GALLEGO VS VERRA

G.R. No. L-48641 November 24, 1941

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte,
which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the
election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.

Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman,
Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost.
In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for
the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in
September 1940.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in
December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated
that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was
elected mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:

NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by
choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that
Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a
teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2)
His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land
in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He
visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a
stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected
with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.

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ROMUALDEZ V RTC etal. (G.R. No. 104960, 1993 (Case Digest)

Romualdez v. RTC etal, Sept. 14, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of Imelda
Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the
days of People Power, relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled
the country. One of them are the Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United
States.

However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else they’ll be
deported. Upon receipt of the information, Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay
his return to his residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the
voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter.
However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the
appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his
sudden departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because he is still considered a
resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great
fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment
of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every
citizen enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.

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Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)

FACTS:

In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No.
8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10,
2010.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer
upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest
elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-
election acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by
operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive
period set forth by R.A. 8189.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every
national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day
period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.

R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A.
8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this
grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common
underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot
be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.

With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the
petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the
prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.

As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.

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Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized
(those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in
provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one
or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in
provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction:
Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said
that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51
and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their
charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary
of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being
only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it
is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit.
It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
thecontinued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincialofficials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law
since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is
without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and
denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

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US v. Dorr

Facts

Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No.
292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or
circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of
the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned
acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom
criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de
Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as
"rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as
"rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292.

Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In
addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to
produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the
same conclusion.
As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing political
system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of
Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law
intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its individual members,
not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292.

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ACCFA v CUGCO G.R. No. L-21484. November 29, 1969.

J. Makalintal

Certiorari

Facts:

(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative
machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the
Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA)
and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations
composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations
against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the
collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and
refusal to bargain.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en
banc. Hence this appeal.

During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of
Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors
and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court agreed with this move.
However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.

Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given
that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified

Ratio:

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture.

According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to
enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as
the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include powers non really accorded to non-government
entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government
agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.

Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a government agency
tasked t implement land reform.

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining
powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the
grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA is a
government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.
These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished
from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these
letter functions being ministrant, he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals." continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities
that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.

Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court
below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic
weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.

This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:

"SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. — The terms and conditions of employment
in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of
securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike:
Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions
of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations."

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