belief in the
competitive meritocratic ideology. This ideology legitimates socioeconomic
inequality by assuming that the allocation of scarce, high-socioeconomic po-
sitions in society is based on individual merit as reflected in a fair competition
rather than on social advantage. The scarcity of high grades in the educa-
tional system presumably enables schools to engage in a meritocratic process
of allocation that corresponds to and justifies the principle of allocation in
the economic system. It also fosters patterns of personal development that
accommodate the socioeconomic inequalities of the occupational world.
Through the repeated and pervasive experience of competitive struggle for
scarce goods in the classroom, students are socialized into believing that this
is not only the just way but also the natural and inevitable way of allocating
scarce values in the larger, impersonal, nonfamiliar world. They also learn
that there are winners and losers in such competitions and that, although it is
possible for them to win, they are more likely to lose.
3. Suppose, for contrast, everyone in a community had equally high merit; in terms of
ability, motivation, and character, all were equally qualified to do the more interesting, challeng-
ing, and rewarding jobs available in the community. Also suppose that only a small percentage of
the jobs were desirable. How would one allocate these scarce good jobs? Would people be
assigned by seniority or by random selection? Would people bid for the better jobs? Or would
the jobs in the community be restructured so that they were equally good? Having a shortage of
merit when there is a shortage of good positions helps to avoid difficult decisions.
212 APPLICATIONS
It is, as I suggested above, not surprising that the school system prepares
its students to conform to and accept the ideology, beliefs, and practices of
the broader society in which they live. It would be surprising were it not so. I
have emphasized the function of the grading system as a central element in
creating the correspondence between the educational and occupational sys-
tems. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the correspondence is
anywhere close to perfect. There appears to be much more equality and
reliance on merit in the educational system than in the economic system. It
has been estimated that less than 25 percent of the workers in the United
States are paid according to their individual productivity at work. And as I
indicated above, there is much less discrimination against women and blacks
with regard to grades and educational attainment than there is with regard to
income and occupational attainment. One would hope that the greater de-
mocracy and meritocracy of the school places continuing pressure on the
broader society for improvement in these respects.
So far in my discussion of the content, quantity, and quality of distribu-
tive systems, I have focused on the significance of high marks and on their
scarcity. I now turn briefly to a consideration of the quality of grades. Most
of us have been on the giving and receiving ends of the distribution of grades
and are very much aware of their ambiguities and imperfections. Grades and
grade point averages are summary evaluative symbols, but they communicate
little clear information about what characteristics have been evaluated or
how they have been summarized into a letter or numerical grade. Nor do
they commonly specify the frame of reference or standard that is employed in
making the evaluational judgment. Moreover, different instructors, different
departments, and different schools often vary in important aspects of the
grading process.
As Thorndike (1969) and Warren (1971) have suggested, it is evident that
the specific information transmitted by grades, as they are usually employed,
is often very unclear. The clearest feature in a mark is its evaluative compo-
nent, and even that has considerable ambiguity when one is uncertain about
the frame of reference or standard employed in the evaluation. Thus, I con-
clude my discussion of the first question with the statement that a high grade
is a distributive good of uncertain quality and unspecific meaning, which
nevertheless has considerable importance because of its evaluative signifi-
cance and artificially induced scarcity.
TO WHOM IS IT BEING DISTRIBUTED AND BY WHOM?
Grades are almost always distributed by teachers to students, although in

recent years, in some colleges, teachers have also been rated by their students.
One could imagine other possibilities than the traditional ones. For example,
it is by no means self-evident that the object of grading should exclusively be
the individual student. In the adult world, achievement is often the result of
group and organizational processes and cannot be easily localized in indi-
viduals. Although our preconceptions lead us to localize educational achieve-

ment in individual students, educational achievement is very much influenced
by the interaction processes among students, the social norms that exist
among peers, the group climate, and other group and organizational factors.
Focusing on an idividual as the sole unit to be graded neglects the social
context in which students are enmeshed and to which they contribute; this
may lead both students and teachers to pay little heed to developing the skills
and motivations necessary to produce the social contexts that facilitate learn-
ing by diverse students.
Similarly, it is by no means self-evident that teachers are in the best
position and have the best information for grading students. Thus, there is
research that indicates that fellow classmates in the army’s Officer Training
School may be better than the teachers in predicting which students will be
more successful as officers. Although fellow students often have more full
and detailed knowledge of one another than does the teacher, the teacher
usually has more expert judgment and experience. This suggests that grading
should be more of a joint responsibility of teachers and students.
Such changes in grading procedures presuppose that teachers and students
can develop cooperative relations based on a sense of concordant interests.
Cooperative relations are less likely when the teacher-student relation is seen
as a superordinate-subordinate relation, or in other words, when it is seen as
being part of a system of hierarchical control in which the teacher has unilat-
eral control over the student as a result of the teacher’s superior status in the
educational system. Superordinate-subordinate relations tend to breed con-
flicts over power. A grading system that is completely controlled by the
teachers helps to enhance the teachers’ power over the students and to but-
tress their superordinate position. By grading students individually, in com-
parison with one another, teachers deflect conflict from themselves by en-
couraging conflict among the students. They inhibit collective action against
them by stimulating the students to compete with one another and by foster-
ing the illusion that learning occurs primarily in the superior-inferior relation
and not in relations among peers.
For purposes of contrast, consider the situation where a teacher is not in a
superordinate position in relation to his students, for example, an army ma-
jor or a civilian with a Ph.D. in social psychology teaching a class of generals
a course in organizational psychology, or a social psychologist conducting a
workshop on conflict resolution for presidents of leading corporations. In
such situations, the teacher is often not labeled as a teacher so as to avoid the
status distinctions commonly associate with this label (terms like consultant,
facilitator, resource person, or staff are commonly used). Nor in such situa-
tions would it be likely for the teacher, however he is labeled, to use the
grading practices common in our schools. It seems evident that these prac-
tices are part of the system of hierarchical control that typically characterizes
teacher-student relations in our educational system. So far as I know, there is
no good research evidence that suggests that the learning of students is in-
ferior if they are not in a subordinate relation to their teachers.
214 APPLICATIONS
WHAT IS THE STYLE AND TIMING OF THE DISTRIBUTION?
There are many issues that could be discussed here. I limit myself to a brief
discussion of the openness versus the secrecy of the basis of the distribution
and to a short consideration of many versus few contests. It is evident that
the students are in a bewildering position if a teacher marks them without
telling them in sufficient detail the values, rules, and procedures employed in
his grading. In such a situation, the mark-oriented students are necessarily
anxiously dependent on the teacher’s approval, since they have no other basis
for guiding their behavior to achieve merit. If the teacher is influenceable by
ingratiation, flattery, or bribery, these may be attempted; if not, the student
may try to master all topics of potential interest to the teacher. If the instruc-
tor is explicit in his style of grading, the student can be more independent of
the teacher. The explicitness of the bases of evaluation, however, may lead
the mark-oriented students either to limit their work to what is being assessed
by the procedures employed in the grading or to attempt to outwit the
procedures. For example, managers in telephone companies who are graded
or evaluated by “profit indices” often outwit the system by postponing rou-
tine maintenance costs; the equipment breakdowns become evident only after
several years, by which time the successful manager will have been promoted
to a new position. It is not easy to resolve such dilemmas in distributing
symbols of merit to those who are primarily motivated to obtain the rewards
connected with the appearance of merit; grades, like money, have external
value no matter how they have been obtained. Such dilemmas are preventable
only to the extent that the distribution system fosters the motivations to
achieve intrinsic merit rather than its external symbol.
As I noted above, grading in our schools is like a contest. There are two
aspects of the frequency of contests that are worth noting here. The more
frequent the contests, the more salient will be the competitive atmosphere
generated by contests. On the other hand, the more frequent contests are and
the more diverse they are in terms of the talents they demand, the more likely
it is that there will be many winners. If there are enough different kinds of
contests to go around, it is likely that everyone will experience some victories
and some defeats. The existence of many diverse contests diffuses competi-
tion and reduces the negative implications of losing any particular contest; it
is less harmful to one’s self-esteem and social standing. Analogously, a grad-
ing system can give rise to frequent or infrequent contests; it may give many
an opportunity to win a contest or concentrate the opportunity so that there
are few winners. In so doing, it can either intensify or diffuse the competitive
character of the grading system.
Contests have different forms. Some take the form of elimination tourna-
ments and some, that of a round robin. In an elimination tournament, if you
lose or don’t qualify in any given round, you are eliminated from the rest of
the tournament. In a round robin, even if you lose in one round of the
tournament, you get to play in subsequent rounds, and it is your total score
over the series of rounds that counts. There is some evidence that the merit
contests our schools put their students through are more like elimination than
round-robin tournaments. In a study of tracking in a working-class high
school, Rosenbaum (1976) found that movement between tracks was largely
in one direction from upper to lower. In other words, students who were
eliminated from an upper track in any given year were rarely able to get back
to this track at a later time. Track placement not only affected the content
and level of the students’ courses but also their chances of getting into a
prestigious college or into college at all. Additionally, a student’s reputation
for smartness, his self-concept, and the stability of his IQ were strongly
influenced by track placement.
WHAT ARE THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE DISTRIBUTION.>
In the scholarly discussions of the substantive values that underlie distributive

justice, a number of key values have repeatedly been identified (see chapters 1
and 3). Justice has been viewed as the treatments of all people (1) so that they
have equal inputs (for example, so that each student has equal educational
resources available to him), (2) so that they have equal outputs (for example,
so that each student has the resources necessary to enable him to achieve a
given level of educational attainment even if some students require more
inputs than others), (3) according to their needs, (4) according to their ability
or potential, (5) according to their efforts and sacrifices, (6) according to
their performance or according to their improvement in performance, (7)
according to the social value of their contributions, (8) according to the
requirements of the common good, (9) so that none fall below a certain
minimum, (10) according to what others choose to do for them, and (11)
according to the principle of reciprocity.
A teacher could thus use any of these values, singly or in combination,
in distributing grades among students. He might, for example, decide to
give grades so as to produce equal outputs of student motivation, giving a
high-ability student a lower grade than his performance warranted and a
student with low ability a higher grade than his performance warranted.
The teacher might believe that this would be the most effective means of
motivating maximum learning from each of the two types of students. Or
the teacher might decide to give high grades to those who need them most,
for example, to those who needed them to avoid military conscription. Or
the teacher might decide to give them to those who work the hardest, those
who accomplish the most, or those who help others the most. Similarly, in
the distribution of resources for education among different students, any
one or more of several of the different basic values might be employed. It
might, for example, be decided that all children—no matter what their
initial educational assets or handicaps—be allocated equal inputs such that
all schools would receive an equal amount of funds per pupil. Or it might
be decided that children with special handicaps because of physical disabil-
ity, social background, or language differences be provided with extra edu-
216 APPLICATIONS
cational resources so that they could achieve educational success (outputs)

equal to that of children without these handicaps. Or it might be decided
that those pupils who were considered most apt to contribute to the well-
being of the community should be given preferred consideration. Or it
might be decided that those with most ability or those who had worked
hardest should be given the most resources.
It is evident that these different values may conflict with one another. The
most needy may not be the most able; those who work the hardest may not
accomplish the most; giving everybody equal inputs may not result in their
having equal outputs; treating everyone equally may not maximize the com-
mon good. Among the many conflicting values for defining justice, are there
any that have a claim for an inherent or natural priority? In chapter 3, I
presented a theoretical analysis that suggests that the distributive values op-
erative within a group or society will and should depend on circumstances.
Under some conditions, distributing goods according to individual need will
be more just, and under other conditions, allocating goods in terms of indi-
vidual productivity will be more just. My theoretical analysis suggests that
merit based on individual performance will be the dominant principle of
distributive justice in situations where an economic orientation predominates;
equality will be the dominant principle in situations where a solidarity orien-
tation predominates; need will be dominant in caring-oriented groups or
institutions.
In our society, schools serve as a transition between the caring-oriented
family group and the economically oriented, impersonal, competitive world
of work. One would expect that at the preschool level, the distributive princi-
ples would resemble those of the caring-oriented family—that is, need would
dominate—but that as the child (particularly if he were from a working-class
or middle-class background) moved closer to entrance into the economy, he
would be exposed increasingly to a competitive grading system based on
merit. If the adult world of work were oriented to communitarian-solidarity
values as in Israeli kibbutzim, one would expect that a competitive grading
system based on individual merit would play little or no role in the educa-
tional system; students would be equally valued as members of a community
and would be appreciated particularistically rather than compared on univer-
salistic scales meant to weigh one student against another.
WHAT ARE THE EEEECTS OE THE DISTRIBUTION?
Our scientific knowledge of the effects of different distributive systems is at a

very early stage. We are just beginning to know something about the effects
of cooperative and competitive distributive systems from research in the so-
cial psychology laboratory, in schools, and in industry. There are, of course,
many varieties of each of these two types of distributive systems, and in each
type, I consider a system in which rewards are affected by individual or group
achievement. The fundamental character of a competitive system is that the
amount of reward that one person obtains, or the probability of receiving a

reward, is negatively linked to the amount of reward that others obtain or to
their probability of being rewarded; to the extent I win, you lose. In a
cooperative system, the amount or probability of reward is positively linked
so that as one’s personal situation improves or worsens so do those of the
others in the system; to the extent I win, you win, and to the extent I lose,
you lose.
There have been recent reviews of the effects of different classroom
reward structures by Johnson and his colleagues (1974, 1975, 1979a,
1979b, 1981, 1983), Slavin (1977, 1983), and Michaels (1977); there is a
review by Lawler (1977) of the effects of different reward systems in indus-
try; and I have recently reviewed the social psychological literature related
to distributive justice (Deutsch, 1983). From these various reviews, my gen-
eral knowledge of the relevant social science literature, and my own past
and current research in this area, I draw the following conclusions.
The Strength of Motivation
As reflected in effort expenditure and willingness to work, the strength of

motivation is not induced more reliably or more intensely by one type of
reward system as compared with the other. There seems to be considerable
individual and cultural variability, as well as situational and task influence;
some individuals respond more favorably to one system than to the other.
Children in societies with a more collectivist, as compared with an individual-
istic-competitive, orientation tend to be more responsive to a cooperative
reward system. One is motivated to compete more intensely against enemies
than friends; the reverse is true for cooperation. Within the United States, one
would expect more responsiveness to a competitive system; yet a considerable
number of studies have shown no consistent differences between the two
systems. The conclusion seems inescapable that neither system is intrinsically
more motivating; however, task requirements, situational determinants, cul-
tural values, and personality characteristics may predispose an individual to
be differentially responsive to cooperation and competition.
Individual Productivity
As it is affected by the two systems, individual productivity is very much

influenced by the characteristics of the task. If the task is such that individual
performance is facilitated by effective communication with others, by the
resources or help others can provide, or by the specialization of roles, then
the cooperative reward system produces superior performance. If the task is
such that communication and coordination with others is distracting and
interfering with task effectiveness, the cooperative reward system produces
inferior performance if it leads to attempts to work collectively on the task. If
individuals work in isolation on tasks that permit separate work, task perfor-
218 APPLICATIONS
mance is not consistently different under the two reward systems/ If person-
ality or cultural factors predispose a greater motivational responsiveness to
one reward system than to the other, and the task is such that increased
motivation improves performance, then task performance will be greater in
the reward system to which the individual is more positively responsive. The
conclusion seems clear that there is nothing intrinsic in competitive reward
systems that leads to superior task performance. On the other hand, coopera-
tive reward systems have an intrinsic advantage in relation to tasks that are
facilitated by effective communication, coordination, specialization, sharing
of resources, mutual help, and the like.
Individual Learning
Individual learning appears to be affected by the two reward systems in a

manner comparable with the way in which individual task performance is
affected. Essentially, there are no inherent advantages to a competitive reward
system in any type of traditional learning task, but there are intrinsic advantages
to a cooperative system in a variety of learning situations (Johnson and Johnson,
1979a). However, each of the two reward systems probably tends to promote
the acquisition of the particular types of skills that are instrumental to effective
functioning in its system. Thus David Johnson and his colleagues (Johnson and
Johnson, 1979b) have demonstrated that social perspective taking (the ability to
understand how a situation appears to another and how that person is reacting
cognitively and emotionally to that situation) is promoted more by cooperative
than by competitive learning experiences. Although I know of no research
bearing on other skills involved in cooperation, it seems plausible that a coop-
erative reward system would more likely promote skills related to team func-
tioning and team building, skills in communication, coordination, trust build-
ing, supportiveness, self-disclosure, cooperative conflict resolution, and the like.
Similarly, it seems plausible that a competitive reward structure would more
likely enhance the development of the gamesmanship and power-utilization
skills related to manipulating, outwitting, or intimidating one’s adversaries.
Stephen Potter and Machiavelli provided descriptions of such skills. I suggest,
however, that the acquisition of sophisticated skills of cooperation or competi-
tion is not likely to result from mere exposure to or participation in such
systems; systematic tutelage may be necessary to produce skills that can be
transferred to other contexts.
4. Michaels (1977), summarizing results from a number of relevant investigations, reported

that individual competition was more effective than group competition in six studies, more
effective than individual reward contingencies in two studies, and more effective than group
reward contingencies in two studies. Unfortunately, a number of these studies were basically
flawed; they did not equate the objective probability of reward in the reward structures being
compared. In an unbiased comparison between two reward structures, an individual in each of
the two reward structures would have the same probability of getting an A or the same probabil-
ity of getting an F. If an individual objectively had a higher chance of getting an A in one reward
structure than in another, this factor alone might affect his or her motivation to perform on the
task. My own recently completed research showed no systematic differences in performance on
isolated work under several different reward systems (see chapter 10).
Attitudes toward Work or Learning
Johnson and Johnson (1979a), in their review of recent research findings in

primary and secondary schools, stated that “cooperative learning experi-
ences, compared with competitive and individualistic ones, promote greater
willingness to present one’s answers and more positive feelings toward one’s
answers and the instructional experience, as well as more positive attitudes
toward the instructional tasks and subject areas.” They also reported several
field studies that demonstrated that students experiencing cooperative in-
struction like the teacher better and perceive the teacher as being more
supportive and accepting, academically and personally, than do students
experiencing competitive or individualistic instruction. My early study of
cooperative and competitive grading systems (see chapter 8), which used
students in introductory psychology sections at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, found similar results.
The more negative attitudes resulting from the competitive process reflect
the more hostile and critical atmosphere induced by competition, which leads
students to downgrade others in order to promote themselves and to expect
that others will attempt to downgrade them. The downgrading is expressed
in such behvior as inattentiveness to others’ ideas, obstructiveness, and lack
of helpfulness. The more positive attitudes resulting^ from the cooperative
process reflect the more friendly and supportjê atâiosphere induced by coop-
eration, which leads students to encourage help one another and to
respond attentively and receptively to one aflother. As could be expected,
these differences not only produce differences in attitudes toward learning
but also affect the level of students’ anxiety, their self-esteem, and their
attitudes toward and relations with other students. All these are more nega-
tive under the competitive as compared with the cooperative grading systems.
Students are more anxious; they think less well of themselves and of their
work; they have less favorable attitudes toward their classmates and less
friendly relations with them; and they feel less of a sense of responsibility
toward them.
The more positive effects of the cooperative grading system on individuals
are paralleled by more positive effects on groups. Group productivity on
tasks involving interdependence of the group members is higher; communica-
tion processes are more effective; there is less misunderstanding, less need for
repetition, and fuller transmission of information; there is greater develop-
ment of specialization among group members, with a consequent increase in
diversity of individual activity; there is more effective coordination of the
activities of group members; and stronger group norms develop regarding
mutual helpfulness and the fulfillment of one’s obligations to the group and
to other group members.
I do not mean to suggest by this comparative review of cooperative and
competitive grading systems that there are no problems associated with co-
operative systems. A number of typical pathologies often characterize such
systems (see chapter 15). These include the development of vested interests in
220 APPLICATIONS
one’s specialized role in the cooperative system, the growth of in-group favor-
itism that may lead to discrimination against out-group members, and the
evolution of excessive conformity and reluctance to question the majority
opinion. In addition, there are problems associated with dealing with mem-
bers who are either unable or unmotivated to cooperate effectively and re-
sponsibly. Nevertheless, the research evidence strongly suggests that overall,
the advantages of the cooperative grading system outweigh its disadvantages.
Nor do I mean to suggest by my review that competition produces no
benefits. Competition is part of everyday life, and the acquisition of the skills
necessary to compete effectively can be of considerable value. Moreover,
competition in a cooperative, playful context can be fun. It enables one to
enact and experience, in a nonserious setting, symbolic emotional dramas
relating to victory and defeat, life and death, power and helplessness, domi-
nance and submission; these dramas have deep personal and cultural roots.
In addition, competition is a useful social mechanism for selecting those who
are more able to perform the activities involved in the competition. Further,
when no objective, criterion-referenced basis for measurement of perfor-
mance exists, the relative performance of students provides a crude yardstick.
Nevertheless, there are serious problems associated with competitive grading
systems. These problems are, in my view, of sufficient magnitude to suggest
that competitive grading, when employed, should be a component in a larger
context of continuous, everyday emphasis on the cooprative aspects of learn-
ing. Students need to acquire the skills that enhance cooperation as well as
those that enable them to compete, and they need to acquire the attitudes
that encourage a sense of community rather than a feeling of alienation.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe what would characterize
an ideal grading system. However, let me point out a few of its essential
features. First, an ideal system would foster the view among students that
they have a positive interest in the educational attainments of one another.
Second, instead of emphasizing comparative evaluations, such a system
would provide individualized, particularistic feedback aimed at helping indi-
vidual students and groups of students to function effectively both as indi-
viduals and as groups in achieving educational objectives.^ Third, when pre-
requisites of specific skills and knowledge were necessary for students to
engage in a course of study, criterion-referenced rather than norm-referenced
tests would be developed and employed to assess the specific skills and
knowledge. Similarly, criterion-referenced tests rather than norm-referenced
tests would be used when it was necessary to certify the level of a student’s
educational attainments in a given area.
5. Some researchers, most notably Slavin (1977) and his colleagues, have found that reward
structures that combine intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition are highly motivat-
ing to students. The research of Johnson and Johnson (1979), however, suggested that intergroup
competition may not be necessary to produce a high motivation to achieve. If such competition is
not necessary, then an ideal system would not deliberately foster intergroup competition to
supplement intragroup cooperation; doing so would help to foster antagonistic attitudes toward
out-group members.
If our schools were to foster a cooperative system of education where

each student stood to gain rather than lose by the achievements of other
students, would the competitive, meritocratic ideology that helps to legiti-
mate socioeconomic inequality in our society be undermined? It would un-
doubtedly be weakened, and this threat might well be a source of resistance
to any basic, widespread change in the nature of our grading system. As
educators and social scientists, we must confront this resistance rationally, by
communicating the knowledge that we are accumulating about the conse-
quences of different grading systems to teachers, parents, and others who are
concerned about the effects of schooling on our children.
In addition, I believe we must begin to challenge the assumptions underly-
ing the competitive, meritocratic ideology of our society. We must question
whether socioeconomic position in our society is actually distributed on the
basis of individual merit. In addition, we must take issue with the notion that
merit belongs solely to an individual, as though its possession were not
strongly influenced by social and biological circumstances largely beyond the
individual’s control. And we must raise doubts about the traditional answer
to the question of who merits merit—namely, those who have most merit as a
consequence of having been more favored with the conditions that foster
merit. Finally, we must raise the central question: if the competitive grading
system in our schools—a less corrupted version of a competitive merit system
than the one that characterizes our larger society—does not foster a social
environment that is conducive to individual well-being and effective social
cooperation, why would one expect that such values would be fostered in a
society that is dominated by a competitive, meritocratic ideology? If the
competitive-hierarchical atmosphere is not good for our children, is it good
for us?
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Suppose We Took Egalitarianism Seriously?
Egalitarianism as an ideal seems well established in many areas of American

life. All qualified citizens have equal political, legal, civil, and social rights.
Thus, we share in common the rights to vote, emigrate, travel, and run for
public office and the rights of free speech, freedom of worship, police protec-
tion, public education, fair trial, access to public places, and so on. In addi-
tion, there appears to be increasing public acceptance of the view that all
citizens are entitled to freedom from poverty and to at least a minimum of
medical care. However, there is little evidence of the existence of economic
egalitarianism or of public support for it in the United States. Income is less
equally distributed in the United States than in most other highly industrial-
ized nations; similarly, the United States spends a smaller share of its gross
national product on social welfare policies than the other affluent nations
except for Japan (Hochschild, 1981). Public opinion polls generally indicate
little enthusiasm for a policy of equal incomes or for limiting the amount of
money that can be earned and only moderate support for taxing the rich
heavily in order to redistribute wealth.
Although citizens have equal political, legal, civil, and other rights—and
although these rights are, in principle, not for sale—it is evident that the
quality and effectiveness of one’s rights can be strongly influenced by one’s
economic position. As Okun has written: “Even though money generally
cannot buy extra helpings of rights directly, it can buy services that, in
effect, produce more or better rights. . . . Money buys legal services that can
obtain preferred treatment before the law; it buys platforms that give extra
weight to the owner’s freedom of speech; it buys influence with elected
officials and thus compromises the principle of one person, one vote”
(1975, p. 22).
Economic inequality tends to undermine equality in other spheres. Okun
is aware of this regrettable tendency, but like many other economists, he
believes that the attempt to enforce equality of income would entail even
222
Suppose We Took Egalitarianism Seriously? 223
worse consequences than those resulting from economic inequality. In pursu-

ing the goal of economic equality, he indicates that “society would forego
any opportunity to use material rewards as incentives to production. And
that would lead to inefficiencies that would be harmful to the welfare of the
majority. Any insistence on carving the pie into equal slices would shrink the
pie. That fact poses the trade-off between economic equality and economic
efficiency” (p. 48).
Is there, inevitably, a trade-off between efficiency and equality as is so
commonly assumed? The research I have summarized in chapters 8 and 10
clearly indicates that an egalitarian distribution of rewards or earnings
within a group does not result in less effective individual or group perfor-
mance than a meritocratic one; to the contrary, when the task required
coordination, sharing, communication, or inderdependent activity among
group members, the performance of egalitarian groups tended to be supe-
rior. However, these were laboratory and classroom groups; the people
involved were students; the rewards that were distributed did not affect
the individual’s standard of living; the groups had short lives; and so on.
Perhaps the postulated trade-off would appear in research on real-life
egalitarian work groups, even if it does not necessarily occur in the labora-
tory or classroom.
In this chapter, I shall briefly review the diverse scholarly literature
dealing with different forms of worker compensation, ownership, participa-
tion, and control to see whether egalitarianism and efficiency are incompat-
ible. This will include the following sections: patterns of compensation,
patterns of participation and control, employee ownership in the United
States, and self-management in the Mondragon cooperative system, the Is-
raeli kibbuttzim, and Yugoslavia. However, before proceeding with this
review, I consider the meaning of economic egalitarianism. In a final sec-
tion, before some concluding comments, I discuss some of the problems
associated with egalitarianism.
THE MEANING OE ECONOMIC EGALITARIANISM
In the literature on economic democracy, worker cooperatives, and the like,

there is a clearly emerging social ideal of economic egalitarianism that has
several key components. These components articulate widely held implicit
notions of what is fair in the workplace and, in so doing, also help define
standards for determining what is an invidious distinction among people. The
central features of this emerging ideal appear to include: (1) a cooperative,
communitarian emphasis; (2) economic democracy or democratic control of
the workplace; (3) worker participation in the management of their own
work activities; (4) worker or collective ownership; (5) limitations on income
and hierarchical differences; (6) limitations on size of workplace; (7) equal
opportunity to be considered and trained for different work positions; (8)
224 APPLICATIONS
equal access to information; and (9) free choice not to be a member of such a
cooperative, democratic, egalitarian work systemd
Central to the ideal of economic egalitarianism is the view that the work-
place should be a cooperative rather than an authoritarian or adversarial
system. (Whyte and Blasi, 1982). A cooperative framework is required to do
away with the oppositional, alienating tendencies inherent in the power dif-
ferences between the bosses and the bossed as well as those implicit in the
different economic interests of employers and employees. Worker coopera-
tives are democratically controlled by those who work in them. In small
cooperative enterprises, decisions are usually made by the entire work group
in frequent meetings. Larger ones have management positions that are filled
by election on the basis of one person, one vote. Such positions are usually
subject to rotation and are open to all qualified members. Managers can be
recalled by the members; ultimate authority rests in the work force. Full
worker participation in decision making exists at all levels of the organiza-
tion. The opportunity for informed and effective participation is aided by
training and full access to relevant information.
How the income and surplus produced by the cooperative should be
distributed is decided by the work force. The tendency is toward equality;
differences, when they exist, between the highest and lowest paid worker are
much smaller than in privately owned firms. Profit or surplus may be used
for reinvestment within the firm to create new jobs, to improve working
conditions, or to improve productivity; it may be invested in education,
health clinics, day-care centers, or other social and community purposes; or it
may be distributed in the form of bonuses or increased benefits.
Land, buildings, machinery, and other assets and liabilities of the co-
operative are owned by the work force. Unlike the situation in employee-
owned corporations, where the shares they own in the corporation can be
sold to other individuals (including outsiders), members of a worker coopera-
tive cannot sell their share of ownership except to the cooperative. The value
of a cooperative member’s share is determined by the value of his “internal
account.” The initial balance in this account is determined by the member-
ship fee or the member’s initial financial contribution at the start of the
cooperative. At the end of each fiscal year, the member’s portion of the
cooperative’s surplus (or loss) is added to (or subtracted from) his account
balance. When a person terminates membership, the balance in the member’s
account is paid out to the ex-member over a specified number of years. As
Ellerman points out, this procedure “allows each member to eventually re-
ceive back the net amount of capital supplied to the coop (membership fee
plus accumulated earnings) without any leakage of membership rights to
outsiders and without requiring newcomers to come up with the accumulated
1. I have developed this list after immersion in the literature on economic democracy, worker
participation, worker cooperatives, worker ownership, codetermination, self-management, and
the kibbutzim. For entries into this literature, see Lindenfeld and Rothschild-Whitt (1982),
Rosner (1982), Simmons and Mares (1983), Whyte and Blasi (1982), Thomas and Logan (1982),
Kuhne (1980), Jain (1980), and Horvat, Markovic, and Supak (1975).
savings of the retiring members” (1982, p. 3). It avoids the “suicidal” tenden-
cies of employee-owned corporations in which ownership shares can be sold.
Membership in a cooperative is entirely voluntary and a member is free to
withdraw from membership if he so desires. Analogously, a coop need not
accept everyone who desires to be a member and it may expel a member for
just cause after due process. Worker-managed firms typically function in a
competitive, free-market system, and in such a system, they may fail and
disband or thrive and expand. However, it is possible to envisage a coopera-
tive, free-market system in which the interests of various producing and
various consumer cooperatives are complementary rather than antagonistic
to one another.
PATTERNS OE COMPENSATION
The preceding discussion of the meaning of economic egalitarianism indicates

that income distribution is only one of its key components. Scholars (for
example, Katzell and Yankelovich, 1975; Lawler, 1981) who have exten-
sively studied worker compensation plans agree that it is difficult to make
meaningful comparisons between different plans without considering the
other features of the social and organizational context in which they are
embedded. Thus, as Lawler (1981) has indicated, the effectiveness of any
performance-based pay system (whether group or individual centered) will
depend upon how the performance system is developed and administered,
how performance appraisal is made, the credibility of the system, trust in the
organization, the compatability of the type of pay system with the type of
organization, and other factors.
It is evident that it is difficult to do sound and meaningful research on the
effects of different compensation plans; it requires large research expendi-
tures and the use of the most sophisticated research methodologies available
in the social sciences. Hence, it is not surprising to find that no adequate
research has yet been done in this area. With the meager resources at their
disposal, investigators have been forced to conduct small-scale studies with
inadequate samples and without the experimental or statistical controls ne-
cessary to determine whether the presumed effects of one or another compen-
sation plan were due to the compensation or other factors confounded with
it. Thus, various incentive plans also involve providing workers with ap-
praisal and feedback about their performance; without appropriate research
controls, it is difficult to determine whether the effects of the incentive plan
were caused by the incentives or by the appraisal and feedback.’
With the recognition that the research on which they base their assess-
ments is both meager in quantity and inadequate in quality, I shall summarize
below the conclusions of knowledgable and sophisticated scholars in this area
2. For reviews of the research, see Lawler (1971, 1981), Katzell and Yankelovich (1975),
Katzell, Bienstock, and Faerstein, (1977), Locke et ah, (1980), Guzzo and Bondy (1983), and
Katzell and Guzzo (1983).
226 APPLICATIONS
about worker compensation, drawing especially on the writings of Katzell

and Yankelovich (1975) and of Lawler (1971, 1981).
Katzell and Yankelovich indicate that workers who are more satisfied
with their pay are more likely to like their jobs better and are less likely to
quit, be absent, or strike, but their job performance is not appreciably better
unless their pay is clearly connected to their performance. Pay plans (incen-
tives, bonuses, and so on) that are linked to performance are usually asso-
ciated with higher levels of work motivation and performance, providing the
workers understand the linkage and providing they believe that increased
production will not change pay rates. Where work requires close coopera-
tion, group incentives generate higher productivity than individual incentives;
otherwise individual incentives are more effective, particularly when groups
are large.
Lawler indicates that a number of conditions must be present if rewards
are to motivate performance: “(1) important rewards can be given; (2)
rewards can be varied depending on performance; (3) performance can be
validly and inclusively measured; (4) information can be provided that
makes clear how rewards are given; (5) trust is high; and (6) employees
accept the performance-based system” (1981, p. 100). Where conditions are
not right, a performance-based pay system can contribute to superior-
subordinate mistrust and the breakdown of communication, to falsification
of performance data, to worker behavior that is dysfunctional for the over-
all goals of the organization, and to employee cynicism and bickering. In
short, the negative effects of merit pay or incentive plans—when conditions
for them are not right—may make them dysfunctional for an organization.
Lawler suggests that when conditions are appropriate for the use of an
incentive system that an open participative approach may be the best way to
administer it. Such an approach can be expected to produce good decisions
that are accepted and that motivate. Such an approach, however, is particu-
larly likely to be effective if it is part of an overall participative approach to
management that fosters a climate of trust and joint problem solving between
management and workers.
A recent survey of experience with productivity-sharing plans in firms,
conducted by the U.S. Government Accounting Office, attests to their gener-
ally positive effects (Preiwisch, 1981). The thirty-six firms studied included
firms that ranged in size from those with less than 400 to more than 100,000
employees; they had plans in operation from less than a year to more than
twenty. Savings resulting from the productivity sharing, which averaged 16.9
percent of the workplace cost of participating employees (their salaries,
wages, and fringe benefits), were split between the company and the employ-
ees; the firms’ share of the savings ranged from a low of 25 percent to a high
of 79 percent. In addition to the higher profitability to the company and the
higher income to the employees, the productivity-sharing plans resulted in
substantially improved labor-management relations, fewer grievances, less
absenteeism, reduced turnover, and a greater involvement and commitment
of employees to their work.
To sum up, the available research on performance-based pay plans in

industry does not speak clearly nor reliably to the question of whether there
is a trade-off between egalitarian wage structures and work efficiency. Thus,
there is some research evidence to suggest that individuals work more effi-
ciently when their pay is clearly linked to their performance. But there are
many qualifications that have to be added to this statement. First, the re-
search does not demonstrate that it is the connection between pay and perfor-
mance rather than the connection with “accountability” (that is, with perfor-
mance appraisal and feedback) or with other confounded factors that is
instrumental. Second, as Lawler has pointed out, merit pay systems can be
dysfunctional and lead to inefficiencies when the organizational conditions
necessary to their effective functioning does not exist. There is little reason to
believe that the necessary conditions for their effective functioning exist in
most work organizations.
There is also some research evidence suggesting that performance-based
pay plans where the performing unit is the group (department, plant, or firm)
can lead to more efficiency than pay plans based on individual performance
when cooperative work is required. Such plans tend to be more egalitarian
than plans based on individual performance. Group plans, in addition, are
less plagued by some of the measurement and other administrative problems
of individual merit pay systems.
I could find no research evidence that directly addresses the question of
whether individual as compared to group merit pay systems lead to more
efficient retention of high-performing employees and more efficient elimina-
tion of low-performing ones. One reason for assuming that egalitarian pay
systems are relatively inefficient is because high performers presumably could
earn more in a nonegalitarian system and, hence, would be likely to leave the
egalitarian system; this would not be the case in an individually based merit
system. There are other reasons to suppose that the closer, personal attach-
ments and the more congenial interpersonal atmosphere associated with the
egalitarian as compared to the individualistic-competitive system might lead
to a stronger desire to remain in the egalitarian system.
PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL
In the doctrine of economic egalitarianism, the ideal of equality of power—

the ability to participate equally in making the decisions that control, directly
and indirectly, one’s work and the organization in which one works—is at
least as central as the ideal of an equal standard of living. Although resistance
to power sharing and worker participation has often been strong from both
management and unions, the resistance has not been universal, and it has by
no means stopped the accelerating growth of worker participation in both
Europe and the United States (Carson, 1977; Jain, 1980; Kuhne, 1980; Car-
noy and Shearer, 1980).
Worker participation in decision making within a firm can take place at
228 APPLICATIONS
three levels: the shop floor, the department and plant, and the corporate
level. At the department and corporate levels, participation is usually indirect
through delegates or representatives. Shop floor participation involves direct
personal involvement as an individual or as a member of a small group in
such day-to-day operating decisions as scheduling of work, work methods,
workplace layout, quantity of output, quality control, and training. Terms
such as job enrichment, job redesign, job enlargement, job rotation, work
restructuring, autonomous work group, and so on are often used to charac-
terize worker participation and control at the shop level.
At the departmental and plant levels, worker participation is in the ad-
ministrative decisions, through representatives to “work councils” or “joint
labor-management consultative committees,” that usually have consequences
for weeks to months (at the departmental level) or for a year or two (at the
plant level). At the departmental level, these include cost and quality control,
resource allocations, achievement of targets and quotas, and planning and
coordination of activities. At the plant level, the decisions center about
product lines, production layouts, plantwide work arrangements, hiring, fir-
ing, and promotion of employees, and the acquisition, organization, and
control of resources needed for production. At the corporate level, worker
participation is through representatives on corporate boards that are con-
cerned with such long-range strategic policy decisions as setting goals and
objectives, choice of products and geographic locations, pricing and market-
ing policies, major capital expenditures, diversification, mergers, acquisitions,
and raising of capital, and disposition of profits.^
There has been a good deal of experience with worker participation at the
three levels but, as yet, not much good systematic research. Katzell and
Yankelovich (1975) have summarized the research on the shop level. They
conclude that “work groups whose members have more of a say over the
group’s production goals, work, and working conditions usually have higher
average job satisfaction than those having less control” (p. 233). There is also
evidence indicating stronger work motivation and reduced turnover and ab-
senteeism. They indicate the productivity is usually, but not always, higher in
groups having more control.
Katzell and Yankelovich have also summarized research relating to the
correlates of how much control employees perceive themselves to have in
their organization. They conclude that organizations whose members see
themselves as having a relatively high control over their work lives are usu-
ally more productive and express greater job and need satisfaction than those
characterized by lower control. A structural feature that appears to produce
the perception of greater control on the part of lower ranking members is
reduction in the number of hierarchical levels (that is, creating a “flatter”
organization). Most of the studies do not distinguish between the total level
of perceived control in the organization and how equalized the perceived
3. The description of worker participation at the three levels of an enterprise is adapted from
Jain (1981, p. 5).
control is within the organization. In those that do, total control is more
consistently correlated with better attitudes and performance than equalized
control.
Katzell and Yankelovich have also presented an overview of research on a
number of organizations who have simultaneously introduced systemwide
changes in the distribution of tasks, of control, and of financial compensa-
tion. Their analysis of these studies leads them to suggest that the beneficial
effects in raising productivity and improving the economic performance of
the manufacturing plants were due to such factors as introduction of mechan-
isms whereby employees participated more actively in proposing and making
decisions affecting their work and their jobs, enlargement of the scope of
duties and responsibilities of employees, increased participation by managers
and supervisors in decisions affecting their own and related operations, re-
duction in the number and lengths of channels of communication and author-
ity (flattening the organization), increases in compensation with improved
performance so that the company shared its gains with its employees, and
improvements in the resources required for effective performance.
A variety of case studies of direct worker participation in control of their
work at the shop floor level in The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Sweden,
Japan, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Canada (presented in Jain, 1980)
consistently indicate that its effects are generally positive on job satisfaction,
absenteeism, turnover, and productivity. This is particularly so when the
profits from the productivity gains are shared with the work force. However,
some workers—a minority—apparently do not welcome the increased re-
sponsibility that is associated with greater control. The limited number of
case studies of indirect worker participation (see Jain, 1980) through dele-
gates to work councils at the department or plant level or to supervisory
boards at the corporate level (as in the codetermination system of West
Germany) suggest that they have had beneficial effects when employers and
unions were able to curb their traditional tendencies to adopt an adversarial
orientation toward each other. However, even though legally encouraged in
many Western countries, employers often do not welcome worker participa-
tion, resist power sharing in decision making, are reluctant to make available
the information necessary for informed participation, and are unwilling to
share the economic benefits resulting from effective cooperation. Unions,
similarly, often do not encourage worker participation because they believe it
may be an attempt to bypass the union and to co-opt the workers without
true sharing of power or of economic gains; they also believe that the inter-
ests of the workers are best protected through the use of their power in
collective bargaining. Such adversarial orientations on the part of manage-
ment or unions provide little basis for effective cooperation whether it is on
work councils or boards of directors.
To sum up, the meager available evidence about the effects of a more
equal sharing of power in the workplace suggests that it increases rather than
decreases economic efficiency. Although there is a significant push toward
more participatory control in the workplace, propelled in part by the increas-
230 APPLICATIONS
ing education and sophistication of the high-tech work force, neither em-
ployers nor unions yet seem to be eager to extend cooperation to include the
corporate board as well as the shop floor.
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Two forms of employee ownership of firms are emerging as a result of the
increasing problems of economic instability in the United States (Woodworth,
1981). In one form, sometimes labeled “worker capitalism,” employees, as
individuals, typically acquire shares in the enterprise through an employee
stock ownership plan or through direct purchase of a plant that is about to
close, be relocated, or be subjected to a takeover by a conglomerate. Here,
the employees function as individual shareholders who have a personal eco-
nomic interest in the profitability of their firm; as shareholders, even when
they together own a majority interest (this is often not the case), the employ-
ees do not use their shares collectively to determine management decisions.
Worker capitalism may or may not involve participation and control over the
workplace. Rarely does it involve a fundamental change from a capitalist
philosophy of ownership and management.
In contrast to the worker capitalism form of ownership is the “worker-
owned collective”; in the latter, the interest is in maximizing the amount of
worker participation and power. As Woodworth asserts: “Such enterprises
invert organizational operations so that decision-making flows from the bot-
tom up instead of from the top down. In such systems of self-determination
the underlying process is not simply that of employees attempting to enlist
the support of management to humanize work. Rather, workers become
managers” (1981, p. 199).
We shall review worker-owned cooperatives in greater detail in the fol-
lowing section. Here, we summarize the effects of some components of
worker-employee ownership upon the functioning of the enterprise. Conte
and Tannenbaum (1978) report the results of a survey of ninety-eight such
firms with a median size of 350 employees. Employees and managers in
about three-quarters of the companies owned at least half of the equity,
employees alone, about 25 percent of the equity. Employee owners had stock
voting rights, representatives on the board of directors, and influence on
important decisions in about 50 percent of the firms. On the basis of their
survey, Conte and Tannenbaum conclude:
The industrial relations in employee-owned companies appear to be good in
the judgment of managerial respondents; managerial respondents in these
companies see employee ownership as having a positive effect on productivity
and profit; the employee-owned companies that have been studied appear to
be profitable—perhaps more profitable than comparable, conventionally
owned companies; the ownership variable most closely associated with profit-
ability is the percent of equity owned by the workers themselves. (1978)
To sum up, the results of the limited available research indicate that
economic egalitarianism as expressed in the form of employee ownership of
the firm appears to result in greater productivity and profitability as well as

better attitudes. Again, there is little support for the widely held notion that
increased egalitarianism has a trade-off in economic efficiency. Nevertheless,
it is well to recognize that the atmosphere of euphoria that often character-
izes a firm after its transformation to employee ownership is often followed
after several months by growing dissatisfaction, sometimes accompanied by
severe conflict. As Whyte and Blasi point out, “The disillusionment of
workers and the resulting conflicts arise out of a failure of management to
recognize that an employee-owned firm cannot be managed effectively by
following the authoritarian model” (1982, p. 143).
WORKER COOPERATIVES
Worker cooperatives are usually owned by the work force of the firm or by
the cooperative community in which the enterprise is located (as in the kib-
butzim); many such cooperatives do not permit sale or transfer of individual
ownership rights. Control of the firm is in the hands of the work force and is
commonly distributed on the egalitarian principle of one person, one vote.
However, when the cooperative is part of a cooperative community (as in the
kibbutzim) or part of a complex of interrelated cooperatives (as in the Mon-
dragon system), the larger community or cooperative system usually has an
important voice in determining policy decisions that would affect the commu-
nity or system of which it is a component.
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a mushrooming of grass-roots
collectives in the United States, and it has been estimated that over five
thousand may have been created in the past twenty years (Rothschild-
Whitt, 1979). The instigators were usually young people in their twenties
or thirties who started an enterprise requiring small amounts of capital.
The members were predominantly middle class in origin who rejected the
“establishment” and traditional forms of authority in organizations. The
norm of equality among members was their key principle in structuring
their cooperatives. But, as Whyte and Blasi (1982) point out, what this
norm means in practice poses a number of difficult questions. Must all
members participate equally in all decisions? Must everyone receive the
same pay, without regard to skill or length of service or family responsi-
bilities? Should everyone have a chance to perform every job, regardless of
his skills?
As Whyte and Blasi also indicate, grass-roots collectives have characteris-
tic problems in the handling of authority. Their ideal is that all decisions shall
be made collectively and arrived at through consensus. However, Whyte and
Blasi stress that as “the organization grows, collective decision making can
absorb enormous amounts of time and lead to the frustration of the mem-
bers. The problem becomes especially serious when the organization grows
beyond the limits of a small face-to-face group. . . . the growth of the organ-
ization separates people in functions and in space and multiplies the p^roblems
232 APPLICATIONS
of coordination. It is at this point that many previously successful grass-roots

collectives tend to break down” (p. 142).
There is no census of grass-roots cooperatives and communes; it is not
known what proportion succeed and fail, how long they survive, and whether
they are inferior or superior in these respects to traditional small enterprises.
Case studies (see, for example, those in Kanter, 1973, and Lindenfeld and
Rothschild-Whitt, 1982) indicate that there are successes as well as failures:
some grow and thrive, but others do not. Some of the typical problems that such
cooperatives have to cope with will be discussed in the final section of this
chapter. However, let me note that in addition to the above mentioned problems
connected with increasing size and confusions about the meaning of egalitarian-
ism, their difficulties have frequently resulted from hostility and attacks from
the surrounding community. Other typical problems are inadequate initial
capitalization, the lack of a supporting network of cooperative organizations,
inadequate training of its members for functioning as effective members of a
cooperative, the personal stress entailed in being part of a new and highly
demanding process of social interaction, and the personality difficulties asso-
ciated with members who have a naive hope that a cooperative atmosphere will
free them of their long-standing emotional and interpersonal difficulties. As
Kanter has stated in terms that are applicable to worker cooperatives as well as
communes:
As new social forms, communes are unlikely to recruit members experi-

enced in and socialized for communal living, and they must create their own
social orders from scratch, lacking blueprints and guidelines (although “how-
to-do-it” manuals are beginning to appear). As revolutionary social forms,
they are unlikely to get support from their environments—either directly in
the form of financial aid and advice or indirectly in the form of tolerance.
Internal tensions and pressures from the outside account for the high dissolu-
tion rate of communes.
Many communes disintegrate early in their experience, then, because in-
ternal and external pressures prove too much for them, and members’ mythic
expectations of emotional intimacies and ecstasies do not match the mundane
requirement of a shared life. But these are not the only reasons that com-
munes dissolve. An increasing number of groups today do not expect or want
a stable, long-term existence. They want a “family” base as well as the free-
dom to change “families.” (1973, p. 447)
There are many examples of successful, well-established, worker-

controlled enterprises and of long-lived communes (see Oakeshott, 1978;
Lindenfeld and Rothschild-Whitt, 1982; and Simmons and Mares, 1983, for
illustrations of worker cooperatives, and Kanter, 1973, for communes).
Whyte and Blasi (1982) have discussed four examples of enterprises that are
structured on the egalitarian principle of one member, one vote: the U.S.
Plywood cooperatives, the Mondragon cooperative system in Spain, the kib-
butz cooperative sector in Israel, and the Yugoslavian model of self-
managed cooperatives. Much of what follows below is indebted to Whyte
and Blasi.
The U,S. Plywood Cooperatives

These cooperative plywood manufacturing firms were first started in the
Pacific Northwest in the 1920s, and by the 1960s they were at least twenty-
one such cooperatives. Most were started by workers contributing about
$1,000 to $2,000 per person to form a new firm, but about one-third arose
from the workers taking over a private plant being shut down. Ultimate
control of decisions is vested in a general meeting of the members (one vote
per member). In two or three meetings per year, they set overall policy, vote
on capital expenditures above a certain amount, may remove the general
manager, and elect a board of trustees from their own ranks. Day-to-day
management is handled by a nonmember manager hired by the board of
trustees to whom he reports at weekly or biweekly meetings. Board members
are elected to one-year, staggered terms; the turnover in board composition
permits many workers to become deeply knowledgeable about the firm’s
operation. There is a tremendous amount of informal discussion among
board members and those they represent as they work next to one another in
the mills or warehouses.
Everyone gets the same pay for the hours worked, except for the
manager who serves the firm on the basis of a contract that the board
negotiates with him. Various studies have shown that the plywood coop-
eratives have consistently outperformed private plywood firms substantially
(25 to 60 percent) in productivity and also in the wages received by the
workers (about 25 percent higher). A large portion of this productivity
difference may result from the smaller number of management and super-
visory personnel required in the cooperatives. In traditional firms, supervis-
ory personnel are used to police the work force, checking on goofing off
and careless or inefficient work. In the coops, workers police themselves
and one another, saving an enormous amount of money that is tradition-
ally spent for supervisors.
The plywood cooperatives, however, have not developed an effective-
solution for the problem of how to bring in new workers as owners. As their
companies have prospered, the ownership share of the original members has
increased twenty to fifty times in value, to $100,000 in some instances. The
original owners have been reluctant to dilute their holdings by increasing the
number of member-owners as additional workers have been needed. Their
solution has been to hire outside workers who cannot be shareholders, creat-
ing a two-class system that is embarrassing to the members. In addition, as
the original members have retired and sold their shares to entrepreneurs, a
number of the cooperatives have reverted to traditional ownership and con-
trol by outside shareholders.
The Mondragon Cooperative System in Spain

The Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque region in Spain have grown from
a single industrial cooperative (ULGOR) started by five young men in 1956
to a network of more than eighty-seven cooperatives with 18,000 workers
234 APPLICATIONS
and $1.7 billion in annual sales. Thomas and Logan after a careful economic
analysis conclude:
Various indicators have been used to explore the economic efficiency of the
Mondragon group of cooperatives. During more than two decades, a consid-
erable number of cooperative factories have functioned at a level equal or
superior in efficiency to that of capitalist enterprises. . . . Efficiency in terms of
the use made of scarce resources has been higher in the cooperatives; their
growth record of sales, exports, and employment, under both favourable and
adverse economic conditions, has been superior to that of capitalist enter-
prises. (1982, pp. 126—27)
Based on a small-scale interview survey, Thomas and Logan also conclude:

As far as the main aspects of this study are concerned: employment, educa-
tion, distribution, economic efficiency, and expansion of a self-managed sec-
tor . . . there is still strong support for the Mondragon model as this was
designed a few decades ago. ... In fact, it is quite remarkable that such
creative solutions were then found to complex problems and are still accepted
by a new generation, (p. 191)
The cooperative production firms have been supported and linked to-
gether by the Caja Laboral Popular, a cooperative banking organization that
had over 300,000 individual accounts by 1980. The bank was established
after the original founders of the initial production coop realized that the
financial support required for continued development of their cooperative
had outgrown the financial capacity of the informal network of their friends
(from whom their initial funds had been borrowed). It was created at the
suggestion of Father Arizmendi, the teacher and adviser of the original coop
founders, who was convinced that a cooperative savings bank could benefit
from the Basque propensity to save by offering 1 percent more interest on
savings than commercial banks. The bank was to become the key institution
for sustaining the growth of the Mondragon cooperatives. The bank has two
divisions: an economic section that attracts local savings and a management
one that serves as adviser and “godfather” to new coops. The bank provides
the accumulated financial and management experience, as well as financial
resources, to help potentially productive coops get established in a sound
way. Between 1961 and 1976, the cooperative bank helped in the creation of
fifty-six new coops; not one has failed.
Two kinds of cooperatives have emerged: producer coops such as stove,
machine tool, construction, and agricultural ones; and service cooperatives
whose function is to serve the industrial and agricultural enterprises. These
latter include the bank, educational cooperatives and schools, a research and
development center, and consumer and housing cooperatives. The boards of
service coops typically have half their members from their own enterprise and
half from other coops.
Most of the coops are governed through a general assembly where the
workers elect a governing board to oversee management. Equality in voting
rights is accompanied by an unusually narrow range of pay differentials

compared to those prevailing in private firms: workers at the low end receive
somewhat more than workers at the same level in private industry, whereas
the top executives receive substantially less. When demand for company
products slackens, workers retain their pay while studying at an educational
coop instead of being laid off; this encourages worker self-improvement and
commitment to the coop. In addition to being represented on the governing
board, the workers are represented on social councils, which advise manage-
ment with regard to personnel policy and social benefits.
At Mondragon, 10 percent of the profits from the coops are invested in the
community in schools and other civic associations (this is required by Spanish
law), 20 percent is reinvested in the coops, and 70 percent is deposited in
individual worker accounts; this latter money is also reinvested in the coop.
When workers leave or retire, they are paid the accumulated proceeds of their
internal accounts over a specified period, usually five years. In addition. Mon-
dragon operates its own system of social security. In the late 1970s, individual
accounts of retiring workers were worth about $50,000. Ownership remains
social and, unlike the situation in the U.S. Plywood companies, a worker does
not have ownership and membership rights that can be sold; he has “member”
rights of one vote per worker as long as he remains in the coop and specified
rights to the funds in his individual account when he leaves the coop.
Mondragon has not been without its problems. Whyte and Blasi (1982)
suggest that these problems were due to contradictory organizational models:
a model of community democracy with regard to control of the coop’s policy
and the authoritarian model of F. W. Taylor with regard to industrial man-
agement of the workplace. As the Taylor model was implemented after the
coops grew in size, this produced some alienation that culminated in a strike
of 400 members out of a total of 3,400 in 1974 in the oldest and largest firm,
ULGOR. The strike shocked the leaders of the system and led to two impor-
tant changes. Democratic governance was introduced into the workplace, and
the social councils have begun to play a role somewhat akin to a workers’
union that is consulted by management on all major questions.
The Kibbutz Cooperative Sector in Israel
Menachem Rosner, one of the foremost students of the kibbutzim, has writ-
ten, “The equality of mankind—not merely in its formal connotation but in
the true human and social sense as well—is the most fundamental principle
upon which Kibbutz society is based” (n.d., p. 109).The founding fathers of
the kibbutz movement drew upon Marx’s conception of communist society
v/herein each individual contributes to society according to his abilities and is
rewarded according to his needs. Embodied in this principle are two major
conceptions: allowance for the specific and diverse needs of various individ-
uals (an individualized or particularistic equality) and the separation of one’s
4. In this section, I draw heavily upon an unpublished manuscript of Menachem Rosner and
his colleagues, The Second Generation: Continuity and Change in the Kibbutz.
236 APPLICATIONS
social contribution from the material rewards one receives. Marx believed
that his principle could be realized only under conditions of material abun-
dance. The kibbutzim, however, adopted it as a fundamental premise of its
social system and have practiced it during a period of considerable privation
and austerity.
In 1979, there were 254 kibbutz communities with almost 120,000 mem-
bers, comprising about 3.3 percent of the population of Israel (Rosner,
1982). The contribution of the kibbutz to the Israeli national product greatly
outweighs its portion of the population (40 percent of the agricultural and 6
percent of the industrial output) and its members have been and are dispro-
portionately represented in the parliament and among the political and mili-
tary leaders of Israel. At the same time, the various indicators of social
pathology—crime, drug addiction, suicide, juvenile delinquency, mental dis-
order—appear to be disproportionately low in the kibbutzim.
A typical kibbutz is an egalitarian, rural community of several hundred
families democratically governed by a general assembly based on the princi-
ple of one member, one vote; the assembly meets on the average of three
times a month. A kibbutz is “owned” by its members, but it cannot be sold
and its assets cannot be divided by its members. If individual members leave,
they have severance pay provisions based on a number of clearly defined
factors. Kibbutzim are organized into a “holding company,” which is affili-
ated with the general labor organization of Israel. Should the majority of a
kibbutz decide to dissolve it, the kibbutz’s assests would be turned over to the
holding company. (For additional descriptions of kibbutz life, see Blasi,
1980; Lieblich, 1982; Rayman, 1982; and Snarey, 1982).
Whyte and Blasi (1982) point out that from their very beginning in 1910,
kibbutzim linked together to form federations that function similarly to Mon-
dragon’s Caja Laboral Popular. The kibbutz federations guide the develop-
ment of educational and cultural programs, give technical assistance, operate
management and vocational training colleges, provide capital through mutual
banks, and function as liaisons with government organizations.
However, unlike Mondragon, the workplace and the neighborhood are
integrated in the kibbutz. People who work together in a kibbutz factory, no
matter what their positions in the factory, live together in the same commu-
nity and have equal standards of living as well as equal control over commu-
nity affairs. Every kibbutz member has an equal right to housing, medical
care, education for his children, food and meals, higher education and occu-
pational training, social security throughout old age, support if he becomes
sick or disabled, and access to a community car pool, and (in most communi-
ties) unlimited public transportation within the country, occasional overseas
vacations, a paid vacation, and so on. (Whyte and Blasi, 1982). The equality
is particularized in the sense that it is responsive to individual needs—for
example, special arrangements will be made for those who have a physical
disability or for those who are unusually talented.
The decision-making process on issues related to the industrial plant
within a kibbutz is partly determined by the nature of substantive issues.
The kibbutz general assembly usually makes decisions on the election of a

plant manager, the investment plan, the professional training plan, and the
hiring of outside workers; the workers’ assembly within the plant com-
monly makes decisions with regard to production plans, work arrange-
ments, choice of candidates for training, and elections of other plant offi-
cials than the manager; and the plant management makes decisions with
regard to technical and professional problems. Even when the general as-
sembly retains final decision power, it will receive suggestions and propos-
als from the workers’ assembly and the plant manager with regard to the
issue being considered. Among the different kibbutzim, there is some vari-
ability in which kibbutz or plant institution decides what (see Leviatan and
Rosner, 1980; and Rosner, 1982, for detailed discussions of self-manage-
ment of kibbutz industries).
Eor the kibbutz as a whole as well as for its industrial plants and other
branches, all managerial and coordinating positions are rotated in order to
prevent the emergence of a managerial elite. Rosner and Palgi (1980), in a
sample of fifty-four plants in 1976, found that top factory managers had an
average tenure of 3.5 years in office. Rotation implies not only a turnover
of personnel but also that a factory manager will usually be assigned to
other lower levels within the plant after completing his tour of duty as
manager. Similar to results found in the United States and elsewhere, top
and middle managers report more “opportunities for self-realization” and
“job satisfaction” and are considered to have more “influence” than rank-
and-file workers in kibbutz factories (Leviatan, 1980b); these differences are
less pronounced in the kibbutz plants that practice stronger adherence to
the kibbutz principle of worker participation. As Leviatan (1980b) has indi-
cated,; rotation increases the number of individuals who experience a re-
warding work situation and who have influence in organizational matters; it
upgrades the level and quality of the workers’ body as ex-officers become
part of it; and the legitimization of rotation decreases some of the ill effects
of arbitrary or invidious status differences between managers and workers.
Leviatan (1980a), in a study of twenty-seven kibbutz factories and thirty-
three farm branches, found that 34 percent of the personnel were currently
top managers or first-line supervisors, 48 percent had previously been in
managerial positions but were now rank-and-file workers, and about 18
percent were workers who never had been in any managerial position.
In addition to job rotation of managers, Leviatan (1980a) identifies two
other mechanisms that are used in the kibbutzim to counterbalance the ill
effects of hierarchy in organization: direct democracy, which provides rank-
and-file workers influence over the selection (via the workers’ assembly and
the general assembly) of plant officers and influence over many aspects of
the plant’s functioning; and independence of status dimensions, such that
the individual’s standard of living as well as his position in the kibbutz
community organization is uncorrelated with his position in the factory.
That is, a manager has the same standard of living as a worker and is not
any more likely to have a high position in the community. In fact, the
238 APPLICATIONS
general norm is that kibbutz members will not hold central offices both in
the community and in the work spheres.
Rosner’s (1982) survey of fifty-four industrial plants in 1976 revealed
that the degree of influence of the plant’s workers’ assembly on such factory
policies as the production plan, investment plan, work arrangements, and the
training plan was significantly correlated with the degree of managerial rota-
tion. In addition, he reports data showing that managerial rotation and
worker influence, as well as worker participation in the workers’ assembly,
were negatively associated with the size and age of the industrial plant.
Leviatan and Eden (1979) and Leviatan (1980b and n.d.) summarize research
studies on kibbutz factories that reveal that the more the factory is character-
ized in practice by the key kibbutz values (direct democracy for rank-and-file
workers; opportunities for self-realization; cooperation and mutual depen-
dence; considerate, responsive, and capable management), the more the
workers display psychological commitment and self-initiated contributions to
the economic success of the factory and the higher its economic efficiency as
manifested in its rate of capital return.
Leviatan (1978) points out that, from a traditional economic perspective,
the kibbutzim have many handicaps with regard to competing economically
with nonkibbutz organizations that have as their main goal maximizing their
profitability. Profitability is not the goal of the kibbutzim; their goals include
service to Israeli society, the fostering of the kibbutz movement, and the
enhancement of the quality of life of kibbutz members. Service to Israeli
society and to the kibbutz movement often requires the allocation of man-
power, organization capacity, money, and other valuable resources that could
be used profitably by the kibbutzim for their own economic functioning and
development. Concern for the quality of life of kibbutz members often results
in personnel practices that would traditionally be viewed as economically
dysfunctional. These practices include the provision of jobs for all members;
the use of aged and physically disabled members who desire to work; rota-
tion of plant managers; direct democracy and the participation of all worker-
members in all important decisions regarding work organization; decentral-
ization of the decision-making process and the vesting of responsibility with
the different teams that work in branches; and limitations on the size of work
organizations and restrictions on some economies of size so that there is no
need to hire nonmembers to work in the kibbutz plant. This last kibbutz
principle has not been adhered to by a sizable number of kibbutzim; how-
ever, the announced goal for all is the abolition of hired labor and the return
to a purer state of self-labor (Leviatan, 1978).
Despite the “handicaps” under which they operate, Leviatan, one of the
most knowledgeable scholars of the kibbutzim, points out that “studies and
economic analyses of the functioning of Kibbutz work organizations have
proved that the Kibbutzim not only compete with their rival organizations in
Israel but that in many instances they function even better than similar organ-
izations outside the Kibbutz” (1978, p. 11). He indicates that the following
general lessons can be drawn from the kibbutz experience:
• The Kibbutz experience in the spheres of work and economy had proven the
feasibility for the successful existence of a non-market economics, since the
Kibbutz had broken the traditional link between the contribution made by a
person and the rewards conferred upon him.
• It serves also as a successful example of functioning of work organizations
in a situation where material rewards or their equivalents cannot serve as
such because of their nondifferentiality. So, it highlights the effectiveness of
psychological motivations of higher order needs.
• The Kibbutz experience can serve as proof that societies of socialistic ingre-
dients can function successfully even when they are surrounded, and form
parts of, capitalistic societies.
• The Kibbutz experience has shown that organization and management
based on humanistic values, which are centered around workers’ need fulfill-
ment and those emphasizing quality of working life principles, can compete
successfully with traditionally managed organizations. It has also shown
that technology can be redesigned and jobs redefined to fit constraints by
human needs and values.
• In the Kibbutz setting one finds support for the slogan coined recently that
“small is beautiful” and also indications for the optimal size where democ-
racy can still prevail while the organization can be autonomous in its func-
tioning. This indication is given both for individual work organizations, as
illustrated by Kibbutz work branches, as well as for the social system as a
whole as illustrated by the individual Kibbutzim.
• The relations among Kibbutzim within any of the Kibbutz movements and
within the Kibbutz federation, can teach ways of handling sub-units of a
very large organization with common goals and a network of ways of mu-
tual help, which are organized centrally but are operating on principles of
almost full autonomy. This is particularly of interest as an answer to the
problem of keeping to optimal size with an actually operating unit and still
using the advantages of the economics of size. (pp. 23—24)
The survival of the kibbutzim depends not only upon their ability to
function as reasonably effective economic systems but also upon their capa-
city to attract and retain members and their ability to maintain their mem-
bers’ commitment to the key values of the kibbutz ideal.
The available research on membership retention has been presented in
Leviatan (1975) and Rosner (n.d.). The data indicate that the population of the
kibbutzim during the period 1950—70 has grown at a faster rate than the rural
population in Israel and other Western countries, but it has grown at a slower
rate than the total population of Israel. Among the second generation of kib-
butz members (that is, kibbutz-born members), the average annual rate of
leaving the kibbutz during the period 1956—70 was, for males, 4.8 percent in
kibbutzim in the Ichud Kibbutz Federation and 3.0 percent in kibbutzim in the
Artzi Federation; for females, it was 8.7 and 6.4 percent, respectively. The
retention rate (as of 1971) of kibbutz members who joined various kibbutzim
during the period of 1951—69 as graduates of the socialistic-Zionistic youth
movements in Israel and abroad was much lower than for kihbutz-horn mem-
240 APPLICATIONS
bers: about 26 percent for the former and nearly 60 percent for the Ichud and
Artzi kibbutz-born members. The decisions to leave their kibbutzim bv those
born there are usually made before they are twenty-four years old, the women
making their decisions somewhat earlier, on the average, than the men; fre-
quently, the decisions are made after the required service in the armed forces or
after educaiton outside the kibbutz. Leavers are more likely to be single (never
married, widowed, or divorced), to have fewer children, and to be less active in
social functions and community offices than those who remain.
Although attitudinal variables seem less important than demographic
ones (age, sex, family status) in accounting for who leave, those who support
the central values of the kibbutz system (equality, communality, self-labor,
mutual help) are less apt to be leavers than those who are attracted to
kibbutz life because their expected level of fulfillment of various needs (for
example, standard of living, work satisfaction, educational opportunity) is
higher within their kibbutz than outside. The data also suggest that the
dropouts have been less exposed to ideological education than those who
remain. There is also some evidence that rates of retention of members are
higher among the kibbutzim that are viewed as having high rather than low
adherence to the central values of the kibbutz movement.
So far as I could ascertain, there has been no systematic study of the
people who drop out of the kibbutzim or of their reasons for doing so.
However, in a 1969 study comparing founding and second-generation mem-
bers of the kibbutzim (Rosner, n.d.), 61 percent of the second generation
indicated that they would leave if there were a deterioration in social rela-
tions and 33 percent said that they would leave if they had inadequate
training opportunities; other data indicate that 14 percent of the kibbutz-
born disagreed with the egalitarian values of the kibbutzim. In 1976, ex-
members of the kibbutz indicated that more opportunities for fulfillment of
their personal aspirations regarding family life existed outside the kibbutz
than within. The ex-members, however, considered that more opportunities
for realizing their aspirations for higher education and engagement in sports
and cultural activities existed within the kibbutz.
From the limited data that are available, it seems reasonable to draw only
the following conclusions about dropping out of the kibbutzim. The drop-out
rate is not high by comparative standards and is by no means high enough to
threaten the survival of the kibbutz movement; on the other hand, there is no
evidence to support the view that the kibbutzim are increasing their relative
membership and are an expanding sector of Israel. The dropouts undoubt-
edly leave for many different reasons: inability to fulfill personal aspirations
for a career, for education, for family life; poor personal relations with other
members of the community; the stress of living in a highly involving, interac-
tive cooperative community; lack of commitment and even opposition to
egalitarian values; dissatisfaction with rural, small-town life; and the psycho-
logical difficulties of living with repeated Arab-Israeli wars and threats of
war. There is no evidence to indicate that the dropouts are the most produc-
tive or talented members of the kibbutzim.
The kibbutzim will, apparently, survive in terms of their continued abil-

ity to attract and retain a sufficient number of able members. However,
questions have been raised about whether their value system will survive the
passing of their founding members. This issue has been addressed most
thoroughly in the work of Rosner and his colleagues entitled The Second
Generation: Continuity and Change in the Kibbutz (n.d.). Their research
indicates that in 1969 (when the research was done) the second as com-
pared to the first generation was much less committed to the kibbutz for
ideological reasons and was considerably more apt to characterize living in
the kibbutz as being “out of habit.” For the founding members, there is
more stress on the kibbutz objectives of fostering the development of social-
ism and contributing to broader Israeli society. For the second generation,
there is more emphasis on the internal kibbutz community: its social as-
pects, its self-fulfillment conditions, and the standard of living it provides.
Despite these differences in emphasis, the attitudes of the two generations
were not opposed; as Rosner points out, “There was continuity in affinity
for fundamental Kibbutz values and movement outlooks” (pp. 707—08).
The second generation shares with its predecessor an acceptance of the view
that the community should operate as an egalitarian, democratic system.
With regard to intergenerational differences, Rosner concludes:
Although only a few second generation members declared that their main
motive for living in the Kibbutz was a desire to live according to its unique
principles, in fact all members live according to these concepts. Relations with
friends and family are free of such economic features as inheritance or pension
problems and are devoid of the type of competition likely to instigate genera-
tional conflict. Thus, successful generational integration at work and in social
relations is brought about by realization of the very same principles of collec-
tivity and equality in reference to which the difference of approach between
the generations has been deemed a “failure.” This smooth generational inte-
gration was indeed made possible only through the absence of sharp ideologi-
cal differences. Although the second generation did see greater justification for
their self-fulfillment aspirations, what they aspired to was higher professional
and educational levels within the Kibbutz system, rather than material benefits
or higher standards of living for the professionals, (pp. 714—15)
Thus, the evidence appears to be that members of the founding generation

of the kibbutz have passed on successfully to the second generation a desire
to continue the practice of egalitarianism and democracy even if they have
not succeeded in instilling an ideological passion to persuade others of the
moral and other benefits of kibbutz life. It is difficult to ascertain from the
limited data that are available whether the commitment to the practice of
egalitarianism and democracy reflects the conservative acceptance of what
exists in their community or a conscious realization of the effectiveness of the
kibbutz system in providing them with a relatively high standard of living
and a generally satisfying quality of life.
One final point: like all democratic systems, the kibbutzim face two cen-
tral dangers—apathy of members and centralization and monopolization of
242 APPLICATIONS
influence in the hands of a few officeholders. As I indicated earlier, rotation

of offices, independence of status dimensions, and direct democracy inhibit
the monopolization of power. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that
the balance of rewards and costs are such that formal office is not eagerly
sought; officeholders obtain intrinsic rewards and have much influence, but
they tend not to receive much “sympathy” or “esteem” (Rosner, 1982, p.
49). The four central positions in the kibbutz (general secretary, economic
coordinator, treasurer, and general plant manager) can be filled by a little
more than 5 percent of the membership during a ten-year period (assuming a
turnover every two years in each position). This is about what happens; only
a small number of persons hold more than one central office in a kibbutz
during a ten-year period (Rosner, 1982).
Monopolization of central offices does not seem to be much of a problem,
but apathy or lack of participation by members may well be. Attendance at
the general assembly meetings averages about 30 percent in the kibbutzim of
the three kibbutz federations, and less than 10 percent define themselves as
frequent speakers at such meetings; men attend and speak more frequently
than women. In general, it appears that participation is highest among indi-
viduals committed to kibbutz ideals and in kibbutzim most characterized by a
democratic climate (Rosner, 1982).
To sum up, the kibbutz movement was founded by individuals who were
dedicated to the ideals of egalitarianism, direct democracy, self-labor, and
mutual help. The kibbutzim they established have evidently been generally
successful economically (see Melman, 1970) as well as successful in creating a
quality of life that is satisfying to most of their members and relatively free of
the social pathologies found elsewhere. Membership in the kibbutz was from
its inception and remains voluntary; this is undoubtedly an important ele-
ment in its success.
Many of the problems in initiating and maintaining a long-lived coopera-
tive system have been experienced in the kibbutzim. However, like the Mon-
dragon system, they have managed to cope effectively with their problems by
developing a supporting network of institutions that augment the capacities
of individual kibbutzim. It is difficult for small, isolated cooperative systems
to survive without supporting institutions to provide technical assistance,
operate management and vocational training institutes, provide capital
through mutual banks, and offer expert guidance on many issues.
The Yugoslavian Model
As Whyte and Blasi have stated, “The world’s largest system of worker
cooperatives is found in Yugoslavia where the state has supported the devel-
opment of industrial firms governed on cooperative principles” (1982, p.
158). The control of each factory is in the hands of its worker-members on
the basis of one worker, one vote. The workers govern themselves in assem-
blies, which elect a workers’ council, which in turn elects managing boards
and the director. The government sets regulations regarding the structure of
the firms and their governance. The boards are designed to advise the council
as well as to interpret and expedite on a day-to-day basis the decisions of the
council in the respective areas of the boards’ responsibility—for example,
production planning, investments, personnel. The council is the supreme au-
thority and is responsible to the collective as a whole. It may make decisions
concerning production plans, pricing of products, distribution of wages and
salaries, hiring and firing of employees, discipline, and so on. (See Denitch,
1976, for a description of the Yugoslavian context of self-management.)
Authority relations are an important issue in the Yugoslavian philosophy
of management. As Tannenbaum and his collaborators have stated: “Empha-
sis is placed on mutual respect and equal rights of all employees; there must
be no superiority or inferiority. An implication of this emphasis is that super-
visors and managers do not formally exercise authority over others, but
rather are said to coordinate or organize the work. Hence they are called
organizers of work” (1974, p. 82).
The formal emphasis in the Yugoslav system is on egalitarianism and
participativeness. Research by Tannenbaum and his associates (1974) on
hierarchy in organizations in Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, the United States,
and the Israeli kibbutzim indicates that Yugoslavian plants resemble those in
the kibbutzim—in contrast to the Western countries—in fostering a higher
degree of power equalization, more worker participation in decisions affect-
ing the plant, and less differences in reward and psychological reactions to
one’s job between those high and low in the organizational hierarchy. How-
ever, Tannenbaum and his coworkers also found that, although formal par-
ticipativeness in Yugoslavian firms is mandated by government legislation,
there are strong obstacles to its fulfillment in actual practice. Authoritarian
hierarchical relations have been customary in Yugoslavian industry, and
workers as well as managers have been deeply imbued with this traditional
ideology of organizational functioning. This problem was exacerbated be-
cause education is a common basis of status in Yugoslavia and the work
force in Yugoslavia was characterized by a relatively low level of education
compared to that of managers. As a result of these obstacles, Stephen indi-
cates that “policy-making was dominated by a limited strata of workers
within enterprises” (1982, p. 34). This eventually led Yugoslav policymakers
to develop the new Constitution of 1974 and the Associated Labor Act of
1976, which formally abolished the enterprise and created new groupings of
Basic Organizations of Associated Labor. The system is complex and in the
early stages of development; it is meant to foster both increased worker
participation and increased organizational efficiency. (See Singleton and
Carter, 1982, for a most up-to-date description.)
Whitehorn (in Jain, 1980) describes a comparative study of four Yugoslav
and three Canadian plants conducted in the early 1970s. He found that in
Yugoslavia, as compared to Canada, managers as well as workers reported
feeling a greater sense of self-influence on decision making; presumably, Yu-
goslavian management-worker relations were more cooperative and Cana-
dian, more adversarial. However, inequality of influence, as well as a sense of
244 APPLICATIONS
alienation from work, was clearly manifested in Yugoslavia as well as in

Canada, even if less so in the former. Work stoppages and strikes have
occurred with considerably less frequency in the Yugoslav as compared to the
Canadian enterprises.
To sum up, the Yugoslavian system of self-managed firms was imposed
by Marshall Tito, under somewhat adverse conditions, rather than chosen by
a democratic process. The system has led to considerable egalitarianism with
regard to income within firms but considerable increases in intersectoral
differences (for example, differences among oil, metal, and tobacco firms) in
income. It has generally increased equality with regard to decision making
within firms but not as much in practice as mandated by the egalitarian
ideology. Although hierarchical differences in psychological reactions and
adjustments to work between managers and workers have decreased, the
average level is not as positive as in the kibbutzim or the United States; it is,
however, more positive than in Italy and equal to Austria (Tannenbaum et
ah, 1974, p. 186). It is difficult to assess the economic success of the Yugo-
slavian self-management system. The Yugoslavian economy appears to have
done very well comparatively when the world economy was prospering, but
it also appears to have stagnated during a period of worldwide economic
stagnation and recession. (For a discussion of the Yugoslav economy, see
Dirlam and Plummer, 1973; Horvat, 1976; Denitch, 1976; Sire, 1979; and
Singleton and Carter, 1982.)
PROBLEMS OF EGALITARIANISM
After reviewing the literature on worker participation, worker ownership,
worker cooperatives, the kibbutzim, communes, and the like, I am convinced
that paradise is not to be found on this earth. I am further persuaded that
even the nearest thing to common visions of an earthly utopia—a small,
well-functioning, worldly, cooperative, egalitarian community—has to work
hard and thoughtfully on a continuing basis to preserve its democracy, co-
operativeness, and egalitarianism as well as to survive. The inherent tendency
of such communities is to break down; it takes sustained effort to prevent
this from happening. Despite the passive fantasies of some proponents of co-
operative communities (in which the cooperative is unconsciously equated
with a nurturing, benevolent mother), effective cooperation requires very
active, intense work.
Below I consider some of the problems related to democracy, coopera-
tion, equality, and survival.
Democracy
In cooperative communities, democracy tends to break down because of un-

equal participation by their members. This inequality is partly due to structural
factors and partly due to the differences in the personalities, interests, and
skills of the individual members of the community. Such structural factors as
the size of the community as well as the time and space available for meetings
may make it difficult or impossible for all members to participate, much less
participate equally in a meeting. Thus, from the existing research on participa-
tion in small groups, it is evident that the proportion of group members who
are likely to talk during any group meeting decreases as the size of the group
increases. Similar results are obtained when the time available for meeting
decreases. As the size of the group increases, the amount of time needed to
permit equal participation of all members becomes oppressively large; lengthy
meetings, in turn, would discourage attendance. The result is that as the size of
a cooperative community increases, participation tends to be concentrated
among a smaller and smaller percentage of its members.
In addition to structural factors, differences among individual members
result in unequal participation. Some are deeply committed to the ideal of
participatory democracy, but others are not; some are shy, and others are
assertive in public settings; some have the skills, education, and information
necessary for effective participation, and others do not; some are interested in
the issues to be discussed, and some are not; and some desire political power,
but others have little such desire.
It is evident that the structural factors that limit the opportunity to
participate and the individual differences that affect the readiness to partici-
pate, in combination, tend to break down democracy and lead to a concen-
tration of power in the hands of the few. Michels (1962) refers to this
tendency as the “iron law of oligarchy.” This concentration of power is
often self-perpetuating because it enhances the readiness and ability of those
with power to participate, while decreasing these characteristics in those
with little power.
To counter the iron law of oligarchy, many procedures have been em-
ployed. Among them are (1) keeping the size of the group small so that direct
participatory democracy remains feasible; (2) rotating participants, leader-
ship, and office so that power does not get concentrated in the hands of the
few and is shared more widely; (3) eliminating some of the incentives for
political power by removing perks and other advantages often associated
with it; (4) educating and indoctrinating members so that they become deeply
committed to the values of participatory democracy; (5) training and inform-
ing members so that they have the skills and information necessary for effec-
tive participation; (6) developing and employing the technology and pro-
cedures that encourage and enable widespread member participation; and (7)
engaging in periodic, independent reviews of the way the democratic process
is functioning and making the necessary repairs.
These procedures have been used in different cooperatives with some
degree of success in limiting the deterioration of their democratic practice.
However, it is well to recognize that although the democratic ideal is striven
for, it is never fully achieved. It is also well to realize that the intense effort
required to achieve much progress toward the ideal, even if one falls short of
it, may be entirely worthwhile; one has only to consider the problems in the
alternatives to democracy.
246 APPLICATIONS
Cooperation
As I have indicated in my writings on cooperation and competition (Deutsch,

1949, 1973, 1979), there is a natural tendency for cooperation to break
down as a result of the very social psychological processes—substitutability,
cathexis, and inducibility—that are central to cooperation. Thus, substitut-
ability, which enables the work of one cooperator to replace the work of
another so that they don’t have to duplicate one another’s efforts, leads to
specialization of function. Specialization of function, in turn, gives rise to
specialized interests and to specialized terminology and language; the likely
consequence is a deterioration of group unity as those with special interests
compete for scarce resources and communicate in a language that is not fully
shared. Similarly, cathexis of other group members (the development of per-
sonal bonds between members) can lead to in-group favoritism, clique forma-
tion, nepotism, and so on. Here, the consequences are apt to be a weakening
of overall group cohesion as cliques develop, a deterioration of cooperation
with other groups as in-group favoritism grows, and a lessening of group
effectiveness as a result of nepotism. Inducibility, the readiness to be influ-
enced positively by other group members, can lead to excessive conformity
with the views of others so that one no longer makes one’s own independent,
unique contribution to the group; the cooperative process, as a result, may be
deprived of the creative contributions that can be made by each of its mem-
bers, and also, those who suppress their individuality may feel inwardly
alienated from themselves and their group despite their outer conformity. In
addition, free riding or social loafing may occur in which some members
shirk their responsibilities to the group and seek to obtain the benefits of
group membership without offering the contributions they are able to make
to it.
Some of the same procedures that are employed to prevent the deteriora-
tion of democratic functioning can be used to limit the impairment of co-
operation. These include (1) rotation among positions and job enlargement to
retard the development of specialized interests; (2) fostering communication
among individuals and groups with different interests to facilitate perception
of common interests; (3) educating and indoctrinating members so that they
become group oriented; (4) developing group symbols, rituals, and occasions
to foster group unity; (5) instituting coordinating and translating mechan-
isms, as well as cross-cutting memberships in specialized subgroups; (6) hon-
oring and cherishing individuality and buttressing the right to differ; (7)
maintaining sufficient individual accountability so that shirking can be de-
tected, when not deterred, and responded to with appropriate diagnostic and
intervention procedures; and (8) engaging in periodic, independent reviews of
the way the cooperative system is functioning and making the necessary
repairs.
The effort in maintaining effective cooperative systems and of repairing
them when required is considerable. When cooperation is not required and
individual action is feasible, the costs of cooperation may outweigh its bene-
fits and make the individual action preferable. However, often individual
action is insufficient and cooperation is necessary. In such cases, the effort
required to develop and maintain an effective cooperative process may be the
only sensible alternative to the dismal consequences of failure to do so.
Equality
There is a pathological version of egalitarianism that identifies equality with

sameness and that tries to deny the reality or significance of human differ-
ences (see Schimel, 1962 and 1974, for discussions of the psychopathology of
egalitarianism). Treating children and adults, the sick and the healthy, or the
gifted and the retarded in identical ways would be a travesty of egalitarian-
ism. It would violate its central value: the equal worth and dignity of each
individual human being. This value implies an appreciation rather than a
denial of each individual’s distinctive characteristics. However, as Dworkin
(1981a) has pointed out, the interpretation of egalitarianism as treating
people so that they obtain “equality of welfare” (or “equality of success” or
“equality of enjoyment,” and so on) creates insurmountable problems, espe-
cially if welfare is defined subjectively. Even when defined in objective terms
(for example, so that a paraplegic might have all the resources necessary to
walk as well as a nonparaplegic), this conception is unworkable.
As an alternative interpretation of equality, Dworkin (1981b) proposes an
interesting hypothetical version of “equality of resources,” which supposes
that the resources devoted to each person’s life should be equal. His proposal
entails an insurance system to compensate people for various forms of catas-
trophe and misfortune (such as physical handicap, poor mental endowment,
catastrophic illness); a market system that would enable people, in effect, to
trade resources so that the various individuals can obtain the resources they
individually prefer; and an income tax system that would seek to redistribute
unequal income derived from unequal endowment (but not from unequal
effort, consumption, or risk taking).
I have given a very brief, inadequate summary of Dworkin’s important
discussion. He raises many of the problems that an egalitarian system must
confront. In essence, the problems boil down to the question of how to
provide the conditions that respect the fundamental equality of human beings
in the context of a full recognition and acceptance of their individual differ-
ences. Dworkin offers an abstract framework of institutions and policies that
can provide conceptual guidelines for implementing the value of egalitarian-
ism. However, the implementation of egalitarianism must always be particu-
laristic; it must be responsive to the specific group and its particular context
as well as to the specific people and their characteristics.
To be successfully egalitarian, a cooperative community must avoid in-
vidious distinctions among its members even as it recognizes and responds to
their individuality; lack of distinctions, as well as invidious ones, lead to
alienation and the breakdown of cooperation. On the one hand, it must be
responsive to the fact that some people would prefer to work harder and
248 APPLICATIONS
longer in order to consume more, whereas others would prefer to work less
and have more leisure; it must also be responsive to the possibility that some
would prefer to consume less now in order to consume more later, whereas
others would prefer not to delay gratification. On the other hand, those who
accumulate more through greater effort or thrift should not be able to trade
what they accumulate for power over others.
Egalitarian systems not only have the difficult problem of navigating
between the shoals of invidious distinctions and lack of responsiveness to
individual differences; they also face the problem that their most talented
individuals are often able to advantage themselves economically and in terms
of relative power by leaving their system to join a nonegalitarian one. How-
ever, as research by Tannenbaum et al. (1974) has shown, noneconomic
considerations often are more crucial to job satisfaction, and even to satisfac-
tion with one’s income, than one’s pay. Thus, specially talented individuals
may desire to remain in a well-functioning egalitarian system because of the
social and psychological benefits they receive from participating in such a
system, despite a loss of material advantage.
To sum up, egalitarianism is not a system for all. Some would find its
restraints too confining; membership in such systems should be voluntary. It
is also a system that must be administered sensitively and with considerable
knowledge of particular local realities. In its relatively pure form, it seems
more appropriate to small cooperative communities where the relations of
members are direct and personal rather than large ones where the relations
are remote and formal. It gives rise to less problems, the higher the level of
cooperation and trust in a given community and the more ideologically com-
mitted its members are to egalitarianism.
Survival
In a number of places above, I have suggested that small is beautiful for

democratic, egalitarian cooperatives. However, the descriptions of the Mon-
dragon system and the kibbutz system indicate that small is not enough.
Cooperatives need support systems that enable such small units to have the
assistance they need to organize and structure themselves, to train their mem-
bers for functioning in a cooperative system, to provide the financial and
technical aid for effective economic performance, and so on. In other words,
it is difficult for a small cooperative to survive without being part of a
federation of cooperatives, which, together, can sustain an organizational
infrastructure with a sufficient magnitude of resources to provide the support
a small cooperative system needs.
To survive, cooperatives must also build commitments among their mem-
bers to the shared values of the cooperatives. As Ranter’s (1972) study of
long- and short-lived communes indicates, the groups that employed many
commitment mechanisms had the strength to endure rather than break up at
the first indication of trouble. Whyte and Blasi (1982) state that the organiza-
tional leaders must develop and articulate an ideology that both justifies the
form of the organization and guides its practice. They also suggest that the
shared ideology must be continually reassessed in light of the cooperative’s
experience.
If a cooperative from its inception realizes that there has been a history of
success and failure among cooperatives and if it is willing to learn from the
experiences of others, then it is more likely to survive. It is evident that “the
wheel is being reinvented” by many new cooperatives with the result that
many repeat the mistakes of previous failures. It is unfortunately true that
only recently has a research literature on cooperatives begun to emerge that
could be helpful to new cooperatives.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
I have reviewed an extensive literature that indirectly or directly bears upon

the issue of whether egalitarian cooperative systems are inherently less effi-
cient than nonegalitarian systems. The existing research is meager and not of
high quality, but its findings are concordant with the results of the more
carefully controlled laboratory studies described in chapters 8 and 10. There
is no reliable or consistent research-based evidence that justifies the conclu-
sion that egalitarian systems are intrinsically less productive than nonegalitar-
ian systems. To the contrary, the available research suggests that, when effi-
cient work requires efficient cooperation, almost any movement toward a
democratic, egalitarian, cooperative system and away from the more tradi-
tional authoritarian, hierarchical, adversarial system of work improves pro-
ductivity and lessens worker alienation. This is so whether the movement is
from individual- to group-performance-based pay, or from nonparticipation
to worker participation in decision making and profit sharing, or from out-
side ownership to worker ownership, or from authoritarian control to demo-
cratic control. This is not to deny the importance of individual performance
and accountability but rather to suggest that when everyone has a stake in
your performance, your immediate coworkers as well as yourself, this en-
hances rather than reduces your accountability and your motivation to work
and cooperate effectively.
Egalitarian, cooperative systems have a tendency to break down and fail
or to regress toward a more traditional, hierarchical, nonegalitarian system.
It takes thoughtful, organized, and continual effort to sustain such systems. If
those of us who are not asocial or antisocial took egalitarianism seriously and
devoted the effort necessary to establish and maintain such democratic coop-
erative systems, the odds are that we would be more productive and less
alienated from ourselves and from one another.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Justice in the Crunch
Tallulah Bankhead is reported to have said “I’ve been poor and I’ve been rich
and, believe me, rich is better.” Most of us would agree with Tallulah.
Nevertheless, many individuals, groups, and societies during the course of
their existence face the necessity of coping with an economic crunch—with a
diminution of their resources. Often they cope badly and feel a loss in their
self-esteem, their unity, and their sense of purpose as well as in their standard
of living. However, it is not always the case that economic loss makes one
poorer psychologically and socially. Thus, it is reasonable to ask: what condi-
tions lead to the stimulation of latent paranoia, to the emergence of suspi-
cious relations with others, to the breakdown of civility, to the decrease of
individual and group morale, and to individual and social disruption in the
face of an economic crunch? What conditions foster the effective mobiliza-
tion of self and community to deal with adversity? These are the basic ques-
tions to which this chapter is addressed.^
My approach to these questions is guided by two interrelated assump-
tions:
1. The ability to cope is impaired to the extent that the economic loss is
experienced as a threat to one’s self-esteem. One of the important factors
contributing to this experience is the sense that one’s loss is personally
unjust, one has been deprived unfairly.
2. The ability to cope is impaired to the extent that the economic loss weak-
ens the cooperative bonds that exist among individuals, and within groups,
organizations, or societies. The bonds of solidarity that help individuals
and collectives to cope with adversity are weakened by the sense that the
loss is not being justly shared or distributed.
1. I am grateful to Dr. Shula Shichman for her helpful suggestions for this chapter.
Adapted from “Justice in the ‘Crunch,’ ” in M. J. Lerner and S. C. Lerner, eds., The Justice
Motive in Social Behavior (New York: Plenum Press, 1983).
250
Justice in the Crunch 251
It should be emphasized that the maintenance of self-esteem and the

cooperativeness of the group bear reciprocal relationships with coping with a
crunch. Thus, the ability of a group, institution, or society to cope with
economic adversity is a function of its cooperativeness and self-esteem, and in
turn, its cooperativeness and self-esteem are influenced by the success of its
coping.
The above two assumptions lead me to place considerable stress on the
importance of justice in coping with hardship. However, we would be amiss
if we did not recognize that coping is affected by many factors and that the
sense of justice in the face of adversity both affects and is affected by these
other factors.
CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT COPING
Below, I list and discuss a variety of conditions that affect coping with
economic loss. These are (1) the individual’s and the group’s situation prior
to adversity, (2) the salience of economic value in the individual’s and the
group’s eyes, (3) the nature of the crunch, (4) the causal attribution of the
crunch, (5) the distribution of the loss, (6) the constructiveness versus the
destructiveness of the inevitable conflicts, (7) the ability to be creative, (8)
the potential for mobilization, and (9) participation in decision making. My
discussion is, for the most part, speculative rather than based upon well-
established research findings.
The Individuals and Group's Situation Prior to the Adversity
Here I refer to the prior economic condition as well as to the preexisting

psychological and social state. The economic conditions include factors such as
one’s level of economic expectations, one’s existing economic reserves for
coping with adversity, and one’s prior experiences and skills in dealing with
hardship. Uninterrupted prior affluence may be a poor basis for coping with
adversity. It leads to a high level of economic expectations and, thus, a sense of
severe deprivation when difficulty is experienced; it does not promote the
development of the skills for coping with adversity; and it might lead to an
optimism regarding future affluence that does not encourage the accumulation
of reserves for hard times. Prior poverty might, on the other hand, be good
training for dealing with current hardship except if the new adversity were to
push one below the level necessary for physical, psychological, or organiza-
tional survival, or if the prior poverty had left one so debilitated that one had
no capacity to deal with further stress. The best basis for coping might well be
a moderate degree of prior affluence, providing that this were associated with
prudent expectations developed under the influence of past experiences of
adversity, as well as comfort, and providing it were combined with unused
resources that could be mobilized to deal with the current hardship.
As noted above, one’s vulnerability to an economic crunch is determined
252 APPLICATIONS
not only by one’s prior economic condition but also by one’s preexisting
psychological and social state. In general, it could be expected that the worse
off an individual is in problem-solving skills and other personal resources,
then the lower will be his self-esteem and, hence, the less able he would be to
cope with new adversity. Similarly, the more poorly a group, institution, or
society normally functions, the less skills and resources it has developed for
promoting cooperative relations, and the more rigidly it is organized, the less
capacity it would have to cope with additional hardship.
The Salience of Economic Value in the Individual’s and the Group’s Eyes
Material affluence and comfort is often intimately linked to an individual’s

self-esteem or to a group’s functioning. A person might define his psychologi-
cal worth in terms of his economic worth, in terms of his possessions and
material standard of living. Similarly, a group or society might hold economic
production as a highly central value and might place primary stress upon the
production and distribution of consumer goods in its mode of functioning. If
individuals or groups define themselves in terms of economic values, then
they have increased vulnerability to economic adversity. It seems likely that
much of the difficulty in coping with an economic crunch in the relatively
affluent Western world would come from the social and psychological mean-
ings of economic loss rather than from the associated physical hardships.
The Nature of the Economic Crunch
Clearly, the ability to cope with a situation is, in part, a function of its
nature. An economic crunch has such characteristics as magnitude, onset,
expected duration, types of hardship, predictability, and perceived cause. An
economic loss of minor magnitude that has a gradual onset and short dura-
tion, that was expected and perceived to be of natural causes, and that
creates tolerable hardships will cause little upset. On the other hand, the
nature of the economic crunch might be such as to induce a large discrepancy
between what a person obtains and what he feels entitled to in the way of
economic well-being; or in other words, he may have a strong sense of
relative deprivation. This is apt to occur when the individual has been led to
expect a high or increasing standard of living, and he experiences instead a
sudden, unpredicted, sharp decrease that he believes is not likely to be of
short duration. Such circumstances are very apt to arouse an intense feeling
.Jofinjustice.
The Causal Attribution of the Crunch
There are many factors that might influence whether an economic crunch is
perceived to be justifiable. Perhaps the most important is the social distribu-
tion of the economic loss, which will be discussed below. Another key factor
is the causal attribution or the subjective explanation that is made for the
occurrence of the crunch. The explanation might give rise to the view that
someone or some group was responsible for it and could be blamed for the
resulting hardships, or it might support the contrary belief that it is no one’s
fault—the crunch resulted from a natural disaster or an unavoidable, uncon-
trollable concurrence of mishaps. The latter view is much less likely to sup-
port a sense of injustice about the hardships one is experiencing than the
former view.
It is evident that whom one blames could affect how and how well one
copes with the crunch. If the blame were “intropunitive” so that it is directed
against oneself or one’s group, internal turmoil and immobilization could
result. If it is “extrapunitive” so that the hardship is externalized, problems
that are internal to an individual or to a group can be projected on to an
external adversary or a disliked out-group (especially if these are judged to be
weaker than oneself or one’s group). In this case, increased internal cohesion
and mobilization of resources may result, and the individual or group might
function better than otherwise.
The Distribution of the Loss
Crucial to whether one views one’s adversity as being fair or unfair is how
one evaluates the social distribution of the hardships resulting from the eco-
nomic crunch. In discussions of distributive justice, a number of the values
underlying it have been repeatedly identified (see chapters 1 and 3).
Under conditions of an economic crunch, how should the adversity be
distributed? What distribution would be most likely to foster effective social
cooperation to promote individual well-beipg? Rescher has suggested that in
an economy of scarcity, the just rule is “The number of individuals whose
share of utility falls below the ‘minimal’ level is to be made as small as
possible” (1966, p. 97). Acceptance of a minimal rule implies the basic equal-
ity of human life: all people are entitled to at least the minimal conditions
necessary for a humane life in a given society. How can the minimum be
defined in a way that achieves social consensus? Rawls (1971) has suggested
an interesting procedure that seems adaptable to the decision of how to
define minimality: principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
If decisions about the minimal share were made behind a veil of ignorance,
each responsible individual in that society would be asked to define the
minimal level that he would require for a humane life, and in making his
definition, he would also be asserting that this would be the minimum for all
others in that society. In making his definition, he would not know whether
he would be sacrificed if there were not enough for everyone to have the
minimum; he would know only that each person had the same chance to be
sacrificed.
It seems unlikely that the amount available for distribution will be pre-
cisely the amount necessary to meet the requirements of a minimal distribu-
tion; it will either be too little or too much. If it is too little, it seems likely
that Rescher’s rule (“the number of individuals whose share of utility falls
254 APPLICATIONS
below the minimal level is to be made as small as possible”) will be invoked

rather than dividing the total equally so that all individuals are below the
minimum. An exception might occur if an equal division would paradoxically
make the lower minimum more humane. This might be the case if the lower
minimum does not lead to physical debilitation or death, but, if equally
shared, leads to a higher sense of trust and cooperativeness among members
of the community. If the lower minimum were physically debilitating and
Rescher’s rule were applied, then some procedure for selecting those who
would not receive the minimum—that is, those who would be “sacrificed”—
must be developed. Two procedures that maintain the equal value of human
life have been described for such circumstances: a lottery in which everyone
has an equal risk of being sacrificed and a self-sacrificing, or volunteer,
system. In both systems, those who are sacrificed would be honored for their
sacrifice.
However, it seems likely that randomization of sacrifice and volunteering
of self-sacrifice would not be adequate, by themselves, to ensure the survival
and perpetuation of the group in a catastrophic crunch: a crunch that would
permit only a small percentage to survive. To achieve these ends in such a
crunch, it would be necessary to make certain that those selected to receive
the minimum include group members who are most willing and able to
produce the goods and services required for the survival of the group and
also members who are most willing and able to bear and rear children so as
to ensure the group’s perpetuation. The introduction of high-priority catego-
ries of group members does, of course, impair the equality principle and
could lead to intragroup strife about the selection of members to compose the
prospective favored categories. The equality principle would be least im-
paired if either of two conditions prevail: if all or many members of the
group have the characteristics that would place them in high-priority catego-
ries or if only a very small percentage fall into such categories. In any case, if
people were classified into various categories, the number required from each
category could be selected by a lottery designed to equalize chances within
categories and also to take into account the differential priorities of the
various categories.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that, where there is not
enough for all to be above the minimal level, scarcity should lead to the
application of the equality value as the basis for distributive justice, and this
value would be modified to give priority to those who can contribute most to
the group’s survival and perpetuation when the scarcity is catastrophic. Sup-
pose, however, there is more than enough to provide everyone with a humane
minimum but not enough to give everyone what they have been used to—
how in that case is the extra to be distributed? One principle might be to
distribute the extras so that everyone’s income before the crunch is reduced
by equal numbers of “j.n.d.’s” (“just noticeable differences”). Thus, if person
A had a yearly income of $1 million, he might just notice a drop in his
standard of living if his income were reduced by $500,000; if person B
earned $500,000, he might just notice a loss of $25,000; if person C’s income
was $10,000, he might just notice a drop of $500. In a moderately severe

economic crunch, where each individual would have to lose many “j.n.d.’s”
of income, I believe it can be shown that there would be a convergence of
incomes of people at initially quite different levels of affluence. Thus, for all
but relatively minor or catastrophic economic crunches, it seems that equality
should be the dominating value for distributive systems.
Yet it is evident that equality will result in an inequality of absolute
economic loss; the previously affluent will lose more than those who were
previously poor. As a consequence, they are more apt to experience the
change to a system of equality as unjust and to resist it. Is there any way that
they can be psychologically compensated for their larger economic losses
without undermining the value of equality? I am not sure that there is a
positive answer to this question. One can think of ways of easing the pain of
the transition, by substituting honors, social appreciation, and such for in-
come and wealth. But the fundamental problem for the formerly rich and the
formerly poor alike in adjusting to a distributive system based upon equality
is to disengage their conceptions of themselves from a system of unequal
distribution based upon notions of relative individual worth. If they could
take esteem for themselves and enjoy the human warmth of being part of a
mutually respecting, friendly community of equals, their loss of relative posi-
tion in a mutually suspicious, cold community of competitive unequals might
not be a source of regret.
The Constructiveness versus the Destructiveness of the Conflict
In the economic crunch, the number and magnitudes of conflict among mem-
bers of a society are bound to increase partly because of the increased scarcity
of many resources and partly because of the social and individual changes
required to adjust to the crunch. Changes will challenge vested interests,
habits, loyalties, and commitments.
Conflict can take a destructive or constructive course. Its course will be
very much influenced by whether it occurs in a cooperative or competitive
context, and the course a conflict takes will, in turn, influence whether the
conflicting parties develop cooperative or competitive relations with one
another. Destructive conflict has the characteristics of a competitive process
and tends to elicit competitive relations, whereas constructive conflict has the
characteristics of a cooperative process and tends to elicit cooperative rela-
tions. I have summarized the differences in these two processes in chapters 5
and 9. Here, I select from the early summary several points for emphasis.
A cooperative process leads to the defining of conflicting interests as a
mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort. It facilitates the recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of each other’s interests and of the necessity of search-
ing for a solution that is responsive to the needs of all. It tends to limit rather
than expand the scope of conflicting interests. In contrast, a competitive
process stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can only be one that
is imposed by one side on the other. The enhancement of one’s own power
256 APPLICATIONS
and the minimization of the legitimacy of the other side’s interests in the
situation become objectives. It fosters the expansion of the scope of the issues
in conflict, so that the conflict becomes a matter of general principle and is
no longer confined to a particular issue at a given time and place. The
escalation of the conflict increases its motivational significance to the partici-
pants and intensifies their emotional involvement in it; these factors, in turn,
may make a limited defeat less acceptable or more humiliating than mutual
disaster might be.
What factors influence whether a conflict will take a constructive-
cooperative or destructive-competitive course? What will enable a group to
react cooperatively rather than competitively in the face of economic adver-
sity? In chapters 5 and 9 and in Deutsch (1973), I have presented a detailed
answer to such questions. Here, I will restate the general principle, which
provides a basis for deriving the more specific answers. This principle, which
I have labeled Deutsch’s crude law of social relations is that the characteristic
processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship tend also
to elicit that type of social relationship. Thus, the strategy of power and the
tactics of coercion, threat, and deception result from and also result in a
competitive relationship. Similarly, the strategy of mutual problem solving
and the tactics of persuasion, openness, and mutual enhancement elicit and
also are elicited by a cooperative orientation.
Among the many implications that can be drawn from Deutsch’s crude
law are a few that are listed below:
1. Egalitarian and need-oriented systems of distributing the benefits and costs
of group membership are more apt to foster cooperation than a competi-
tive, meritocratic system.
2. The opportunity for direct, full, open, and honest communication among
group members and between group leaders and group members will en-
courage cooperation; infrequent communication, evasiveness, and lack of
open, direct communication will give rise to rumors that will stimulate
suspicious, paranoid thinking and competition.
3. Increasing the salience of common interests and of similarities in values
among group members will stimulate cooperation; emphasizing the diver-
gence of interests and values will elicit competition.
4. Encouraging more frequent, friendly, informal interactions among group
members will strengthen cooperativeness; restricting contacts to formal,
distant, impersonal relations is more apt to evoke competition.
5. Fostering member participation in group problem solving will aid coopera-
tion; restricting problem solving to a few members will encourage competition.
The issue of cooperation within a group is closely related to the issue of co-
operation among different generations. Heilbroner (1975) raises the horren-
dous possibility that humanity may remain indifferent to the dangers for future
generations, diminution of resources being one of them. The question is: on
what considerations should we make sacrifices now to ease the lot of future gen-
erations? There is only one possible answer to this question: it lies in our capac-
ity to form a collective bond of identity with those future generations. Indeed, it
is the absence of such a bond with future generations that casts doubt on the
ability of contemporary society to take measures now needed to mitigate the
problems of the future. In contemporary society where economic productivity is
a primary goal, individuals have but a limited motivation to form such bonds. In
a society where competitive rather than cooperative relations are predominant,
the conception of one’s community is narrow and thus the scope of one’s respon-
sibility for future generations is narrow. It is probable that in a more cooperative
society that is concerned more with the general welfare and indulges less in self-
ish calculations, such an identificatory sense could be strengthened.
The Ability to Be Creative
Effective cooperation and the ability to confront conflict constructively are

important ingredients of creative solutions to problems. It is evident that an
economic crunch will face individuals, groups, institutions, and societies with
the necessity of creatively developing new ways of relating to their changed
realities. The creative process can be described as consisting of several overlap-
ping phases: (1) an initial period that leads to the experiencing and recognition
of a problem that is sufficiently arousing to motivate efforts to solve it, (2) a
period of concentrated effort to solve the problem through routine, readily
available, or habitual actions, (3) an experience of frustration, tension, and
discomfort that follows the failure of customary processes to solve the problem
and leads to a temporary withdrawal from it, (4) the perception of the problem
from a different perspective and its reformulation in a way that permits new
orientations to a solution to emerge, (5) the appearance of a tentative solution
in a moment of insight, often accompanied by a sense of exhilaration, (6) the
elaboration of the solution and the testing of it against reality, and finally, (7)
the communication of the solution to relevant audiences.
There are three key psychological elements in this process: (a) the arousal
of an appropriate level of motivation to solve the problem, (b) the develop-
ment of the conditions that permit the reformulation of the problem once an
impasse has been reached, and (c) the concurrent availability of diverse ideas
that can be flexibly combined into novel and varied patterns. Each of these
key elements is subject to influence from social conditions and the personali-
ties of the problem solvers.
Thus, consider the arousal of an optimal level of motivation, a level
sufficient to sustain problem-solving efforts despite frustrations and im-
passes and yet not so intense that it overwhelms or prevents distancing from
the problem. Optimal motivation presupposes an alert readiness to be dis-
satisfied with things as they are and a freedom to confront one’s environ-
ment without excessive fear combined with a confidence in one’s capacities
to persist in the face of obstacles. The intensity of motivation that is opti-
mal will vary with the effectiveness with which it can be controlled; the
more effective the controls, the more intense the motivation can be without
having disruptive consequences.
258 APPLICATIONS
Although acute dissatisfaction with things as they are and the motivation
to recognize and work at problems are necessary for creative solutions, these
things are not sufficient. The circumstances conducive to the creative break-
through of impasses are varied, but they have in common that they provide the
individual with an environment in which he does not feel threatened and in
which he does not feel under pressure. He is relaxed but alert. Threat induces
defensiveness and reduces both the tolerance of ambiguity and the openness to
the new and unfamiliar; excessive tension leads to a primitivization and a
stereotyping of thought processes. As Rokeach (1960) has pointed out, threat
and excessive tension lead to the closed rather than the open mind. To enter-
tain novel ideas that may at first seem wild and implausible, to question initial
assumptions of the framework within which the problem or conflict occurs,
the individual needs the freedom or courage to express himself without fear of
censure. In addition, he needs to become sufficiently detached from his original
viewpoints to be able to see the conflict from new perspectives.
Although an unpressured and unthreatening environment facilitates the
restructuring of a problem or conflict and, by so doing, makes it more amen-
able to solution, the ability to reformulate a problem and develop solutions
is, in turn, dependent upon the availability of cognitive resources. Ideas are
important to the creative resolution of conflict, and any factors that broaden
the range of ideas and alternatives available to the participants in a conflict
will be useful. Intelligence, the exposure to diverse experiences, an interest in
ideas, a preference for the novel and complex, a receptivity to metaphors and
analogies, the capacity to make remote associations, an independence of
judgment, and the ability to play with ideas are some of the personal factors
that characterize creative problem solvers. The availability of ideas is also
dependent upon such social conditions as the opportunity to communicate
with and be exposed to other people who may have relevant and unfamiliar
ideas (experts, impartial outsiders, people facing similar or analogous situa-
tions), a social atmosphere that values innovation and originality and encour-
ages the exchange of ideas, a social tradition that fosters the optimistic view
that, with effort and time,'* constructive solutions can be discovered or in-
vented for problems that initially seem intractable.
It can be shown that a cooperative process produces many of the charac-
teristics that are conducive to creative problem solving—openness, lack of
defensiveness, and full utilization of available resources. However, in itself,
cooperation does not ensure that problem-solving efforts will be successful.
Such other factors as the imaginativeness, experience, and flexibility of the
parties involved are also determinative.
The Potential for Mobilization
Individuals, groups, institutions, and societies rarely function at their capac-

ity. They have resources and assets that are used inefficiently or not at all.
Mobilization (see Etzioni, 1968) is the process by which individuals or social
units increase the amount of effective resources or assets that they have
available to bring to bear upon the problems confronting them. Mobilization

can increase the availability of any of a variety of types of resources: (1)
motivational resources, such as energy, drive, commitment, dedication, and
determination; (2) cognitive resources, such as attentiveness, consciousness,
information, memory, intellectual, and other more specific skills; (3) eco-
nomic resources, such as manpower, tools, land, and capital; (4) organiza-
tional resources, such as leadership, division of labor and specialization of
function, communication and coordination, and planning and evaluation;
and (5) social resources, such as cohesion, trust, loyalty, and solidarity.
As Etzioni has pointed out, “Major societal changes are propelled by
small changes in the absolute level of mobilization because they constitute
sharp increases in the relative level of energy available” (1968, p. 398).
Typically, the level of political mobilization is low in modern societies—for
example, only about a third of American adults know the name of their
congressperson and even fewer actively participate in political organizations.
Similarly, the level of economic mobilization is commonly low in modern
societies—for example, it has been established that energy consumption in
the United States could be reduced by more than one-third without a change
in the standard of living by a more efficient and less wasteful use of energy.
What determines whether an individual or group can mobilize itself to
deal with a continuing crisis such as an economic crunch? Being prepared to
mobilize, knowing where one’s unused resources are and knowing how and
when they can be used more effectively, and having practiced or rehearsed
mobilizing one’s resources will facilitate an effective mobilization when it is
required. Also, having confidence in one’s resources and in the possibility of
amplifying them significantly through a process of mobilization will increase
the likelihood of an effective mobilization.
Mobilization has costs in terms of discipline, self-denial, postponement of
pleasures, and the like. These costs are not likely to be borne if one has little
trust that others will cooperate and assume their responsibilities in the pro-
cess of mobilization. If one knows that many are cheating and obtaining
more rations than they are entitled to in a rationing program, it is difficult to
withstand the temptation to cheat when it becomes possible for one to do so.
Also, one will be less likely to conserve energy by driving at or below the 55
MPH speed limit if one sees others disregarding it. The felt inequality of
disciplining oneself and making sacrifices while others are perceived to be
taking advantage of the situation will undermine the cooperativeness neces-
sary to an effective group mobilization. In contrast, the sense that the duties
and obligations involved in the mobilization are being fairly shared enhances
one’s commitment to it.
Participating in Decision Making
It seems reasonably well established that people who participate in making

decisions that affect their lives are more likely to accept the decisions and to
feel that they are just than if they have had no part in the decision-making
260 APPLICATIONS
process. Thus, a participatory decision-making process in response to an

economic crunch is apt to foster a cooperative process in relation to the issues
involved. However, it is very difficult or impossible to have a meaningful
participatory, decision-making process as the size of the group expands be-
yond a certain point. This difficulty is enhanced in emergency situations that
require quick decisions. These problems often lead to more centralization in
decision making, as organizations and communities grow in size; more cen-
tralization, in turn, results in an increase in alienation and a decrease in the
sense of cooperativeness.
How can one handle this size-related dilemma for participatory decision
making and cooperation? No one really knows. As I have noted before,
however, there is widespread agreement that small is beautiful. But it is not
yet clear how in a large world, with world-scale problems, the small units can
be nested together into increasingly larger units so as to avoid the problems
associated with remote, centralized decision making. Nevertheless, there
seems to be an emerging consensus among utopian thinkers that as much
decision making as possible should be placed in the hands of small, coopera-
tive local units that are democratically controlled by the immediate members
of the local unit—the inhabitants of the local community or the people work-
ing in a given institution—and that cooperative, regional federations of local
units should coordinate activities of the local units to enable the economies of
large-scale purchasing, production, and distribution. Similarly, cooperative
national federations would coordinate the regional units. Ideally, the control
of resources and of decision making would remain in the small, local units
and would not move upwards. There are, unfortunately, many factors condu-
cive to the flow of power and decision making to centralized units. How to
inhibit this flow while maintaining effective coordination and cooperation
among smaller units is a problem that needs our most creative work. Social
injustice is fostered by the accumulation of power and the control of re-
sources in remote, central decision-making bodies, but it is also fostered by
the inequalities of local communities, by their out-group prejudices, and by
their ethnocentric neglect of larger, worldwide concerns.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have advanced the thesis that the ability of an individual or

group to cope with an economic crunch is heavily dependent upon the main-
tenance of self-esteem and group pride as well as upon the strengthening of
cooperative bonds. These are likely to be impaired if one thinks that the loss
one experiences during an economic adversity is not being justly shared or
distributed. In a situation of economic scarcity, it seems likely that the sense
of justice is most likely to be satisfied by a distributive system that seeks to
provide all or as many as possible with at least a minimal humane level of
goods. Such a distributive system is essentially a socially egalitarian system
leavened by particularistic responses of local units to individual needs and
situations. The advantage of such a distributive system during a period of

economic hardship is that it not only promotes the sense of justice but also
strengthens the ties of solidarity among the members of a community and
enables them to function cohesively and productively in difficult circum-
stances. The resulting experience of participating in a cohesive, productive
solidarity group enhances one’s feeling of personal and social well-being. This
may more than compensate for the economic losses one experiences during a
period of economic crunch.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
Preventing World War III:

A Psychological Perspective
I will start with a Jewish proverb and then will come to a Jewish story. First
the proverb: an insincere peace is better than a sincere war.
I believe that there is currently an insincere peace between the super-
powers. For good reasons, they do not trust each other, and they are justified
in doubting the other’s peaceful intentions. There may be a few morally
righteous extremists who would prefer the simplicity and clarity of a sincere
war to an insincere peace, but most of us are prepared to accept the ambig-
uity and complexity of an insincere peace. We are aware that a sincere war
involving the superpowers is likely to end up as a nuclear holocaust in which
the survivors might well envy the dead.^
It seems unlikely, however, that an insincere, hostile peace will long
endure. To put it bluntly, it seems to be driving the governments of the
superpowers “NUTS”; NUTS is an acronym (Nuclear Utilization Target
Selection) used by Keeny and Panofsky “to characterize the various doc-
trines that seek to use nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex
of nuclear war—fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the
management over an extended period of a general nuclear war between the
superpowers” (1981—82, p. 289). It is crazy for the United States and the
USSR each to be spending hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear wea-
pons systems with the illusion that it will be possible to “prevail” over the
other side in a nuclear war.
My Jewish story concerns a rabbi who was asked by a married couple to
help resolve a dispute. The rabbi, deciding to see each spouse separately, first
saw the wife and, after listening to her for some time, commented to her as
she was leaving: “You are right.” Then, he saw the husband, heard his side.
Adapted from “Preventing World War III: A Psychological Perspective,” Political Psychology
3, no. 1 (1983): 3-31.
1. Those who need to be convinced of the disastrous and horrifying consequences of nuclear
war should read Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth (1982).
262
Preventing World War III 263
and, as he was leaving, told him: “You are right.” The rabbi’s wife, who had
secretly been listening in the next room, confronted the rabbi and upbraided
him: “How could you tell them both that they are right when they disagree
so strongly?” The rabbi shrugged and said to his wife: “You are right, too.”
As the rabbi observed to the married couple, so it can be said of the
superpowers: each is correct in thinking that the other is hostile, provocative,
and dangerous to peace. The relations between them are pathological, and
such malignant relations characteristically enmesh the participants in a web
of interactions and defensive maneuvers that, instead of improving their sit-
uations, make both feel less secure, more vulnerable, and more burdened.
I believe it is important to recognize that the superpowers are involved in
a pernicious social process that, given the existence of nuclear weapons, is
too dangerous to allow to continue. Perfectly sane and intelligent people,
once caught up in such a process, may engage in actions that would seem to
them rational and necessary but would be identified by a detached observer
as contributing to the perpetuation and intensification of a vicious cycle.
You have seen this happen among married couples or in parent-adolescent
relationships: decent, intelligent, rational people trap themselves in a vicious
process that leads to outcomes—hostility, estrangement, violence—no one
wants.
Therefore, I also believe that this can happen with nations. Sane, decent,
intelligent people—leaders of the superpowers—have allowed their nations to
become involved in a pathological process that is relentlessly driving them to
actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of a nuclear
holocaust—an outcome no one wants. As I have indicated, in such a social
process both sides are right in believing the other is hostile, malevolent, and
intent on harm. The interactions and attitudes provide ample justification for
such a belief.
I call such a social process—which is increasingly dangerous and costly
and from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without
becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-
identities or self-esteems—a malignant one.
In what follows, I want to sketch general characteristics of such a process
to indicate how the superpowers seem enmeshed in one and to suggest some
ideas for getting out of it.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MALIGNANT SOCIAL PROCESS

A number of key elements contribute to the development and perpetuation of
a malignant process. They include (1) an anarchic social situation, (2) a
win-lose or competitive orientation, (3) inner conflicts (within each of the
parties) that express themselves through external conflict, (4) cognitive rigid-
ity, (5) misjudgments and misperceptions, (6) unwitting commitments, (7)
self-fulfilling prophecies, (8) vicious escalating spirals, and (9) a gamesman-
ship orientation that turns the conflict away from issues of what in real life is
being won or lost to an abstract conflict over images of power.
264 APPLICATIONS
Although this discussion centers on the superpowers, my description of

the malignant process can, I believe, be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict
and many other protracted, destructive conflicts.
The Anarchic Social Situation
There is a kind of situation that does not allow the possibility of rational
behavior so long as the conditions for social order or mutual trust do not
exist. I believe the current security dilemmas facing the superpowers partially
result from their being in such a situation.
A characteristic symptom of such nonrational situations is that an at-
tempt on the part of an individual or nation to increase its own welfare or
security without regard to the security or welfare of others is self-defeating.
Consider, for example, the United States’ decision to develop and test the
hydrogen bomb in the effort to maintain military superiority over the USSR
rather than to work for an agreement to ban testing of the H-bomb and,
thus, prevent a spiraling arms race involving this monstrous weapon (Bundy,
1982). This U.S. decision led the Soviet Union to attempt to catch up. Soon
both superpowers were stockpiling H-bombs in a nuclear arms race that still
continues in different forms.
U.S. leaders believed that if the Soviets had been the first to develop the
H-bomb, they would have tested it and sought to reap the advantages from
doing so. They were probably right. Both sides are aware of the temptations
for each to increase security “by getting ahead.” The fear of “falling behind”
as well as the temptation to “get ahead” lead to a pattern of interactions that
increases insecurity for both sides. Such situations, which are captured by the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game, have been extensively studied by myself (Deutsch,
1958, 1973) and other social scientists (see Alker and Hurwitz, 1981, for a
comprehensive discussion).
When confronted with such social dilemmas, the only way an individual
or nation can avoid being trapped in mutually reinforcing, self-defeating
cycles is to attempt to change the situation so a basis of social order or
mutual trust can be developed.
Comprehension of the nature of the situation we are in suggests that
mutual security rather than national security should be our objective. The
basic military axiom for both the East and the West should be that only those
military actions that increase the military security of both sides should be
taken; military actions that give military superiority to one side or the other
should be avoided. The military forces of both sides should be viewed as
having the common primary aim of preventing either side from starting a
deliberate or accidental war.
Awareness of this common aim could be implemented by regular meet-
ings of military leaders from East and West, the establishment of a continuing
joint technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament
and inspection plans, the establishment of mixed military units on each
other’s territory, and so on.
The key point we must recognize is that, if military inferiority is danger-

ous, so is military “superiority”; it is dangerous for either side to feel tempted
or frightened into military action. Neither the United States or the USSR
should want its weapons or those of the other side to be vulnerable to a first
strike. Similarly, neither side should want the other side to be in a situation
where its command, control, and communications systems have become so
ineffective that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be in the hands of
individual uncontrolled units.
Competitive Orientations
A malignant social process usually begins with a conflict that leads the parties
to perceive their differences as the kind that create a situation in which one
side will win and the other will lose. There will be a tendency, then, for
perpetuation and escalation of the conflict. These are some of the characteris-
tics of a competitive conflict process (see chapter 5):
1. Communication between the parties is unreliable and impoverished. Either

available communication channels and opportunities are not utilized or are
used to try to mislead or intimidate. Little confidence is placed in informa-
tion obtained directly from the other party; espionage and other circuitous
means of obtaining information are relied upon. The poor communication
enhances the possibility of error and misinformation of the sort likely to
reinforce preexisting orientations and expectations. Thus, the ability of one
party to notice and respond to shifts away from a win-lose orientation by
the other party becomes impaired.
2. The conflict stimulates the view that the solution can only be imposed by
one side or the other through superior force, deceptions, or cleverness. The
enhancement of one’s own and the minimization of the other’s power
become objectives. The attempt by each party to create or maintain a
power difference favorable to its own side tends to expand the scope of the
conflict from a focus on the immediate issue to a conflict over the power to
impose one’s preference upon the other.
3. The competitive conflict leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude that in-
creases sensitivity to differences and threats while minimizing awareness of
similarities. This, in turn, makes the usually accepted norms of conduct
and morality less applicable. It permits behavior that would be considered
outrageous if directed toward someone like oneself. Since neither side is
likely to grant moral superiority to the other, the conflict is likely to
escalate as one side or the other engages in behavior morally outrageous to
the other.
1 have written extensively (Deutsch, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1982) about the
diverse conditions leading people to define a situation with a mixture of
cooperative and competitive features as a win-lose or competitive situation
rather than as a cooperative one. Much of this can be summarized by what 1
have termed Deutsch’s crude law of social relation: the characteristic pro-
cesses and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to
266 APPLICATIONS
induce that type of social relation (if introduced into the social relation before
its character has been strongly determined).
In terms of competition, my crude hypothesis would indicate that compe-
tition induces and is induced by use of tactics of coercion, threat, or decep-
tion; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the
other; poor communication; minimization of awareness of similarities in val-
ues and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and hostile atti-
tudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of the issues in conflict; and so on.
In contrast, cooperation induces and is induced by perceived similarity in
beliefs and attitudes, readiness to be helpful, openness in communication,
trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and deempha-
sis of opposed interests, orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather
than power differences, and so on.
What is the nature of the conflict between the superpowers? Is it in-
herently a cutthroat, win-lose struggle? Public statements of the leaders of the
two nations define the conflict as a confrontation of mutually irreconcilable
ideologies, and it is apparent that basic ideological differences do exist. On
the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neither the United States nor
the USSR closely resembles its ideological ideal. Neither Karl Marx nor
Adam Smith would recognize his offspring.
Let us examine the central notions of each ideology. The key phrase of
the American ethos is “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The vision
is of the lone, self-reliant, enterprising individual who has escaped from the
restraints of an oppressive community so as to be free to pursue his destiny in
an environment that offers ever-expanding opportunity to those who are
fittest.
The starting point of the communist ethos is the view that the human
being is a social animal whose nature is determined by the way people are
related to one another in their productive activities in any given community.
The vision is of social beings free to cooperate with one another toward
common objectives because they jointly own the means of production and
share the rewards of their collective labor.
There is no need to detail here how far short of its ideal each system has
fallen nor to describe the many similarities in values and practices that char-
acterize these complex modern industrialized societies. One might even sug-
gest that many—but certainly not all—of the dissimilarities that strike the
casual observer are differences that are due to variations in affluence and
national character rather than to ideological distinctiveness.
In fact, neither ideology is more than an emphasis, a partial view of the
total picture. Each side looks at the elephant from a different vantage point
and, of course, describes it as two different beasts. However, this much can
be said about the beast (the relation of individual to society and between
individual liberty and social justice): it is a complex animal that has different
needs and characteristics at different stages of its development and in differ-
ent environments. It is a poorly understood beast, and only careful, objective
study from all vantage points will give us insight into its care and nurture.
But it is already evident that the beast needs both of its sides to function
effectively. It needs individuals who are free to make their personal views and
needs known, people who are neither conforming automatons nor slavish
followers, and it also needs a community that enables men to recognize their
interrelatedness and to cooperate with one another in producing the social
conditions that foster the development of creative, responsible people.
I suggest that neither the Marxist ideology nor the American ideology is
consistent enough or operational enough to be proved or disproved by em-
pirical test. Nor is either specific enough to be a guide to action in the
day-to-day decisions that shape the course of history.
I have stressed the fact that ideologies are vague. Vagueness permits di-
verse aspirations and changing practices to be accommodated under the same
ideological umbrella. There are two important implications to be drawn.
First, it is useless to try to refute an ideology. Moreover, since an ideology
often serves important integrative functions, the attempt to refute it is likely
to elicit defensiveness and hostility. Like old soldiers, ideologies never die;
they are best left to fade away. Second, the vagueness of ideologies permits
redefinitions of who is “friend” or “foe.” There is ample room in the myth
systems of both the United States and the Soviet Union (or China) to find a
basis of amicable relations.
The resurgence of the cold war has intensified our perception of ideologi-
cal differences between East and West. Now, however, in light of internal
conflicts within both East and West (the Sino-Soviet break and the trade
disagreements among the nations in the Western Alliance are only the more
obvious cases), we have an opportunity to revise our images of the nature of
the so-called struggle between communism and freedom. We have more basis
for recognizing that the ideological dispute is only the manifest rationaliza-
tion of other less noble motives on both sides.
As Freud pointed out, the manifest life of the mind—what men know or
pretend to know and say about the motives for their behavior—is often
merely a socially acceptable rationalization of their unrecognized or latent
motives. I suggest that the intensity of the ideological struggle has primarily
reflected an anachronistic power struggle between two continental super-
powers that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leader-
ship. The emergence of a power struggle between the United States and
Russia was predicted by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 and by many others
long before Russia adopted a communist ideology. It is much easier for Soviet
leaders to rationalize an attempt to control and repress the popularly sup-
ported Solidarity movement in Poland by thinking of it and calling it a tool of
American imperialism than to admit a crude attempt to maintain Soviet
domination. Similarly, it is much easier for the United States to rationalize its
support for corrupt dictatorial governments in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia m terms of a defense against communism rather than to consider it an
attempt to maintain our world power.
As Milburn et al. (1982, p. 19) point out, there are curious mirror-image
aspects in the views of leading Soviet and American analysts. Pipes (1976)
268 APPLICATIONS
and Conquest (1979) on the American side have positions analogous to those
of Suslov and Romanov on the Soviet side:
AH believe that the leadership of their major adversary is monolithic and that
there are essentially no differences among members of the ruling class of their
opponents. . . . Those on the ideological right in both countries argue for the
obstinate, stubborn, immutability of their imperialistic opposite number: you
just cannot deal with these people; you cannot influence them or produce
change in the way they think and act. Negotiation with them is likely to prove
a waste of time and, besides, they cannot be trusted. (Milburn et al (1982,
p. 19)
As I have suggested earlier, both superpowers are correct in thinking that
the other side is attempting to increase its relative power, and it is natural
that those on each side most caught up in the competitive power struggle
come to have views that are mirror images of one another. This is the inevit-
able result of a competitive power struggle.
Traditionally, the quest for world power has been closely bound to striv-
ings for national security, economic dominance, and international prestige or
influence. The quest has commonly taken the form of an attempt to establish
military supremacy over major competitors. It is increasingly recognized that
the drive for military dominance in the age of missiles and hydrogen bombs is
dangerously anachronistic. So too, crude economic imperialism—Western or
Eastern style—no longer provides as much opportunity for economic gain as
does a concentration upon scientific research and development. However, the
quest for international power and influence is a reasonable one for all soci-
eties. In a later section, I shall discuss the development of fair rules for
competition for power and influence.
Inner Conflicts
Although competition is a necessary condition for malignant conflict, it is not

a sufficient one. Malignant conflict persists because internal needs require the
competitive process between the conflicting parties.
There are many kinds of internal needs for which a hostile external rela-
tionship can be an outlet.
• It may provide an acceptable excuse for internal problems; the problems can
be held out as caused by the adversary or by the need to defend against the
adversary.
• It may provide a distraction so internal problems appear less salient.
• It can provide an opportunity to express pent-up hostility arising from inter-
nal conflict through combat with the external adversary.
• It may enable one to project disapproved aspects of oneself (which are not
consciously recognized) onto the adversary and to attack them through
attack on the adversary.
• It may permit important parts of one’s self—including attitude, skills, and
defenses developed during conflictual relations in one’s formative stages—to
be expressed and valued because the relations with the present adversary
resemble earlier conflictual relations; and so on.
When an external conflict serves internal needs, it may be difficult to give

it up until other means of satisfying these needs are developed. There is little
doubt that the conflict between the superpowers has served important inter-
nal functions for the ruling establishments in the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet establishment has been able to justify the continuation of its
autocratic form of government, the Russian domination of the other nation-
alities in the Soviet Union, the control of the nations of Eastern Europe, and
the subordination of Communist parties in other countries—all in terms of its
struggle against “the dark forces of imperialism.”
The U.S. establishment has been able to justify intervention in other coun-
tries (under the guise of support for anticommunism) to promote the interests
of American business, support the continuation and growth of the military-
industrial complex, rationalize governmental secrecy so that many important
decisions are made without the possibility of informed public discussion of
the issues, and inhibit the development of significant and sustained political
opposition to the policies of the national security establishment.
It seems clear that an external enemy, or “devil,” has served many useful
functions for those in power in both the Soviet Union and the United States.
However, there is growing recognition by important elements within each
superpower that the increasing dangers and costs of the arms race may begin
to dwarf the gains from having a superpower as an external devil.
Cognitive Rigidity
Malignant conflict is fostered by cognitive rigidity, which leads to becoming

set in positions because of inability to envisage alternatives. An oversimplified
black-and-white view of issues in a dispute contributes to the rigidity. So does
the high level of tension that may be generated by an intense conflict. The
excessive tension leads to a constriction of thought, impairing capability for
conceiving of new alternatives and options. To the extent that parties in a
conflict rigidly set themselves in their initial positions, they are unable to
explore the range of potentially available solutions, among which might be
one that satisfies the interests of both sides. In contrast, cognitive openness
and flexibility facilitate a creative search for alternatives that may be mutu-
ally satisfying, with the initial opposed positions evaporating as new concor-
dant options emerge.
Although the views of knowledgeable American scholars on the Soviet
Union may be sophisticated and the same may also be true for Soviet scholars
who specialize in American studies, there is little reason to think that this true
of the policymakers of the superpowers. They appear to have developed con-
ceptions of the other power that reflect ideological indoctrinations they were
exposed to in their earlier years. They have not traveled to the other super-
270 APPLICATIONS
power nor have they had informal contacts with counterparts in the other
nation. In short, they have had little opportunity to learn that the other does
not neatly fit the rigid stereotypes developed in their younger years. This is an
important defect in the experience of the leaders of the superpowers and
should be remedied through systematic attempts to cultivate such experiences.
Misjudgments and Misperceptions
Impoverished communication, hostile attitudes, and oversensitivity to differ-

ences—typical effects of competition—lead to distorted views that may in-
tensify and perpetuate conflict; other distortions commonly occur in the
course of interaction. Elsewhere (Deutsch, 1962b, 1965), I have described
some of the common sources of misperception in interactional situations.
Many of these misperceptions function to transform a conflict into a com-
petitive struggle—even if the conflict did not emerge from a competitive
relationship.
Let me illustrate with the implications of a simple psychological principle.
The perception of any act is determined by both the perception of the act
itself and the context within which it occurs. The context of a social act often
is not obvious, whereupon we tend to assume a familiar context—one that
seems likely in terms of our own past experience. Since both the present
situation and the past experience of actor and perceiver may be rather differ-
ent, it is not surprising that the two will interpret the same act quite differ-
ently. Misunderstandings of this sort are very likely, of course, when actor
and perceiver come from different cultural backgrounds and are not fully
informed about these differences. A period of rapid social change also makes
such misunderstandings widespread as the gap between past and present
widens.
Given the fact that the ability to place oneself in another’s shoes is notori-
ously underemployed by and underdeveloped in most people, and also given
the impairment of this ability by stress and inadequate information, it is to be
expected that certain typical biases will emerge in the perceptions of actions
during conflict.
Thus, since most people are more strongly motivated to hold a positive
view of themselves than to hold such a view of others, a bias toward perceiv-
ing one’s own behavior as being the more benevolent and legitimate is not
surprising. This is a simple restatement of a well-demonstrated psychological
truth, namely, that the evaluation of an act is affected by the evaluation of its
source—and the source is part of the context of behavior. Research has
shown, for example, that American students are likely to rate more favorably
an action of the United States directed toward the Soviet Union than the same
action directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States. We are likely to
view American espionage activities in the Soviet Union as more benevolent
than similar activities by Soviet agents in the United States.
If each side in a conflict tends to perceive its own motives and behavior as
the more benevolent and legitimate, it is evident that the conflict will inten-
sify. If A perceives its actions as a benevolent, legitimate way of interfering

with actions that B has no right to engage in, A will be surprised by the
intensity of B’s hostile response and will have to escalate its counteraction to
negate B’s response. But how else is B likely to act if it perceives its own
actions as well motivated? And how unlikely is it not to respond to A’s
escalation with counterescalation if it is capable of doing so?
To the extent that there is a biased perception of benevolence and legiti-
macy, one could also expect that there will be a parallel bias in what is
considered to be an equitable agreement for resolving conflict. Should not
differential legitimacy be differentially rewarded? The biased perception of
what is a fair compromise makes agreement more difficult and thus extends
conflict.
Another consequence of the biased perception of benevolence and legiti-
macy is reflected in the asymmetries between trust and suspicion and between
cooperation and competition. Trust, when violated, is more likely to turn
into suspicion than negated suspicion is to turn into trust. Similarly, it is
easier to move from cooperation to competition than in the other direction.
There are, of course, other types of processes leading to misperceptions and
misjudgments (see Jervis, 1976, for an excellent discussion). In addition to
distortions arising from pressures for self-consistency and dissonance reduc-
tion (which are discussed below), intensification of conflict may induce stress
and tension beyond a moderate optimal level, and this overactivation, in turn,
may lead to an impairment of perceptual and cognitive processes in several
ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alternatives; it may reduce the time
perspective in such a way as to cause a focus on the immediate rather than the
overall consequences of the perceived alternatives; it may polarize thought so
that precepts will tend to take on a simplistic black-or-white, for-or-against,
good-or-evil cast; it may lead to stereotyped response; it may increase the
susceptibility to fear- or hope-inciting rumors; it may increase defensiveness; it
may increase the pressures for social conformity.
In effect, excessive tension reduces the intellectual resources available for
discovering new ways of coping with a problem or new ideas for resolving a
conflict. Intensification of conflict is the likely result, as simplistic thinking
and polarization of thought push the participants to view their alternatives as
being limited to victory or defeat.
There are three basic ways to reduce the misjudgments and mispercep-
tions that typically occur during the course of conflict. They are not mutually
exclusive, and if possible all should be used.
One method entails making explicit the assumptions and evidence that
underlie one’s perceptions and judgments. Then one would examine how
likely these were to have been influenced by any of the common sources of
misperception and misjudgment and how reliable and valid they would be
considered by an objective outsider—as in a court of law, for example.
A second method entails bringing in outsiders to see whether their judg-
ments and perceptions of the situation are in agreement or disagreement with
one’s own. They may have different vantage points, different sources of
272 APPLICATIONS
information, and more objectivity, which would enable them to recognize

errors of judgment and misperceptions developing from enmeshment in the
conflict. The outsiders should have the independence to ensure that they are
free to form their own views and the stature to be able to communicate them
so that they will be heard.
When the nature of the conflict is such that the employment of objective
outsiders is not feasible, the use of internal deviPs advocates has been recom-
mended (George, 1972; Janis, 1972) as a way of challenging the assumptions
and evidence underlying one’s perceptions and judgments. Here, too, it is
important that the deviPs advocates be sufficiently independent and presti-
gious to present hard challenges to conventional views in a way that cannot
be ignored.
Finally, there are agreements that can be made with one’s adversary to
reduce the chances of malignant misjudgment and misperceptions during
conflict. Such agreements could promote continuing informal contacts among
international affairs and military specialists on both sides. They could pro-
vide for regular feedback of each side’s interpretations of the other’s commu-
nications. They could enable each side to present its viewpoints on television
and in the mass media of the other side on a regular basis. They could
provide for role-reversal enactments, where each side is required to state the
position of the other side to the other side’s complete satisfaction before
either side advocates its own position (Rapoport, 1960).
None of the foregoing procedures would be certain to eliminate all mis-
perceptions and misjudgments during conflict. Yet, in combination, they
might substantially reduce them and, in consequence, decrease the risks that
conflict would escalate because of poor communication and misunderstand-
ings. As the superpowers increasingly place themselves in the position where
their leaders and strategic advisers may feel they must launch their nuclear-
tipped missiles within minutes after being informed that the other side has
initiated nuclear attack, the importance of not misinterpreting the other’s
behaviors and intentions is increasingly urgent.
Unwitting Commitments
In a malignant social process, the parties not only become overcommitted to

rigid positions, but also become committed, unwittingly, to the beliefs, de-
fenses, and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities.
The conflict, then, is maintained and perpetuated by the commitments and
investments given rise to by the malignant conflict process itself.
Consider, for example, the belief by leaders of the American government
that the Soviet Union would destroy us militarily if it could. This leads to
actions, such as intensifying military buildup, which, in turn, produce an
increased psychological commitment to the belief. For example, with a deci-
sion to build the MX missile, doubts about the beliefs that support the
decision will be reduced in a psychological process of dissonance reduction.
Within limits, the more costly the actions you take based on your beliefs, the
greater the need to reduce any prior-to-action doubts that you may have had
about your beliefs (Festinger, 1957). Jervis has an excellent, detailed discus-
sion with many illustrations from international conflict of how the need to
reduce cognitive dissonance will “introduce an unintended and unfortunate
continuity in policy” (1976, p. 405).
One of the characteristics of a pathological defense mechanism is that it is
perpetuated by its failures rather than by its successes in protecting security.
An individual might, for example, attempt to defend himself from feeling like
a failure by not really trying, attributing failure to lack of effort rather than
lack of ability. The result is that the person does not succeed and does not
quell anxieties and doubts about the ability to succeed. As a consequence,
when again faced with a situation of being anxious about failing, the individ-
ual will resort to the same defense of not trying; it provides temporary relief
of anxiety even as it perpetuates the need for the defense, since the individual
has cut himself off from the possibility of success.
So too, the defenses that emerge during the course of conflict can perpetu-
ate themselves and the conflict. Thus, suppose the Soviet Union, because it is
suspicious of the United States and its intentions toward the Soviet bloc,
defends itself by limiting the amount of dissidence that can be expressed in
Poland and other Eastern European nations. The repression of dissidence
does not permit grievances to be expressed and makes it less likely that the
necessary socioeconomic changes to reduce discontent will occur. As a conse-
quence, discontent and dissidence may grow, and there will be a need for the
continued use of the defense of repression.
Parties to a conflict, frequently, get committed to perpetuating the conflict
by the investments they have made in conducting the conflict. Thus, for
example, in explaining his opposition to an American proposal shortly before
Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Tojo said that the demand that Japan withdraw
its troops from China was unacceptable (as quoted in Jervis, 1976, p. 398):
We sent a large force of one million men (to China) and it has cost us well
over 100,000 dead and wounded, (the grief of) their bereaved families, hard-
ships for four years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of
yen. We must by all means get satisfactory results from this.
Similarly, there is considerable evidence to suggest that those who have

acquired power, profit, prestige, jobs, knowledge, or skills during the course
of conflict may feel threatened by the diminution or ending of conflict. Both
the Soviet and the U.S. military-industrial complexes have developed vested
interests in the cold war; it justifies large military budgets, gives them posi-
tions of power and prestige, and makes their skills and knowledge useful.
They have good reason to be apprehensive about an “outbreak of peace” that
would make them obsolete, deprive them of power and status, and make
them lose financially. Under such conditions, it is quite natural to accentuate
those perspectives and aspects of reality that justify the continuation of an
arms race.
These understandable fears have to be dealt with constructively, or else
274 APPLICATIONS
they may produce defensive adherence to the views that justify a war. I
suggest that we must carefully plan to anticipate the psychological difficulties
in the transition to a peaceful world; otherwise the resistance to such a
transition may be overwhelming.
As a basic strategy to overcome some of these difficulties, I would recom-
mend that we consider a policy of overcompensating those who otherwise
might be adversely affected by the change. We' want to alter the nature of
their psychological investment from one in military pursuits to one in peace-
ful pursuits.
Self-fulfilling Prophecies
Merton, in his classic paper “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy” (1957), has

pointed out that distortions are often perpetuated because they may evoke
new behavior that makes the originally false conception come true. The
specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error.
The prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right
from the very beginning.
The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy help to explain individual
pathology—for example, the anxious student who, afraid he might fail,
worries so much that he cannot study, with the consequence that he does fail.
It also contributes to our understanding of social pathology—for example,
how prejudice and discrimination against blacks keep them in position that
seems to justify the prejudice and discrimination.
So, too, in international relations. If the policymakers of East and West
believe that war is likely and either side attempts to increase its military
security vis-a-vis the other, the other side’s response will justify the initial
move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of “folie a
deux,” wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another.
As a result, both sides are right to think that the other is provocative, danger-
ous, and malevolent. Each side, however, is blind to how its own policies and
behavior have contributed to the development of the other’s hostility. If each
superpower could recognize its own part in maintaining the malignant rela-
tions, it could lead to a reduction of mutual recrimination and an increase in
mutual problem solving.
Vicious Escalating Spirals
In recent years, a number of social psychologists have concerned themselves

with understanding the conditions under which people become entrapped in
a self-perpetuating cycle of escalating commitment (Teger, 1980; Rubin,
1981; Levi, 1981).
Decision makers sometimes face the problem of deciding whether to per-
sist in a failing, costly course of action; they must choose between, on the one
hand, changing their course of action so as to cut their losses and, on the
other hand, continuing to invest in the hope of reaching their goal.
Ariel Levi (1981) has developed a model of the factors affecting decision
making when such a dilemma has to be faced. The model implies that the
tendency to escalate commitments after failure should be greatest when the
decision maker (1) evaluates his losses thus far as very negative, (2) considers
that further losses will not make his position much worse than the losses
already suffered, and (3) believes that the previous failures do not reduce the
chances of success of an increased commitment of resources.
From Levi’s model, it can be predicted that decision makers who see
themselves as highly accountable to others for their decisions are likely to be
cautious before losses have occurred but increasingly ready to take risks as
losses increase. Also, since gains or losses are evaluated from a reference
point, the greater the losses are perceived to be from this reference point, the
greater will be the decision maker’s tendency to escalate his commitment. In
addition, if the decision maker attributes the previous losses to changeable
factors, escalation of commitments is likely.
Levi’s model is based, in part, upon Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory, which seeks to explain why decision makers systematically
violate the basic tenets of rational, economic decision making. One of their
basic assumptions is that people undervalue outcomes that are merely prob-
able in comparison with outcomes that are obtainable with certainty. This
certainty effect means that a gambler facing the prospect of a sure loss of a
smaller amount if he stops now and an uncertain loss of a larger amount if he
continues to gamble is apt to choose to take the risk of increasing his losses.
The superpowers appear to be trapped in an escalating commitment to an
arms race that is rapidly increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war. As
Arthur M. Cox has pointed out:
Most of the new nuclear weapons will have a capability for a first strike
because they can reach their targets with such speed, accuracy and power.
When they are deployed, both sides will be on hair-trigger alert, especially at
times of political crisis. These weapons will be able to destroy nuclear com-
mand, control and communications systems, both human and mechanical.
Those systems are vulnerable and subject to error. The United States in 1979
and 1980 had three nuclear-war alerts caused by false alarms from computer
error.
Fortunately, for this planet, we could survive such false alarms because
there was time to ascertain the error before a command to launch was given.
In the future there will not be time.
In June, 1980, Fred C. Ikle, the present Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, wrote an article in the Washington Post entitled “The Growing Risk
of War by Accident.” He said: “The more we rely on launch on warning (or,
for that matter, the more the Soviets do) the greater the risk of accidental
nuclear war. . . . The crux of the matter is that the more important it becomes
to launch on warning, the more dangerous it will be. The tightening noose
around our neck is the requirement for speed. The more certain one wants to
be that our missile forces (or Soviet missile forces) could be launched within
minutes and under all circumstances, the more one has to practice the system
and to loosen the safeguards.” {New York Times, May 27, 1982)
276 APPLICATIONS
We are progressively tightening the noose around our necks out of the
increasing fears that each side is creating by its development of nuclear
weapons that have a first-strike capability. The notion that each side must
be prepared to “launch on warning” is the culmination of the escalating,
competitive “game of strategy” being played by the superpowers in which
each side has initiated moves to improve its strategic position without ade-
quate recognition of how the other would be forced to respond and without
positive concern for what would happen to the strategic position of the
other.
Gamesmanship
What is so psychologically seductive about nuclear weapons and hypothetical

nuclear war scenarios that strategists and decision makers in both super-
powers are drawn to them like moths to a flame? There are so many dimen-
sions of power—economic, political, cultural, scientific, sports, educational,
and so on—in which the struggle between the superpowers could be played
out. What is the special fascination to playing the international power game
with nuclear weapons?
I speculate that two key psychological features make the nuclear game a
supergame: it has a tremendous emotional kick for those with strong power
drives, and it is a very tidy, abstract game.
It has a tremendous emotional kick for several reasons: the stakes are
high (the fate of the earth is at risk), decisions have to be made quickly (there
is no time for indecisiveness), and the use of nuclear weapons is inherently an
aggressive action.
For those with strong power drives, being in a position of nuclear superi-
ority can be seen as a sure way to dominate and control others, whereas
being in a position of nuclear inferiority can be seen as a sure way to be
dominated and humiliated by others. In the eyes of those driven by power,
nuclear weapons are the purest and most concentrated form of power that
exists. As Barnet (1972) has pointed out, the national security managers and
our governing class are educated and selected in a way that ensures that
many will have strong power drives and a conception of human life that leads
them to believe that, unless one controls and dominates, one will be con-
trolled and dominated.
In order to be a competent participant in nuclear war games, one must be
steel-like and unflinching in resolve not to allow the other side to prevail no
matter how catastrophic the consequences. Maccoby (1976) has suggested
that the “gamesman” differs from the “jungle fighter.” The latter’s lust for
power is passionate and open, and the domination he seeks is personal and
concrete. In contrast, the gamesman’s power drive is more depersonalized.
His game of power is played coolly, analytically, and with emotional detach-
ment. As Maccoby says:
He is energized to compete not because he wants to build an empire, not for
riches, but rather for fame, glory, the exhilaration of running his team and of
gaining victories. His main goal is to be known as a winner, and his deepest
fear is to be labeled a loser, (p. 100)
Maccoby further describes gamesmen in these terms:

Imaginative gamesmen tend to create a new reality, less limiting than normal,
everyday reality. Like many adolescents, they seem to crave a more romantic,
fast-paced, semifantasy life, and this need puts them in danger of losing touch
with reality and of unconsciously lying. The most successful gamesmen keep
this need under control and are able to distinguish between the game and
reality, but even so, in boring meetings they sometimes imagine that they are
really somewhere else—at a briefing for an air-bombing mission, or in a
hideout where the detested manager who is speaking is really a Mafia chief-
tain whom the gamesman will someday rub out. ... At their worst moments
gamesmen are unrealistic, manipulative, and compulsive workaholics. Their
hyped-up activity hides doubt about who they are and where they are going.
Their ability to escape allows them to avoid unpleasant realities. When they
let down, they are faced with feelings that make them feel powerless. The
most compulsive players must be “turned on,” energized by competitive pres-
sures. Deprived of challenge at work, they are bored and slightly depressed.
Life is meaningless outside the game, and they tend to sit around watching TV
or drinking too much. But once the game is on, once they feel they are in the
Super Bowl or one-on-one against another star, they come to life, think hard,
and are cool. (pp. 108—09)
The abstract character of nuclear war scenarios appeals to the talented,

imaginative gamesmen, who are the leading strategic analysts in the national
security establishments of the United States and the USSR. The game is
exciting and competitive, calling for the use of inventive thought, cool, ana-
lytic ability, and emotional toughness. It has little of the messiness of war
games involving real soldiers, battlefield commanders, rain, mud, and pesti-
lence. It is basically an abstract, impersonal, computerized game, involving
nuclear weapons with strategists on each side trying to outsmart the other.
To play the game, each side has to make assumptions about how its own
weapons (and its command, control, and communications systems) will oper-
ate in various hypothetical future nuclear war scenarios, as well as how the
other side’s will operate. There is, of course, very little basis in actual experi-
ence for making accurate, reliable, or valid assumptions about these matters,
since none of these weapons or systems has been tested or employed in
circumstances even remotely resembling the situation of any imaginable nu-
clear war.
However, for the nuclear game to be played and for scenarios to be
developed, assumptions about these matters have to be made. Once these
assumptions have been made and have, by consensus, been accepted within
one side’s strategic group, they become psychologically “real” and arc treated
as “hard facts” no matter how dubious their grounding in actual realities.
These “psychological realities” and dubious “hard facts” are then used as
a basis for further decisions in the strategic game of preparing for the eventu-
ality of nuclear war. The decisions may entail potential expenditures of hun-
278 APPLICATIONS
dreds of billions of dollars for new nuclear weapons—as, for instance, on the
MX missile and the B-1 bomber—which will require the strategic gamesmen
on the other side to respond (also based on their “psychological realities” and
dubious “hard facts”) in a way that will prevent them from “losing” the
nuclear war game.
This alluring, involving, imaginative game is played in an abstracted,
unreal world in which the real costs of playing' (extravagant damage being
done to the economic systems of the superpowers and the world) and the real
horrors of nuclear war are not faced. There is a continuing need to make
these costs and horrors “psychologically real” to the people and decision
makers of the superpowers as well as a continuing necessity to challenge the
dubious “hard facts” underlying the “psychological realities” of the strategic
gamesmen on both sides.
Let me summarize my presentation so far. I believe the United States and
the Soviet Union are entrapped in a malignant social process giving rise to a
web of interactions and defensive maneuvers, which, instead of improving
their situations, make them both feel less secure, more vulnerable, more
burdened, and a threat to each other and to the world at large. This malig-
nant social process is fostered and maintained by anachronistic competition
for world leadership; security dilemmas created for both superpowers by
competitive orientations and the lack of a strong world community; cognitive
rigidities arising from archaic, oversimplified, black-and-white, mutually an-
tagonistic ideologies; misperceptions, unwitting commitments, self-fulfilling
prophecies, and vicious escalating spirals that typically arise during the
course of competitive conflict; gamesmanship orientations to security dilem-
mas, which turn a conflict from what in real life is being won or lost to an
abstract conflict over images of power in which nuclear missiles become the
pawns for enacting the game of power; and by internal problems and con-
flicts within each of the superpowers that can be managed more easily be-
cause of external conflicts.
REDUCING THE DANGER
What can be done to reverse this malignant social process? How can we
begin to reduce the dangers resulting from the military gamesmanship and
security dilemmas of the superpowers? Let me turn to the latter question first.
I shall outline a number of proposals, none original. They are based upon
what I consider to be common sense rather than specialized knowledge of
military affairs or international relations, although I have informed myself as
best I could in these areas. These matters are too important to be left to
consideration only by specialists.
1. “The truly revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons as instruments of war”

(Keeny and Panofsky, 1981—82, p. 287) suggests that the United States and
the USSR should quickly come to an agreement banning the first use of
nuclear weapons and should, as part of this accord, jointly agree to puni-
tive actions to deter any other nation’s first use of nuclear weapons. Such
an agreement between the superpowers should be presented to the United
Nations for discussion and ratification.
The United States and the nations in Western Europe appear to be
concerned, however, that a no-first-use agreement would place their non-
nuclear military forces at a disadvantage in case the military forces of the
Soviet bloc were to attack Western Europe (although there is considerable
dispute among “experts” as to whether this is the case). Thus, the no-
first-use agreement should be preceded by a nonaggression pact between
the Soviet bloc and NATO nations (including France) and should come
into effect only after five years during which time unilateral or bilateral
changes could be made to bring the opposing conventional military forces
into balance.
Almost all experts appear to agree that a limited nuclear war involving
the superpowers is very likely to turn into an all-out nuclear war (for
example, Bundy et ah, 1982). Hence, it is imperative to establish strong
barriers against the use of any nuclear weapons by the superpowers. But
the Western powers seem reluctant to agree on no first use because of the
“superiority” of the conventional forces of the Soviet bloc. A five-year
period to right the balance of conventional forces either by increasing the
strength of the Western forces or by decreasing the military forces of the
Soviet bloc, or both, should be sufficient, especially if it is buttressed by a
nonaggression pact. Western Europe has more material and population
resources than the Soviet bloc. There is no reason why it should feel unable
to defend itself against a conventional attack.
As a matter of highest priority, we should not continue to dillydally
about a no-first-use agreement. It not only could deter use of nuclear
weapons by nations in the second and third worlds but also could pave the
way for a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear weapons de-
ployed and stockpiled by the superpowers.
2. Immediately following the signing of a no-first-use agreement, representa-

tives from NATO and the Soviet bloc should meet continuously to seek
verifiable agreements that would (a) eliminate all short-range and interme-
diate-range nuclear missiles including all missiles in Western Europe and all
missiles in the Soviet bloc that could not reach the United States; (b) reduce
conventional armaments in the Soviet bloc and the NATO bloc, particu-
larly those weapons that have little value for defense, and reduce the possi-
bility of surprise attack; (c) create a demilitarized zone in Central Europe
that would separate the military forces of the Soviet bloc and NATO by a
militarily significant amount of space.
3. The United States and the USSR should each unilaterally and through
agreement seek to increase the stability of nuclear deterrence by removing
those nuclear weapons from their arsenals that are vulnerable to a first
strike, by renouncing use of “launch on warning,” and by agreeing to a
verifiable freeze on further deployment, research, development, and testing
of nuclear weapons. After the freeze, a verifiable reduction to a small
number of strategic weapons on each side should take place; the total of
both sides should be significantly less than the number that could trigger a
“nuclear winter” if the weapons were used.
280 APPLICATIONS
4. The United States and the USSR should establish joint working groups that
would collaborate (a) to reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war or war
due to misunderstanding, and (b) to foster the development of effective
defenses against nuclear weapons. Both sides should want to tip the nu-
clear balance strongly toward defense. This can only be done through
cooperative scientific and technological work on defense (so that one side
does not acquire the possibility of a successful defense against the other’s
nuclear weapons while the other rerriains vulnerable to an attack) and a
drastic elimination of weapons (so that an effective defense becomes feasi-
ble). As the nuclear balance shifts strongly toward defense, it should be
possible to move toward nuclear disarmament.
5. Since the Middle East is so volatile, the United States should seek to be-
come independent of oil supplied from the Middle East as rapidly as possi-
ble. The development of alternative sources of energy—shale oil, coal, solar
power, geothermal, and so forth—should be fostered by governmental pol-
icy. The United States should not be in the position of having to intervene
militarily in the Middle East in order to preserve a supply of energy for
itself or its allies.
A bold and courageous American leadership would take a risk for peace.
It would announce its determination to end the crazy arms race. It would
offer to agree to a package of no first use of nuclear weapons, a nonagression
pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, and a substantial
reduction and equalization of the opposing conventional forces in Europe.
At the same time, the United States would initiate a “Graduated Recipro-
cation in Tension Reduction” (GRIT) process (Osgood, 1959, 1962). We
would state our determination to end the nuclear arms race and would an-
nounce an across-the-board unilateral reduction of, for example, 10 percent
of our existing nuclear weapons, inviting the USSR and other nations to
verify that so many nuclear weapons in each category were being destroyed.
We would request the USSR to reciprocate in a similar fashion.
I believe our superfluity of nuclear weapons is such that we could afford
to make several rounds of unilateral cuts, even if the Soviets did not initially
reciprocate, without losing our capacity to retaliate against any nuclear at-
tack so that destruction of the Soviet society would still be assured. Such
repeated unilateral initiations, if sincere in intent and execution, would place
the Soviet Union under the strongest pressure to reciprocate. We could re-
place the arms race with a peace race.
UNDOING THE MALIGNANT SOGIAL PROCESS
Although some of the dangers of living in a mad nuclear world can be

controlled by arms control and disarmament agreements, the reality is that
we cannot put the genie back into the bottle; the possibility of making
hydrogen bombs, nuclear missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction
will continue to exist—forever. This is why we must seek to remove the
malignancy from relations between the superpowers and develop sufficiently

cooperative relations among all major powers to make a major war unlikely.
Great Britain and France both possess hydrogen bombs and missiles, and
we in the United States are not unduly disturbed by this reality because our
relations with these countries are sufficiently cooperative. Also, there are
many more nuclear missiles in the western part of the United States than in
the eastern part; nevertheless, as an easterner, I am not anxious about this
disparity. We are part of one nation and the weapons are not controlled by
individual states but by a government representing all states, and there ap-
pears to be little likelihood of another Civil War.
How do we undo the malignant social process in which the superpowers
are enmeshed? The first step is to heighten everyone’s consciousness of how
crazy the process is and to make people aware of both its very real dangers
and enormous economic costs. The people of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and the rest of the world should be encouraged to recognize the
craziness of the process and to denounce it as unacceptably dangerous and
costly to humanity. It is difficult to induce a therapeutic change in a patho-
logical process until the pathology is recognized as such and seen to be
unacceptably harmful.
The second step is to focus on the underlying dynamics that foster and
maintain the pathology. In my earlier description of the key features of a
malignant social process, I sketched the dynamics in general terms. Here, I
want to highlight two features that are central to the pathological relations
between the superpowers: the security dilemma and their competitive
orientations.
The security dilemma stems from the development of nuclear weapons
that have made the world a more uncertain, dangerous, and anxious place
and have revolutionized the nature of war. They have outmoded the concepts
of “military victory,” “military supremacy,” and “nuclear superiority” as
pertinent to the relations between the superpowers and made the anachronis-
tic pursuit of such goals endangering to self as well as to others.
The danger and resulting anxiety push policymakers in the superpowers
to use what has been a good defense against danger and anxiety in the past:
increase power vis-a-vis the adversary. But this previously successful defense
against insecurity now does the opposite: it increases insecurity. Overcoming
this underlying pathological dynamic requires the recognition that the old
defense is inappropriate to the new, revolutionary situation caused by nuclear
weapons.
As I have indicated earlier, the old notion of “national security” must be
replaced by the new notion of “mutual security” if the superpowers are to
break out of this malignant social process. It is difficult to give up old,
well-established beliefs even when they have become dysfunctional until the
new beliefs have been implemented and seen to work. We must begin to
implement the idea of mutual security and give it a chance to work.
As for competitive orientation, it is evident that the superpowers have
such an orientation toward their conflicts, and this makes it difficult for them
282 APPLICATIONS
to handle their security dilemma cooperatively and constructively. But must

their conflicts for power and prestige be conducted as cutthroat affairs or can
fair rules for competition be developed? Is it possible to develop a coopera-
tive framework to support adherence to fair rules?
FAIR RULES FOR COMPETITION
A contest is considered to be fair if the conditions and rules are such that no
contestant is systematically advantaged or disadvantaged in relation to other
contestants. All have equal rights and opportunities, and all are in the same
category—more or less matched in characteristics relevant to the contest’s
outcome.
Thus, it is manifestly unfair if the rules are such that the international
contest permits noncommunist nations to become converted to communism
or to join an alliance with the Soviet Union, but do not permit communist
nations or allies to be converted to the noncommunist side.
Similarly, rules that would outlaw the establishment of a communist na-
tion in the Western Hemisphere but not give a parallel right to the Soviet
Union in its sphere of control hardly would be fair. Rules that put smaller,
weaker nations—Cuba or Hungary—in a one-to-one contest with larger,
powerful nations are not likely to lead to outcomes that are viewed as legiti-
mate by the smaller nations.
The major international arena for rivalry between the big powers today
is made up of the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle
East, and Latin America. The competition for these “prizes” is mixed with
arms and military confrontations. The danger of continued armed sparring
in such places as Cuba, South Vietnam, Angola, and the Middle East is
that misjudgment or despair may lead to escalation of armed conflict. We
have lived through several close calls. It is time to rely on more than nerve
and luck to avert disaster. I suggest that we take the initiative to propose
fair rules in the competition for the unaligned countries. As Amitai Etzioni
(1962) has pointed out, a set of rules would include such principles as the
following:
1. No nonaligned country would be allowed to have military ties with other

countries, particularly not with any major power.
2. No foreign troops, bases, or arms would be permitted to remain in or to
enter the nonaligned country. Foreign arms would be prohibited to rebels
and governments alike in nonaligned countries.
3. United Nations observer forces consisting largely of personnel from non-
aligned countries and equipped with the necessary scientific equipment and
facilities (flashlights, infrared instruments, helicopters, aerial photographs,
lie detectors, and the like) to check the borders, ports, airfields, roads, and
railroads would be deployed at the request of any of the major powers or
by the secretary general of the United Nations. Costs would be allocated so
as to reduce the incentive to create repeated false alarms.
4. A United Nations research and development staff would be established to

keep informed abut the development of new observational techniques and
equipment.
5. Violations of the arms embargo—once certified as such by an
appropriate UN tribunal—would set in motion a cease-and-desist order
aimed at the sender of arms or troops and a disarm order aimed at the
receiver. Obedience to these orders would be checked by the UN ob-
server force. Lack of compliance would result in sanctions appropriate
to the nature of the violations—for example, trade and communica-
tions embargo, blockade, sending of armed forces into the nonaligned
country.
Suppose such rules could be established: what effects might be expected?

Clearly, the revolutionary ferment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America would
not disappear, nor would communist governments be unlikely to take power
in some countries. These rules would not have prevented Castro from over-
throwing Batista in Cuba. However, I suggest that the critical issue is not
whether local communists or their sympathizers can achieve power in a given
country without external military aid but rather whether, after achieving
power, they retain it because of foreign military aid and whether they become
a base for military aid to communists in other countries.
Let us look at the issue of communism and the underdeveloped countries
more directly. I suggest that a communist government in an underdeveloped
country presents no threat to us so long as it remains militarily unaligned.
Such a government may be a tragedy to its people, but we would be fulfilling
our moral responsibility if we were to develop and enforce rules that could
prevent outside military aid from foreclosing the possibility that the people
will overthrow a government that is obnoxious to them. A communist gov-
ernment that stays in power with the acquiescence of its people may be
distasteful to us, and we may not want to help it stay in power, particularly if
it is a terrorist government. But we can hardly claim the right to obliterate it.
We do not intervene against such right-wing terrorist governments as those in
Haiti, Paraguay, and Guatemala.
The underdeveloped countries face incredibly difficult problems. The
revolution of rising expectations has created aspirations that cannot be ful-
filled in the foreseeable future without massive aid from the richer nations.
Even with massive aid, it will be a long and slow process before most under-
developed countries reach an economic, educational, and technological level
that will put them within reach of standards of living found in modern
industrialized nations.
The Soviet Union cannot afford to give massive economic aid to many
underdeveloped communist nations. They cannot support many Cuhas. Al-
though we can afford to give much more aid than the Soviet Union and, in
fact, much more than we do, our own capacities are not limitless. In both
cases, capacities could he considerably enhanced, as would those of recipi-
ents, if we could agree to keep arms and armed forces outside the reach of
underdeveloped areas. Too much of present assistance is in the form of
284 APPLICATIONS
military aid, and too much of the production of underdeveloped countries is

being channeled into military expenditure.
How would the United States make out in a competition for the free vote
of the underdeveloped countries of the world? Would we do better than the
Soviet Union, Communist China, France? I do not know, but if we cannot do
well in a free competition, perhaps we might consider the possibility that
something is wrong with us and revise many 6f our conceptions and ways of
relating to other nations.
We start off with many advantages. We have unsurpassed and even un-
used resources to draw upon. We can turn out more food and more material
goods than any other nation. We have a democratic tradition and the reputa-
tion of being the land of opportunity. The names of Washington, Jefferson,
Lincoln, and Roosevelt are revered almost universally.
We also start out with disadvantages. We have identified ourselves with
the status quo, with governments that are unwilling to institute economic and
political reforms necessary to make them responsive to popular aspirations.
Also, populations of most underdeveloped countries are nonwhite, and un-
fortunately, we have not yet overcome the pervasive practices of racial dis-
crimination and segregation in our country. We are making progress, but the
progress is slow. It seems evident that, unless we can achieve much more
rapid and substantial progress in eliminating racism at home, these barriers
will obstruct us abroad.
It also seems apparent that if we are going to be effective in the underde-
veloped countries, our aid has to be directed toward those governments that
are attempting to increase national productivity and improve the lot of their
populations. Aid to governments that are ineffective or to tyrannical rulers
will not help the position of the United States in the international competition
for prestige and influence. Too often our aid has gone to just such countries.
Would not our position in Latin America be somewhat better than it is now
if Trujillo’s accomplices, Stroessner’s henchmen, and Batista’s militia had not
been armed with guns supplied by us?
The proposal I have made for the military neutralization of the underde-
veloped countries has many technical problems that I have ignored, for ex-
ample, the nature and composition of observer forces, the composition and
functioning of the tribunal, the kinds of sanctions that might produce effec-
tive compliance. I assume that the major technical problems center about the
need to reduce the likelihood that the rules can be violated to give any side an
insuperable advantage. Without going into this issue in detail, I think it can
be seen that any given violation is not likely to have catastrophic conse-
quences for the military security of the superpowers. And even if an underde-
veloped country is subverted or taken over as a result of violations, this is
hardly likely to be disastrous. Moreover, violations are hardly likely to be
undetected; they are apt to become evident before they substantially threaten
security.
In other words, an agreement on fair rules for competition does not
require a great deal of trust. However, it does require governments peddling
arms to other countries to give up this form of trade. Currently, the arms
business amounts to about $25 to $35 billion a year, of which NATO coun-
tries originate somewhere over 50 percent of the export volume and the
Warsaw Pact countries about 40 percent (Sivard, 1981). It is a very profitable
trade. So is dope peddling. The Western bloc and the Soviet bloc should agree
to end arms peddling; it is an even more destructive form of trade than drug
peddling.
DEVELOPING A COOPERATIVE ERAMEWORK
Acceptance of fair rules for competition means an abandonment of cutthroat

rivalry. It implies a change in one’s conception of the adversary from an
enemy to a fellow contestant. Then the conflict changes character. The rules,
which limit forms of conflict, bind the contestants together in terms of com-
mon interest. However, common interest in the rules is not, by itself, likely to
prevail against the debilitating effects of inevitable misunderstandings and
disputes associated with any rule system. The tie between the contestants
must be strengthened by enhancing their community or cooperative interests.
How can this be done? The key to development of cooperation can be
stated very simply. It is the provision of repeated and varied opportunities for
mutually beneficial interactions. In relation to the Soviet Union, we have
done some of this but obviously not enough.
Our reluctance to trade with the Soviets and our unsuccessful attempts to
get our allies to limit trade with them indicate an underlying view that
hampers attempts to strengthen cooperative bonds: the view that anything
that helps them hurts us. Clearly, it helps them if their control over their
nuclear missiles is such as to prevent accidental firings. But does this harm
us? Clearly, it helps them if their children have available the Sabin polio
vaccine. But does this harm us?
George E. Kennan in 1964 stated something that seems just as pertinent
today (especially with the prospective change in Soviet leadership):
It is not too much to say that the entire [Communist] bloc is caught today in a
great crisis of indecision over the basic question of the proper attitude of a
Communist country toward non-Communist ones. The question is whether to
think of the world in terms of an irreconcilable and deadly struggle between
all that calls itself Communist and all that does not, a struggle bound to end
in the relatively near future with the total destruction of one or both, or to
recognize that the world socialist cause can be advanced by more complicated,
more gradual, less dramatic, and less immediate forms, not necessitating any
effort to destroy all that is not Communist within our time, and even permit-
ting in the meanwhile reasonably extensive and profitable and durable rela-
tions with individual non-Communist countries. (1964, pp. 13—14)
None of us will fail to note that a parallel question tortures public opin-
ion and governments in the West. There can be little doubt that our answer
286 APPLICATIONS
to the question of whether communist and noncommunist countries can exist

together peacefully will be an important influence in determining how the
communists answer it. If we continue to maintain the quixotic notion that the
communist governments of Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, and, for that mat-
ter, the Soviet Union are likely to disappear in some violent internal convul-
sion, will we influence them to choose the less belligerent answer? Or will
they be better influenced by a policy that accepts the reality of the communist
governments and adopts the view that we are willing to participate in any
and all forms of mutually beneficial interactions, including normal diplomatic
contacts, cultural and scientific exchanges, trade, and so on.
Which policy provides a more promising prospect of a relaxation of the
severity of the communist regimes and a weakening of the barriers that separate
their peoples from contact with the outside world? Which policy is more likely
to promote the growing individualism and diversity among the communist
nations? The answers are obvious. Yet so many seem frightened by the idea of
cooperation with the communists; the very phrase sounds subversive.
Many equate appeasement with cooperation. They seem to feel that the
only credible stance toward someone who might have hostile intentions is a
self-righteous, belligerent counterhostility. There is, of course, an alternative
stance: one of firmness and friendliness. It is possible to communicate both a
firm, unwavering resolve not to allow oneself to be abused, intimidated, or
made defenseless and a willingness to get along peacefully and to cooperate
for mutual benefit. In other words, willingness to cooperate does not imply
willingness to be abused.
Firmness in contrast to belligerence is not provocative, and thus, while
aborting development of vicious spirals, it does not abort development of
cooperation. It is, of course, difficult to resist the temptation to respond with
belligerence to the belligerent provocations of some communist nations. It
requires a good deal of self-confidence to feel no need to demonstrate that
one is “man enough” to be tough or that one is not “chicken.” It is just this
kind of firm, nonbelligerent, self-confident, friendly attitude that appears to
be most effective in reforming aggressive delinquents and that our research
(Deutsch, 1973) suggests is most effective in inducing cooperation.
Can we adopt such an attitude? Our defensiveness is rather high, suggest-
ing that we do not feel confident of ourselves. Our defensiveness comes from
two sources. First, we have too high a level of aspiration. Throughout most
of our history, we have been in the uniquely fortunate position of having had
pretty much our own way in foreign affairs. Initially, this was due to our
powerful isolated position in the Americas. Since World War II we have been,
moreover, the leading world power. We face a loss of status. It seems evident
that we cannot remain in our former unique position. We can no longer be
isolated from the physical danger of a major war, nor can we remain the only
powerful nation. We have to adjust our aspirations to changing realities or
suffer constant frustration.
The second root of our national defensiveness is lack of confidence in our
ability to maintain ourselves as a thriving, attractive society that can cope
effectively with its own internal problems. The fact is that we have not been
coping well with economic growth, unemployment, civil rights, the education
of our children, the rebuilding of our cities, the care of our aged.
Conflict is more likely to take the form of lively controversy rather than
deadly quarrel when the disputants respect themselves as well as each other.
The process of reforming another, of inducing an opponent to adhere to fair
rules of competition, often requires self-reform. The achievement of a sincere
peace will require a sincere, sustained effort by both sides.
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Index
Abelson, R. P., 82 138, 145, 156, 159, 196; toward work

ability, 154, 157, 207-09, 210-11; as dis- or learning, 4, 219-21
tributive value, 2, 3, 39-40, 215-16 attribution, of blame, 47
accountability, 196-97, 227, 246, 249 Austin, W., 17, 22, 97, 99
achievement, 196; as distributive value, 3, authoritarianism, of left vs. right, 50
133-34, 154-57, 160, 215; educa- authoritative support, 187-88, 203
tional, 2, 210; motivation, 89, 156; pro-
motion of, 3, 68, 115, 133. See also task Bach, G. R., 197
performance Back, K. W., 68
achievement equality grading, 155 Bailey, S. D., 197
achievement proportionality grading, 155 Bales, R. F., 49, 76
Acme-Bolt Trucking game, 121, 124—29 Bandura, A., 204
Adams, J. Stacy, 9, 11-15, 16, 17, 18, 21- Banton, M., 88
22, 40, 96, 108 Baral, R., 23
Adorno, T. W., 50 bargaining, 4, 26, 97, 120-32
agreement, 6, 118, 120-21, 122-29, 132, bargaining power, 52, 54-56, 58, 60
197; in cooperative group process, 67, Barnet, R. ]., 276
114 Bartlett, A. P., 82
alienation, 54, 116, 244, 246, 247, 249, 260 Bateson, G., 82
Alinsky, S., 57, 58 Bay, Christian, 49
Alker, H. R., Jr., 264 Becker, L. A., 19
allocation, 98-99, 101-02, 105, 108, 135, Behavioral Strategy game, 121, 129-32
202, 215—16; injustice experiment, 189- Benn, S. 1., 41
93 Benne, K. D., 76
anarchic social situation, 263, 264-65 Berger,]., 107
Anderson, N. H., 105 Berkowitz, L., 1, 23, 68
antagonism, 77, 78 Berlin, 1., 41
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 9, lOn Bernstein, M., 109—10
arms business, 269, 285 Berscheid, E., 1, 9, 11, 15-25, 26, 108
arms race, 262, 264, 269, 273, 274-76, 278 blacks, 21, 47-48, 52, 56, 60-62, 208n,
Aronson, E., 68 212, 274; employment of, 60, 61, 62;
Atkinson, J. W., 89 rising expectations of, 53; white attitudes
attitudes, 66; in conflict resolution, 69—71; toward, 48, 60-61
in cooperative vs. competitive processes, Blake, Robert, 72, 117-18
119, 138, 219—21; toward distributive Blasi, J. R., 224, 231, 232, 235, 236, 242,
principles, 134, 136-37, 138-41, 143, 248
144-47, 149, 153, 156, 157-61; to- Boell, J. E., 203
ward group members, 138, 145, 154, Boulding, Kenneth, 72
156, 158-59, 161, 219; toward task. Bowles, S., 211
305
306 Index
Boyle, R. P., 210 Conquest, R., 268

Brock, T. C., 19, 20 constructive process of conflict resolution,
Brown, Bert, 68, 72, 126, 197, 198 68, 69-72, 255-58
Bundy, McGeorge, 264, 279 Conte, M., 230
Burton, Joseph, 72, 198 contribution: of ability vs. effort, 154, 157;
Buss, A. H., 20 as distributive value, 3, 6, 9, 10-11, 12,
28, 38-40, 98-99, 105, 108-09, 133,
Campbell, A., 48 215—16; principle not used in kibbut-
caring-orientation, 30, 42—44, 45, 78, 87, zim, 236, 239
93, 216 contrient interdependence, 66—67, 70, 75
Carnoy, M., 227 Coogler, O. j., 197
Carter, B., 243 Cook, T. D., 1, 97, 109
Cartwright, D. P., 76 cooperation, 6, 26, 35-36, 37—38, 44, 105,
cathexis, 66, 67, 70, 83, 85, 87, 246 115-16, 122-24, 127-29, 132, 143,
Chalmers, W. E., 197 153, 157-58, 166, 238, 249; breakdown
Chambers, J., 200 of, 246—47; generational, 256-57; in-
Chapman, I. W., 41 ducing, strategies for, 129—32, 246; in-
character, 207—09, 210—11; orientation, 79 ternational, 285-87; organized vs. hier-
Coates, D., 203 archical, 78
Cobbs, P. M., 47 cooperation-competition, 6, 38, 64-68, 69,
cognitive dissonance, 13, 14, 15, 273 75, 93—94, 196—97, 266, 271; cognitive
cognitive orientation, 5, 74, 79, 82—83, 94, orientation in, 84; in grading systems,
174; in cooperation-competition, 84; in 65-66, 114-15, 213, 216-21, 255-57;
formal vs. informal relationship, 90; in group processes, 66—68, 113-19, 140,
power relationship, 86; in task-oriented 145-47, 153-54, 158-59, 162-63,
vs. social-emotional relationship, 88—89 256; and learning, 114-16, 196, 218-
cognitive rigidity, 263, 269—70, 271 20; moral orientation in, 85—86; motiva-
Cohen, R. L., 1, 29, 97, 98, 99 tional orientation in, 84-85; outcomes
Coles, R., 106 vs. processes, 65, 68—70; and productiv-
collective ownership, 223, 224—25, 230—31 ity, 67, 114-15, 196, 217-18; reward
Columbia University, 64, 72, 134—35 systems, 217—18; terminology, 75
common (collective) good, 3, 16, 215-16 cooperative-constructive processes of con-
communes, 231—32, 236 flict, 67, 69-72, 255-58
communication, 26, 55, 114, 217—18, 219, cooperative grading, 65-66, 114, 216-17,
259, 266; in conflict resolution, 67, 69— 219-20
70, 71, 72-73, 118, 126-29, 256 cooperative relations, 38-44, 75, 77-79, 82,
communism, 235—36, 266-67, 269, 282- 84, 86, 87, 92-94, 174, 178, 196, 213
83, 285 cooperatives, 223, 224-25, 230, 231-49
compensation: of victim, 19, 20—23; coordination, 55, 67, 218, 219, 259; of ef-
worker, 11, 13-14, 33-34, 39-40, 133- fort, 114
34, 212, 223, 225-27 Cormick, C. W., 197
competition, 6, 29, 38, 105, 115-16, 122- costs (Homans term), 10, 12, 14, 15-16, 25
24, 126-29, 131-32, 161, 220-21, 270; Cox, Arthur M., 275
international, fair rules for, 282-85. See creativity, 210; in conflict resolution, 71-73,
also cooperation-competition 257-58
competitive-destructive processes of conflict, Crespi, L. P., 200
67-68, 69-72, 255-56, 265 Crosby, F., 50, 109-10, 193-95
competitive grading, 66, 114, 216, 219-21 cross-national research, 108-09
competitive relationships, 30, 44, 75, 77-78,
82, 84, 86, 87-88, 92-94, 178, 196, Daniels, L. R., 23
213; international, 263, 265-68, 281-82 dating, 23-25
Condry, j., 200 Davies, J. C., 53
conflict, 62, 68, 71-73, 100, 117, 120-32, Davis, j. A., 109
183, 185, 197, 287; competitive, 67, 69- Davis, K. E., 20, 21
72, 255, 265-68; escalation, 67, 117, 256, Daymont, T. N., 208
265, 271, 274—76; malignant, 263—78; Deaux, K., 98, 202
perpetuation, 272-74; size of, 128-29 Deci, E., 199
conflict resolution, 5, 44, 68-73, 117-18, decision making, 29, 264, 27^4-78; in collec-
197—98, 255—58; bargaining studies, tives, 230; in cooperatives, 234—38,
120-32 242-44; procedures, 4, 31, 34-35, 40,
Conner, W. H., 23 184,259-60
Index 307
democracy, 34, 212, 244-45, 260; eco- Edelman, P., 52

nomic, 223-25, 235; in kibbutzim, 236, Eden, D., 238
237-39, 241-42 Edmead, E., 197
Denitch, B. D,, 243 education, 54; of blacks, 60, 61, 62; and
deprivation, 50. See also relative depriva- distributive justice, 6, 207-21; hierarchi-
tion; self-deprivation cal system, 213, 221; objectives of, 208
destructive process of conflict resolution, educational attainment, 2, 208, 210, 215
67-68, 69-72, 255-56, 265 educational merit, 6, 210-12. See also grad-
deterrent strategy, 130-31, 132 ing systems
Deutsch, M., 29, 38, 44, 50, 55, 68, 69, 76, educational (guiding) relationship, 78, 87
84, 86, 93, 96, 97, 131, 196, 197, 217, educational resources, 2, 3, 208-09, 215
256, 264, 265 effort, as distributive value, 3, 133, 137,
Deutsch’s crude hypothesis of social rela- 154-57, 158, 160, 215
tions, 5, 69-70, 93, 132, 203, 256, 265- effort equality grading, 154—55
66 effort proportionality grading, 155
Diesing, P., 40, 41, 44 egalitarianism, 4, 6, 41-42, 49, 85, 147,
dimensions of interpersonal relations, 75—79 156, 166, 170-71, 173, 178-79, 202-
disabled, disabilities, 2, 3, 115, 116, 215, 03, 222-49, 256, 260
247; in kibbutzim, 236, 238 Ellerman, D., 224
disadvantaged, the, 2, 3, 60-62, 186-88. employee ownership, 224—25, 230—31
See also relative deprivation entitlements, 52, 53-54, 106, 109—10, 194—
discrimination, 220; racial, 60-62, 208n, 95
212, 274; sexual, 193-95, 208n, 212 equality, 235, 247-48; in education system,
dissonance reduction, 13—14, 271, 272—73 212; and efficiency, 6, 223, 227, 229, 231,
dissonance theory, 18 233—34, 238, 249; of resources, 247
distress of inequity, 15-16, 17-18, 27—28; equality, as distributive principle, 2, 3, 5, 6,
relieving, 17, 18, 19-23 30, 33, 39, 40, 43, 85, 93, 98-99, 102,
distributive injustice, 9—11, 31-45, 85 104, 105, 108, 115, 215-16; choice of
distributive justice: defined, 1; examples, 1—2 (studies), 166, 167, 169-70, 172-74,
distributive justice systems, 2—4; attitudes 179; as dominant principle, 38, 41—42,
toward, 134, 136-37, 138-41, 143, 44, 45; in economic crunch, 254-55; ef-
144-47, 149, 153, 156, 157-61, 164; fects of (studies), 135-41, 143-48, 152—
choice of (studies), 164—79; effects in 56, 157-63, 198, 202
education, 216-21; effects of (studies), equal opportunity, 52, 87—88, 223; lack of,
134-63 60-61, 193-95
distributive values, 2—3, 5, 31, 33, 35, 37, equal social relations, 75-76, 77, 78, 79,
93, 98-99, 104, 184, 196; for caring- 85, 90, 174; cognitive vs. motivational
oriented group, 42—44, 45, 216; conflicts vs. moral orientation in, 86, 87-88
between, 3, 6, 44-45, 216; cross- equity, 5, 30, 33, 99, 102, 104-05, 108-09,
national research, 108—09; for economi- 115, 202; actual vs. psychological, 18-
cally oriented group, 38—41, 44, 45, 20, 23, 24; as dominant distributive prin-
216; in education, 215-16; sociocentric ciple, 38—41, 44, 45, 93; formula, 13-
vs. individual-centered, 202—03; for soli- 14, 25, 38-39; individualistic form of,
darity-oriented group, 41—43, 44—45, 115; joint, 15; modes of restoration, 13—
216 15, 17, 18, 19—23; tendency to restore,
division of labor, 55, 67, 114, 259 16, 17, 18
Dodson, J. D., 200, 201 equity theory, 5, 9-30, 31-45; Adams, 11-
Doob, L. W., 198 15; basic propositions of Walster et al.,
Douglas, A., 197 15—16; cognitive assumptions in, 28—
drive, 207-09, 210—11. See also motivation 29; conception of justice implicit in, 29-
Druckman, Daniel, 72 30; critique of, 25-30, 97-100, 133—34;
Dworkin, R., 41, 247 Homans, 9—11; motivational assump-
tions in, 26—28, 161-62; multiprinciple
Eachus, H. T., 68 approach, 105; reference person/group,
Ebbesen, E. B., 199 107-08, 109
economic “crunch,” 6, 250—61 Etzioni, Amitai, 258, 282
economic egalitarianism, 6, 222, 223—25, Evenbeck, S., 17, 22
227, 230-31 expected utility theory, 101
economic “man,” 14, 29, 105 exploitative relationships, 15, 18-23, 46-
economic orientation, 5, 30, 38—41, 44, 45, 63; moral orientation in, 88. See also vic-
164-66, 174, 178-79, 202, 203, 216 tim; victimizer
308 Index
fair agreement, 123—29, 132, 197 Habermas, J., 107

fairness, 39, 101; distributive systems Hackman, R. J., 201
studies, 137, 138, 144, 145, 149, 156, Hage, J., 75, 76
158, 159, 160-61, 167, 169, 172-73; handicapped, the, 2, 3, 115, 116, 215, 247
sense of injustice (studies), 186—95; in Harkins, S., 196
superpower competition, 282—85 harmdoer, 18, 19, 21. See also victimizer
family sphere, 1, 5, 30, 42—43, 202, 216, Hatfield, E., 97, 99
263 Hause, J. C., 208
Feather, N. T., 89 Hauser, R. M., 208
Fenichel, O., 49, 203 have-nots vs. haves, 50, 57-58
Festinger, L., 13, 15, 54, 273 Haynes, J. M., 197
Fischoff, B., 29 Head, Sir Henry, 82
Fisher, Roger, 72, 197 health care, 2, 42-43, 202; insurance, 94
Foa, E. B., 28, 32, 108 Heilbroner, R. L., 256
Foa, U. G., 28, 32, 107, 108-09, 202 Helmreich, R. L., 194
Folberg, J., 197 helping relationship, 15, 25, 116
Folger, R., 1, 97 Hennigan, K. M., 109
formal relationship, 76, 78—79, 85, 178; hierarchy in organizations, 50, 78-79, 93,
cognitive vs. motivational vs. moral ori- 221, 237, 243; schools, 213, 221; work-
entation in, 90—91 place, 223, 228-30
frame, 82 Hochschild, J. L., 100, 202, 222
fraternal relations, 78, 93 Holmes, J. G., 29, 97
Fredholm, E. M., 107 Homans, George C., 9-11, 12, 13—14, 16,
Freedman, S., 15, 17, 18, 22, 40, 96 17, 21, 29n, 97
free-riding, 196—97 Hull, C. L., 200, 201
Freud, Anna, 47, 88 Hurwitz, R., 264
Freud, Sigmund, 107, 267 Hyman, H. H., 50, 109
Fromm, Erich, 23
frustration, 106, 180-85, 195 identification: with the aggressor, 47—48,
Fry, W. R., 35, 98 88; with the underdog, 48—50
ideology, official, 52-53, 59, 60, 193-95,
202, 248—49; of superpowers, 266—67
Galston, W. M., 32, 43 Ikle, Ered C., 197, 275
gamesmanship, 218, 263, 276—78 incentives: effects of, 198—202; work, 225—
Garson, G. D., 227 26
generational cooperation, 256—57 income, 33, 208, 211, 212; limitations on,
George, A., 272 222, 223; redistribution, 62, 222, 247,
Gerard, H. B., 68 245—55. See also worker compensation
Gergen, K. J., 97 individual-centered principles of distributive
Gintis, H., 211 justice, 202
goal interdependence, 66-67, 113-16 individual concentration tasks, 157, 163
Goffman, E. G., 82 individualistic form of equity/proportional-
Gottheil, E., 68 ity, 115, 157
grading systems, grades, 2, 3, 6, 208, 209— individualistic orientation, 114, 115-16,
21; cooperative vs. competitive, 65—66, 122-23, 129, 130, 219
114—15, 216—21; effort vs. achieve- inducibility, 66, 67, 70, 246
ment, 154—55, 160 inequality, 42, 85; economic, 222; sexual,
Greenberg, J., 1, 97, 98 193-95; socioeconomic, 208 and n,
Greenberg, M. S., 97, 98 221. See also unequal social relations
Greene, D., 27, 198-99 inequity, 11-14; goal of elimination, 16, 17,
Grier, W. H., 47 18; modes of reduction, 13—15, 17, 18,
GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension 19-23
Reduction), 198, 280 informal relationship, 76, 77-79, 85, 174,
Grossack, N., 68 178; cognitive vs. motivational vs. moral
group processes, 6, 65, 98, 101, 143; orientation in, 90-91
cooperative vs. competitive, 66—68, 113— injustice, 9-11, 31-45, 46, 84; official justi-
19, 140, 145-47, 153-54, 158-59, 162- fication of, 52—53, 58, 59; proportional-
63, 256. See also solidarity orientation ity, 9-10; types of, 184. See also sense of
guilt, sense of, 10, 17, 19, 49-50 injustice
Gurr, T. R., 54, 109 inner conflict, 263, 267, 268—69
Index 309
input, 2, 3, 12-15, 16, 25, 28, 38-39, 107- Kidder, L. H., 203
08, 215—16; change, for inequity correc- Kiesler, S., 23
tion, 13-14, 19-20, 22 Kitt, A. S., lOn, 109
interdependence, 5, 65, 66-67, 70, 74-95, Knowles, E. S., 107
219, 238; vs. independence, task experi- known-performance, 136, 138, 167, 169,
ments, 141-47, 153—54, 157, 162; types 171-73
of, 75-79; types of, and psychological Kochan, T. A., 197
orientations, 74, 84—92 Krauss, Robert M., 50, 68, 128
intergroup processes, 67; competition, 115, Kressel, Kenneth, 68, 72, 197
116-19, 220n; cooperation, 116-19 Kuhne, R. J., 227
international relations, 65, 73, 197, 266-69,
273; steps for improvement, 278-87 labor, 39—40
interpersonal relations, 196, 202—03; com- labor-management relations, 68, 226, 227-
petition, 67, 115; dimensions and types 30, 243
of, 75-79; Lerner’s classes of, 104; and Latane, B., 196
psychological orientation, 79—95, 174; Lawler, E. E., 217, 225, 226-27
strife, 4 learning, 114-16, 196, 210, 213, 218-19;
intimate relationships, 15, 23-25, 77-78, attitudes, 219-20; effect of reward on,
91, 96 200, 215
intragroup processes, 67; competition, 116; Lepper, M., 27, 198-99
cooperation, 116, 117, 157, 220n Lerner, Melvin J., 1, 4, 5, 23, 29, 35, 38,
intrapersonal processes, 67 59, 97, 102-04, 202, 203
intrinsic motivation, 28, 106, 159, 161-62, Lerner, S. C., 1, 97
198-202, 218, 239 level of aspiration theory, 50
investments (Homans term), 10—11, 12 Leventhal, G. S., 29, 35, 38, 40, 97, 98, 99,
invidious distinctions, 41—42, 247—48 101-02, 105, 202
Levi, Ariel, 274-75
Jackson, E., 197 Leviathan, U., 237—39
Jacobson, P. R., 13 Levinger, G., 20
Jacques, E., 12 Levy, S., 68
Jam, H. C., 227, 229, 243 Lewin, Kurt, 47, 50-51, 64, 65, 81
Janis, Irving, 72, 272 Lieblich, A., 236
Jasso, G., 99 Lichtenstein, S., 29
Jervis, R., 271, 273 Lichtman, R. R., 203
Johnson, David W., 68, 71, 72, 115-16, Lincoln, H., 20
217, 218, 219, 220n Lindenfeld, E., 232
Johnson, E. P., 71, 72 Lindskold, S., 198
Johnson, H. H., 14 Logan, L., 234
Johnson, R. T., 115-16, 218, 219, 220n Luce, R. D., 121
Jones, E. E., 20, 21 Lujansky, H., 24
Jonsson, D. R., 107, 108
Judd, C. M., 68, 93-94, 173 Maccoby, M., 276-77
Juster, E. T., 208 Mahor, M., 98, 202
justification of injustice, 52—53, 58, 59 malignant social process, 263—78; undoing,
justification techniques of restoring equity, 280-82
20, 21, 22 Mares, W., 232
just world hypothesis, 23, 59, 99, 102-03, Margolin, J. B., 68
203 market orientation, 5, 30, 39-40, 239
Maruyama, G., 115-16
Kahneman, D., 29, 275 Marwell, G., 75, 76
Ranter, R. M., 232, 248 Marx, Karl, 235-36, 266
Kaplan, S. J., 75, 76, 77 masochism, 48, 49
Karuza, J., Jr., 35, 98 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 64,
Katzell, R. A., 225-26, 228-29 65, 113-14, 219
Keeny, S. M., Jr., 262, 278 mate selection, 23-24
Kelley, H. H., 75, 76 Matza, D., 20
Kelman, Herbert C., 72, 198 McClelland, D. C., 89
Kennan, George E., 285 McCloskey, H. J., 41
kibbutzim, 100, 216, 231, 232, 235-42, 243 McCullers, J. C., 200
Kidd, R., 29, 97 McGraw, K. O., 200, 201
/
310 Index
Mead, G. H., 106 need: as distributive value, 2, 3, 5, 30, 32,

measurement procedures, 4, 31, 34, 35, 133 33, 36, 39, 40, 93, 104, 105, 108, 135-
Melman, S., 242 39, 143-47, 149, 157-58, 160-61, 163,
merit, 3, 6, 32, 33, 207-10, 221; attributes 198, 215-16, 256; as dominant distribu-
of, 207-09; profit indices of, 214 tive principle, 38, 42-44, 45; in motiva-
meritocratic principle, 4, 9, 133, 154, 156, tional orientation, 83, 85, 86-87, 89;
166, 179,202,203,209,211-12,221,256 types of, 43
merit pay systems, 226—27 negotiation; 73, 100, 107, 118, 197
Merton, R. K., lOn, 50, 76, 91, 109, 274 Neisser, U., 79
Messick, D. M., 1, 97 Nelson, D., 115
Michaels, J. W., 217, 218n Nesbitt, R., 199
Michels, R., 245 Nisbett, R. E., 29
Mikula, G., 1, 24, 29, 97, 98, 99, 104-05, nonaligned countries, 282—83
202, 203 non-punitive strategy, 130-32
Milburn, T. W., 267-68 nuclear freeze and disarmament, 279—80
military superiority, 264-65, 268, 276, 281 nuclear war, 6, 64-65, 262-63; accidental,
Miller, D. T., 29 275—76, 280; limited, 262, 279; strate-
Mills, C. W., 106 gies, 276-78
minimum, maintenance of, 3, 215, 253—54
minority groups, 47—48, 55, 63. See also
Oakeshott, R., 232
blacks
observers of injustice, 22-23
Mintz, A., 68
occupational status, 208, 211, 212
Mischel, W., 199
Okun, A. M., 222
misjudgments, misperceptions, 263, 270—72
Oldham, G. R., 201
Mizuhara, T,, 68
Oppenheim, F. E., 41
mobilization, 6, 258—59
Osgood, C. E., 198, 280
mode of thought, 79, 93, 173
other-directed orientation, 3, 105-06, 215
Mondragon system, 231, 232, 233-35, 236,
outcome, 11-15, 16, 25, 28, 38-39, 88,
242
107—08; change in, for inequity correc-
moral community, 181, 185, 195; scope of,
tion, 13, 14, 19—20, 22; collective, 16,
4, 36-37, 59
26; maximization of, 14, 15—16, 26-27,
moral orientation, 5, 69, 74, 79, 82, 83-84,
102; vs. process, in cooperation-competi-
94, 99-100, 173; in cooperation-compe-
tion, 65, 68-70
tition, 85—86; in formal vs. informal re-
output, 2, 3, 15, 38, 215-16. See also
lationships, 91; in power relationships,
outcome
87—88; in task-oriented vs. social-emo-
tional relationships, 90
motivation, 3, 26-28, 71, 137, 158-59, Palgi, M., 237
207—08, 257—58; in cooperative vs. Panofsky, W. K. H., 262, 278
competitive system, 217, 220n, 249; ef- Parsons, T., 88
fect of incentives on, 198—202, 226; by participation, 256; in cooperatives, 237—38,
grades, 209—10, 215, 217; intrinsic vs. 243, 244-45; encouragement of, 245;
extrinsic, 28, 106, 161-62, 198-202, worker, 223, 226, 227-30. See also deci-
239; and performance, 198-202, 226; sion-making procedures
by sense of justice vs. frustration, 184- Pechota, V., 198
85 peer support/acceptance, 116, 186-88, 203
motivational orientation, 5, 74, 79, 82, 83, Pennock, J. R., 41
94; in cooperation-competition, 84-85; perception, 12—13, 16-17, 18, 20; in coop-
in formal vs. informal relationships, 90- erative vs. competitive processes, 118—
91; in power relationships, 86—87; in 19, 270-72; of injustice, 51—52, 54
task-oriented vs. social-emotional rela- performance: as distributive value, 3, 215—
tionships, 89 16; improvement of, 3, 133-34, 215. See
Mouton, Jane, 72, 117—18 also productivity; task performance
Moyer, M. M., 203 personal development and welfare orienta-
multi-principle approach, 105 tion, 38, 42-44, 45
Murray, H. A., 85, 87, 89, 90 personality traits, 79, 173
mutual security, 264, 281 perspective-taking, 116, 218, 270
Peters, S. C., 14
national security, 264, 268, 274, 276, 281 Peterson, C., 204
nature of good or harm being distributed, 2, Pettigrew, T., 53, 54
31-32 Pipes, Richard, 267
Index 311
politeness ritual, 99, 105, 138, 166, 167, relative advantage, 10-11, 13-14, 17—18,
172-73, 179 23, 110, 186-88, 195, 208
Porac, J., 199 relative deprivation, 10-11, 13-14, 17—18,
potential, as distributive value, 2, 215 23, 50-54, 109-10, 186-88, 193-95,
power, 40, 41, 54-58, 67, 70, 161, 255-56, 252; egoistical vs. fraternal, 51, 193
276; centralization, 245, 260; cognitive Rescher, N. P., 2, 32, 253-54
orientation, 86; corruption by, 209; dis- resource attractors, 208
tribution, 75; equalization, 237, 242, resources: categories of, 32, 108; equality of,
243; moral orientation, 87—88; motiva- 247; mobilization of, 258-59; scarcity, 38,
tional orientation, 86-87; resources of, 115, 253-55, 260; type of, and allocation
54, 55-56; struggle, 77-79, 93, 265-68; preference, 202. See also allocation
utilization, 218; workplace sharing of, responsibility, sense of, 196—97, 219
227, 229 retaliation, 19, 22; distress, 17, 18
Preiwisch, C. F., 226 revolution, 48—49; of rising expectations,
Prestholdt, P., 20 53, 283
Prisoners’ Dilemma game, 69, 121-24, 264 rewards, 6, 9-12, 15-16, 25, 26-28, 133-
problem-solving, 67, 256; relations, 78; 34, 154, 161-63, 196; collective, 16, 26;
techniques, 71—73, 257-58 in cooperative vs. competitive system,
procedural justice, 4, 35, 100, 101 217—18; differential, legitimization of,
productivity, 38-40, 133; in cooperative vs. 39-41; effect upon motivation and per-
competitive condition, 67, 114—15, 196, formance, 98, 198-202, 217—18, 226;
217-18, 249; group, 4, 6, 28, 40, 66, grades as, 211, 214, 216-21; injustice
98, 101-02, 157, 196, 198, 219; individ- study, 189-93; intrinsic vs. external, 28,
ual, 4, 36, 38-40, 157, 161, 162, 196, 106, 161-62, 198-202, 248; and pun-
198, 217-18; worker compensation and, ishment, 130
212, 225—27; worker ownership and, Riesman, D., 106
230—31, 233-34; worker participation rivalry, 77, 78
and, 228, 229. See also task performance “robbers’ cave” study, 117
productivity-(profit-)sharing plans, 226, 249 Rogers, E. D., 14
profit (reward minus cost), lOn, 11 — 12, 14 Rokeach, M., 258
promotive interdependence, 66-67, 70, 75 roles in distribution process, 2, 31, 32-33,
proportionality principle, 5, 9, 10, 16, 28, 35; teacher-student, 212—13
40, 99, 135—41; choice of (studies), 164, Rosenbaum, J. E., 208, 215
167, 169-70, 172-74, 179; effects of Rosenbaum, W. B., 13
(studies), 143-156, 157-63, 198, 202; Rosner, Menachem, 100, 235-42
prerequisites for validity, 133—34; rejec- Ross, A. S., 21
tion, 97 Ross, L., 29
prospect theory, 275 Ross, M., 17, 22
protecting relationship, 78, 87 Rothschild-Whitt, J., 231, 232
Pruitt, Dean, 72 Rubin, Jeffrey, 68, 72, 197, 198, 274
Pruitt, O. G., 197, 198 Rubin, Z., 23
psychological equity, 18, 19-20, 23, 24 rules for defining values, 3, 31, 33-34, 35
psychological orientation, 5, 74, 79-84; and Runciman, W. C., 51, 109
social relations, 79-84, 92—95, 174;
studies, 152-54, 162, 173-74, 178-79; sacrifice, 3, 24, 27, 215, 254
various types of interdependence and, 74, sadomasochism, 77, 78
84-92 Sampson, F7 E., 29, 38, 97, 98, 105-07
punishment, 17, 23; and reward, 130; of scarcity, 38, 115, 253-55, 260
self, 19, 21 Schanck, R. C., 82
schema, 82—83
Schimel, J. L., 247
race relations, racism, 46, 60—62, 115, 116, schools, 1—3, 42, 202; classroom confiict
284. See also blacks; discrimination resolution, 71-72, 73; tracking in, 215.
Raiffa, H., 121 See also education; grading svstems
Rapoport, Anatol, 72, 272 Schwartz, B., 198, 200, 201
rationality, 5, 16, 17, 29, 40, 49, 264, 275 Schweitzer, Albert, 36, 37
Raven, B. H., 68 Schwinger, T., 29, 97, 98, 99, 104-05, 202
Rawls, John, 1, 41, 42, 85, 136, 164, 253 scope of moral community, 4, 36-37, 59
Rayman, P., 236 script, 82—83
reciprocity, distributive principle of, 3, 215 self-blame, 18,47,48, 187-88, 195
reformed-sinner strategies, 130—31, 132 self-concept distress, 18
312 Index
self-efficacy, 204 superpowers, 6, 262, 264-70, 272-85

self-esteem, 4, 14, 41, 47, 86, 116, 196, Sykes, G. M., 20
219, 250-52; loss of, 18, 203, 250; and
mate selection, 23-24; oppressed groups Tajfel, H., 51
and, 48; studies, 137, 149-51, 161 Tamai, S., 68
self-fulfilling prophecies, 61, 263, 274 Tannenbaum, A. S., 230, 243, 244, 248
self-hate, 47—48, 116 task-orientation, 67, 76, 77—78, 85, 87, 91,
self-interest, 99, 102, 105, 179; disregard 114, 17^, 178, 179, 202; and cognitive
for, 166-67, 179 vs. motivational vs. moral orientation,
selfishness, 16, 26, 27—28 88-89, 90; in cooperative vs. competi-
self-punishment, 19, 21 tive processes, 119, 196
Seligman, M. E. P., 204 task performance, 3, 42; achievement vs. ef-
sense of injustice, 3, 4, 6, 31, 46—50, 110, fort grading, 155-57, 160; attitude to-
203-04; awakening, 50—63, 203; emo- ward system and, 158, 160-61; effects
tions of, 181, 184-85; studies of, 180- of incentives on, 198-202; m egalitarian
95 vs. meritocratic condition, 137, 139,
sexism, 52, 193-95, 203 140-41, 143-44, 148-49, 150-51,
Shapiro, M. H., 207, 208 152, 153-54, 156-57, 161-62; im-
Shearer, D., 227 provement, 3, 133-34, 200, 215, 226.
sharing, 5; in adversity, 6, 253—55, 260 See also productivity
Sheats, P., 76 Tawney, R. H., 41
Sherif, Muzafar, 72, 117-18 Taylor, A., 197
Shichman, Shula, 68, 197 Taylor, F. W., 235
Simmons, J., 232 Taylor, S. E., 203
Singleton, F., 243 Teger, A. I., 274
Skon, L., 115 tension: of conflict, 258, 269, 271; of in-
Slavm, R. E., 68, 196, 217, 220n equity,T3, 15; reduction modes, 13-15,
Slovic, P., 29 271, 272—73. See also distress
Snarey, J., 236 Thibaut, J. W., 17, 22, 35, 75, 100
social cohesion, 55-56, 57, 58, 259 Thomas, E. J., 68
social comparison, 11, 12—15, 54 Thomas, H., 234
social-emotional orientation, 76, 77-78, 85, Thorndike, R. L., 212
87, 91, 172, 174, 178, 202; and cogni- threat, 70, 256, 258, 266
tive vs. motivational vs. moral orienta- timing of distribution, 2, 31, 33, 35; in edu-
tion, 88-89, 90 cation, 214-15
social loafing, 196-97, 246 Tito, Josip, 244
social organization, facets of, 55-56, 58 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 53, 267
social orientation, 38, 41—42, 44 Tojo, Hideki, 273
social support, 186-88, 195, 203 Tornblom, K. Y., 107-09, 202
sociocentric distributive principles, 202 Triandis, H. C., 75, 76
socioeconomic merit, 207—08 and n, 210, trust, 69, 122-24, 218, 226, 259, 264, 271
211 Tuchman, Bruce, 100, 154n, 180n
solidarity orientation, 6, 30, 42, 44-45, 98, Turner, C. F., 208
101, 164-66, 173, 174, 178-79, 202, turn-the-other-cheek strategy, 129, 130-32
216 Tversky, A., 29, 275
specialization, 55, 217, 218, 219, 246, 259
Spence, J. T., 194 underdeveloped countries, 282-84
Spence, K. W., 200, 201 unequal social relations, 75-76, 78-79, 85,
status-disequilibrium, 42, 54 90; cognitive vs. motivational vs. moral
Steil, Janice M., 68, 100, 180n, 186n, 193n orientation in, 86, 87, 88
Stein, M. I., 73 unwitting commitments, 263, 272-74, 275
Steiner, I. D., 14 Ury, W., 72, 197
Stephen, F. H., 243 U.S. Plywood cooperatives, 232-33, 235
Stephenson, G. M., 22 Utne, M. K., 29, 97
Stevens, C. M., 197
Stouffer, S. A., 50, 109 veil-of-ignorance condition, 136, 138, 167,
styling of distribution, 2, 31, 33, 35; in edu- 169, 170, 171-73, 253
cation, 214-15 vicious escalating spiral, 263, 264, 274-76
substitutability, 66, 67, 70, 246 victim (exploited), 18, 21, 46-47, 88; com-
Sullivan, H. S., 106 pensation of, 19, 20-23; maximization
superficial relationships, 76, 85 of power, 54-58; and peer support, 203;
Index 313
relieving distress of, 22-23; sense of in- Winston, T., 203

justice, 46-48, 50-58, 189-93, 203-04 Wish, M., 75, 76, 77
victimizer (exploiter), 18, 21, 46—47, 59; re- women, 48, 52, 56, 98, 109, 203, 208n,
lieving distress of, 19—22; retaliation 212; vs. men, in various studies, 140—41,
against, 19, 22; sense of injustice, 46—47, 143-45, 147, 149-51, 160, 161, 187-
48-50, 59-63, 191 88; sense of injustice study, 193-95
Wood, J. V., 203
wage systems, 133—34, 225—27 Woodworth, W., 230
Walker, L., 35, 100 worker compensation, 11, 13-14, 33-34,
Wallington, S. A., 19 39-40, 133-34, 212, 223; performance-
Walster, E., 1, 9, 11, 15-25, 26, 40, 97, based, 225-27
108 worker participation, 223, 226, 227-30,
Walster, G. W., 1, 9, 11, 15-25, 26 237-38, 243, 249
Walton, Richard, 72, 197, 198 worker performance, 198-202, 223, 225-
Walzer, M., 32, 41 27, 249
Warren, J. R., 212 Workie, A., 68, 116
Weber, M., 76 work sphere, 2, 4, 6, 202, 211, 216; egali-
Weick, W. E., 27 tarianism in, 223-44; employer-
Weiner, B., 89 employee relations, 11, 224; tension re-
White, J. H., 22 duction, 13
Whitehead, L. A., 35 Wyden, P., 197
Whitehorn, A., 243
Whyte, E. W., 224, 231, 232, 235, 236, Yankelovich, D., 225-26, 228-29
242, 248 Yerkes, R. M., 200, 201
Williams, K., 196 Yugoslavian model cooperatives, 232, 242—
Williams, R. M., 109 44
Willis, R. H., 97
winner-takes-all, 30, 93, 135—41, 143—48, Zander, A. F., 76
152-54, 157-63, 202; “high-low” re- Zeaman, D., 200
ward system, 148—50, 160 Zeiss, A. R., 199

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DISTRIBUTIVE

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Designed by Margaret E.B. Joyner

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence

Preface and Acknowledgments vii

2. A Critique of Equity Theory 9

PART II. RESEARCH

8. Cooperation-Competition: Earlier Studies of Different Distribution

PART III. APPLICATIONS

14. Education and Distributive Justice: Some Reflections on Grading

This book is concerned with the social psychology of distributive justice. My

dents who are physically handicapped or socioeconomically disadvantaged.

(e) according to their efforts and sacrifices;

6. Measurement procedures. How are the rules or criteria operationalized and

Much of the theoretical and empirical work presented in this book is

My work on the social psychology of justice was initiated by an invitation

conference on injustice in North America. In preparation for the 1972 confer-

labels could be labeled as “justice” research quite properly. Thus, my early

rnrr ■ ■■■•v' ■' ; -■ ' ■-

'■ ,U- : i ■ .V ' - . -'

A Critique of Equity Theory

rewards, contributions, or investments. In judging whether one has re-

Homans (1974) has illustrated the workings of the rule of distributive

Adams, like Homans, is dealing with perceived inequity as well as per-

WALSTER, BERSCHEID, AND WALSTER

Adams’s major contributions to the development of equity theory were to

Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where

Proposition IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable rela-

The propositions are grounded in a particular view of human nature and

conclude that the relationship between A and B is or is not equitable. Two

Relieving the Distress of the Exploiter:

Relieving the Distress of the Exploiter:

Instead of restoration of actual equity, an exploiter may relieve his distress by

relationship is in fact equitable. He can do this by reducing his own perceived

The Choice of Technique to Restore Equity

The “adequacy” of a technique is defined as the extent to which it will

Relieving the Distress of the Exploited

Walster et al. describe three techniques employed by victims to restore equity:

is not successful, to force a harmdoer to make restitution to his victim, with

Equity Theory and Intimate Relations

CRITIQUE OF EQUITY THEORY

feel. Presumably, the anticipated distress of inequitable behavior may serve to

contributions/ Superimposed on this rational model of coming to an equity

suggested that “need” may be the predominant value of distributive justice in

THE CONCEPT OE JUSTICE

Broadly viewed, the concept of distributive justice is concerned with the

considerable ambiguity in the meaning of the different principles. The sense

“Procedural justice,” as traditionally conceived, refers to the fairness of the

The Natural Values of Justice

The Scope of Justice

My preceding discussion has limited the concept of justice so that it is appli-

verts”—who are perceived to be outside one’s potential moral community or

Cooperation and Justice

Is it unduly limiting to restrict the concept of justice to situations in which

Determinants of the Value Base

I shall outline briefly the theoretical underpinnings of these propositions:

a person’s share of economic goods should be determined by his relative skill

linked to a person who cannot be bought or sold or used without regard to

the temptation to accumulate personal power may give rise to an equity

more good-looking than you, I am superior to you as a person); (2) general-

pie of need than that of equality or equity in allocating resources in such

mental hypotheses: the more face-to-face contact that members of a group