the loeb classical library

FdUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

edited by
Gr. P. GDOLD, PH.D.

PREVIOUS EDITORS
T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. + E CAPPS ph n
W. H. D. ROUSE, Lirr.D. ^ fL ^

t E. H. WAKMINGTON, "

PLOTINUS
VII

468
 PLOTINUS
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
A. H. ARMSTRONG
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

vn

ENNEADS
VI. 6-9

CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
MCMLXXXVni
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1988

CONTENTS
PAGE
. vii
PREFACE ............................................................................
. . ix
SIGLA.....................................................................................
ORDO ENNEADVM and ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS . . • - *
American ISBN 0-674-99515-5
British ISBN 0 434 99468 5 ENNEAD VI.
6. ON NUMBERS.............................................................................
7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND
ON THE GOOD . ...........................................................................
8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE ... 221
9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE...................................................

Printed ih Great Britain by

Thomson Litho Ltd, East Kilbride, Scotland V
\
 PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI-VII

t
The text of these volumes corresponds to that of
j the third volume of the revised editio minor of Henry
and Schwyzer (Plotini Opera III, Oxford Classical
Texts, 1982), with correction of printers’ errors and a
few changes in punctuation, except in the following
places, where the changes are indicated in the
critical notes:
vol. VI vol. vn
VI. 1.12. 3? VI. 7.1. 4&-9
VI. 2. 5.5 ' VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21 VI. 7. 7. 26-8
VI. 3. 4. 36 VI. 8.1. 7
VI. 4. 3.15 VI. 8.14.19
VI. 5. 8. 29-31 VI. 8.18. 29
VI. 5.10. 44 VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5.12. 6
Indices have not been provided. The availability of
the recently published Lexicon Plotinianum (by J. H.
Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven
1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index
unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the
Index Fontium in Plotini Opera III (see above), while
« not complete, is very extensive and must be referred
i
to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of
1

t
t Vll

1
 PREFACE

Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is

continuing.
The preparation of Volumes VI and VII for publi­
cation has been assisted by grants from the British
Academy and the Leverhulme Trust, which are SIGLA
gratefully acknowledged.

A. H. Armstrong. A = Laurentianus 87, 3.

A* = codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85,16.
R = VaticanusReginensisGr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
w = AE
X = RJ
mg = in margins
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
H-S' = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S“ = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)

IX
 ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO
Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
I 1 53 n 1 40 Ill 1 3
I 2 19 II 2 14 m 2 47
I 3 20 II 3 52 III 3 48
I 4 46 II 4 12 III 4 15
I 5 36 II 5 25 ra 5 50
I6 1 11 6 17 in 6 26
I 7 54 II 7 37 m 7 45
I 8 51 n 8 35 m 8 30
I 9 16 n 9 33 III 9 13
Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
IV I 21 V 1 10 VI 1 42
IV 2 4 V 2 11 VI 2 43
IV 3 27 V 3 49 VI 3 44
IV 4 28 V 4 7 VI 4 22
IV 5 29 V 5 32 VI 5 23
rv 6 41 V 6 24 VI 6 34
rv 7 2 V 7 18 VI 7 38
IV 8 6 V 8 31 VI 8 39
IV 9 8 V 9 5 VI 9 9

ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS COMPARATVR

CVM ORDINE ENNEADVM
chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn.
1 I 6 19 I 2 37 II 7
2 rv 7 20 I 3 38 VI 7
3 ni 1 21 IV 1 39 VI 8
4 IV 2 22 VI 4 40 II 1
5 V 9 23 VI 5 41 rv 6
6 rv 8 24 V 6 42 VI 1
7
8
V 4
IV 9
25 II 5 43 vr 2
26 III 6 44 VI 3
9 VI 9 27 IV 3 45 III 7
10 V 1 28 IV 4 46 I 4
11 V 2 29 IV 5 47 ni 2
12 II 4 30 III 8 48 III 3
13 III 9 31 V 8 49 V 3
14 II 2 32 V 5 50 m5
15 III 4 33 II 9 51 I 8
16 I 9 34 VI 6 52 II 3
17 II 6 35 II 8 53 I 1
18 V 7 36 I 5 54 I 7

X
 PLOTINUS
ENNEAD VI. 6-9
 SVMMARIVM

TdSe eveart. HXcotivov <f>iXoa6(l>ov fwedSos eK-rqr

VI. 1 jiis'Ile/Ji TOiv yevoiv toO ovros a'.

VI. 2 Tlept Twv yevaiv rov ovtos
VI. 3 HTj' Ilept TWV yevwv rov ovtos y .
VI. 4 n9' Ilcpt Tov TO ov ev Kat tovto ov ajLia
TTavTayov etvai oXov a .
VI. 5 v' ne/>i TOV TO ov ev Kai tovto ov a/xa
TTavTayov etvai oXov j3'.
VI. 6 va' Ilepi dpidpwv.
VI. 7 vp' riept TOV TTWS TO TrXrjOos rcov lOeon'
virloTT] Kat 7T€pl rayaOov.
VI. 8 vy' Ilept TOV eKovaCov Kai deX'qpaTOS TOV
t /
€VOS-
VI. 9 vS' Ilepi Tayadov rj tov evos.

3
 I
$

I^

♦ *

VI. 6. ON NUMBERS
Introductory Note
This treatise is number 34 in Porphyry’s chronological
order. It immediately follows the work now generally
referred to as the "Gross-Schrift" or "Great Work”, which
Porphyry so strangely divided into four and placed in three
different Enneads (see Introductory Note to III, 8), so that
in his Ennead edition it appears as III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5
(32) and II. 9 (33). V. 5 contains a brief account of what
Plotinus thought about the One and numbers in chapters
4 and 5, and the present treatise is announced at the end of
chapter 4: "If there are ahy difficulties about this, we will
deal with them later.” The status of numbers in the
intelligible world and the generation of Numbers and
Forms from ultimate principles, the One and the Indefinite
Dyad, had been matters of interest and importance to
Platonists since the lifetime of Plato himself, especially to
those who were influenced by that side of their traditional
inheritance which goes back to the Pythagoreans. Between
the time of the revival of Platonism and Pythagoreanism in
the first century B.C. and the time of Plotinus a considerable
numerological literature had developed. But his treatise on
Numbers is not at all closely related to it. His thought here
is outstandingly original and independent and his interest
in numbers is subordinate to his great primary concerns, to
show how all reality proceeds in due order from its source,
the One or Good, and how the human spirit may find its
way hack to that soirrce, which is also its goal. He looks
back to the discussions about the Ideal Numbers which
took place in the Academy in the lifetime of Plato (about
which he does not appear to know more than the scanty
6 7
ON NUMBERS
and baffling surviving evidence permits us to). And he
takes account of Aristotle’s discussions of the Ideal
Numbers in Books A, M and N of the Metaphysics and of
such limited light as the Aristotelian commentators read in
his school, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Porphyry
Life chapter 14), could throw on these passages of Aristotle.
But he does not seem to have been very much interested in
or affected by the Pythagorean or Pythagoreanizing
numerologists. The differences between their surviving
works and the thought of Plotinus about the Ideal Numbers
and the One are well described in the introduction to the
recent Paris edition of VI. 6: "The two principal themes
developed in this treatise, which are the problem of infinite
number (chs. 1-3 and 17-18) and the status of number in the
intelligible (chs. 4-16), do not derive from the current
arithmological tradition. On the other hand, this tradition
is distinguished by two very widespread characteristics: it
includes a technical initiation into arithmetic and
culminates in a theology and mysticism of numbers ...
Now Plotinus shows himself very reserved about the
number-mysticism which was so much in favour before, as
after, his time. As for his arithmetical knowledge, it is
indisputable, but it does not seem to have been encumbered
by technical detail”* (cp. Porphyry Life ch. 14, 7-10).
There is however one passage from a Pythagorean
numerological writer, Moderatus of Gades, who seems to
have been of some philosophical importance and whose
thought in some ways anticipated the Neoplatonism of
Plotinus,^ the beginning of which is worth quoting in
conclusion as it has something in common with the
approach of Plotinus and shows why he would have
* Plotin Traiti Sur les Nombres {Enniade VI 6 34), ed.
with translation and commentary by Janine Bertier and
others (Paris 1980), Introduction pp. 9-10.
® On Moderatus see J. Dillon The Middle Platonists
(London 1977) 344-51.
 ON NUMBERS
thought it necessary to take speculation about numbers
seriously. It is to be found in Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras
48-63: "Moderatus says that the Pythagoreans, since they
were not able to express clearly in words the first forms and
the first principles because they were so hard to
understand and hard to explain, turned to the numbers for
the sake of intelligible instruction.” For Plotinus not only
the One but the realities of the intelligible world are
strictly beyond the reach of discursive thought and
language. But the traditional number-language, like other
kinds of language, may instruct us and help us on our way
to the direct apprehension of them which is our goal.
Synopsis
Is multiplicity, as a falling away from the One, and so
infinity as innumerable multiplicity, evil? Yes, in so far as
it is a self-dissipation of a thing’s self, a going outwards
instead of inwards. But it can be limited and made good and
beautiful by unitary and unifying form (ch. 1). The
"number of the infinite” is not in the sense-world. Number
is not created by the numberer; it is limited in the
intelligible world but we multiply it subjectively (ch. 2).
How can the infinite really exist as infinite (or
undetermined), when what exists is already determined by
number? Multiplicity in the real intelligible world is not
evil, though lower than the One, because it is determined
and unified by the One; but it is the infinite (undetermined)
which is limited. Infinity is not in -motion or at rest:
difficulty of focusing the mind on this slippery nature (ch.
3). Different ways of thinking about intelligible numbers:
are they posterior to the Forms or co-ordinate with them or
prior to them? Difficulties in the interpretation of Plato on
number (ch. 4). Numbers cannot be simply incidental even
if inevitable accompaniments of Forms: they must have
some kind of prior independent existence (ch. 5).
Refutation of a subjective-idealist view of Forms and
8 9
ON NUMBERS
Numbers: thought does not make intelligible realities but
they make our thought of them (ch. 6). The wonderful unity
in diversity of Intellect, in which all realities are together,
which Soul loves and aspires to; how to attain to
contemplation of that reality (chs. 7-8). The order of the
primary triad: Being before Intellect, Intellect before Life;
the real numbers are in and prior to Being; quantitative
number is an image of them (chs. 8-9). Continuing
argument for the priority and independent existence of all
number, not only the one (chs. 10-11). Refutation of the
Stoic view that one and number have no real existence but
are ways in which the soul is affected when it encounters
things: the one and number are prior to thought and to
substance (chs. 12-13). Number cannot be reduced to
relation (ch. 14). Intellect is the true universal living being
in which all living things exist together, and our universe
imitates it; in both, numbers are prior to and generate
beings (ch. 15). Quantitative number is secondary and
depends for its existence on substantial number in Intellect
and in the soul (ch. 16). The infinity or unlimitedness of
intelligible number is not like the subjective unlimitedness
of a line; line and figure are posterior to number, but have a
real existence in the real living being and in Intellect (ch.
17). Number in the intelligible is unlimited only in the
sense that it is absolute measure and cannot be measured
by anything elSe. Concluding vision of the beauty and
majesty of the intelligible world (ch. 18).
 VI. 6. (34) nEPI APIQMnN
VI. 6. ON NUMBERS
1. ’Ap eari to nXrjdos aTroGraais tov evos Kai -q
1. Is multiplicity a falling away from the One, and
a-TTeipia dmaraois TravTeXrjs tw nX^jdas avdpiBfiov infinity a total falling away because it is an innumer­
elvai, Kai 8id to to kukov eivai, ^ dneipia, Kai ■qp.els able multiplicity and for this reason is evil in so far
as it is infinity, and are we evil when we are multi­
KaKoi, orav nXijdos; Kai yap ttoXv CKaarov, orav plicity'? For a thing is multiple when, unable to tend
5 dSwarow els avro veveiv y^V^ai Kai eKTelvqrai to itself, it pours out and is extended in scattering;
and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its
aKihvdp.€vov Kai trdvT-q fiev arepiOKopievov ev rij yvaei outpouring it becomes multiplicity, since there is
TOV ivos TrXrjdos ylveadai, ovk ovros tov aXXo wpos dXXo nothing to unite one part of it to another; but if
something comes to be which abides in its outpour­
p.epos avTov evovvTOS' el Se ti yevoiTo del x^dpievov ing, it becomes a magnitude. But what is there
dreadful about magnitude? Now, if a thing perceived
p.evov, fieyedos yCveTai. dAAd ti Setvdv tw pieyeBei; rj el
it, it would be dreadful; for it would perceive that it
TjadaveTOf av atf> eavTov yap yivopievov Kai had come to be out of itself and had gone far away
from itself. For everything seeks not another, but
10 a<f>iaTap,evov els to noppo) •paddveTO. eKaoTov yap ovk
itself, and the journey to the exterior is foolish or
aXXo, aXX avTo ^rjTei, tj 8 e^oj rropela pidTaios rj compulsory. A thing exists more, not when it comes
to be many or large, but when it belongs to itself: and
avayKaCa. p.dXXov 8e eariv eKaoTov, ov^ OTav yevrjTai
it belongs to itself in tending to itself. But the desire
TToXv rj pAya, dXX’ OTav eavrov ■§■ eavTov 8’ eoTi rrpos to be great in this way is the property of something
which does not know what true greatness is and is
avTo vevevKos. rj 8e e(f)eais rj rrpos to ovtcvs peya hastening not where it should but to the exterior;
15 dyvoovvTOs eari to ovtcvs peya Kai arTev8ovTOS ovx oS but the direction towards itself was inward. A sign of
this is that when a thing comes to exist in magni­
8et, aXXa rrpos to e^w to 8e rrpos avTo to ev8ov •^v. tude, if it is by separation of parts, it exists as each
papTvpiov 8e TO yevopevov peyedei, el pev drrrjpTrj- Pythagorean view of the evil of multiplicity and infinity (or
indefiniteness), which, in his usual way, he modifies in the
' Plotinus begins here with a traditional Neo- direction of a more positive valuation of multiplicity and
number as the treatise continues. Cp. ch. 3, 7-9.
10
11
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
fxevov, d)s eKaorov toiv fxepwv avrov eivai, eKelva
eTvai eKaara, dAA’ ovk avro to dpxTjS' el 8‘ earai
20 avTO, Set rd vavra pepr] npos ev djare elvai avro, orav
dp/rjyeTrTj ev, p,ri p,eya, ‘fj. ylverai toIvvv Sid pev to
peyedos, Kai oaov ewi Tip peyedei diroXXopevov avTOV- o
TL Se eyei ev, eyei eavTO. Kai prjv to irdv peya Kai KaXov.
rj OTi OVK dijyeiO'q <f>vyetv els Trjv drreiplav, dAAd
25 ■!TepieX'q<f)d'q evr
Kai KaXdv ov tw peya, dAAd Tip KaX&-
Kai eSe’qOrj tov KaXov, oti eyeveTo peya. enei eprjpov ov
TOVTO, oaip peya, Toaip dv KaTeif>dvr] alaypov Kai ovtid
TO peya vXrj tov KaXov, oti ttoXv to Seopevov Koapov.
pdXXov o5v aKoapov to peya Kai pdXXov alaypov.
2. Tt ovv erri tov Xeyopevov dpiBpov TTjs dneiplas;
dAAd npiVTOV TTws dpiBpos, el dneipos; ovTe yap rd
alaBrjTa dneipa, iLoTe ovSe d e-n’ avTols dpiBpos, ovTe 6
dpiBpihv TTjv dneipiav dpiBper dAAd Kav SinXdaia rj
5 TToXXaTrXdaia rroif), dpi^ei Taina, Kav rrpds to peXXov rj
TO TrapeXrjXvBds Xap^dvr) rj Kai dpov, dpi^ei Tavra. dp’
ovv ovy drrXcus drreipos, ovtw Se, toare del e^etvai
Xap^dveiv; rj ovk erri Tip dpiBpovvTi to yewdv, dAA’ rjSrj
cdpiOTai Kai eaTTjKev. rj ev pev Tip vorjTip iLarrep rd ovTa
10 ovTO) Kai d dpiBpds dipiapevos oaos rd dvTa. rjpeis Se
cos TOV avBpiorrov rroXXd rroiovpev eij>app6lovTes
rroXXaKis Kai to KaXdv Kai to dXXa, ovtiv peTa
' The text of Plato referred to here seems to be the
mention of amtpos apiBpos at Parmenides 144A6; cp.
Aristotle Metaphysics M 8. 1083b36-1084al.
12
ON NUMBERS
and every one of its parts, and they each of them
exist, but not the original thing itself; but if it is
going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one: so
that it is itself when it is one in some way, not large.
So through magnitude and as far as depends on
magnitude it loses itself; but as far as it possesses a
one, it possesses itself. Yet, all the same, the uni­
verse is large and beautiful. This is because it has
not been left to escape into infinity, but has been
circumscribed by one; and it is beautiful not by
largeness but by beauty; and it needed beauty
because it became large. For if this universe was
destitute [of beauty] it would have appeared as ugly
as it was large; and so largeness is the matter of
beauty, because what needed ordered beauty was
many. Therefore the largeness [of the universe] is
rather lacking in ordered beauty and rather ugly
[than beautiful].
2. What, then, about what is called the niunber of
the infinite'? But first, how is it a number, if it is
infinite? For the objects of sense are not infinite, so
their number is not infinite either, and the numberer
does not number infinity; but, even if he makes them
twice or many times as many, he limits them, and
even if he takes into account the past or the future
or both at once, he limits them. Is then the number
not simply infinite, but so that we can always take
more? No, the generation of number is not in the
power of the nuniberer, but it is already limited and
tov
stands fast. Or, in the intelligible, just as the real
beings are limited so is the number limited to as
many as the real beings. But we, just as we make
"man” many by many times applying beauty and the
rest to him, so along with each image we generate an
13
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
eiScoXov eKOLOTov Kal etSojXov api9fj,ov avvairoyevvwfxev,
Kai ws TO aoTV ■noXXaTrXaaiovp.ev ovx v<f>eaT6s
15 ovTWS, Tov avTov Tporrov Kat tovs apidp,ovs ttoXv-
TrXaaiovs TTOiovp,ev Kal ei tovs Se api0poip€v,
a<f>’ wv eyop-ev apiOpcvv ivayopiev errl tovs xpovous
p,ev6vTwv €v rip.lv eKeivcvv.
3. ’AAAd TO aneipov S'q tovto ttcos v<l>iaTr}K€v ov
aneipov; o yap v<l>4aTr]Ke Kal eOTiv, apidpip
KaTeiXrjTTTai 1781J. dAAd rrpoTepov, el ev toIs ovaiv ovtcoj
•nXfjBos, ircoj KaKov to rrXrjdos; rj oti rjvwTai. to TrXrjOos
5 Kal KeKcoXvTai navT-q rrXfjOos eivai ev ov nXrjdos. Kal Sid
TOVTO Se eXaTTovTai tov evos, oti rrXqdos oaov
■npds TO ev x^lpov- Kal ovk exov Se Tqv (f>vaiv eKeivov,
dAAd eK^e^qKOS, rjXaTTWTai, tw S’ evl nap’ eKelvtp to
aepvdv exei, Kal aveoTpeiJie Se to nXqdds els ev Kal
10 epeivev. dAA’ q dneipla ndis; q yap ovaa ev toIs ovaiv
qdq coptOTOi, q el pq copiOTOi, ovk ev toIs oSaiv, aXX’ ev
Tols yivopevois laws, ws Kav^ tw xpdvw. q Kav opiadq,
TOVTW ye dneipos' ov yap to nepas, dAAd to aneipov
opl^eTai' ov yap Sq dXXo ti peTa^v neparos Kal aneipov,
15 d Tqv TOV opov SexeTai (l>vaiv. tovto Sq to aneipov
(fievyei pev avTO Tqv tov nepaTOS ISeav, aXloKerai Se
nepiXq<f>dev e^wdev. ijrevyei Se ovk els Tonov dXXov ef
' Igal: Kai Enn.
' The idea of subjective, imaginary multiplication here
derives from Aristotle Physics F 8. 208al5-20.
14
ON NUMBERS
image of number, and, as we multiply the town
though it does not really exist as multiple, in the
same way we also multiply the numbers'; and if we
should be numbering times, we apply numbers to
them from those which we have, and those numbers
still remain within us.
3. But how can this infinite really exist as in­
finite? For what really exists and is, is already
determined by number. But before we consider that,
if there is really multiplicity in the real beings, how
is multiplicity evil? Now [multiplicity there is not
evil] because the multiplicity is unified and not
allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-
multiple. And because of this it is less than the One,
because it has multiplicity, and in so far as it is
compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does
not have the nature of that One; but has gone out
from it, it has been diminished, but it keeps its
majesty by the one in it, and it turned back its
multiplicity to one and there it stayed. But how
about infinity? For if it exists in the real beings it
has already been limited, or if it has not been
limited, it is not in the real beings, but perhaps in the
things which come to be, as also in time.^ Now even
if it is limited, it is by this very fact infinite [or
unlimited]; for it is not limit but the unlimited which
is limited [or bounded]; for there is certainly nothing
else between limit and unlimited which receives the
nature of boundary. This infinity, certainly, in itself
runs away from the idea of limit, but is caught by
being surrounded externally. But it does not run
away from one place to another: for it does not even
^ Cp. Aristotle Physics F 7. 207bl4-15.
15
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

erepov ov yap ovS’ eyei tottov dAA’ orav aXw, inreoTri have any place; but when it is caught, place comes
into existence. Therefore one cannot assume that
TOTTOS. 8i6 ovSe rr/v Xeyop,ivT]v Kivijaiv aiirijs roiriK-qv what is called its movement is movement in place
20 Oeriov ovSe Tiva aXXrjv toiv Xeyop,ev(x)v avrfj nap’ avTris nor does any other one of what are called forms of
movement belong to it of itself; so that it would not
VTrdpxciv' coCTTe ou5* dv klvolto. aXX ov8 earyjK^v av‘ be in motion. But on the other hand it does not stand
TTOV yap Tov ttov varepov yevop-evov; aXX eoiKev Tj still either: for where could it, when "where” came
to be afterwards? But the movement of infinity itself
KivTjais avrrjs rrjs dyreipias ovtco Xeyeadai, on prj seems to mean that it does not stay still. Is it then in
pevei. 3,p’ oSv ovTOJS d)S periwpos etvai ev toi a state of being up above in the same place, or
swinging to and fro? Certainly not: for both are
avTO), T] aiiopetadai eKeiae /cat 8evpo; ov8apci)S' dpixjxa judged in relation to the same place, what is up there
25 yap TTpos tov avrov tottov /cpiVerat, rd re peTeuipov and does not swing towards the same place and that
which swings. In what way, then, could one conceive
ov TrapeyKXivov [irpos tov avrov tottov] * /cat to
infinity? By separating its form in one’s reasoning.
TTapeyKXtvov. tI dv ovv ns eirivoTqoeiev avrrjv; rj What, then, will one conceive? One will conceive it
as the opposites and at the same time not the oppo­
XOipiaas TO eI8os rij 8iavoca. tI ovv voijaet; t) rd evavna
sites: for one will conceive it as great and small *—
dpa Kal ov rd evavria' Kat ydp peya /cat apiKpov for it becomes both—and at rest and moving—^for it
does really become these. But it is obvious that
30 voTjaei-—yiverai ydp dp(^oi—/cat kanas Kat
before becoming them it is neither definitely: other­
Kivovpevov—/cat ydp ravra yiverai. dAAd yrpd tov wise, you have limited [or defined] it. If then it is
ylveadai 8ijXov, on ovderepov ojptapevws' et 8e prj,
infinite, and infinitely and indefinitely infinite, it
could be imagined as either. And when you come up
wpiaas- el oSv direipos Kat ravra aTrelpcos Kat close to it and do not throw any limit over it like a
doploTws, jravraadeit] y dv eKarepa. Kat TTpoaeXdmv net you will have it slipping away from you and will
not find it any one thing: for [if you did] you would
eyyvs pr) eTTi^dXXtov n rripas dta-rrep St/cTuov have defined it. But if you approach any of it as one,
35 vireKtfrevyovaav i^ets Kat ov8e ev evprjaeis- '^St? ydp it will appear many; and if you say that it is many,
you will be wrong again: for if each [part] of it is not
(Zpioas- dAA’ et TCp npoaeXdots d)S evl, iroXXd (fraveiTaf
Kdv TToXXd etTTTjj, TtdAtv av tji€var)- ovk ovtos ydp * Aristotle records that Plato spoke of the indefinite
principle of multiplicity as a dyad "great and small”: see
Physics r 4. 203al5-16 and Metaphysics A 6. 987h26.
' del. Kirchhoff.
I?
i6
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

eKaarov ivos ovSe ttoXXo. ra ndvra. Kai avrrj <l>vaLS one, all of them cannot be many. And this nature of
it according to one and another of your imaginations
avTrjs Kad’ irepov tu)v <f>avTaofjLdTwv Kivrjais, Kai, Kado is movement, and, according as imagination has
40 TTpooijXdev r) <f>avTaa(a, ardais. Kai to fj,rj SvvaaBai Si arrived at it, rest. And the impossibility of seeing it
avTrjs avrrjv tSetv, Kiv-rjais diro vov Kai dTToXladrjais' to
by itself is movement from intellect and slipping
away; but that it cannot run away but is held fast
Se p,rj dnoSpdvai exeiv, etpyfaBai Se e^wBev Kai kvkXw from outside and all round and is not able to go on,
Kai fjirj i^eivai Trpoxojpeiv, ardcris dv eiTj- c5ot€ p.r) pidvov this would be its rest: so that one may not say that it
e^elvai KivelaBai Xeyeiv. is only in motion.
4. But we must consider how the numbers are in
4. riept 8e tcov dpiBpiuiv ottojs eyovaiv ev tco votjtw the intelligible, whether as coming into existence
OKeTTTeov, TTOTepa cos emyivopievcov toIs dXXois eiSeaiv after the other Forms or always accompanying them;
for instance, since being is of such a kind as to be
rj Kai vapaKoXovBovvTcov del" oiov CTreiSi) to ov
itself the first, we conceived it as monad, then, since
ToiovTov otov TTpwTOV avTO (tvai, evo’qaap.ev piovdSa, movement and rest came from it, we at that stage
5 err’ inei Kimjais avTOv Kai cjTdais, Tpia i}Sr], Kai €(f>’ conceived three, and a number for each of the other
Forms. No, not like this, but one monad was gen­
eKdoTov Tcov dXXojv eKaOTOv. t] ovy ovrios, oAAd erated along with each, or a monad for the first
avveyevvrjBrj eKdoTcp piovds piia, rj em fiev tov irpcoTov existent and for that after it, if there is an order, a
OVTOS piovds, eni Se tov jner’ eKeivo, el rdf is eoTi, Sods rj
dyad or as much as the plurality of each is, for
instance a decad if it is ten. Or not like this, but
Kai oaov TO irXrjBos eKdoTov, otov el SeKa, Se/cds. y ovy number was conceived itself by itself; and if so, was
10 ovTcos, dXX’ avTOs e<f)’ eavTov 6 dpiBpios evoriBr)- Kai el it prior to the others or posterior to them? Now Plato
says that men came to the idea of number by the
ooTtos, Trdrepa -npOTepos tcov dXXcov, y dorepos. d piev alternation of day and night, attributing'the concept
oSv UXdTcov els evvoiav dpiBpiov tovs dvBpcorrovs to the difference of the objects; perhaps he is saying
eXrjXvBevai elrrcov ■qpiepdiv npos vdicTas Trj TrapaXXayr), that the things numbered are prior and make num­
ber by their difference, and that it is coming into
TTj TWV TTpaypidTCOV eTepOTTjTl SlSoVS T-qV VOTjaiV, Tdx’ existence in the transition of soul as it goes on from
15 dv TO, dpiBprrjTa npoTepov 8i’ erepoTTjTOS iroieiv dpiBpidv one thing to another, and comes into existence when
the soul numbers^: that is when it goes over things
Xeyoi, Kai eivai avTOv avvioTdpievov ev pieTa^daei tlivxrjs
ene^iovarjs dXXo pieT dXXo rrpdypia Kai TOTe ylveaBai, 1 Plotinus is expounding here Plato Timaeus 39B-C and
OTav dpiBp.fl ■’■odro S’ eoTiv, OTav adrd Sie^lr} Kai 47A on how we come to our knowledge of number and time.

i8 19
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
Aeyij Trap avrij aAAo, 8e aAAo, ojs, ecus ye * ravrov ri
to
20 Kai erepov p,er‘ avro voet, ev Xeyovarjs. dAAd p.riv
orav Xeyrj ev rdi aXrjdivw dpidpLw ” Kai tov ipidpLOv ev
ovaia, TrdAiv aS vnoaraaiv riva dv d(f>’ eavrov tov
dpi6p,ov Xeyoi Kai ovk ev rij dpi6p,ovar] v(j>i<}Taadai
>pvxij, dAAd dvaKiveiadai ev eavTfj eK rijs irepl rd
aiaOrjrd TrapaXXayrjs rrjv ewoiav tov dpi6p,ov.
5. Ti'y odi' <j>vais avTov; dpa napaKoXovdrjpia Kai
oiov eTTidewpovpievov eKaoTT) ovala, olov dvOpcoTTOS Kai
ets dvdpwTTos, Kai ov Kai ev ov, Kai rd navTa eKaoTa rd
vorjTa Kai Trds 6 dpidpios; dAAd ttoij Sods Kai Tpids Kai
5 TTcvs TO. TTavTa Ka6‘ ev Kai 6 toiovtos dpiOpios eis ev dv
avvdyoiTo; ovtw yap eoTai ttX'^Oos piev evdSwv, els ev Be
ovSeis trapd to d-nXovv ev el pvt] tis Xeyoi, dis Sods p.ev
eoTiv eKetvo to vpdypia, pidXXov Be to eiri tu) TTpdypiaTi
6ewpovp.evov, o Bvo eyei Bvvdpieis avveiXrjpipievas oiov
10 avvdeTov els ev. rj oiovs eXeyov ol TlvOaydpeioi, oi
eBoKovv Xeyeiv dpidpiovs eK tov dvdXoyov, oiov
BiKaioavv7]v TeTpdBa Kai dXXov dXXojs' eKelvcos Be
pidXXov TO) TTXijdei TOV TTpdyp.aTOS evos ovtos opiws Kai
TOV dpidpiov av^vyTj, tooovtov ev, oiov BeKaBa. KaiToi
* Kirchhoff: t< Enn.
' The Timaeus passages might suggest that number only
exists in the numbering soul and is posterior to the visible
realities numbered. So Plotinus turns immediately to
Republic VII529C—D, where Socrates is insisting that true,
philosophical astronomy is concerned not with the visible
heavenly bodies but with "true” number and figure
perceptible only to thought.
^ Cp. Aristotle Metaphysics F 2. 1003b22-30.
20
ON NUMBERS
and says in itself "this is one thing and that is
another”, as, for instance, as long as it thinks some­
thing the same and does not think another thing
after it, it says "one”. But then when Plato says "in
the true number”, and speaks of the number in
substance,^ he will, on the other hand, be saying
that number has an existence from itself and does
not have its existence in the numbering soul but the
soul arouses in itself from the difference in sensible
things the idea of number.
5. What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an
accompaniment of each substance and something
observed in it—man and one man,^ for instance, and
being and one being, and so with all the individual
intelligibles and the whole of number? But how is
there a dyad and a triad, and how are all unified, and
how could such and such a number be brought
together into one? For in this way there will be a
multiplicity of unities, but no number will be
brought into unity except the simple one; unless
someone were to say that the dyad is that thing there
itself, or rather what is observed in that thing, which
has two powers brought together, as if conjoined
into one. Or numbers might be as the Pythagoreans
said they were: they seem to have spoken of numbers
analogically,® the tetrad as justice, for instance, and
other numbers in other ways; but in that way the
number would be coupled with the multiplicity of
the thing, which all the same is one, a one which is
so many, a decad for instance. We however do not
= Plotinus clearly has no source for early Pythagorean
thought which he regards as more dependable than
Aristotle. He is using here Metaphysics A 5. 985b23-51.
21
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
rjfieis ovx‘ ovTW ra SeKa, oAAd avvayovres Kai ra
15 Stearwra SeKa Xeyofiev. rj
ovto) /xev SeKa Xeyofiev, orav
Se eK TToXXwv yivrjrai ev, SeKaSa, d)s KaKet ovtcjs. dAA’
ei ourcus, dp’ ert viroaraais apidfiov earai eni rots
TTpaypaatv avrov deojpovp,evov; aAAd rt KwXveij <f>aL7j
av Tis, Kai Tov XevKov erri tois npdyp.aai Oewpovpevov
20 VTToaraaiv tov XevKov ev tois TTpdyp,aaiv etvai; enei Kai
Kivrjoeois eiTi toi ovti Oecvpovpievrjs vvoaraais ^v
KivTjaeoJS ev tw ovri ovarjs. [d S’ dpidpos ovy <os r)
Kiv-rjaisY dAA’ on ^ Kivrjais n, ovtws ev e-rr’ avTrjs
edecoprjdTj- <^o 8 api6p,6s ovx d)S r/ Kivrjaisy * Xeyerai.
25 eiTa Kai ij Toiavrr) vnoaraais d<f>(aTrjaitov dpidpov tov
ovalav elvai, avpLpe^rjKOS Se p,dXXov troiel. koltoi ovSe
avp^e^yjKOS oXws- to yap avfi^e^ijKOs Set ti eivai npo
tov avp.^e^y)Kevai, Kav dyotpiaTov ■§, opcos etvai ti
eavTov <j)vaiv Tivd, cos to XevKov, Kai KaTTjyopeladai
KaT dXXov TjSr] ov o KaTTjyoprjOTqaeTai. coore, el vepl
30 eKaoTov to ev Kai ov tovtov tw dvdpwnw to “ets
avdpwvos , aXX’ eTepov to ev tov dvOpcovov Kai koivov
TO ev Kai e(f> eKaoTOv twv dXXwv, TrpoTepov dv etr] to
TOV avOpwTTov Kai eKdoTov twv dXXwv, tva Kai d
avOpwTTOs Kai eKaoTov twv dXXwv Tvyr] eKaOTov tov ev
35 eivai. Kai rrpo Kivijaews toIvvv, etirep Kai rj Kivrjais ev,
' transpos. Igal.
' I adopt this rendering of KaKet in agreement with Henry
and Schwyzer; most translators take eKet in the usual sense
22
ON NUMBERS
conceive ten like this, but we bring together things
that are separate and say "ten”. This indeed is how
we say "ten”, but when a unity comes to be from
many, we say "decad”, because this is how it is also
in the Pythagorean way of thinking.^ But if this is
so, will there still be any real existence of number
when it is only observed in things? But, someone
might say, what is there to prevent there being a real
existence of white in things, though white also is
only observed in things? For movement also was
observed in being and there was a real existence of
movement which is in being. But because movement
is a something, in this way a unity was observed in
it; but number is not spoken of in the same way as
movement. And then a real existence of this kind
would deprive number of being substance, and make
it rather something incidental. Yet not even altog­
ether an incidental; for the incidental must be some­
e<f>’ thing before incidentally occurring, and, even if it is
inseparable, all the- same be something by itself, a
particular nature, like white, and be predicated of
something else when it is already what it will be
predicated as. So that, if "one” applies to each
individual thing and "one man” is not the same as
ev
"man”, but the "one” is other fhan the "man” and
the "one” is common and belongs to all the other
individual things, the "one” would be prior to
"man” and all the other individual things, so that
man and each of the others might succeed in being
one. And so it is prior to movement, since movement
also is one thing, and prior to being, so that being
for Plotinus, "in the intelligible world”, which does not
seem appropriate here.
23
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Kat TTpo TOV OVTOS, "va Kai avro tov ev eivai rvxr)- Xeyco itself may succeed in being one; but I mean not that
Se OV TO €V €K€tvO, O € TT € K€IVa TOV OVTOS One which we say is "beyond being”* but this other
one which is predicated of each individual Form. So
<l>ap.iv, dAAd Kal tovto to iv 6 KaTrjyopeiTai rdiv eiScbv the decad also is prior to that of which decad is
eKaoTov. Kat SiKas toivvv npo tov koB' ov predicated; and this will be the absolute decad, for
KaTTjyopeiTai Se/cdy Kat tovto eoTai avToSsKas- ov yap the thing in which decad is observed certainly will
40 3i) c5 TTpdyp.aTi emBecopeiTai SeKas avToSeKas eoTai. not be the absolute decad. Did this other one, then,
come into being and exist along with the real beings?
dAA' Spa avveyevfTO Kat avveaT-q oSatv; dAA’ ei
tols But if it was generated along with them, it would be
avveyewtjBq dis p.€v avfiPePTjKos. olov tw avBpSjncp incidental, like health to man—but health also must
vyifia Set Kat Kad’ avTO vyUiav eivai. Kat et dis be something in itself. And if the one is like an
element of a compound, there must be beforehand a
aToiyecov 8e awBeTOv to ev, Set npoTepov eivai ev avTo one which is one in itself, that it may be compounded
45 TO ev, Lva avv aWip- eira [et npoTepov eivai] * avp-puydev with another; then, if it is compounded with another
aXX<p Tw yevop,evcp Si’ avTo ev eKetvo TToi-qaet tfievSws which has become one through it, it will make that
ev, Svo noiovv aiTO. em Se T-qs SeKaSos Trios; Tiyap Set
other spuriously one, by making it two. But how is it
with the decad? For what need of the decad has the
eKeivip Trjs SeKaSos, o eoTai Std T-qv ToaavTqv Svvapiiv thing which is going to be a decad by the power of
SeKas; dAA’ et eiSoTroi-qaei avTo wa-rrep vXqv Kat eorai that amount? But if it is going to inform it like
matter, and the thing is going to be ten and decad by
60 Ttapovaia SeKaSos Se'tca Kat SeKas, Set npiTepov if
the presence of decad, the decad must exist before­
eavTTjs Tqv SeKaSa ovk aXXo ti ovaav q SeKaSa p,6vov hand by itself and be nothing else but only decad.
€LVat„ 6. But if the one itself and the decad itself exist
6. ’AAA’ et’ avev twv npaypiaTiov to ev avTo Kat q without the things, and then the intelligible things,
after being what they are, are'going to be, some of
SeKas avT-q, eira rd irpaypiaTa tS voqTa pieTa to eivai them henads and some of them dyads or triads, what
o-rrep eoTt rd p.ev evdSes eoovTai, tS Se Kat SvdSes Kat would be their nature, and how would it come into
TpiaSes, Tis av eiq q <f>vais avTwv Kat -rribs avoTaaa; existence? But we must understand that we make
them come into being only in thought. First, then,
5 Aoyto Se Set vop.i^eiv Tqv yeveaiv avrwv -rroietaBai. we must comprehend the substantial nature of the
TrpwTov Toivvv Set Xa^etv Tqv ovaiav KaBoXov tiov elSwv, Forms in general, that it does not exist because the
OTi eoTtV od^i voqaavTOs e/caarov tov vevoqKOTOs, etr’
' Plato Republic 509B9, the text which is one of the
‘ del. Kirchhoff. foundations of the doctrine of the One beyond Being.
24 25
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
avTrj rfj vo'qa€i ttjv VTToaraatv avrojv Trapaaxofxevov. ov
yo-pt OTl €V07J(T€ Tl TTOT €GTi BlKCilOavVTJ, SlKaLOOVVIJ
10 eyevero, ovS’ on ivo-rjae n ttot kan kCvtjois, Kivqais
V7T€<jT7j. OVTOJ yo.p 6/xeAAe rovTo TO voTjijLa Kai vorepov
eivai Tov TTpayparos avrov rov vo-qdkvros—
SiKOLoavv-qs avrijs r) vorjois avT'^s—Kai ■naXw av ij
voTfais TTpoTepa rov €k Trjs vo'poe.ois vnoordvros, €i
TO) vevorjKevai vTrkaTrj. ei Sk r-p vorjaei Trj ToiavTjj
15 ravTOv rj SLKaLoavvrj, Trpdirov ptev dronov p.r]8ev eivai
hiKaioavvrjv t] rov oiov opiapiov avrijs' rl yap kan
TO vevorjKkvai SiKaioavvrjv rj Kivrjaiv ij to t( koTiv
avTwv XapovTa; tovto Sk tovtov tcu /ii) v<f>eaTU)Tos
TTpayp.aTos Xoyov Xa^elv, o-nep dSvvaTOv. ei Sk tij
X€yOlf WS € 7T l T O) V a V € V V X 7J S TO a V T 6 k <J T I V
20 7J eTTlOTTJp.TJ TW TTpaypaTLf €K€tVCOS XPV ^0€lV
TO Xey6p,€V0v, ws ov Trjv eTriOTTypir/v to npaypa Xkyei
eivai ovSe tov Xoyov tov deiopovvTa to vpaypa avTO to
TTpayp.aj aXXa ava^raXiv to irpaypa avTO dvev vXtjs ov
vorjTov T€ Kai voTjaiv eivai, ovx o’av Xoyov eivai tov
25 TTpaypiaTos ovS e77i^oAi)v TTpos avTO, dAA’ ooto to
TTpdypa ev Tip voTjTip ov t'i oAAo ^ vovv Kai kmaT'qprjv
eivai; ov yap 1} kiriUTripiiq irpos avTTjv, dXXd to npaypa
eKei T-qv knioTqpqv ov pievovaav, oia koTiv q tov kv vXq
TTpdyp.aTOs, eTepav k-rroiqaev eivai- tovto S' kanv
30 dXqOivrjv kTnaTqpqv tovto S’ koTiv ovk e’lKOva tov
■npaypaTos, aXXd to irpaypia avTO. q voqais toivvv Tqs
Kivqaews ov rrevoiqKev avTOKivqaiv, dXX’ q avTOKivqais
' A clear statement that a Platonic Form is something
very different from a hypostatised Aristotelian universal.
^ Aristotle De Anima F 5. 430a2-3 and 7. 431al-2.
26
ON NUMBERS
thinker thinks each of them and so by that very
thinking gives them their existence. For it is not
because the thinker thought out what righteousness
is that righteousness existed, or because he thought
out what movement is that movement existed. For in
this way this thought would be both posterior to the
thing itself which was thought—the thought of
righteousness posterior to righteousness itself—and
on the other hand the thought would be prior to
what existed as a result of thought, if it came into
existence by thinking. But if righteousness is the
same as the thought of righteousness, first of all it is
absurd that righteousness should be nothing except
something like its definitionfor what is thinking
righteousness or movement except grasping their
essential nature? And this is the same as grasping
the conception of a non-existent thing, which is
impossible. But if someone were to say that in
immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are
the same”,= one must understand what is said in the
sense that it does not mean that the knowledge is the
toing nor the reason contemplating the thing the
toing itself, but the other way round, that the thing
itself when it is without matter is object of thought
and thought, not thought in the sense of being a
definition of the thing or an intuition of it, but the
thing itself in the intelligible is nothing else but
intellect and knowledge. For the knowledge is not
directed to itself, but the thing there makes the
knowledge, which does not stay like the knowledge
of a thing in matter, to be different: that is, makes it
true knowledge: that is, not an image of the thing
but the thing itself. So the thought of movement has
not made absolute movement, but absolute move-
27
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 6.
neTroirjKe T-qv v6-q<jiv, (Lore avr-}, iavrrjv kIvt^oiv Kal
V07)mv ri y6.p Kivrjms -q enel KaKeivov v6qms. Kal avro
Se KiVTjais, on npcvr-q—ov yap aXXrj npo avr-qs—Ka'i q
35 ovrojs, on p.^ avp^i^qKiv aXXcp, dAAd rov Kivovpivov
evepyeta 6vros ivepyeia. <Lar€ aS Kal ovaia- evivoLa U
rov OVTOS eTfpa. Kal SiKaioavvq Se ov voqais
StKaioavvqs. dXXd vov otov didOeais, pdXXov 81 kvipyua
ToiaSe, (VS dXqd<vs KaXov to tt p6 a (utt ov Kal
y (odrf ecpos odroj KaXd)'
ov8 oXo)s nrivv alaO^rdiv, dXX‘ otov dyaXpd n voepdv,
oiov e| (IVTOV earqKos Kal ■tTpo<f>av€v ev avrw, pdXXov 8e
OV €v avT<h.
,1; ”^2"^ rrpdypara ev pia
{(pvaei) Kal pCav (f>vaiv ndvra exovaav Kal otov
TrepcXa^ovaav, ovy cos ev rois aladqrols eVaarov yo^pts
aXXayov rjXtos Kal dXXo dX^oOi, dAA’ opov ev evl
5 n dvr a- avrq ydp vov ,f>dais- enel Kal ijivy-q ovrcv
pipeirai Kal -q Xeyopevq j>vais, Kad’ rjv Kal v(j)’ tfs
eicaara yevvdraidXXo dXXodi, avrqs dpov eavrrj ovaqs.
opov de mvTwv ovrcvv eKaarov ad ycopts eanv evopd 8e
cLvra rd ev rw v(v Kal rrj ovaia 0 [e^cov]® vovs ovk
em^XlTTCvv, dAA’ Ipfcov, ov8^ yo^piCcw eVaarov
* Kirchhoff.
“ Muller.
Mel.Theiler.
'Euripides Melanippe fr. 486 Nauck^ quoted by
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics E 3. 1129b2&-9. Plotinus
quotes It also at I. 6. 4.11-12, where it connects in his mind,
as perhaps it does here, with the vision of the beauty of the
moral Forms in Plato Phaedrus 250B.
28
ON NUMBEKS
ment has made the thought of it, so that it has made
itself as movement and thought; for movement there
is also the thought of that thing itself, and it itself is
movement, because it is the first movement ^for
there is no other before it—and real movement,
because it is not incidental to something else, but is
the active actuality of what is moved, which exists
in actuality. So, again, it is substance; but the [mere]
notion of being is different. And righteousness is not
the thought of righteousness, but a kind of dispo­
sition of intellect, or rather an active actuality, of
such a kind that "its face” is truly beautiful and
"neither the morning nor the evening star are so
fair”,' not at all any object of sense, but like an
intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and
manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself.
7. In general one must think of the intelligible
things as in one nature, and one nature holding
them all and in a way encompassing them, not each
one separate as in the things of sense, the sun in one
place and something else in another, but all things
together in one®; for this is the nature of Intellect,
since Soul imitates it in this way, and what we call
Nature, according to which and by which the indiv­
idual things are generated one in one place and one
in another, while it is all together in itself. But
though all things are together each one, on the other
hand, is separate; but Intellect sees them, the things
that are in Intellect and Being, not by looking at
them but by having them, and does not separate each
2 opov ndvra is a phrase from the beginning of the book of
Anaxagoras (fr. B 1 DK) which Plotinus finds particularly
applicable to his intelligible world.
29
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
10 Kexwpiarai yap ijSt; ev avrw dei. ■maTovp.eda 8e npos
rovs TedavixaKoras iK rdiv p.€reiXr)<ji6TO)v to Se
p^^ycdos avTov Kai to koXXos ^vyyjs cpojTi Trpos avTov ^
Kai Toyv aXXo)v [roi^] ^ cij ^vyr^v eptoTt dia t^v TOiavT'qv
<l)vaiv Kai Toi eyeiv ^ KaTO. ti cu/xotcorai. /cat yap Sij /cat
15 aTOTTov €ivai ti ^cpov KaXov avTo^wov /xi) OavpiaoTOv to
KaXXos Ka'i a^avoTov ovtos. to Srj-rravTeXes^coov
e/c TTavToiv ^wwv ov, piaXXov Se ev avT<p to navTa ^wa
■nepieyov Kai ev ov tooovtov, oaa rd navTa, wanep Kai
ToSe TO irdv ev ov Kai tt&v to opaTov rrepiexov Travra to
ev Tip opaTO).
8. ’ETT-eiS^ Tolvvv Kai Iwov TTplOTtOS euTi Kai 8id
TOVTO aiiTo^wov Kai vovs eoTi /cat ovaia rj ovtojs Kai
4>ap.ev exeiv Kai ^wa to. vdvTa /cat dpidpiov tov
avp.TTavTa /cat 8iKaiov avTo Kai KaXov /cat oaa aXXa
5 TOiavra aXXais yap avTodvOponrov <j>ap,ev Kai dpiOpiov
avTO Kai 8iKaiov avTo OKenTeov ttcos tovtcov eKaoTOv
Kai Tt OVf €LS OGOV OLOV T€ TI €Vp€LV 7T€pl TOVTCOV. TTpCOTOV
Tolvvv d<f>eTeov ndaav aiaOrjaiv /cat vovv vdi OewprjTeov
Kai ev9vp,rjTeoVj cos /cat ev rjpiiv Kai vovs ovk ev
10 oyKcp, dAA’ ev 8vvdpiei doyKiu, /cat T-qv dX-qdivqv ovalav
’ Kirchhoff: aino Enn.
^ delevimus ut correctionem ad auro falso hie insertam:
TOP EBxUQ: Tcop AC,
‘The "complete living being” is the intelligible
paradigm of the material universe in Plato Timaeus 30C. It
is clear from ch. 8 that Plotinus, like most Platonists, takes
it to he the whole intelligible universe. Life in Plotinus is
3°
ON NUMBERS
individual thing: for they are already separated in it
for ever. We confirm this for those who are surprised
at it from the participants: its greatness and beauty
by the love of soul for it and by the love of other
things for soul because it has a nature of this kind
and by its having a nature by which it is in some
respect made like Intellect. For it is certainly quite
absurd for there to be any beautiful living being it
the absolute living being is not of wonderful and
inexplicable beauty. It is truly the "complete living
being’* composed of all living beings, or rather en-
compassing in itself all living beings, being one as
large as all things *; just as this All is one and is all
that is visible, encompassing all things that are in
the visible. , . , • a
8. Since, then, it is the primary living being, and
for this reason the absolute living being, and is
Intellect and substance, real substance, and we
claim that it contains all living things and the whole
of number, and the absolutely righteous and ^auti-
ful and all other such things—we speak in a different
way of absolute man and absolute number and ab­
solute righteousness—we must enquire how each of
these exists as an individual and what it is, as far as
it is possible to discover anything about these
things. First, then, we must put away all sense-
perception and contemplate Intellect by intellect
and consider that in us also there is life and in­
tellect, not in bulk but in bulkless power, and that
often thought of as prior to intellect; hut the intelligible
living being as the formed, structured whole must be
considered posterior to the intellect which eternally forms
and structures its life.
31
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
eKSeSvKevaL ravra Kai Svvamv etvai i<j)’ eavTrjs
Pe^Aaav, ovk dfj,€vqv6v ti xPVf^°-' aAAd TrdvTcov
^WTiKcardTTjv Kai voepcuTarrjv, •^s ovre ^cDTiKwrepov
ovTe voepWTepov oure ovaiwSearepov, od to
e<j>aijidp,€vov exet ravra Kara Adyov rys €TTa(f>rjs, to pev
15 eyyvs eyyvrepo), to Be TToppo) TToppwrepco. eiirep odv
e<l)€Tov TO elvai, to pdXiara dp pdXXov o re pdXiara
vovs, eirrep to voeip oXcos' Kat to rijs cuoavraJS' ei
Brj TO OP TTp&TOP Bel Xa^eip Trpwrop op, elra povp, eira
TO ld)OP—TOVTO yap ySrj vdpra Soxei 7Tepiex^‘P—d Be
20 povs Bevrepop—epepyeia yap rijs ovaias—ovt’ dp Kara
TO ^(pop o apiOpos eiTj—t^Br/ yap xai Trpo avrov xat ep
Kat Bvo djp—ovre Kara top povp—irpo yap avrov rj
ovaia ep oSaa xat TToXXd djp.
9. Aeinerai tolpvp detopeip, noTepa ovaia top
apiOpop eyeppTjae Ta> avTTjs pepiapw, rj 6 dpiBpds
epepiae t'^p ovolap' xat Brj xal ■q ovaia xat Klpqais xal
ardais xal ravrop xat erepop avrd top dpidpop q 6
5 dpi6p,6s ravra. dpxq Be rijs OKetfieois’ dp’ otop re
api6p,op eipai e<f> eavrov q Bet xal rd Bvo erri Bvat
f'pdyp.aai deaipetadai xat rpla waavrois; xat Bq xai to
ep TO ep rots api9p,ots; ei yap e<f>’ eavrov dpev twp
api6p,qTct)P BvpaiTO eipai, TTpo rdip optojp Bvpairo dp
10 eipai. dp’ oCp xal npo rod optos; q tovto eareop xat Trpd
dpidpLov ep Tip TTapopTi xat Boreop dpidpop e| optos
yipeaOai. aXX ei to op ep op eari xat rd Bvo opra Bvo
opra earl, vpoqyqaeTai tov re optos to ep Kat 6 dpiOpids
' These are the "very important "kinds” of Plato Sophist
254-255A which Plotinus understands as the categories of
the intelligible world.
32
c
ON NUMBERS
the true substance has stripped off these things and
is a power standing on itself, no feeble shadowy
thing hut the most living and intelligent of all, than
which nothing is livelier or more intelligent or more
substantial; that which touches it has all this in
proportion to [the closeness of] its touch, that which
is near more nearly and that which is far from
farther. If then being is an object of desire, that
which is most of all being is still more desirable, and
that which is most of all intellect, if intelhgence in
general is desirable; and the same with life. It then
one should take being first, since it exists first, then
intellect, and then the living being (for it is already
established that this contains all things)—but in­
tellect comes second, for it is the active actuality o
substance; then number would not be on the level ot
the living being—for even before it both one and two
existed—nor on the level of intellect—for substance
was before it, which was already one and many.
9 It remains then to consider whether substance
generated number by its own division, or nimber
divided substance; for certainly either substance
and movement and rest and same and other gen­
erated number or number generated them. 1 tie
starting-point of our investigation is: can number
exist by itself, or must the two be observed in two
things, and the three likewise? And, indeed, also the
one which is among the numbers? For if it could
exist by itself without the things numbered, it could
exist before beings. Then also before being? Well, let
us leave this and assume for the present that the one
is before number and grant that number comes to
exist from being. But if being is one being, and two
beings are two beings, the one will precede being
33
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
Twv ovTcov. S.p’ ovv Trj eiTivoia Kal rrj eni^oXfi tj Kat rij
15 VTToaTaaei; OKemeov Se cSSe' orav tis avOpconov eva vofj
Kal KaXov ev, varepov Synov to ey voet eKarepu)- Kat
Sr) Kat orav ittttov Kat Kvya, Kat Sij aatfxhs rd di5o
evravOa varepov. dAA’ el yevvwT] dvOpcoTTov Kat yevv(pt]
iTTvov Kai Kvva tJ ev avrd) dvras rtpo^epoi, Kat pL-q Kara
20 TO eneXOdv p.qre yewwq p.qTe Trpo^epoi, dp’ ovk epet-
"els ev Ireov Kat pieriTeov els dXXo ev Kat Svo Troirjreov
Kai pLer’ ep,ov Kat dXXo TTOLqreov’’; Kat pi,qv ovSe to.
ovra, ore eyevero, rjpiOpL-qdq- dAA’ oaa eSet^ yeveaOai
St^Xov ■^v [doa ISei]. ^ Trds dpa 6 dpidpLos ijv npo avTwv
Twv ovrojv. dAA’ el npo rcuv ovtojv, ovk qv ovra. q ^v ev
25 Tw ovTi, OVK dpiOpiOS cov TOO OVTOS—ev yap qv eri to
dv—dAA’ q Tov dpidpLov Svvapics vnoardoa epiepiae to
ov Kat oiov dtSlvecv enocqaev avrdv to TrXqdos. q yap q
ovala avTov q q evepyeia 6 dpidpids earai, Kat to t^cpov
avrd Kat 6 vovs dpiOpLOS- apt ovv to piev dv dpidpLos
30 qvcopievos, ra Se dvra e^eXqXiypLevos dpidpLOS, vovs Se
dpiBp,ds ev eavT<p Kivovp,evos, to 8e ^&ov dpidpLOS
Trepiexcov; enet Kat and tov evds yevop^evov to dv, ws ^v
ev eKetvo, Set avrd ovtcvs dpiBpidv etvar Sid Kat to. elSq
eXeyov Kat evdSas Kat dpidpLOvs. Kat oStos eariv d
35 ovaiwSqs dpidpios' dXXos Se d piovaSiKds Xeyopievos
eiSwXov TOVTOV. d Se ovaicvSqs d piev eniBewpov/aevos
' Harder: Set Enn.
^ del. Harder, ut correctionem ad 22 oaa Set.
' Plotinus is working here with the speculation about
Ideal Numbers in the Old Academy discussed by Aristotle
in Metaphysics M and N. For "monadic” (arithmetical)
number see M 8. 1083bl6-17.
34
ON NUMBERS
and number will precede beings. Is this, then, in our
idea and intuitive conception of it, or in its reality.
But we should proceed with the investigation in this
way: when someone thinks one man and one beauty,
he presumably thinks the one later in each case; and
also when he thinks a horse and a dog, it is perfectly
obvious here that he thinks the two afterwards. But
suppose he was generating man and generating
horse and dog, or, when they existed in himself,
bringing them out, and not just generating them or
bringing them out as they casually occurred to him,
will he not say "We must go to one, and pass to
another one, and make two, and make another one
along with me”? And certainly the beings were not
numbered at the time when they came to he; but it
was [already clear] how many there had to be. The
whole number, therefore, existed Jiefore the heings
themselves. But, if numbers were before beings, they
were not beings. Now number was in being, not as
the number of being—for being was still on^but
the power of number which had come to exist divided
being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth
to multiplicity. For number will be either the sub­
stance or the actual activity ,of being, and the ab­
solute living being is number, and Intellect is num­
ber. Is not Being, then, unified number, and the
beings number unfolded, and Intellect number mov­
ing in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number?
Since, because Being came into existence from the
One, as that One was one. Being must also in this
way be number: this is why they called the Forms
henads and numbers. And this is substantial num­
ber; but the other, which is called monadic, is its
image. 1 But the substantial number is that con-
35
t
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

rots eiSeoi Kal avyyevvcov avTdiTrpdjTws 8e o ev rd)
Kat ixerd rov ovtos Kai npo twv ovtwv. jSdaiv Se
ovra €V avTw Kai TT-qyrjv Kal pi^av Kai apyr/v. Kal yap
40 TOi ovTL TO ev apyrf Kal e-nl tovtov earlv ov OKehaaOei'q
yap dv dAA’ ovk ini tu) ovti to ev rjSrj yap dv e“rj ev
npiv Tvyelv tov ev, Kal ijSrj to Tvyydvov Trjs SeKdSos
SeKas TTplv Tvyetv Tijs SeKdSos.
10. 'EffTO)? oSv TO ov ev -irXridei dpidp,6s, ore noXv
p.ev -qyeipeTo, napaoKevq Se otov ■Tjv npos rd ovTa Kal
TTpoTOTTOiOLs Kal otov ivdSes TOTTov eyovaai toIs in’
avTas iSpv97jGop,evois. Kai yap Kal vvv ’’tooovtov
5 Pov\op.a(” <f>r)ai “nXijdos yp^oov rj oIkiwv". Kal ev p,ev
o ypvaos, ^ovXeTai Se ov tov dpiBpidv ypvaov noiijaai,
aAAd TOV xpvaov dpidpidv, Kal tov dpiOpiov rjS-q eyoiv
inidetvai tovtov tw xpvaw, toare avp-^rivai tw
Xpvad) ToaovTip yeveadai. el Se rd ovTa p.ev iyiveTo npo
10 api0p.ov, 6 S’ dpiOfios in’ avTols ineOewpeiTo ToaavTa
Kivr)6e(aT]s tt/s dpi6p.ovar]s 4>dae<x)s, oaa rd dpi6p,rjTd,
KOTa awToylav ijv dv ToaavTa Kal ov Kand npoOeaiv
ToaavTa, oaa ioTiv. el oSv fir) eUfj ToaavTa, d dpidpids
aiTios npowv tov ToaavTa- tovto Se ioTiv, ■rjSrj
15 api9p,ov p,eTeax€ Ta yevopieva tov ToaavTa, Kal eKaoTov
p,ev TOV ev p-eTeayev, iva e'v eari Se ov napd tov ovtos,
enel Kal to dv nap’ avTov ov, ev Se napd tov^
eKaoTov re ev, ei opov noXXd •^v to ev to in’ avTols, chs
* Theiler: nap' avroC (vel avroO) Enn.
36
ovti templated in the Forms and sharing in their gener­
rd ation, and, primarily, the number in Being and with
Being and before the beings. The beings have their
foundation in it, and their source and root and
principle. For indeed the One is the principle of
Being, and the being of Being rests upon this; for
otherwise it would be scattered; but the One does not
rest upon Being; for then Being would be one before
attaining the One, and what attains the decad would
be a decad before attaining the decad.
10. Being, therefore, standing firm in multiplicity
was number, when it woke as many, and was a kind
of preparation for the beings and a preliminary
sketch, and like unities keeping a place for the
beings which are going to be founded on them. For
even here and now one says "I want such and such
an amount of gold or house-property.” And gold is
one, but he wants not to make number gold but gold
number; and since he already possesses the number
he tries to apply it to the gold, so that it will happen
to the gold to become so much. But if the beings
came into existence before number, and the number
was observed in them as the numbering nature was
moved to a total corresponding to the things num­
bered, they would be so many by chance, and not as
many as they are by deliberate predisposition. If
ovtos then they are not as many as they are just casually,
number is a cause which pre-exists their being so
many: that is, it was when number already existed
that the things which came to be participated in the
ev. "so many” and each one of them participated in the
"one”, so that it might be one. It is a being from
Being, as Being is being from itself, and one from the
one. And each is one, if the one in them is many all
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

together, as the triad is one, and all the beings are

rpias ip, Kai rd Travra ovra ovrms iv, ovx di? to iv to
one, not like the one of the number one, but as the
Kara T-qp popaSa, dXX’ coy ep rj fivpids t] dXXos ns ten thousand or any other number is one. Since
20 dpiOpos. etrei Kal d Xiywp ■qSr] ■npdyp.aTa pvpia someone who says Ifhat things have now come to ten
thousand, if he says "ten thousand as he counts, he
yepopepa, el eiire pvpia 6 dpidpuip, ov Trap’ avrcap
is not asserting that the things are called "ten
<l>rjai rd pvpia ■7Tpoa<f>copela6aL SeiKPVprojp coairep rd thousand” of and from themselves, as if they were
Xpwpara avrwp, dAAd Siapolas Xeyovarjs ToaavTa- showing their colours, but it is the reason which
says there are so many of them; for if it did not say
el yap prj Xeyoi, ovk dp elhevrj, daop to TrA'^doy. T7cdy otJv so, he would not know how many there were. How,
25 epel; ij eTTiOTapepos dpiBpeiv tovto Se, el dpiBpop then, can he say how many? Because he knows how
elSelr]' elSetrj 8’ dp, el elr] dpiBpos- dypoeip Se tijv (jivaip
to number; but this is so if he knows number; but he
could only know number if there was number. But it
eKelp-qp, oaa eoTi to TrXijBos, utottop, paXXop Se would be absurd, or rather impossible, to be ignorant
dSvpaTOP. dtanep toIpvp el Xeyoi tis dyaBd, rj rd rrap’ of the nature of number, of how much the amount is.
It is, then, as when someone speaks of good things;
avTWP TOIOOTO Xeyei, rj Karr^yopel to dyaBop coy he either speaks of them as good of themselves, or
30 avp^ePrjKOS adrcov. Kal el rd Trpcora Xeyei, vrrdaTaaip predicates the good incidentally of them. And if he is
Xeyei Trjp rrpdiTrjp- el Se ois avpPiPrjKe to dyaBop, Sel speaking of primary goods, he is speaking of the first
real existence; but if of things to which the good is
eipai (f)vaip dyaBov, ipa Kal oAAoty avp^e^rfKTj, to incidental, there must be a nature of good in order
aiTiop TO rrerroirjKOS Kal ep dXXcp Sel eipai rj avToayaBop for it to be incidental to other things, in that the
cause which produces good also in another must be
rj yeyepprjKOS to dyaBop ep <^daei olKela. odrcoy Kal errl
either the Good Itself or something which has gen­
Twp dpTcup 6 Xeycop dpiBpop, olop SeKaSa, rj avTrjp erated the good in its own nature. In this way also
35 v<f>eaTcbaap SeKaSa dp Xeyoi, rj ots avppiPrjKe Se/cdy one who speaks of a number in the real beings, a
decad for instance, would be speaking either of the
Aeycov avTrjp SeKaSa dpayKa^oiTo dp TiBeaBai e<j>‘ avTrjs decad which exists as itself, or if he was speaking of
OVK dXXo Ti ij SeKaSa odaap. dpdyKrj toIvvp, el rd dvra the things to which decad is incidental he would be
SeKaSa Xeyoi, rj avrd SeKaSa eipai rj rrpo adrcov dXXrjp compelled to postulate the decad itself existing by
itself and being nothing but decad. It is necessary,
SeKaSa eipai ovk dXXo Tpfj avTO tovto SeKaSa oSaap.^ then, if one says that the real beings are decad, that
they themselves must be the decad or there must be
' Igal: rj Enn. another decad prior to them which is nothing else
“ Kirchhoff: c’vai Enn., H-S'.
39
38
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
40 KadoXov Toivvv SeKreov,^ on ndv, ornrip dv Kar' dXXov
KaTtjyopijTai, nap’ dXXov iXrjXvdev eis €K€lvo y evepyetd
iariv iKfivov. Kai ei toiovtov, olov p.y wore pkv
napeivai, nore Se py napelvai, dXX’ del per eiieivov
eivai, el ooaia eKeivo, ovala Kal avro, Kat ov pdXXov
eKelvo y avro ovala- el Se p-fj ovalav StSoly, dXX’ ovv
45 Twv ovTwv Kal ov. Kal el pev Svvairo to npdypa eKeivo
voeiadai dvev rys evepyelas avrov, dpa pev eivai ovSev
■^TTOv eKelvw, varepov Se ry enivola Tarreadai nap’
-ypdtv. el Se p-y napenivoeiadai oTov re dvev eKelvov, oiov
avOpwnov dvev tov ev, y ovy varepov avrov, dXXd
50 avvvndpyov, y nporepov avrov, iva avro Si’ eKeivo
vndpxy ypeis Sy <j>apev nporepov ro ev Kal rov
dpidpov.
11. ’AAA’ el ryv SeKaSa pySev eivai ns Xeyoi y
evdSas roaavras, el pev ryv evdSa avyywpoi eivai, Sid
rlplav pev avyyojpyaei evdSa eivai, rds Se SeKa ovKeri;
d)S yap y pla r-yv vnoaraaiv eyei, Sid rl ov Kal al dXXai;
5 ov yap S-y avve^evyOai Sei evl rivi rwv dvraiv ryv plav
evdSa- ovTU) yap ovKeri eKaarov rdiv dXXoiv ev eiy. dXX’
el Sei Kal eKaarov rwv dXXojv ev eivai, koivov to ev-
TOVTO Se ^vais pla Kara noXXwv Karyyopovpevy, yv
eXeyopev Kal npo rov ev noXXois OeiopeiaSai Seiv Kad’
10 avryv vndpyeiv. ovays Se evdSos €v rovrw Kal ndXiv ev
dXXw decopovpevys, el pev KdKelvy vndpyei, ov pla
povov evds r-yv vnoaraaiv e^ei Kal ovrcos nX-ydos earai
evdScuv- el S’ eKelvyv pdvyv r-yv npwryv, yroi rw
^ Sleem^n: heiKriov £nn.
40
ON NUMBERS
but that very thing, decad. In general, then, it must
be accepted that everything, whatever it is, which is
predicated of something else came to it from some­
thing else or is the active actuality of the thing of
which it is predicated. And if it is of such a kind as
not to be sometimes present and sometimes not, but
to be always with that thing, if that thing is sub­
stance, it also is substance, and what it is predicated
of is no more substance than it is; but if one does not
grant it substance, at least it belongs to the real
beings and exists. And if that thing could be thought
of without its actual activity, that activity could
none the less be simultaneous to it, but ranked later
by us in our thought. But if it cannot he thought
except along with what is predicated of it, as "man”
cannot be thought without the "one”, it is either not
posterior to but co-existent with it, or prior to it, so
that the thing may exist through the activity; but we
maintain that the one and number are prior.
11. But if someone says that the decad is nothing
but so many henads [or units], if he agrees that the
unit exists, why will he agree that one unit exists
and not agree that the ten do? For why do not the
other units have existence as the one does? For the
one unit must not be yoked to any one being: for if it
was, each of the others could no longer be one. But if
each individual one of the others must also be one,
the one is common: this means that there is one
nature predicated of many, which we said must exist
in itself before being observed in many. If then a unit
exists in this thing and is again observed in another,
if that other unit also really exists, it will not be only
one unit which has existence, and so there will be a
multiplicity of units; but if it is said that only that
41
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

fjidXiaTa ovTi avvovaav rj tw fiaXiara €vt Travry. dXX’ el first unit exists, it will do so as coupled either to that
which in the highest degree exists or to that which is
15 /xev TO) ixdXiara ovti, djicDvvyiuts dv at dXXai evdSes <cai
in the highest degree one in every way. But if to that
ov avvTaxdrjaovTai rij TrpwTrj, rj 6 dpiOfjios e^ dvop.oliDv which exists in the highest degree, then the other
units will have merely their name in common with
p.ovd8cov Kai 8La(l>opaL t&v p.ovd8cov Kal Kadoaov the first, and will not be ranked on the same level
piovd8es' el Se tw p-dXiara evl, tI dv 8eoiTO to p.dXiaTa
with it, or number will consist of unlike unities and
there will be intrinsic differences between unities
ev, iva ev y, rys p.ovd8os ravrys; el 8y ravTa dSuvara, even in so far as they are unities; but if it is coupled
to that which is one in the highest degree, why
dvdyKy ev eivai ovk dXXo ti ov y ev ipiXov, would what is one in the highest degree need this
20 dTTypyp,(xip.evov ry ovala avrov irpo too eKaarov ev
unity in order to be one? If these suggestions are
impossible, there must be a one which is nothing else
XexOyvai Kal voydyvai. el oSv to ev dvev rov ■npayp.aTOS but bare one, isolated in its essential nature, before
each individual one is spoken and thought. If, then,
TOO Xeyop-evov ev KaKel earai, 8id tI ov Kal dXXo ev the one without the thing which is called one is
VTToaTyoerai; Kal x^opls p-ev eKaarov iroXXal povd8es, d going to exist also there in the intelligible, why
should not another one as well come into existence?
Kal TToXXd ev. el 8’ e<f)e^ys oiov yevvcpy y <j>vais, pdXXov And each individual taken separately will be many
unities, that is, many "ones”. But if that nature
25 8e yevvyaaaa y ov ardaa Ka6’ ev div eyevva, otov avvexy generates in a kind of succession, or rather has
eva TTOiovaa, nepLypdiJiaaa pev Kal ardaa Odrrov ev ry generated, or does not stand still at one thing of
those which it has generated, but makes a kind of
TTpo68ep rovs eXdrrovg dpiOpovg arrayevvyaai, els rrXeov continuous one, when it draws a line and stops more
quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser num­
8e Kivydelaa, ovk err’ dXXois, dXX’ ev avrals rats bers, but when it moves further, not in other things
Kivyaeai, rovs pei^ovs dpidpovs vnoaryaai' Kal ovrw but in its very own movements, it brings the greater
numbers into existence; and so it would fit the
30 817 eKdarois dpiOpols e^appoaai rd rrXyOy eKaara Kai particular multiplicities and each particular being
to the particular numbers, knowing that, if each
eKaarov rd>v dvrwv el8vlav, cos, el py e(f>appoadely
particular thing was not fitted to each particular
eKaarov dpiOpai eKdarco, y 008’ dv eiy y dXXo ti dv number, it could not exist at all or would get away
and be something else by becoming innumerate and
irapeK^dv ely dvdpiOpov Kal dXoyov yeyevypevov. irrational.
42 43
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

12. ’AAA’ el Kai TO ev Kat ti)v (xovdha nrj vnoaraaiv 12. But if someone says that the one and the unit
Xeyoi eyeiv—ouSev yap ev, o jj-rj ti ev—nddrjfjia Se ti
have no real existence—^for there is nothing that is
one which is not some one thing—^but the one is a
rijs flivxrjs TTpos eKaarov T<hv ovtwv, npcuTOV pev ti way the soul is affected in regard to each of the real
KcoXvei, Kai orav Xeyp ov, TrdOrjpa Xeyeiv eivai rijs heings, first of all, what is the obstacle to saying that
whenever one says "being” one is speaking of a way
5 ijivxfis Kai prjSh' eivai 6v; el S’ on vvrrei tovto Kat in which the soul is affected and there is no such
■nX'^TTei Kat ^avraalav irept ovros noiel, vvTTopevrjv Kat thing as being? But if it is because this stabs and
strikes and takes a mental image of being, we see
^avraalav Xap^dvovaav rrjv wepi to ev
that the soul is also stabbed by and takes a mental
opcbpev. eireiTa voTepa Kat to irddrjpa Kat to voTfpa Tfjs image of the one.* Then, do we see this way of being
affected and this thinking of the soul as one or
tjivxTjs ev r} nXfjdos opwpev; dAA’ OTav Xeycopev '‘prj ev ,
many? But when we say "not one”, we do not have
10 €K pev Tov TTpdypaTOS avTov ovk exopev to ev—<l>apev the one from the thing itself—for we say that the one
yap OVK eivai ev avTip to ev—eyopev dpa ev, Kat eoTiv is not in it—^but we do have the one, and it is in the
soul without the "some one thing”. But we have the
ev ilivxTj dvev tov “ti ev”. dAA’ eyopev to ev eK toiv one by taking some kind of thought and impression
e^w9ev Xa^ovTes Tivd voT^aiv Kai Tiva tvttov, oiov from the things outside us, a sort of idea derived
from the thing. For those who posit the idea of
evvorjpa eK tov -rrpdypaTos. ol pev yap twv Xeyopevcov
number and the idea of the one as one species of
Trap’ avTots eworjpdTcov ev eiSos to twv dpiQpwv Kat what are called in their philosophy ideas,^ should
15 TOV evos TiOevTes VTTOOTdaeis dv TOiavTas TiBeiev, enrep
posit existences of this kind, if any of such things are
in existence; and there is much that could appropri­
Ti TWV ToiovTWV ev vTTOOTdaei, TTpos ovs Trepi aiiTwv ately be said against them about this. But if they
KaipLWS dv XeyoiTO. dAA’ ovv el toiovtov oiov voTepov were to say that this way of being affected or
thought arises in us as a kind of after-consequence of
dvo TWV TTpaypdTWV Xeyoiev yeyovevai ev -ppiv Trddrjpa
the things, like the "this” and the "something” and,
T] voTjpa, oiov Kat to tovto Kat to Tt Kat Si) Kat oyXov for that matter, "crowd” and "feast” and "army”
and "multitude”—for just as the multitude is no­
20 Kat eopT-qv Kat OTpaTOV Kat ■n-Aijdos—Kat yap wanep to
thing over and above the things which are said to be
irAij^os TTapd to. npdypaTa to iroAAd Xeyopeva ov8ev
^ emo-qpa is a Stoic term; for the Stoics cwoi^jiara had no
' Plotinus is arguing here against the Stoics: cp. SVFII extra-mental existence; cp. SVF 165 and Diogenes Laertius
864 and 866. VII61.
44 45
 ON NUMBERS
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
many, nor the feast anything over and above those
eariv ovS’ ij koprrj Trapa tovs avvaxOevras Kai
assembled and enjoying themselves at the cere-
evOvpLOvp-evovs erri cepocs, ovtcus ovSe to ev p,6vov ti /cat monies, so, when we say *'one”, we do not think of
dTTr)pr]p.a)p,evov rdiv aAAct/v voovvres, orav Xeyoip-ev ev the one as something alone and quite apart from the
TToXXd Se /cat aAAa roiavra eivat, otov Kal Senior /cat to other things; and there are many others like this,
25 dvu) /cat' rd dvTt/cei/Lt€va rovrots' ti yd.p dv eh] Trpds like "right” and "up” and their opposites; for what
would there be of real existence about "right” other
WToaraaiv eni Se^iov rj on 6 piev cbSi, 6 S’ coSi earrjKev
than that one stands or sits here and the other there?
Kadrirai; /cat 817 /cat erri rod dvco diaavTois, to p,ev And it would be just the same with "up”, that a thing
TOiavTTjv deaiv <[ex€tv)> ^ /cat ev tovtco too ttovtoj has this kind of position and is more in that part of
fidAAov, o Xeyop,ev dvco, to Se eis to Xeyop-evov kAtco— the universe, which we call "up”, and another more
30 Trpds 817 Tti TOiavTa TrpcoTov p.ev e/cetvo XeKTeov, cos in that called "down”—in answer to this sort of
VTToaTaais tis twv eip7]p.evcov ev eKaoTcp tovtcov, ov
argument we must first say this, that there is some
kind of real existence in each of these things men­
p-evToi 17 avTT] €TTL TrdvTcov ovTe avTcdv Trpds dXXrjXa ovTe
tioned, but not the same in all, either of themselves
TTpds Td ev arravTCov. /tevTOt rrpds e/caoTOV tcIiv in relation to each other or in the relation of all to
XeyOevTCOv emoTaTeov. the one. So we must consider each of the arguments
13. To 817 0770 TOO oTTO/cet/xevoo yeveaOai Trjv vonjaiv separately.
TOO evds, TOO VTTOKeipcevov [/cat] ^ too ev aiadriaei
13. How could it be reasonable to suppose that the
thought of the one originated from what underlies it,
dvOpCOTTOV OVTOS T] dXXoV OTOOOOV ^CpOV rj Kal Xldov, TTcds which is a man or some other living thing, or even a
dv etrj evXoyov, dXXov p-ev ovtos tov cf>avevTOS—too stone, in the realm of sense, since what appears is
5 dvdpcoTTOV—dXXov 8e /cat 00 tootoo ovtos too ev; ov one thing—the man—and the one is another and not
yap dv Kal errl tov prj dvOpconov Td ev rj Sidvoia the same? Otherwise reason would not predicate
Karrjyopol. erreira, coarrep errl tov Se^iov Kal tcov "one” in the case of a thing which is not man. And
then, just as in the case of "right” and the like
toiovtcjov ov paTTjv Kivovpevrj, dAA’ dpcbaa deaiv
reason was not moved without any cause, ^ hut
Sidcfropov eAeye to coSi, ovrcoai ti evTavda dpcdaa Xeyei because it saw a different position it said here , so
ev ov ydp Sr] Kevdv rrddrjpa Kal errl prjSevl Td ev Xeyei. in this case it is because it sees something that it
10 00 ydp 817 OTt povov Kal ovk dXXo' Kal ydp ev to) “/cat says "one”; for it is not reporting an empty way of
ovK dXXo” dXXo ev Xeyei. erreiTa Td dXXo Kal Td eTepov being affected and saying "one” about nothing. For
it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and
there is no other thing; for in the no other thing it
' Theiler. is saying another "one”. And then the other and
“ del. Beutler.
47
46
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
varepov p,r) yap epeiaaaa npos ev ovre dAAo epel rj
Sidvoia ovT€ erepov, to re “p,6vov” orav Aeyij, ev p,6vov
Aeyei' ware to ev Xeyei irpo tov "p.6vov”. eneiTa to
15 Xeyov, npiv eivelv Trepl dXXov "ev”, eoTcv ev, xai irepi oS
Xeyei, irplv eiireiv ij vorjaai Tiva irepl avTOv, eoTiv ev rj
yap ev rj rrXeiw evos Kal rroXXo." Kat el rroXXd, dvdyKt]
rrpovrrdpxetv ev. erret Kal orav rrXrjdos Xeyrj rrXeCo) evos
'exist before it. For also when it says "multitude” it
Xeyei' Kal OTparov rroXXovs (LrrXiapievovs Kal els ev
20 avvTeTaypievovs voel, Kal rrXrjdos ov ovk ea vXijdos
eivai' ij Stdvoia SrjXdv rrov Kal evTavOa rroiel i) SiSovaa
TO ev, o pi'll eyei to rrX'rjdos, rj^ o^ews to ev to eK T'ijs
Td^ecos ISovaa T-qv tov rroXXov ijrvaiv avvijyayev els ev
ovSe yap ov8‘ evTavda to ev ijievSeTai, warrep Kal errl
25 olKias TO eK rroXXwv XlQiav ev pidXXov pievTOi to ev err’
olKias. el ovv pidXXov errl tov avveyovs Kal pidXXov errl
TOV pit] piepioTov, S'ijXov oti ovtos Tivos (jrvaecos tov evos
Kal vifieaTwaris. ov yap olov Te ev toIs pi'll ovai to
pidXXov elvai, dXX’ cuarrep Tqv ovalav KaTrpyopovvTes
Kad eKdoTov twv aladriTcvv, KaTrjyopovvTes Se Kal
30 Kara toiv i'otjtoiv KvpiWTepov KaTa tcov vorjTcdv Tqv
KaTTjyoplav rroiovpieda ev tois ovai to pidXXov Kal
KvpiwTepov TidevTes, Kal to ov pidXXov ev ovalq Kal
aladriTr) rj ev tois dXXois yeveaiv, ovtw Kal to ev pidXXov
Kal KvpicvTepov ev Te tois aladiqTOLs avTols hidtjropov
35 KOTO. TO pidXXov Kal ev tois votitoIs opwvTes eivai—
KOTO. rrdvTas tovs Tporrovs els dvaijropdv pievToi evos
’ t; (vel) U, Creuzer: i) wBCQ: ei x: 17 H-S'.
48
ON NUMBERS
the "different” come later; for if the reason does not
rest on the one it will not say "other” or "different”,
and when it says "alone” it says "one alone”; so that
it says the "one” before the "alone”. And then what
speaks is one before it says "one” of something else,
and that about which it speaks, before anyone
speaks or thinks about it, is one, for it is either one
or more than one and many; and if many, one must
says "more than one”; and it thinks an army as many
men armed and brought together into one order, and
does not allow what is a multitude to be a multitude;
the reason which gives the "one” which the multi­
tude does not have makes it clear [that it is not only
a multitude], or, by seeing the "one” which results
from its order, gathers the nature of the many into
one; for the one is not falsely predicated here any
more than it is of a house which is one from many
stones; though the "one” of the house is more one. If
then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more
one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is
a particular nature which has existence. For it is not
possible for there to be a "more” in non-existents,
but just as when we predicate substance of each
individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the
intelligibles, we predicate it more appropriately of
the intelligibles, putting the "more” and the "more
appropriately” in the realm of real beings, and say
that there is more being in the category of sub­
stance, even sensible substance, than in the other
genera, in the same way also we see that the one,
which differs in respect of more [and less] also in the
sense-objects, is also more and more appropriately in
the intelligibles—and in all these ways it must be
49
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

etvai <f>aT€ov. iLanep Se ovala Kal to etvai vorjrov (cat affirmrH that there is a reference to one. But just as
substance and being is intelligible and not per­
ovK aiadrjTov eari,, Koiv to aiadrjTOv avrwv,
ceptible, even if the perceptible participates in it, in
ovTio Kai TO iv nept aiaOtjTov p,iv dv /card peToxTjv this way also the one might be perceived in the
perceptible by participation, but the reason grasps it
decopoLTo, vorjTOv p,evTOi Kat vorjTws 'q Sidvoia avTo as intelligible and does so intellectually; so that it
40 AaftjSdvef coots an’ dXXov aXXo voei, o ovx dpa- npofjSei thinks one thing, which it does not see, from an­
other; so it knew it before. But if it knew it before as
dpa' et Se npoTjhei ov ToSe ti, tuvtov tw ov. /cat otov ti,
being this particular thing, it is the same as being.
€v aS Xeyec coanep oTav Tive, Svo- Kat OTav Tivds, And when it says it is something, it says as well that
there is one; just as when it says "some” in the dual,
noXXovs. et TOivvv pL-qSe * Tt vorjaai eoTiv dvev tov iv rj it says that there are two; and when in the plural,
TOV 8vo -q Tivos dpi6pi,ov, nibs otov t€ dveu oS ovx that there are many.’ If, then, it is not possible to
think anything without the one or the two or some
45 Tt vorjaai rj elnelv fiTj eivai; ov yap p.'q ovtos pirfS’ otiovv
number, how is it possible for that not to exist
Svvaaai^ vorjaai rj einelv, Xeyeiv p,-q eivai dSvvaTOV. without which it is not possible to think or speak?
For it is impossible to say that something does not
dXX’ oS navTayov npds navTos voqpiaTos rj Xdyov exist of which, since it does not exist, you cannot
yeveaiv, npoiindpxeiv Sei Kai Xdyov Kai vo-qaeors' ovtw think or say anything at all. But that which is
needed everywhere for the coming into existence of
yap dv npds nqv tovtojv yeveaiv napaXapi^dvoiTO. et Se every thought and statement must be there before
60 Kai eis ovaias e/cdoTijj vndaTaaiv—odSeo yap ov, o pq statement and thinking; for this is how it can be
brought to contribute to their coming into existence.
ev—(cat npo ovaias dv eiq Kai yevvdiv Tqv ovaiav. Std But if it is needed for the existence of each and every
Kai ev dv, dXX’ ovk dv, eiTa ev ev pev yap toi "dv” Kai ev substance—for there is nothing which is which is
not one—it would also exist before substance and as
noXXd dv eiq, ev Se tco "ev” ovk evi to "dv”, ei pq Kai generating substance. For this reason also it is one-
noiqaeiev avTO npoavevaav avTOV Trj yeveaei. Kai to
being, but not first being and then one; for in that
which was being and also one there .would be many;
55 "tovto” Se ov Kevdv vndaTaaiv yap SeiKvvpevqv Xeyei but being is not present in the one except in the
sense that it might make it hy inclining to its
^ H—S: jLtiyTc Enn. generation. And the "this” is not an empty word; for
^ Ig£tl: Svvaadai wBUCQ; Suvarai Kirchhoff: StJt'aroi^ H—S^:
om. X. * Cp. Plato Sophist 237D6-10.
5° 51
 ON NUMBEKS
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
it is used to speak of a real existence which is
avTi Tov ovofxaTOS aiirov Kai -rrapovalav nvd, ovaiav r} pointed out instead of its name, and of a presence, a
dXXo TL Tojv OVTOJV (Lore to "tovto" arjfxaivoi dv ov substance or some other of the things which really
Kevov TL ov8‘ loTt Trd^ij/Lia rijs SiavoCas €tti ftr^Sevi ovti,
are; so that the "this” would indicate something
which is not empty, arid it is not a way in which the
dXX‘ eari TTpayp-o. CnroKeipLevov, uKJirep ei Kai to i8iov reason is affected about nothing existent, but a thing
60 avTOv Tivo? ovopa Aeyoi. underlying the thought, just as if it said the proper
name of a thing itself.
14. Ilpd? 8e TO, Kara ro rrpos tl Xexdevra dv tis
14. One might reasonably reply to what has been
evXoycos Xeyoi, o)s ovk eari to ev toiovtov otov dXXov said under the head of relation, that the one is not
•nadovTos avTO prj8€v Tra^dv dnoXuiXeKevai ttjv avTOV the kind of thing to lose its own nature when some­
thing else is affected and it is affected in no way; but
<j>vaiv, dXXd Sei, ei peXXoi €k tov ev eK^rjvai, neTTovOevai if it is going to escape from the one it must ex­
5 T1JV TOV evos aTepijaiv els 8vo tj nXelco 8iaip€dev. ei odv o perience the deprivation of the one by being divided
into two or more. If therefore the same bulk becomes
avTOS oyKOS 8iaipe6€ts 8vo ycveTai ovk anoXopevos o)S two by being divided without being destroyed as
oyKOS, 8fjXov oTi napd to vnoKelpevov ijv ev avTCU bulk, it is clear that besides the underlying bulk the
npoaov TO ev, o dve^aXe Trjs 8iaipeaeojs avTO one was in it as something added, which it lost when
the division destroyed it. Now, how can we avoid
(jydeipdarjs- o 8ri ore pev tw ovtw TrdpeaTiv, ore 8e ranking among things which exist, wherever it may
10 aTToylveTai, irdis ovk ev toIs oSol Td^opev, onov dv jj; be, what is sometimes present to and sometimes
absent from one and the same thing? And we shall
Kai avp^e^t^Kevai pev tovtocs, koB’ avTO 8e eivai, ev re affirm that it is present to these things incidentally,
Tois alaOriTols otov <j>a(vriTai ev re toIs vorjTois, toIs but exists by itself, when it appears both in per­
pev voTepois avp^e^rjKos, e<^’ avTOV 8e ev [rois
ceptible and intelligible things, incidentally to the
later order, but on its own in the first [order of
vorjTols] ^ TW TTpwTcp, OTOV ev, eiTU ov. el 8e tis Xeyoi, being], when it is first one and then being. But if
ws Kai TO ev pTj8ev naBov npoaeXBdvTOS dXXov avTW someone were to say that the one also, without being
affected in any way, when something else comes to it
15 ovKeTi ev, dXXd 8vo eoTai, ovk opBws epet. ov yap to ev will no longer be one but two, he will not be speak­
eyeveTO 8vo, ovTe <L TTpoaeTeBT) ovTe to TrpooTeBev, dXX ing correctly. For it was not the one which became
eKdTepov pevei ev, wa-nep •^v rd 8e 8vo KaTTjyopeiTai
two, neither the one which was added nor the one it
was added to, but each of them remains one, as it
was; but the "two” is predicated of both, but the
' delevimus, ut glossam ad T<i -npuiTui-
S3
52
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Kar’ diJ,(j>oiv, ev Kad’ eKarepov p,evovTOS. "one” separately of each, which remains what it is.
The two and the dyad is not therefore naturally
ovKOvv ra Svo (ftvaei ev axeo€i Kat rj Sua?. dAA’ et p,kv relative. But if two was by coming together, and
coming together was the same thing as making two,
20 Kara rrjv avvoBov Kal ro' avvoSep etvai ravrov r(p Svo perhaps the two and the dyad would be a relation of
TTOieiv, rax’ dv •^v rj roiavrij axecri? to Svo Kat i) Svds. this kind. But as it is the dyad is also observed on the
other hand in the opposite way of being affected; for
vvv Se Kat ev tA ivavricp nddei Beoipelrai rrdXiv av Svds' when some one thing is cut, it becomes two; so that
axiodevTos yap evds tlvos ylverai Svo- ov roivvv cure the two is neither a coming together nor a cutting,
so as to be a relation. And the same argument
ffdvoSos ovT€ aytais rd Svo, iv’ dv ijv a;^eats'. d avros Se applies to every number. For, when it is a relation
25 Adyos Kat evt ttovtos dpidp.ov. orav yap ayfois jj ij which produces something, it is impossible for the
opposite relation to produce the same thing so that
yewdiCTa ti, dSvvarov r-ijv ivavrCav to avrd yevvdv, dis this thing can be the relation. What then is the
proper ’cause of number? A thing is one by the
rovTO etvai to -irpayfia ttjv ayeaiv. ti ovv to Kvpiov
presence of the one and two by the presence of the
aiTiov; ev piev etvai tov ev -napovaia, Svo Se SvdSos, dyad, just as it is white by the presence of the white
and beautiful by that of the beautiful and just by
diarrep Kat XevKov XevKov Kat KaXov KaXpv Kat SiKaiov that of the just. ^ Otherwise, one would not be able to
30 SiKaiov. -rj ovSe ravra dereov etvai, dXXa ayeaeis Kat ev maintain that these exist either, but would have to
make relations responsible for these two, as it the
TOVTOis aiTiareov, cos SiKaiov jjiev Sid ttjv -npos rdSe just was so because of this particular relation to
ToidvSe ayeaiv, KaXov Se, on ovno Siandepieda ovSevos these particular things, and the beautiful because
we are so disposed, with nothing existing in the
ovTOS ev avTcp no viroKeijievio oiov Siadelvai -rjpids ovS’ underlying reality of a kind to dispose us, and
nothing coming from outside to what appears beauti­
-rjKOVTOS erraKTOv tco KaXcp <j>aivop.evip. orav toivvv “S-rjs ful. Whenever, then, you see something which you
35 n ev o Aeyeij, TravTajs S-q-rrov eart Kat pieya Kat KaXov call one, it is of course also in every way great and
beautiful and there would be a vast number of other
Kat jjivpia dv eirj eirrelv rrept avrov. cos ovv to jiiya Kat things to say about it. Therefore, as the great and
jjieyedos eanv ev avrco Kat yXvKV Kat viKpov Kat dAAat greatness are in it, and sweet and bitter and other

* Cp. Plato Phaedo 96E8-97B1. Plotinus here is following as a particular kind of Forms, with the same objective
the Phaedo very closely, i.e. he is treating numbers simply reality and causative power as other Forms.
55
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

TroiOTijres, Sia tI ovxl Kal ro ev; ov yap 8i) noior-qs /xev qualities, why not also the one? For there will
certainly not be every possible kind of quality, but
earai Trdaa ■priaovv, ttogottjs 8’ iv toIs oSaiv ovk earai,
not quantity, in the real things; nor will the con­
ovSe TToaoTTjs p,ev to avveyes, to Se 8io}piap,€vov ovk tinuous be quantity and the discrete not, although
40 earai, Kairoi pierpip ro avveyiS ’’"V 8iwpiafiivw. the continuous uses the discrete as a measure. As
therefore a thing is great by the presence of great­
coy ovv pieya p.eye6ovs rrapovaia, ovrai Kal ev evos Kal ness, so it is one by the presence of one and two by
Svo SvdSos Kal rd dXXa waavrcos. to 8e Irjrelv ttcvs the presence of dyad, and the rest in the same way.
pieraXapi^dvei koivov rrpds Trdvrwv rdtv elSwv rrjv- But the problem of how the thing participates [in
number] is common to the enquiry about partici­
^rfrovp.evrjv pierdXrjifjiv. ifiareov S’ ev piev rots pation in all the Forms. But we must affirm that the
45 SirjprjpievoLs dXXcvs deaipetadai rrjv [SeicdSa] ^ evpvaav decad is observed in one way in things that are
SeKdSa, ev Se rots avveyeaiv dXXoJs, ev Se rats TroXXats discrete and in another in things that are con­
tinuous, and in other ways in the many unified
els ev roaaurais Svvd/zeaiv dXXcvs' Kal ev rots vor/rots powers of this particular number; and that we have
rjSrj dvaPe^rjKevai- eri 8e eKel pirjKeri ev dXXois already ascended among the intelligibles; and that
Oewpovfievous, dXX’ avrovs e<f>’ avrcov ovras rods there are the true numbers, no longer observed in
other things but existing themselves on their own,
dXrjdeardrovs dpidpiovs eivai, avroSeKdSa, ov SeKdSa the absolute decad, not the decad of some
50 Tivwv vorjrcvv. intelligibles.
16. Now that this has been said, let us say again,
15. ITdAtv ydp e^ dpxrjs rovrcov rjSrj XeyOevroiv starting at the beginning, that total being, that true
Xeywpiev rd p,ev ^vp-rrav ov rd dXrjOivdv eKetvo Kal ov being, is both being and intellect and perfect living
elvai Kal vovv Kal ^wov reXeov eivai, dp,ov Si) ndvra ^coa thing, and is all living things together; this univer­
sal living thing here below has imitated its one, as
eivai, oS Si) TO ev evl, cos '^v avrw Svvardv, p.ep.lp.’prai
far as it could by [its own] one; for the nature of the
5 Kai ToSe rd ^coov rd irdv e^vye ydp rjrov aladrjrov (fivais perceptible escaped the one there, since it was going
rd eKel ev, e'iirep Kal epeXXev aladrjrdv eivai. dpidpdv Si) to be perceptible by the senses. It must certainly be
total number; for if it was not perfect, it might be
Set avrdv eivai avpiTravra- el ydp p-r/ reXeos eirj, eXXeliroi deficient in some number; and if the whole number of
dv dpidpw rivi- Kal el prj irdy dpidpds ^wcov ev living things was not in it, it would not be the
avrw eir], tt av r e X e s ^ w ov ovk dv ei-q- eariv "complete living thing”.* Number therefore exists

' del. Igal. ' Again Plato Timaeus 31B1.

56 57
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

10 oSv 6 apidnos TTpo ^(pov TTavTos Kai tov TravreXovs prior to every living thing and to the "complete
living thing”. Man is certainly in the intelligible,
^(pov. 6 p,ev Si) avOpojTTOs ev toi vorjTcp Kal ra aXXa ^cpa and the other living things in that they exist, and
Kado fan, Kal i) ^wov vavTfXes ianv fKfivo. Kal yap that intelligible exists in that it is the "complete
Kal 6 fvravOa avOpcoTTOS, ^(pov to ndv, p.€pos avrov- living thing”. For in fact the man here below also, in
that the All is a living thing, is part of it; and each
Kal fKaarov, ^ Cvov, fKfi kv ^axp koTiv. kv 8k tw vai, individual thing, in that it is a living thing, is there
Kadoaov vovs, d)s pikv p.kprj ol ’ vol ndvres Kad’ in the intelligible living thing. And in Intellect, in so
far as it is Intellect, all the intellects exist individu­
15 fKaoTov apidpLOS Sk Kal rovnov. ov toIvvv ov8’ kv v<p
ally as parts; but then there is a number of these
dpidp,6s TTpoiTois" coj 8k kv v<p, oaa vov kvkpyfiar Kal a»y also. Not even in Intellect then does number exist
vov, 8iKaioavvr] Kal aa)<f>poavvrj Kal at dXXai apfral Kal primarily; but it is in Intellect as the pm of the
active actualities of Intellect; and, as it is the num­
kTTLarrjp.T) Kal oaa vov^ fyojv vovs kanv ovtcos. ttois ovv ber of Intellect, it is righteousness and self-control
ovK kv dXXcp Tj kTnaTTjpLT]; rj on kan ravrov Kal 6p,ov 6 and the other virtues and knowledge and all the
things by the possession of which Intellect is really
20 e77jo’Ti)/xajv, to kTriarprov, rj ciriaTij/iij, Kal ra dXXa
Intellect. How then is knowledge not in something
waavTOJS" 8i6 Kal TTpWTcos fKaarov Kal ov avp-^f^yjKos else? It is because the knower, the known and the
i) 8iKaioavvq, ^vxfl Se, Kadoaov avpL^fPrjKOS' knowledge are the same and all together, and it is
just the same with the rest; for this repon each
8vvdp,fi yap p.dXXov ravra, kvfpyfia 8f, orav Trpos vovv exists primarily and righteousness is not incidental
Kal avv v(p.^ pifTOL 8k tovto ■p8r] to ov, Kal kv tovtw 6 but is incidental to soul in so far as it is soul, for in
25 dpiOpLOS, p-fO’ oS Tfi ovra yfvva Kivovpfvov kot dpidpov,
soul these things are rather potential, bp are actual
when it is directed to Intellect and with Intellect.
TTpOOTTjadpfVOV TOVS dpldpovs TTjS VTTOaTdofWS aVTOJV, But immediately after Intellect comes being, and
uiaiTfp Kal avTov to fv avvdnTov avTO to ov npos to number is in this, and with its help it produces the
real beings when moving according to number, set­
TTpWTOV, ot S’ dpidpol OVKfTL TO. dXXa TTpOS TO VpWTOV ting the numbers before their existence as the One
dpKfl yap TO ov avvr/ppkvov. to 8k ov yfvopfvov dpidpos stands before its own, joining ping itself to the first
30 avvdnTfi to. dvra Trpos avTO- ayi^fTai yap ov Kado kv, (but the numbers no longer join the other beings to
the first; for it suffices that being is joined to it). But
dXXd pkvfi TO fV avTov’ ayi^dpfvov 8k Kara rrjv avTov being, when it has become number, joins the beings
to itself; for it splits (not in so far as it is one, but p
* Creuzer: ws Enn.
au^jEnn. one abides); and when it has split according to its
59
S8
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
<f>vaiv eis oaa '^OeXrjaev, eiSev eis oaa Kara' tov dpiBixov
iyevvrjaev ev avru apa ovra- rats yap Swap-eai tov
dpiOpLov eayiadr] Kal Toaavra iyevvrjaev, oaa ^v 6
apidpLos. dpxrj ovv Kai rrrjyrj vrroardaews tols otaiv
36 o apiOpLos 6 rrpwTOS Kai dXrjOrjs. Sto Kai evravda pLerd
dpidpLwv -q yeveais eKaarois, Kav dXXov dpi6jj,6v Xd^rj
Ti, -q dXXo yevva rj ylverai ovSev. Kai ovtoi p,ev vpioToi
dpidp,o{, (1)S dpidp,qTOi- oi S’ ev Tois dXXois ijSq
ajx,(j)OTepa eyovaiv ^ p,ev rrapd tovtcov, dpidp-qrot, ^ 8e
40 Kara tovtovs rd dXXa pLerpovai, Kai dpidjiovvTes tovs
apidjxovs Kai rd dpidjxqrd' tlvi ydp SeKa dv Xeyoiev q
Tols Trap’ avTois dpi0p,ois;
16. ToStou? S'^, ovs <f>apiev rrpdiTOVS dpL9p.ovs Kai
aXqdeis, TTOV dv tis <f>alq Oetqre Kai eis ri yevos Tcbv
dvTwv; ev p.ev ydp rw rroad) SoKovaiv ecvac rrapd rrdai
Kai Srj Kai rroaov pv-qp/qv ev rip rrpoadev erroielade
5 diiovvres opoiais [ev] ^ to) avveyei Kai to Siiopiapevov
ev Tols odai Tidevai. rrdXiv re av XeyeTe, <hs rrpwTWv
ovTwv odTol eiaiv oi dpiOpoi, dXXovs re ad dpiOpovg
Trap’ eKeivovs eivai Aeyere dpidpovvTag. rruis ovv Tavra
SiaTaTTeade, XeyeTe Tjplv. eyei ydp rroXXrjv drropiav
10 errei Kai to ev to ev tois alaOqTois rroTepa rroaov ti q
' coniecimus: rai Enn.
expunctum in A, del. Kirchhofif.
‘ In this chapter Plotinus has moved from the simple
Platonism of the Phaedo to a position more in accord with
the later discussions in the Academy, alluded to by
6o
ON NUMBERS
nature into as many as it wished, it looked to see
how many it had generated according to number,
which were therefore in it; for it was split by the
powers of number and generated as many as the
number was. Therefore the first and true number is
the principle and spring of existence for the real
beings.* And so here below too the coming into being
of every individual thing takes place with the help of
numbers, and when something takes another num­
ber it generates something else or nothing comes to
be at all. And these are the first numbers, as num­
bered; but those in the other things already have
both; in that they come from these first, they are
numbered numbers, but in that they are according to
these, they measure the other things, numbering
both the numbers and the things numbered; for by
what could they say "ten” except by the numbers in
themselves?
16. Now, these which we affirm are the first and
true numbers—someone might ask Where do you
put them, and in which of the genera of brings? For
everybody puts them in the quantitative, and you did
mention the quantitative in what you said before,
when you claimed that one must put the discrete like
the continuous among beings.^ But again on the
other side you say that these are the numbers of the
first real beings, and again you say that there are
other numbering numbers beside these. So tell us
how you arrange all this. For there is a great deal of
difficulty here; since the one also which is in per-
Aristotle, in which the Ideal Numbers are prior to the
Forms.
“ In ch. 14, 38-40.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

TToXXoLKis fiev TO ev TToaov, avTO Se fjAvov dpx'^ ttooov ceptible things—is it something quantitative, or is a
number of times one quantitative, hut it itself the
Kal ov TToaov; Kai norepa dpx^ ovoa avyyeves tj aXXo
principle of the quantitative and not quantitative.'
ri; ravra rjpi,lv ndvra Sixaioi 8iaaa(f>€iv eare. XsKTeov And, being the principle, is it of the same genus, or
odv dp^ap,evoLS evrevOev nept tovtcov, cos orav pev— something else? You owe us an explanation of all
this.” So, starting from this point, we inust sa^ about
TTpcoTov S’ €771 Ttbv aiadr]T(hv ttoi7)t4ov tov Xoyov—orav all this that when—we must base our discussion first
15 Toivvv dXXo per’ dXXov Xa^cov eiTrrjs Svo, otov Kvva Kal on perceptible things—when, therefore, you take
dvdpcoTTOV rj Kal dvdpcoTTovs Svo rj nXeiovs, Se/ca eirrcov one thing after another and say "two”, a dog and a
man for instance, or two men, or more when you say
Kal dvdpcoTTcov SeKaSa, 6 dpidpos oStos ovk ovaia ovS’ "ten” and "a decad of men”, this number is not a
cos €v aladrjrocs, dXXd Kadaptos noaov. Kal pepl^cov^ substance, not even the kind of substance which
occurs among perceptible things, but purely quant­
Kad’ eva Kal rijs SeKaSos TavTrjs pept] ttolcov to eva
itative. And when you divide iiito ones and make
20 dpxijv TTOieis Kal riB^aai noaov' efy yap tcov Se/ca ovy ev them part of this decad you make and posit the ones
Kaff’ avTo. orav Se tov dvOpconov avrdv ecf>’ eavroO as principle of the quantitative, for a one of the ten is
not one in itself. But when you say that man in
Xeyrjs dpiOpov riva, oTov SvdSa, tppov Kal XoyiKov, ovy himself is a particular number, a dyad for instance,
€is €TL 6 TpoTTOS evTavda, dAA’ ■§ pev Sie^oSeveis Kal animal and rational, your way of proceeding here is
dpidpels, TToadv tl TTOiels, ^ Se rd vnoKeipevd iari. Svo
not one single way, but in so far as you are counting
and numbering you are making something quantita­
25 Kal eKarepov ev, ei to ev eKarepov avpnX'qpovv rrjv tive but in so far as the underlying realities are two
ovatav Kal i) ivoTTjs ev eKarepcp, dpidpdv dXXov Kal and each of them is one, if each one is an essential
completion of the substance and unity is in each, you
ovaicoSrj Aeyeis. Kal rj Svds avT-q ovy varepov ovSe oaov are speaking of a different and substantial number.
Xeyei pdvov e^coOev tov irpaypaTos, dAAd to ev ttj ovaici And this dyad is not posterior, nor just as much as it
Kal avveyov ttjv tov npdypaTos ^vaiv. ov ydp TTOiecs says merely, outside the thing, but that which is in
the substance and holds the nature of the thmg
dpidpdv av evTavOa ev Sie^dScp enicov vpdypaTa Kad’ together. For you certainly do not make number
30 avTd ovTa ovSe awiOTapeva ev tco dpidpeladai' tl ydp here below when you go through one after another
things which have their own existence and do not
dv yevoiTO els ovaiav dXXco dvdpcJoTTCp peT dXXov
come together in the numbering: for what difference
dpidpovpevcp; ovSe ydp tis evds, cooTrep ev X°PVi V does it make in substance to one man if he is counted
' Creuzer: ixeplCov Enn. along with another? For there is no unity either, as
62 63
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.
SeKas avrr) toiv dvdpanrajv €v aot rw dpi^/xouvTt ttjv
vTToaraaiv dv exoi, ev Se roiy SeKa ovs dpidixeis p'q
35 avvT€Tayp,evois ets ev ovSe SeKas dv Xeyoiro, dAAd SeVa
ai) TTOiecs dpi6p,d)v, Kai ttogov tovto to SeKa- ev Se tw
yopd) Kai eoTi Ti e^o) Kai ev rw arparw. ttws S‘ ev aoi; r]
d piev -TTpo Tov dpiOpietv eyKeipt-evos dXXcos' 6 S’ eK tov
(l)avrjvai e^cvOev Trpds tov ev aot evepyeia -rj eKeivwv rj
40 Kar’ eKeivovs, dpi0p,ovvTOS dp,a Kai dpiOpudv yevvcvvTOS
Kai ev T-fj evepyeia viroaraaiv ttoiovvtos -noaov, oiaTrep
Kai ev T<p ^aSi^eiv virdaraaiv tivos Kivrjaeois. tt<x>s ovv
dXXws 6 ev ripuv; y d rijs ovaias •qpUbv pieTeyovad
(fiTjaiv dpidp-ov Kai dppiovCas Kai dpiOpids av Kai
apfjiovia- ovre yap awpid <j>TqaiTis ovre pieyedos' dpidpios
45 dpa Tj tjsvxrj, einep ovaia. d piev S-rj tov adipiaTOS dpiOpos
ovaia, d)s awpia, 6 Se T-rjs ifivyrjs ovalai, coy ifivyai. Kai
Sr) oAcoy €771 TcZiv vorjToiv, el eoTi to etcet ^wov avTo
TrAetco, oiov Tpids, avT-q rj Tpids ovaicoS-qs rj ev toi CvV-
Tj Se Tpids Tj piTjiTOi Cvov, dXX’ oXeos Tpids ev tw ovti,
50 dpxTj ovaias. el S’ dpidpiels iwov Kai KaXdv, e/cdrepov
‘ Plato Timaeus 36E6-37A1. In considering Pythagorean
and Platonic thought about numbers it is most important
always to remember that, from Pythagoras onwards, the
numbers are musical numbers, the numbers of melody and
rhythm.
’^A Pythagorean doctrine accepted by Plato’s pupil
64
ON NUMBERS
there is in a chorus, but this decad of men yyo^d
have its existence in you, the numberer. but in the
ten which you number, which are not ordered to­
gether into one, one could not even speak of a decad,
but you make ten by numbering, and this ten is
quantitative; but in the chorus there is also some­
thing outside you, and also in the army. But in what
way is the number in you? Now, that which is latent
in you before the numbering is there in a different
wav but that which comes from the outward ap­
pearance to the number in you is the actualisation
either of those numbers in you or according to them,
when you number and at the same time generate
number and in this actualisation produce a real
existence of the quantitative, just as in walking you
produce a real existence of a kind of movement.
What, then, about the number which is in us in a
different way? It is the number of our substance; tor,
Plato says, since it participates in number and
melody! it is again number and melody; tor, one
says, it is not body or magnitude; the soul therefore
is a number,2 if it is a substance. The number of body
is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the
number of soul is substances in the way souls are.
And indeed generally among the intelligibles, if the
living being there is itself more than one, a triad tor
instance, this triad in the living being is substantial.
But the triad which does not yet belong to the living
being, but is in a general way a triad in real being, is
a principle of substance. But if you number living
being” and "beautiful”, each of them is one, but you
Xenocrates: see Aristotle Metaphysics A 5. 985b30 and
Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze; for Xenocrates the soul was a self-
moving number.
6S
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

/iev ev, ail Se yewds dpiOfiov iv aol Kal evepyels noaov generate number in yourself and actualise tbe quan­
titative and the dyad. If however you say that virtue
Kai SvdSa. ei pevToi dpeTrjv rerrapa Xeyois—Kai is form—and it is a kind of tetrad, as its parts come
rerpas eari ns ofov rd p.ip'q avrijs etV ev—Kal evdSa together into one—and a tetradic [or fourfold] unity
rerpdSa otov to vnoKeipevov, Kal ai) rerpdSa
like the underlying reality, then you are fitting to it
the tetrad which is in you.
e<f>app.6TT€is TTjv ev aoi. 17. But what about the number called unlimited '
17. '0 8e Xeyopevos direLpos dpidpos ttws; nepas For these arguments of ours give it limit. And this is
correct, if it is going to be a number; for unlimited­
yap ovToi avTOi SiSdaaiv ol Xoyoi. ij Kal 6pBd)s, eiTrep
ness clashes with number. Why, then, do we say
earai dpiBpos' to yap aTreipov pdyeTai tw dptBpcp. Sid "The number is unlimited”? Is it with number as it is
TL ovv Xeyopev "aTreipos d dpiBp,6s"; dp’ oSv dianep when we say a line' is unlimited?—^but we say a line
is unlimited not because there is any line of this kind
5 aneipov Xeyopev ypapp.rjv—Xeyopev 8e ypap,p,rjv
but because it is possible with the longest line, that
aTreipov, ovy otl eoTi tis TOiavT-q, dAA’ on e^eoTiv errl of the universe for instance, to think of a Icinger.
Tfj peyiOTT), ofov too ttovtos, eTTivoTjaai pei^oj—oJtco For when it is known how much a number is it is
possible to double it in thought without connecting
Kal etrl too dpiBpov; yvwaBevTos yap oaos eoTlv eoTiv
it to that original number. For how could you attach
avTOv 8nrXaa{ova iroiijaai tt) 8iavoia ovk eKeivoj a thought and mental image which is only in you to
10 awdipavTa. to yap ev aol piovip v6r]p,a Kal (fidvTaapa things which really exist? Or are we going to assert
that there is an unlimited line among the intelli-
nebs dv TOty oSai npoadijiais; rj (jyqaopiev dneipov ev toIs
gibles? For [otherwise] the line there will be of a
vofjTois etvai ypappL-qv; noarj yap dv eir/ ij e/eef ypapprp certain length; hut if it was not of a certain num­
dAA’ ei /lit) noarj tis ev dpiBp,cb, dneipos dv eirj. rj to bered length, it would be unlimited. But its un­
limitedness may be of another kind, not like some­
dneipov dXXov Tpdnov, ovy coy dSte^iTT/Tov. dXXd nebs thing which you cannot get to the end of. But how is
15 dneipos; rj ev reb Xdyep rrjs avToypapiprjs ovk evi it unlimited? Now in the definition of the absolute
npoervoovpevov nepas. rl oSv eKei ypapiperj Kal nov; line limit is not thought as included. What then is
the line there in the intelligihle, and where? It is
varepov piev yap dpiBpov- evopdrai yap ev aiirfi to ev certainly posterior to number; for the one is ob­
Kai yap defi’ evdy Kal npos piiav SidaTaaiv noaov 8e to served in it: it proceeds from one point and over one

' Here Plotinus returns to the question raised in ch. 2 ^ This is Aristotle’s account of mathematical infinity: see
and deferred at the beginning of ch. 3. Physics r 7. 207b28-34.
66 67
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I PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

( Trjs SiaardaecDS fxerpov ovk ex®‘- dX\d itov tovto; 5.pa distance; but it does not have a quantitative measure
I i| of that distance. But where is this? Is it only in a
* !^ pLOvov ev evvo-qaei otov opiariKij; rj Kai irpayna, voepov kind of defining thought? No, it is a thing, but an
I intellectual thing. For all [heings there] are like
r 20 pLCVTOi. TTavra yap ovrws, to? Kai voepd Ka( itws to
this, so as to be intellectual and, in some way, the
npaypLa. Kai Sij Kai nepl eirineSov Kai arepeov Kai real thing. And indeed [we must also ask] where and
how about plane and solid and all the figures: for it is
■ndvTcov Tthv axT]p-dTCi)v, ttov Kai ottws' ov yap 8r] ij/Lieij certainly not we who merely think the figures. The
TCt ayqpiaTa €Tnvoovp,ev. p,aprvp€l Se to re too navros figure of the universe, which was before us, is
evidence of this, and the other natural figures in the
ayripca npo rjp,wv Kai ret aAAa, oaa (f>vaiKd ay^p-aTa ev things which exist by nature, which must exist
26 Tols (j>va{i. ovaiv, a Si) dvdyKt] irpo Ttov acopdrcov etvai
before the bodies as unfigured figures there in the
intelligible, and primary figures. For they are not
h daxrjpdriaTa e/cei Kai npoora ax’^para. ov yap pop<j)al shapes in something else, but since they are them­
I selves belonging to themselves there was no need for
i ev dXXois, aAA’ avra avrwv ovra ovk eSelro eKradrjvai- them to be extended; the extended figures belong to
TO. yap eKTadevra aAAcov. •ndvrore oiJv ax^jpa ev ev rtp other things. Figure, then, is always one in real
being, but it has distinctions in it either in the living
ovTi, SieKpWrj 8e rjroi ev tw ^toto rj Trpd rov ^tooo. Acyto being or before the living being. But I mean has
I
distinctions” not in the sense that it has acquired
30 Se “Ste/tpi^ij” ovx on epeyeOvvOr], dAA’ on eKaarov
size, but because it has been divided, each part of it
epepiaOrj Tpos eKaarov, cos to ^<oov, Kai toIs acopaaiv in correspondence to each being, and given to the
e bodies there in the intelligible, as to fire there, if you
e86dri Tols eKel, oiov nvpL, el jSooAet, Tto e/cei i) eKel like, to the pyramid there.^ This is why this fire here
TTVpapis. 8i6 Kai TOVTO pipeladac BeXei jtti) 8vvdpevov below wants to imitate it, though it cannot by reason
of matter, and the other elements in a similar way, as
vXr/s aiTca Kai rd dXXa dvdXoyov, toy Xeyerai Trepl Ttov is said about the elements here below. But is figure,
then, in the living being in that it is living being?
35 T^Se. dXX’ oSv ev tw ^toto Kad’ o ^oiov; y ev rdi voi
No, it is in Intellect before. For it is certainly in the
TTporepov ean pev yap ev tw Ctoto' el pev oSv to ^wov living being; if therefore the living being was inclus­
ive of Intellect, it would be primarily in the living
' The pyramid is the "unit and seed” (oroixeiov Kai anepiMa)
of fire in the mathematical physics of the Timaeus: see intelligible world requires the presence of bodies there,
56B4-5. Plotinus’ whole way of thinking about the though they cannot be extended in space.
I
\ 6g
68
\
1
i

I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

TrepieKTiKOV -^v tov vov, ev toi Cd>w TTpwTOis, el Se vovs being; but if Intellect has priority in rank, it is
primarily in Intellect. But if in the complete living
Kara rrjv rd^iv nporepos, ev v(p. dAA’ el ev toi ^tpip rw being there are also souls, Intellect is prior. But,
navreXet Kal ifivxo-l, TTporepos vovs- dAAd vovs <f>r]aiv Plato says, "as many as Intellect sees in the hying
being’’*; if then it sees, it is posterior. But it is
oaa 6 pa ev rdi tt av t e X e t C(p<p' el ovv opa, possible that the "sees” is meant in this sense, that
40 varepos- ^ Svvarov to ''opa” ovtcvs elpf/aBai, d)S ev rfi the real existence of the living being comes about in
the seeing; for Intellect is not other, but all are one,
opdaei Trjs vnoaTaaetos yivopevrjs' ov yap dXXos, dAAd and intellection has the bare sphere but the living
TtavTa ev, Kal rj vorjais 8e >/jiX6v eyei a<f>alpav, to Se being the sphere of the living being. . ^ ,
18. But certainly number there in the intelligible
^wov ^wov a(l>alpav.
is limited; but we think of a number greater than
18. AAAd yap 6 dpidpos eKel (LpiOTar -qp-els S’ that which is before us, and the unlimited belongs to
emvorjaopev TrXeCova tov npoTeOevTOS, Kal to dneipov
us numbering in this way. But there it is not possible
to think of more than what is thought of; it is aLeady
OVTWS dpi9p,ovvTU)v. eKei S’ eTTivorjaai nXeov ovk eoTi there; no number is deficient, nor will any be de­
TOV eTrivoTjOevTOS' ^Stj yap eoTiv ovS’ tis ovSe ficient, so that any number could be added to it. But
number might be unlimited there also, because it is
5 Xei<j>9riaeTai, tva tis Kal irpooTeB^ avTW. eir] S’ av KO-Kel not measured: for what could it be measured by? But
dveipos, OTi OVK eoTi p,epeTprjp,evos' vno tIvos yap; what it is it all is, being one and all together and,
certainly, a whole, and not bounded by any limit but
dAA’ os eoTi, nds eoTiv ev wv Kal opov Kal oXos Si) Kal by its own agency being what it is; for in general
oil TTepieiXrjppivos irepart Tivi, dAA’ eavTW dlv os eoTV none of the real beings is in a limit, but what is
Twv yap ovTcvv oXcvs ovSev ev irepaTi, dAA’ eoTi to
limited and measured is what is prevented from
running on into indefiniteness and needs a meas^e;
10 ireTTepaapevov Kal pepeTprjpevov to els dmeiplav but those real beings are all measures, and theretore
KCvXvBev Spapelv Kal peTpov Seopevov eKelva Se TrdvTa are all beautiful. For in that it is a living being it is
beautiful, having the best of life, deficient in no life,
peTpa, o9ev Kal KaXd TrdvTa. Kal ydp, ^ ^oiov, koXov, nor again having life mixed with death; for nothmg
dplaTrjv TTjv eyov, ovSepia ^cdt) cAAeiiroi', ovS’ aS is mortal or dying; nor again is the life of the living
being itself strengthless, but the first and clearest
irpos BdvaTov avppiyij eyov TTjv ^coijv ovSev ydp Bvr/rdv
life, having the pure essence of living, like the nrst
15 ovS’ dvoBvpaKov oiiS’ av dpevrjvrj rj ^corj tov ^(pov
avTov, dAA’ i) TTpdiTfi Kal evapyeoTdTT] Kal to Tpavdv '■ Timaeus 39E7-9.
71
70
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

exovaa tov ^oirep to trpwrov (fxhs, d<f>‘ oi Kal at light, from which the souls live there, and those
which come down here bring it with them. But it
tfivxai ^oiCTt re enet /cat at Sevpo iovaai Kopl^ovrai. oi8e
knows for what reason it lives and towards what it
8e /cat OTOV Trpos o ^rj, d<f>‘ ov Kat oS lives, towards that from which also it lives; for that
20 yap, Kat ets o ■q Se irdvTwv <j)p6vqais /cat o ttols vovs from which its life comes is also that to which it
goes. But the thought of all [the beings in it] and
incdv. Kal avvcuv Kat opov d)v dyadd)T€pov avro universal Intellect is upon it and accompanies it and
eTTixpcuaas Kal avyKepaadpevos (I>p6vqai.v afpvoTepov is closely together with it and by giving it a colour of
avTov TO KaXXos irapexeTai. inet /cat evTavda ^povtjaoy greater goodness and mixing thought into it makes
its beauty more majestic. For even here below a
^coTj TO aepvov Kat to koXov koto dXqOeidv eoTi, koLtoi thoughtful life is majesty and beauty in truth,
25 dpv8pd)s opaTai. eKet Se KaOapcbs dp&Taf StScuai yap though it is dimly seen. But there it is seen clearly;
for it gives to the seer sight and power to live more,
Tw opcoVTi opaaiv Kat Svvapiv ets to pdXXov ^rjv Kat
and by living more intensely to see and become what
pdXXov evTOVojs ^cdvTa opdv /cat yeveadai o dpd. he sees. For here below most of our attention is
evTavda pev yap q 77poCT/3oAi7 /cat Trpos atfivya q ttoAAtj, directed to lifeless thinp, and when it is directed to
living beings what is lifeless in them stands in the
Kat orav Trpos ^<pa, to pq ^d)v avTWV TTpo^e^XqTai, Kat way, and the life within them is mixed. But there all
q evSov ^a>q pepiKTai. eKet Se ^<pa ndvTa Kat dXa ^cZ/vra are living beings, living as wholes and pure; and if
30 /cat' Kadapd- Kav dts ov ^wov tl Xd^qs, e^eXapipev avTOV you take something not to be a living being it
immediately itself flashes out its life. But when you
evOecos Kat avTO Tqv tpx>qv. Tqv Se ovalav ev avTols contemplate the substance running through them,
Sia^daav, dKvvqTov ets peTa^oXqv vapexovaav avTots giving them a life which does not move by changing,
and the thought and the wisdom and knowledge in
Tqv ^coqv, Kat Tqv <f>p6vqaiv Kat Tqv ev aiiTots ao<f>£av
them, you will laugh at the lower nature for its
Kat eiTiaTqpqv deaadpevos Tqv kotw ^vaiv drraaav pretension to substantiality. For by this substance
35 yeActoet Tqs ets ovalav npoaTroiqaecvs. Trapd yap TavTqs life abides and intellect abides, and the real beings
stand still in eternity; nothing puts it out of itself or
pevei pev l,ojq, pevei vovs, eoTqKe 8e ev atcvvi ret ovra' alters it or makes it deviate; for there is nothing
e^loTqoL Se oiiSev ovSe rt Tperret ouSe Trapa/ctvei avTo- beside it to get a grip on it; but if there was anything,
ovSe yap eOTi tl ov peT’ avTO, o e<j>difieTai avTOV' et Se tl it would exist because of it. And if there was any­
thing opposed to it, it would he unaffected by this
qv, VTTO TOVTOV dv tJv. Kat et evavTiov tl t^v, dvades dv ^v very opposed thing; but, existing itself, it would not
40 TOVTO vtt’ avTov TOV evavTiov dv Se avTO ovk dv tovto have made this opposite exist, but some other com-
72 73
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 6.
kTToirjoev 6v, aXX’ erepov Trpo avTOV koivov, Kai ijv eKeivo
TO 6v coCTTe ravTTj Tlapp.eviSr]s opdws ev einojv to 6v
Kat ov 8i’ eprjpLiav aXXov dirades, dXX’ on ov pi6v(p yap
TOVTip Trap’ avTov ioTiv eivai. ttws dv ovv tis
45 TO ov nap’ avTov d<l>eXoiTO rj otiovv dXXo, oaa ovtos
evepyela Kal oaa an’ avTov; ecus yap dv yopT^yel' con
8’ der diane KdKeiva. ovtco 8’ ioTiv ev 8wdp.ei Kal
KdXXei p.€ya, wane deXyeiv Kal rd ndvTa dvTjpTrjadai
avTOV Kal lyvos avTov nap’ avTov eyovTa dyanav Kal
50 /Lterd tovto ndyaOoy^ ^lyreiv to yap eiuai npo eKeivov
coy TTpdy 'pp,ds- Kal 6 nds Se Koap-os ovtos Kal l^Tjv Kal
<j>povelv, iva ■§, deXei, Kal ndaa i/'i’X'’? ^d.s vovs o
eoTiv etvai- to 8e eivai avTapKes eavTU).
^ Kirchhoff: fcerd tovto dyaOdv Enn.; joer’ avTov
H-S>.
74
ON NUMBERS
mon cause before it, and that would be the really
existent; so that Parmenides' in this way was right
in saying that being was one; and it is not unaffected
because of the absence of anything else, but because
it really exists; for real being alone can exist of and
by itself. How then could anyone take being from it,
or anything else of all the things which exist by
being’s activity and come from itself? For as long as
it exists, it gives of its store of being; but it exists for
ever, so that they do also. But in this way it is great
in power and beauty, so that it is enchanting and all
things depend on it and are happy when they have a
trace of it and seek the Good with it; for being stands
in front of the Good from our point of view. And this
whole universe wants to live and think that it may
be, and every soul and every intellect wants to be
what it is; but being is sufficient to itself.
to dyadov ' The reference is a general one to the Second Hypothesis
of Plato’s Parmenides, beginning at 142B.
75

VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS
CAME INTO BEING. AND ON THE GOOD
Introductory Note
This treatise, perhaps the greatest of the single works of
Plotinus, is number 38 in Porphyry’s chronological order.
It is separated in that order by only three short works on
minor questions from its predecessor in the Enneads, VI. 6
On Numbers, and is immediately followed by its successor
in the Enneads, VI. 8, the great treatise on divine freedom.
The chronological order and the Ennead order coincide
here more closely than anywhere else in Porphyry’s
edition. VI. 7 is the most intellectually and spiritually
powerful of all Plotinus’ "ascents of the mind to God”. It
begins in this world here below, and in the philosophical
lecture-room, with a discussion of what for Plotinus (and
other late Platonists) was the most important question
raised by Plato’s mythical account of the making of the
world in the Timaeus: how far is Plato’s description of that
making in terms of the activity of a Demiurge or craftsman
to be taken literally? Does God plan the world and then
make it? Is divine wisdom to be understood in terms of
the sort of intelligent, purposive, over-all planning
characteristic of a good architect or civic designer? In
showing that it is not, and in displaying the true nature of
the creativity of the Divine Intellect, Plotinus builds up his
fullest and most impressive account of the nature and
contents of the intelligible world, showing us how
everything here below is there too, and only here because
it is there, and not there in the form of a system of
abstractions but in a more vital reality than we apprehend
it here: it is a world "boiling with life”, an eternal world
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
which somehow contains time and movement and change
and process. In the end we are left with the very strong
impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but
one real world apprehended in different ways on different
levels. It is from our highest and truest apprehension of
this intelligible world of which we ourselves are parts that
we ascend to the Good. For, as Plotinus shows here
with particular care and clarity, ascend we must. The
intelligible world which he has displayed in all its beauty is
not our goal. Intellect and the intelligible cannot finally
satisfy us. The demonstration of transcendence culminates
in Plotinus’ fullest and strongest account of the soul’s
union with the Good in the self-transcendence of Intellect,
an account which shows more clearly than anything else in
the Enneads the consonance of his mysticism and his
metaphysics. The treatise concludes with a section which
confirms the transcendence of the One or Good above
Intellect by a full demonstration that the One does not
think.
Synopsis
When God or the gods were making man, did they plan
his senses with a view to self-preservation in the sense-
world? No, there is no planning in the intelligible; but
everything is there in such a way that when it is unfolded
into time here below it looks as if it had been perfectly
planned (ch. 1). In the intelligible th,e thing and the reason
why it is are one (ch. 2). Man in the intelligible has senses
so that the whole may be complete and evei^thing may be.
there; but does not this mean that Intellect inclines to and
plans for the sense-world (ch. 3)? The complexity of man,
not just a soul but also the formative principle of body and
the form in body (chs. 4 and 5). All his complexity exists in
the intelligible, including senses and perhaps bodies, and
the possibility of existing on different levels, from god to
beast (ch. 6). There is nothing unnatural about the making
of the lower animals; co-operation of universal and
79
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
individual souls in making things here below; sense-
perceptions here below imitate intellections in the
intelligible (ch. 7). But how can there be irrational animals
in the intelligible? Intellect is not the One and so must be
multiple; and its multiplicity must be all-inclusive (ch. 8).
All is living thought there; so what are irrational animals
here below are living thought there (ch. 9). Horns and teeth
and claws, which are to supply deficiencies here below, are
there in the intelligible as part of the richly varied
perfection of the whole (ch. 10). Plants and the four
elements are in the intelligible world as well as animals:
the elements are alive in their own way here below, and
more intensely alive there (ch. 11). The glorious unity-in­
diversity of the intelligible world, containing all that is in
the universe of sense, in perfect unity and boiling with life
(ch. 12). Only the last and lowest forms are single and
simple. Intellect is vastly complex because it is all
activities. How the Platonic categories of Otherness and
Movement operate in Intellect to produce endless change,
variety and movement all contained in its substance of
living thought (ch. 13). Analogy from the complexity of
lower forms, e.g. the form of a face. The unity in love
without confusion of Intellect (ch. 14). Beginning of the
ascent from Intellect to the Good. Intellect receives
everything in it from the Good, but in receiving it breaks
up the primal unity into its own unity-in-diversity (ch. 15).
The need to go higher than Intellect: how Intellect comes
from the Good and the Good is cause both of its substance
and its vision (ch. 16). The giver is greater than the gift: the
Good gives Intellect what it does not have; it is the giver of
form, itself beyond form and limit (ch. 17). What "being in
the form of good” means when applied to Intellect and the
Forms in Intellect; why the Good is supremely desirable so
that we must go beyond Intellect to find it (chs. 18-21).
Intellect and the Forms in Intellect need another light from
the Good to be desirable besides the glory immanent in
themselves (which they received from it); without this light
and life they would be uninteresting and undesirable (chs.
8o
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
21-2). Necessity of the supreme Good, before all evils,
which is before all things and makes all things (ch. 23). But
what, after all, is this Good? What does it do for us and why
do we desire it (ch. 24)? Exegesis of Plato’s conclusion
about pleasure in the Philebus: ascent through the scale of
goods to the ultimate (ch. 25). The Good cannot be an
illusion or a subjective feeling (ch. 26). The good for
anything is not simply what is most akin to it (ch. 27).
Could matter, which is evil, choose and desire the Good
(ch. 28)? Difficulty of the unintellectual man with talk
about Intellect as good; perhaps he has some dim
awareness of a Good beyond Intellect (ch. 29). Return to
and full explanation of Plato’s mixture of pleasure and
intelligence in the Philebus (ch. 30). The light and life
which come to Intellect and Soul from the Good; the soul,
moved by the Good to love, is carried by its love from bodies
to the Forms in Intellect (ch. 31). The unbounded, formless
source of the beauty of the Forms (ch. 32). Rejection of
discursive reasoning about the Forms as a hindrance to the
love which must go on beyond form to the formless (ch. 33).
The experience of the final union or vision, in which the
soul attains to the Good in the eternal self-transcendence
of Intellect (chs. 34-6). The Good does not think: rejection
of the Peripatetic idea that the First Principle thinks its
own thinking, and full working out of the implications of
saying that the Good is beyond being and intellect (chs.
37^2).
 VI. 7. (38) nnz TO nAH0OE TON lAEON
THEETH KAI HEPI TATAeOT
1. El’s yeveaiv nifiTTcov o Beds ^ Beos tls ras ijivyas
<l> (1) a (f> 6 p a nept to TTpoawnov eBrjKev o p, p. a t a Kal
TO. aXXa opyava rals alaBtqaeaiv eKaarais eSwK€
Trpooptupevos, cos ovtws av ctco^oito, ei tTpoopwro Kal
5 TTpoaKOvoi Kal ailiapevrj ro pev (^evyoi, to 8e Sicokoi.
noBev B'q TTpoiSojv Tavra; ov yap Si) Trporepov
yevopevcjv aXXcav, eira Si’ anovaiav aiaB-^aeaiv
<j>Bap€VTO}v, eScoicev varepov a eyovTes epeXXov
avBpwTTOi Kal TO. aXXa ^ipa to iraBelv <j>vXd^aaBai. ij
eiTTOi dv Tis, ijSei, on €v Beppols Kal ijivxpois eaoiro ro
10 l^cpov Kal Tois aAAois awpdrwv ndBear ravra Se ciScos,
OTTCOS fii) ^BeipOiTO jOaSitos rwv l^wcjv rd acdpara, to
' Plotinus is here commenting on the whole account of
the making of the material universe, the sending of souls
into it, and the preparation of their bodies, in the Timaeus.
He writes "God or one of the gods” because in the Timaeus
(44E5 flf.) it is not the great Craftsman but his children, the
younger gods, who make the human body and its organs
(the "light-bearing eyes” 45B3). Plato’s whole description,
of the activity both of Craftsman and of younger gods is in
terms of reasoning (e.g. 34A8-B1) and planning. The
exegetical problem for Plotinus is to show that this is not to
be taken literally.
82
VI 7 HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE
FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND
ON THE GOOD
1. When God or one of the gods was sending the
souls to birth he put "light-bearing eyes” in the face
and gave them the other organs for each of the
senses, foreseeing that safety would be ensured in
this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by
touching could avoid one thing and pursue another.'
But really, where did this foreseeing come from? For
it certainly was not because others had come into
existence before and then perished because of the
absence of senses that he afterwards gave what
human beings and other living things were going to
avoid suffering by having.^ Now someone might say
that he knew that the living being would be in heats
and colds and other affections of bodies®; and
because he knew this, so that the bodies of living
things might not be easily destroyed h,e gave them
^ Plotinus may have in mind here the curious "natural
selection” of Empedocles as reported by Aristotle Physics
B 8. 198b29-33, in a context (the discussion of the
appearance of purposiveness in the processes of nature)
very relevant to his argument here.
^ This is exactly what Plato does say in Timaeus 33A,
though he is speaking here not of individual human bodies
but of the necessity of including all of each of the four
elements in the body of the universe.
83
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAt) VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
aiaOdveaOai eSwKe, Kai Si <Lv evepyqaovaiv at sense-perception and organs for the senses to work
aiaO^aeis opydvoiv. dAA’ 17x01 eyovaais rds Swdpeis through. But he either gave the organs to souls
which already had the powers or gave both at once.
eSa)K€ rd opyava rj dp,<f>w. dAA’ ei p.€v eSwKe Kai rdy
But if he gave the senses also, then, although they
15 alaO'qaeis, ovk ^aav aladriTiKal TtpoTepov ijivyal oiaav were souls before, they did not have sense-
ei S’ eiyov, ore eyevovTO ijivyo-i, Ko.i eyevovro, iv’ els perception; but if they had sense-perception when
they came into being as souls, and came into being
yeveaiv iiaai, avpi^vTov avrals to els yeveaiv levai. that they might go to birth, then going to birth was
TTapd <f>vaiv apa to dno yeveaews Kai ev tw vorjTcp eivai, connatural to them. So it would be against nature
Kai nenolrjVTai S-q, iva dXXov (Lai Kai iva ev KaKiL etev for them to be away from birth and in the intelli­
gible, and they would actually have been made in
20 Kai 17 TTpovoia, iva aiL^oivTo ev tcL KaKW, Kai 0 order to belong to something else and to be in evil;
Xoyiapios 6 TOO Beov oLtos Kai oXcos Xoyiapids. dpyai 8e and the purpose of the forethought would be that
they might be kept safe in the evil, and this would be
Xoyiapidiv Tives; Kai ydp, el e^ dXXojv XoyiapicLv, Set enl
God’s planning, and it would be altogether planning.
Ti Trpo Xoyiapiov 17 Tivd ye ndvTcos levai. Tives ovv But what are the principles of plans? For even if they
apyai; q ydp aiadrjais q vovs. dAAd ataO-qais piev ovttcj-
derive from other plans, they must be directed to an
end or ends prior to planning. What then are the
vovs apa. dAA’ el vovs al TrpoTdaeis, to avpnrepaapia principles? They are either sense-perception or in­
25 eTTiaTrqfjiry ■nepi aladrjTOV ovSevds apa. oS ydp apyr} piev tellect. But there is no sense-perception yet, there­
eK Tov vorjTov, TeXevrri Se els vo-qTOv dijuKveiTai, ttws
fore intellect. But if the premises are intellect the
conclusion is knowledge: not, then, about any sense-
evi TavTiqv TTjv e^iv npds alaOrjTov Siavorjaiv object. For how can that of which the beginning is
d<j>iKvetadai; ovt odv ^(Lov irpovoia ov6’ dXoJS TovSe tov from the intelligible and which comes in its end to
the intelligible, being a disposition of this kind,
TravTos eK Xoyiapiov eyeveTO- e-rrei ovSe oXojs Xoyiapids come to the understanding of a sense-object? There­
30 eKei, dAAd XeyeTai Xoyiapids els evSei^iv tov vdvTa fore neither forethought for a living thing nor fore­
ovTios, <Ls [dAAoy ao(f>ds] ^ eK Xoyiapiov ev Tois voTepov, thought for this universe in general derived from a
plan; since there is no planning there at all, but it is
Kai vpoopaais, oti ovtcos, (Ls dv tis ao<f>ds [ev tois called planning to show that all things there are as
vaTepov] ^ TTpoiSoiTO. ev ydp tois pirj yevopievois irpd they would be as a result of planning at a later stage,
and foresight because it is as a wise man would
^ del. Harder. foresee it. For in things which did not come to be
^ del. Theiler. before planning, planning is useful because of the
84 85
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

Xoyiafjiov 6 XoyiafMOS a-nopia Bwafiews T-fjs lack of the power before planning, and foresight,
because the one who foresees did not have the power
35 TTpo XoyiapLov, Kal npoopaais, otl p.rj 8vvap.is tu> by which there would be no need of foresight. For
■npoop&VTi, KaO’ fjv ovk kherjdrj npoopdaews. Kal ydp rj foresight is in order that there should not be this but
that, and there is in it a kind of fear of what is not
npoopaais, "va p.rj tovto, aAAd tovto, Kal oiov i^ojSeiTat just so. But where there is only this, there is not
TO /xt) roiovTov. oS Se tovto fiovov, ov Trpoopaais. Kal 6 foresight. And planning is 'This instead of that”. But
when there is only one of them, why should there be
XoyiapLos TOVTO dvri tovtov. p,6vov S’ ovtos OaTtpov tI a plan? How then can the alone and the one and the
40 Kal XoyC^€Tai; ttws ovv to piovov Kal ev Kal aTrXws simple contain explicitly the "this that there should
not be that”, and "there had to be this if not that”
dvavTVTTopievov to "tovto, iva p.ri tovto" Kal "e/xcAAe and "this appeared useful and this preservative
ydp TOVTO, el p,ri tovto” Kal "xprjaipi,ov tovto dve(j>dv7) when it came to be”? So then it saw beforehand and
planned beforehand, and indeed—as was said at the
Kal awTTjpiov TOVTO y€v6p,evov"; irpoelSeTO apa Kal beginning of the present discussion—also gave the
TTpoeXoylaaTO apa Kal Srj Kal—to vvv e^apyris senses because of this, no matter how puzzling the
giving. But all the same, if every divine activity must
Xeydev—rds aladrjaeis Sid tovto Kal eSwKe [rdy not be incomplete, and it is not permitted to suppose
45 SovdjLieis]/ el Kal oti p,dXiaTa dnopos •p Soais [/cai that anything which is of God is other than whole
and all, then everything must exist in any thing
77£oj].^ ov fiTjv dXX’ el Set eKdoTTjv evepyeiav p,rj aTeXrj which is his. So existing for ever must be there also.’
etvai, pLTjSe Oe/Litrov 6eov otiovv ov aXXo ti vop-l^eiv ij So the future must also be already present there. For
there is certainly nothing which comes later in that
oXov Te Kal Ttdv, Set ev otojovv twv avTov ndvTa [divine world], but what is already present there
evvndpyeiv. Set toIvvv Kal tov del efvat.® Set toIvvv Kal comes to be later in another [world]. If then the
future is already present, it must necessarily be
Tov pLeXXovTos 'pSri napovTOS eivai. ov S'rj voTepov rt ev present as if it had been thought out beforehand
50 eKelvip, dAAd to rjSt] eKel irapov voTepov ev dXXw with a view to what comes later; but this means so
ylveTai. el oijv ySrj ndpeOTi to peXXov, dvdyKT) ovtco
' 8ci ToiVw Kal TOV del ehai is found only in the quotation in
Trapelvai, cos npovevoripevov els to voTepov tovto Sc Philoponus De Aetemitate Mundi II 5 p. 39 8. H-S' print it
‘ delevimus, ut glossam e lin. 13 arcessitam. in the text. H-S^ omit it as being a comment of Philoponus,
^ delevimus. but there seems no sufficient reason for being certain that
® Set . . . eJitat om. H-S^. it is so.
86 87
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
kariv, ws fJLtqBkv Seladai jj.rjSevos Tore, rovro Se eari
fjLTjSev kXXeCtjiovTOS. ndvra dpa ’^Srj •kjv Kal del ijv Kal
55 ovTcos ^v, ws eiTTeiv varepov rdSe p,erd ToSe-
iKT€iv6p.€vov p,ev yap Kal oiov aTrXovfxevov eyet
SeiKvvvai ToSe pLerd roSe, opiov 8e ov ttov robe- tovto Se
eariv eyov ev eavrw Kal Trjv airlav.
2. Aio Kal evrevOev dv tcs ovy ^ttov Karapiddoi rrjv
vov <f>vaLv, rjv Kal nXeov twv dXXwv opwpiev ovS‘ coy
oaov earl to vov xPVI^°- opwpiev. to p.ev yap ‘‘on”
SiSopiev aiiTOV eyeiv, to Se ‘‘Sioti” ovKeTi, rj, el Solrjpiev,
5 ywpls. Kal opwpiev dvdpwnov rj 6(f>daXp.6v, el Tvyoi,
warrep dyaXpia y dydX/aaTOS' to Se eariv eKel dvdpwnos
Kal Sid Ti dvOpwTTOs, et-nep Kal voepdv avTov Set tov eKel
dvOpwTTov eivai, Kal 6(f>9aXpi6s * Kal Sid tI- y ovk dv
oXws eiy, el piy Sid tI. evTavda Se warrep eKaoTov
10 Ttov piepwv ywpls, ovtw Kal to ‘‘Sid ti ”, eKel S’ ev evl
rrdvTa, wOTe TavTov to irpaypia Kal to ‘‘Sid Ti” tov
TTpdypiaTos. TToXXaxov Se Kal evTavda to npaypia Kal to
‘‘Sid Ti” TavTov, oiov Ti eariv eKXeu/iis. ti otjv KwXvei
Kal eKaOTOV Sid ti efvai Kal errl twv dXXwv, Kal tovto
eivai Tyv ovalav eKdoTOv; pidXXov Se dvdyiey- Kal
^ Theiler: 6<j>BaXp6v Enn.
’ This passage (line 49 to end), together with IV. 4. 16,
anticipates the doctrine of lamhlichus and other later
Neoplatonists of the pre-existence of time in the higher
world. On this see S. Sambursky and S. Pines The Concept
of Time in Late Neoplatonism (a selection of texts with
88
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
I
that there will be no need of anything then, and this
means that there will be no deficiency. All things,
then, existed already and existed for ever, ^ and
existed in such a way that one could say later this
after that”; for when it is extended and in a sense
unfolded it is able to display this after that, but when
it is all together it is entirely this; but this means
having its cause also in itself.'
2. And so even starting from here one could none
the less come to know the nature of Intellect, which
we see even more clearly than the others; but not
even so do we see how great Intellect is. For we
grant that it has the "that” but not the "why”, or, if
we do grant it the "why”, it is as separate. And we
see man, or, if it happens so, eye, as an image or
belonging to an image. But in reality there in the
intelligible there is man and the reason why there is
man, if the man there must also himself be an
intellectual reality, and eye and the reason why
there is eye; or they would not be there at all, if the
reason why was not. But here below, just as each of
the parts is separate, so also is the reason why. But
there all are in one, so that the thing and the reason
why of the thing are the same. But often here below
also the thing and the reason why are the same, as
for instance "what is an eclipse”.^ What then pre­
vents each and every thing being its reason why, m
the case of the others too, and this being its sub­
stance? Rather, this is necessary; and when we try in
translation and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.
2 Plotinus in what follows is characteristically
developing an Aristotelian distinction for his own
purposes. Cp. Aristotle Metaphysics H 4. 1044b9-16 and
Posterior Analytics B 2. 90al5.
89
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
15 TTeipwfxevois ovtojs to ti elvat XajjiPdveiv opOws
avp^aweL. o yap iariv eKaarov, Std tovto eari. Xeyio 8e
ovx on TO etSos e/cdarco atnov rod eivai—tovto /xev
ydp dXrjOes—dAA’ oti, ei Kai avTO to etSos enaoTOv
TTpos avTO avaTTTVTTOis, eipTfOiis ev avTW to “8id ti”.
20 dpyov p.ev ydp ov Kat ^oj-qv ^ “^‘■d ti” ov
TrdvTcus ex^i, eiSos Sc ov Kai vov ov TTodev dv Xd^oi to
“Sid Ti el Se Ttapd vov ns Xeyoi, ov xojpls eanv, ei ye
Kat avTO eoTiv ei ovv Set exeiv TavTa p.'qSevt
eXXelvovTa, pL-pSe tw “Sid. ti” eXXeiTreiv. vovs Se eyei
TO Sid tI ovTOis eKaoTov tcov ev avTw- Td Se ev avTw
25 avTOS eKaoTov dv eirj [tiov ev avT<p],^ woTe p,qSev
■npoaSeladat too Sid ti yeyoveo, dAA’ dp-ov yeyove Kat
eyei ev avTw Trjv Trjs VTrooTdaecvs aiTiav. yeyovds Se
ovK eiKfi ovSev dv TrapaXeXeippevov e^oi too “Sid ti ”,
dAAd TTav exov exei Kat to KaXcos dpov Tqs aiTias. Kat
30 TOi? dpa peTaXapPdvovaiv ovtco SlSioaiv, ws to “Sid
Ti ” €;^eii'. Kat piqv, djanep ev TtvSe tw Travrt eK ttoXXwv
avveoT^KOTL avveipeTai npds dXXqXa Td trdvTa, Kat ev
TW rrdvTa eivai eoTi Kat to Sioti eKaoTov—wanep Kat
etj)’ eKdoTov to pepos npds to dXov exov opaTai-—oil
35 TOVTOV yevopevov, eira tovtov peTd ToSe, dAAd TTpds
dXXriXa dpov Trjv aiTiav Kat to aiTioTov avviOTdvTWV,
ovTW XPV '^oXv pdXXov eKet Td Te irdvTa Tipds to dXov
eKaoTa Kat eKaoTOV npds avTO. el odv q avvvTToaTaais
* Theiler.
“ delevimus.
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
this way to grasp the essential nature of a thing, it
comes out right. For what a thing is is the reason
why it is. But I do not mean that the form is cause ot
existence for each thing—this is of course true—but
that if also you open each individual form itseli
back upon itself, you will find the reason why in it.
For a thing which is inert and does not have life does
not at all have the reason why, but if it is a form and
belongs to Intellect, where would it get its reason
why from? But if someone were to say "from In­
tellect”, it is not separate, supposing that it is also
itself Intellect; if then Intellect must have these
things in no way deficient, they must not be deficient
in the reason why. But Intellect in this way has each
and every reason why of the things in it; but it is
itself individually all the things in it, so that none ot
them has come to be in need of a reason why, “Ut it
has come to be along with it and has in itself the
cause of its existence. But since there is nothing
casual in its coming to be it would not have any of its
reason why left out but in having everything it has
that of its cause which makes it exist beautifully. So
it also gives to the things which participate in it in
such a way that they possess their reason why. And
truly, just as in this All here below, which is corn-
posed of many things, all of them are linked to each
other, and each individual reason why is contained
in their being all—just as in each individual the part
is seen relating to the whole—it is not that this
comes to be, and then this after that, but they jointly
establish cause and caused together in relatioii to
each other, so much more there in the intellipble
must all things be each of them related to the whole
and each to itself. If therefore there is a joint
91
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
OjLtoi} TrdvTCOV Kal ovk eiKfj TrdvTWV Kai Set /liij
dTTrjpTTjadai, ev avrois dv e^oi rd aiViard rds alrias,
40 /cai TOLOVTOV eKaoTOV, otov dvanlias ttjv airiav €;^€iv. ei
ow jui) airiav tou eivai, avrapHT] Se eari Kai
p.ep.ovo}p,€va alrias earlv, eirj dv iv avrois exovra aiiv
avTois rrjv alrlav. Kal yap av el p.rjhev eari pLarr^v €Kei,
TToXXd Se iv eKaarw earl, rravra oaa eyei eyois dv emelv
45 Siori eKaarov. irpoijv dpa Kal avvrjv ro Siori eKei ovk dv
Store, dXX’ on- pdXXov Se aptfxx) ev. rl yap dv Kal
rrepirrov eiye vou, dts dv vov vdr/pa pr) roiovrov dv, otov
prj reXeov yewqpa; el odv reXeov, ovk eariv elrrelv drip
eXXelnei, ovSe Sid rl rovro ov ndpeari. irapdv dpa eyois
50 dv elrrelv Sion rrdpeariv ev dpa rfi vrroardaei rd Sid rl-
ev eKaarw rolvvv vo-rjpari Kal evepyrjpari oiov Kal
dvOpwrrov rras rrpoeifrdvr] 6 dvdpwrros avpifrepwv eavrov
avrw, Kal rravra daa eyei e^apy-^S dpov eywv eroipos
eariv dXos. eira, el p-fj rras eariv, dXXd Sel ri avrw
55 rrpoadelvai, yewqparos eariv. eari S’ del- ware rras
eariv. dXX’ 6 yivdpevos dvdpwrros yevrjros.
3. Tt^ oSv KwXvei rrpo^ovXevaaadai rrepl avrov; -q
Kar’ eKelvov eariv, ware ovre ri d<f>eXelv Set ovre
92
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
existence of all things together, of all things with
nothing random about it, and there must be no
separation, then the things caused would have their
causes in themselves, and each would be of such a
kind as to possess its cause causelessly. If then the
intelligibles have no cause of their being but are self-
sufficient and independent of cause, they would be in
possession of their cause in themselves and with
themselves. For again, if nothing there is purpose­
less, and there are many things in each, you could
say that all the things which each individual has are
each individual reason why. So there in the intelli­
gible the reason why was before and with the things
and was not a "why”, but a "that”; but rather both
are one.- For what could an intelligible have over and
above Intellect, so as not to be of such a kind being a
thought of Intellect, as to be a perfect production? If
then it is perfect, it is impossible to say in what it is
deficient, nor why this is not present in it. If then
something is present, you could tell the reason why
it is present; so the reason why is contained in its
existence; in each thought, then, and active
actualisation of Intellect, man for instance, the
whole man is manifest, bringing'himself along with
the thought of him, and, since all he has he has all
together from the beginning, he is all ready as a
whole. Then, if he is not whole there, but something
has to be added to him, this belongs to something
generated; but he exists for ever; and so he is all
complete. But the man who has come to be is
generated. .
3. What, then, is there to prevent there being
previous deliberation about him? Now he is accord­
ing to that intelligible man, so that one must not
93
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
take away or add anything, but deliberation and
■npoaBeivai, dAAd to ^ovXevaaaBai Kal XeXoylaBai 8ia reasoning are due to [Plato’s] assumption: for he
Trjv VTToBeaiv VTreBerp yap yiv6p,eva. Kai ovtco p,€v ri assumed that things had come into being. And this is
why there is deliberation and reasoning; but by
5 ^ovXevois^ Kal 6 XoyiapLOS’ Tip S’ “del yivopeva’’
saying "always coming into being” he also abolishes
evhel^aoBai Kal on Xoyi^erai dvelXev. ov yap evi the idea that God reasons.' For it is not possible to
Xoyi^eaBai ev rip del' Kal yap av €TTLXeXr]ap,evov •^v, reason in what is always; for to do so would belong
to someone who had forgotten how it was before.
OTTOis Kal irporepov. etra, el p,ev dp.€ivoj varepov, ovk dv And then if things were better afterwards, they
KaXd TTporepov el 8’ ■^v KaXd, eyei to waavTCDS. KaXd S’ would not have been beautiful before; but if they
were beautiful, they keep the same. But they are
10 earl perd rijs alrlas" eirel Kal vvv KaXov n, on rravra— beautiful because they are with their cause; since
TOVTO yap Kal eiSos to irdvra—Kal on Trjv vXrjv now also a thing is beautiful, because it is
everything—for this is what form is, being
KaTeyei' Karexei- Se, el p.rjSev avrijs dpLopcftwrov everything—and because it controls matter; but it
KaraXeiTTor KaTaXelnei Se, ei ns p.op(f>ri eXXetiroi, oiov controls matter if it leaves no part of it unshaped;
but it does so leave it if any shape is wanting, an eye,
6(f>BaXpL6s 'Ij aXXo n' ware alnoXoywv Tidvra Xeyeis. Sid for instance, or something else; so that when you tell
15 Ti ovv 6<f>BaXp.ol; iva Travra. Kal Sid rl 6<f>pves; iva the cause, you tell all. Why then eyes? That there
TrdvTa. Kal yap el eveKa acoTTjplas Xeyois, <f>vXaKnK6v shall be everything. And why eyebrows? That there
shall be everything. For even if you say tor
T-qs ovalas Xeyeis ev avri} vnapyov tovto Se eivai preservation”, you are speaking of a safeguard ot the
avpLpaXXopievov. ovnos dpa ovala ■^v nplv Kal tovto, Kal substance which exists in it; but this means you are
saying that it contributes to its essential nature.
TO aiTiov dpa piepos TfjS ovalas' Kal dXXo toIvvv tovto, Thus, then, the substance existed before this
20 d S’ eOTL, TTjS ovalas. ndvTa toIvvv dXXqXois Kal rj oXt] safeguard and the cause therefore was a part of the
substance; and this safeguard, then, is something
Kal TeXela Kal Trdaa Kal to KaXcos p-eTa Trjs alTias Kal other, but what it is belongs to substance. All things
ev TTj alTia, Kal ij ovala Kal j6 ti qv etvai Kal to Sioti therefore are for each other, and the whole is perfect
and all-complete and its existing beautifully is with
1 jj2mg (deliberatio Ficinus): jSouAijcrir Enn. the cause and in the cause, and the substance and

'The reference is to Plato’s distinction between the 27D5-28A4. It is Plotinus, not Plato, who draws the
realm of real being and the realm of becoming in Timaeus conclusion from it that God does not reason.
95
94
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
ev. ei TOLvvv eyKeirai to aiadrjTiKov etvai Kal ovrws
aiad'qriKov iv toi ei’Sei vrro diSiov dvdyKrjs Kal
TeXeiOTTjTos vov ev avr(h eyovTOS, eiirep reXeios, rds
26 airias, ware ■qfj.ds varepov iSeiv, coj apa opOtbs ovtcus
ydp ev Kal avp.TrX'qpojTiKov to aiTiov Kal
ovyl 6 dvdpwTTOS €Kel p.6vov vovs ijv, TTpoaeTeO-q 8e to
aladrjTiKov, 6t€ els yeveaiv eoTeXXeTO—7701? ovk dv
eKelvos 6 vovs irpos rd r^Se pe-noi; tL yap dv elij
30 aladrjTiKOV rj dvTiX’pTTTiKov aiad'qTwv; Trois S’ ovk
aTorrov, eKel p,ev aladrjTiKov diBlov, evTavda 8e
aladdveadai Kal Trjs eKel 8vvdp,ews Trjv evepyeiav
irXrjpovadai evTavda, OTe yelpojv i) i/'ux’? ylyveTai;
4. ndAiv ovv TTpos TavTTjv TTjv diToplav dviodev
XrjTTTeov Tov dvOpioTTOv ooTis eKelvos eoTiv. laais Se
TTpdTepov yprj tov TrjSe dvdpcvTTOv ootls ttot€ eoTiv
elirelv—pi,iqTTOT€ ov8e tovtov aKpi^dis elSoTes dis
5 eyovTes tovtov fKelvov ^r/TOVfiev. jiaveL-q S’ dv i'aojs
Tialv o avTos oStos re KaKelvos etvai. apyr) Sc ttjs
aKei/iews evTevdev dpa 6 dvdpioTTOS ovtos Xdyos can'
’l^vxrjs eTepos TTjs tov dvOpWTTOV tovtov TToiovarjs Kal
t,ijv auTov Kal Xoyi^eadai napexopievrjs; rj rj i/'ux’?
10 TOiavTT] 6 dvOpcoTTos eoTiv; tj rj tw awjxaTi Tip Toiipde
ifivxTi TrpoaxpojjJievTj; dXX’ ei piev t,(pov XoyiKov o
* The Platonic text with which Plotinus is concerned
here is the conclusion drawn in Alcibiades I 129E-130A
that man is a soul using a body, which acquired a rather
disproportionate weight and importance in later Greek
thought. It was an important source of sharp body-soul
dualism not only for later Platonists but for Stoics and
THE POEMS AND THE GOOD
the essential nature and the reason why are one. If,
therefore, having senses, and senses of this kind, is
contained in the form by eternal necessity and the
perception of Intellect which, if it is perfect, pos­
sesses the causes in itself, so that we afterwards see
that this then is the right way for things to be—for
there in the intelligible the cause is one with and an
essential completion of the substance—and if man is
there not only an intellect, sense-perception being
added when he was sent to birth, how could that
Intellect not incline to the world here below? For
what could sense-perception be except the apprehen­
sion of sense-objects? But how would it not be
absurd for there to be sense-perception from eterni­
ty, but for it to do its perceiving here below, and for
the power there in the intelligible to accomplish its
activity here below, when the soul becomes worse?
4. To deal with this difficulty, therefore, we must
go back and take up the question of who that man in
the intelligible world is. But perhaps we should first
say exactly who this man here below is—in case we
go looking for that man on the supposition that we
have got this one, though we do not even know this
one accurately. But perhaps it might seem to some
people that this man arid that man are the same. This
is the starting-point of our investigation: is this man
a rational forming principle belonging to soul other
than the soul which makes this man and provides
him with life and reason? Or is the soul of this kind
the man? Or the soul which uses a body of such a
kind*? But if man is a rational living being, but a
Gnostics. On its history in Greek philosophy see J. Pepin
Id&es Grecques sur VHomme et sur Dieu (Paris 1971), Part I
La Tradition du P’’ Alcibiade.
97
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FOKMS AND THE GOOD

avdpojTTOS, ^a»ov 8e to eK •jivx'jjs Kal awfiaros, ovk av living being is what is composed of soul and body,
this rational form would not be the same as soul. But
e“r] 6 \6yos oiros rfi ifjvxfl o avros- dAA’ el to eK tlivyris if what is composed of rational soul and body is the
XoyiKrjs Kai adifj-aTOS 6 Xoyos tov avOpconov, nebs av elrj rational form of man, how could it be something
eternally existent, since this rational form of this
vnoaraais dlSios, tovtov tov Xoyov tov toiovtov
kind of man comes into existence when body and
15 dvdpcbnov yivopevov, oTav awpa Kat 4‘vxh (^vveXOrj; soul come together? For this rational form will be
explanatory of what is going to he, not the sort we
eoTai yap 6 Xoyos o^Toy Bt^Xcotikos tov eaop,evov, ovy say is absolute man, but more like a definition, and
oTos ov <j)ap,ev avTodvdpeonos, dAAd p,dXXov eoiKcbs opw, the kind of definition which does not explain the
essential nature. For it is not even a definition of the
Kal TOiovT(p oiip p,T]Se SriXwTLKtp TOV tI ■^v eivai. ov8e form in matter, but explains the composite, which
yap eiSovs eoTi tov evvXov, dAAd to avvapi^OTepov already exists. But if this is so, the man is not yet
found; for he was going to be the one according to
20 BrjXcbv, o eoTiv •^8r/. el 8e tovto, ovneu evprjTai 6 the rational form. But if someone were to say "The
avOpwnos' 'qv yap 6 KaTO. tov Xoyov. el 84 tis Xeyoi "tov rational form of such beings must be something
composite, this in this”, he does not think fit to say
Xoyov 8el TOV twv tolovtiov eivai avvap,(f>6Tep6v ti, t68’
by what each exists; hut one must, however much
ev TOiSe”, Kad’ o eoTiv eKaoTov, ovk d^tof Xeyeiv xp'h one must also speak of the rational forming prin­
ciples of forms in matter as including matter, grasp
84, Kal el OTi pdXiOTa twv evvXwv el8wv Kal peTO. vXrjs the forming principle itself which makes, for in­
25 Tody Xoyovs XPV X4yeiv, dAAd tov Xoyov avTov tov stance, man; this applies especially to those who
claim to define the essential nature in. each case,
nenonjKOTa, otov tov dvBpwnov, XapPdveiv Kal when they define strictly and properly.' What is it,
pdXiOTa, oaoi to' t I iji' eivai d^iovaiv e(/>‘ eKaoTOv then, to be a man? That is, v^hat is it which has made
this man here below, which exists in him and is not
opl^eaOai, OTav Kvplws opl^wvTai. tI oSv ecTi to eivai separate? Is, then, the rational forming principle
dvOpwnw; tovto 8’ eOTi, ti eoTi to nenoirjKOS tovtov itself a rational living being, or is the living being
the composite, but the principle itself one which
30 TOV dvOpwnov evvndpxov, ov x^vpiOTOv; dp’ odv avTos 6 makes the rational living being? What is it then
Xdyos ^wdv eoTi XoyiKov, •q to awape^oTepov, avTOS 84
Tty noiqTiKos ^wov XoyiKov; Tty cov avTOs; q to ^wov
1 Plotinus is here critically concerned with Aristotle’s
discussion of essence and definition in Metaphysics Z 4-6.
' Kirchhoff: tov Enn. 1029bl-1030al4.
98 99
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
avTi ^wrjs XoyiKrjs ev toi Xoyco. ^coij roivvv XoyiKrj o
avOpwTTOS. dp’ ovv ^airi dvev ijivyris; rj yap rj i/ivyri
I 35 TTapeierai tijv ^wrjv ti)v XoyiKXfv Kai earai o dvdpomos
!% •I ivepyeia ipvyijs Kai ovk ovala, rj r) ipv^rj 6 dvOpcorros
f *
earai. aXX’ ei ^ ^vyr] rj XoyiKrj 6 dvdpwTTOs earai, orav
els dXXo ^wov Irj^ rj 'jivx'q, rrws ovk dvdpwrros;
5. A.6yov Tolvvv Set rov dvOpiurrov dXXov rrapd rrjv
>fivx^v elvai. rl KcoXvei avvapii^oTepov ri rov dvOpwrrov
etvai, xfjvyrjv ev roiipSe Xoyw, ovros rov Xoyov oiov
ivepyeias roidaSe, rfjs 8e evepyelas jxrj Svvapievrjs dvev
J of particular activity, and the activity being unable
i, 5 Tov evepyovvTOS eivai; ovroi yap Kai ol ev rots arreppiaai
i to exist without that which acts? For this is how the
Xoyor ovre yap dvev ^vyijs ovre ifivyai dirXws. ol yap
Xoyoi Ol TTOiovvres ovk dijivyoi, Kai davjiaarov ouS^
rds Toiavras ovaias Xoyovs eivai. ol odv rroiovvres
dvOpojTTov Xoyoi iTolas 'jivyrjs evepyeiai; dpa rrjs
10 <j>vTiKrjs; rj rrjs ^^ov noiovarjs, evapyearepas rivos Kai
avTO TOVTO ^WTiKcvrepas. rj Se tlivyrj rj roiavrrj ■q
eyyevop-evrj rfj roiavrrj vXrj, are odaa rovro, oiov ovrcv
SiaKeipi&rj Kai dvev rov awpiaros, dvBpornos, ev
acopiari Se jiopifiwaaaa Kar’ avrrjv Kai dXXo elSoiXov
15 dvOpwrrov oaov eSeyero ro awjia rroirjoaaa, warrep Kai
rovrov av rroirjaei o ^coypdijros eri eXdrrw dvOparvdv
riva, rrjv piop<l>rjv eyei Kai rods Xoyovs rj rd rjOrj, rds
SiaBeaeis, rds Svvdjieis, djjivSpd rrdvra, on jxrj odros
rrpwros' Kai Srj Kai [eiS?; alaB-qaecov qAAcov] ® alaB-jaeis
20 aXXas evapyels SoKOvaas eivai, dpivSporepas Se cos rrpds
ras rrpd avrchv Kai eiKOvas. 6 Se errl rovrcp dvBporrros
'■ Creuzer (transit Ficinus, et testatur Theologia): Enn.
^ Orth: nTj Enn.
I
® delevimus, ut glossam ad aiaBrjoeis aAAoj.
lOO
j
!
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
itself? Or does "living being” stand for "rational
life” in the form? Then man is rational life. Is he then
life without soul? For either soul will provide the
rational life and the man will be an activity of soul
and not a substance, or the soul will be the man. But
if the rational soul is going to be the man, how is the
soul not man when it goes into another living being?
5. Man, therefore, must be a rational forming
principle other than soul. What is there to prevent
man from being a composite, a soul in a particular
kind of forming principle, the principle being a sort
forming principles in seeds are; for they are neither
without soul nor simply souls. For the rational
forming principles which make things are not soul­
less, and there is nothing surprising in substances of
this kind being rational forming principles. Of what
kind of soul, then, are the forming principles which
make man activities? Of the growth-soul? Rather of
that which makes a living being, a clearer one and
just because of that more alive. And the soul of this
kind which enters into matter of this kind, just
because this is what it is, being in a way disposed
like this even without the body, is man; it makes
shapes in body according to itself, and makes an­
other image of man as far as body allows, just as the
painter in his turn makes yet another image of this,
a kind of still lesser man; it has the shape and the
forming principles or traits of character, the dispo­
sitions, the powers, all dim because this man is not
the first; and it also has other senses, which seem to
be clear, but are dimmer in comparison with those
before them and are images. But the man over this
lOI
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
tlivxfjS ’qSt] Oeiorepas, exovarjs ^eXrloj avdpco-nov Kat
aladrjaeis evapyearepas. Ka,i eirj dv 6 UXaTcov tovtov
6piadp.evos, vpoadels 8e to x p oi p.€vr)v a d> p, a t i,
25 OTi eTTOxeiTai rf) 17x1? TTpoaxprjTaL TrpdiTws awpari, ij Se
devrepcos rj deiorepa. 17877 yap aioBrjTiKOV ovxos xot)
yevopevov eTTrjKoXovOrjaev avT-q rpavoripav ^oiiyv
StSouffa' pdXXov S’ ovS’ eirqKoXovdqaev, dXXd oiov
npoaedqKev avrqv- ov yap k^lararai tov voqrov, dXXa
awaipapevq oiov eKKpepapevqv eyei TTjv xdxaj
30 avppl^aaa eavrrjv Xoycp irpos Xoyov. odev Kai dpvSpos
ovTOS d)V eyevero tf>av€p6s rfj eXXopijiei.
6. ntu? ovv €v rfi KpeiTTOVi TO aladqTLKOv; rj to
aloBqTLKOV TOJV e/<€t dv aiaOqTCUV,^ Kal dis eK€i to.
aladqTa. Sio Kai ovtcos aladdveTai T-qv aiadqTqv
appovlav, TT) Se aiadqaei rrapaSe^apevov tov
5 aladqTiKov dvdpfurrov Kal avvappoaavTos els eayaTOv
rrpds Tqv €Kei dppovlav, Kal rrvpos evappoaavTOS rrpos
TO eKel TTvp, od aLadqai.s ifv eKelvq tyj ipvxV dvdXoyov
(yrffy ^ TOV rrvpos tov eKel (frvaei. el yap qv eKei aurpaTa
TavTa, djaav avTwv Tq •p'^XV aladqaeis Kal dvTiXqipecs'
10 Kal 6 dvBporrros 6 eKei, 17 TOiavTq ^vxq, dvTiXqrrTiKq
TovTcov, oBev Kal o voTepos dvBpwrros, to plpqpa, etxe
Tovs Xoyovs ev pipqaei' Kal 6 ev vat dvBpatrros tov rrpo
rravTotv Totv dvBpatrratv dvBpatrrov. eXXdprrei S’ oStos
Tw SevTepqi Kal oStos tw TpiTot- exei Se rrats rrdvTas o
' Schwyzer, testatur Theologia: twv (kcI avaioBqrwv A“ (dv
exp.) EBUCQ: tw eKei dvaiaOijrw X.
^ Beutler.
102
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
one belongs to a soul already more divine which has
a better man and clearer senses. And this would be
the man Plato was defining, and by adding "using a
body” he indicated that it rides upon the one which
primarily uses a body, and the one which does so
secondarily is diviner.* For when the man who came
to be already had sense-perception, this soul fol­
lowed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not
follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go
out of the intelligible, but united to it has the lower
soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in,
forming principle to forming principle. And so this
man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the
illumination.
6. How, then, is there a power of sense-perception
in the better soul? It would be a power of perceiving
the sense-objects there, and would correspond to the
sense-objects there. This is the way, therefore, in
which the better soul perceives the melody of sense,
when the man of the sense-world receives it by sense-
perception and comes into tune, to the last and
lowest degree, with the melody there in the intelli­
gible, and fire is tuned to the fire there, of which that
better soul had a perception which corresponded to
the nature of the fire there. For if there were bodies
there, the soul had perceptions and apprehensions of
them; and the man there, the soul of this kind, was
able to apprehend these bodies; and that is why the
later man, the imitation, had their forming prin­
ciples in imitation; and the man in Intellect appre­
hends the man before all men. But this man shines
on the second, and this second on the third; and the
' Again Alcibiades 1129E—130A.
103
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
15 faxoLTos, ov yivofievos e/ceivoi,' dAAd Trapaiceijnevoy
eKeCvoLS. kvepyel Se 6 p.€v rjfxibv Kara tov eaxarov, rip 84
Ti Kal Trapa tov TTpo avrov, tw 8e Kai Trapa tov TpiTOV ij
evepyeia, Kat eoTiv e/caaros Kad’ ov evepyel, koItoi
TrdvTas eKaoTos eyei Kai aS ovk exei. tov Sc acojuaToy
20 ■’"7? TpLTTjS l,0}fjs Kal TOV TpiTOV dvOpCVTTOV,
Cl ovvtTTOLTO Tfi ScitTC/JO,^ avv€TToiTo Sc p-Tj x<vpiadelaa
Twv dvco, ov eKelvT] Kal avT-p Aeycrai eivai.
pfTaXa^ovaijs Sc dr/peiov acvpa Oavpd^eTai Se, ttws
Xoyos ovaa avBpdmov. rj ndvTa ■4jv, dAAoTC Se evepyel
KaT aXXov. KaOapd pev oSv ovaa Kal nplv KaKvvBijvai
25 dvBpojTTov BeXet Kal dvBpcvirds ecTi- Kal yap KdXXiov
TovTo, Kal TO KdXXiov TToiel. TTOiel Sc Kal 8aipovas
TrpOTepovs, opoeiSels Trj <(17^® dvBpionov Kal 6 vpo
avT-qs haipovLWTepos, pdXXov Se Beds, Kal can pipiqpa
Beov Saipojv els Beov dvTjpTTjpevos, (oairep dvBpwnos els
30 Saifiova’ * ov yap XeyeTac Beds, els ov 0 dvBpcvTTos’ cyci
yap 8ia<l>opdv, rjv eyotiai ijivxal npds dXXqXas, Kav eK
TOV avTov coai otoCxov ® Xeyeiv Se Sec Sacpovas ecSos
Saipdvojv, ovs (j>'qaiv 6 TlXdTwv Sacpovas. OTav Se
avveTTTjTai tt) ® Bqpecov cjivacv eXopevrj tfivxfj ’’ q
35 avvqpTqpevq [rij] ® ore dvBpcvTTOS ijv, tov ev avTfj
' Geiger, testatur Theologia: exelvois Enn.
^ coniecimus: 17 hevrepa Enn.
^ Tfi ‘\i}y H-S': Trj wBUCQ: t6v x.
"* Volkmann: avBpcorrov Enn.
® Volkmann: arlxov Enn.
® Theiler: rrjv Enn.
7 p3mg ( = Ficinus): tf’vxv Enn. ® del. Kirchhoff.
' Plotinus is probably thinking of two passages in Plato:
Symposium 202D-E and Timaeus 90A. These give rather
104
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
last man somehow possesses all men, not becoming
those other men, but set alongside them. And one of
us is active according to the last and lowest man, but
another has something also from the one before him,
and another’s active actuality comes even from the
third, and each is the man according to whom he is
active, though each of us has all of them—and again
does not have them. And when the third life and the
third man are separated from the body, if the third
life follows the second, and follows it without being
separated from the things above, then this life is said
to be also where that life above is. But when the soul
takes the body of a beast one wonders bow it does it
when it is the forming principle of man. Now it was
all things, but is active at different times according
to different ones. When it is pure, then, and before it
is spoilt it wills man and is man; for this is finer, and
it does what is finer. But soul makes the spirits
which come before man, which are of the same kind
as the soul which makes man; and he who is before
the soul is more of a spirit, or rather is a god, and a
spirit is an imitation of a god, dependent on the god
as man is on the spirit; for the being on whom man is
dependent is not called a god. He has the difference
from a god which souls have from each other, even if
they belong to the same order. But, one must call
spirits that kind of spirits whom Plato calls spirits.^
But when the soul which was joined to it when it was
a man follows the soul which has chosen the nature
of a beast, it gives the forming principle in it which
different accounts of the nature of spirits: in the Timaeus
the personal Saipuiv or guardian spirit is demythologised
and said to be the highest part of our soul, the immortal
reason. Plotinus reconciles the two in III. 4. 5.
105
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
Xoyov eKeivov tov ^mov eSwKev. eyei yap, Kai ■q
fvepyeia avr-q x^ipoiv.
7. ’AAA’ el KaKwdeiaa /cat x^ipcot/ yevopevq
TrAdrTei dqpeiov (jjvaiv, ovk o i^apy-qs ^ovv IttoUi rj
iTTTTOv, Kal d Adyoj 8e ittttov Kai ittttos Trapa <l>vaiv., q
eXaTTOV, ou p^qv napa <j>vaiv, dAA’ eKelvo ttcus /cat
5 e^apxqs Imros q kvoju. Kai el piev e^ei, TTOiel to /cdAAtov,
el 8e p.q, o 8vvaTai, q ye noielv irpoaTayOelaa' oia Kai
ol voXXa ei8q noielv el86res 8qp.iovpyol, eira tovto
TTOiovvres, q o irpoaerdxOqaav, q o q vXq eOeXei rq
e7Tnq8ei6rqTi. rl yap KwXvei rqv piev 8vvapiiv rqs tov
10 TTavTOS ijtvxqs TTpoviroypd^eiv, are Xoyov ndvra ovaav,
npiv Kai Trap’ avrqs qKeiv rds ijivyiKas 8vvdpieis, /cat
Tqv TTpovTToypaifiqv oiov TTpo8p6p,ovs eXXdpiifieis els
rqv vXqv eivai, q8q 8e Tols toiovtois lyveaiv en-
aKoXovdovaav rqv e^epya^opievqv ipvxqv /card p.epq
16 rd lyvry 8iapdpovaav noiqaai /cat yeveaOai eKdarqv
TOVTO, w TTpoaqXde axqp-aTiaaaa eavTqv, woTrep tov ev
opxqaei npos to 8o6ev avTCu 8pdpia; dXXd yap
eTTiOTTOpievoi Tip ei^e^qs els tovto qKOpiev. qv 8e qpiiv 6
Xoyos, TO alaOqTiKOv ottws tov dvdpwirov /cat ttu)s ovk
eKeiva irpos yeveaiv ^Xeirei' /cat qpilv e^alveTo Kai 6
20 Xoyos e8elKvvevovk eKeiva npos to. Tfi8e pXeneiv, dXXd
TavTa els eKeiva dvqpTqadai /cat piip,eiadai eKeiva, Kai
’ Here and in what follows in ch. 7 Plotinus is explaining
Plato’s doctrine of animal reincarnation as stated in
Timaeus 42B-C.
io6
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
belongs to that living thing in the intelligible world.
For it possesses it, and this is its worse form of
activity.* , , ,
7. But if it is when it is spoilt and has become
worse that the soul makes a beast-nature, it was not
from the beginning the principle which made horse
or ox, and the forming principles of horse, and horse,
were against nature. No, a lesser thing, certainly not
an unnatural one, but that which made them was
somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the
soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but
if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any
case: it is like the craftsmen who know how to make
many forms and then make just this one, for which
they had the order or which their material by its
particular characteristics required. For what is
there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from
drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the univer­
sal forming principle, even before the soul-povyers
come from it, and this preliminary outline being like
illuminations running on before into matter, and the
soul which carries out the work following traces of
this kind and making by articulating the traces part
by part, and each individual soul becoming this to
which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to
the dramatic part given him? Well, by following up
one line of thought after another we have arrived at
this point. But our discussion was about how the
power of sense-perception belongs to man and how
those intelligible realities do not look to coming to
birth; and it appeared to us, and our argiunent
showed, that those realities do not look to the things
here below but these are dependent on those and
imitate those, and that this man here below has his
107
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
TOVTOV Tov avdpWTTOV Trap’ €KfCVOV exovTa rds Svvdpeis
TTpos eKeiva, Kat avvel^€vxOo.i ravra rd aladrjrd. tovtw,
€K€iva S’ €Keiv<p- €K€iva yap rd aladrjrd, a ovrws
25 <l)vop,daap,€v, on aco/xara/ dAAov Se rpdrrov ev
dvnXrjijiei,' Kat rrjvSe rrjy ai'adrjaiv ^ dpLvSporepav
elvai ® rijs eKel dvnXrjtfiews, rjv u}vop.d^op,£v aladtjaiv
on acopidraiv ivapyearepav ovaav.^ Kat Sid rovro
Kat TOVTOV alaOr/TiKOv, on eXarTOVcos Kat eXarrovcov
30 dvnXrjnnKos eiKoviov eKelvcov ware ecvai rds
aladrjaeis ravras dpLvSpds votjaeis, rds Se eKel vorjaeis
evapyeis aiaBrjons.
8. ’AAAd TO p,kv aladrjTLKOv ovtojs. to Se “Ittvos ”
o/ncoy® Kat SKaarov tcov ^wcvv eKel Trios' ov rrpos rd
ivTavda edeXei pXeneiv; dXX’ ei piiv, tva kvravda imros
yevoLTO 7] dXXo n C<pov, eifvpe vdtjaiv lttttov; Kalroi
5 TTCOS otov T€ TjV ^OvX6pL€VOV ITTTTOV TTOlijaai VOTjOai irTTTOV;
■fjSrj ydp SijXov on vnfjpxev imrov vorjais, elrrep
Tj^ovXrjdrj ITTTTOV TTOiTjoai' ware ovk eanv, iva noiTjarj,
vorjaai, dXXd rrpOTepov etvat tov p,ri yevopxvov imrov
rrpd TOV pierd ravra eaopievov. el oSv irpo rijs yeveaews
10 tJji Kat ovx, iva yevrjrai, evorjOr], ov rrpos rd TrjSe
pXeiTcvv eiye rrap’ eavrw os eiye tov eKel Imrov, ovS’ Iva
' (corpora Ficinus): dowfiara AEBxUCQ, H-S^.
^ post aiaOrjatv transp. on awpartov ■^v Steinhart, H—S^.
^ Theiler: otaav Enn., H-S^.
■* aiaOrjaiv on acopaTwv -^v del. H—S^.
® Theiler: elvai Enn., H-S^.
® Igal: oXws EBxUCQ: oAos A.
' In this difficult passage I remain closer to the MSS (and
H-S*) than to H-S^. But in line 26 I read aot/iara with
Ficino (who translates corpora) and in lines 26 and 28 I
io8
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
powers from that intelligible man and looks to those
realities, and these sense-objects are linked to this
man and those others to that; for those sense-objects,
which we called so because they are bodies, are
apprehended in a different way; and that this sense-
perception here below is dimmer than the apprehen­
sion there in the intelligible, which we called sense-
perception because it is of bodies and which is
clearer. 1 And for this reason this man here has
sense-perception, because he has a lesser apprehen­
sion of lesser things, images of those intelligible
realities; so that these sense-perceptions here are
dim intellections, but the intellections there are
clear sense-perceptions.
8. But so much for the power of sense-perception.
But all the same, how do "horse” and each and every
one of the animals not intend to look to the things
here below? But supposing God discovered the
thought of horse in order that a horse (or some other
animal) might come into being here below? Yet how
would it be possible for him when he wanted to make
a horse to think a horse? For it is already clear that
the thought of horse existed if he wanted to make a
horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in
order to make it, but the horse which did not come
into being must exist before that which was to be
afterwards. If then it existed before its generation
and was not thought of that it might be generated,
he who possessed the horse there in the intelligible
did not possess it in himself in looking to the things
here below, nor that he might make the things here
transpose ouaav and eivat with Theiler. The presence of
bodies in the intelligible world is suggested in the previous
chapter, lines 7-9, and clearly affirmed in VI. 2. 21. 52-53.
109
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

TO. Tfjhe. TTOi-qa-Tj, eTxe tovtov re Kal ra aXXa, dAAd fiev below, but those intelligibles existed and these
things here necessarily followed upon them; for it
€K€iva, ravra 8e eTrrjKoXovdeL dvdyKTjs eKelvois' ov was not possible to stop at the intelligibles there.
yap OTrjvai fMeypi twv eK€i. rig ydp dv earTjae For who could bring to a stop a power able both to
15 Svvap.Lv peveLv re Kai TTpoievai Swapev-qv; dAAd dtd tl
abide and to go forward? But why these animals
there in the intelligible? For why should they be in
€K€l iCpa Tavra; tl ydp iv dew Tavra; ra pev ydp XoyLKd God? Rational animals, yes; but what majesty does
earo)' aXoycvv Se tooovtov nX-qBag tl to aepvdv e^et; tl so great a multitude of irrational ones have? Why
Se oil TovvavTLov; otl pev ovv noXXd Set tovto to ev eivaL does it not have just the opposite? Now it is clear
that this one must be many, because it exists after
ov peTa TO TTavTq ev, SqXov rj ovk dv fjv /ter’ eKelvo, the altogether One; or it would not have been after
20 aAA eKelvo. peT eKelvo Se ov inrep pev eKelvo vpdg to that One, but it would have been that One. But,
being after it, it could not be above it in the direction
pdXXov ev yeveaOaL ovk "^v, eXXelnov S* eKelvov tov S* of being more one, but had to fall short of it; but, as
dpLOTOv ovTog evog eSet 77Aeov q ev eivaL- to ydp TrX-qdog the best was one, it had to be more than one; for
ev eXXelifjei. tI ovv KcuXvei SvdSa eivai; -q eKOTepov tcov multiplicity is deficient. But what prevents it from
being a dyad? Now each of the ones in the dyad could
ev T-fj SvdSi ovy oiov re ijv ev -navTeXcvg eivai, dAAd TrdXiv not be absolutely one, but must again be at least two,
25 aS Svo TOvXdyiaTov eivai, Kai eKeivcvv av cbaavTCvg- and again it is the same with each of those; and then
eiTa Kai Kivqaig ^v ev T-q SvdSi T-fj TTpdiTq Kal OTaaig, -^v
there was in the first dyad movement as well as rest,
and there was also intellect, and life was in it: and
Se Kal vovg, Kal l^oi-q ^v ev aiiT-q-^ Kal TeXeog vovg Kal perfect intellect and perfect life.* Then it was not
loyq TeXeia. ^v tolvvv ovy dig vovg eig, dAAd nag Kal one as Intellect but all, and possessing all the parti­
cular intellects, and as many as all of them and
ndvTag Toiig Kad’ e/eoara vovg eyoiv Kal ToaovTog oaoi
more; and it lived not as one soul, but as all, and as
ndvTeg, Kal nXeioiv Kal e^q ovy cog t/ivx-q pia, dAA’ cog possessing more power to make all the individual
30 TTaaai, Kal nXeico ^ Svvapiv elg to noielv ipvxdg e/cdaraj souls, and it was the "complete living being”,^ not
having only man in it: for otherwise there would
excov, Kal ^ipov n av t e Xe g -fjv, ovk dvOpconov ev only be man here below.
avTU) povov excov povov ydp dvOpcunog evTavOa -^v. 9. "But yes,” someone will say, "I grant the valu­
9. AAA’ eoTCO, (ji-qaei Tig, rd Tipia tcov ^cocov ndig
able living beings, but on the other hand, how could

' Harder, testatur Theologia: avrw Enn. ‘ Cp. Plato Sophist 249A-C.
AJP^ H-S": nXeiwv EBRUQ, H-S'; om. C. ^ Plato Timaeus 31B1.
I 10 Ill
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

av TO. evreAy Kai ra aAoya ijv; to eiireXes BtjXovoti toi the cheap and irrational ones be there?’’ Their
cheapness obviously comes by irrationality, if being
dAoyo) exovra, el tw XoyiKw to Tifjuov Kai ei toi voepw valuable comes by rationality; and if they are valu­
TO Tl/J-LOV, TO) aVOrjTW TO eVaVTLOV. KoCtOI 770)9 dvoTjTov rj able by their intellectual quality, they are the re­
5 dAoyov eKCLvov ovtos ev tS eKaoTa y e^ ov; vpo Sy twv
verse by their unintellectuality. And yet how can
anything be unintellectual or irrational when it is
Trepl TavTa Kai Trpos tovto Xex^yoopievwv Xd^ojpiev, cos that Intellect in which each and every one exists or
6 dvdpcoTTos 6 evTavda ov toioutos cotiv, oios eKelvos, from which they come? Before, then, beginning the
arguments about and against this position, let us
cooTe Kai TO. dXXa ody ofa rd evTavOa KOKet, dXXd grasp that man here is not like that intelligible man,
piei^ovcos Sel eKelva Xap-^dveiv eiTa ovTe to XoyiKov so that the other living beings are not the same here
10 exer toSe ydp lacos XoyiKOS, €Kei Se 6 npo tov
and there, hut one must have a greater and nobler
apprehension of those there; and then too there is no
Xoyl^eadai. Sid ti ovv ivTavda Aoyi^erai oStos, to. S’ rationality there: for here perhaps man is rational
aXXa ov; y hia<f>6pov ovtos eKel tov voeiv ev t€ dvOpconcp but in that world there is the man before reasoning.
Why, then, does this man here reason, but the others
Kat Tois dXXois ^(pois, hidcfiopov Kai to Xoylt,eadai- evi do not? N6w, there in the intelligible, intelligence is
ydp 770)9 Kai Tois dXXois ^<0019 77oAAd Siavoias epya. Sia different in man and the other living beings, and
reasoning is also different; for there are present
16 Ti odv ovK e-nlays XoyiKd; Sid ti he dvOpcoTTOi npos
somehow also in the other living beings many works
dXXyXovs OVK enlays; Set he evdvpcetadai, cos tois 77oAAa9 of deliberate thought. Why then are they not equally
rational? And why are men not equally so in com­
Icods oiov Kivyaeis ovaas Kat tois ttoXXois voyaeis ovk
parison to each other? But one must consider that
eypyv TOLS aiiTas eivai, dAAd Kat ^o)d9 hiacfiopovs Kat the many lives, which are like movements, and the
voyaeis coaavTcos' Tas he hiacfiopds 770)9 cficoTeivoTepas many thoughts should not have been the same, but
different lives and in the same way different
20 Kat evapyeoTepas, KaTo.^ to eyyvs Se tcov TrpioTiov thoughts; and the differences are, somehow, in bril­
TTpcoTas Kat hevTepas Kat TpiTas- hid-nep tcov voyaecov at liance and clarity, firsts and seconds and thirds
according to their nearness to the first principles.
piev deal, at he SevTepov ti yevos, ev co to XoyiKov And for this reason some of the thoughts are gods,
eniKXyv evTavOa, e^ys S’ d77d tovtcov to dXoyov KXydev. and some of a second kind, in which is included what
we call rational here below, and in sequence from
eKet he Kat to dXoyov Xeydpievov Xdyos yv, Kat to avow these what is called irrational. But there what we
^ H—fcai Enn. say is irrational was also a rational principle, and
112 113
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
vovs ^v, eirel Kai 6 voihv ittttov vovs eari, Kai ■q vorjais the mindless was mind, since the thinker of horse is
26 ITTTTOV vovs ■qv. dAA’ el fxev vo-qais (xovov, otottov ovSev mind and the thought of a horse was mind. But if it
TTjv vorjdiv avrrjv vorjaiv ovaav dvorjrov eivai' vvv S’ el was only a thought, there would be nothing out of
the way in the thought itself as a thought being of
TavTOv Tj vorjais tw TTpay^ari, ttws t) yiev vorjOLs, something thoughtless; but as things are, if the
dvoTjTOv Se TO TTpdyfia; ovtcv yap dv vovs dvo-qrov thought is the same as the thing,' how can the
eavTov TTOLol. t\ ovk dvoTjTov, dAAd vovs ToidaSe- {tui)
thought be thought and the thing thoughtless? For
in this way thought would make itself thoughtless.
30 yap ToidSe. dis yap yriaovv ovk dTT'qXXaKTai rov But now it is not thoughtless but a particular kind of
eivai t,o)rj, ovrcos ovSe vovs roidaSe dmjXXaKTai rov intellect: for it is a particular kind of life. For just as
any particular life does not cease to be life, so
eivai VOVS' eirel ovSe 6 vovs 6 Kara otlovv ^coov
neither does an intellect of a particular kind cease to
dTTiqXXaKTai av tov vovs eivac TTavrcvv, otov Kai be intellect: since the intellect appropriate to any
dvdpwTTOv, eiTTep eKaarov piepos, o ti dv XdPjjs, Travra particular living being does not on the other hand
cease to be the intellect of all, of man also, for
dAA’ laojs dXXcvs. evepyela p,ev yap eKetvo, Svvarai Se instance, granted that each part, whichever one you
35 Travra- XapL^dvopiev Se KaO’ eKaarov ro evepyela- rd S’ take, is all things, but perhaps in different ways. For
evepyela eayarov, ware rovSe rov vov to eayarov ittttov it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all;
but we apprehend in each what it actually is; and
eivai, Kai -fj eX-q^e Trpoiwv del els eXdrrw t,wrjv, ittttov
what it actually is, is the last and lowest, so that the
eivai, dXXov Se Karwrepw X-q^ai. e^eXirropievai yap al last and lowest of this particular intellect is horse,
Svvdpieis KaraXel-TTOvaiv del els to dvw- irpoiaai Se ri and being horse is where it stopped in its continual
outgoing to a lesser life, but another stops lower
40 d<j>ielaai Kai ev rw d<j>elvai Se dXXa dXXai ^ Sid rd evSees down. For as the powers unfold'they always leave
rov ^wov rov <j>avevTos eK rov eXXelTTOvros erepov something behind on the higher level; and as they go
e^evpovaai TTpoadeivai- otov errel ovk eariv eri rd iKavdv out they lose something, and in losing different
things different ones find and add on something else
els ^w-qv, dve<f>dvq dvv^ Kai rd yapn/iwvvyov rj rd because of the need of the living being which ap­
^ H—S^: aAAa' ctAAa Enn.
peared as a result of the deficiency; for instance,
since there is not yet enough for life’s purpose, nails
appeared, and having claws and fangs, and the na-
' Cp. Aristotle Metaphysics A 9. 1075al-5. Both in
Aristotle and Plotinus it is divine thought which is being
considered, but the conclusions they draw from the principle of the identity of perfect immaterial thought with
its object are startlingly different.
114 115
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
ture of horn; so that where the intellect came down
KapxapoSov tj Keparos <j>vais' ware, fj KarfjXOev 6 vovs, to, at that very point it comes up again by the self-
45 ravrrj naXiv aS rw avrdpKei rrjs <f>vaews dvaKvtfiai /cat sufficiency of its nature and finds stored in itself the
cure for the deficiency. • n-
evpeiv ev avrw rov eXXeiirovros KeifxevTjv laaiv. 10. But how was it deficient there in the intelli­
10. ’AAAd TTo/j eicei kveXevne-, tl yap Kepara e/cei gible? For why should there be horns for defence
there? They are for its self-sufficiency as a living
TTpos dpivvav; rj rrpos to avrapKes ws ^wov /cat to
being and its completeness. For it had to be complete
reXeov. toy yap ^wov eSei reXeov etvai, Kat toy vovv Se as living being and complete as intellect and com­
plete as life; so that if it did not have this, it must
reXeov, Kai toy ^wrjv Se reXeov ware, el p,ri rovro, dAAd have that. And the difference is by having one thing
5 rovro. Kat ij Sia<f>opd rw dXXo dvrt dXXov, iva e/c instead of another, so that from all living beings
[there may be composed] the most perfect living
TTavTwv pLev ro reXeiorarov ^wov Kat d reXeios vovs Kat being and the perfect intellect and the perfect life,
•q reXeiorarT] t^w-q, eKaarov Se toy eKaarov reXeiov. Kat and each individual may be perfect as an individual.
And certainly, if it is composed of many, it must on
p.iqv, el €K TToXXwv, Set eivai av ev tj ovy otov re e/c the other hand be one; now it is not possible for it to
TToXXwv fiev eivai, rwv avrwv Se Trdvrwv "q avrapKes ijv be composed of many and all of them the same, if it
was, it would be a self-sufficient one. It must then be
10 dv ev. Set rolvvv e^ erepwv del Kar’ etSoy, wairep Kat composed of things again and again differing in
TTav avvderov, Kat aw^ofxevwv eKaarwv, oiai Kat at form, like every composite being, and each indiv­
idual must be preserved, as their shapes and forming
piop<^at Kat ol Xoyoi. a" re yap fi.op<^at, otov dvOpwrrov, principles are. For the shapes also, of man for in­
e^ oawv Sta^optdv, Kairoi to em Trdaiv ev. Kat fieXrlw stance, are composed of so many different elements,
though that over all is one. And they are better'and
Kat dXXqXwv, 6^daXp.6s Kat SaKrvXos, dXX’ evdy worse than each other, eye and finger, but they
15 Kat od ™ rrdv, dXX’ on ovrw, ^eXnov Kat 6 belong to one; and the whole is not worse but,
because it is so, is better; and the rationally defined
Xoyos Se ^wov Kat dXXo n, o pirj ravrov rw “^<oov”. /cat forming principle is living being and something else,
dperrj Se to koivov Kat to iSiov Kat ro dXov KaXdv which is not the same as "living being”. And it is a
virtpe to be both general and particular, and the
dSia(f>6pov rov koivov ovros. whole beautiful—the general is not differentiated.
11. Aeyerat Se ovS’ 6 ovpavds—/cat' TToXXd Se 11. But it is said that even the heaven—and many
living beings are manifest in it—does not think
^aiverai—ovK dnp.daai rrjv rwv ^wwv vdvrwv <f>vaiv,
II7
116
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
worthless the nature of all living things, since also
enei Kai roSe to ■ndv Trdvra e^ei. vodev oSv e^et; iravTa
this All here has all of them. From where, then, does
oiv exei oaa evravda raKei; t) oaa Aoyot ■nevotrjTai Ka't it have them? Does then the world there have every­
thing that is here? Yes, everything that is made by
5 Kar’ eiSos. aXX’ orav vvp ^XV’ vSojp exei, exei 8e forming principle and according to form. But when
irdvrois Kat ^vrd. ttws oSv rd <j>VTd €Kel; Kai ttois nvp it has fire, it also has water, and it most certainly
also has plants. How then are there plants there?
^fj; Kat 770)? YV! V Cv V otov veKpd earai c/cei, coore And how does fire live? And how does earth? For it
p-T] TT&v TO eKet ^ijv. Kat ri oAo)? eartv CKct Kat ravra; rd either lives or it will be a kind of dead body there, so
that not everything there lives. And how in general
pev ovv (f>vTd Svvair’ dv tw Xoycp avvappoaai- enet Kat can these things here be there in the intelligible?
Well, the plants could fit into the argument; for the
10 TO TTjSe <f>VT6v Xdyos eoTtv iv Iwrj Keipevos. el S-q o
plant here is a rational forming principle resting in
evoAoj At3yos 6 tov <f>VTOV, KaO’ ov to (fiVTOv eoTi, Ccorj life. If then indeed the forming principle in matter,
that of the plant, by which the plant exists, is a
tIs eOTi TOidSe Kat t/tvx'q tis, Kat o Xdyos ev tl, t/toi to particular life and a soul, and the forming principle
TTpcoTOV <f>vT6v ioTiv oStos rj ov, dAAd npd avTov <l>VTdv is some one thing, then this principle is either the
first plant or it is not, but the first plant is before it,
TO TTpd)Tov, d(j)’ od Kat TOVTO. Kat ydp eKetvo ev, raura and this plant here derives from it. For that first
15 Se TToXXd Kat dcf)’ evds e^ dvdyKTjs. el 8i) tovto. Set noXv plant is certainly one, and these plants here are
many, and necessarily come from one. If this is really
TTpoTepov eKetvo ^rjv Kat avTo tovto <j>VTdv eivai, an’ so, that plant must be much more primarily alive and
be this very thing, plant, and these here must live
eKelvov Se TavTa SevTepais Kat TpiTojs Kat (car’ ly^os
from it in the second and third degree and from its
eKelvov ^rjv. yrj Se nebs; Kat tI to yrj elvai; Kat tIs q eKet traces. But how does earth live? And what is it to be
earth? And what is the earth there which has life? Or
yrj TO ^rjv eyovaa; q npOTepov tIs avTrj; tovto S’ eori ti rather, first, what is this earth here? Thdt is, what
20 TO eivat TavTjj; Set Sr/ pop^rjv Tiva elvai Kat evnavda Kat being does it have? It must certainly even here below
be a pattern and a forming principle. Well, in that
Xdyov. eKet pev oSv ent tov <j>vTov e^q Kat 6 TqSe avTov case of the plant, its forming principle here too was
Xdyos. dp’ oSv Kat ev TfjSe Tq yrj; rj el Xd^oipev to
alive. Does it then so live in the earth here? Now, if
we were to take the most earthly things generated
pdXiOTa yrpva yewcopeva Kat nXaTTdpeva ev avTrj, and shaped in it, we should find here below too the
nature of earth. The growth, then, and shaping of
evpoipev dv Kat evTavOa T-qv yrjs (frvaiv. Xldwv toIvvv
II9
ii8
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
25 av^'qaeis re Kat •nXdaeis Kal opciiv dva<f>vofjievcov evSov
p,op<f>(jl)aei.s TrdvTCJS ttov Xoyov ep,ijivxov Srjp.iovpyovvTos
evSoOev Kat etSoiroiovvros XPV vop,i^eiv yiveaOar Kat
TOVTO eivai to eiSos rijs yrjs to ttoiovv, dta-nep kv tols
84v8pois TTjv Xeyop,€vqv <l)vaiv, tw 8e ^vXcp tov 8eu8pov
30 dvdXoyov TTjv Xeyop,kvr]v etvai yrjv, Kat dTTOTp,rj0kvTa tov
XWov ovTOiS exeiv, cos et iK tov 8ev8pov ti Koireir], /xiy
TTaOovTos Se TovTov, dXX’ €Ti avv7]pTT)p,evov, cos TO prj
KOTTev eK TOV ^wvTos 4>vtov. TTjv '\8riy ^ 8rip,LOvpyovaav
kyKadr)p,kvqv Trj yfj cjivaiv i^corjv kv Xdycp dvevpdvTes
TTLOTOLpieOa dv TO kvTevdev pa8(cos tijv kKet yr)v ttoXv
35 TTpOTepov ^coaav etvac Kat t^corjv kXXoyov yrjs, avToyrjv
Kat TTpcliTcos yfjv, d<f>’ -^s Kat Tj kvTavda yrj. et 8k Kat to
TTVp Xoyos Tis kv vXrj kcjTt Kat to. aXXa to. ToiavTa Kat
ovK kK TOV avTopcd-rov trip—nodev ydp; ov yap kK
TrapaTptijiecos, cos dv tls oiTjdetri- rj8rj ydp ovtos
40 kv Tcp iravTi nvpos rrapdTpuliis kydvTcov tcov
TrapaTpi^opcevcov acopcdTCov ov8k ydp 'q vXq ovtcos
8vvdp,ei, cocTTe nap’ avTrjs—ei dq KOTd Xoyov del to
noiovv eivai cos p,opcf>ovv, tL dv eiq q tjivxq noieiv nvp
dvvapcevq; tovto 8' kcjTt t,coq Kat Xoyos, kv Kat TavTo
dp,cf>co. 8i6 Kat JlXdTcov kv kKdoTcp tovtcov >fivxqv ^qacv
45 eivai ovk dXXcos q cos noiovaav tovto 8q to alaOqTov
nvp. eoTiv ovv Kat to kvTavda noiovv nvp ^coq tis
' {nimirum Ficinus), Kirchhofif.
’ In IV. 4.27 (where Plotinus also speaks, as he does here,
of the living rock growing) it is strongly asserted that earth
here below not only has a soul, but a divine soul. She is, in
accordance with all Greek tradition, a goddess.
120
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
stones and the inner patterning of mountains as they
grow one must most certainly suppose take place
Lcause an ensouled forming principle is working
within them and giving them form; and this is the
active form of the earth, like what is called the
growth-nature in trees, and what we call e^th corre­
sponds to the wood of the tree, and when the stone m
cut out it is in the same state as if something is
chopped from a tree, but if this does not happen to it
and it is still joined on it is like what has not been
chopped off from a living plant.‘ Now surely when
we Lve discovered the working nature seated in
earth as a life in a forming principle we shall easUy
be'confident about what comes next, that the earth
there in the intelligible is much more primarily alive
and is the life of earth in its forming P^nciple
absolute earth and primary earth, from which the
earth here below derives. But if fire also is a forming
principle in matter, and so are the other things of
this kind, and fire is not spontaneously generated—
for where could it come from? Not from friction, as
one might think: for friction occurs when fire is
already in the All and the bodies being rubbed
together have it; also, matter is not able to be fire in
such a way that fire can come from it—if then wha
makes fire must do so by forming principle, as st^c-
turing it, what could it be except a soul able to make
fire’ But that is a life and a forming principle, both
one and the same. This is why Plato says that there
is a soul in each of these elements ^ in no other way
than as making this perceptible fire. So then wha
^Plotinus here appears to be thinking of Epinomis
981B-C and 984B-C.
I2I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

■nvpCvr), aXr)6eaTepov TTvp. to apa eneKeiva -rrvp p,dXXov makes the fire here below is also a fiery life, a truer
ov TTvp p,a.XXov av eiTj ev ^o)fj' apa Kal avTo to Trvp. 6 fire. The transcendent fire, then, since it is more hre
would be more in life; so then absolute fire also lives.
S’ avTos Xoyos Kat em twv dXXwv, vSaros re Kal depos. And the same argument applies to the others, water
60 dXXd Sid Ti ovK epultvya Kal ravra Manep -q yrj; on pev and'air. But why are these too not ensouled like the
earth? Now it is clear, I suppose, that these are in tke
ovv Kai TavTa ev ^cpcp tw TravTi, SqXov irov, Kal on universal living being, and that they are parts of the
pepq ^wov ov <j>alverai Se ^oiq ev avTok, wanep ovS’ living being; but life is not apparent in them, as it is
not in the case of the earth; but one could deduce the
enl Trjs y-qs' avXXoyi^eaOai Se ■fjv KOKel Kal eK toiv presence of life there too from the things which came
yivopevojv ev avTrj' dAAd yiverai Kal ev nvpl C<pa, Kal ev into being from it; but in fire also living things come
to be, and more obviously in water; and there are
55 vSaTi Se tj>avepo)Tepov' Kal aepivoi Se ^wcov avuTaoeis. living organisms in the air. But the individual fird
yivopevov Se to irvp eKaarov Kal rayv a^ewvpevov rqv which comes to be and is quickly quenched moves
past the soul in the whole and has not come to be
ev rip dXip ipvxqv Trapepyerai eis re oyKov ov yeyevqrai static in a bulk, when it would have shown the soul
pevov, tv’ eSei^e rqv ev avnp ijjvyqv diqp re Kal vSwp in it- and it is the same with air and fire; since, if they
were naturally fixed, they would show their soul; but
cLaavnvs' eireC, el vayelq nojs Kara ^vaiv, Sel^eiev dv since they had to be flowing, they do not show the
60 aAA’ on eSei eivai Keyvpeva, rjv eyei ov SeiKvvai. Kal soul which they have. It is likely that their state
resembles that of the liquids in us, blood for in­
KLvSvvevei opoiov eivai olov to €7tI toiv vypwv tcov ev stance; for the flesh and whatever becomes flesh
qpiv, oiov atpaTOs- q pev yap adp^ SoKei Kal o ti
from the blood seems to have poul, but the blood
because it does not give a sense-perception does not
dv adp^ yevqTai eK tov atpaTos, to S’ aipa atadqaiv ov seem to have it—though it must exist m it also-
irapexdpevov ex^iv ov SoKel—KaiToi dvdyKq eveivat Kal since also nothing violent happens to it- But it is
easily liable to separate from the soul which exists in
65 ev avTU)—enel Kal ovSev eoTi ^laiov yivopevov irepl it as one must think is so with the three elements;
avTo. aAA eToipov eoTi SieoTavai Tqs evvnapxovaqs since all the living beings which are composed of
air' coming together do not have any sense-
^vxqs, otov Kal enl twv OTOixelwv twv Tpidiv Sel perception which affects them. For just as the air
vopl^eiv eivai- eTiel Kal oaa ef depos avoTavTOs pdXXov > These are Saiiioves, who, Platonists generally believed,
had bodies of air. Cp. III. 5. 6. 37 and the passages there
^<pa exei to p-q aladdveaBai eis to Tradeiv. wanep Se 6 referred to.
122 123
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
arjp TO <f>ws areves ov Kai fievov, ecos fievei, avros
70 Trapepxerai, tovtov rov rponov -napeiai' Kal tijv tfivx^iv
avTOV kvkXw Kal ov ndpetai- Kal rd aXXa coaavrcos.
12. ’AAAa jrdXiv cSSe Aeyco/xev eirei ydp <l>ap,ev irpos
otov TTapdSeiyp.a SKfivov rdSe to Ttdv eivai, Sei kokcl
TTpoTepov TO vdv ^<pov etvai Kal, eiir av t eXe s to elvai
avTW, vdvTa etvai. Kal ovpavov Srj eKel t,<pov etvai, Ka'i
5 ovK eprjixov toIvvv daTpcvv twv evTavda tovto
Xeyofievojv ovpavov, /cat to ovpavo) etvai tovto. eoTi S’
eKei Sr/XovoTi Kai yij ovk eprjpios, dAAd ttoXv pidXXov
et,ojo}pievT), Kal eoTiv ev avTrj ^cpa ^vpinavTa, oaa irel^d
Kai x^poaia XeyeTai evTavda, Kai <f>VTd Si/Aovoti ev Tip
10 ^ijv tBpvpieva' Kai ddXaaaa Se eoTiv eKei, Kai Trdv vScup
ev pofj Kai ^wfi pievovoTj, Kai rd ev uSoti ^oia irdvTa,
depo's Te ^vais tov eKei navTos fioipa, Kai ^dia depia ev
avT<h dvdXoyov avTip tw depi. Td ydp ev ^diVTi ttcvs dv
ov ^ciiVTa, OTTOV Srj Kai evTavda; rruis otjv ov vdv ^wov e^
15 dvdyKTjs eKei; cos ydp eKaoTOV twv pieydXcov jjiepmv
eoTiv, e^ dvdyKTjs ovtcos eyei Kai rj tcov t,cpiov ev avTois
<j>vais. ovcos oSv eyei Kai eoTiv eKei ovpavds, ovtco Kai
eyei Kai eoTiv eKei Td ev ovpavcp ^oia vdvTa, Kal ovk
eoTi jjvTj etvai- rj ovS’ eKeiva ecrrai. d oSv ^rjrcov vodev
20 (cpa, IrjTei vodev ovpavds eKei- tovto S’ eori t,rjTeiv
vodev ^aiov, tovto Se TavTov vodev ^co-fj Kal ^corj vdaa
Kirchhoff: TrapeuTi Enn.
124
THE FOKMS AND THE GOOD
itself moves past the light which does not give way
and abides as long as it abides, in this way it passes
round its soul and does not pass; and the same with
the other elements.
12 But again, let us put it this way; since we
maintain that this All exists after the pattern (so to
call it) of that, the universal living being must exist
there too first, and, if its existence is to be complete,
must be all living beings. And certainly the sky there
must be a living being, and so a sky not bare of st^s,
as we call them here below, and this is what being
sky is. But obviously there is earth there also, not
barren, but much more full of life, and all animals
are in it, all that walk on and belong to the land here
below, and, obviously, plants rooted in life; and sea
is there, and all water in abiding flow and life, and
all the living beings in water, and the nature of air is
part of the universe there, and aerial living things
are there just as the air itself is. For how could the
beings in what lives not be living, when they most
certainly are so even here below? How then can
every living being not be there of necessity? For as
each of the great parts of the universe is there, so is
of necessity the nature of the living beings in tbem.
As, therefore, the sky is there, and in the way in
which it is there, so and in that way all the living
beings in the sky are there, and it is impossible for
them not to be; or else those great parts would not be
there. If one enquiries, therefore, where the living
beings come from, one is enquiring where the sky
there comes from; and this is to enquire where the
[universal] living being comes from, and this is the
same as where life comes from, and universal life and
* An allusion to Timaeus 31B1.
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
universal Soul and universal Intellect, when there is
Kal >jtvx^ ndaa Kai vovs 6 ^vfnras, ixrjSe/jiids e/cei nevlas no poverty or lack of resource there, but all things
fjLrjS’ dnopias ovarjs, dXXd TrdvTwv •neTrXrjpwfj.evcav are filled full of life, and, we may say, boiling with
Kai OLOv ^eovTcov. eari S’ avrdiv 17 otov porj eK pids life.' They all flow, in a way, from a single spring,
25 nrjy^s, ovx otov evos rivos irveu/xaro? r] deppLOTrjTOS
not like one particular breath or one warmth,'' but
piids, dXXd otov et ns ‘rjv TTOiorrjs p.ta -ndoas iv avrrj
as if there was one quality which held and kept
intact all the qualities in itself, of sweetness along
exovaa Kai aai^ovaa rds iroioTTjTas, yXvKvrrjTOS jnerd with fragrance, and was at once the quality of wine
evujSlas, Kai 6p,ov oivwSrjs ttoiotijs Kai xoXwv dnavnov and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours
SvvdpLeis Kai xpotp-drwv oijieis Kai oaa di^ai and all the awarenesses of touch, and all that hear­
•yivwoKOvaiv eanuaav Se Kai oaa dKoai dKovovai, ings hear, all tunes and every rhythm.
13. For neither is Intellect simple, nor the soul
30 -ndvra peXrj Kai pvdp.6s nds.
which derives from it, but all are varied in propor­
13. “Eari yap ovre vovs dnXovv, ovre rj avrov tion to their simplicity, that is, in so far as they are
tpoxT], dXXd TTOiKiXa TtdvTa da<p drrXd, tovto Se dacp prj not composites and in so far as they are principles
avvdera Kai oacp dpxai Kai Saw evepyeiai. tov p,ev yap and in so far as they are activities. For the activity of
the last and lowest is simple as coming to a stop, but
eaxdrov rj evepyeia ws dv Xijyovaa dnXrj, tov Se
of the first is all activities; and Intellect in its
6 TTpwrov Trdaai’ vovs re Kivovp-evos Kivelrai p,ev movement moves along in the same way and on one
diaavTOJs Kai Kara ravra Kai opioia del, ov p,evTOi same and identical course, but still is not the same
ravTOv Kai ev n ev pepei, dXXd Travra- eTrei Kai to ev
one partial thing, but all things: since also the
partial thing is in its turn not one, but this too is
pepei av ovx tovto arreipov Siaipodpevov.
infinite when it is divided. But from what should we
drro tIvos Se <f>apiev dv Kai ndvTws eni tl dts eaxaTOv; to say that it began, and to what does it move as the
Se peTa^v Trdv dpa woTrep ypapp-q, rj coairep eTepov ultimate point? And is all in between like a line or
like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But
10 ad)pa opoiopepes ti Kai dTTOiKiXov; dXXd tI to aepvdv;
what majesty would there be in that®? For if it has
'This remarkably powerful phrase is perhaps suggested ® There may be an allusion here to Plato Sophist 249A1.
to Plotinus by De Anima A 2. 405b26-29, where Aristotle Plotinus is certainly much concerned in this chapter with
says that Pre-Socratic ideas about soul and life followed the discussion in the Sophist which begins there, and, as he
their etymologies: some connected (live) with Ceiv (boil) often does, describes the living world of Intellect in terms
and so thought of soul as something hot. of the "very important kinds” (Sophist 264D4) which
^ Plotinus may be suggesting here that the life of the appear in the course of that discussion, Being, Motion,
intelligible world in its complex unity is not to be thought
of in terms of Stoic nvtvna. Rest, Same and Other.
127
126

PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 7.
el yap p.rj8€p.(av eyei e^aXXayrjv fj.r]Se ns e^eyelpei avro
els TO erepoTTfs, ovS’ dv evepyeia eir]' ovSev yap dv •q
ToiavTT] KardoTaais p-rj evepyelas Sia(f)epoi. Kdv Kivqais
8e fi ToiavTTj, ov vavTaydos, povayeos 8’ dv elrj 8el
15 8e ndvra ^rjv Kai navrayoOev Kai ov8ev prj ^rjv. evt
Trdvra ovv KLveladai 8el, pdXXov 8e KeKivyjaBai. dvXovv
Si) el Kivolro, eKelvo pdvov eyei' leat rj avro Kai ov
npov^Ti els ov8ev, rj el rTpov^-q, aXXo pevov ware 8vo-
Kai el ravTOv rovro eKelvw, pevei ev Kai ov
20 TTpoeXTqXvdev, el 8‘ erepov, rrporjXde perd eTepor-qros Kai
errolqaev eK ravrov nvos Kai erepov rplrov ev.
yevdpevov Si) eK ravrov Kai erepov ro yevopevov <f>vaiv
eyei ravrov Kai erepov eivai- erepov 8e ov rl, dAAa rrav
erepov Kai yap to ravrov avrov rrav. rrav 8e ravrov ov
26 Kai rrav erepov ovk eariv o ri diroXelwei rdiv erepwv.
ifrvaiv dpa eyei erri rrav erepoiovaOai. el pev oSv eari rrpo
avrov rd erepa rrdvra, rjdrj ndayoi dv vn avr&v el 8e
pri eariv, ovros rd rrdvra eyevva, pdXXov Se rd rrdvra
ifn. OVK eariv dpa rd ovra eivai pq vov evepyqaavros,
evepy-qaavTOS 8e del dXXo per’ dXXo Kai oiov
30 rrXavqOevTos rrdaav rrXdvqv Kai ev avrw rrXavqOevros,
oia vovs ev avrw o dXqOivds rre<f>vKe rrXavdaOar rreifrvKe
S’ ev ovalais rrXavdadai avvdeovawv rdiv ovaiwv rais
avrov rrXdvais. rravrayov S’ avros eari- pevovaav odv
128
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to lif^ it
would not even be an active actuality: for such a
state would be undistinguishable from non-actual
inactivity. And even if it were a movement of this
[simple and straightforward] kind it would be life
not in all ways, but in one way only; but it must live
all things and from all directions and there must be
nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to
all, or rather have moved to all. Certainly if it moves
a simple movement it has that one alone; and it is
either itself and it has not gone forward to anything,
or if it has gone forward, it is another thing as
staying behind; so there are two; and if this [one of
the two] is the same as that, it remains one and 1ms
not gone forth; but if it is other, it has gone forth
with otherness and from a same and another has
made a third one. Now certainly if what has come to
be has come to be from the same and the other, it is
its nature to be the same and the other; and not just
any other, but universal other: for its same also is
universal. But since it is all that is the same and all
that is other, there is no one of the others that it
leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other m
every way. If then all the other things exist before it,
it would already be affected by them; but if they do
not, then this Intellect generated them all, or rather
was them all. It is not then possible for the real
beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work, lor
ever working one thing after another and, we may
say, wandering down every way and wandering in
itself, as it is natural for the true Intellect to wander
in itself; and it is natural for it to wander ^ong
substances while the substances run along . with its
wanderings. But it is everywhere itself; so its wan-
129
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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

exei TY/v irAdvyv. y Se rrAavy avrw ev tw rys dering is an abiding one. And its wandering is in
"the plain of truth”,^ which it does not leave. And it
35 d Xy Betas Tredicu, oS ovk eKpalvei. ex^i Se
encompasses and possesses it all, and makes a kind
KaraXa^wv ndv Kai avrA TTOiyaas eis to KivelaBai dtov of place for its’ movement, and the place is the same
as that of which it is the place. But this plain is
TOTTOV, Kal 6 TOTTOS 6 aVTOS TO) od TOTTOS. TTOlKlXoV Se varied so that Intellect may travel through it; but it
eari to veSlov tovto, tva Kat Sie^wf el Se fiy koto, vdv it was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far
as it was not varied. Intellect would stand still. But
Kai del ttoikIXov, Kadoaov /xy ttoikcXov, eoTyKev. el S’ if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to
40 eoTyKev, ov voer euare /cat, el eoTy, ov vevoyKev el Se
a standstill, it has not thought; hut if this is so, it
does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all
TOVTO, ovS’ eoTiv. eoTiv odv vdyais' y Se Kivyais Trdaa movement filling all substance, and all substance is
all thought encompassing all life, and always one
•nXypovaa ovalav ndoav, Kai y Trdaa ovala voyais rrdaa thing after another, and whatever of it is the same is
a^oryv irepiXa^ovaa Trdaav, Kal p,eT aXXo del dXXo, Kal o also other, and as one is dividing it the other is
always appearing. But all its journeying is through
TL avTov TavTOV, Kal dXXo, Kal Siaipovvri del to dXXo life, and all through living beings, as when someone
dva<f>alveTaL. rrdaa Se Sid ^cvys y tropela Kal Sid ^atiov travels through the earth, all he travels throu^ is
earth, even if the earth has its differences. And there
45 Trdaa, (Larrep Kai tw Sid yys iovti rravTa, d Sie^eiai, yy, in the intelligible, through which [the journey goes,]
the life is the same, but because it is always other,
KCiv Sia<l>opds exy y yy. Kal e/cet y piev ^wy, Si‘ •^s, y
not the same. But Intellect keeps always the same
avTy, OTi Se del dXXy, ovx y avTy. del S’ €;^ajv Tyv avTyv journeying through the things which are not the
same, because it does not change, but unaltenng
Sid Twv OVK avTwv Sie^oSov, oti p,y dpiei^ei, dXXd sameness is present with the things which are other;
avveoTi Tols dXXois to a/aai/Tcuj Kal KaTa TavTa' edv for if unaltering sameness is not in the things which
are other. Intellect is altogether inactive and its
50 yap py rrepl rd dXXa to waavTws Kal KaTa rd avTa, actuality and activity are nowhere. But it is also
dpyei rrdvTy Kal to evepyela Kal y evepyeia ovSapov. itself the other things, so that it is all itself. And it it
is itself it is all, and if it is not, it-is not itself. But it it
eoTi Se Kal rd dXXa avTOS, waTe irds avros. Kai eirrep is itself all, and all because it is all things, and there
is no thing which does not make its contribution to
avTOS, rrds, el Se py, ovk avTOS. el Se rrds avTOS Kai rrds,
OTI rd rravTa, Kal ovSev eaTiv, o tl py avvTeXel els rd ' Plato Phaedrus 248B6.
130 131
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 7.
55 navTa, ovSev eariv avrov, o ti firj aXXo, iva aXXo ov Ka'i
rovTO avvTeXfj. el yap purj aXXo, dAAd aXXw ravTov,
eXarrwaei avrov rrjv ovalav ISlav ov TTapeyopievov els
avvreXeiav avrov (f>vaiv.
14. “Ectti 8e Kai ‘rrapaBeiyp.aai voepols
eiSevai olov eari vovs, cos ovk dveyerai oiov Kara
p,ovdha /4iy dXXos elvac. rlva yap Kai /SodAei els
rrapaheiyp-a AajSetv Adyov etre <f>vrov etre i(,d>ov; el yap
5 ev ri Kai p,rj ev rovro ttoikIXov, ovr’ dv Xoyos eirj, ro re
yevop,evov vXrj dv eh) rov Adyou )xr) rravra yevopcevov els
ro rravraxov rrjs vXrjs eprreaovra pirjSev avrrjs edaai ro
avro eivat. otov TTpoaoirrov ovk oyKOS eis, dAAd Kai pives
Kai o<f)daXp,ol' Kai r) pis ovyi ovaa ev, dAA’ erepov, ro 8’
10 erepov aS ndXiv avrrjs, el epieXXe pis elvai- ev yap ri
driXcbs odaa dyKOS dv rfv piovov. Kai ro arreipov ovrcos ev
vip, on ev^ d)s ev iroAAd, ovy cos oyKOS^ eis, dXX’ cos
Xoyos TToXvs ev avrcp, ev evi axrjpiari vov olov nepiypacjyfl
excov nepiypcufrds evros Kai ax'r)piariapiovs ad evros Kai
15 8vvdp,eis Kai vorjaeis Kai tijv 8ialpeaiv p.rj Kar evOv,
aXX eis ro evros del, olov rov vavros ^cpov ep.-
■nepiexopevas t,(piov cjrvaeis, Kai ndXiv ad dXXas erri rd
piKporepa rdov ^cpcov Kai els rds eXdrrovs 8vvdpeis,
OTTov ar-qaerai els el8os dropov. r) 8e 8ialpeais eyKeirai
ov avyKexvpevcov, Kalroi els ev dvrcov, dAA’ eariv rj
' Porphyrius Sent., testatur Theologia: dv Enn.
^ Porphyrius Sent., testatur Theologia: oikos Enn.
132
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
the totality of things, then there is nothing of it
which is not other, that by being other it may make
this contribution. For if it is not other, but the same
as something else, it will diminish the substance of
Intellect by not bringing to its completeness its own
particular nature.
14. But it is also possible by using examples taken
from the intellectual realm to understand what In­
tellect is like, that it does not endure to be not other
like a unit. For what forming principle of plant or
animal would you like to take as an example? For if
it was one thing and not this one varied thing, it
would not be a forming principle, and what came to
be would be matter, if the principle did not become
all things so that by penetrating every point of the
matter it allowed nothing of it to be the same. A face,
for instance, is not one lump, but has both nostrils
and eyes; and the nose is not one thing, but there is
one part and again another of it, if it is going to be a
nose; for if it was simply and solely one thing it
would be a lump. And the unbounded is in Intellect
in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one
lump but like a rational forming principle multiple
in itself, in the one fi^re of Intellect holding as
within an outline outlines inside itself and again
figurations inside and powers and thoughts; and its
division does not go on in a straight line, but moves
always to the interior, as the natures of living beings
are included in and belong to the universal living
being, and again other natures going on to the
smaller living things and the weaker powers, where
it will come to a stop at the indivisible form. But the
division which is in Intellect is not of things con­
fused, though of things existing in unity, but this is
133
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
20 XeyaiJ-evri ev toi navri <^iAia tovto, ovy ij ev TotSe toi
what is called' the love in the All, not the love in
this All; for this is an imitation, since it is a loving of
■navTi- iMifielrai yap avTtj (k hieartfKOTOiv ovaa <f>iXr)- ij things which are separate; but the true love is all
8e aXrjOris ndvra ev eivac Kat fxrjTroTe SiaKpiOrjvai.
things being one and never separated. But Em­
pedocles says that what is within this our sky is
SiaKpLveaOai Se (f>'r]ai to ev rwSe to) oiipavci). separated.
15. This life then, multiple and universal and
15. Tavrrjv ovv rrjv ^curjv rrjv ttoXX^v Kai vaaav Kat primary and one—^who is there who when he sees it
TrpaiTtjv Kat fj,Lav Tty t8chv ovk ev ravTrj etvai daTra^erai does not delight to be in it, despising every other
life? For the other lives, the lives below, are dark­
Tijv dXX'Tjv vaaav drifxdaas; okotos yap at dXXai at ness and little and dim and cheap; they are not pure
Kdro) Kat ajjLiKpat Kat d/auSpat Kat evreXet^^ Kat ov and pollute the pure lives. And if you loc)k at them
you no longer either see or live the pure lives, those
5 KaOapat Kat rds Kadapds p.oXvvovaai. Kotv eis avTas lives all together in which there is nothing which
iSrjs, ovKeri Ttxy KaOapds ovre opas ovre ^fjs eKetvas rds does not live, and live purely, having no evil. For the
evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace
vdaas ofjLOV, ev ais ovSev eariv d ri piTj ^fj Kat Kadapws of life and a trace of Intellect; but there, Plato says,
i^fj KaKov oiiSev eyov. rd ydp KaKd evravOa, on is the archetype, which "has the form of good ^
because it possesses the Good in the Forms. That
^coijy Kat vov lyvos' eKet 8e to apyerwov to
then is the Good, but Intellect is good by having its
10 dyaOoeiSes (jyqaiv, oti ev TOiy eiSeai to dyaddv life in that contemplation; and it contemplates the
objects of its contemplation as having the form of
eyei.. to p,ev ydp eoTiv dyaOov, 6 8e dyados eoTiv ev to)
good and as the ones which it came to possess when
deaipetv to eycvv Oewpei 8e dyadoei8fi ovTa to it contemplated the nature of the Good. But they
came to it, not as they were there, but as Intellect
Oeoipovp-eva Kat avTd, a CKTijaaTO, OTe edewpei ttjv tov
itself possessed them. For that Good is the principle,
dyaOov (fivaiv. ^XBe 8e eiy avTOV ovy coy eKet tJv, ctAA’ coy and it is from that that they are in this Intellect, and
it is this which has made them from that Good. For it
15 avTos eayev. apyt) ydp e/cefooy Kat e^ eKetvov ev tovtw
was not lawful in looking to him to think nothing,
Kat oStos 0 irotijaay TavTa e^ eKetvov. ov ydp ^v dep,is nor again to think what was in him; for then In­
tellect itself would not haVe generated them. In-
pXevovTa eis eKetvov p,r]8ev voetv ov8‘ av tcx ev eKetvw'
ov ydp dv avTOS eyevva. 8vvap.iv ovv ets to yevvdv eiye ' By Empedocles; cp. e.g. frs. B 17. 7 and 26. 5 DK.
^ Plato Republic 509A3.
' w: oTeAeis BxUCQ, H—S'.
135
134
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

frap’ eKeivov Kal twv avrov •nXijpovaOai yewrjpLaTwv
20 SiSovTOS eKeivov a pri eiyev avros. dAA’ ef evo? avrov
TToAAd rovTO)' rjv yap eKopi^ero 8vvap.iv dSvvarwv eyeiv
avvedpave Kal iroXXd evoi-qae tijv piav, iv’ ovrco Bvvairo
Kara pepos <j>epeiv. o ri ovv eyevva, dyadov €k Svvdpews
■fjv Kal dyadoeiSes '^v, Kal avros dyados e^ ayaOoeiSwv,
25 dyadov ttoikCXov. 8i6 Kal et ns avrov dveiKa^ec a(l)aipa
^warj TTOiKiX'p, etre vapvpoacorrov ri XPVH-°- Xdpirov
Icbai rrpoawTTOis eire ijivyds rds Kadapds rrdaas els rd
avrd awSpapovoas <f>avrd^oiro ovk evSeets, aXXa
ndvra rd avrwv eyovaas, Kal vovv rov rravra err' aKpais
30 aiirats Ihpvpevov, dis <f>eyyei voepw KaraXdpveadaL rov
roiTOV—cl>avra^6pevos pev ovrcos e^oj ncos dXXos d)v
opwrj aXXov 8el 8e avrov ^ eKetvo yevdpevov rrjv deav
eavrdv rroi’qaaadai.
16. Xpij 8e pr]8‘ del ev rip rroXXcp rovrtp KoXip
peveiv, pera^aiveiv 8’ en rrpds rd dvw dl^avra, d^evra
Kal rovro, ovk eK rovrov rov ovpavov, dAA’ e^ eKeivov,
Oavpdaavra ris d yewpaas Kal orruts- eKaarov pev odv
5 eI8os, eKaarov Kal i8ios otov rvrros' dyadoei8es 8e ov
' Igal: iavTov Enn.
‘ Cp. V. 3. 11. In the next chapter (16, lines 10-24)
Plotinus carefully criticises and refines this account of the
pluralising contemplation of Intellect.
^ There is a reminiscence here of Plato’s description of
136
tellect therefore had the power from him to generate
and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the
Good gave what he did not himself have. But from
the Good himself who is one there were many for this
Intellect; for it was unable to hold the power which
it received and broke it up and made the one power
many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part. ^
Whatever it generated, then, was the power of the
Good and had the form of good, and Intellect itself is
good from [the many] which have the form of good, a
good richly varied. And so, if one likens it to a living
richly varied sphere,^ or imagines it as a thing all
faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure
souls running together into the same place, with no
deficiencies but having all that is their own, and
universal Intellect seated on their summits so that
the region is illuminated by intellectual light ^if
one imagined it like this one would be seeing it
somehow as one sees another from outside; but one
must become that, and make oneself the
contemplation.
16. But we must not remain always in that mani­
fold beauty but go on still darting upwards, leaving
even this behind, not out of this ,sky here below, but
out of that, in our wondering about who generated it
and how. Now each thing there is a fom, and each
has a kind of distinctive character of its own; but,
being in the form of good, all of them have in
the true surface of the earth in the myth of the Phaedo
(110B7). What follows is strangely reminiscent of In^an
many-faced representations of the gods (it is possible,
though of course by no means certain, that Plotinus might
have seen some small Indian image of this kind in
Alexandria or elsewhere).
137
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
Koivov TO emdeov ini ndai irdvra exei. €X« jaev ovv Kai
TO ov ini ndaiv, exei 8i Kai to ^wov eKaoTOV l^wrjs
Koivfjs ini naaiv vnapxovcrqs, Taxa S’ dv Kai aAAo.
dAAd KaO’ oaov dyadd Kai 8i oti dyadd, ti dv eir/; npos
10 Sy TTjv TOiavTi)v OKiifsiv Tdy dv eir) npovpyov dp^aadai
ivT€v6ev. dpa, ot€ iwpa npos to dyadov, ivoei ws noXXd
TO €v iK€ivo Kai (v dv avTos ivoei avTOv noXXd, p,epi^a)v
avTov nap’ avTih Tip voetv /j.tj oXov 6p,ov Svvaadai; dAA’
ovnw vovs T]v iKeivo ^Xinwv, dAA’ e^Xenev dvoijTios- rj
15 <f>aTiov lus ovSi iiLpa nwnoTe, dAA’ e^ri p,iv npos avTO
Kai dvr/pTTjTO avTov Kai inianpanTO npos avTo, ij Srj
Kivrjois avTt) nXrjpcoOeiaa Tip iKei Kiveiadai Kai nepi
iKeivo inX'fjpivaev avTO Kai ovKiTi Kivrfois i^v pidvov,
dAAd Kiv-qais SiaKoprjS Kai nXr/prjs' i^rjs 8i ndvTa
20 iyivcTO Kai eyvcu tovto iv avvaiadrjaei avTOv Kai vovs
rjSrj r)v, nXrjpwBeis p.iv, iv’ 1x37, d oijieTai, ^Xincvv Si
avTd p,€Td tfxoTOS napd tov Sovtos iKeiva Kai tovto
Kopn^opievos- Sid TOVTO ov pidvov XiyeTai Trjs ovaias,
dAAd Kai TOV dpdaOai avT'qv aiTios iKeivos eivai. wanep
25 Si 6 ■qXios TOV dpdaOai tois aioBtjTois Kai tov yiveadai
aiTios wv aiTids ncvs Kai Trjs oi/jecvs ioTiv—ovkovv
ovTe oifiis ovTe rd yivdpieva—ovtcos Kai 17 tov dyadov
<f>v(ns aiTia ovaias Kai vov odaa Kai <f>u)s Kara ^ to
dvdXoyov tois iKei opaTois Kai Tip opwvTi ovre rd ovTa
1 ^3mg ^ _ Picjnus): Kai Enn.
' Here Plotinus begins to develop from Plato’s analogy of
the Sun {Republic 509B2-8) the idea of the light which
138
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
common what runs over them all. They of course
have also being over them all, and each has the
living being as there is a common life over all, and
perhaps they have other things [in common]. But
what is it according to which and by which they are
good? For this kind of enquiry perhaps it would be
profitable to begin from here. Did Intellect, when it
looked towards the Good, think that One as many,
and because it was itself one being think him as
many, dividing him in itself by not being able to
think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect
when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually.
Or rather we should say that it did not ever see the
Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and
turned to it, and its movement was fulfilled because
it moved there and round that Good and filled In­
tellect, and was not just movement but movement
satiated and full; and thereupon it became all things,
and knew this in its own intimate self-consciousness
and was now at this point Intellect, filled full that it
might have what it was going to see, but looking at
them in a light, receiving this light too from the
giver of them. 1 This is why that Good is said to be the
cause not only of substance but of its being seen.
And just as the sun, which is cause for sense-objects
both of their being seen and their coming into being,
is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is
neither sight nor the things which have come to be-
in this way also the nature of the Good, which is
cause of substance and intellect and light, according
to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer,
shines upon Intellect from the Good, which becomes
important later (chs. 21 and 22).
139
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
30 ovT€ vovs iariv, dXXa airios tovtwv Kal (^voeiv Kai)^
voetadai (fxoTi ria iavrov eis rd ovra Kal els rov vovv
Trapex^^v. TTXrjpovp.evos p.ev ovv iylvero, irXrjpwdels 8e
■ijv, Kat 6p.ov aTTeTeXeadr) Kat iiLpa. apxrj 8e avrov
eKelvo T€ TTplv TrXypaidrjvai •^v, erepa Se dpx'>? otovei
35 e^ojdev ij TrXtjpovaa d<l>‘ otov €tvttovto
nXrjpovp.evos.
17. ’AAAd TTcbs ravra ev avrw Kal avros, ovk ovtwv
€Kei €v TO) TrXrjpwaavTi ovS’ av ev avrw tw
TTXrjpovp.€V(p; ore yap p.'fjTTO) eTrXrjpovro, ovk ety^v. rj
OVK dvdyKrj, o ris SlScuac, tovto eyeiv, dXXd Set iv rots
5 ToiovTOis TO p.h’ SiSov p,ei^ov vopi,(^eiv, to Se SiSd/nevov
eXaTTOv Tov SiSovtos' ToiavTr] yap ij yeveats ev toIs
ovai. TTpojTOv yap Set to evepyela eivai, to. S’ voTepa
etvai Svvdp,€i rd irpo avTcuv Kal to TrpwTOv Se irreKeiva
TU)v SevTepojv Kal tov SiSofievov to StSov erreKeiva ^v
10 KpeiTTOv yap. ef rt toIvvv evepyelas TrpoTepov, eveKsiva
evepyelas, cuore Kal eTreicetva C^^rjs. el ovv ^coi) ev
TOVTCp, 6 SiSovs eSto/ce p,ev ^oiTjv, KaXXlwv Se Kal
Tip,id)Tepo5 ^oiijs. etyev ovv Kal ovk eSetro
TTOiKiXov TOV ScSdvTos, Kal ■qv ij ^cot) Tyvos rt eKelvov,
OVK eKelvov ^wq. irpos eKelvo p,ev oSv ^Xenovaa
15 dopiOTos ^Xeipaaa S’ e/cet upll^eTO eKelvov opov ovk
eyovTOS. evdvs yap npos ev ti ISovaa opl^eTai tovtw
Kal tayet ev avTrj opov Kal nepas Kal eiSos' Kal to eiSos
ev Tcp p,op(j>o}devTi, to Se piopifxhaav djitop^ov r^v. 6 Se
' Igal.
^ re o Igal: TO Enn.
140
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of
these, giving by its own light thinking and being
thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then
Intellect came to be by being filled, and when it was
filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and
saw. Its principle was that which it was before being
filled, but another principle, in a way external to it,
was the one that filled it, from which it received its
character in being filled.
17. But how can these be in Intellect, and be
Intellect, when they are not there in what fills it,
nor, again, in it itself which is filled? For when it was
not yet filled, it did not have them. Now, there is no
necessity for anyone to have what he gives, but in
this kind of situation one must consider that the
giver is greater, and that what is given is less than
the giver; for that is how coming to be is among the
real beings. For that which is actual must be first,
and those that come after must be potentially those
before them; and the first transcended the seconds
and the giver transcended the gift: for it was stron­
ger. So if there is anything prior to actuality, it
transcends actuality, so that it also transcends life.
If then there is life'in this Intellect the giver gave
life, but is nobler and worth more than life. Intellect
therefore had life and had no need of a giver full of
variety, and its life was a trace of that Good and not
his life. So when its life was looking towards that it
was unlimited, but after it had looked there it was
limited, though that Good has no limit. For immedi­
ately by looking to something which is one the life is
limited by it, and has in itself limit and bound and
form; and the form was in that which was shaped,
but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is
141

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
opos ovK e^wBev, oiov /xeye^ei nepireBeis, dAA’ ijv nda-qs
20 eKeCvrjs Trjs opos noXArjs Kai atreipov ova-qs, cos dv
TTapd TOiavTtjs <j>vae<jos et^apujidaqs- ^coq re qv ov
TouSe' wpiOTO yap dv cos drop-ov ^Sq- dAA’ copiaro
pevTOf T^v dpa opiaBelaa cos eods rivos ttoXXov—coptCTTO
Srj Kai eKaoTOV tcov ttoXXwv—Sid pev to ttoXv rrjs ^(ofjs
25 TToXXd opiadetaa, Sid Se aS rdv opov ev. r( ovv rd ‘‘iv
dypiaOq"; vovs' opiadetaa ydp ^torj vovs. ri Se
‘VoAAd”; odes ttoXXoi. vdvTa ovv odes, Kai 6 pev nds
vovs, oi Se eKaaToi voi. 6 Se irds vovs eKaaTov vepiexiov
dpa TavTOv eKaarov nepiexei; dAA’ eva dv Trepietxev. ei
30 odo TToXXoi, Siaijiopdv Set eivai. ndXiv ovv ttcos e/coaros
Sia<f>opdv ea^co; q ev Tip Kai ets oAcos yeveaBai eiye Tqv
Sia<l>opdv ov ydp TavTOV otovovv vov to irdo. Tfv ovv q
pev ^(uq Svvapis Trdaa, q Se opaais q eKeiOev Svvapis
irdvTOJv, 6 Se yevopevos vovs adrd dve<j>dvq to ttooto. d
35 Se eiTiKddqTai avTots, ovx too iSpvBq, dAA’ Too iSpvaq
eiSos eiScoo tcoo it/jcotcoo doetSeoo oord. Kai vovs Se
yioeroi npds cp^XV^ odrcos (fxos eis avTqv, cos eKetvos els
142
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
not from outside, as if it was surrounded by a
largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life
which is manifold and unbounded, as a life would be
which shines out from a nature of this kind. And it
was not the life of this or that; or it would he limited
to being the life of an indivisible minimum; but all
the same it was limited and defined; it was therefore
defined as the life of one manifold thing—and each
individual of the many thinp in the manifold was
certainly also defined—and it was defined as many
because of the multiplicity of its life, but on the
other hand as one because of the defining limit.
What then does "it was defined as one” mean?
to
Intellect: for life defined and limited is intellect. And
what "as many”? Many intellects. All then are
intellects, and all as a whole Intellect, and the
individuals intellects. But does the whole Intellect
in comprehending each individual comprehend each
as the same? But if it did, it would comprehend only
one. If then the intellects are many, there must be
difference. Again, then, how did each one have
difference? It had its difference in altogether becom­
ing one: for what is the same in any intellect is not
the all. The life of Intellect, then, is all power, and
the seeing which came from the Good is the power to
become all things, and the Intellect which came to
be is manifest as the very totality of things. But the
Good sits enthroned upon them, not that it may have
a base but that it may base the "Form” of the first
"Forms”,' being formless itself. And in this way
Intellect is to soul a light upon it, as that Good is a
^ NoOs is said to be c?Sos elBwv by Aristotle, De Anima F 8.
432a2.
143
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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

vovv Kai orav Kai oStos opLar) rrjv tjivx'qv, XoyiKTjv woiei
light upon Intellect; and when Intellect also defines
and limits the soul it makes it rational by giving it a
Sous avTfi <Lv eayev ixvos. rj^uos ovv Kat vovs eKeivov trace of what it has. Therefore Intellect too is a trace
40 ivei 8e 6 vovs etSos Kat ev eKraaei ^ Kat TrAijflei, eKeivos of that Good; but since Intellect is a Form and exists
in extension and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless
aixopcfios Kat dveiSeos' ovtco yap etSonoiet. ei S’ tJv and formless; for this is how he makes forms. But if
eKftvos eiSos, o vovs tjv dv Xoyos- eSei Be to vpwTOV pij that was a form, Intellect would have been [only a
TToXii pLT]Sap,<x)s etvar dvrjpTrjTO yap dv to ttoXv avTOV
derived] rational principle. But the first must be not
in any way multiple: for its multiplicity then would
els eTepov av Trpo aiiTOV.
depend on another again before it.
18. ’AAA’ dya0oeiSij koto tl to. ev tw vw; dpa fj 18. But in what way do the things in Intellect
have the form of good? Is it in that each of them is a
eiSos eKaoTOv rj ^ KaXg, r] tI; el Srj to napd tov dyadov
Form, or in that they are beautiful, or what is it.
^Kov trav r^vos Kat tvttov eyei eKeivov rj dn eKelvov, Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good
dtoTTep TO dTTO TTvpos uj^vos TTvpos Kat TO dno yXvKeos
has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives
from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire
5 yXvKeos vovv Kat ^oj-q dn’ eKelvov—eK and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet,
yap Trjs Trap’ eKelvov evepyelas imeoTT)—Kat vovs Se Si’ and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect
for it came to exist from the activity derived from
eKelvov Kat to twv elSdiv KaXXos eKetdev, ndvTa dv
him—and Intellect exists through him and the
dyaOoeiSij elr/ Kat ^coy Kat vovs Kat ISea. dXXd tI to beauty of the Forms comes from there, all would
Koivov; ov yap Sy dpKel to dn’ eKelvov npos to TavTOV
have the form of good, life and intellect and idea. But
what is it that is common to all? For coming from
10 ev avTols yap Sel to koivov eivai' Kat yap dv yevoiTo that Good does not suffice for sameness; for what is
diTo TOV avTOV piy TavTov y Kat Sodev waavTws ev rots common should be in them themselves; for what is
not the same could come to be from the same, or,
Se^opievoLS dXXo ylveadar enet Kat dXXo to els irpwTyv
also, what is given in sameness might become differ­
evepyeiav, dXXo Se to Ty TTpcjTy evepyela Sodev, to 8’ ent in the things which are going to receive it; since,
em TOVTOLS dXXo ySy. y ovSev KOjXvei Kad’ eKaoTOv p.ev too, what pertains to the first activity is one thing
and what is given by the first activity another, and %I
15 dyadoeiSes etvai, pidXXov p,yv kot’ dXXo. tI odv Kado what depends on these another again. Now, nothing
pidXiOTa; dXXd npoTepov eKelvo dvayKalov ISeiv dpa ye prevents it having the form of good in each way, but
more in one of them. What then is it by which most of
all it is this? But first of all it is necessary to look at
^ Theiler: e/cardaei Enn.
145
144
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

dyaOov y ^ojt] fj avro tovto ^wq ^ tjiiXri decDpovfievq the following: is life a good in that it is this very
Kal dnoyeyvp.vo)fj,4vq; ^corj q dm’ avTOV. to 8’ “dm’ thing, life considered bare and stripped of all else?
Rather, in that it is the life which comes from the
avTOv” dXXo TLTj^ Toiavrq; irdiXiv ovv Tt rj roiavTq ^ojq; Good. But does this "from the Good” mean anything
20 rj diyadov. d.XX’ ovk avTov qv, dAAd 6^ avrov. dAA’ ei ev else but that it is of a particular kind? Again, then,
rfj ^oiTj €K€ivrj evioiTO eKeivov Kai eartv 17 ovtws what is ’’life of a particular kind”? It is life of the
Good. But it was not life of the Good, but deriving
Kal ovSev dTip,ov nap’ kKeivov [AeKT€ov eivai],® Kal
from the Good. But if in that life the authentic life
Kado diyadov <(AeKTeov])>® eivai, Kal ini vov Sq tov from that Good has entered and is, and nothing from
diXqOivov dvdyKq Xiyeiv rov npcoTov iKelvov, on that is valueless, it must be said to be good also in
25 diyadov. Kal SrjXov on Kal eiSos eKaarov diyadov Kal that it is life, and it is necessary to say also of that
true and first Intellect that it is good; and it is clear
diyadoeiSis, ^ odv n iyei d.yad6v, eHre koivov, etre also that each individual Form is good and has the
pdXXov aXXo, eiTe to pev npaiTcos, to Si T<p i^e^rjs Kal form of good, in that, therefore, it has some good,
SevTepoiS. inel yap eiXrj^api.€v fKaoTov ws ex°*' '7^’? either common, or more particularly one rather than
another, or one primarily and another by succession
rq ovaiq avTOv diyadov Tt Kal Std tovto t^v diyadov—Kal and secondarily. For, since we took each Form as
30 ydip q ^coq ■^v diyadov ovy dinXcvs, dAA’ drt iXiyeTO having something good in its substance, and it was
diXqdivq Kal OTi nap’ iKeivov, Kal vovs 6 ovtws—Set rt good for this reason—for its life was not good simply
as life, but because it was called true life and
TOV avTOV iv avTois dpdadai. Sia<f)6pwv yap ovtwv, OTav
because it came from that Good, and Intellect
TO avTO avTciiv KaTqyopqTai, KwXvei piv ovSiv iv Trj because it was real Intellect—something of the same
ovaiq avTibv tovto ivvndpxeiv, opws 8’ ioTi AajSeiv must be visible in them. For, as they are different,
aiiTO x^ttpts Tw Xoyw, oiov Kal to ^wov in’ divdpwnov
when the same thing is predicated of them there is
nothing to prevent this being immanent in their
35 Kal innov, Kal to deppov ini uSaros Kal nvpds, to piv substance, but all the same it is possible to take it
ws yivos, TO S’ ws TO piv npwTws, to 8i SevTepws' q separately in thought, as, for instance, "living
opwvvpws dv etedrepov q eKaarov Xiyoiro diyadov. dp’ thing” in man and horse, and "hot” in water and fire,
in the one case as the genus, and in the other as one
ovv ivvndpyei rfj ovalq avTwv to dyadov; q oXov primarily and the other secondarily; otherwise each
eKaarov dyadov ianv, ov Kad’ ev to dyadov. nws oSv; q of them or each particular one of them would be
' del. Theiler: ^ H-S'. called good equivocally. Is then the good immanent
“ Harder: ^ Enn. in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a
® Igal. whole; its good does not depend on just one constitu-
146 147
 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
ent. Well then, are they good as parts? But the good
40 <l)s IJ^epT); dAAd d/nepes to dyadov. r] ev (j,ev avro, ovrcjal
is partless. Now, it is one itself, but is in this way,
Se ToSe, ovTwai 8e rode. Kal yap ij evipyeia i) irpoiTr] this particular good, and in that way, that. For the
first activity is-good and what is defined following
dyaOov Kai to in’ avrij opiaOev dyaOov Kal to avvdp,<l>w upon it is good, and the pair of them together; and
the one is good because it is brought into being by
Kal TO p.iv OTi yevop-evov vn avTOV, to S’ oti Koapos dn’ the Good, and the other because it is an ordered
aiiTov, TO S’ OTI avvdp<j)o}. dn’ avTov oSv, Kal ovSev world which comes from it, and the last because it is
both of them together. They come from the Good
46 TavTOv, otov el dnd tov avTOV <l>wvfj Kal jSdSiots Kal then, and not one of them is the same, as from the
same [Form of man] talking and walking and a
dAAo Ti, ndvTa KaTOpdovpeva. rj ivTavOa, oti Ta^is Kal variety of other things come, all correct [according
to the Form]. Now here below this is because there is
pvOpos- eKel Se tI; dAA’ elnoi tis dv, dis ivTavdd oAov eh order and rhythm: but why there in the intelligible?
TO KaXths e^codev Sia^opaiv ovtcov twv nepl a t) rd^is, But one might say that here below always what
brings about the excellence comes from outside, and
eKel Se Kal avTa. dAAd Sid ti Kal avTa; oii yap oti dn’ the things with which the order is concerned are
different [from the order], but there the things them­
50 eKeivov Sel niOTevovTas d<j>elvai' Set pev yap axjyxtopelv selves also are good. But why are they also good?
For we should not just trust that it is because they
dn’ eKeivov ovTa etvai Tipia, dAAd nodel 6 Adyos Xa^elv,
come from that Good and give up; for we must agree
KaTa Ti TO dyadov avTWV. that it is because they are from that Good that they
are valuable, but the discussion is anxious to grasp
19. ’Ap’ oSv TTj e^eaei Kal Tfj ijivxfi ^’’^i-'Tpetjiopev Trjv the reason for their goodness.
19.Shall we then hand over the decision to desire
Kplaiv Kal Tw TavTTjs nddei niOTevaavTes to tootij
and to the soul and, trusting in this soul s experi­
e^eTov dyadov ^-qaopev, Sioti Se e<f>leTaL ov ^iqT-qaopev; ence, maintain that what is desired by this is good,
and not enquire why it desires? And shall we pro­
Kal tI pev eKaoTOV, nepl tovtov dnoSel^eis Kopiovpev, duce demonstrations of what each and every thing
is, but commit the good to desire? But we see many
5 TO S’ dyadov tt) e<f>eaet Swaopev; dAAd noXXd aTona absurdities in this. First, because the good also will
become one of the accompaniments. Then, because
rjplv (l>alveTai. np&TOV pev, oti Kal to dyadov ev ti twv
there are many that desire, and different ones desire
nepl. eneiTa, oti noXXd to e^iejuera Kal dXXa dXXcuv different things; how then shall we decide by the
149
148
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
TTOis oiJi' Kpivovfiev TO) e<f>i€fji€vci), el PeXriov; dAA’ laws
ovSe TO jSeAxiov yvwaofjieda to ayaBov dyvoovvres- dAAd
10 dpa TO dyadov 6piovp,eda Kara tijv eKaarov dpeTrfv;
dAA’ ovTws els eiBos Kai Xoyov dvd^op,ev, dpBws piev
TTopevopLevoi. dXXa eXdovres eKet tI epovpLev avrd ravra
^rjTovvres ttws dyaBd; ev p.€v yap rots yeipoaiv, cos
eoiK€, yiyvwaKoip,ev dv tijv ^vaiv tijo TOiavrrjv Kalroi
15 ovK eyovaav elXiKpivws, eveiSy^ ov vpwrws, rij Trpos
rd x^cpco TrapaBiaei, ottov 8e p,rjSev eari kokov, avrd S’
e<f>’ eavrwv eari rd dp,e(vw, dTToprjaop,€v. dp’ ovv,
eTTeiSri ^ Xdyos rd Sidri ^r/ret, ravra 8e dyaBd nap’
avrwv, Sid rovro dnopel rov “Sidri” rd “on” ovros;
enei Kav dXXo <l>wp,ev airiov, rdv Beov, Xoyov p,rj
20 (fiBdvovros eKet dpiolws rj dnopla. ov p.'qv dnoarareov, el
nji Kar’ dXXtjv dSdv nopevopievois ri <l)avelr).
20. ’EwecSi) Tolvvv dniarovpiev ev rw napovri rats
dpe^eai npds rds rov ri eariv rj notdv eari Beaeis,^ dpa
XpiJ npds rds Kplaeis ievai Kai rds rwv npaypid-
Twv evavriwaeis, otov rd^iv dra^lav, avpipierpov
5 davpipieTpov, vyelav voaov, eiSos dpiop<f>lav, ovaiav
<l>Bopdv, oXws avaraalav d<f>dviaiv; rovrwv ydp rd
npwra KaB’ eKaarrjv av^vylav rls dv dp,<l>ia^riTr)aeie jitij
OVK ev dyaBov elSei eivai; el Se rovro, Kai rd noirjriKd
' Gollwitzer: exet Se Enn.
2 Kirchhoff.
^ R’’° (ad asseverandum Ficinus), Creuzer; deaei Enn.
IS'
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
desirer whether the desired is better [than other
objects of desire]? But perhaps we shall not even
know the better if we are ignorant of the good. But
shall we then define the good according to each
thing’s excellence i? But in this way we shall refer to
Form and reason-principle, certainly a correct man­
ner of proceeding. But when we have got there, what
are we going to say when we enquire how these very
Forms are good? For in the things which are in­
ferior, it seems likely, we might recognise the nature
of this kind, though it is not in a pure state, since it
does not exist primarily, by comparison with things
which are [still] worse. But where there is nothing
evil but the Forms themselves by themselves are the
better things, we shall be in difficulties. Is the di -
ficulty, then, there for this reason, that, since our
rational discourse seeks the reason why but these
are good in themselves, the why is the that .
Since even if we also assert another cause, God, tne
difficulty remains all the same while our disciourse
has not arrived there. We must certainly not give up
while there is any chance of something appearing i
we proceed by another way.
20. Since, then, we do not at present rely on our
impulses for establishing what a thing is or what it is
like should we then turn to judgements and the
oppositions of things, for instance order, disorder,
symmetrical, unsymmetrical, health, sickness, form,
shapelessness, substance, destruction, and in gen­
eral coherence and dissolution? For who is there
who would argue that the first of these in each pair
is not in the form of good? But if this is so, it is
I This is how Aristotle defines human good in
Nicomachean Ethics A 7.1098al&-17.
iSi
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

avTcbv avayKt} €v dyadov fjLOipa rlOeaOai. Kal dper-^ 8ij

necessary to put their makers also on the good side.
And surely virtue and intelligence and life and soul,
10 Kat vovs Kai ^coij Kat tlivyri, rj ye €[jL(f>p<DV, kv dyaOov thinking soul at least, are in the form of good; and
eider Kai Sv e<j>ieTai tolvvv eptfipaiv rt odv ov so, then, are what thinking life desires. Why then,
someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and
aTrja6p,eBa, <f>riaei tis, eis vovv Kat tovto to dyadov posit this as the Good? For soul and life are traces of
dTjadpieda; Kat yap fjivxr) Kat ^airj vov ixvT}, Kat tovtov Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires.
And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect,
e<f>teTai tfivyq. Kat Kpivei tolvvv Kat e<f>ieTaL vov, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness,
Kpivovaa p,ev SiKaioavvrjv dvT’ dSiKias dp-eivov Kat and preferring each form of virtue to the [corre­
sponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable
15 eKaoTov eiSos dpeTfji irpo KaKias eiSovs, Kat toiv avTOJv
the same things which it chooses. But if it only
■fj TTpoTip-qais, (Lv Kat -q aipeais. dAA’ et pev vov povov desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need ot
e<f>leTaL, Taya dv irAeiovoj edeqae Aoyov SeiKvvvTojv, cos further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the
ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but
ov TO eayaTOv 6 vovs Kat vov pev ov TzdvTa, dyaOov Se all things desire the Good. And not all of the things
TrdvTa. Kat twv pev prj eyovTcov vovv ov Travra vovv which do not have intellect seek to gain possession
of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop
20 KT-qaaadaL t^rjTel, rd S’ eyovTa vovv ovy ioTaTai qSq, there, hut again seek the Good, and they seek In­
dAAd iraXiv to dyadov Kat vovv pev eK Xoyiapov, tellect from their reasoning, but the Good even
before reason. And if they also seek life, and
TO 8 ayadov Kat tipd tov Xoyov. et 8e Kat ^(vrjs e<j>leTaL
everlasting existence and activity, what they desire
Kat TOV det etvai Kat evepyeiv, ovy fj vovs dv eiq to is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so to
e^eTov, dAA’ f dyadov Kat dwo dyadov Kat ets dyadov as it is good and from the Good and directed to the
Good: since this is so also with life.
enet /cat q ^cvq ovtcos. 21. What therefore is it which is one in all these
21. T( oSv ev ov ev irdai tovtols iroiei dyadov and makes each and every one of them good? Let us
then, make bold to say this: Intellect and that life ot
eKaoTov; S8e tolvvv TeToXprjadu)' eivaL pev tov vovv Kat its are in the form of good and thfere is desire of these
TTjv ^ojqv eKetvqv dyadoeLSij, e<f>eaLV 8e eivaL Kat also in so far as they are in the form of good: I mean
"in the form of good” in the sense that life is the
TOVTcvv, Kadoaov dyadoeLSij' dyadoeLSij Se Xeyco tw ttjv
activity of the Good, or rather an activity from the
5 pev Tdyadov eivaL evepyeLav, paXXov Se eK Tdyadov Good, and Intellect is the activity already bounded
evepyeLav, tov Se qS-rj dpLodeiaav evepyeLav. eivaL S’ and defined. But they are both filled full of glory and
153
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 THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
are pursued by the soul because it comes from them
avra [xeaTO. (xev dyAaias Kai SiwKeaOai vtto ipvx^S, ciij
and again is directed to them; as akin then, but not
eKeWev Kai npos eKelva av- ws towvv oiKeta, dAA’ ovyi
as good; but since they are in the form of good, not to
dyadd' dyadoeiSrj Se dvra ovSe ravrrj dndpXrjTa eivai. be rejected for this reason. For what is akin to one, if
10 TO ydp OLKelov, el p-rj dyaOdv e“r], oiKelov pev eari, it is not good, is indeed akin, but one avoids it; since
<j)€vy€i Se Tis avTO- eiTet Kai dXXa -noppo) ovra Kai Kara) [if it was otherwise] other things also which are far
Kivrjaeiev dv. ytverai Se -npos avra eptos 6 avvrovos ovy off and deep below might move one to desire. But
there comes to be the intense kind of love for them
OTav ^ dnep earlv, dAA’ drav eKeWev ■qSt] dvra' dvrep
not when they are what they are but when, being
eoTiv dAAo TTpoaXd^rj. olov ydp eirl twv atopaTwv
already what they are, they receive something else
(fxjDTOS eppepiypevov opws Sel (fxjDTOS dXXov, tva Kai from there beyond. For just as with bodies, though
15 (/>avelr] to ev avrols xpd)pa to <j>ws, ovtw rot Sel KalAnl light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of
TUiv eKel KaiTTep noXv <f>ci)s eyovTiov (/xxitos KpeiTTovos another light for the light, the colour, in them to
aXXov, Iva KdKelva Kai vtt‘ avTcbv Kai utt’ dXXov 6<f>d'^. appear, so with the things there in the intelligible,
22. lOTav ovv TO <l>cbs TOVTO Tts Tore Si) Kai though they possess much light, there is need of
another greater Jight that they may be seen both by
KiveiTai en avTa Kai too (/xotos tov emOeovTOS err’
themselves and by another.
aiiTots yXiyopevos ev^palveTai, d>anep KdTrl^ toiv
22. When anyone, therefore, sees this light, then
evTavda ocopaTcov ov tcov vnoKeipevwv eoTlv 6 epws, truly he is also moved to the Forms, and longs for the
5 dXXd TOV ep<l>avTalopevov kuXXovs en’ avTols. eoTi ydp light which plays upon them and delights in it, just
eKaoTov o eoTiv e<j>‘ avTov" e(f>eT6v Se ylveTai as with the bodies here below our desire is not for
enixpcdoavTOS avTo tov dyadov, (vairep xdpiTas Sovtos the underlying material things but for the beauty
avTols Kai els Ta e<j)iepeva epoiTas. Kai toIvvv ijivx'^ imaged upon them. For each is what it is by itself,
but it becomes desirable when the Good colours it,
Xa^ovaa els avTTjv T-qv eKeldev dir o p p o-q v Kivehai
giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to
Kai dva^aKyeveTai /cat oloTpcvv iripTrXaTai Kai epws
the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into itself an
1 p3s (_ Ficinus): A Enn.
^ Beutler: xat Enn. outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and
I5S
154
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
10 yCverai. Trpo rovSe ouSe npog tov vovv Kivilrai, Kamep
KaXov ovra- dpyov re yap to KaXXos avrov, irplv tov
ayaOov (f>u)s Xd^rj, VTTTia re dvaTrenToiKev ij
i/ivxy Trap’ avTTjs Kai TTpos Trdv dpyws eyei Kat TrapovTos
vov eOTi TTpos avTOv voidrjs. eireiSav Se -^kt/ els avrrjv
15 wOTrep deppaala eKeldev, porworaC re Kai eyeiperai Kal
ovTws irrepovrai Kat Trpos to TrapaKeipevov Kat TrXrjaiov
KaiTrep eTTTorjpevr] opws Trpos dXXo olov rfj pvTjprj
pet^ov Kov<f>i^eTai. Kat eois rl eariv dvoirepw tov
TrapovTOS, atperai (jrvaei, dvoi alpopevrj vtto tov Sovtos
20 TOV epwra. Kat vov pev vrrepalpei., ov Svvarai Se vrrep to
dyadov Spapeiv, on prjSev ean to vrrepKeipevov. edv Se
pev-p ev v<p, KaXd pev Kat aepvd Bearai, ovtto) prjv o
Iprei TrdvTTj eyei. olov yap irpoawTTw -rreXa^ei KaXw pev,
ovTTO) Se oiJiLv KLveiv Svvapevcp, w p-q epirpeTrei
25 eTTiOeovaa tw KaXXei. Sio Kat evravBa (jrareov paXXov to
KaXXos TO eirt rfi avppeTpia erriXapTropevov q ttjv
avpperpCav etvai Kat tovto eivai to epdapiov. Sid tl
yap eTrt pev t^wvros TTpoaiorrov paXXov to <f>eyyos tov
KaXov, tyvos S’ eirt TeOvrjKOTOS Kat pq-rro) tov TrpoaoiTrov
' Plotinus in this chapter is, as so often, inspired by
the myth in Plato’s Phaedrus 246A £f. He refers here
particularly to the description of the soul in love in 251B.
The phrase "falls flat on its back” in line 12 also comes
from the myth (254B8), but the context is startlingly
different. In Plato the charioteer of the soul falls back in
reverence when he is reminded by the beauty of the beloved
of the Form of beauty which he once saw, and drags his
horses back with him. In Plotinus the soul lies back in
boredom and indifference if it does not see over the Forms
IS6
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
is all stung with longing and becomes love. Before
this it is not moved even towards Intellect, for all its
beauty; the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it
catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itselt
"falls flat on its back” and is completely inactive
and, though Intellect is present, is unenthusiastic
about it. But when a kind of warmth from thence
comes upon it, it gains strength and wakes and is
truly winged; and though it is moved with passion
for that which lies close by it, yet all the same it rises
higher, to something greater which it seems to re­
member. And as long as there is anything higher
than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on
upwards, lifted by the giver of its love.=^ It rises above
Intellect, but cannot run on above the Good, tor
there is nothing above. But if it remains in Intellect
it sees fair and noble things, but has not yet quite
grasped what it is seeking. It is as if it was m the
presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but
cannot catch the eye because it has no grace playing
upon its beauty. So here below also beauty is what
illuminates good proportions rather than the good
proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable.
For why is there more light of beauty on a living
face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its
the light which comes from beyond them, from the Good.
On the signiflcance of this chapter and its relationship to
some equally startling remarks on the beauty of the World
of Forms in V. 6. 12 see my "Beauty and the Discovery ot
Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus” (Plotinian and
Christian Studies XIX).
‘ This is the clearest statement by Plotinus of something
implicit in his whole system, that our desire to return to the
Good is given by the Good.
157
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

rats aap^i Kai rats avp-p^rpiais p,€p,apaap,evov; koi flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away?
30 Twv ayaXp.dT(uv he rd ^(oriKcorepa KaXXlw, Kav And are not the more lifelike statues the more
beautiful ones, even if the others are better propor­
avp-pt-erporepa rd erepa Kat aiayicav ^div KaXXicov rov tioned? And is not an uglier living man more beauti­
ev dydXpxLTi koXov; rj on rohl etfyerdv p,dXXov tovto S’ ful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because
the living is more desirable; and this is because it
on ipvx'^v eyer tovto S’ oti dyadoeiSeoTepov tovto S’
has soul; and this is because it has more the
OTi dyaOov dpi,rjyeTrr] (fxvTL KcypcooTai Kai xpcvadelaa good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by
36 eyqyepTai Kat dvaK€Kov(f>iaTai Kat dvaKov<^[^ei o exei, the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes
and rises up and lifts up that which belong to it, and
Kat ws oiov T€ avT<p dyadoTToiet avTO Kat eyeipei. as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.
23. ’E/cei St), o t/ivx’tj SicoKei, Kat o vw (f>d)s vapexei 23. There, surely, one need not wonder it that
Kat epLTTeadv avTov ixvos Kivel, ovtoi Set davp,d^eiv, which the soul pursues and which gives light to
Intellect and in falling upon it stirs a trace of itseit
el TOiavrrjv Svvap,i.v exei eXKOv npds avTO Kat
has so great a power, and draws to itself and calls
dvaKaXovp.evov eK -ndar^s TrXdvrjs, iva irpds avTov back from all wandering to rest beside it. Por li there
is something from which all things come, there is
6 dvaTTavoaiTO. et ydp eK tov rd vdvTa, ovSev eoTi
nothing stronger than it, but all things are less than
KpeiTTOv avTOV, eXaTTW Se iravTa. to St) apiOTOv tcov it. How can the best of realities possibly not be the
dvTuiv Trdis ov to dyaOdv eoTi; Kat p.riv el Set Trp> tov Good? And furthermore, if the nature of the Good
must be completely sufficient to itself and without
dyaOov <l>vaiv avTapKeoTaTrjv re eivai avTT) Kat dvevSea need of anything else at all, what other nature than
dXXov OTOvovv TTavTos, Tiva dv dXXrjv ij TavTrjv oSaav this could anyone find, which was what it was before
10 evpoi Tis, rj TTpd tcov dXXwv ■Tp/ onep ijv, ore p,rjSe KaKia the others, when there was not yet any badness! But
if the evils come later, in things which do not
TTw tJv; et Se rd /ca/cd voTepov ev Tots p.rjSe Kad’ ev participate in this Good in any way at all, and on the
TOVTOV p.eTeiXri<j>6ai Kat ev Tots eaxdTOis Kat ovSev very last and lowest level, and there is nothing
eireKeiva twv kokcvv Trpds to x^tpov, evavTicos dv exoi
beyond the evils on the worse side, the evils would be
opposed to it without any middle term for the oppo­
rd KaKd npds avTO ovSev exovTa p.eaov npds sition. This then would be the Good; for either there
evavTicvaiv. to dpa dyaOdv tovto dv etf)' t) ydp ovk is no Good at all, or, if it is necessary that there is, it
would be this and not something else. But if someone
15 eoTiv dXcvs dyaOov, ij, et dvdyKt] eivai, tovto dv Kat ovk
says that there is not, then there would be no evil
dXXo eiTj. et Se tis Xeyoi pT) eivai, ovSe KaKdv dv elry either; so things would be by nature indifferent for
1S8 159
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

ahia^opa apa npos aipeaw rff <l>va€i- tovto 8‘ dSvvarov. our choice; but this is impossible. But what others
a S’ dAAa Aeyovacv dyadd, els tovto, avTO Se els ovSev.
call goods are referred to this, but it itself is refereed
to nothing. What then does it make, if it is hke this.
t( ovv TTOiei ToiovTov ov; r} eTTolrjoe vovv, etrol-qae Coyqv,
It made Intellect, it made life, and from Intellect the
20 ijivyds eK tovtov Kai rd dAAa, daa Adyov rj vov tj souls and all else that has a share in reason or
peTeyei. o Srj tovtcov Tr-qyrj Kal dpyq, tIs dv intellect or life. Then, surely, what is source and
principle” i of these, how could one say in what way
eiTTOi, OTTOJS dyadov Kal oaov; dAAd tI vvv noiet; ^ Kal
and how greatly it is good? But what is it making
vvv acpt^ei. eKelva Kal voelv noiel rd voovvTa Kal ^rjv rd now? Now as well it is keeping those things in being
^d)VTa, epirveov vovv, epirveov ^ojyv, el Se ti prj SvvaTai and making the thinking things think and the lining
^■fjv, eivai.
things live, inspiring thought, inspiring life and, it
something cannot live, existence. ,
24. ‘Upas Se TL TToiel; rj rrdAiv rrepl tov tfxxiTos 24. But what does it make us? Either let us speak
Aeycapev tI to <j)ws, <S KaTaAdpireTai pev vovs, again of the light and say what that light is by which
peToAapPdvei Se avTOv <pvxrj- rj tovto vvv els voTepov Intellect is illuminated and in which Soul has a par .
Or else let us leave this till afterwards and, as is
d(f>evTes elKOTCvs eKelva rrpoTepov dnoprjaoipev. dpd ye
reasonable, deal first with the following difficulties.
5 TO dyaBov, on eariv dAAo) c^erdv, Ian Kal AeyeTai Is the Good good, and does it have that name,
dyadov, Kal tivi pev dv etjjeTOV tivi dyadov, rrdai Se dv because it is desirable for another, and is it good for
one because it is desirable for one, but because it is
TOVTO Aeyopev etvai to dyadov; rj paprvpiov pev av ns this for all we say that it is the Good? Now one might
TOVTO voiTjaaiTO TOV eivai dyadov. Set Se ye (jrvaiv avTo offer this as evidence that the Good exists, but surely
TO e<f>eT6v eyeiv TOiavTrjv, cos ScKalcos dv Tvyelv Trjs the object of desire itself must have such a nature
that it is right to call it this. And do its desirers
10 TOiavTtjs TTpoarjyoplas. Kal troTepa tco ti Seyeadai Ta
desire it because they receive soniething, or beimuse
ecjriepeva ecfrleTai rj tco xalpeiv avrco; Kal el pev ti they delight in it? And if they receive something,
SeyeTai, tC tovto; el Se tco pfatpctv, Sid ti tovtco, dAAd what is it? But if it is because of delight, why do they
prf dAAcp Tivi; ev cL Sij Kal rrdTepa tco olKelco to dyadov rj delight in this and not in something else. And in this
the question is certainly involved whether the good
dAAcp Tivi. Kal Sr; Kal rrorepa to dyadov oAcos dXAov
is so by kinship or by something else. And, indeed,
the further question whether the good is altogether
* The phrase is taken from Phaedrus 245C9. But Plato the good of another, or whether the good is good for
uses it there of soul as "source and principle” of movement
to all else. 2 Ch. 31 onwards.
i6o i6i
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
15 eariv,■q Kai axnw to dyadov dyaOov eariv t) o dv
dyaOov, avrw fiev ovk eariv, dX\ov 8e ef dvdyKqs; Kai
rivi (jjvaei dyaOov eariv; eari 8e ns (l>vais, fj fiiySev
ayadov eari; KaKetvo 8e ovk d^ereov, o ray dv ns
8vax^pa.vriKOS dvrj'p eivoi, cos “vpiets, <o oSroi, rl 8ri
drroaepivvveTe rois 6v6p,aaiv^ dvco Kai Kano ^corjv
20 ayaOov Xeyovres Kai vovv dyaffov Aeyovres Kai ri
eneKeiva rovnov; ri yap dv Kai 6 vovs dyaOov eirj; rj ri 6
vocdv rd ei8q avrd dyadov eyoi avrd eKaarov decopiov;
rjTTarrjpievos piev yap dv Kai qdopievos evi rovrois rdya
dv dyadov Xeyoi Kai rriv t,a>qv rj8elav ovaav ards 8’ ev
25 Toi dvqdovos etvai 8id ri dv (f>rjaeiev dyadd; rj rd avrov
eivai; ri yap dv e/c rov eivai KapTTwaairo; rj ri dv
8ia<f>epoi ev rip eivai rj dXcos fcrj eivai, el pn/j ns rrjv rrpos
avrov tfnXiav airiav rovrcov deiro; ware 8id ravrqv rrjv
drrdrqv ^vaiKrjv odaav Kai rdv ifro^ov rqs <f>dopds rqv
30 rwv dyadwv vopiiadrjvai deaiv. ”
25. '0 p,ev ovv TlXdrwv ri8ovrjv rw reXei piiyvvs Kai
ro dyadov ovy drrXovv ov8e ev vw povco ndepievos, cos ev
rw ^iXqPcp yeyparrrai, rdya dv aladdpievos ravrrjs rrjs
arropias ovre -navrarraaiv erri ro qdv rWeadai to dyadov
1 E,2mg. Enn.
' Plotinus is rather more sympathetic than might be
expected to this down-to-earth and anti-metaphysical
person. He gives him here a good, forcible statement of his
case, and answers him seriously and carefully in ch. 29,
where he indicates (lines 21-22) that he and this awkward
162
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
itself; or is whatever may be good not good for itself,
but necessarily the good of another? And for what
nature is it good? And is there any nature for which
nothing is good? And we must not leave out the
following remarks which some cantankerous person
might make,* "Really, you people, why do you use
this pompous language up and down and all around,
saying life is good, and intellect is good, and some­
thing transcending these? For why should intellect
be good? Or what good could the thinker of the
Forms have as he contemplates each of them? If he
takes a deceptive pleasure in them he might perhaps
say intellect was good, and life, because it was
pleasant; but if he is stuck in a pleasureless state,
why should he say they are good? Is it because he
exists? What then would he gain from existence?
What difference would there be in existing or altog­
ether not existing, unless one makes affection for
oneself the reason for all this? In that case it would
be this natural deception and the fear of dissolution
which would account for the acceptance of the
supposition of goods.”
25. Plato, then, who mixes pleasure into the end-
object and does not posit the good as simple or in
intellect alone, as it is written in the Philebus,^
perhaps because he was aware of this difficulty was
not inclined to place the good altogether in the
pleasant—and in this he was right—nor did he think
character have at least this in common, that the good of
Intellect is not enough for them by itself.
“ The passages in Plato’s Philebus which Plotinus is
discussing in this chapter (21D-22A and 61B-D) are
important, in his understanding of them, for his thought
about Intellect and the Good.
163
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
6 eTpaTTSTO, 6p8u)s ttoiwv, ovre tov vovv dv^Sovov dvra
(pyOr/ Seiv deadai dya$6v to kivovv ev avTW ovy 6pd)v.
rdya Se ov TavTTj, dAA’ otl •q^iov to dyadov eyov (fivaiv
€v avT(p ToiavTTjv Selv ef dvdyK-qs yo-pTOV eivai, to Te
i<f>eTdv TO) TvyydvovTL Kai TvydvTi navTcos ex®**'
10 yaipeiv, coare, <L p-rj to yalpeiv, dyadov ptjSe etvai, Kal
waTe, el to x“*peii' toi e<f>iepevep, tw TTpdiTW pr} eivar
woTe prjSe to dyadov. Kal ovk o-tottov tovto' avTOS yap
ov TO npwTOv dyadov e^ijTei, to Se ■qpcdv, Kal oXcos
eTepov ovTOS eoTiv avTO) eTepov ov avTOV, eXXenrovs
15 OVTOS avTOV Kal lacos avvdeTOV odev Kal to e p t] p ov
Kal pov ov prjSev eyeiv dyadov, dAA' eivai eTepais Kal
pei^ovcus. e<f)eT6v pev ovv Set to dyadov eivai, ov pevroi
Tip e<f>eTdv eivai dyadov ylyveadai, dXXd tw dyadov
eivai ecfieTov ylyveadai. dp’ oSv tw pev eayaTW ev Tois
oSai TO TTpd avTov, Kai del rj dvd^aais to VTrep eKaoTOv
20 SiSovaa dyadov eivai tw vv’ avro, el ■q dvd^aais ovk
e^loTaiTO TOV dvdXoyov, dXXd eirl peil^ov del irpoywpol;
Tore Se aTqaeTai en’ eayaTcp, ped’ o ovSev eoTiv els to
avw Xa^eiv, Kal tovto to TTpwTOV Kal to ovtws Kal to
pdXioTa Kvplws eoTai, Kal aiTiov Se Kal toIs dXXois.
25 Tfj pev yap vXrj to eiSos—-el yap aiadrjaiv Ad/3ot,
daTrdaaiT dv—tw Se awpaTi ipvyq—Kal yap ovS’ dv
* The phrase is again taken from the Philebus (63B7-8)
but can only be applied to the Good by a very strained
exegesis.
^ Plotinus speaks, in the treatises in which he deals with
matter, of matter desiring form or soul or good (I. 8. 14.
35-36; III. 6.11. 32,14. 9-10). But in I. 8 and HI. 6 he goes to
considerable trouble to show that matter can never really
164
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
that he ought to posit intellect which was without
pleasure as the good, since he did not see what there
was in it to move [us to desire it]. But perhaps it was
not for this reason, but because he thought it right
that the good, since it had such a nature in itself,
should of necessity be delightful, and that the de­
sired object must altogether hold delight for the one
who is attaining or has attained it, so that who does
not have delight does not have good, and so that, if
delight belongs to the desirer, it does not belong to
the First; so that neither does the good. And this is
not unreasonable; for Plato himself [here] was not
looking for the First Good, but for our good, and
since this is altogether different, there is for him a
Good other than it; for it is deficient, and perhaps
composite; this is why he says that the "solitary and
alone” * has nothing good in it, but is [the Good] in
another, greater way. The Good, therefore, must be
desirable, but must not become good by being desir­
able, but become desirable by being good. Is it then
so that the good for the last and lowest among beings
is what lies before it, and there is a continuous
ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for
what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent
never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on
for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at
the ultimate, at that after which one cannot grasp
anything higher, and this is the First and the really
good and the Good in the strictest sense, and the
cause also of the other goods. For form is the good
for matter—for if it were conscious, it would wel­
come it 2—and soul for body—^for without it it could
receive form or be changed by^ it from its own evil nature.
Cp. ch. 28 lines 1-12 and n. 1, p. 173.
i6s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

enj ovS’ dv ffoi^oiTO—Se dper-q. ■qSrj Se Kal not exist or be preserved—and virtue for soul. And
avcDTepu) vovs Kal eirl tovtco rjv h-q ^apiev rrpcoTqv now, still higher, there is intellect, and above this
what we call the first nature. And certainly each of
(fivoLv. Kal Srj Kal rovrcuv eKaarov rroieiv ri els rd c5v these effects something for those of which they are
dyadd eari, rd p,€v rd^iv Kal KdapLOV, rd 8’ fjh’q lyCO-qv, the good, some arrangement and ordered beauty,
30 TO Se (jipovelv Kal eS, tw Se vw to dyadov, o <f>ap,ev
some already life, and some thought and living well,
but for Intellect the Good effects something, the
Kal els TovTO rjKeiv, Kal on evepyeta e^ avrov, Kal on Good which we maintain comes also to this, both
Kal vvv SlScoal (^ti) * (ftois Xey6p,evov o 817 ri -nor eariv, because its active actuality comes from it and
because now also it gives something called light:
varepov.
what this is, we shall see later.*
26. Kai 817 TO Tre^oKOj aladdveadai irap’ avrov, el 26. And surely what has by itself the natural
rjKei avrcp to dyadov, yivcvoKeiv Kal Xeyeiv exeiv. ri power to perceive, if the Good comes to it, has the
power to know and to say that it has it. Well then,
odv, el rjTrdrqrai;_Set dpa nvd etvai 6p,oiaiaiv, Kad’ rjv
what if it is deceived? There must then be some
TiTTdrqrai. el Se rovro, eKeivo dyadov dv avrcp eiq \d(j>’ likeness [to the Good] which accounts for the decep­
5 08 ■qvdrrjrai]-^ enel Kai, drav eKeivo qKrj, dcftiararai tion. But if there is this, that would be the good for
it; since also, when that [Good] comes, it [eaves that
d<f>’ 08 rjTTarrjrai. Kal q e(f>eais S’ avrov eKaarov Kal rj which was the origin of its deception. And each and
chSls p-apTvpel, on eon n dyadov eKaarov. rocs p.ev ydp every thing’s desire and birth-pangs of longing bear
witness that there is some good for each. For to
difivxocs Trap’ dXXov rov dyadov avrols rj Soais, rep Se
things without soul the gift of the good comes from
tjtvxrjv eyovn rj e<j)eais rqv Sicv^iv epyd^erai, eva-rrep Kal another, but for that which has soul it is the desire
10 Tols veKpols yeyevqpLevoLS acopcaai rrapd rdiv ^evvreov 17
which brings about the pursuit, jugt as when bodies
have become corpses they are tended and prepared
empceXeia Kal rj K-qSevais, rols Se ^cvai nap’ avrd>v rj
for burial by the living, but the living take thought
npovoia. on S’ ervye, niarovrai, drav ^eXnov n for themselves. But the attainment is confirmed
yivqrai Kal djxeravoqrov ^ Kal nenXqpdiadac avrcp
when a thing becomes better and has no regrets, and
fulfilment comes to it and it remains with the Good
yiyvqrac Kal en eKeivov pcevrj Kal /L117 aAAo Crjrfj. Sio Kal and does not seek something else. This is why plea­
16 rj ■qSovrj ovK avrapKes" ov ydp dyana ravrdv ov ydp, d sure is not self-sufficient; for one is not satisfied with
the same thing; for what pleasure is satisfied with
' Igal.
^ del. Harder. 1 Ch. 32 ff.
166 167
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

Ti rjSovri ^ ndXiv, ravrov dXXo yap dei ro e<j)’ <J rjSerai. again is not the same; for that which gives one
pleasure is always something else. Certainly the
Set Srj TO dyaOov, o atpelraC rts, etvai ov to irdOos to eiri good which one chooses must be something which is
T(p TvyovTi- odev Kai k€v6s fievei. 6 tovto dyadov not the feeling one has when one attains it; that is
why the one who takes this for good remains empty,
vop.(^a)v, TO -irddos p.6vov eyonv, o eayev dv tis dno tov because he only has the feeling which one might get
20 dyadov. Sio ovk dv dvdaxoiTO tis tov nddovs, €<f>’ <L ovk from the good. This is the reason why one would not
find acceptable the feeling produced by something
eyoiv, otov evl tw naiSt, on ndpeoTiv, rjSeadai ov one has not got; for instance, one would not delight
irapovTOS' ovSe ye otp-ai ots ev Td> nXifpovadat in a boy because he was present when he was not
present; nor do I think that those who find the good
ao)p.aTiKci)s TO dyadov rjBeadai cos eadiovTa p.rj in bodily satisfaction would feel pleasure as if they
eadiovTa, cos dcf>pohiaiois W ovvovTa ^ were eating when they were not eating or as if they
were enjoying sex when they were not with the one
e^ovXeTO, Tj oXcos pcq Spoivra. they wanted to be with, or in general when they were
27. ‘AXXd TLvos yevop.evov eKdoTcp to avTco not active.
27. But what is it by the coming of which to each
npocr^Kov eyei; rj eiSovs tivos cl>iqaop,ev Kal yap Tjj vXri one it has what is appropriate to it? We shall main­
eiSos, Kal cfivyr) rj dpeTTj etSos. dXXd to eiSos tovto dpd tain that it is a form; for form is the appropriate good
for matter, and virtue is form for soul. But is this
ye Tcp OLKeiov eivai dyadov eoTiv eKeiv'cp, Kal rj exeats form good for that which has it hy being akin to it,
5 TTpos TO ocKelov; rj ov' Kal yap to ojioiov oiKelov, kov and is its desire directed to what is akin'? No: for
what is like it is akin, and if it wishes the like and
edeXrj avTO Kal '’’V djioccp, omrco to dyadov eyei.
delights in it, it does not yet have the good. But
dXX’ OVK otKeiov cjy’qaojiev dyadov eiTTOVTes etvai; rj when we say that something is good, are we not
cfiaTeov TOV oiKeiov tco KpeiTTOvi Kpiveiv Set Kal Tcp
going to maintain that it is akin? Rather we must
maintain that one must judge the good by what is
^eXTiovi avTov, repos o Svvdjtei fonv. ov yap Svvdjiei higher than what is akin and by what is better than
10 TTpos d eoTiv, evSees eoTiv avTOV, oS Se evSees eon
the thing itself, to which it is potentially directed.
For, since it is potentially directed to what it is, it is
^ Beutler: rjSov^v Enn. in need of it, and what it is in need of as something
’ This is the doctrine of oiKeicoais, fundamental in Stoic
ethics. See SVFl 197 and III 178 £f. Plotinus’ criticism of it the origin of love (the story of the bisected spherical proto­
develops Diotima’s rejection of Aristophanes’ account of humans) in Plato Symposium 205D10-206A1.
169
168

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
KpeiTTOVos ovTos, dyaOov eariv avTW e/cetvo. rj Se vXrj
TrdvTOiv evSeecrraTOV Kai to eayaTOP elSos irpoaexes
avrfj- per’ avTrjv yap vpos to dvw. ei Se 8rj Kai avro
avToi dyadov eoTi, ttoAv p.aXXov dv etr) dyadov avTW rj
15 TeXeioTtjs avTOv Kai to elSos Kai to KpeiTTOV avTOV, Kai
TTj eavTOV <l>va€i ov toiovtov Kai ad tw, oti Kai aiiTO
dyaOov voiei. dXXd Sid tL avTip dyadov earai; dp oti
oiKeioTaTOv avTw; rj oil- dXX’ oti ioTi tis dyadov polpa.
Sid Kai pidXXov oiKeicDais rrpds avTOVS toIs elXiKpiveai
20 Kai Tots pdXXov dyadots. aTorrov Sij to ^rjTeiv, Sid ti
dyadov ov avTip dyadov eoTiv, warrep Seov rrpos avTO
k^loTaadai Trjs avTOV (jrvaecos Kai pri dyarrdv iavTo.ios
dyadov. dXX’ erri tov drrXov tovto OKerrTeov, ei, orrov
pirjSapidis evi dXXo, to Se dXXo, eariv ij oiKeiwais rrpds
avTO, (.Kai ei avTO^ dyadov eoTiv eavTO). vvv Se, ei
25 TavTa dpdcbs XeyeTai, Kai erravd^aais eyei to dyadov
ev (frvaei tivi Keipevov, Kai ovy t} eifreais rroiei to dyadov,
dXX’ rj eifieais, oti dyadov, Kai yiveTai ti tois KTwpevois
Kai TO erri TTj KT-qaei ijSu. dXXd to pev "ei prj erroiTO
■qSovrj,^ aipeTeov to dyadov” Kai avTd ^rjTrjTeov.
28. To S’ eK TOV Xdyov avp^aivov vvv orrTeov. ei yap
rravTaxov to rrapayivopevov ws dyaddv eiSos, Kai Trj
vXt) Se eiSos ev to dyaddv, rroTepov TideXrjaev dv ij vXrj,
eirrep '^v avTfj to deXeiv, eiSos pdvov yeveadai; aXX ei
5 toOto, drroXeadai deXiqaei' to 8’ dyadov avTOi rrdv
'USK
^ Steinhart: emieiro riSovfj Enn.
170
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
higher than it, that is its good. And matter is the
neediest of all, and the last and lowest form is next to
it; for it comes after it in the upward direction. But
even if a thing is a good for itself, its perfection and
its form and what is higher th^n it would much more
be a good, both because it is such by its own nature
and again because it makes the thing good. But why
will anything be a good for itself? Is it because it is
the most akin to itself? No, but because it is a part of
good. This is why those who are pure and more good
have a closer kinship with themselves. It is therefore
absurd to enquire why a thing which is good is good
for itself, as if it would have as regards itself to get
out of its own nature and not be content with itself
as good. But when something is simple we must
consider this question, whether, where in no way
there is in it one part and another, there is kinship to
itself, and if it is a good for itself. But now, if these
conclusions are correct, the movement upwards
grasps the good present in a particular nature, and it
is not the desire which makes the good but there is
desire because there is a good, and something comes
to those who possess it, and also pleasure in the
possession. But we must also enquire into the saying
"even if pleasure did not follow, the good should be
chosen.”'
28. Now we must look at what follows from the
discussion. For if everywhere what comes as a good
is form, and one single form is the good for matter,
would matter wish, if it had the power of wishing, to
become only form? But if so, it will wish to perish;
* A paraphrase of Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics K 3.
1174a6-8. Plotinus discusses this in ch. 29.
171
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

^r)T€L. aXX’ laws ovx vXrj etvai ^rjTTqaei, aXXa fivai, but everything seeks what will he good for itself. But
perhaps it will not seek to be matter, but to be, and in
TOVTO S’ exovaa dipeivai avrrjs deX-qaei Trjv KaK-qv. dXXd possessing this to let its evil go. But how can evil
TO KOKOV TTws etf)€aiv cfet Tov dyadov; q ovSe rqv vXr/v have a desire of the good? But we did not assume
that matter was desirous, but our argument framed a
€v e^eaei iriOefjieOa, dXX’ virodeaiv eTTOielro o Xoyos hypothesis by giving it perception—if it was possible
10 aLadrjaiv Sovs, eiTrep oidv re tJv Sovvai vXrjv rrjpovaiv to give it and still keep it as matter; but we assumed
that when form came upon it, like a good dream,
dXXd TOV etSovs e-rreXSovTos, wanep dveipoTOS dyadov, it came to be in a fairer order. If then matter is
€v KoXXiovi rdfei yeyovevai. el p.ev odv to kokov rj vXq, [absolute] evil, enough has been said^; but if it is
something else, badness for instance, if its essential
etprjTai- ei S’ dXXo ti, otov kokCo, el atadqaiv AdjSoi to
being acquired perception, will what is akin to it on
eivai avTTjs, dp’ ovv ert to oiKeiov npos to KpeiTTOv to the higher side still be the good? Now it was not [on
15 dyadov eoTai; rj ovy KOKia fjv rj atpovpievr], dXXd to
this supposition] badness which chose, but what had
become bad. But if its being and evil were one and
KOKOVfievov. el Se tovtov to eivai Kal to kokov, rribs the same, how can this choose the good? Well then, if
TOVTO TO dyadov alpiqaeTai; oAA’ dpd ye, el atadqaiv evil acquired a perception of itself, would it be
satisfied with itself? And how could what is not good
avTov Xd^oi TO KOKOV, dyarrqaeL avTo; Kal rrws be satisfactory? For we certainly did not identify the
dyaTTqTov to piri dyadov^ eoTai; ov yap Srj tw olKelw good with the kindred. And so much for that. But if
form is everywhere the good, and the higher the
20 edepieda to dyadov. Kal tovto p,ev TavTrj. dXX’ el etSos ascent goes the more there is form—^for soul is more
TO dyadov rravTOXov Kal p.dXXov errava^alvovai pidXXov form than the form of body, and one part of soul
more form, and another very much more, and In­
eiSos—/xdXXov yap i/ivyri elSos rj awfxoTOS etSos, Kal
tellect more than soul—^the Good would come to that
ijivxqs TO piev fxdXXov, to S’ empAXXov, koI vovs which was opposed to matter, and, we may say,
tlivxrjs—TO dyadov dv npoaxwpoi tw Trjs vXrjs^ evavTiw which was purified from it and had put it away,
according to the capacity of each, and most to that
25 Kal otov Kadaipopievcp Kal drTOTidepLevw koto SvvapLiv which put away everything belonging to matter.
fxev eKaoTW, to Se fxdXiaTa rrdv 6 ti vXrjs drroTidepievw. And certainly the nature of the Good, which has
escaped from all matter, or rather never in any way
Kal Srj Kal rj tov dyadov (l)vaLS rrdaav vXrjv <f>vyovaa, * This is Plotinus’ own view; this passage is his
amplification and correction of a possibly misleading
^ Igal: dyairqrov Enn. general remark in ch. 25, lines 24-5: see n. 2 there, p. 165.
2 ^3mg ( = Ficinus): ijivxvs Enn.
173
172
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FOKMS AND THE GOOD

IxdXXov S( ovhaiJifi ovSaficl)s TrXijalov yevofievT), dva- at all come near it, will have escaped up into the
formless nature from which the first form comes. But
TTe(f>eiyyvla dv etij eis Trjv dveiSeov <l)vaiv, d^' ■^s to
we shall speak of this later.^ -i j
TTpdiTOV eiSos. dXXd irepi tovtov varepov. 29. But if pleasure does not follow upon the Good,
but there comes to be something before pleasure
29. ’AAA’ ei p-Tj enoiTO -qBavri ro) dyaOcp, ylvono Se through which there is also pleasure, why is it not to
npo Tijr ijSovijs Ti, Si o Kai t) -qSovrj, Sid tI ovk be welcomed? Now in saying "to be welcomed we
have already said "pleasure”. But suppose that it
danaarov; ■q eiirovres doTraOTOv qSovqv TjSq eiTTopfV. exists but, though it exists, there is a possibility of
dXX’ €1 vndp^ei pev, vnap^avros Se Swardv pij its not being welcome. But if this is so, when the
Good is present, what has it, though it has a percep­
5 darraaTOV elvai; dXX’ et tovto, napovros tov dyaOov tion of it, will not know it is there. Or what is to
aiaOqaiv eyov ro ex°*' yvcoaerai, on. rj rC KioXvei Kai prevent it from knowing and not being moved in any
other way going beyond the actual possession? This
yiyvwoKeiv Kai pq Kivetadai oAAcos perd to avrd exeiv; would be more likely to happen to a more self-
o pdXXov dv TO) aoo^poveaTipm xmdpxoi Kai pdXXov controlled person, and more likely if he was without
needs. This is why the First has no pleasure, not only
np pq evSeei. Sid ovSd np TTpdoTip, ov povov on
because it is simple but because it is the acquisition
10 dnXovv, dAA’ on q KTqois SeqdivTOS qSeta. dXXd of something needed which is pleasant. But this will
be luminously clear when we have first cleared up all
Kai TOVTi KaTa(j>aves earai rd dXXa oaa Xoiird
the remaining difficulties and repelled that opposing
TTpoavaKaOqpapevois * Kai eKelvov tov dvrlnmov Adyor argument. This argument is that of someone^ who
has a difficulty about what a man with intelligence
diTOJOapevois. ean Se odros oj dTropet, ti dv
would get out of it in the way of gopd, being in no
KapTTcdaaiTO 6 vovv eyajv et? dyadov poipav, ovSev way disconcerted when he hears the^e arguments of
ours because he does not know what they mean, he
nXqTTopevos, orav ravra dKovq, np pq avveaiv avrwv either hears only the words or understands each
16 layeiv, q ovopa dKovcDv q dXXo n eKaarov avraiv thing [spoken of] differently or is looking for soine-
thing perceptible [by the senses] and locating the
VTToXapPdvcov q aladqrov n Cqnhv Kai to dyadov iv
Good in property or something of the sort. One must
Xpqpaaiv q nai toiovtois nOepevos. npos ov XeKreov,
' In chs. 32 and 33.
‘ Harder: irpoa- Enn. 2 This is the objector who states his position forcibly m
2 Theiler. ch. 24: see n. 1, p. 162.
174 175
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
<1)S, orav ravra aTifid^ji, ofxoXoyel Tideadai ti •nap
avTW dyaOov, dnopwv S’ ottjj, riy ivvota rij nap amw
20 ravra e^ap/iOTTei. ov yap eon Xeyeiv pLrj rovro
ndvrrj dneipov Kat dvevvorjrov ovra rovrov. rdya Se Kai
TO vnep vow dno/j-avreverai. eneira Se, et rip dyad<p ij
rip eyyvs rovrov npoa^dXXojv ayvoel, sk toiv
dvriK€ipeva)v els ewoiav tro). ij ovSe KaKov rrjv avoiav
25 drjoerai; Kairoi nds alpelrai voetv Kai vodiv aepLVVverai.
paprvpovai Se Kai ai aioffijaeis eiS'tjaeis etvai deXovaai.
el Sij vovs rifxiov Kai KaXov Kai vovs d npibros pdXiara,
ri dv <f>avraade(rj ns, et ns Svvairo, rov rovrov
yewryTiyv Kai narepa; to Se etvai Kai to ^■fjv anpd^ojv
30 dvnpaprvpel eavrtp Kai rots eavrov nddeai ndaiv. el Se
ns Svayepaivei rd ^ijv, cL Odvaros pep-iKrai, rd roiovro
Svayepaivei, ov rd dXrjOdis l^rjv.
30. ’AAAa ei Set r& dyadip Tiyv lySoviyv pepiyBai Kai
p/rj reXedv ean rd ^Tjv, et ns to Beta Beipro Kai p-dXiara
Tijv TOVTtuv dpxTpv, vvv ISetv e(f>anropevovs rov dyaBov
ndvrcos npoai^Kei. rd pev odv oteaBai rd dyaBov eK re
5 rov vov (1)S vnoKeipevov eK re rov ndBovs r-fjs
yiverai eK rov (f>povetv, ov rd tcAos ovS’ avrd rd dyaBov
rd avvap(l>drepdv ean riBevros, dAAct vovs dv etrj rd
dyaBov, ■qpets Se x^itpovres rip rd dyaBov eyeiv. Kai eirj
176
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
say to him that when he despises these things he
admits that he does posit some good for himself, but,
since he finds it difficult to see how [the Good is
good], he fits these things to his own idea of it. For it
is not possible to say "not this” if one has no
experience or conception of "this”. But perhaps also
he has a prophetic intuition of what is above In­
tellect. But then, if when he applies his mind to the
Good or that which is near it he does not recognise
them, let him come to some idea of them from the
things opposed to them. Or will he not even regard
unintelligence as evil? Yet everyone prefers to be
intelligent and is proud of himself when he uses his
intelligence. And our sense-perceptions bear witness
to this when they want to be knowings. But if
intellect is honourable and beautiful, and above all
the first Intellect, as what would one image, if one
could, this Intellect’s generator and father? But if
[our opponent] despises existence and life, he brings
evidence against himself and all his own experi­
ences. "But if anyone is dissatisfied with life with
which death is mixed, it is this kind of life he is
dissatisfied with, not true life.
30. But whether pleasure must be mixed with the
good and life is not perfect, if someone contemplates
the divine things and above all their principle, is a
question which it is in every way appropriate to keep
in sight now that we are getting into touch with the
Good. Well then, to think that the good consists of
B Intellect as underlying reality and of the experience
of the soul which comes from thinking does not
belong to one who posits the composite of both as the
goal or the Good itself, but Intellect would be the
Good, and ourselves in the enjoyment of possessing
177

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
dv avTT) Tiy So^a nept dyadov. eripa Se eHrj dv rrapd
10 ravTtjv, p,l^aaa toi v<h rriv 'pSov'qv ws ev ri dp.<f>olv
VTTOK€ipL€vov TOVTO TiOerai etvai, tv’ rip,€ts rov toiovtov
vovv KTrjadpi,€voi rj Kat iSovres to dyadov eycopLev to yap
e prj p,ov Kat p,6v ov ovTe yeveadai ovTe atpeTov
etvai SvvaTov cos dyadov. ttcos dv oSv puydeCr) vovs rjSovfj
IB els pilav avvTeXeiav (f>vaecos; oti piev oSv Trjv acopiaTOS
riSovriv ovK dv tis oirjdelr] vw SwaTr/v etvai p.lyvvadai,
TtavTi drjTTOV 8-^Xov dXX’ ovS’ oaai
dXoyoi yevoiVTO. dXX’ erreiSr] Trdarj evepyeia /cat
Siadeaei Se /cat ^cofj eireadai Set Kat avv'elvai otdv ti^
20 enideov, Kado rij p.h' eoTi /card <l>vaiv iovarj to
epiTTohlt^ov Kai ti tov evavTiov napapiepiiypievoy, o ovk
ea TTjv ^o}Tjv eavTTjs etvai, Trj Se k a d a p 6 v Kat
elXiKpives TO evepyrjpia Kat ij ^o/ij ev Siadeaei
<f>aiSpa, TTjv ToiavTTjv tov vov KaTaoTaaiv dapieviaTTjv
25 Kat atpeTWTdTTjv etvai Tidepievoi ^Sovfj pief^iydai
Xeyovaiv dnopla ot/cetas TTpoarjyopCas, ota ttoiovoi Kat
Ta dXXa ovopiaTa nap’ rjp.iv dyanwpeva peTa<f>epovTes,
TO "pedvadets ent TOV.veKTapos’’ Kat “ent SaiTa Kat
eoTiaaiv ” Kat to “petSrjae Se naTTjp’ oi noirjTat Kat
* Sleeman: to Enn.
' Again Philebus 63B7-8, but here in a more appropriate
context (see ch. 25, n. 1, p. 164). In this chapter Plotinus is
concerned to explain and justify Plato’s doctrine in the
Philebus that the good life must be a mixture of pleasure
and intelligence, taking account also of Aristotle’s
discussion of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics K 1-5.
1172a-1176a.
178
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
the Good. And this would be one opinion about good.
But there would be another contrary to this, which
mixes pleasure with intellect as one thing made from
both and posits this as the underlying reality, so that
we, by possessing, or even seeing, this kind of in­
tellect may possess the Good; for what is isolated
and single” * could not come to be or to be chosen as
the Good. How then could intellect be mixed with
pleasure into one composite perfection of nature?
Well, it is, I suppose, clear to everyone that nobody
would think that bodily pleasure could possibly be
mixed with intellect; but neither could all the ir­
rational joys of the soul which may occur. But, since
a sort of something extra and external must follow
upon and accompany every activity and disposition
and life, in so far as to one of them going its natural
way there will be a hindrance and something of its
opposite mixed into it, which does not allow the life
to be independent, but another will have its activity
"pure and unmixed” ^ and its life will be a state of
luminous clarity, the philosophers,® assuming that
such a state of intellect is most pleasing and accep­
table, say that it is mixed with pleasure because they
cannot find an appropriate wa^ of speaking about it;
this is what the other words wliich we are fond of do
metaphorically, like "drunk with the nectar ■* and
"to feast and entertainment”,® and what the poets
say, "the father smiled”,® and thousands and
2 Philebus 52D6-7.
® Plato is meant: see previous note.
* Plato Symposium 203B5 (Poros in the garden of Zeus).
® Plato Phaedrus 247A8 (with iarlaaiv for Oolvrjv).
® A formula-phrase from Homer (not very appropriate in
this context): Iliad 5. 426; 15. 47.
179
! I
(■ !
{ '
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
30 dXXa TOiavra /jivpia. eari yap Kai to aap,evov ovtws
€Ket Kai TO dyaTnjTOTaTOV koi to TTodeivoTOTOV, ov
1 yiv6p.evov oiiS’ ev Kivtqaei, aiTiov Se to emxpwaav aura
1!
Kai STTiXapiifiav Kai ^aihpwav. 8io Kai aXr]deiav tu)
pi(yp,aTi TTpoaTidrjai Kai to pieTprjaov vpo avTOV ttouI
Kai Tj avp.p.€Tpia Kai to KaXXos enl tw p,Cyp.aTi eKeiOev
35 (jyrjoiv els to KaXov eXriXvOev. woTe koto, tovto dv rip.e~is
1
Kai ev TOVTO) piolpas' to Se 6vto)S opeKTOV ■qp.lv dXXoJS
1
p.€v ripiels avTols els to ^IXtiotov eavTwv dvdyovTes
J eavTovs, TOVTO Srj to avp.p,eTpov Kai KaXov Kai eiSos
4 selves to the best of themselves; this is the well-
davvdeTOV' Kai ^cv-qv evapyrj Kai voepdv Kai KaX-qv.
i 31. ’AAA’ eTTel eKaXXvvdr) to. Trdvra eKelvo) to) vpo
TOVTCov Kai (t>d)S eaye, vovs p.ev to T-qs evepyelas Trjs
voepds <l)eyyoSt <J) T'qv ij>vaiv e^eXapApe^ ipvyq 8e 8vvaptv
eo^ev els to l^qv ^ojTjs vXeiovos eis avryv eXBovoqS'
5 TjpQq pev ovv eKel Kai epeivev dyav-qaas to vepl eKelvov
eivai- evioTpa<f>elaa 8e Kai ipvxq q 8vvqdeioa, dis eyvoj
Kai elSev, rjadq re TTj Bea Kai oaov oia re ijv i8elv
eievXdyq. ei8e 8e oiov vXqyelaa Kai ev avTq exovad ti
avTov avvqaBeTO Kai 8iaTeBetaa eyeveTO ev vdBtp,
10 d)Ovep ol ev Tip el8d)X(p
tov epaopiov Kivovpevot eis to
avTO I8elv eBeXeiv to epojpevov. wavep Se evTavBa
axqpoiTl^ovTai els opoiOTqTa tw epaoTW oi dv epwai,
Kai TO. awpaTa evvpeveoTepa Kai rds i/ivyds ayovTes eis
opoioTqTaj ws pq XeiveoBai KaTa 8vvapiv BeXeiv ttj
^ H—S^: ovyffeTov Enn.
’ In Philebus 64B-65A.
i8o
)
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
thousands of others. For there in the realm of In­
tellect is true delight and the greatest satisfaction,
the most loved and longed for, which is not in
process of becoming nor in movement, but its cause
is what colours and shineg upon and glorifies the
intelligibles. This is why Plato adds truth to the
mixture, and puts what measures it before it, and
says that from there the good proportion and beauty
in the mixture come to the beautiful.^ So we should
be according to this and have our parts in it; but in
another way what is really worth aspiring to for us
is our selves, bringing themselves back for them­
proportioned and beautiful and the form which is
not part of the composite and the clear, intelligent,
beautiful life. r i u
31. But since all things were made beautitul by
that which was before them and held its light.
Intellect held the resplendence of its intelligent
activity, with which it illuminated its nature, and
soul held power to live, since a greater life came to
it. So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed
there, happy in being around that Good; but the soul
also which was able turned to it and, when it knew
and saw, rejoiced in the visibn and, in so far a.s it was
able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw, as if in utter
amazement, and, since it held something of it in
itself it had an intimate awareness of it and came
into a state of longing, like those who are moved by
an image of the loved one to wish to see that same
beloved. And just as here below those who are in
love shape themselves to the likeness of the beloved,
and make their bodies handsomer and bring their
souls into likeness, since as far as they can they do
i8i
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
15 rov epcoftevov aw^poawrj re Kai aperfj rij aXXr]—rj
aTTO^XrjToi av (Uv toIs epwpAvois rots roidvrois—Kal
oStol elaiv oi aweivai 8vvdp.evoi, tovtov tov rpovov Kal
ijivx^ ipa p.€v SKeivov vit‘ avroO dpx'rjs els to epdv
Kivqdfiaa. Kal rj -npoxeipov l^ovoa rov epcora vtto-
20 p,vr}aiv ov nepipLevei KaXcdv rwv TfjSe, exovaa 8e
e/c twv
TOV epcora, Kal av dyvofj oti exei, ^rjTei del Kal irpos
€Kelvo <f>epea9ai OeXovaa imepoijiiav rwv rijde exec, Kal
l8ovaa rd ev rwde rip navrl KaXd vnoiplav exei -npos
avrd, on ev aap^l Kal awpMoiv opa avrd ovra Kal
pLiaivopLeva rfj napovarj oiK'qaei Kal rocs p,eyedeoi
25 8ieLXTjp,p,eva Kal ovk avrd rd KaXd ovra- p-rj yap dv
ToXprjaai eKetva old eanv els ^dp^opov atupdrcov
epPijvai Kal pondvai eaurd Kal d<f)avlaai. drav 8e Kal
■napappeovra t8rj, navreXcds yiyvcooKei, on dXXodev
exei, o ■^v avTots evideov. eir eKei ^eperai deivrj
30 dvevpecv o^Trep epd ovaa, Kal ovk dv vplv eXelv
diToardoa, el prj itov ns avrijs Kal tov epwTa e^eXoi.
ev6a Sij el8e pev KaXd irdvTa Kal dXrjOrj ovra, Kal
eneppwadrj nXeov Tfjs tov ovtos ^oirjs TrXrjpwdeiaa, Kal
ovTcvs dv Kal avTTj yevopevt] Kal avveaiv ovtojs Xa^ovaa
eyyvs oSaa aladdveTai od vdXai ^rjTel.
* Plotinus is thinking of the philosophic lovers in
Phaedrus 250-257. But here, as in 1.6. 9, it is himself, not as
in Plato the beloved, whom the lover shapes to the divine
likeness: this of' course suits the present context
considerably better.
182
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
not want to fall short of the integrity and all the
other excellence of the loved one—if they did they
would be rejected by loved ones like these—and
these are the lovers who are able to have inter­
coursein this way the soul also loves that Good
moved by it to love from the beginning. And the soul
which has its love ready to hand does not wait for a
reminder from the beauties here, but because it has
its love, even if it does not know that it has it, it is
always searching and in its wish to be borne away to
that Good has a contempt for the things here, and
when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts
them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh
and polluted by their present dwelling and disin­
tegrated by magnitudes and are not the true beauti­
ful things themselves; for those, being as they are,
would never bring themselves to enter the mud ot
bodies and dirty themselves and disappear. But
when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it
already knows completely that they have the light
which plays on them from elsewhere. And then it is
borne away there, skilled in finding what it loves,
and not leaving off till it catches it, unless someone
were to take even its love away. There certainly it
sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains
greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real
being, and has become truly real itself also, and has
true awareness, and it perceives that it is near to
what it has long been seeking.
2 Here as in V. 5. 12, the unperceived presence and
unconscious love of the Good are prior to the conscious
recollection of the beauty of the World of Forms aroused by
the beauties here.
183
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

32. Iloi) oSv d TTOiijcjas to tooovtov koWos koi rrjv 32. Where then is he who made the beauty which
is so great and the life which is so great, he who is
ToaavTTjv ^co'qv nai yewiqaas ovaiav; opas to in’ avTots
the generator of substance? You see the beauty
dnaai noiKiXois oSaiv eiSeai KaXXos. KaXov p,ev diSc which rests upon the very Forms, all of them richly
fieveiv dAA’ iv KaXw ovTa del ^Xeneiv, odev Tavra Kai varied. It is beautiful to abide here; but when one is
in beauty one must look to-see whence these Fonns
5 o6ev KoXd. del d’ avTO eivai tovtojv /iiySe ev tI yap
come and whence they derive their beauty. But this
avTU)v eoTai p.epos re eoTai. ov toivvv odSe TOiavT-q itself must not be any one of them; for then it will be
p.op(l>ri ovde tis dvvapus ovd’ ad ndaai at yeyevrip,evai one of them and will be a part. Nor, then, can it be a
shape of any kind or an individual power, nor again
Kai ovaai evTavBa, dXXd del vnep ndaas elvai dwdpeis all those which have come to be and exist here
Kai vnep ndaas px)p<f)ds. dpxQ de to dveideov, ov to above,' but it must be above all powers and above all
10 p,op<j)rjs deopLevov, dXX’ dtf> od ndaa P'Op<l)ri voepd. to shapes. The principle is the formless, not that which
needs form, but that from which every intelligent
yap yevopievov, etnep eyiveTO, edei yeveaOai ti Kai form comes. For what came to be, if it did come to be,
fjLOp<pT]v loiav €ax€V' o de firfocis ^Troirjoc, \ti/ tis av came to be something and had its own particular
noiTjaeiev; ovdev odv tovto toiv ovtwv Kai ndvTa' ovdev shape; but who could have made what no one made
anything? Therefore it is none of these things and all
p,ev, OTi voTepa to. ovTa, ndvTa de, oti e^ avTov. ndvTa of them: none of them because the real beings are
15 de noielv dvvdpievov ti dv pLeyedos V d.neipos dv later, but all of them because they come from it. But
eh), aXXC el dneipos, pieyedos dv eyoi ovdev. Kai yap what size could that have which has the power to
make all? Now he would be unbounded, but if un­
pceyeBos ev toIs voTdTois' Kai del, el Kai tovto notijaei, bounded he would have no size. For there is size, in
avTov pLrj ovalas p,eya ov noaov exoi d’ the last and lowest things; and, even if he makes size,
dv Kai dXXo TL pLeT avTOV to peyeOos. to de peya avTov
he himself must not have it. And the greatness of
substance is not quantitative; but something else
20 TO prjdev avTov etvai dvvaTtoTepov napiaovadal Te posterior to him might also have size. But his great­
prjdev dvvaadar tIvi yap t&v avTov els “aov dv ti eXffoi ness is that nothing can be more powerful than him
pyjdev TavTov eyov; to Te els del Kai els ndvTa ov peTpov
and nothing can be compared with him; for to what
that belongs to him could anything come to equality
' <Ti> ns coniecimus: n's Enn. which has nothing the same? And being for ever and

' Plotinus normally uses exet (there) for the World of passage he is speaking as one who is already in the World
Forms and hravda (here) for the material world. But in this of Forms and seeking to go beyond it.
184 i8s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
avTW Si'Swaiv ovS’ aS dfierpiav ttws yap dv rd aXXa
p.€rprjO€i€v; ov tolvvv atJ ovSe axrjp,a. Kat p^'^v, otov av
25 TToOfivov dvTOS /iTjTe apfij/xa /iiyre pop<jyrp/ eyoi? Xapelv,
TTodfivoraTOv Kat epaap,i<x)TaTOV dv etrj, Kal^o epws dv
dpi€Tpos eirj. ov yap wpiarai evravda 6 epws, on prjSe
TO epdipevov, dXX’ direipos dv eiij d tovtov epojs, ware
Kat TO KaXXos avTOV dXXov rpoirov Kat KaXXos VTrep
30 KaXXos. odSev yap ov ti KaXXos; epdapiov 8e ov to
yevvibv dv eiij to KaXXos. Svvapis oSv navros KaXov
dvdos eoTL, KaXXos koXXottoiov. Kat yap yevva avTO Kat
KaXXiov TTOiei tt) nap’ avTOV nepiovata tov KaXXovs,
&ar€ dpxti KaXXovs Kat nepas KaXXovs. ovaa Se
36 KaXXovs dpxri eKstvo p.ev KaXov noiei ov dpxf), Kat
KaXov TTOiei ovk iv p.op<l>fi' dXXd Kat avro to yevofievov
dpop<l>etv, dXXov Se Tponov ev pop(l>ii. rj yap Xeyopevrj
avTO TOVTO pLOVov p.op<f>Tj €v aAAo), 6^ eavTTjs Se ovaa
dpop<f>ov. TO oSv p€T€xov KaXXovs pep6p<f>a)Tai., ov to
KaXXos.
33. Aid Kat OTav KaXXos XeyrjTai, (j>evKT€ov paXXov
and popcl>rjs TOiavTtjs, dXX’ ov npo oppaTivv noirjTeov,
iva p,ri eKTrearjs tov KaXov els to dpvSpa peToyfl koXov
Xeyopevov. to 8e dp,op(f>ov efSoj KaXov, evnep et8os eoTi,
6 Kat oaw dv dnoavXrjaas eiys ndaav pop(f>rjv, otov Kat
TTjv ev Xoyip, fj 8ia^epeiv aAAo aAAoo Xeyopev, <os
8iKaioavvr]v Kat ao}<j>poavvr]v aXXrjXwv eTepa, KaiTOi
186
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
for all things gives him no measure—nor on the
other hand measurelessness: for [if he was measure­
less] how could he measure the others? Nor again
has he form either. Truly, when you cannot grasp the
form or shape of what is longed for, it would he most
longed for and most lovable, and love for it would be
immeasurable. For love is not limited here, because
neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be
unbounded; so his beauty is of another kind and
beauty above beauty. For if it is nothing, what
beauty can it be? But if it is lovable, it would be the
generator of beauty. Therefore the productive power
of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes
beauty. For it generates beauty and makes it more
beautiful by the excess of beauty which comes froin
it, so that it is the principle of beauty and the term of
beauty. But since it is the principle of beauty it
makes that beautiful of which it is the principle, and
makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the
very beauty which comes to be from it to be shape­
less, but in shape in another way; for what is called
this very thing [, shape,] is shape in another, but by
itself shapeless. Therefore that which participates in
beauty is shaped, not the beauty.
33.Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one
must even more avoid shape of this kind; but it must
not be set before the eyes, that you may not fall out
of beauty into what is called beauty by obscure
participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful,
since it is form, and is so in proportion to the length
you go in stripping all shape from it, the shape in
reasoning, for instance, by which we say that one
form differs from another, as we say that righteous­
ness and integrity are different from each other,
187
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

KaXa ovTa. eireih'^ 6 vovs iSiov ri voet, •^XdrTwrai, Kav

although they are heautiful. When the intellect
thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it is
ofjLOV TTOvTa AdjSij oaa ev tw vorjT<v- Kav eKaarov, ixiav also even if it takes together all things that are in
10 fj,op<j>rjv vorjTrjv exci' 6p,ov Se iravTa otov TTOiKiXrjv rivd, the intelligible realm; if it thinks an individiml, it
has one intelligible shape; if it thinks all together it
€Ti €v Serjaei, otov Set dedaaaOai ov virep eKeivo to has a kind of variegated shape, still in need land
■jrdyKaXov Kac ttoikiXov Kal ov ttoikiXov, oS opeyerai p,fv
trying to discover] how it should contemplate that
which is above that which is all-beautiful and
tjtvxTi ov Xeyovaa Sid ti roiovrov noOet, 6 Se Xoyos variegated and not variegated; that which the soul
desires without saying why it longs for something
Xeyei, on rovro rd ovrois, et-nep ev rd) irdvTr] dveiSew -q
like this, hut our reasoning says that this is the real
Tov dplarov ^vats Kai rj tov epaapnoirdrov. Sio d n dv thing, since the nature of the best and the natoe ot
the most lovable is in the altogether formless. There­
15 els etSos dvdyojv rr} ifivyfi SeiKvvrjs, enl rovnp dXXo to
fore, whatever you bring into form and show to the
piop^waav tpqTel. Xeyei Si) o Xoyos, oti to p-opift-qv eyov soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it
shape. Our reasoning insists that what has shape,
Kai Tj pop(f>r) Kai to etSos p.epeTp7jp,evov vav, tovto Se and shape, and form, all this, is measured and
ov nav ovSe avTapKes ovSe vap' avTOV KaXdv, dXXd Kai limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or
beautiful of itself, hut this too is mixed. These
TOVTO piepiiKTai. Set toIvvv TavTa pev KaXd, to Se ovtws beautiful things, then, must he measured and
20 7] TO vnepKaXov prj pepeTpfjadar el Se tovto, pq limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the
super-beautiful; but if this is so, it must not be
pepop<f>ci)adai pqSe eiSos eivai. dvetSeov dpa to vpwTios shaped or be a form. The primarily beautiM, then,
and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the
Kai TTpwTov Kai Tj KaXXovTj eKeivo q tov dyadov (j)vais.
nature of the Good. The experience of lovers bears
papTvpei Se Kai to twv epaoTcbv ndOos, dij, eoDs eoTiv ev witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has
the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is
eKelvip TW TVTTOv^ aladqTOV eyovn, ovttw epa' OTav S’ not yet in love; but when from that he him^lt
25 dir’ eKelvov avTOS ev avTW ovk alaOqTov yevvqaq tvttov generates in himself an impression not perceptible
by the senses in his partless soul, then love springs
ev dpepei epws <f)veTai. ^Xeireiv Se t,qTel to up. But he seeks to see the beloved that ke may
epwpevov, iv’ eKeivo eirdpSoi papaivopevov. el Se water him when he is withering.* But if he should

* Sleeman: tov wBxUC: to Q. 1 An allusion to Phaedrus 251B1-4.

189
188
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

avveaiv Xd^oi, cos Sec ^lera^aiveiv km to d/io/ji^oT€/)ov, come to understand that one must change to that
which is more formless, he would desire that; for his
eKsivov dv opeyoiTo- Kai yap 5 ef apy^js kiradev, eK
experience from the beginning was love of a great
30 aeXaos dp,vhpov epois (fxoros p-eyaXov. to yap lyvos tov light from a dim glimmer. For the trace of the
dp6p(f>ov pop<f>'q' TOVTO yovv yevva rr/v pop^-qv, ovy q shapeless is shape; it is this which generates shape,
pop<f>ri TOVTO, Kai yevva, OTav vXrj ■npoaiXO’p. q Se vXt] not shape this, and it generates it when matter
comes to it. But matter is necessarily furthest from
TToppcvTaTco avdyKTjs, otl prjSe tu)v voTdTcvv pop<f)wv it, because it does not have of itself any one even of
Trap’ avT-qs Tiva eyei. el ovv ipdapiov pev ovy q vXq, the last and lowest shapes. If then what is lovable is
35 (xAAd TO elSoTTOiqOev Sid to eiSos, to S’ etri -rq vXq not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and
eiSos TTapd ifivxqs, ^vxq Se paXXov eiSos Kai pdXXov
the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul
is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more
ipdapiov Kai vovs pdXXov Tavrqs eiSos Kai Iti pdXXov form than soul and still more lovable, one must
epaapiwTepov, dvelSeov Set tt/v KaXov TiOeaOai <f>vaiv assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.
TTfv vpcvTqv. 34. And we shall no longer be surprised if that
which produces these strangely powerful longinp is
34. Kai ovKeTi davpdaopev to tovs Seivovs rrodovg
altogether free from even intelligible shape; since
Trapexov el irdvTq aTrqXXaKTai Kai popijyqs voqTqs- eTret the soul also, when it gets an intense love of it, puts
Kai ijivxq, OTav avTov epoiTa avvTovov Xd^q, diroTlBeTai away all the shape which it has, even whatever
Ttdaav rjv eyei popifiqv, Kai qTis dv Kai voqTOV ^ ev avTq. shape of the intelligible there may be in it. For it is
not possible for one who has anything else and is
5 00 ydp eoTiv eyovTd ti dAAo Kai evepyovvTa Trepi avTo actively occupied _about it to see or to be fitted in.
ovTe ISetv ovTe evappoaOrjvai. dXXd Set pijTe KaKov prjT But one must not have evil, or any other good either,
av dyadov pqSev dXXo TTpoyeipov eyeiv, iva Se^ijTOi ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it
alone. But when the soul has good fortune with it,
povq pdvov. OTav Se tovtov evTvyqaq ij ifivyq Kai TjKq and it comes to it, or rather, being there already,
vpos avTqv, pdXXov Se vapov <j>avq, OTav eKelvq eKvevaq appears, when that soul turns away frorn the things
10 Tcov TTapovTcov Kai TrapaaKevdaaaa avT-qv cos otl that are there, and has prepared by making itself as
pdXiara KaXqv Kai els opoioTqTa eXOovaa (ij Se beautiful as possible and has come to likeness (the
preparation and the adornment are clearly under­
TrapacKevri Kai q Koapqais SqXq ttov rots stood, I think, by those who are preparing them­
TTapaaKevatjOpevois), ISovaa Se ev avrfj e^al(f>vqs selves) and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing (for
<f>avevTa {peTa^v ydp ovSev ovS’ Iti Sdo, dAA’ ev dprjiw there is nothing between, nor are there still two but
190
191
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
oil yap dv SiaKpivais eri, ecus irdpeari- pLip-Tjais §€
15 TOVTOV Kai oc evravOa kpaarai Kat ipcopLevoi avyKplvai
deXovres), Kai ovre atu/ioros eri alaOdverai, on eariv
ev avTO), ovre eavTrjv aXXo n Aeyet, ovk dvOpcDTTOV, oil
OVK ov, ov8e itdv (dvdipaXos yap rj tovtoov irtoy
dea), Kai ovSe ax°^V'' npos avrd ovre deXei, dAAa
20 Kai avrd ^rjriqaaaa eKeivcp vapovri dnavra kokcIvo
dvr’ avrrjs ^Xerref ris Se ovaa jSAeirei, ovSe rovro
ayoXd^ei opdv. evBa Srj ovSev ndvrcov dvrl rovrov
dXXd^airo, ov8‘ ei ns avrp ndvra rdv ovpavdv
emrpeiToi, cos ovk ovros aXXov eri dpeivovos odSe
pLaXXov dyadov' ovre yap dvcorepco rpeyei rd re dXXa
25 irdvra Kanovarjs, Kav fj dvo). ware rare eyei Kai rd
Kpiveiv KaXws Kai yiyvwoKeiv, on rovro eanv od
e^lero, Kai riOeadai, on fxrjSev ean Kpelrrov avrov. ov
ydp eanv drrdrq eKer i] ttov dv rov dXrjdovs
dXrjOearepov rvyoi; o odv Xeyei, eKelvo ean, Kai varepov
30 Xeyei, Kai aiwirwaa 8e Xeyei Kai eimadovaa ov
ijiev8erai, on eviradei' ov8e yapyaXi^opevov Xeyei rov
awparos, dXXd rovro yevopevrj, o rrdXai, ore eirvyei.
dAAct Kai rd dXXa rrdvra, ots rrplv rj8ero, dpyats ij
Swdpieaiv rj rrXovrois ij KdXXeaiv rj emarrjfiais, ravra
vrrepidovaa Xeyei ovk dv elvovaa pitj KpeCrroai
' "There is nothing between” is said of Intellect and Soul
in IV. 4. 2. 27-28, and, more unexpectedly, of Intellect and
the material universe at V. 8. 7. 13. ct is always used
by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united
192
THE FOKMS AND THE GOOD
both are one'; nor could you still make a distinction
while it is present; lovers and their beloveds here
below imitate this in their will to he united), it does
not still perceive its body, that it is in it, and does
not speak of itself as anything else, not m^, or
living thing, or being, or all (for the contemplation
of these would be somehow disturbing), ^d it has no
time for them nor wants them, but it has been
seeking it, and meets that when it is present, and
looks at that instead of itself; but it has not even
time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, 1
would not exchange this for anything in the world,
not even if someone handed over the whole universe
to it, because there is nothing still better, and no­
thing that is more a good; for it does not run up
higher, and all the other things are on its way down,
even if they are in the realm above. So then it has the
ability to judge rightly and to know that this is what
it desired, and to establish that there is nothing
better than it. For there is no deceit there; or where
could it find any thing truer than the truth. What it
speaks, then, is that, and it speaks it afterwards, and
speaks it in silence, and in its happiness is not
cheated in thinking that it is happy; and it does not
say it is happy when the body tickles it, but when it
has become that which it was before, when it is
fortunate. But it says it in contempt of ail the other
things in which it delighted before, offices or Powers
or riches or beauties or sciences, and it would not
have spoken if it had not met better things than
retain their distinct natures. See Lexicon Plotimanum s. v.
aUui (b). Its use in IV. 4. 2. 29, » eonv an^ui Kai 8uo, ot boul
and Intellect, brings out its meaning clearly.
193
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

35 avvTVxovaa tovtuv ov8e <l>o^tLTaL, fj.’q ti nddr], ^ler’ these; it is not afraid, either, that anything may
eKeivov ovaa ovS’ oXcos iSovaa- et 8e Kal rd dXXa to happen to it, since it does not even see it while it is
with that; but if all the other things about it
TTepi avTTjv (f>deipoiTo, €v p,dXa Kat /SooAerai, iva npos perished, it would even be pleased, that it might be
T0VT<p ^ (idvov etV roaov evnadeias. alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it
35. OuTco 8e 8idKeiTai Tore, ws Kai tov voelv reached.
KaTa<f>povelv, o tov dXXov xpovov ^a-nd^ero, on to votiv 35. And the soul is so disposed then as even to
despise intelligence, which at other times it wel­
Kivrjai's ns Tjv, avT-q Se ov Kivetadai BiXei. Kai yap ov8’ comed, because intelligence is a kind of movement,
eKeivov ^qaiv, ov opa, koitoi vovs yevopevos avTq and the soul does not want to move. For it says that
5 Oewpel oTov vowdelaa Kai ev vo-qTw
toi tottco t w
he whom it sees does not move either; yet when this
soul has become intellect it contemplates, when it
yevopevT]- dXXd yevopevq pev ev aiiTw Kat Tzepi avTov has been, so to speak, made intellect and has come to
eyovaa to vot/tov voel, en-qv 8’ eKeivov i8rj tov 9e6v, be in the intelligible place*; but when it has come to
■navTa q8q a<j>vqaiv, olov el tis elaeXOwv els oIkov be in it and moves about it, it possesses the intelli­
gible and thinks, but when it sees that god it at once
TTOiKiXov Kai OVTO) KaXov Becopol ev8ov CKaoTa twv
lets everything go; it is as if someone went into a
TToiKiXpaTwv Kat Bavpd^oi, npiv I8elv tov tov oIkov house richly decorated and so beautiful, and within
10 8eaTT6Tqv, l8wv 8’ eKeivov Kat dyaaOeis ov koto Tqv tcov it contemplated each and every one of the decora­
tions and admired them before seeing the master of
ayaXpaTwv <l>vaiv ovTa, oAA d^iov Tqs ovtws Bias,
the house, but when he sees that master with de­
d<j>eis eKelva tovtov povov tov Xoittov ^Xe-not, eha light, who is not of the nature of the images [in the
PXeTTcov Kat pq a<j>aipo}v to oppa pqKeTt opapa ^Xenoi house], but worthy of genuine contemplation, he
dismisses those other things and thereafter looks at
T<p avveyel Tqs Bias, oAAd Trjv oipiv avTov him alone, and then, as he'looks and does not take
15 avyKepdaaiTo tw BedpaTi, aioTe ev avrw ■q8q to opaTov his eyes away, by the continuity of his contemp­
npoTepov oijiiv yeyovevai, toiv 8‘ ctXXcvv ndvTtov lation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his
emXaBoiTO BeapdTwv. Kat Tdya dv a(pt,oi to dvdXoyov q seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was
seen before has now become sight in him, and he
etKwv, et pq avBptvTTOS etq o €7Tt(TTdff tw to tov oikov forgets all other objects of contemplation. And per­
Bewpevip, aXXa tis Beos, Kat oStos ov kot ot/iiv <f>aveis, haps the likeness would keep in conformity with the
reality if it was not a mortal who encountered the
The phrase the intelligible place” here and in line 41 is one who was seeing the sights of the house but one of
taken from Plato’s Republic (508C1 and 517B5). the gods, and one who did not appear visibly but
194 195
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
20 dAAd Tiyv ^vx^v efnrXiqaas rov 6€<ofjAvov. Kai tov vovv
roCvvv TTjv fiev exeiv Svvafiiv els to voelv, ^ ra ev avrw
^Xerrei, Tr/v 84, fj ra. i-neKeiva aiirov 4tTi^o\fj rivi Kai
napahoxf), Ka6‘ rjv /cot irporepov ewpa p.6vov Kai opaiv
varepov Kai vovv eax( Kai ev eari. Kai eariv eKeivrj pev rj
Bea vov ep<f>povos, avTT] Se vovs epcov, orav aijipajv
26 yevqrai peBvadeis rov veKrapos- rare epibv
yiverai anXaiBeis eis evnadeiav rip Kopip- Kai eariv
avrip pedveiv ^eXriov aepvorepcp eivai roiavrrjs
pedijs. rrapa pepos Se 6 vovs eKeivos aXXa, ra Se aXXore
aXXa opa; rj ov- 6 Se Xoyos SiSdaKcvv yivopeva rroiel, ro
30 Se ex€i ro voeiv del, eyei Se Kai ro prj voeiv, dAAd dXXws
eKetvov pXerreiv. Kai yap opdiv eKelvov eaye yevvrjpara
Kai avv^adero Kai rovrcuv yevopevojv Kai evdvrwv Kai
ravra pev opdiv Xeyerai voeiv, eKelvo Se Svvdpei
epeXXe voeiv. Se t/jvx'^ oiov avyyeaaa Kai d^avi'aaaa
35 pevovra rov ev avrfj vovv, pdXXov Se d vovs avrrjs opa
•npioros, epx^rai Se r) Bea Kai els avrrjv Kai ra Svo ev
yiverai. eKraBev Se ro dyaBov err’ avrols Kai
avvappoaBev rfj dp<j)orepoiv avardaei emSpapov /cot
evcuaav to Sdo erreariv avrols paKapiav SiSovs alaBrjaiv
’ Plotinus may be thinking here particularly of
possession by Apollo or Dionysus.
“ For this "pre-intellectual” vision of Intellect see III. 8.
9. 29-32; V. 4. 2. 4-7; V. 3. 11. 4-12; it is the first moment in
Intellect’s eternal generation, its properly "intellectual”
vision being the second.
196
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
filled the soul of the beholder.' Intellect also, then,
has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the
things in itself, and one by which it looks at what
transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by
which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired
intellect and is one.^ And that first one is the con­
templation of Intellect in its right mind, and the
other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind
"drunk with the nectar”®; then it falls in love,
simplified into happiness by having its fill; and it is
better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this
than to be more respectably sober. But does that
Intellect see in part, at one time some things and at
another others? No, but oiu- rational discourse in­
structing us makes them come to be, but Intellect
always has its thinking and always its not thinking,
but looking at that god in another way. For when it
saw him it had offspring and was intimately aware of
their generation and existence within it; and when it
sees these it is said to think, but it sees that by the
power by which [later] it was going to think. But the
soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the
intellect which abides within it—but rather its in­
tellect sees first and the vision comes also to it and
the two become one. But the Good is spread out over
them and fitted in to the union of both; playing upon
them and uniting the two it rests upon them and
® Again the drunkenness of Poros from Plato Symposium
203B5; see ch. 30, n. 4, p. 179. The application of it to
Intellect’s eternal self-transcendence in vision of and union
with the One is strikingly powerful and paradoxical.
Intellect must be eternally out of its mind with drink or
love to be the Divine Mind.
197
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

Kai 9eav, roaovTOV apas, ware fiT^re ev TOTTip eivai, gives them a blessed perception and vision, lifting
them so high that they are not in place nor in
40 pLrjre ev rw aXXw, ev ots Tre(j>vKev aXXo ev aXXcu elvar anything other, among things where it is natural for
ouSe yap avros ttov 6 Se v orj t 6 s tott o s iv avT<p, one thing to be in another; for he is not anywhere
either; but the intelligible place is in him, but he is
avTOS 8e ovK ev aXXcp. Sio ovSe Kiveirai rj ijivx^ rare, on not in another. Therefore the soul does not move
p,T]8e eKetvo. ov8e ilivxfj toivvv, on pLri8e eKelvo, aXXa then either, because that does not move. Nor, then,
is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life.
xnrep to ^fjv. ov8e vovs, on p,r]8e voer 6p,oiova6ai yap Nor is it intellect, because that does not think
45 8el. voec 8e ov8’ eKeivo, on ov8e voel. either; for one must be made like. It does not even
think that it does not think.
36. Td p.ev yap aXXa 8fiXa, etprjTai 8e n Kal nepl 36. The rest, then, is clear, and something has
TOVTOV. aXX’ op,ws Kai vvv in’ oXiyov XeKreov been said also about this. But all the same, even now
we must speak of it for a little, starting from that
apyop-evois fxev eKeiOev, Sid Xoyiap.wv 8e irpolovaiv. [experience] but proceeding by rational discourse.
ean p,ev yap ij rov dyadov eire yvwais eHre The knowledge or touching of the Good is the
greatest thing, and Plato says it is the "greatest
5 peyiOTov, Kai p,ey i a r 6v (j)r)ai tovt etvai p.dB t) p,a,
study”,* not calling the looking at it a "study”, but
oil TO TTpos aiiTO I’Seiv p,ddrjp.a Xeyaiv, dXXd nept avTOV learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it
by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the
piadeLV Ti TTpoTepov. 8i8daKOvai p.ev oSv dvaXoyiai re
things whifch come from it and certain methods of
Kal difiaipeaeis Kai yvdiaeis toiv e^ aiiTOv Kal ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by
dva^aapioi Tives, vopevovai 8e KaOdpaeis npos axiTO Kal purifications and virtues and adornings and by gain­
ing footholds in the intelligible and settling our­
dpeTal Kal Koap.'qaeis Kal tov vot)tov eTTi^daeis Kai ctt’ selves firmly there and feasting on its contents. But
10 avTov I8pvaeis Kal toiv e/cei eoTidaeis- dan? "(Sc whoever has become at once contemplator of himself
and all the rest and objeqt of his contemplation, and,
y^yevTjTai ^ 6p,ov OeaT-qs re Kal deapia avTOS avTov Kai since he has become substance and intellect and
TOIV dXXoiv Kal yevopievos oiiala Kal vovs Kal ^ai ov "the complete living being”,^ no longer looks at it
from outside—when he has become this he is near,
TT avT e Xe s pirjKeTi e^oidev avTO ^Xenoi—tovto 8e and that Good is next above him, and already close
yevopievos eyyvs eoTi, Kal to eifie^ijs eKeivo, Kal vXrjaiov
' Plato Republic 605A2 (of the Idea of the Good).
* coniecimus. ® Plato Timaeus 31B1.
199
198
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

15 avTO rjSr] eTTi vavTi tw vorjTW imariX^ov. evBa Srj edaas by, shining upon all the intelligihle world. It is there
that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been
Tis TTOV fiddrifia, /cat fJ-expi tov iraiSaycoyrjBels Kai ev
led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as
KaXw tSpvOels, iv <5 ju.ei' iari, p^eypi tovtov voei, this one thinks that in which one is, hut is carried
i^evexBels Se rw avroC * tov vov olov KVpuiTi Kai infiov out of it by the surge of the wave of Intellect itself
and lifted on high by a kind of swell and sees
vtt‘ avTOV oiov olSriaavTOS dpBels elaelSev efai^vr/s ovk
suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes
20 iStov OTTcvs, dXX’ Tj dea TrAijaaaa ^£otoj rd 6p.p.aTa ov Si‘ with light and does not make him see something else
avTOV TT€iTo(rjKev aXXo opdv, dAA’ avro to <j)a)S to opap,a by it, but the light itself is what he sees. For there is
not in that Good something seen and its light, nor
rjv. ov yap ■^v ev eKeCvo) to p,kv 6pu>p,evov, to 8e <j)6>s intellect and object of intellect, hut a ray which
avTov, ovSe vovs Kai voovpievov, dAA’ avyTj yevvihaa generates these afterwards and lets them he beside
TavTa els voTepov Kai d<f>elaa eivai Trap’ avTip' avTOS Se it; but he himself is the ray which only generates
Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the genera­
avyrj pAvov yewotaa vovv, ovti a^eaaaa avTrjs ev to) tion, hut it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to
25 yewrjaai, dAAd pelvaaa pev avT-q, yevopevov 3’ eKeCvov he because this Good exists. For if this was not of the
TO) TOVTO eivai. el yap prj tovto toiovtov ■^v, ovk dv kind it is, that would not have come into existence.
37. Those who in their reasoned account attribute
vveoTT] eKelvo. thinlr^ng to the Good do not attribute to him think­
37. 01 pev odv vor/aiv avTip SdvTes tw Xoyip toiv ph> ing of the lesser things which derive from him^; yet
eXaTTOVwv Kai twv e^ avTOv ovk eSoaav koItoi Kai some people do say that this is absurd, that he
should not know the other things; but, however that
TOVTO aTOTTOV TO. oAAa, <f>aa( Tives, pq elSevai- dAA’ oSv may be, those [Peripatetics], since they did not find
eKetvoi dXXo TipicoTepov avTov ovy evpovTes tt)v voqaiv anything of more worth thail himself, attributed to
5 avTW avTov eivai eSoaav, wanep tt) voqaei aepvoTepov
him thought of himself, on the supposition that he
would become more majestic by thinking and that
avTov eaopevov Kai tov voeiv KpeiTTovos rj kot avTov d thinking was better than what he is in himself, but
eoTiv OVTOS, dAA’ OVK avTov aepvvvovTOS Tqv voqaiv. tIvi that it was not he himself who conferred majesty on
thinking. For by what does he have his worth, by
yap TO Tipiov e^ei, rij voqaei q avTip; el pev Trj voqaei,
thinking or by himself? If it is by thinking, he is in
avTW ov Tipiov q ■^ttov, el 8e avTtp, npo Tqs voqaeiLs himself of no worth or lesser worth, but if by himself
10 eoTi TeXeios Kai ov Trj voqaei TeXeiovpevos. el 8’ oti he is perfect before thinking and not perfected by

* Harder: avTw wBUCQ: avro J: avrui vel oiJto R. ' See Aristotle Metaphysics A 1074bl7-35.
200 201
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

evepyeid eariv, dAA’ ov Svvafiis, Set voelv, et fxev ovata thinking. But if he has to think because he is active
actuality, but not potency, if he is a substance
eartv del voovaa Kat tovto) evepyeiav Xeyovai, Svo
always t.Viinking and it is because of this that they
ojxws Xeyovai, rr^v ovaiav Kal rrjv vorjaiv, Kat ovy say he is active actuality, they are all the same
speaking of two things, substance and thinking, and
aTrXovv Xeyovaiv, dXXd ti erepov TTpoariOeaaiv avTw,
are not saying that he is simple, but adding some­
tooTTep 64>daXpL0is TO opav kut’ evepyeiav, Kav del thing else to him, as actually seeing is an addition to
the eyes, even if they are dlways looking. But if they
15 pXeTTwaiv. el S’ evepyeia Xeyovaiv, on evepyeid ean Kai
say that he is actual because he is active actuality,
voTjOis, ovK dv oSaa voTjais voot, diOTrep puSe Kiv-rjais that is, thought, if he was thought he would not
think, just as movement is not in motion. "Well then,
KivoiTO dv. rl oSv; ov Kai avroi Xeyere ovaiav Kal
do you not yourselves say that those higher things
evepyeiav eivai e/cetva; dAAd ttpAAo ravra opioXoyovpiev are substance and active actuality?’ Yes, but we
agree that these are many, and being many are
eivai Kal ravra erepa, rd Se TTpcorov aTrXovv, Kal to e^
different, but the first is single and simple, and we
20 dXXov SlSopiev voelv Kal oiov ^rfrelv avrov rrjv ovaiav attribute thinking to what comes from another, and
a kind of seeking its substance and its self and what
Kal avrd Kal ro noirjaav avro, Kal emarpaifiev ev rfj Bea
made it, and say that in turning back in its con­
Kal yvioplaav vovv •qSrj SiKalcos eivai' ro Se piijre templation and recognising itself it is at that point
rightly and properly Intellect'; but that what has
yevdpievov pirir eyov npo avrov, dAA’ del (,dv} * d ean—
not come to be and has nothing before it, but is
Tiy airla rov voelv e^eiv; ^ Sio vrrep vovv (j>7)aiv 6 always what it is—what reason will it have to think?
This is why Plato rightly says that it is above
25 TlXdrcov eivai opBcbs- vovs piev yap pi'll vocbv dvoriros' <S
Intellect. Now Intellect, if it did not think, would be
yap rj ^vais eyei ro voelv, el pi'fj rovro rrpdrroi, dv6r]rov unintelligent; for if that whose nature includes
thought did not think, it would be unintelligent; but
w Se pitiSev epyov earl, rl dv rovrqi ns epyov irpoadyiov
when something has no work to do, why should one
Kara areprjaiv avrov Karriyopol rovro, on pi'q rrpdrrei; put a work to it and then predicate the absence of
this work of it because it does not do it? It would be
olov el dvlarpov avrov ns Aeyoi. /xijSev Se epyov eivai
as if one were to call him unmedical. But he has no
avrd), on piriSev eni^dXXei avrd) rroielv dpKel yap work to do because there is no obligation on him to
do anything; for he is sufficient and does not have to
' Kirchhoff.
^ Igal: efei Enn. ' See ch. 35, n. 1, p. 194.

202 203
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
30 avTOS KOI ovSev Set Trap' avrov virep ra rravra
ovra' dpKel yap avru) Kai tols aXXois div avros d iariv.
38. ”EffTi Se ovSe TO “eoTiv”- ovBev yap ovSe tovtov
SeiTai- evel ovSe to "dyados eari" Kara tovtov, dAAd
Ka6’ od TO “eoTi”- to Se "eoTiv" ovx d>s xaT dXXov
dXXo, dAA’ cos arjp,alvov o eoTi. Xeyopcev Se Tdyadov Trepl
5 avTov XeyovTes ovk avTO ovSe KaTrjyopovvTes, oti avTw
virdpxei, dAA’ oti avrd- eira ovS’ “Iariv dyadov” Xeyeiv
d^LOvvTes ovSe to "to" irpoTidevai avTov, SrjXovv Se oii
Svvdp,evoi, et ns adrd rravTaTraaiv drfreXoi, tva p.rj aXXo,
TO Se dXXo TToiciifiev, cos /.n? Setadai. tov "eoTiv" In,
10 ooTco Xeyop,ev "Tdyadov". dAAd tis vapaSe^eTai <j)vaiv
OVK ovaav <ev>i alaOrjaei Kal yvdraei avTijs; tl ovv
yvcdaerai; “eyed eipn"; dAA’ ovk eoTi. Sid tLovv ovk epel
TO "dyadov eip,i”; rj naXiv to “Ian” KaTTfyopTjaei
avTOV. dAAd TO "dyadov" piovov epel tl TTpoadeis'
"dyadov” p.ev yap voijaeiev dv ns dvey tov “lanv , el
15 p-rj KaT dXXov KaTijyopor 6 Se avTov^ voedv on dyadov
irdvTCOS voijaei to “eyed eipi to dyadov"' el Se p-rj,
dyadov ju.ev voijaet, od vapeoTai Se avTip to oti avTos
ean tovto voelv. Set ovv ttjv vorjaiv eivai, oti "dyadov
elpi". Kal el pev vorjois avTrj to dyadov, ovk avTov
20 larat vor/ais, dAA’ dyadov, aurds re ovk larai
dyadov, dAA’ ij vorjais. el Se eTepa tov dyadov ’rj vor/ais
TOV dyadov, lanv ^Sij to dyadov irpo ttjs votjaeojs
1 ^3s ( = Ficinus).
^ Kirchhoff: aoro Enn.
204
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
seek anything but himself who is above all things;
for he suffices for himself and all else by being what
he is.
38. But he is not even the "is”; for he has no need
whatever even of this; for "he is good is not applicj-
able to him either, but to that to which the is
applies; but the "is” [, when said of him,] is not said
as one thing of another, but as indicating what he is.
But we say "the Good” about him, not speaking of
him himself nor predicating of him that good belongs
to him, but saying it is himself; so then, since we do
not think it proper to say "is good” nor to put the
article before it, but are unable to make ourselves
clear, if one takes it away altogether, we say "the
good” so as not to still need the "is”, that we may not
make one thing and then another. But who is going
to accept a nature which is not in a state of percep­
tion and knowledge of itself? What then will he
know? "I am”? But he is not. Why then will he not
say "I am the Good”? Again he will predicate the
"is” of himself. But [perhaps] he will only say
"good”, with some addition; for one could think
"good” without "is”, if one did not predicate it of
something else. But he who thinks that he is good
will in every case think "I am the Good ; if not, he
will think good but the thought will not be present
to his mind that he is this good. The thought, then,
must be "I am good”.' And if the thought itself is the
to
Good, it will not be a thought of himself but of good,
and he himself will not be the Good, but the thought
will. But if the thought of the Good is different from
the Good, the Good is there already before the
1 Cp. the closely parallel discussion in V. 3.10.
205
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
avrov. el S’ Ictti npo rijs voijaeojs to ayadov avrapKes,
avrapKes ov avrw els ayadov ovSev dv heoiro rrjs
25 vorjoecos rrjs nepl avrov' ware ^ ayadov ov voet iavro.
39. ’AAAa Ti; T] ovSev aAAo irdpeariv avroj, dAA’
dnAy ns eirt/SoAij avrw npos avrov earai. dAAd oiiK
ovTOS oiov SiaoT'qp.aros nvos ovSe 8ia<f>opds rrpds avrd
TO em^aXXeiv eavrw ri dv enj y avrd; Sto /cat opd&s
5 erepoTyra XapL^dvei, dnov vovs Kal ovaia. Set yap rdv
vovv del ereporyra Kal ravroryra XapL^dveiv, eirrep
voyaei. eavrov re yap ov Sta/cptvei arro rov voyrov ry
•npos avrd erepov axeaei rd re rrdvra ov deiopyaei,
p,y8ep.ids ereporyros yevop.evys els rd ndvra eivai- ov8e
10 yap dv ov8e 8vo. errena, el voyaei, ov dyrrov eavrdv
pLOvov voyaei, etrrep dXcos voyaei- 8id ti yap ovy
arravra; y ddvvar-yaei; dXcus 8e ovy dnXovs ylverai
vodjv eavrov, dAAd Set ryv voyaiv r-yv rrepi avrov erepov
etvai, ei ri dXcos 8vvairo voeiv avrd. eXeyopiev 8e, on ov
vdyais rovrov,^ ov8’ el dXXov avrdv edeXoi I8elv. vo-yaas
15 Se avrds noXvs ylverai, voyrds, vodiv, Kivovpievos Kai
daa dXXa npoayKei vw. rrpds Se rovrois /cd/ceti/o dpdv
rTpoarjKei, orrep eipyrai -ydy ev dXXois, d)S eKdary
^ Igal: rovTo Enn.
2o6
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
thought of it. But if the Good is sufficient to itself
before the thought, since it is sufficient to itself for
good it will have no need of the thought about it; so,
as good, it does not think itself.
39. But as what, then? Now nothing else is present
to it, but it will have a simple concentration of
attention on itself. But since there is no distance or
difference in regard to itself, what could its atten­
tion be other than itself? Therefore Plato rightly
understands that there is otherness and sameness
where there is intellect and substance. ‘ For one
must always understand intellect as otherness and
sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it
will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its
relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemp­
late all things if no otherness has occurred to make
all things exist: for [without otherness] there would
not even be two. Then, if it is going to think, it will
not presumably think itself alone, if it is going to
think at all; for why will it not think all things? Will
it not be able to? But in general intellect is not
simple when it thinks itself, but its thought about
itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to
think itself as anything at al]. But we said that there
is no thinking of this Good, not even if he wanted to
see l^imself as another. But if he himself thinks he
becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion
and everything else appropriate to Intellect. But
besides this it is appropriate to observe that poii^
which has been discussed elsewhere,^ that each
‘Plotinus’ usual application of the "very important
kinds” of Plato Sophist 254-5 to Intellect.
“ Cp. e.g. VI. 9. 2.
207
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
voTjais, einep vorjais earai, ttoiklXov ti Sei eivai, ro 8e
dwXovv Kai TO avTO vdv otov KivqpLa, el roiovrov eltj
20 otov eiracjyri, ovSev voepov ti oSv; ovre rd dX\a ovre
avTov etS'^aei; [dAAd aepvov eaTrj^erai] ^ rd pev ovv
dXXa varepa avrov, Kai TTpd avrdtv o •^v, Kal
e-irlKTrjTos avrd)v ij vorjais Kai ovx r} avTrj del Kai ovx
earrjKOTiov Koiv rd earthra 8e vofj, iroXvs eariv. ov yap
26 Srj rd pev vOrepa perd rrjs vorjaews Kai rrjv ovalav e^ei,
at Se TOVTOV voijaeis detopiai Kevai pdvov eaovrai. rj 8e
TTpdvoia dpKet ev rd) avrov etvai, rrap’ od to rrdvra. ro Sc
npos avrov rrcos, el prj avrov; dAAd aepvov earrj^erai.
30 eXeye pev odv d FIAaTWi' nepi rrjs ovalas Xeywv, on
vorjaei, dAA’ od aepvov earrj^oiro dis rrjs ovalas pev
voovarjs, rov Sc prj voovvros aepvov earrj^opevov,
ro pev "earrj^oiro" rd) prj dXXios dv 8eSvv^a0ai
epprjvevaai, aepvorepov 8e Kai ovrws aepvov vopl^ov
eivai ro vrrep^e^rjKOS ro voeiv.
40. Kai on pev /iiy 8el votjaiv rrepi avrov eivai,
el8elev dv ol rrpoaaipdpevoi rov roiovrov 8el ye prjv
rrapapvBia drra rrpos rots elprjpevois Kopl^eiv, el rrrj
oidv re np Xdyw arjprjvai. 8et 8e rrjv rreiOiu pepiypevrjv
5 eyeiv rrjv dvdyKijv. 8€i rolvw yiyvdraKeiv emarrjaavra,
<1)5 vorjais rrdaa eK rivos eari Kai rivds. Kai ij /ncv
‘ delevimus, ut e lin. 28-9 iteratum.
' Plotinus is here interpreting Plato Sophist
2o8
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
thought, if it is going to be a thought, must be
something multiply various, but that kind of move­
ment, simple and all the same, if it is to be something
like a touch, has nothing intelligent about it. Well
then, will he not know the other things or himself?
The other things come after him, and he was what he
was before them, and the thought of them would be
acquired from outside himself, and not always the
same, and of things that do not stand still; and even
if he thinks the things that stand still, he is many.
For it is certainly not true that the things which
come after will possess the substance with their
thought, but the thoughts of this Good will be only
visions empty [of real content]. But it is enough for
providence that he exists from whom all things
come. But what is his relation to himself, if he does
not think himself? But he will stand still in majesty.
Plato did say, speaking of substance, that it will
think, but would not stand still in majesty, meaning
that substance thinks, but that which does not think
will stand still in majesty; he used "will stand still
because he could not explain what he meant in any
other way, and he considered more majestic and
truly majestic that which transcends thought.*
40. And those who have had a contact of this kind
would know that thinking cannot pertain to him;
but we do need to add some words of encouragement
to what has been said, if discourse can indicate it in
any way at all. But necessity must have persuasion
mixed with it. One must, then, know and understand
that all thinking comes from something and is of
248D6-249A2; he seems conscious that his interpretation
will seem rather odd.
209

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
avvovaa t(u oS eariv vttok€l^i€vov fiev ep^ei to ov eari
vorjais, oiov Se CTTiKeCfievov ootij yiverai ivepyeia avrov
ovaa Kai TrXrjpovoa to Svvdpiei eKetvo pvSev ootij
10 yevvwaa' eKeivov yap iariv, oS iari, p,6vov, oiov
reXeicoais. -fj Se oSaa vorjais pier’ ovaias Kal
vTToar-qaaaa Trjv ovaiav ovK dv SvvaiTO ev eKeCvcp etvai,
d<l>‘ oS eyevero' ov yap dv iyiwqoe ti ev €K€Lv<p oSaa.
aXX' ovaa Svvapus too yevvdv e(f)’ eavTrjs kyivva, Kat rj
15 kvepyeia avrijs kariv ovala, Kal avveari Kal kv Trj ovaia,
Kal koTiv ovy erepov rj vorjais Kal r/ ovala avrrj Kal ad
kavrrjv voel rj <j)vaLS, ovy erepov, dAA’ rj Xoycp, to
voovp,evov Kal to vooOv, nXrjOos ov, cu? SeSei/CTat
TToXXax'p. Kal earIV avrtj -npojTr] kvepyeia vrroaTaaiv
20 yevvrjaaaa els ovaiav, Kal lv8aXp.a ov dXXov ovtojs earl
pieydXov tlvos, ware eyeveTO ovala. el S’ ijv kKelvov Kal
p.rj an’ kKelvov, ovS’ dv dXXo ti rj kKelvov ■^v, Kal ovk dv
k<f>’ eavTrjs vnoaraais rjv. rrpwTrj Srj ovaa avrrj kvepyeia
Kal TTpWTi) vdrjais ovk dv eyoi ovre kvepyeiav irpo avrrjs
25 ooTe vorjaiv. piera^alvorv rolvvv ns drrd ravrrjs rrjs
ovalas Kal vorjaeojs ovre krrl ovaiav rj^ei ovt k-rrl
voijaiv, dAA’ kiT e K e IV a rj^ei ovalas Kal vorjaeais
krrl Ti OavpiaaTov, o jU.'^Te eyei kv avrw ovaiav pirjre
vdrjaiv, dAA’ eanv eprjfiov avro krf)’ kavrov rdiv k^ avrov
^ au d Theiler: auri) Enn.
210
i
THE FORMS AND THE GOOD
something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps
close to that from which it comes, has as its ground
that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a
kind of superstructure, being its ground’s actuality
and fulfilling that ground’s potentiality without
generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of
completion of that of which it is. But the thinking
which accompanies substance and has brought sub­
stance into existence could not be in that from which
it came to be; for it would not have generated
anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of
generation by itself, it generated, and its active
actuality is substance, and also in substance it is
there with it, and the thought and this substance are
not different things, and, again, in that the nature
thinks itself, they are not different except in de­
finition, what is thought and what thinks, that is, a [
plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this 1
is the first active actuality, which has generated an
existent which came to be substance, and, being the
image of another, is the image of one so great that
substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that
and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else
but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on
its own. Certainly, as this is the first active actuality
and the first thought, it would have neither actuality
or thought before it. So then when one goes on from
this substance and thought one will not arrive at
substance or thought, but will come, beyond sub­ a.
stance^ and thought, to something wonderful, which n
does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone
by itself, with no need of the things which come from
^ Plato Republic VI609B9.
211
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

30 ovSey Seo/nevoy. ov yap evepyijaas nporepoy iyevvrjaev it. For it did not act before it generated activity; for
then activity would have been there before it came
evepyeiav yap av i^y, nply yeviadai- ov8e yo'qaas
to be; nor did it think before it generated thought;
eyeyyriae yorjaiy r]8r] yap ay yeyo'qK€L, TTpiy yeyeaBai for then it would have thought before thought came
yorjaiy. oAcus yap ij y6r)ais, ei p,€y dyadov, yelpoy avrov' to be. For in general thought, if it is of the Good, is
worse than it; so that it would not be thought of the
ware ov tov dyaOov dv eiry Xeyto 8e ov rov dyadov, ovy Good; but I mean "not of the Good” not in the sense
35 OTi /H1J IffTi yorjoai to dyadoy—tovto yap earw—dAA’ that it is inipossible to think the Good this may
OTi ey avTW toi dyadw ovk dv ettj vorjois' t] ev earai well be so—^but that there would be no thought in
the Good itself; otherwise the Good and what is less
6p.ov TO dyadov Kai to eXaTTOV avrov, Tj vorjois avTov. than it, the thought of it, would be a unity together.
el 8e yelpov eoTai, 6p,ov rj voTjais eoTai Kai rj.ovaCa. ei Se But if [thought] is going to be worse [than the Good],
KpeiTTOV Tj voTjais, TO vorjTov yelpov eoTai. ov 8ri ^ ev tw thought and substance will be together. But if
thought is better, the object of thought will be
dyaBd) rj vorjais, dAAd x^lpo^' oSaa Kai 8id tovto to worse. Certainly then thought is not in the Good
40 dyaOdv d^iwBelaa eTepcvBi dv eoj avTov, KaBapov eKeivo but, being worse and given its value by this Good,
would be somewhere else than it, leaving that Good
(Zavep Twv dXXcuv Kai avTrjs d<j>eiaa. KaBapov 8e dv
clear of thought itself as well as everything else. But
vorjaeois elXiKpivcbs eoTiv o eoTiv, ov vapa'no8iCdp,€vov being clear of thought it is purely what it is, not
Tfi voTjaeL TTapovarj, to? /iij eiXi.Kpi.ves Kai ev etvai. el 84 hindered by the presence of thought from being pure
Tis Kai TOVTO dp.a voovv Kai voovp.evov rroiel Kai ovaiav
and one. But if someone makes this also at once
thinker and thought and substance and thought in
45 Kai voTjOiv avvovaav tt) ovala Kai ovtcvs avTO voovv company with substance, and in this way wants to
BeXei TTOielv, dXXov Scijaerai Kai tovtov npo avTov, make it self-thinking, he will need another, and this
other prior to itself, since active actuality and
eTreiirep rj evepyeia Kai rj votjais rj dXXov vnoKeip-evov thought is either the bringing to completion of
reXeioiais rj avvvnoaraais odaa rrpo avTrjs Kai avrrj something else underlying it or a co-existent and so
dXXrjv eyei (frvaiv, fj Kai to voeiv elKOTois. Kai yap o has itself also another nature prior to it by which
thinking comes naturally. For it has something to
50 vorjoei, on dAAo rrpo avTrjs' Kai otov avrrj avrrjv, otov think about because there is something else before
KarapLavBdvei a eayev eK rrjs dXXov Beas ev avrij. tS 8e it; and when it thinks itself it is in a way compre­
jxrjre tl dXXo rrpo avrov fJ.rjre n avveariv avro) ef hending what it had from the vision of another in
itself. But that which has nothing else before it nor
* Kirchhoff: ouSc Enn. anything accompanying it from something else—
212
213

i
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

aXXov, Ti Kat vo-qaei -q iroi? iavTov; rt yap e^qrei rj ti whatever will it think and how will it think itself.
For what did it seek and what did it long for? Was it
fTTodei; q rqv hvvap.iv avrov oaij, cos €kt6s ovaqs avTov,
to know how great its power was, as if it was outside
66 Kado ivoei; Xeycu he, ei aXXrj pkv ■q hvvapis avrov, qv it in so far as it thought it? What I mean by this is, if
epdvdavev, aXXq he, ^ epdvdavev el he pia, rl ^qrel; the power which it learnt about was one thing and
the power by which it learnt another; but if they
41. KivSuveuet yap ^o-qBeia to voelv hehoaBai rats were one, what was it seeking? . . , ,
cjivaeai rals deiorepais pev, eXarroai he ovaais, Kat otov 41. For it seems likely that thinking has been
given as a help to the natures which are of the more
avrals rv(j>Xals ovaais oppa. 6 8’ 6<f>9aXp6s rl dv heoiro divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an eye
TO ov opav <f>(bs avTos cov; o S’ dv heqrai. Si’ 6<f>6aXpov for their blindness. But why should the eye which is
itself light 1 need to see real being? But what does
6 aKOTOV eycov Trap’ avrco <f>ws ^qrei. el'oSv cj>cos to voetv,
need to seeks light through the eye because it has
TO he <f>(os cf>cos ov ^qrel, ovk dv eKeivq ij avyq ^ cfidts pq darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light
^qrovaa i^qrqaeie voelv, ovhe npoaOqaei avTfj to voelv does not seek light, that ray which does not seek
light would not seek to think, and will not add
tI yap Kat Troiqaei; q rl TrpoaOqaei heopevos Kat avros 6 to itself; for what will it do with it? Or what
vovs, iva vofj; ovk aladaverai odv eavrov-—ov yap will even Intellect itself add in its need in order to
think? So he has no perception of himself—he does
10 helrai—oSS’ eari hvo, pdXXov he ^ouSe^^ TrXelco, avros, not need it—and he is not two, or rather not several,
q voqais—ov yap hq q voqais avros—8ei 8e rpirov Kat himself, his thinking—for his thinking is certainly
TO voovpevov etvai. el he ravrov vovs, voqais, voqrov,
not himself—and what is being thought must be the
third. But if intellect, thinking, and object of
Trdvrq ev yevopeva dcpaviel avra ev aiirols' hiaKpiOevra thought are the same, if they become altogether one
Se rip “dXXo” vdXiv aS ovk eKelvo earai. eareov odv rd they will make themselves disappear in themselves;
but if they are distinguished by being other they
16 dXXa TrdvTq errl cpvaeeos dplarqs ovhepids eviKovplas will, again, not be that Good. With the best nature,
heopevqs' o yap dv TTpoadijs, qXdrrcoaas rfj TrpoadqKq then which needs no assistance, we must leave aside
everything; for whatever you add, you have lessened
rqv ovhevds heopevqv. qplv pev yap q voqais KaXov, on by the addition the nature wliich needs nothing. For
ipvxq helrai vovv eyeiv, Kat vcp, on to eivai avrco thinking is a fine thing for us, because the soul needs
to possess intellect, and for Intellect, because its
' Kirchhoff: aCrij Enn.
“ coniecimus. ' Cp. IV. 6. 4 and 7; V. 6. 7.
214 215
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7. THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

ravTOv, Kal i) vo-qais TreTronj/cev avTOv avveivai o^v Sei being is the same as thinking, ‘ and thinking made 1^
therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with
20 rfj voijcrei tovtov Kal avveaiv avrov Xafi^dveiv del, on thinking and to be always getting an intimate under­
TOVTO TOVTO, OTi TO. 8vo iv el 8’ ev ■^v [iovov, rjpKeaev dv standing of itself, that this is this, because the two
avrw Kal ovk dv eSeijdi) Aa^ecv. enel Kal to "yvwdi are one; but if it was only one, it would have sufficed
to itself and would not have needed to get under­
aavTOv" Xeyerai rovrois, oi Sid to irXiidos eauTcIiv standing. Since also "Know yourself” is said to
epyov eyovai Siapidfieiv eavrov^ Kal /naffetv, oaa Kal those who because of their selves’ multiplicity have
the business of counting themselves up and learning
25 TTOia ovTey ov ndvra taaaiv ovSev, ovS’d n dipyei ovSe
that they do not know all of the number and kind of
Kara rl avroi. el Se rl eanv avro, pei^ovcos earlv rj things they are, or do not know ^iny one of them, not
Kara yvwaiv Kal vorjaiv Kal awaCaOrjaiv avrov- errel what their ruling principle is or by what they are
themselves. But if the Good is anything, it is so in a
ovSe eavTw ovSev eanv ovSev yap eladyei els avrov, greater way than by knowledge and thought and
dAAd dpKet avro. ov rolvvv ov8’ dyadov avrw, dAAd rols self-perception; since it is not anything for itself, for
30 dAAoiy ravra yap Kal 8elrai avrov, avro 8e ovk dv it does not bring anything into itself, but itself
suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for
8eoiro eavrov- yeXoiov ydp- ovraj yap dv Kal ev8ees -^v the others; for they need it, but it could not need
avrov. ov8e /SAeirei 8ij eavro- 8ei ydp ri elvai Kal itself; that would be ridiculous; for if it did it would
ylveadac avrcp e/c rod ^Xe-aeiv. rovrcuv ydp andvraiv be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at
itself; for it must have and get something from the
TTapaKexcdprjKe rots p.er’ avro, Kal Kcv8vvevei p,rj8ev looking. For it has left all these things to the beings
ru)v npoaovrojv rols dXXois eKeCvcp napelvai, wa-nep which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the
additions to the others are with it, just as even
35 ouSe ovala- ov rolvvv ovSe to voelv, etrrep evravQa rj
substance is not; so not thinking either, since that is
ovala Kal 6p,ov dp(j>oi -q voqais 17 irpcvrq Kal Kvplws Kal where substance is and the primary and authentic
rd etvai. 816 o v r e Xd y o s ovre at a d -q a is thinking and being are both together. Therefore
"There is neither discourse nor perception nor
ovr e erTiar-qpiq, on p.q8ev eon Karqyopeiv avrov knowledge” 2 because it is impossible to predicate
ws TTapov. ^ anything of it as present with it.
42. ’AAA’ orav d-nop-qs ev rw roiovnp Kal l,rjrfjs. 42. But when in this kind of enquiry you adopt a
rational approach to these things and get into dif-

* A reference to Parmenides fr. B 3 DK. ^ Plato Parmenides 142A3-4.

216 217

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.
oTTOv Sei TavTa OeaOai, Xoyiafjub en avrk areXXo/xevos,
aiTodov ravra, a vofML^eK aefiva etvai, ev rots Sevrepois,
Kat /Li'^re to Sevrepa irpoaTudei tw rrp^Tip p,-^Ti to
5 rpiTa Tols Sevrepois, oAAd to Sevrepa rrepi ro -irpwrov
ridei Kat ra rpira rrepi to Sevrepov. ovrco yap avra
eKaara edaeis, tvs eyei, Kat ra varepa i^apr-qaeis
eKeivwv cos eKelva rrepideovra e<f>’ eavrwv ovra. Sio Kat
opdws Kat ravrrj Xeyerai rr e pt r ov rr dvr cov
lO^aacXea rrdvra eart KOKeivov eveKa
rr dvr a, ra rrdvra ovra Xeyovros avrov Kat ro eKelvov
eveKa, erreiSrj Kat rov eivai airios avrois Kat oiov
opeyerai eKeivov erepov ovros rwv rrdvrcov Kat ovSev
eyovTOS, 0 eKeivois rrdpeariv rj OVK dv eirj eri to rrdvra,
ei Ti eKeivcp rcov aXXcov rcbv p.er avrov rrapeir]. et ovv
15 Kat vovs rcov rrdvrcov, ovSe vovs eKeivtp. airiov Se
Xeycov rr d V r CO V k aXcbv ro KaXov ev rots eiSeai
<l>aiverai ridepievos, avro Se vrrep ro KaXov rrdv rovro.
ravra Sij Sevrepa riBets els <^auTd) ^ to rpCra ^rjatv
dvtjprrjaOai to pierd ravra yevop-eva, Kat rrept to rpira
20 Se riOets etvai, SrjXov on rd yevopieva eK rcov rplriov,
Koapiov rdvSe, els ipvxriv. dvr]prr]p.evr]s Se tjivxris els vovv
Kat vov els rdyaOdv, ovrco rrdvra els eKelvov Sid pieacov,
rcov piev rrXrjaiov, rcov Se rots rrXrjalov yeirovovvrcov,
eaxdrrjv S’ drroaraaiv rcov alad-qrwv exovrcov els tpvxrjv
dvrjprrjpievtov.
’ The reference is to Platonic Letter II 312E1-2. This
2i8
THE FOKMS AND THE GOOD
ficulties and enquire where you should put theni, put
away these things which you regard as majestic on
the second level, and do not add the seconds to the
first or the thirds to the seconds, but set the seconds
around the first and the thirds around the second.
For thus you will leave each of them as they are and
will make the things which come after depend upon
those higher realities which exist in independence
as the later things circle round them. This is why it
is rightly said in this regard also "All things are
around the King of all and all are for the sake of that
King’’*; Plato is speaking of all the real beings and
says "for the sake of that King”, since he is the cause
of their being and they, we may say, strive after him,
who is other than all of them and has nothing which
belongs to them; otherwise they would not still be
"all things” if any of the other things which come
after him belonged to him. If then Intellect is one of
"all things” it does not belong to him. But when
Plato'calls him "Cause of all beauties” he is clearly
putting beauty in the world of Forms, but the Good
itself above all this beauty. Now when he puts these
second, he says that the thirds depend on them, that
is the things which come to be after tl;iem, and what
he posits around the thirds, clearly the things that
came to be from the thirds, this universe here, he
makes depend on Soul. But since Soul depends on
Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so all things
depend on him through intermediaries, some close to
him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the
things of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate
distance from him.
cryptic passage, very unlikely to be authentic Plato, had
great authority for the Neoplatonists.
219
ENNEAD VI. 8
 VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Introductory Note
This treatise, number 39, immediately follows m
Porphyry’s chronological order its predecessor in the
Enneads, VI. 7 (38). The two together contain the pro-
foundest and most powerful expression of the thought of
Plotinus about the One or Good. This First Principle is
spoken of here in more strongly positive terms than any­
where else in the Enneads-. the language of will and love
and thought is used about him, and he appears as some­
thing more like a "personal God” than he does elsewhere in
the Enneads. But, as Plotinus makes clear in the treatise,
this positive emphasis is in no way intended to be incoMist-
ent with the negative way of approach to the One on which
he so strongly insists. It is rather a powerful contribution
to that negating of negations which the later Neoplatonists
showed clearly was the final stage on the negative way and
was necessary to attain that fruitful and illuminating
silence in which alone the One can be contemplated.
Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our
concept of human freedom and it is from this that he
ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that
he has no better starting-point, to consider the freedom of
the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7
he introduces a "rash statement starting from a different
way of thinking” which says that since the Good "happens
to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is,
and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom.
223
 FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or
not to do is not in its power.” It is not clear whether
Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine
other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine;
and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he
has himself thought of or an objection which he has
actually heard from others; a view of my own that it comes
from a Christian source much concerned to assert the
absolute freedom of God’s will has not been generally
accepted (A. H. Armstrong, "Two Views of Freedom” in
Studia Patristica XVIII, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982,
397-406). But however that may be, he takes it very seri­
ously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on
establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in
doing this that he uses language more likely than anything
else in the Enneads to commend his version of Platonism to
theists (Platonist, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to
think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence
and will; though, as has already been said, he is careful to
show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent
with his negative theology.
Synopsis
Statement of scope of the enquiry; it is to extend as high
as the One; but we must begin with our own experience of
"having something in our power” (ch. 1). Problems about
the freedom of human beings in our present state, as
embodied souls (chs. 2-3). Freedom is power to go to the
Good: Intellect possesses this in the fullest degree (ch. 4).
Our souls in their highest, contemplative, activity can
share in this freedom of Intellect (chs. 5-6). How can we
drag the lord and master of all things, the Good, into our
discussion of freedom? A rash and absurd statement about
224
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
it (ch. 7). Total inadequacy of all our language to the Good
(ch. 8). And especial inadequacy of "it happened to be” (ch.
9). Chance is later than and inferior to Intellect; and
though the Good necessarily is what he is he is not bound
by necessity but is the necessity and law of the others
(ch. 10). Questions which cannot properly be asked about
the Good; necessity to overcome our persistent tendency to
imagine it as in a place (ch. 11). That which gives freedom
to substance itself must be still freer; though "master of
himself” is inadequate (ch. 12). Yet perhaps we must use
this sort of inadequate language, understanding "as if
with every word; then we shall say that the Good is master
of himself and is as he willed himself to be (ch. 13). Cause
and substance are one in the world of real being; still more
in the cause of that world. He is cause of himself, self
primarily and beyond being (ch. 14). He is supremely
lovable and love of himself; when we attain to him we are
far above chance, more than free and more than independ­
ent (ch. 16). He is everywhere and nowhere, giving himsefr
existence in being awake to himself (ch. 16). Intellect is
beyond providence, choice and chance, and its cause still
more so, by himself what he is, related and directed to
himself (ch. 17). Intellect and the One: image of the circle
with the One as centre, being as he wished to be and ought
to be (ch. 18). Experience of the Good transcends language,
he who made being has no need of being and is so beyond it
(ch. 19). He is eternally his own self-making, total^ self-
determined and at his own disposal (ch. 20). He is his will,
truly free and truly himself (ch. 21).
225
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

VI. 8. (39) nEPI TOT EKOYZIOT KAI VI 8 ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF
0EAHMATOZ TOY ENOZ THE ONE

1. ’Ap’ Ictti Kai STTL deibv ei ri eariv in’ avrols 1. Is it possible to enquire even about the gods
whether there is anything which is in their power, or
^ijTelv, rj iv avdpwnwv dSuva/ntats re Kai is it true that this kind of enquiry is proper in
afji<f>iaP'riT'qa(p,ois Swa/xeai to tolovtov av npenoi
dealing with human impotences and dubious
powers, but we must attribute to the gods om­
^rjTetv, deals Si to * ndvTa Svvaadai iniTpenTeov koI nipotence and say that not just something but
everything is in their power? Or is it true that
5 en avTols ov povov ti, dAAd Kai ndvTa etvai; rj tijv
omnipotence and having everything in his power is
Svvapiv Srj ndaav Kai to in’ avTW S'q ndvTa evi indeed to be attributed to the One, but with the other
gods we should say that some things are this way
iniTpenTeov, toIs S’ dXXois to. pev ovtous, to. S’ iKeivws and some the other way, and of which gods each is
Tiaiv^ iKaTepws; rj Kai TavTa pev ^TjTrjTiov, true? Now we must certainly enquire about this as
well [as human freedom] and we must dare to push
ToXprjTiov Se Kai ini tuiv npojTOJv Kai tov avw vnep our enquiry on to the first beings and to him who is
on high above all things, and enquire in this way
10 ndvTa ^rjTelv to toiovtov, ncos to in’ avTW, Kav ndvTa
what "being in his power” means, even if we agree
avyxaipwpev Svvaadai. koCtoi Kai to SvvaoOai tovto that he is omnipotent. And we must investigate as
well what this "potent” means, in case by using this
OKenTeov nws noTe XiyeTai, prjnore ovtods to pev term we intend to say that it sometimes means
Svvapiv, TO S’ ivepyeiav (frrjaopev, Kai ivepyeiav potency and sometimes actual activity, and an acti­
vity which belongs to the future.* But we must
peXXovaav. dAAd raOra pev iv to) napovTi dva^XrjTeov, postpone these questions for the present, and first
enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether
15 npoTepov Se e<j) rjpibv avrwv, i(j>’ wv Kai ^rjTeiv edos, ei
' Plotinus shows himself here very well aware of the
ambiguity inherent in the Greek philosophical usage of
' H-S': re Enn. SwaaSat, Svvapis, which it is often necessary to take into
“ Harder, Theiler, recte: naiv H-S^. account in reading him.
226 227
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Ti €<l>’ rjulv ov Tvyxavei. vpwTOv ^rjTrjreov rC ttots 8ei to anything does happen to be in our power.* First we
i<l>’ rjijuv eival ti Xiyeiv tovto S’ earl t(s ewoia rov must ask what something "being in our power”
ought to mean; that is, what is the idea of this kind of
Toiovrov ovTct) yap av ttcos yvcaadeiTj, ei Kat ent deovs thing in our minds; for in this way it might come to
Kal Iti p,dXXov kiTi Oeov dpp,6^€i peTa(f>epeiv tJ ov be known whether it is suitable to transfer it to the
20 pereveKTeov ■!) pLereveKreov p,ev, ^tfTrjTeov Se, ttcos to gods and, still more, to God, or whether it should not
be transferred; or whether it should be transferred,
€TT avTots TOis Te aXXois Kat e-irt t6)V irpcoTcov. ti toivvv
but we should enquire how "being in their power” is
voovvTes TO e<f>’ T)p,lv Xeyopxv Kat Sid t( ^rjTovvTes; eyco to be applied to the other gods and to the first beings.
pev otpai, €v Tats evavTiais Kivovpevoi Tvyais re Kat What then do we have in our minds when we speak
dvdyKais Kat TraOchv iaxvpats TTpoaPoXats ttjv >I>vxt)v of "being in our power”, and why are we trying to
find out? I myself think that, when we are pushed
25 KaTexovaais, diravra Tavra Kvpia vopCaavTes eivai Kai around among opposing chances and compulsions
SovXevovTes avTots Kat <j>ep6p€voi ij eKetva ayoi, p'q and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul,
TTOTe ovSfv eapiev ovSe ti eoTiv icj)’ rjpiv ‘qTTop'qaapev, cos we acknowledge all these things as our masters and
TOVTOV eaopevov dv ^<f>’ 'qptv, o prj Tvxais SovXevovTes are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take
us, and so are in doubt whether we are not nothing
pTjSe dvdyKais pr]Se Trddeaiv laxvpots irpa^aipev av and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that
30 povXrjOevTes ovSevos evavriovpevov Tats jSouAijaeatv. el whatever we might do when not enslaved to chances
Se TOVTO, eiTj dv ij ewoia tov ecfi’ Tjpiv, o Trj jSouAijaei or compulsions or strong passions, because we
wished it and with nothing opposing our wishes, this
SovXevei Kat irapd tooovtov^ dv. yevoiTO i] piq, nap’
would be in our power. But if this is so, our idea of
oaov PovXrjOei'rjpev dv. eKovcjiov pev yap ndv, o prj ^la what is in our power would be something enslaved to
peTa TOV elSevai, e^’ riptv Se, o Kat Kvpioi npd^ai. Kat our will and would come to pass (or not) to the
extent to which we wished it. For everything is a
' Kirchhofif: toCtov wBRQ: toCto JU: toutov C. voluntary act which we do without being forced to
and with knowledge [of what we are doing], and in
our power which we are also competent to do. And
’ In this discussion of human freedom, which continues
to ch. 6, Plotinus takes account of earlier, mostly refuting or criticising his predecessors but with building
Peripatetic, discussions, especially Aristotle’s treatment of up his own distinctive Platonic view of human freedom,
the voluntary and involuntary in Nicomachean Ethics F that we are only truly free when we live on our highest
1-6. 1109b30-1114b25. But he is not concerned with level in the realm of Intellect.
228
229
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

35 axn/6eoi fiev^ dv TToXXaxov aju^w Kat rov Xoyov avTcbv both may often coincide, even if their definition is
irepov oVtos, eari 8’ oS Kai 8ia^<xivr)a€i€v dv oiov ei different; but sometimes they might be discordant;
for instance, if one was competent to kill, it would
Kvpios ‘^v Tov amoKTelvai, fjv dv oux eKovaiov avrw
not be a voluntary act when one did so if one did not
TTfTTpaxoTi, el rov Trarepa ■qyvdei rovrov etvai. rdxa 8’ know that this man was one’s father. But perhaps
dv KaKelvcp 8ia<j>o}vol exovri to €<j) eavrw- 8el 8rj Kai that ignorance would he incompatible with having
something in one’s power; and certainly the know­
40 Ti)v el8r](Jiv ev rep eKovaiw ovk ev TOtr KadeKaara p.6vov
ledge involved in a voluntary act must not only
eivai, dXXd Kat oXoJS. Sid +i yap, el p.ev dyvoel, on apply in the particular circumstances but generally.
(filXios, aKOvaiov, el 8e dyvoel, on p.rj 8et, ovk aKovaiov; For why is the action involuntary if one does not
el S’ on e8ei fxavddveiv; ovy eKovaiov to firj el8evai, on know that it is a relation, but not involuntary if one
does not know that one ought not to do it? Possibly
e8ei pLavOdveiv, rj to dvdyov and rov p.av0dveiv. because one ought to have learnt that? Not knowing
2. ’AAA’ eKelvo !^T]TT)Teov tovto Sij to dva<^ep6p.evov that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary, nor
els ijfids d>s €cj)’ rip.Lv vndpyov tlvl 8el SiSdvai; rj yap rij is what leads one away from learning.
2. But we must enquire into the following; to what
dppfi Kat TjTiviovv ope^ei, olov o dvpw nparrerai (^rj prj
ought we to attribute this which is referred to us as
npaTTeraiy,^ rj eniBvpla rj Xoyiapw tov avp<f>epovTOS being in our power? One possibility is to attribute it
5 per' dpe^ecjs [17 prj irpaTrerai].^ dAA’ el pev dvppj Kat to impulse and any kind of desire, for instance what
eniQvpia, Kat naiat Kat B-qplois to en avrols n etvai is done or not done by passion or lust or calculation
of the beneficial accompanied by desire. But if by
8u)aojj.ev Kat paivopevois Kat e^eoTrjKoai Kat passion or lust, we shall grant that something is in
(fiappaKois dXovai Kat rats npoaninrovaais the power of children and wild animals and madmen
<j>avTaaCaLS, cuv ov Kvpior el 8e Xoyiapw per’ dpe^eevs, and those who are heside themselves and caught by
drugs or casually occurring imaginations of which
10 dp’ el Kat nenXavrjpevLp np Xoyiap<p; rj rip dpOw they are not master; but if by calculation accom­
Xoyiapcp Kht rfj dpdfj dpe^ei. Kalroi Kat evravda panied by desire, is this so if the calculation has
CrjT'^aeiev dv ns, noTepa d Xoyiapds rrp ope^iv gone wrong? Should we perhaps attribute it to
eKivrjaev, rj tovtov tj ope^ij. Kat yap el Kara (l>vaiv at correct calculation accompanied by correct desire?
Yet even here one might enquire whether the cal­
dpe^eis, el pev ws ^<pov Kat tov avvderov, •qKoXovdrjoev culation set the desire in motion or the desire the
* Kirchhoff: awBot pev UCP°: awBei pev wBxC: awBelpev calculation. Then also, if the desires are according
Q, H-S'. to nature, if they are of the kind that belong to the
^ transpos. Igal. living being, that is, the composite, the soul followed
230 231
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

the necessity of nature; but if they are of the kind

16 t) ’’"U <f>vaea)S avdyKrj- el 8e to? ij/vxfis fiovrjs,
that belongs to the soul alone, many of the things
TToXXd Td)v vvv €(f>’ rjfjilv Xeyofievwv e^cD av tovtov which are now said to be in our power will be outside
ylvoiro. etra Kai rt? Aoyia/xo? ^lAo? upoeiai rdiv it. Then also, what bare calculation precedes our
passions? Or when imagination compels and desire
TTadrjfiaTCDv; rj re <f>avTaala dvayKa^ovaa ij re ope^is pulls us in whatever direction it leads, how are we
e<f> o Ti dv dyr) eXKOvaa ttws ev rovrois Kvplovs noiei; given the mastery in these circumstances? And how
in general can we have the mastery where we Me
va)s S’ oAto? Kvpioi, oS dyopeda; to yap evSees e^ led? For that which is in need and necessarily de­
20 dvdyKTjs ■nXrjpataeoJS opeyopevov ovk ecm Kvpiov tov sires to be filled does not have the mastery over that
to which it is simply being led. But how in general
e<f>’ o TTavTeXdis dyerai. irto? S’ oAto? aoro ti nap’ avrov,
can something be self-originated which comes from
o nap’ dXXov Kai dpyrjv els dXXo KdKeWev something else and whose origin is referred to some­
yeyevrjrai otov eon; Kar’ eKelvo yap Kai to? thing else and has come to be as it is from thence.
For it lives according to that and as it is formed by it,
nenXaarai- rj ovtcd ye Kai rd difivxa e^ei to en avTots or in this way soulless things will be able to have
25 Ti elXr]<j>evar noiei yap to? yeyevrjTai Kai to nvp. el S’ something in their power; for fire also acts as it has
come to be. But if it is because the living being and
OTi yiyvwoKei to ^(pov Kai rj tpoyri o noiei, el pev the soul knows what it does, if it knows by sense-
aladrjaei, ti? 17 npoad'qKt] npds to en’ avTols eivai; ov perception, what help is that to things being in their
power? For sense-perception does not give mastery
yap rj aladrjais nenoCrjKe tov epyov Kvpiov ISovaa
of the work since it only sees. But if by knowledge, if
povov. el 8e yvioaei, el pev yvuiaei tov noiovpevov, Kai it is by knowledge of what is being done, here too it
30 evTavda olSe povov, dXXo Se eni Trjv npd^iv dyer el Se only knows, but something else leads to action, but if
reason or knowledge acts against the desire and gets
Kai napd TTjv ope^iv o Xoyos noiei rj ■q yvcoais Kai the better of it, we must enquire to what this is to oe
Kparei, els tl dvai/tepei ^rjrrjTeov, Kai oAto? nov tovto referred, and in general where it takes place. And it
reason itself makes another desire, we must under­
avp^alvei. Kai el pev avrds dXXrjv ope^iv noiei, Trto? stand how; but if it puts a stop to the desire and
Xrjnreov el Se Trjv ope^iv navoas eart) Kai evravda to stands still and this is where what is in our power is,
35 e^’ rjpiv, ovk ev npd^ei tovto eoTai, dAA’ ev vd) this will not be in action, but will stand still in
Intellect; since everything in the sphere of action,
OTT^aeTai tovto' enel Kai to ev npd^ei ndv, Kav KpaT-p 6 even if reason is dominant, is mixed and cannot have
Xoyos, piKTOv Kai ov Kadapov SvvaTai to e^’ •qpiv eyeiv. being in our power in a pure state.
233
232
 FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
3. We must therefore enquire about these matters;
3. Ato aKfTTT€ov TT€pt TovTCOv ySr) ydfi av^ Kai eyyus for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to
yivofieda tov Xoyov tov irepl Ocwv. avayciyovT€S toivvv our subject of discourse, the gods. Well then, we
TO e<l>’ rjfilv els PovXtjaiv, eira ravrrjv ev Xoycp 9ep,evoL, traced back what is in our power to will, and then
placed this in the context of discourse, and then of
etra iv Aoyto 6p9u)—Ictus Se Sel TTpoaffetvai rw 6p9(u to correct discourse—^but perhaps we ought to add to
5 Tijs eTTiarqp/r^s' ov yap, el ns eSo^aaev op9ibs Kai "correct” that it belongs to rational knowledge; for
enpa^ev, eyoi dv lacus dvap.(f>ia^T]TT)Tov to avTe^ovaiov, if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he
would not indisputably have the power of self-
el piT] elScus SioTt 6p9u)S, aAAd roxH V <f>avTaala Tivi
determination if he acted, without knowing why his
npds TO Seov dx9els' etrel Kat TTjv ^avTaalav ovk opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or
•fip-lv elvai XeyovTes tovs kot avTrjv SptuvTas ttous dv els some imagination; since when we say that imagina­
10 TO avTe^ovaiov rd^aipev; dAAd ydp ripels T-qv pev tion is not in our power, how can we put those who
act by it in the class of the self-determined? But we
<j)avTaalav, qv dv tis xai <f>avTaalav Kvpluts elnoi, Tqv do say this about the imagination which one can
eK TOV aoypaTos twv TTa9r]pdTtuv eyeipopevqv (ital ydp properly call imagination,' that which is roused by
Kevcuaeis aiTcuv Kai votwv tfiavTaaias otov the experiences of the body, for being empty, or
again full, of food and drink in a way gives the
avuT^XaTTOvai Kat TrX'qpdioeis ad Kat peoTOS Tts imaginations shape, and one who is full of semen has
15 OTreppaTOS dXXa (f>avTd^eTai Kat Ka9’ eKaoTas different imaginations, and so it is according to all
TTOtoT'qTo.s vyptuv Tu)v ev ccupaTi) TOVS KaTa to.s the qualities of the bodily fluids, and we shall not
TOtaoTaj (j>avTaalas evepyovvTas els dpxqv avreiovaiov
class those who are active according to imagina­
tions of this kind among those whose principle of
OV Ta^opev 8i6 Kat tols cftavXois KaTd TavTas action is self-determined; therefore! we shall not
irpaTTovai Td TtoXXd ovTe to pv avTOis ovTe to grant to bad men, who do most things according to
20 eKovaiov Swaopev, tw Se Sid vov twv evepyeiwv
these, either having something in their power or
voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary ac­
eXev9epw twv TTa9qpdTWV tov awpaTOS to avTe^ovaiov tion to one whose doings depend on the activities of
Swaopev—els dpxqv to e^’ rjplv KaXXloTqv dvdyovTes Intellect and who is free from bodily affections. We
trace back what is in our power to the noblest
Enn.
belonging to the higher and one to the lower soul (IV. 3.31).
' In his earlier discussion of imagination and memory in But here he seems to exclude the higher ^avTaaia from
his great work on the soul, IV. 3-5 (27-29), Plotinus comes consideration.
to -the conclusion that there are two <l>avTamai, one
235
234
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
T1JV Tov vov ivepyeiav Kai ras evrevOev TTpordaeis
iXevdepas ovtcjs (^eivaiy ^ Sd>aop,ev, Kat rds ope^eii rds
€K TOV voetv eyeipop,€vas ovk d-Kovaiovs [eivai
25 8coaop,ev],^ Kat rots Oeols tovtov ^cbai tov Tponov [oaoi
vcp Kat ope^ei rij kotol vovv ^d>ai] ^ (j)riaop,€v irapeivai.
4. KaiTOt ^’qTTjaeiev dv Tig, noig iroTe to kot ope^Lv
yiyvopevov avTe^ovaiov earai rij? opeiecvg eirt to e^co
dyovarjg Kat to evSeeg exovarjg- dyeTai yap to
opeyopevov, Kav ei TTpog to dyaddv dyoiTO. Kat Srj Kat
5 nept TOV vov avTov aTToprjTeov, et onep Tre^u/ce Kat cos
TTe<j>VKev evepywv XeyoiTO dv to eXevdepov eyeiv Kat to
in’ aiiTO), ovk eycvv in’ avTO) to prj noietv. eneiTa, et
oAcos Kvpiojg XiyoiTO in’ e/ceiocoo to in’ avTotg, otg
npd^ig oil ndpeoTiv. dAAd Kat oig npd^ig, rj dvdyKtj
10 e^cvOev oil yap pdTTjv npd^ovaiv. dAA’ ovv ndig to
iXevdepov SovXevdvTcov Kat tovtojv tjj avToiv (fivaei; rj,
el prj iTipw eneadai rjvdyKaaTai, ndig dv to SovXeveiv
XiyoLTo; nwg 8i npdg to dyaddv tl (fiepdpevov
TjvayKaapivov dv etrj eKovaiov Tfjg i<^iaeojg ovarjg, ei
15 eiScos OTi dyaddv dig in’ dyaddv ioi; to yap aKovaiov
dnaywyrj and tov dyadov Kat npdg to rjvayKaapevov, et
npdg TOVTO <f>epoiTO, o prj dyaddv avTui- Kat 8ovXevei
TOVTO, d prj Kvpidv ioTiv int to dyaddv iXdelv, dAA’
eTepov KpeiTTovog i^eaTijKOTog dndyenai twv ainov
20 dyaddiv 8ovXevov e/ceivcu. Sid tovto yap Kat 8ovXeca
ipiyeTai ovy oS Tig ovk eyei i^ovalav int to KaKdv
* transposuimus.
^ del. H-S\ ut glossam.
236
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant
that the premises of action derived from this are
truly free, and that the desires roused by thinking
are not involuntary, and we shall say that the gods
who live in this way have self-determination.
4. But all the same one might enquire how what
happens under the impulse of desire can be self-
determined when desire leads one to what is outside
[oneself] and has deficiency in it; for that which
desires is led, even if it is led to the good. And a
difiiculty must be raised about Intellect itself,
whether, when its activity is what it is by nature and
as it is by nature, it could be said to have freedom
and anything in its power, when it does not have it
in its power not to act. And then whether "in their
power” can properly be said of those beings which
have no practical action. But the necessity comes
from outside also to those beings which are engaged
in practical action; for their action will not be
purposeless. But then how is there freedom when
even these higher beings are slaves to their own
nature? Now, where there is no compulsion to follow
another, how can one speak of slavery? How could
something borne towards the Good be under compul­
sion since its desire for the Good will be voluntary if
it knows that it is good and goes to it as good? For
the involuntary is a leading away from the good and
towards the compulsory, if something is carried to
that which is not good for it; and that is enslaved I
which is not master of its going to the Good, but,
since something stronger than it stands over it, it is
enslaved to that and led away from its own goods.
For it is for this reason that slavery is ill spoken of,
not where one has no power to go to the bad, but
237
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
eXOelv, dAA’ od etri to dyadov to eavrov dyofievos irpos
TO dyaOov to dXXov. to 8e (coi SouAeueiv Xeyeiv tt) avTOV
<l>vaeL Svo TTOiowTos eoTi to t€ SovXevov Kai to (Jj. <f>vpis
25 Se aTrAij Kai evepyeia fxla Kat ovSe to Svvd/nei eyovaa
dXXo, dXXo 8e TO evepyeia, nebs ovk eXevOepa; ovSe yap
cos ne<f>VKe XeyoiTO dv evepyetv dAAijs ovarjs Trjs ovaCas,
T-rjs Se evepyelas dXXrjs, etnep to avTO to etvai iKei Kat
TO evepyetv. el oSv ovTe Si’ eTepov oure e<f>’ erepco, nobs
30 OVK eXevOepa; Kat el p-rj to en’ avTu> dppioaei, dAAd
pet^ov evTavda tov en’ avTip, Kat ootcos in’ avTw, oti
prj e(f>’ erepep p.ij8’ dAAo t^s evepyelas Kvpiov ovSe yap
T-^S ovalas, einep dpxTj. Kat el aXXrjv Se d vovs dpxrjv
exei, dXX’ OVK e^co avrov, ctAA’ ev tw dyadet). Kat el KaT
35 eKelvo to dyadov, noXv paXXov en’.avTcp Kat to
eXevdepov enet Kat to eXevdepov Kat to in’ odrep tis
t,T}Tel TOV dyadov ydpiv. el ovv koto to dyadov ivepyet,
pdXXov dv TO in’ avro)- ySr/ yap eyei to npos avTO i^
avTOV oppebpevov^ Kat iv avTW \einep npos aoTo],® d
40 dpeivov dv etij adrep iv avrw dv etvai, einep npos avro.
5. ’Ap’ ovv iv vcp povut voovvTi TO avTe^ovaiov Kat
TO in’ avTW Kat iv vw tw Kadapip tj Kai ev ijivxfj ccara
vodv ivepryovar) Kat /card dpeTrjv npaTTOvorj; to pev otv
npaTTOvoT] einep Siooopev, npebrov pev ov npos ttjv
* Kirchhoff.
° Kirchhoff: opwiievov Enn.
^ delevimus.
238
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
where one has no power to go to one’s own good but
is led away to the good of another,. But to speak of
being enslaved to one’s own nature is making two
things, one which is enslaved and one to which it is
enslaved. But how is a simple nature and single
active actuality not free, when it does not have one
part potential and one actual? For it could not be
said to be active according to its nature as if its
substance was one thing and its activity another if
being and acting there are the same. If then the
activity is neither because of another or in the power
of another, how is.it not free? And even if "being in
its own power” is unsuitable language, but there is
something higher than being in its power here, even
so it is in its own power because it is not in the power
of another nor is another master of its activity; nor
indeed of its substance, if it is principle of its sub­
stance. And even if Intellect does have another
principle, it is not outside it, hut it is in the Good.
And if it is active according to the Good, it is much
more in its own power and free; since one seeks
freedom and being in one’s own power for the sake of
the Good. If then it is active according to the Good,
it would be still more in its own power; for it has
already what goes from itself to it, and in itself what
would be better for it, being in it, if it is directed
towards it. ^
5. Is self-determination and being in one s own
power, then, only in Intellect when it thinks, that is,
pure intellect, or is it also in soul when it is active
according to intellect and engaged in practical ac­
tion according to virtue? Now if we are going to
grant it to the soul engaged in practical action, first
of all it should not perhaps be granted in reference to
239
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
5 reO^iv “aws XPV StSdvai- ov yap rip.ets tov rvyeiv Kvpiot.
el Se vpos TO KoAd)? Kai to ttavTa itoiTjoai to. nap’
avTov, Taya p,ev av tovto opOws Aeyotro. €K€ivo Se nebs
e<f>’ Tip.lv; otov el, Sioti noXepos, avSpi^olpeda- Xeyo) Se
TTjv Tore evepyeiav nebs e(f>’ T\p,lv, onoTe noXepov prj
10 KaTaXa^ovTOS ovk ■^v tijv evepyeiav TavTijv noirjaaadai;
6p,oiu}s Se Kal enl Tibv aXXojv npd^ewv T<bv KaTO. dpeT-qv
dnaaibv npos to npoanlnTOV aei avayKa^opevys Trjs
dpeTTjs ToSl y ToSi epyd^eoQai. Kai yap ei tis aipeaiv
avTfj Soly TT) apeTT), noTepa ^ovXeTai, iv e^oi evepyelv,
15 elvai noXepovs, iva dvSpCCoiTo, Kai eivai aSiKiav, iva ra
SiKaia opl^y Kai KaTaKoapy, Kai nevlav, "va
eXevdepiov evSeiKvvoiTO, y ndvriov eS eydvTWV yavylav
dyetv, eXoiTO dv ryv yavxlav rdiv npd^ecov ovSevds
depanelas Seopevov Tys nap’ avTys, wanep av ei tis
20 laTpds, oiov 'InnoKpaTys, pySeva SelaOai Tys nap’
avTov Texyys- si ovv evepyovaa ev Tals npa^eaiv y
dperij yvdyKaarai ^oydelv, nibs dv KaOapebs sxoi to en
avTy; dp’ oSv rds npd^eis pev dvayKalas, tijv Se
^ovXyaiv TIJV npo Ttbv npd^ewv Kai tov Adyov ovk
25 yvayKaapevov <f>yaopev; aXX ei tovto, ev t/iiXeb
TiOepevoi TO) npo tov npaTTopevov, e^cv Tys npd^eojs
TO avTe^ovaiov Kai to en’ avTy Ty dpeTy dyaopev. ti Se
in’ avrys Tys dpeTys Tys kotol tijv e^iv Kai
Sid9eaiv; dp’ ov KaKtbs ijivxys exovays <j)yaopev avTyv
els KaTaKoapyaiv eXdeiv avppeTpovpevyv Ta nddy Kai
30 Tas ope^eis; Tiva odv Tpdnov Xeyopev eif)’ yplv
240
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
the accomplishment; for it is not we who are in
charge of the accomplishment. But if it is granted in
reference to acting finely and doing everything
which comes from oneself, perhaps this might be
correctly said. But how is that in our power? For
instance if we are brave because there is a war; what
I mean is, how is the activity then in our power when
if war did not break out it would not he possible to
carry out this activity? But it is also the same with
the other actions done according to virtue, since
virtue is always being compelled to do this or that to
cope with what turns up. For certainly if someone
gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in
order to be active that there should be wars, that it
to
might be brave, and that there should be injustice
that it might define what is just and set things in
order, and poverty, that it might display its liber­
ality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it
would choose to rest from its practical activities
because nothing needed its curative action, as if a
physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish
that nobody needed his skill. If then when it is active
in practical affairs virtue is compelled to be helpful
how can things be purely and simply in its
Ar6 we then to assert that the actions are compelled
but the will and the reason which are before the
action are not compelled? But if this is so, by placing
them only in what comes before the action we shall
be placing self-determination, and being in the
power of virtue itself, outside the action. And what
tijv
about virtue itself which is according to state and
disposition? Are we to say that when the soul is in a
bad way it comes to set it to rights by bringing the
passions and desires within proper limits? In what
to
241

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
dyadoLS eivai Kai to dSearrorov T-qv dper-qv; q
Totj ye ^ovXqdelai Kai eXopevois' q on eyyevofievq
avrq KaraaKevd^ei to eXevdepov Kat to e(fi’ qpilv Kai
ovK ed €Ti SouAouy eivac, c5v -npoTepov ^pev. ei ovv oiov
35 vouj Tis aXXos eoTiv q dpeTq Kai e^is otov vocuOqvai Tqv
tjivxqv TTOiovaa, rraXiv aS qKei ovk ev npd^ei to e<j>’ qpiv,
dXX’ ev vw qavx<p tcov TTpd^ewv.
6. nd)s ovv els PovXqaiv npoTepov dvqyopev tovto
XeyovTes “o irapd to ^ovXqOqvai yevoiTO dv"; q KOKel
eXeyeTO "q pq yevoLTO el odv to. re vvv opOws XeyeTai,
eKelvd re tovtols e^ei, (f>qoopev Tqv pev
5 dpeTqv Kat tov vovv Kvpia eivai Kat els’TavTa xpqvai
dvdyeiv to e(f>’ qplv Kat to eXevdepov dheanoTa Se ovTa
TavTa TOV pev e<j> avTOV etvai, Tqv Se dpeTqv ^ovXeadai
pev e<f>’ avTTjs eivai e^eoTwaav Tq 4'^xfi> eivai
dyaOqv, Kat pexpi tovtov avTqv t6 eXevdepav Kai Tqv
10 tjjvxqv eXevdepav Trapaaxeodai' TTpoavnTTOVTWv Se rdiv
dvayKaCo}v TTadqpaTcov re Kat TTpd^ecov e^eoTihaav
TavTa pev pq ^e^ovXqadai yeveadai, opws ye pqv Kat
ev TOVTOis Siaawaeiv to e<f>' avTrj els avTqv Kat evTavda
dva<l>epovaav ov yap toIs Ttpaypaaiv e<j>e>}ieadaij oiov
15 aco^ovaa tov KivSvvevovTa, dXX’ el SokoI avTrj, Kai
TTpoiepevqv tovtov Kat to ^qv KeXevovoav irpoieadai Kat
XpqpaTa Kat TeKva Kat avTqv iraTplSa, okottov to
KoXov avTTjs exovaav, dXX‘ ov to eivai twv vtt’ avT-qv
woTe Kat TO ev Tals npd^eaiv avTe^ovaiov Kat to e<j>’
20 qplv OVK els to npaTTeiv dvdyeadai ovS’ els Tqv e^w,
' A favourite text from the proclamation which
introduces the choice of lives in the Myth of Er: Plato
Republic X 617E3.
® Ch. 1, lines 32-3.
242
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
way then are we saying that being good is in our
power and "virtue has no master”'? Yes, it is if we
wish and choose it; or because when virtue comes to
be in us it constructs freedom and being in our own
power and does not allow us to be any more slaves of
what we were enslaved to before. If then virtue is a
kind of other intellect, a state which in a way
intellectualises the soul, again, being in our power
does not belong to the realm of action but in intellect
at rest from actions.
6. How then did we refer this before to will when
we said "which would come to pass to the extent that
we wished it”? Now if was said there also "or would
not come to pass”. If then what we are saying now is
correctly said and what we said before will be in
tune with it, we shall assert that virtue and intellect
have the mastery and that we should refer being in
our own power and freedom to them; and since these
have no master, intellect is independent and virtue
wishes to be independent by supervising the soul to
make it good, and up to this point is free itself and
makes the soul free; but when compulsory passions
and actions come in the way it has not in its super­
vision wished that they should occur, but all the
same even among these it will keep its independence
by referring back to itself even here; for it will not
follow the lead of the facts, for instance by saving
the man who is in dapger, but, if it thinks fit, it will
sacrifice him and command him to sacrifice his life
and property and children and even his fatherland,
having in view its own excellence and not the
existence of what is subject to it; so that also in
practical actions self-determination and being in our
own power is not referred to practice and outward
243
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
dAA’ eis T'qv evTOS ivepyeiav Kai vorjaiv Kai dewpCav
avrijs T^S aper^s- Sei Se riji' aper-qv ravrqv vovv riva
Xeyeiv etvai ov avvapidfiovvra rd Trddq rd SovXcoOepra 7
pi€Tpq0evTa T<p A6y<p‘ ravra ydp €OiK€f (jyqaiVf € y y V s
26 T i Teiveiv t ov a di p, a t o s e 0e o i. Kai aoKqaeai
KaTopdwdevTa. ware eivai aaifiearepov, ws to avXov
eari to eXevOepov Ka'i els tovto q dvaywyq tov e(f>’ qplv
Kai avrq q ^ovXqais q Kvpla Kai e<j>’ eavrqs ovaa, Kai el
Ti eiTird^eie irpos rd e^w e$ dvdyKqs. oaa ovv e« ravrqs
30 Kai 8id ravrqv, eif)’ qpiv, e^w re Kai eij)’ avTqs' o airq
^ovXerai Kai evepyei dvepTToBlarws, tovto Kai irpwTOv
e<f)‘ qpiv. 6 8e dewpqriKOS vovs Kai -npwTOS ovtw to eif)’
avTW, OTi TO epyov avrov pq8apws e-n dXXcp, dXXd Trds
eireaTpaiTTai -npos avrov Kai to epyov avrov avros Kai
35 €v TW dyadw Keipevos dvev8eqs Kai TrXqpqs vvapyoiv
Kai otov Kara ^ovXqaiv ^wv q 8e ^ovXqais q voqais,
jSouAiJoiS 8’ eXeydq, on Kara vovv q^ ydp Xeyopevq
fiovXqais TO Kara vovv pipetrai. q ydp ^ovXqais 9eXei
TO dyaddv to 5e voeiv dXqdws iariv iv tw dyaOw. exei
40 ovv eKeivos, OTrep q ^ouAijais OeXei Kai 08 rvxovaa dv
ravrq voqais ylverai. el oiJv ^ovXqaei tov dyadov
rWepev^ to e<f>' qpiv, to q8q €v <L OeXei q ^ouAijois elvai
l8pvpevov TTWS ov TO eij)’ avrw ey^i; q pel^ov elvai
’■ Igal; Kai Enn.
^ Theiler: eTiBefiev Enn.
' Republic 518D10-E2.
^Plotinus is playing here on the common meaning
KOTO vow, "according to one’s mind”, "as one likes it”
the sense required by context here, "acc
244
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that
is, its thought and contemplation. But one must say
that this virtue is a kind ofintellect and not count in
with it the passions which are enslaved and limited
by the reason; for these, Plato says, "come close to
the body, since it is by habits and exercises”* that
they are set in order. So it is still clearer that the
immaterial is the free, and it is to this that being in
our power is to be referred and the will which has
the mastery and is independent, even if something
directs it by necessity to what is outside. All there­
fore that comes from this will and is done according
to it is in our power, when it is acting externally and
when it is by itself; what it wishes and makes actual
without hindrance, this is primarily what is in our
power. But the contemplative, that is the primary,
Intellect is what is in its own power in this way, that
its work in no way depends on another, but it is all
turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in
the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one
might say, living according to its will; but its will is
its thought, but was called will, because it was to its
mind; for what is called will imitates what is to its
mind.’^ For will wants the Good; but thinking is truly
in the Good. That Intellect therefore has what its
will wants, that by which it becomes thought when it
i attains it. If then we allot being in our power to
I willing the Good, surely that which is already firmly
I settled in what its will wants must possess it. Or else
ntellect”. The Divine Intellect lives, of course, according
D itself and so as it likes. The whole passage shows clearly
|W Plotinus, like other Greek philosophers, makes no
b distinction between thinking and willing.
I
I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAB VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

dereov, ei fjiri tis ideXei els' rovro dva^acveiv to €<f>’ it must be assumfed to be something greater, if one
does not want being in one’s own power to go up so
45 avTw.
high.
7. riveraL ovv, ^vxTj eXevOepo, Sid vov Ttpds to 7: The soul, then, becomes free when it presses on
without hindrance to the Good by means of Intellect,
dya^dv OTrevSqvaa dvepnroSlaTCOS, Kal o Sid tovto and what it does through this is in its pdwer; but
TTOiei, k<j> avTrj- vovs Se Si’ avTOV ij Se tov dyadov (f>vais Intellect is free through itself; but the nature of the
Good is the very goal of the striving and that
avTO TO ecfieTdv Kai Si o jd dXXa e^ei to e<f> avTois, through which the bthers have what is itf their
5 OTOv TO piev Tvyydveiv ‘dvepmoSlaTcos SvvrjTai, to Se power, when one is able to attain it without hin­
drance and the other to have it. Now how can one
exeii'- '"■‘US’ Srj avTO to Kvpiov dTrdvTiov twv pieT’ avTO bring the very lord and master of all things of value
Tipiicov Kai ev TTpioTrj eSpq ov, TTpds o rd dXXa dva^aiveiv after it, that which sits in tlie first seat, to which all
things else vyant ‘to ascend, and depend on it and
OeXei Kai e^qpTqTai avrov koi t^s SvvdpieisAxfi>‘ '"’“p” have their powers from it so as to be able to have
avTov, cocfT€ Svvaadai to en’ avTols'exeiv, ttcos dv tis something in their power—^how can one bring it
[down to the level of] what is in your and my power
10 els TO ev’ epioi rj evi aoi dyoi; ovov Kai vovs pioXis, opicos to which Intellect also was only dragged with dif­
Se piq eiXKeTO. el pirj tis ToXp.rjpds Xoyos erepcodev ficulty, though it was all the same violently dragged?
Unless some rash statement starting from a different
OTaXeis Xeyoi, ws Tvxovaa ovtcos fX^iv, cos exei, Kai way of thinking says that since [the nature of the
ovK oSaa Kvpia tov o eariv, oSaa tovto o eoTiv ov vap’ Good] happens to be as it is, and does not have the
masfery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself,
avrrjs ovTe to eXev6epov dv exoi ovTe to ev’ avTfj it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing
15 voiovaa tj p.rj voiovaa, o ■qvdyKaaTai voieiv rj piri what it is necessitated to do or not to, do is not in its
power. ^ This statement is indeed contrary and ab­
voielv. os Srj Adyos dvTiTVvds re" Kai dvopos Kai surd and would altogether do away with the nature
vavTavaai ttjv tov eKovalov t€ Kai avTe^ovalov <f>vaiv of free will and self-defemiination and our idea of
what is in our power, as if this was empty talk and
Kai TTjv ewoiav tov ej>’ rjpitv eir) dv dvaipwv, <Ls piaT-qv names for nop-existent things. For not only must the
eivai javTa Xeyeadai Kai cfxjovds vpaypaTcov one who makes it say that nothing is in anyone’s
power, but he must say that he does not think or
20 dvvvoaTaTCOv. ov yap povov prjSev evi prjSefi eivai
Xeyeiv, dAA’ 'ouSe voeiv ovSe avvievai dvayKalov atifip ' On this statement see Introductory Note p. 224.
246 247
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
Aeyciv Tavrtqv ^rjv .^oyvrjv. el Se ofioXoYot axjvievac, 1781/
av paSitus eXeyxoiTO ewolas tov ecj)’ rjiilv
i<f>ap[jio^o^€vrjs ots e^apfiorreiv ovk eif>ip. 'f\^yap ewoia
25 T171' oiialav ov TToXvirpayp-ovel ovSe eKelvrjv npoa-
TTapaXapL^dvei—dSvvarov yap eavTO ti noieiv Kai els
inToaraaiv dyeiv—dXXd eOeXeL Oecapelv rj etrivoia, tI
TU)v OVTOJV SovXoy erepcuv, kou ri eyet to avre^ovaiov
Kal tI p,ri vtt’ dXXcp, dAA’ avTQ rijs evepyeias Kvpiov, o
KaOaptbs (^Kaiy * tols diSlois VTrdpxei [(foi tois] ^ Kado
30 elaiv dlSioi Kal toIs aKuyXvrws to dya06v SiwKOvaiv rj
exovaiv. vrrep hr) ravra tov dyaOov avTOV ovtos oTov
dXXo Trap’ avTO dyadov ^rjTetv aTOvov. errel Kal to koto.
Tvx^v Xeyeiv avTO etvai ovk dpSov'ev yap toIs voTepov
Kal ev rroXXols tvxt)' tohe rrpwTOV ovTe Kara Tvxrjv dv
35 Xeyoip.ev, ovTe ov Kvpiov Trjs avTOv yeveaeois, oti fxrjhe
yeyove. to he oti d)s exei rraiei aTorrov, ei tls d^iol TOTe
etvai TO eXevdepov, drav rrapd ^vaiv rroif) rj evepyfj. ovhe
hr) TO t6^^piovaxdv eyov d(f)r)pr)Tai Tfjs e^ovalas, el to
fiovaxov pirj tw KwXveaOai rrap’ dXXov eyoi, dAAd tw
40 TOUTO avTo etvai Kal otov dpeoKeiv eavTO), Kal pir) eyetv
d Ti KpeiTTov avTov' ovTw ye to pidXiaTa Tvyxdvov
TOV dyadov d(j>aip'qaeTal tis to avTf^ovaiov. el he tovto
aTOTTOV, drorrwTepov dv ylvoiTO avTO to dyadov
dvooTepelv tov avTe^ovalov, oti dyadoV Kal oti €<f>’
45 avTov pievei ov hedpievov Kivetadai rrpos dXXo tcov dXXcov
‘ transposuimus.
“ Creuzer: tov Enn.
248
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
understand this’term. But if he'did admit that he
understood it, he could he easily refuted, because
our idea of what is in our power fits what he said it
did not fit. For the idea is not concerned with the
substance of a thing and does not take it as well into
consideratioii—for it is impossible for a thing to
make itself and bring itself'into existence—but our
idea wants to observe what among beings is a slave
of others and what has self-determination and what
is not subject to another but itself master of its
activity, which is purely and simply the case with
eternal beings in that they are eternal, and with
those which pursue or possess the good without
hindrance. But certainly since the Good is above
these it is absurd to seek as if for another good
beside it. Then also it is not correct to say that it
exists by chance; for chance occurs among things
that are later and among many things; but we could
not say that the First is by chance and is not master
of its own coining to be, because it has not come to
be. And the remark that it does as it is is absurd if it
involves a claim that there is freedom when it does
things* or is' active against its own nature. Nor
indeed does its possession of uniqueness take away
its independence, if it possesses uniqueness not
because it is obstructed by something else but
because it is this very thing and is, we may say,
satisfied with itself and has nothing better than
itself; otherwise one will take self-determination
away from what ^attains the Good in the highest
degree. But if this is absurd it would be more absurd
to deprive the Good itself of self-determination
because it is good and because it remains on its own
and does not need to move to something else, since
249
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

the other things move to it and it has no need of

Kivavfxivmv TTpos avTO Kat ovSev Seopevov ovSevos. orav
Se Srj rfotov vnoaraais avTOV rj oiov evepyeia fj—ov yap
Ty pev €T€pov, rj S’ erepov iariv, ei ye pTjSe eirl tov vov
TOVTO, OTt pdiXXov Kara to etvai iq ivepyeia q Kara
50 evepyeiav to elvai—ware ovk e^et to cos rre^vKev
evepyelv, ovSe 17 evepyeia Kal q oTov ^wq avevexOqaerai.
els rqv otov ovalav, dXX’ q otov ovala avvovaa Kal oIov
avyyevopevq e^ diSlov rq evepyeia ef dfc^oir avro avro
noiet, Kat eavrw Kal ovSevos.
8. 'Hjiteis Se Oewpovpev ov avp^e^qKOS to
avre^ovaiov e/ceivco, dXXa dno rwv rrepl rd dXXa
avre^ovalwv d<f>aipeaei rwv evavrlwv avro e<f>’ eavro"
•npds avro rd iXdrrw dird eXarrdvwv pertujiepovres
5 dSvvapiq, rov rvyelv rwv a irpoaqKei Xeyeiv vep} avrov,
ravra dv rrepl avrov elrroipev. Kalroi ovSev dv evpoipev
elrrelv ovy on Kar’ avrov, dAA’ odSe rrepl avrov Kvplws'
rrdvra yap eKelvov Kal rd KoXd Kal-rd aepvd varepa.
Tovrwv yap avrds dpxq' Kalroi dXXov rporrov ovk dpyq-
10 drroTidepevois 8q rrdyra Kal rd err’ avrw cos varepov Kal
TO avre^ovaiov—qSq yap e?s dAAo evepyeiav Xeyei—
Kal on dveprroSlarwf Kal dvrwv dXXwv rd els avrd
dKwXvrws- Set Se oAcos rrpds ovSev avrov Xeyeiv ean
yap orrep earl Kal rrpd avrwv errel Kal rd ^‘eanv"
15 d<f>aipovpev, ware Kal rd rrpds rd ovra drrwaovv: dvSe
250
anything. But when his, so to speak, existence is his,
as it were, activity—for one is not one thing and the
other another if this is not even So with Intdlect,
because^ its activity is more according to its being
ttjv than its being according to its activity so that it
cannot be active according to what it naturally is,
nor will its activity and its life, as we may pall it, be
referred to its, in a manner of speaking, substance,
but its something like substance is with and, so to
put it, originates with its activity and it itself makes
itself from both, for itself and from nothing.
8. But we see self-determination not as that
Good’s incidental attribute but itself by itself, by
taking away the opposing factors from the self-
determinations in other things; we might say this
about it by transferring what is less from lesser
things because of incapacity to find what we ought
to say about it. All the same, we could find nothing
to say which is applicable to it, or even really about
it; for all noble and majestic things come after it. 1? or
he himself is the origin of these; yet, all the same, in
another way not their origin. For those who put
away everything, "beipg in his power” [is to be put
away] as later, and "self-determination —for it al­
ready speaks of activity towards another—and that
he is upimpededly active” and "that when others
exist his activity directed to them is unhindered .
But-we must say that he is altogether unrelated to
anything; for he is what he is before them; for we
take away, the "is”, and so also any kind of relations
11 retain Sn here with H-^. But ovri (Kirchhoff: non
Ficino) would fit the context better.
25*
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL‘OF THE ONE

S-q TO “cos TTe^vKev”- varepov-yap Kat tovto, Kai el to the real beings; nor, certainly, [do we accept] the
"as he naturally is”; for this also is later, and even if
AeyoiTo Kat e-ir’ eKeivojv, eirt tcov ef aXXov av Xeyoiro, it may be said about those real beings, it would be
ware Trpwrojs ent rijs ovaias, on e^ eKelvov e<f>v el S’ ev said abouf Ttliiose which come from another, and so
first about substance, because it grew naturally from
TOLs ev Xpovcp Tj ifvais, ovS’ enl T-qs ovaias. ovSe Bq to
him; but if nature is in the things in time, it cannot
20 “ov Trap’ avrijs etvai’J XeKreov to t€ yap "eivai" be applied to substance. Nor indeed must we say this
nature "is not from itself”; for we took away the
a<f>qpovp.ev, TO Te'“ou ndp’ avTqs” XeyoiTo av, OTav vtt’
"is”, and the "not from itselF’ would be said when it
aXXov. ovTws ouv avve^q; q oiiSe to “avve^q” aKTeov [was brought into being] by something else. Did it
ovTe yap avTw ovTe vpos dXXo' ev yap rroXXois to
then just happen to be like this? No, we must not
bring in "happened to be”; nothing happened'to him
avvePq , oTav to. p.ev to 8e etrl tovtois avp.pfp ircos or in relation to something else; for "happened to
25 oBv t6 rrpwTov avve^q; ovSe yap ^A0ev, iva iqTqs "ttws be” applies among many things, when some are
there and something happens to be besides them.
ovv ^Xde; Tvyq t(s qyayev q vveaTqaev avTo; ’’ evet ov8e How then could the First happen to be? For it did not
Tvyq TTw ■fjv ovSe to avTop-aTov 84- Kat yap to come, so that you might enquire "How then did it
come? What chance brought it or established it in
avTopaTov Kat Trap’ dXXov Kat ev yivopevois. being?” For chance did not yet exist, nor accident
9. ’AAAd 77/50S avTO et Tis XapPdvoi to "apve^q", either; for accident comes from something else, and
among thingis which have come to be.
ovToi 8el TTpos TO ovopa "oTaaOai, dXXa oqcos voet 6
' 9. But-if someone takes "happened to be” as ap­
Xeywv avvievai. ti ovv voei; tovto, oti TavTqv eyov Tqv plying to the Good, one must not stop at the word,
<l>vaiv Kat Tqv Bvvap^v dpxq-^ Kat yap el dXXqv etyev, ^v but understand what the man who says it has in
mind. What, then, does he have in mind? This, that it
5 av [apxq] ^ tovto, oirep t^v, Kat el y^ipov, evqpyqaev av is because it has this nature and power that it is
KaTa Tqv avTov ovaiav. trpos 8q to tolovtov XeKTeov, principle; for if it had another, it would have been
what it was, and if it was worse, it would have been
OTi pq otov Te ^v dpyqv ovaav navTcvv to Tvyov eivai, active according to its own substance. To this we
pq.OTi yelpov, aXX’.ovBe dyaOov pev, dyadov Be'dXXws, must reply that it was not possible for it, since it is
the principle of all, to be what chanced, and certain­
olov ev8eeoTepov. aXXa Set KpeiTTova eivai Tqv dpyqv ly not to be worse, not even to be good but good in
‘ Kirchhoff: apxqv Enn. another way, a kind of lesser way. But the principle
^ del. Kirchhoff. must be better than all the things which come after
252
 .PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
10 aTTavTOJv Twv fier’ avrrfv coare cbpiaixevov' ri. Xeyoj 8c
wpiafiivov,'OTi povax^s Kai ovk dvdyKTjs- ovSe ydp
dvayKry iv ydp tols evopevois rfj dpx'p i) dvdyKt] Kal
oiiSe avrrj eyovaa ev avrols tijv jSiw to 8e p-ovayov
rovTO TThp’ avTOV. tovto ovv Kat ovk dXXo, dXX’ oirep
15 expfjv eivai' ov roivvv ovtw avve^rj, aXX‘ eSei ovtcoj’ to
0€ €0€l TOVTO O-pX^ TCOV OOa €0€L. TOVTO TOIVVV OVK OV
ovTois etiji cor avve^rj- ov ydp ovep •ervyev kariv, dAA’
OTTep eypijv etvar paXXov 8e ovSe OTrep eyp'^v, dAAd
dvapeveiv ^ec rd dXXa, 'T.t itotc avrols 6 fiaaiXeds
<f>aveir], Kat tovto (^avrdv BeaOai},^ orrep kariv avrds
20 [toOto avTOV Bkadai],^ ovy cor avyk^r) tftavkvTa, dAAd
dvTcor ^aaiXka Kat ovTcor dpyrjv Kat rd dyaBdv WTcor,
OVK kvepyovvra Kara rd dyaBov—outco ydp av So^eiev
erreaBai dAAco—dAA’ ovra ev, orrep kariv, <x>are ov Kar
kKelvo, dAA’ kKeivo.' el ,roivvv ov8‘ krrt rov ovros rd
25 "avve^r]"—rco ydp ovri, ec ri avp^rjaerai,
"avve^r]”,^dXX' ovk avrd to dv avve^r/, ov8e avveKvpae
rd ov ooTcor eivai, ov8e rrap’ aXXov rd ovrcos eivai, dv
cos eariv, dAA’ avTrj dvrcos <f>vais dv eivai—rrcor dv ns
krrt rov krr e k e iv a ovros tovto kvBvpolro rd "ovrw
avve^rj”, cL vrrdpyei yeyevv^Kevai rd dv, d ovy ovrco
30 avveprj, dAA’ eariv cor eariv tj ovaia, ovaa orrep kartv
ovaia Kat orrep kart 'Vovs; krret ovrco ns Kctv^ rdv vovv
' Igal.
“ Theiler: Kal Enn.
254
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
it; so it must” be something defined. But I mean
defined by its uniqueness, and not of necessity; for
there was no necessity; for necessity is in the things
which follow the principle, and even this [subse­
quent] necessity does not have power to force them;
but this uniqueness comes from the principle itself.
It is this, then, and not something else, but what it
ought to be; it did not then happen to be like this, but
had to be like this; but this "had to be” is principle of
all things that had to be. It could not then he this in
the sense that it happened to be; for it is not whqt it
chanced to be but what it ought to be; or rather, not
whqt it ought to be, but the other things have to wait
and see how their king will appear to them and
affirm that he is what he himself is, not appearing as
he happened to be, but as really king and really
principle and really the Uood, not active according
to the'Good—^for in this way he would seem to be
following another—but being one, what he is, so
that he IS not active according to that, but is that. If
thefa "happened to be” does not even apply to real
rd being—^for, if ahything is going to happen, it hap­
pens to being, but being itself does not happen, nor is
it a casual occurrence that being iS like this, nor
does it derive being like this from something else,
being as it is, but this is really its nature, to be real
being—^how could one imagine about what tran­
scends being* that it happened to be like this, that to
which it belongs to have generated being, which did
not happen to be like this but is as its substance is,
being what substance is and what Intellect is; for in
this way one could even say of Intellect "it just
Plato Republic VI509B9.
255
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
eiTToi "ovTW avvi^T] vovv etvai", woTrep aXXo ti av rov
vovv eaopLevov rj rovro, o Srj (fivais eoTi vov. to Si) oil
TrdpeKPe^TjKOS eavro, dAA’ d/cAive? ov iavrov, avro av
35 Tts KvpiwraTa Xeyoc eivac d eari. ti dv oSv tls Xeyoi (Kel
els TO vnep tovto dvajSds Kai elgiSdtv; S.pd ye to “ovtojs
d>r etSev aiiTOv eyovTa; [to ovtojs
avve^rj] ^ ij ovTe to "ovt'oj” ovTe to "ottojoovv avve^rj ”,
dAA’ odSe dXojs to "avvePrj”. dAAd to "ovtoj p,6vov kol
ovK flv dXXcos, dAA’ ovtojs”; dAA’ ovSe to
40 ‘‘ovTOJs”''ovTOj yap dv opiaas eirfs Kat ToSe tc dAA’ coti
TOi ISovTi ovSe TO "ovTois” elveiv hvvaaOai o'dS’ aS to
‘‘p,ri ovtojs”' tc yap dv eiTrocs avTO tojv ovtojv, ecjj’ wv
TO "ovtojs”. dXXo Tocvvv Trap’ diravTa to. ovtcvs. dAA’
dopcoTov ISojv TrdvTa pcev e^ecs elirelv to. pceT avTO,
45 jjTjaecs Se ovSev eieeivoiv ecvac, dAAd, ecirep,' Svvapciv
TT&aav avT-rjs oVtcos Kvpcav, tovto ovaav o deXec, pcdXXov
Se o deXe'i aTToppiijjaaav els Td ovto, avTrjv 8e pcel^ova
TravTOs Tov deXecv ovaav to deXecv /act’ avTTfv depcevrjv.
ovT odv avTTj rjQeXr;ae to "ovtojs”, cva dv evrreTO, ovTe
dXXos TTeirocrjKev ovtojs.
10. Eat' TOCVVV Kac epaj-fijaac j^pi) tov XeyovTa to
"ovtoj avve^r/”' vojs dv d^ccoaece xfjevhos ecvac to
"avvePrj”, el .t'c^ ecrj; Kac ttojs dv tcs dcjjeXoc to
' Theiler.
‘ Igal: et Tt Enn.
’ A clear statement of the necessity of negating one’s
negations as the final step in the negative way, very
256
FREE WILL AND TSE WILL OF THE ONE
happened in "this way to be Intellect”, as if Intellect
was going to be anything else but this which the
nature of Intellect is. That, surely, which does not
depart from itself, but is its own without declination,
one would most properly say is what it is. What,
then, is one to say at the point where one goes up to
and looks upon what is above this? Is it what it
happens to be as one sees that it is? No, it did not
happen to be in this way or in that way, but it did not
happen to be at all. But [could one say] "in this
way”, and "not otherwise, but in this way”? But [you
must] not [say] "in this way”; for in this way you
would be defining it, and it would be a particular
thing; but the one who sees it cannot say "in this
way” or again "not in this way”^; for you would be
saying that it was one of the beings to which "in this
way” applies. It is then something else besides all
the things which are in this way. But, since you see
it as without definition, you will be able to speak of
all the things which come after it, but you will affirm
that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it
is all power, really master of itself, being what it
wills to be, or rather throwing "what it wills to be”
away to the beings, and being itself greater than all
willing, setting willing after itself. 'It did not then
will the "in this way” so that it might conform to it,
nor did another make it like this.
10. And then one must also put these questions to
the one who said "happened to be”: on what con­
ditions would he affirm that "happened to be” was
false, if there was any [happe'ning to be]? And how
strongly stressed by the Athenian Neoplatonists Proclus
and Damascius and by Pseudo-Dionysius.
257
 ’PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL ANDITHE WILL OF THE ONE
"avvi^r)"; Kal et tCs^ dr] c/rvais, rore ^-qaet. ovk
would one-remove the "happened to be”? And if
5 e(j>apfji6^eLv to “avve^q”;^ el yap rqv twv aXXorv there is a pature, will he then say that the "hap­
pened to be” does not fit? For, if he attributes to
d<f>aipovaav to “ovtco avve^q” dvaTiOqai Tvxq, irov
chance tfie nature which takes away the "happened
wore TO ixq €K Tvyqs eivai yivoiTo; d(f>ai.p€t Se to “ws to be” fi-om the others, whferever will existence
eTvyev ’ avTq q dpyq toiv aAAcov eiSos xai rrepas Kal which is not by chance come to be? But this principle
takes away the "as it chanced” from the others by
p,op<f>qv SiSovaa, Kal ovk eoTiv ev tois ovtoj KaTO. Xoyov giving them form and limit and shape, and one
yivop.€vots Tvyq avaddvai, dAA’ avTO tovto Xoyw Tqv cannot attribute anything to chance in things which
come,to be'rationally in this way, but [must main­
10 aiTi'av, ev Se-Tots p.q rrpoqyovpevcos Kal p.q aKoXov^ws, tain] this very thing, that their cause is rational; but
aXXd avp/iTTOipLaaiv, q Tvyq. Tqv 8q dpxqv travros Xoyov chance is in what does not come to be as a result of
what goes before and consistently, but is mere co­
Te Kai Ta^ecos Kal opov rrws dv tis Tqv tovtov
incidence. But as for the principle of all reasoii and
VTToaTaaiv dvadeiq Tvxq; Kal p,qv rroXXwv pd q Tvxq order and limit, how .could one attribute the
Kvpia, vov Se Kal Xoyov Kal Ta^eois els to yevvdv, TavTa existence of this to chance? Chance is certainly
mistress of many things, hut is not mistress of in­
15 ov Kvpla' drrov xal evavTiov ye SoKei X6y(p' eivfn Tvxq, tellect’and reason and order so as to generate them;
■7TWS dv yewqTeipa avTov yevoiTo; et ovv p,q yevva vovv when chance even seems to be in direct opposition to
reason, how could it be reason’s generator? If then
TVxq, ovSe to rrpo vov ovSe to KpeiTTov vov' ovTe yap chance does not generate Intellect, then certainly
etxev oBev yevvqaei, ovTe qv to Traparrav dvTq ov8‘ oXcos not that which is before Intellect and better than
Intellect; for it would not have any resources to
ev TOCS diSlocs. el odv pcqSev rrpo eKetvov, aiiTOS Se
generate it from, nor did it exist‘at all in’any way
TTpdiTOS, aTTjvai evTavda Sec’Kal pqSd eVt rrepl avTov among the eternal beings. If then there is nothing
20 Xeyecv, aXXd to. peed avTO ^qTeev ttoij eyeveTo, avTo Se before him, but he is the first, one must stop here and
say nothing more about him, but enquire how the
piqKeTc.OTTWs, OTC ovTcos TOVTO pcq eyeveTO. tc ovv, ec pcq things after him came to be, but not how this did,
eyeveTO, eoTc Se olds eoTcv, ovk wv Tqs avTov ovacas because it really did not come to be. Wpll then,
suppose he did not come to be, but is as he is and is
Kvpcos; Kal ec pcq ovacas Se, dAA’ cor os eoTcv, ovx not of his own substance. And if he is not master of
VTTOOTqaas eavTOv, xpdjjucros Se eavTw ocos eOTcv, his substance, but is who he is, as he did not bring
himself 4nto existence but manages with himself as
' Igal: ef ns Enn. he is, then he is what he is of necessity, and could
258 259
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8..
25 i^avdyKTjs tovto dv eirj, o eari, Kal ovk dv dXXcos. rj ovy
OTl OVK aAAcO?, OUTOIJ, dAA’ TTpoS
OTl TO dplOTOV 'OVTCOS.
p,€v yap TO ^iXTiov eXOelv ov ndv aoTe^ovaiov, Trpos Se
TO xetpov eXOeiv ovSev im’ dXXov KiKOiXvrai, qAA’ on p.'^
■^Xde, nap’ avTOv ovk eXrjXvOev, ov rqi KeKcoXvaOai,
30 dAAd T<p avTO eivai, o /ii)' iX-rjXvde- Kal to dSvvaTov
eXdeiv npos to yelpov ovk dSvvapiav orjpaLvei tov p-q
tjKOVTos, aXXd nap’ avrov Kal Si’ avTov to pq rjKeiv. Kal
TO p-q rjKiiv npos /xijSev dAAo tijv vnep^oX-qv T-qs
Svvdpews ev avrw eyei, ovk dvdyKj) KaneiXrjppevov,
35 aAA avTOv avayKTqs twv dXXiuv ovaiqs Kal vqpov- avTriv
odv T) dvdyKT] vneoTqaev; rj ovSe vneanq twv dXXwv
vnooTdvTwv TWV pst’ avTO Si avTO. to ovv
vnooTaacws nws av q vn’ dXXov rj vif)’ avTov vneoTq;
11. AAAd TO pq vnoaTav tovto ti; rj aiwnqqavras
Sci an€XdnVy Kai €V anopw Trj yvwpq O^p^vovs pqScv
€Ti ^qTeiv. Ti yap dv tis Kal IqTqaeiev els ovSev In
fywv npoeXdeiv ndaqs ^qrqaews els dpxqv lovaqs Kal
5 ev Tw TOiovTip toTapeyqs; npos Se tovtois ^qrqaiv
dnaaav xpq vopl^eiv rj tov ti eoTiv eivai rj tov oIov q
TOV Sid Tt rj TOV eivai. to pev oSv eivai, ws Xeyopev
eKetvo eivai, eK twv peT avTO. to Se Sid-Ti dpxqv dXXqv
IqTei- dpxqs Se Tqs ndaqs ovK eoTiv dpxq. to Se oiov
10 eoTi IjqTeiv Ti avp^e^qKev avTw, <5 avp^e^qKe pqSev.
TO Se Tt eoTi SqXoi pdXXov to pqSev Seiv nepl avrov
^qreiv, avrd povov el Swarov avrois Xp/Sovras ev vw ^
' Kirchhoff: toi Enn., H-S^
260
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
not be otherwise. Now he is not as hg is because he
cannot be otherwise, but because being what he is is
the best. For not everything has the power over itself
to go to the better, but nothing is hindered by
another to go to the worse. But that it did not go was
due to itself; it was not because it was hindered but
because it was itself what did not go; and inability to
go to the worse does not indicate the powerlessness
of what does not go, but its not going comes from
itself and is because of itself. And not going to
anything else has in it the extreme of power; [that
which does hot go] is not held fast by necessity, but
is itself'the necessity and law of the others. Did
necessity, then, bring itself into existence? No, that
did not come into existence; the other things after it
npo came to existence through it. How then could that
which is before existence have come to existence
either by another’s agency or by its own?
11. But what is this which did not come to
existence? We must go away in silence and enquire
no longer, aware in our minds that^there is no way
out. For why should one even enquire when one has
nothing to go on to, since every enquiry goes to a
principle and stands still in it? And, besides, one
must consider that every enquiry is about either
what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is
or if it is. Now being, in the sense in which we say
that that is, [is known] from what comes kfter it. And
the question "why?” seeks another principle; but
there is no principle of the universal principle. And
to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire
what attributes it has, whidh has no attributes. And
the question "what is it?” rather makes clear that
we must make no enquiry about it, grasping it, if
261
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

jtiTjSev avTU) Bekirov etvai TTpo<fdTTTeiv fj-aBovras^ oAcuj Se possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right
eoiKap.€v ravTTjv rrjv a-TTOpCav ivBvpL'qBfivai, nepi TavTTjs
to add anything to it. But in general we probably
think of this difficulty, those of us who think about
15 T'^s if>vae(x)s oinep iveBvpirjBrjpLev, eif toO TTpcorov pev this nature at all, because we first assume a space
TiBeaBai x<^po-v Kai tottov, wamp ti x^o?. ^^to, x^pas and place, a kind of vast emptiness,^, and theij, when
rjhr) ovarjs i^rayayeiv Tavrrjv rrjV <j}vaiv eis rov iv rfi
the space is already there, we bring this npture into
the place which has come to be or is in our imagina­
<j>avTaala r/pcov yeyovora tj ovra tottov, eiadyovres Sf tion, and btinging ’it ‘into this kind of place we
avTov els Tov toiqvtov TOTtoy ovroi toi ^rfrelv, otov enquire in this way as if into whence and how it
TToBeP Kat TTciis eXrjXvBev' evravBa, kat w6mp eirrfXw
came here, and as if it was a strangpr we have asked
about its presence an4, in a way, its substance,
20 ovTa i^TjTtjKevai avrov tt)v irapovaiav Kat otov Trjv really just as if we thought that it had been thrown
ovatav, Kat Si) Kat (LoTrep.eK tivoj pdB,ovs tj vijjovs up from some depth or down from some height.
■hvos evBdSe ippi<f)Bai. Sioirkp Set to aiTiov Trjs diropias
Therefore one must remove the cause of the dif­
ficulty hy excluding from our concentrated gaze
dveXovTa e^co nonjadoBai ti)? eTri^oXijs T,rjs vpas avTo upon it all place, and not put ft in any place either as
TrdvTa TOTTOV Kat prjSe ev otwovv .TiBeaBai avTO, prjTe resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but
[think of it] as being what it is (this is said by the
25 det Ketpevov ev avTw Kat tSpvpevov pyTe eXrjXvBoTa,
necessity of speech), but that place, like everything
aXX’ ovTa povov, cos eoTi, Xeyopevov vtt’ MvdyKtjs tcov else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards. When
Xoycov etvai, tov Se tottov, coairep Kat to, dXXa, voTepov therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out
of place, and pu^ nothing round it in a kind of circle,
Kat voTepov dirdvTcov, to ovv otottov tovto voovvTes, cos
and are unahle to encompass its extent, we shall not
voovpevf ovSev Trept avTo eri TiBevTes otov kvkXco oiiSe attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality
30 TTepiXa^etv eyovTes oaos, ovSe to- oaov avTcp either; for there-could not be any shape about it,
even intelligible; and not relation to something else;
ovp^e^TjKevai cjfqaopev ov prjv ovSe to TToidy- oiiSe yap
for it existed hy itself before there was anything else.
popcj)T^ TLS.TTept avTov ovSe votjtti dv etrj- ovSe to Trpos What then, could the "it happened to'be like this”
dXXo\Jcj)’ avTOV yap Kat vcjreoTTjKe, Trptv dXXo: ti dv ovv still mean? And’how shall we be able to say this,
because everything else about it is said negatively?
€Tt etrj TO "ovTco crwe^rj ij ttcos ^Bey^opeBa tovto, otc
begins his account of the generation of the gods {Th^ogony
35 Kat rd dXXa ev^ dcj>aipeaei irdvTa to Trept tovt,ov 116), which he understands as Aristotle does (Physics A
1208b31-3) as the empty space or place which things
' Plotinus is thinking of the phaos with'which Hesiod occupy.
262 263
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
Xeyofieva; woTe aXtjdes fj,aXXov ov to “ovtw avvi^rj”,
dAAd TO "ovSe OVTOJ owe/Stj”, ottou Kai to “odSe avve^rj
oXctis”-
12. T( ovv' ovK eariv o eari; tov Se eivai o eariv ij
TOO ev4K€iva etvai S.pa ye Kvpios avTOs; naXiv yap rj
tfivyr) ovSev ti Tjeiadelaa toIs eiprjp.evois anopos eari.
XeKTeov rolvvv irpos ravra wSe, ws eKaaros p^ev rjpwv
5 KOTO pev TO awpa TToppw av eir] ovaias, kara 8e Trjv
^vx'pv Kai o paXiard eapev pereyopev ovaias Kal eapev
TiS ovala, TVVTO'Se eariv otov avvderov ri eK Sia(j>opds
Kal ovaias. ovKoin' Kvploos ovala odS’ avroovala- Std
odSe Kvpioi rijs avraiv ovaias. dXXo yap ttcos rj ovala
10 Kal 'qpeis dXXo, Kal Kvpioi ovy ijpets rrjs avrwv ovaias,
dAA’ ij ovala avro rjpdiv, elvep avrrj Kal rrjv hia<j>opdv
TTpoarlBrjaiv. dAA’ erreihrj orrep Kvpiov rfpwv rjpeis nms
eapev, ovrcv roi ovSev t^ttov Kal evravda XeyolpeOa dv
avTWV Kvpioi. otJ^ he ye iravreXcbs eariv o eariv
15 avroovala, Kal ovk dXXo pev avro, dXXo he rj ovala
avrov, evravda orrep earl, rovrov earl^ Kal Kvpiov Kal
ovKeri els dXXo, ^ eari Kal ^ eariv ovala. Kal yap av
atfrelBrj Kvpiov eivai avrov, •fj o rrpibrov els ovalav.'ro hrj
rrerroirjKos eXevdepov rr)v ovalav, rreifivKOS hrjXovori
rroielv eXevdepov Kal eXevdeporroiov dv Xeydev, rlvi dv
20 hovXov elrj, eirrep oXivs Kal dSpirov'ifideyyeadai rohe; rij
' Theiler: o Enn.
^ Harder: O eari wBUCQ: om. x.
to to
264
FREE WILL AND THE WILU OF THE ONE
So that nojt "it happened to he like this” but "not
even like this did it happen to be” is truer, where it is
true that it did not'happen to be at all.
12. Weir then, is he not what he is? And is he
himself really master of his being what he is or
transcending being? For again the soul is not in the
least persuaded by what has been said and sees no
way out of its difficulty. So we must say this as well,
that each one of us may be far from substance in
respect of his body but in respect of the soul and
what we most are we participate in substance and
are a particular kind of substance, that is a parti­
cular kind of composite of substance and difference.
We are not then substance in the strict and proper
sense or absolute substance; and for this reason we
are not masters of our own substance. For in some
way substance is one thing and we are another and
we are not masters of our own substance, but sub­
stance, the very thing itself, is master of us, given
that this also adds the difference. But since in some
way we are that which is master of us, in this way,
all the same, even here below we could be called
masters of ourselves.^ But where absolute substance
is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and
its substance another, what it is it is also master of,
and is no longer to be referred to another in that it is
and in that it is substance. For, again, it has been let
go into self-mastery in that it is what is primarily
related to substance. That,- then, which has made
substance free, wliich is clearly of a nature to liber­
ate and can be called liberator—to what could it be a
slave, if it is even in any way permitted to utter this'
' The sense in which this is true is explained in V. 3. 4.
26s

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
avrov ovaia;'dXXa Kai avr^ Trap' avrov eXevdepa Kat
varepa, Kal avTo ovk e^ov ovaiav. el piev oSv earl tls
evepyeia ev avrw Kai ev rfj evepyeia avrov dr)a6p,eda,
ovS’ dv 8cd rovTO tcrj dv erepov avrov Kat ovk avros
26 avrov Kvpios, d<f)’ oS rj evepyeia, on /xt) erepov evepyeia
Kai avros. el S’ oXcos evepyeiav ov Swaopiev ev avrd>
eivai, aXXd rdXXa trepl avrov evepyovvra
VTToaraaiv la^^eiv, eri pidXXov ovre rd Kvpiov ovre
dAA’ odSe to “avrov
Kvpievopievov eKel eivai Swaopiev.
KVpios”, ovy on dXXo avrov Kvpiov, dAA’ on ro “avrov
30 Kvpiov’’ rfj ovaia direSopiev, ro Se ev np-iwrepcp ij Kara
rovro edepieda. rl ovv rd ev npiicorepip rotj o eariv
avrov Kvpiov; if on, eTreiSij ovola Kat evepyeia eKei Svo
TTWS ovra eK rijs evepyelas rfjv evvoiav eSlSov rov
Kvplov, rovro Se f^v rfi ovaia ravrdv, Sid rovro Kat
35 eyevero rd Kvpiov eivai Kat avrd avrov eXeyero
Kvpiov. OTTOV Se ov Svo dij ev, dAAd ev—tj yap evepyeia
fiovov rj ovS oXcus evepyeia—ovSe rd “Kvpiov avrov”
opOws.
13. ’AAA’ el Kat rd dvojjiara ravra errayeiv Sel [ovk
dpffdis] ^ rov ^r/rovpievov, rraXiv av Xeyeadcv, cos Td piev
(^ovKy^ dpdms eipTjrai, on ov .TroiTjreov ovS’ cos els
enlvoiav Svo, rd Se vvv rrjs treiBovs
5 TTppavo-qreov ev rois Xoyois. el yap SoiTjpiev ivepyelas
' del. Theiler.
^ Igal.
266
FREE WILL AND.THE WILL OF THE ONE
word? To its own substance? But this substance gets
its freedom from it and comes after it, and it is not in
possession of substance. If then there is an active
actuality in him, and we are going to locate him
himself in the active actuality, he would not because
of this be something else than himself and not
himself master of himself, he from whom the active
actuality comes, because active actuality and he
rrjv
himself are not different. But if we are not in any
way gojng to grant that-there, is active actuality in
to him, but say that the other things have their
existence by being actiye round him, then still more
shall we refuse* to grant that there is mastery or
being mastered at that level. But we shall not even
admit the "master, of himself”,, not because some­
thing else is master of him, but because we have
allotted the "master of himself” to substance, and
put him in a more honourable place than this applies
to. What then is that which is in a more honourable
position than being'its own master? It is because,
since substance and activity there are in a way two
and gave, from the point of view of activity, the idea
of mastery, but this was the same thing as substance,
for this reason mastery came to be separated, and it
was said to be master of itSelf.'But where there are
not two as one, but there is one—either only active
actuality or not active actuality at all—"master of
himself” is not correct.
13. But if one'must bring in these names of what
\ye are looking for, let it be said again that it was not
correct to use them, because one must not make it
two even for the sake of forming an idea of it; but
now we must depart a little from correct thinking in
our discourse for the sake of persuasion. For if we
267
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
avrA; rdr S’ ivepyeias avrov diov ^ovXrjoei avrov—ov
yap dPovXwv ivepyft—ai Se evepyeiai ly oiov ovaia
avrov, rj PovXtjais avrov Kal iy ovaia ravrov earai. el Se
rovro, toy dpa i^ovXero, ovrw Kal eariv. ov p,dXXov dpa
10 d)s TTe<f>VKe PovXerdi re Kal evepyet, rj ws ^ovXerai re
Kal evepyel rj ovaia eariv avrov. Kvpios dpa ttovtij
eavrov e<f>’ eavrw excov Kal rp elvai. iSe Si) Kal roSe-
'rd)v oProjv eKaarov e(j)iep,evov rov dyaOov ^ovXerai
eKeivo p,dXXov 17 d eariv etvai, Kal rare pidXiara oierai
elva,i, orav rov dyaOov pieraXd^ri, Kal ev ru> roiovrip
15 .aipetrai eavrw eKaarov ro^eivai Kadoaov ^ dv rrapd rov
dyadov laxjj, coy rr/s rov dyadoif ^vaews eavrd)^
^SrjXovori TToXv rrporepov alperrjs ovar]s, etrrep to oar)
polpa ayadov i Trap’ dXXip alperwrdrr), .Kal ovaia
eKovaios Kal rrapayevopian) deX-qaei Kal ev Kal ravrov
20 odaa deXr)aei Kal Sid deXrjaeojs vrroqrdaa. Kal ecoy p,ev
rd dyaOdv p.r) elyev eKaarov, rjdeX-qaev dXXo, ^ Se-ea^ev,
eavro re deXei rjSrj Kal eariv ovre Kara rvyr/jv ^ roiavrr)
rrapovaia ovre e^oi rrjs ^ovXiqaecos avrov rj ovaia, Kal
rovrip Kal dpi^erai Kal eavrrjs eari rov-fip.'ei ovv rovrip
25 avro ri eKaarov eavro rroiei, SrjXov S’qrrov yiverai’rjSr),
coy, eKeivo dv eit) eavrw .roiovrov Trpcorcoy, ip Kal Tct
dXXa eavrois eariv etvai, Kal avveariv avrov rp oiov
ovaiq. rj OeXrjais rov oiov roipvrov etvai, Kal ovk eariv
^ Kirclihoff: Kal 6<jov Enn.
Theiler: eavrfj Enn.
268
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
were to grant activities to him, and ascribe his
activities to what we might call his will—for he does
not act without willing—and his activities are what
we might call his substance, his will and his sub­
stance will be the same thing. But if this is so, then
as he willed, so also he is. He does not then will and
act as it is his nature to, any more than his substance
is as he wills and acts. So he is altogether master of
himself since he has even his being in his own power.
Observe this also: every being in its desire for the
Good wants to be that Good rather than what it is,
and thinks that it is in the highest degree when it
participates in the Good, and in such a state each
being will choose for itself to be in so far as it has
being from the Good; so the nature of the Good is
obviously far more worthy of choice for himself, if it
is true that whatever share of the Good there may be
in something else is most worthy of choice, and is its
freely willed substance which comes to it in ac­
cordance with its will and is one and the same thing
as its will and is established in existence through its
will. And as long as each individual did not have the
Good it wished something else, but in that it pos­
sesses the Good it wills itself, and neither is this kind
of presence by chance nor is its substance outside its
will, and it is by this Good that its substance is
defined and by this that it belongs tp itself. If then it
is by .this that each thing itself makes itself, it
becomes, I suppose, obvious that that Good is prima­
rily the kind of thing it is by its own agency, by
which the other things also are able to be by their
own agency, and that the will, as it were, to be the
kind of thing it is goes with its, as we please to call it,
substance, and it is not possible to apprehend him
2,6'g
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
avTov Aa^eiy avev tov .BeXeiv eavrw onep iari, Kai
30 avvSpOfios avTOS eavrip BiXoov avros eival Kat tovto
wv, OTrep 6e\ei, Kal rj deXrjais Kai avros ev, Kai rovrip
ovx 'fjrTov iv, on jnij dXXo avros, onep ervxev, dXXo 8e
TO COS’ ePovXiqdr] av. ri yap dv Kal ‘qdeXrjoev -q rovro, o
eon; Kal yap el vTTodolp,e6a eXeadai avrw o ri BeXoi
yeveaBai, Kal i^eivai avrip dXXdiaoBai rqv avrov <f>vaiv
35 els dXXo, pi-qr dv dXXo n yeveaBai ^ovXqBrjvai, pvqr’ dv
eavnp ri p.ep,ipaaBai cos 0770 dvdyKqs rovro ov, d ean,
rovro ro “avros eivai” onep avros del ■qBeXqae Kai
BeXei. ean yap ootcos 'q dyaBov <f>vais BeXqais avrov ov
SeSeKaapevov ovSe rfi eavrov <j>vaei emarropevov, dAA’
40 eavrov eXopevov, on prjSe r^v dXXo, iva rrpds eKeivo
eXyBrj. Kal prjv KdKeivo dv ns Xeyoi, cos ev rrj avrdiv
eKaarov rd dXXa ovala ov TTepie(Xr](f>e rov Xoyov rov rov
dpeoKeaBai avrd)' Kal yap dv Kal Svax^palvoi n avro.
ev Se rrj rov dyaBov vnoardaei dvdyKq rrjv aipeaiv Kal
46 rrjv avrov BeXqaiv eprrepieiXqppevqv etvai rj ayoXfl y‘
dv dAAco vrrdpxoi eavnp dpearw eivai, d perovala q
dyaBpv <f>avraala dpeoKerai avrols- Set Se avyx<vpeiv
TOCS dvdpaaiv, ei ns rrepi eKelvov Aeycov e^avdyKqs
evSel^ecos eveKa avrols XPV’’''^''’ “ dKpi^eia ovk ewpev
50 XeyeaBai- XapBaverw 8e Kai rd ‘otov’’ e<f>’ eKaarov. el
oSv v<j>earqKe rd dyaBdv Kai avvv<j>larqaiv avrd q
aipeais Kal q PovXqais—dvev yap rovnov ovK'earai—
Set Se rovro pq rroXXd etvai, avvaKreov els^ ev rqv
‘ Kirchhoff: tis Enn.
270
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
without the will to be by his own agency what he is,
and that his willing to be himself by his own agency
is concurrent with his being what he wills, and his
will and he himself are one, and not less one by this,
that he himself is not one thing as he happened to be
and what he would have liked to be another. For
what could he have wished to be except this which
he is? For even if we assimied that he could choose to
become what he wished, and it was possible for him
to change his own nature into something else, he
would not wish to become something else, or have
any fault to find with himself, as if he is this thing
which he is by necessity, this being himself which he
always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good
is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted
nor following his own nature, but choosing himself,
because there was nothing else at all that he might
be drawn to. And one might also make the following
point, that the other things do not each of them
include in their substance the character of being
satisfied with themselves; for a thing could even
dislike itself. But it is necessary for the choice and
willing of itself to be included in the existence of the
Good, or it would hardly be possible for anything
else to find itself satisfactory; they are satisfied with
themselves by their participation in or imagination
of the Good. But one must go along with the words, if
one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to
indicate it expressions which we do not strictly
speaking allow to be used; but one should under­
stand "as if” with each of them. If then the Good is
established in existence, and choice and will join in
establishing it—for without these it will not be—but
this Good must not be many, its will and substance
271
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAT) VI. 8.
^ovXrjaiv Kat Tr)v ovaiav [/cat to 0eAetv]-' to 8e deXtiv
{ei) ^ nap’ avTov, dvdyKrj Trap’ avrov Kat to etvai aincp
55 etvai, ware avrov TreTTonjKevai avrov o Xdyos dvevpev. et
yap rj povXrjois rrcf.p’ avrov Kat oTov epyov avrov, avrrj
8c ravrdv rfj VTToardaei avrov, avros dv ootcoj
VTToarriaas dv eir) avrov ware.ovx ov-ep ervyev eariv,
dXX’ OTTep iPovXiqdrj avros.
14. “Eti 8e opdv Set Kat ravrrj' eKaarov rcov
Xeyop.evwv eivai 'q ravrov eari rw eivai avrov, rj erepov
oTov dvOpcvTTOs oSe erepos, Kat rd dvdpwrrw eivai dXXo-
piereyei ye pvqv o avdpwnos rov o eariv dvOpm-rrip eivai.
^ipvxv 8e Kat TO ijivxT! €ivai ravrov, el
dnXovv ifivx'q Kat /lit) Kar dXXov, Kat dvdpwnos avro Kat
TO dvdpwTTtp ‘eivai. Kat to fiev dv Kara tvxtjv yevoiro
avOpiOTTOS, oaip^ erepov rov dvOpdnru) eivai, rd 8€
dvOpwTTip eivai ovK dv yevoiro Kara rvy'ijv rovro S’
eart “Trap’ avrov dvdpwnos avro”. el Srj rd dvOpwnw
10 eivai nap’ avrov Kat ov Kara rvxrjv rovro ovSe
avpL^e^rjKe, nws dv rd vnep rd dvdpwnos avro, rd
yevvqriKdv rov dvdpwnov avro, Kat od rd dvra ndvra,
Kara rvx'qv dv Xeyoiro, (jivais dnXovarepa rov
dvdpwnov eivai Kat rov oXws rd dv eivai; eri^ npds rd
15 anXovv tovri ovk eon avvavatjtepeiv rrjv rvx'qv, cootc Kat
^ del. Vitringa.
2 ( = Ficinus).
^ H—S^: oTtp Enn.
■* Harder:'« Enn.
272
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
must be brought into one; but if its willing comes
from itself, it is necessary that it also gets its being
from itself, so that our discourse has discovered that
he has made himself. For if his will comes from
himself and is something like his own work, and this
will is the same thing as his existence, then in this
way he will have brought himself into existence; so
that he is not what he happened to be but what he
himself willed.
14. And, further, one must look at it also in this
way: each of the things which is said to be is either
the same as its being or different; for instance, this
particular human being is one thing and essential
humanity another; the human being, of course, par­
ticipates in essential humanity. But soul and essen­
tial soulness are the same thing if soul is simple and
not predicated of something else, and the human
being as such is the same as essential humanity.*
And the one might become a human being by chance,
in so far as it is different from essential humanity,
but essential humanity could not come to be by
chance: this means "the human being as such comes
to be from himself”. If then essential humanity
comes to be from itself and i^ot by chance or as it
happens, how could that which is above humanity as
such and which generates humanity as such, and to
which all the real beings belong, be said to be by
chance, a nature simpler than essential humanity
and universal essential being? Further, as one goes
towards the simple it is not possible to take chance
* There is a reference here (with a Platonic correction to
bring in the Form of man) to Aristotle Metaphysics H 3.
1043b2-^.
273
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL'AND THE. WILL OF THE ONE

eis TO avXovaTaTov dSvvarov dva^aiveiv Trjv tvxtjv. eri up with one, so that it is impossible for chance to
ascend to the simplest -of all. And, further, it is
Se KaKelvo avafxirqadrjvai TTpoar}Kei 17817 ttov eiprjfxivov, appropriate to remember that statement which has
OJS eKaarov toiv Kara. dXrjdeiav ovriov Kai vtt’ eKeivrjs already been made somewhere* that each and every
one of the things which in truth are and have been
TTjs (f>va€ws eXOovTOiv els vnoaraaiv, Kal el ri 8e ev rots brought to existence by that nature, and anything
20 aladrjTots toioutov/ to) air’ eKelvcov roiovTov Xeyai Se among the things of sense which is'of this kind, is of
this kind by what comes from those higher beings: I
TO TOtovTOV TO ovv avTUiv Trj ovala e^eiv Kai t^s mean by "of this kind” having together with their
vvoardaecos rrjv alrlav, ware tov varepov 'OeaTrjv substance also the cause of their existence, so that
the observer afterwards can say why each of its
eKaarov e^eiv elnetv^ Sio eKaarov rcbv evvvapxdvTOJv, inherent parts is there, for instance why there is an
dlov Sid rl 6(j>daXp.6s Kai Scd rl rroSes rotaSe ToiolSe, eye and \^hy the feet of these particular beings are as
they are and the cause which brings into existence
Kai TTjv alrlav dvtia-TToyewdiaav eKaarov p.epos eKaarov together each part of each thing and brings them
25 eivai Kai Si’ dXXrjXa rd piepr] eivai. Sid rl TToSes els into existence on account of each other. Why are the
legs and feet as long as they are? Because this is as it
p,rjKOs; dri Kai roSe roiovSe Kai on vp6ao)TTOv roiovSe, is, and because the face is as it is the feet and legs are
Kai TToSes TOiolSe. Kai oXcos''q npos dXXrjXa Trdvnov as they are. And in general the harmony of all the
parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and
avpi^oivla dXXrjXois alrla- Kai rd Sia rl rdSe, on rovr’ the reason why this part is, is that this is essential
ean to dvdpwvip eivai' ware ev Kai rd avrd rd eivai Kai humanity; so that the being and the cause are one
and the same. But these came in this way from a
30 TO airiov. ravra Se Ik p,ids rrrrjyrfs ovnos '^Xdev ov single source which did not reason but gave the
XeXoyiapievTjs, dXXd Trapexovaiqs oXov dOpoov rd Sid rl reason why and the being together as a whole. It is
the source therefore of being and the why of being,
Kai rd eivai. TTrjyfj oSv rov eivai Kqi rov Sid rl eivai dpiov giving both at once; but that from which these come
dpi(f>o} SiSovaa- dAAa oia rd yivopieva, noXv is like the things which have come to be much more
originally and more truly and more than as it is on
dpxervTTwrepov Kai dX-pdearepov Kai pidXXov •q Kar their level in that it is better. If then there is nothing
35 eKeiva rrpds rd ^eXnov rd dif)’ ov ravra. el odv pnrjSev random or by chance and no "it happened to'be like
elK'p piTjSe Kard rvxrjv p-rfSe rd "avve^rj ydft ovrcvs” rwv * The reference is a general one to the first two chapters
^ ToiovTov del. Igal, H—S^. of the preceding treatise VI. 7.
274 275
I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Saa ras altCag ev avrois exei, exei Se ra ef aiirov this” with the things which have their cause in
themselves, and all things which come from him do
anavra, Aoyov aiv Kai a it tag xai ovaiag oiViwSouj have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and
v ar Tj p, a Si) ndvra TToppco VTrdpxei TVXT}g, eiT} dv dpxrj causative substance, ‘ which are certainly all far
from chance, he would be the principle and in a way
xal olov napdSeiypLa toiv oaa p-rj KeKoivMvrjKe rvyr), to
the exemplar of all things which have no part in
40 ovTOjg xai to TrpwTov, dplyeg Tvyaig xai avTopdTw xal chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by
chances and coincidence and happening, cause of
avp^daei, aiTiov eavTOv xat Trap’ avTov xad 8i’ outov
himself and himself from himself and through him­
avTog" Kal ydp TrpWTCog avTog xai VTTepovTwg avTog. self; for he is primarily self and self beyond being.
15. And he, that same self, is lovable and love and
15. Kot' epdapiov xai ipwg d avTog xat avrov epojg, love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from
aT€ ovx aXXcog xaXog rj Trap’ avrov xai ev avr<h. xai ydp himself and in himself. For surely his keeping com­
xai TO avveivai eavrw ovx dv aXXcog eyot, el prj to avvdv pany with himself could not be in any other way
than if what keeps company and what it keeps
6 xai TO c5 avveoTtv ev xai ravrov eir). el Se to avvdv rci) <S company with were the one and the same. But if
avveanv ev xai to olov etfrtepevov tw effrerd) ev, to Se what keeps company is one with what it keeps
company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one
e<f>eTov xard Ttjv urroaTaaiv xai ofov viroxelpevov, TrdXiv with the object of desire, and the object of desire is
at T)plv dve<l>dvT] ravrov Tj e<j>eaig xai -q ovala. el Se on the side of existence and a kind of substrate,
again it has become apparent to us that the desire
TOVTO, TrdXiv av avrdg eariv oStoj d ttoiwv eavrdv xai and the substance are the same. But if this is so,
10 xvpiog eavTOv xai ovy <os tl erepov qdeXiqae yevopevog, again it is he himself who makes himself and is
master of himself and has not come to be as some­
dXX’ cos deXei avrdg. xai prjv xai Xeyovreg avrov ovre tl
thing else willed, but as he himself wills. And fur­
eig avrov Sexeadai ovre dXXo avrov xai ravTr) dv eirjpev ther, when we say that he does not receive anything
e£co rroiovvTeg rod rvyri elvai roiovrov 'ov pdvov tco
into himself nor does anything else receive him, in
this way too we shall be placing something of this
povovv avTov xai tA xadapdv Troietv dirdvrcov, dXX’ on, kind outside chance existence not only by making
el TTore xai avroi ev avrotg evlSoLped' riva <f>vatv him one alone and clear of all things but for this
reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this
‘There is a reference here to the Platonic Letter VI323D4,
one of the esoteric passages (with Letter II 312E) from the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the
dubiously genuine letters which were foundation-texts for doctrine of the Three Hypostases.
276 277
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

15 TOiavrrjv ovSev f^ovaav tojv dXXoiv, oaa avfrjpTTjTai kind which has nothing of the other things which
rjutv, Kadd ndaxeiv o ri nep dv avp-^fj [koi] ^ Kara are attached to us by which we have to experience
TV^T^v vTrdpxei.—Trdvra ydp rd dXXa, oaa r)p.d)v, SovXa
whatever happens by chance—^for all the other
things which belong to us are enslaved to and
KaKKeipieva^ rvxais Kat oiov Kara rvxrjv npooeXOdvra, exposed to chances, and come to us in a way by
TOVTW Se fiovw TO Kvpiov avTOv Kai TO avTe^ovaiov chance, but this alone has self-mastery and self­
20 <I)wt6s dyadoeiSovs Kat dyadov evepyeia Kat p,€i^ovos yj
disposal by the active presence of a light in the form
of good, and good, and greater than that which
Kard vovv, ovk inaKTOv to imep to voeiv d belongs to Intellect, having its transcendence of
817 dva^dvTSS Kat yevop-evoi tovto p-ovov, rd S’ aAAa Intellect not as something brought in from outside;
d(f>evTes, Tt dv eiTroipev avTO rj oti yrXeov •q eXevBepoi, surely, when we ascend to this and become this
alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except
Kat nXeov rj avre^ovaioi; tIs 8’ dv -qpds Trpoadilieie Tore that we are more than free and more than independ­
25 Tvyais rj roi eiKij rj tw “au/xjSejSij/cev” avTo to dXqdivdv ent? Who could then make us depend on chances or
^rjv yevopevovs rj iv tovtw yevopevovs, o prjSev eyei
randomness or just happening when we have become
the true life itself or come to be in it, which has
dXXo, dAA’ eoTiv avTO povov; rd pev ovv dXXa povovpeva nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things
OVK eoTiv avTots avTdpKt) elvac eis to eivar tovto Si when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient
ioTiv o ioTL Kat povovpevov. vnooTaais Se rrpdiTq ovk iv enough to exist; but this is what it is also when it is
isolated. But as first existence it is not in the soulless
difivyip ovS’ ev ^o}rj dXoyw- daBevrjs ydp eis to etvai Kat and not in irrational life; for this also is too weak to
30 avrq OKeSaais ovaa Xoyov Kat dopiOTLa- dAA’ oa<p exist and is a dispersal of rational principle and an
■npoeiaiv els Xoyov, drToXeirrei Tvxqv to ydp /card Xoyov indefiniteness; but in so far as it advances towards
rational principle, it leaves chance behind; for that
ov Tvyr]' dva^aivovai Se ’qpiv eKelvo pev ov Xoyos, which is in accordance with ratiorial principle is not
KdXXiov Se rj Xoyos' tooovtov drrexei tov Tvyr/ by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not
avp^rjvai. pll,a ydp Xoyov nap’ avTrjs Kat els tovto rational principle but more beautiful than rational
principle; so far is it from happening by chance. For
35 Xqyei rd ndvTa, warrep <f>VTOv peyloTov xard Adyov it is the root of rational principle from itself, and all
^uivTOS'dpx'q Kat pdais, pevovaa ydp avTrj e<f>’ eavTrjs, things come to a stop in it; it is like the principle and
SiSovaa Se Kord Adyov toi <f>VT<p, dv eXa^ev, eivai. fundament of a mighty tree living according to
rational principle which remains itself by itself but
' del. H-S‘. gives to the tree existence according to the rational
“ coniecimus: nat Ktlneva Enn. principle which it receives.
278 279
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
16. ’ETrei Se (j)aiJL€v Kat So/cei vavraxov re eivai
rovTO Kat aS etvai ov8a(j,ov, rovro roi XPV evdvixrjOrjvai
Kat vorjaai, olov Set Kat evrevdev aKOTTOVfievois Oeadai
irept &v ^T]T0viJ,ev. el yap pLrjSapLov, ouSa/noO avpL^ePrjKe,
5 Kat el navraxov, oaos eartv avros, roaovros rravraxov'
ware to Travraxov Kat to ndvTrj avros, ovk ev eKelvw
ojv TO) Travraxov, dAA’ avros <vv rovro Kat Sovs eivai
rots dXXois iv rw Travraxov vapaKeiadai. 6 S’
VTreprdrrjv exojv rd^iv, fxdWov Se ovk ex<vv, dAA’ dll'
10 xmepraros avros, SovAa irdvra exei, ov avpL^ds aiirols,
avrw Se rcov aXXojv, p,dXXov Se -rrept avrov riov dXXoiv,
ov TTpds avrd ^Xerrovros avrov, dXX’ eKecvcvv Trpos
avrov 6 S’ els ro eiaco oiov (jjeperai avrov oiov eavrov
dyarrrjaas, a v y rj v k a 6 a p dv, aiiros d)v rovro, orrep
15 ■qyd’rrTjae- rovro S’ eartv VTToarijaas avrov, ecrrep
evepyeia p,evovaa Kat ro dyaTrrjroTarov otov vovs. vovs
Se evepyrip,a' drare evepyrjp,a avros. dAAd dXXov p,ev
ovSevds' eavrov dpa evepy-q/xa avros. ovk dpa cos
avfxPe^TjKev earcv, dXX’ d)s evepyet avros. eri roivvv, ei
earl pidXiara, on Trpos avrov oiov arqpl^ei Kat oiov
20 Trpos avrov ^Xerrei Kat ro oiov eivai rovro avrw ro Trpos
avrov pXerreiv, oTov voioi dv avrov, ovy ws ervyev dpa
earlv, dAA’ ws avros BeXei, Kat ovS’ q BeXqais e’lKfj ovS’
ovTw avve^q' rov yap dplarov q deXqais ovaa ovk eariv
elKq. on S’ q roiavrq vevais avrov irpos aiirov oiov
25 evepyeia ovaa avrov Kat fxovq ev avrw ro eivai 6 ean
' The light in which the souls see the Forms in Phaedrus
250C4; for Plotinus this light is the Good (or comes from the
Good; VI. 7. 21-22).
280
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
16. But since we maintain, and it appears to be so,
that this is everywhere and again is nowhere, we
must ponder this and think out what we ought to
posit about the subject of our enquiry when we look
at it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he
has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is
everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so
that the “'everywhere” and "in every way” are him­
self; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself
and gives the others their being there with him in
the everywhere. But he, since he has the highest
place, or rather does not have it, but is himself the
highest, has all things as slaves; he does not happen
to them, but they to him, or rather they happen
around him; he does not look to them, but they to
him; but he is, if we may say so, borne to his own
interior, as it were well pleased with himself, the
"pure radiance”,* being himself this with which he
is well pleased; but this means that he gives himself
existence, supposing him to be an abiding active
actuality and the most pleasing of things in a way
rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualisa-
tion; so that he is an actualisation. But not of
anything else; he is then an actualisation of himself.
He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he
acts. And then, further, if he is supremely because he
so to speak holds to himself and so to speak looks to
himself, and this so-called being of his is his looking
to himself, he as it were makes himself and is not as
he chanced to be but as he wills, and his willing is
not random nor as it happened; for since it is willing
of the hest it is not random. But that an inclination
of this kind to himself, being in a kind of way his
activity and abiding in himself, makes him be what
281
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

TTOiel, ixaprvpel vvoTedh) rovvavTiov on, el Trpos
e^o) vevaeLev avrov, dnoAel to eivai OTrep earl-
eivai OTrep earlv evepyeia 17 Trpos avrov tovto
Kai avTOS. avTOS dpa itreaT-qaev avrov avve^evex^elaqs
30 rifs evepyelas p-er’ avrov. el ovv pq yiyovev, dAA’ -^v del
■q evepyeia avrov Kai oiov eypqyopais ovk dXXov ovros
Tov eypqyopoTos, eypqyopais Kai vrrepvoqais del oSaa,
eariv ovrois, coy eypqyopqaev. q Se eypqyopais eariv
erreKeiva ovaias Kai vov Kai ^coqs ep<f>povos' ravra Se
35 avTOS eariv. avros dpa eariv evepyeia vrrep vovv Kai
(frpovqaiv Kai ^coqv e^ avrov Se ravra Kai ov Trap’
dXXov. Trap’ avrov dpa avrdi Kai e^ avrov to
dpa, coy avve^q, ovrais eariv, dAA’ coy qOeXqaev avros
eariv.
17. "Etc Se Kai coSe’ eKaard <l>apev rd ev rto iravri
Kai roSe to trav ovrujs exeto, coy dv eayev, coy q rov
TTOiovvros irpoalpeais qOeXqae, Kai ooTcoy eyeiv, cos dv
TTpoi'epevos Kai Trpoi'Sdrv ev Xoyiapois Kara trpovoiav
5 oSros ^ elpydaaro. dei Se ouTcoy exdvrwv Kai dei ovrais
yiyvopevevv, ovrco roi Kai dei ev rols avvovai Keladai
rods Xdyovs ev pel^ovi evOqpoavvq earwras' diare
erreKeiva Trpovolas rdKet eivai Kai erreKeiva Trpo-
aipeaeojs Kai Trdvra dei voepdis earqKora eivai, oaa
10 ev rw ovri. dtare rqv ovtco Siddeaiv ei ns dvopd^ei
to he is, is evident if one posits the opposite; because, if
to apa he inclined to what is outside him, he would put an
end to his being what he is; so then his being what he
Se ev is is his self-directed activity; but these are one thing
and himself. He therefore brought himself into
existence, since his activity was brought out into
existence along with himself. If then he did not come
into being, but his activity was always and a some­
thing like being awake, when the wakener was not
someone else, a wakefulness and a thought tran­
scending thought which exists always, then he is as
he woke himself to be. But his waking transcends
substance and intellect and intelligent life; but these
are himself. He then is an active actuality above
intellect and thought and life*; but these are from
eivai. ovk him and not from another. His being then comes by
and from himself. He is not therefore as he happened
to be, but he is himself as he willed.
17. And further, [consider it] also like this: we
affirm that each and every thing in the All, and this
All here itself, is as it would have been if the free
choice of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if
this maker proceeding regularly in his calculations
with foresight had made it according to his pro­
vidence. But since things here are always like this
and always come to be like this, so their rational
principles also always rest among the things which
exist all together, standing still in a better order; so
that the things there transcend providence and tran­
scend free choice, and all the things which are in
real being stand in intellectual stillness. So that if
someone calls this disposition of things providence,

^ Theiler: ourw? Enn. * Again Republic VI509B9.

282 283
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

TTpOVOMV, OVTOJ VOeiTU), OTL eOTl TTpO TovSe VOVS Toil he must understand it in this way, that Intellect is
there standing still before this All, and this All here
■navTos €aT(os, aif>’ otS Kai KaO’ ov to ■nav robe, el p-ev ovv
is from and according to Intellect. If then Intellect
VOVS TTpo TravTOJv Kat o.px'f) 6 roiovros vovs, ovK av eiry was before all things and an intellect of this kind
ervxe, troXvs pev wv, oovojSoj 8e avTcp Kal oiov els was the principle, it would not be just as it chanced
to be, being many but in tune with itself and as it
15 ev awreTaypevos. ovSev yap ttoXv Kal TrXfjOos were brought together into a single order. For what
awreraypevov Kal Aoyoi ndvres Kal TTepiXrj<f>6evTes evl is many and an ordered multiplicity, and all rational
forms included in one which goes through all, none
Sid rravTOS cos ervye Kal cos avve^rj, dAAd iroppco
of this is as it chanced and as it happened to be, but it
<f>vaeo)s Trjs TOiavr-qs Kal evavrlov, oaov rvyr) ev dXoyla is far from a nature of this kind and opposed to it, as
KeipevT] Xoycp. el Se to npd rov toiovtov dpx'q, SrjXovOTi much as chance whose place is in unreason is to
rational principle. But if that before the Intellect of
20 TTpoaex'^s tovtco tw ovrco XeXoycopevcp, Kal to ovtco this kind is the principle, it is obviously close to this
Xeyopevov tovto kot’ eKelvo Kal peTexov eKelvov Kal which is rationalised in this way, and what we speak
of in this way is according to that and participates in
olov deXei eKelvo Kal Svvapis eKelvov. dSidoTaTOS tolvvv that and is as that wills and is the power of that. He
eKelvos, ets (.els^ ^ TrdvTa Xoyos, eis dpiOpos Kal eis is then without dimensions, one rational principle
for all things, one number and one which is greater
pell^iov TOO yevopevov Kal SvvaTcoTepos, Kal ovSev
and more powerful than what has come into being,
pel^ov avTOV ovSe KpeiTTov. ouSe dpa e^ dXXov eyei ovTe and there is nothing greater or better than him. He
25 TO eivai ovTe to ottoios eoTiv etvai. avTos dpa avTco o does not then have from another either his being or
his being what he is. He himself therefore is by
eoTi npos avTov Kal els avTOv, iva prjSe TavTi) npds to himself what he is, related and directed to himself,
efco TTpds dXXov, dAAd Tcpos avTov nds- that he may not in this way either be related to the
outside or to something else, but altogether self-
18. Kai ou ^rjTcov prjSev e^co ^rjTei avTov, dXX’ eiaco related.
TrdvTa TO peT avTOV avTOV Se ea. to ydp e^co avTOs 18. And you when you seek, seek nothing outside
him, but seek within all things which come after
eoTi, ireplXiqijjis ndvTcov Kal peTpov. rj eiaco ev ^ddei, to
him; but leave him himself alone. For he himself is
S’ e^co avTov, oiov kvkXco ecjiavTopevov avTov Kal the outside, the encompassment and measure of all
5 e^TjpTTjpevov ndv o Adyos Kal vovs' pdXXov S’ dv eh) things. Or within in depth, but what is outside him,
touching him in a kind of circle and depending on
* Cilento. him, is all which is rational principle and intellect;
284 28s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
vovs, Kado ((fxiTTTeTai Kal ^ e^rjpTTjTai^ avr.ov [koi fj
e^ijpTTjTai],^ are Trap’ eKeCvov ex(t>v to vovs eivai.
(vairep av ovv kvkXos, icfxiTTTOiTO Kevrpov
kvkXw, opoXoyoiTO dv Trjv Svvapiv irapa too Kevrpov
10 exeiv KOI oldv KevrpoeiSrjs, fj* ypappal ev kvkXw npos
Kevrpov ev avviovaai to rrepas avrdiv to rrpds ro
Kevrpov TTOiovai roLOvrov eivai oiov ro rtpos o
■qvexOfjaav Kal a<j>' oS olov e^e<j>vaav, pei^ovos ovros rj
Kara ravras rds ypappds Kal rd rrepara avrdiv rd
15 avrdiv ar)p,ela rdiv ypap.p.d)v—Kal eari p.ev otov eKelvo,
dpvSpd 8e Kal txvr] eKeivov rov o Svvarai avrd Kal rds
ypap,fids Svvdpevov, at vavraxov eyovaiv avro' Kal
epujtaiverai Sid rdiv ypap.p.d)v, otov eariv eKelvo, otov
e^eXiyOev ovk e^eXrjXiypievov—ovrco rot Kal rov vovv
Kal rd dv xp^i Xap^dveiv, yevopevov e^ eKeivov Kal otov
20 eKXvdev Kal e^eXiydev Kal e^Tjprrjpevov, eK rrjs avrqv
voepds (fivaeois paprvpelv rov otov ev evl vovv ov vovv
dvra" ev ydp. djoTrep ovS’ eKel ypappds ovSe kvkXov rd
Kevrpov, kvkXov Se Kal ypappdiv rrarepa, lyvi] avrov
Sdvra Kal Svvdpei pevovar/ ypappds Kal kvkXov ov
25 TrdvrT) drrrjprrjpeva avrov pdipr] rivl yeyevvrjKora- ovroi
roi KaKelvo, r'qs voepds rrepideovarjs Svvdpews, rd otov
IvSdXparos avrov dpxervnov, ev evl vovv, noXXois
Kal els TToXXd otov veviKrjpevov Kal vov Sid ravra
yevopevov, eKeivov rrpd vov peivavros <(€»<]) ® rijs
30 Svvdpews avrov vovs yevvqaauros—ris dv avvrvxia (r}
rd avrdparov rj rd “dis avve^r] etvai”) rrjs roiavrr/s
* coniecimus: e^anreTai Enn.
“ delevimus.
^ Theiler.
4 p3mg ( = Ficinus): r\ Enn.
6 A3mg (=Ficinus), H-S‘: om. H-S^
286
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
but, rather, it would be Intellect, in so far as it
touches him and in the way that it depends on him,
in that it has from him its being Intellect. Just as a
circle, therefore, which touches the centre all round
in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from
the centre and to have in a way the centre’s form, in
that the radii in the circle coming together to one
centre make their terminal point at the centre like
that to which they are carried and from which they,
so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater
than is proportionate to these lines and their ter­
minal points, the points of the lines themselves—and
the terminal points are like that centre, but only a
dim image of that which has power to produce them
in having power also to produce the lines; and what
that centre is like is revealed through the lines; it is
as if it was spread out without having been spread
out—it is like this that we must apprehend that
Intellect-Being, coming to be from that Good and as
if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it,
is, by its own intelligent nature, evidence of some­
thing like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect;
for it is one. Just as in our example also the radii and
the circle were not the centre, but it is the father of
circle and radii giving traces of itself and with an
abiding power generating radii and circle, not at all
cut off from it, by a kind of strength; so also is that
too, as the intellectual power runs round it, a kind of
archetype of the image of itself. Intellect in one, an
image, as it were, overcome by many and into many
and so becoming Intellect, while that remains before
Intellect and generates intellects from its power—
what chance happening (or accident or "as it hap­
pened to be”) could come near a power like this
287
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

SvvdfA,e<x)s Trjg voottoiov Kat ovtojs ■noirjriKrjs TrXrjaiov which makes Intellect and is maker of reality? For
rjKoi; otov yap to ev vai, -rroXXaxfi p-ei^ov rj tolovtov to something like what is in Intellect, in many ways
greater, is in that One; it is like a light dispersed far
€v ivi eKeivw, warrep (jxxJTOS em ttoXv OKeSaadevTos ef
and wide from some one thing translucent in itself;
35 €v6s Tivog €v avTw ovtos Sia<f)avovs- eiSwXov pev to what is dispersed is image, but that from which it
OKebaadiv, to 8’ a(f)’ oS to dXrjdes' ov prjv dXXoeiSes to comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed
image, Intellect, is not of alien form; it is not chance,
GKebaadev eiScoXov o vovs, os ov Tvyr), dXXa KaOeKaoTOv but each and every part of it is rational principle and
avTOV Xoyos Kai aiTia, aiTiov Se eKelvo tov oItlov. cause, but that One is cause of the cause. He is then
pei^ovcos dpa oTov aiTicoTaTOV kol dXrjdeaTepov aiVt'a, in a greater degree something like the most causa­
tive and truest of causes, possessing all together the
40 opov TTaaas peXXovaas dir" avTOV eaeadai intellectual causes which are going to be from him
voepds aiTias Kai yew-qTiKOv tov ovx dis eTVxev, dXX‘ and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he
ws TjdeXrjaev avTOs. Se deXrjais ovk dXoyos r^v ovSe tov
himself willed. And his willing is not irrational, or of
the random, or just as it happened to occur to him,
€LKy ovS’ u)s eTTTjXdev avT<p, dXX’ cos eSei, cos ovSevos but as it ought to be, since nothing there is random.
dvTos €K€i fcKr/. oOev Kai Se ov Kai k a i p ov For this reason Plato speaks of "due” and "right
45 o YlXaTcov cos otov re rjr atjpTjvai ecfnepevos, oti noppco
moment”,' desiring to indicate as far as possible that
it is far from "as it chanced”, but what it is is what it
TOV cos eTVX€v, aXX’ onep eoTc, tovto Seov. el Se to Seov ought to be. But if this is what ought to be, it is not
TOVTO, OVK dXoycos TOVTO, Kai el Kaipos, to paXioTa so irrationally, and if it is the right moment it has
the most authentic mastery among the things which
KvpicoTaTov ev toIs peT‘ avTo Kai irpoTepov avTco Kai
come after it, and has priority in its own right and is
ovx 0^°*' eTVxe tovto ecjTiv, oAAd tovto eoTiv, onep otov not what it in a way chanced to be, but what he in a
50 ePovXijdrj avTOs, emep rd SeovTa jSodAerai Kai ev to way wished to be, since he wishes what ought to be
and what ought to be and the active actuality of
Seov Kai ij tov SeovTOS evepyeca' Kai eoTi Seov ovy cos what ought to be are one; and it is not what ought to
VTTOKelpevov, aXX’ cos evepyeca irpcoTiq tovto eavTrjv be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality
eK<j>rjvaaa, OTrep eSec. ovtco yd.p Sec aiiTov Xeyecv revealing itself as what it ought to be. For this is
how one has to speak of him since one is unable to
dSvvaTOVVTa Xeyecv cos tcs edeXec.
speak as one should.

’ Taken from an entirely different context, Plato’s 284D-E, from which Aristotle develops his doctrine of the
discussion of the two kinds of measurement, Statesman Mean.
288 289
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
19. Aa/Li/SaveTco tis o^v €k tuiv eipyfxfvcov
dvaKivrjGeis npos eKelvo eKelvo avro, Kal Oedaerai
auToy ovx oaov deXei eiTrelv 8tJvdp.evos. iSwv Se eKelvo ev
avTtp irdvTa Xoyov d(l>el9 Orjoerai -nap’ avrov eKelvo
6 rovTO ov, toy, eiTrep eiyev ovaiav, SovXyjv dv avTov Trjv
ovaiav eivai Kal oiov nap’ avrov etvai. ovS
ToXpLrjoeLe ns iSdiv en to "d>s avve^r)" Xeyeiv, ovS’ dv
oAcoy <f>dey^aa6ai Svvarai- eKnXayeir] yap dv roXpLwv,
Kal ovS’ dv eyoi dt^ay "nov” einelv nepl avrov navrij
10 avrip eKeivov otov npd 6p.p.drwv rijs i^vyrjs npo-
<j>aivop.evov Kai, onoi dv drevlarj, eKeivov pXenovros, el
p.rj nov dXXj) d(l>els rov Oedv drevlarj p.7]8ev eri^ nepl
avrov 8iavoovp.evos. XPV lacos Kai to eneKeiva
o V a las Kal ravrrj voeladai rols naXaiols Xeyopievov
15 St’ alvl^ecos, ov p.6vov on yevva ovaiav, dXX’ on ov
8ovXevei ov8e ovala ot5Se eavro), ov8e eanv avrtp dpxr)
rj ovala avrov, dXX’ avros dpxrj rrjs ovalas div ovy avnp
enol-qae rrjv ovaiav, dXXd noirjaas ravrrjv e^<o elaaev
eavrov, are ov8ev rov eivai 8edp,evos, os enolrjaev avro.
20 ov rolvvv ov8e KaOd ean noiel ro ean.
20. Tt oSv; ov avji^alvei, elnoc ns dv, nplv rj
yeveadai yeyovevai; el yap noiel eavrov, r<p p.ev
"eavrov” ovncu earl, rw S’ ad nocelv eanv rj8rj
eavrov rov noiovp,evov dvros avrov. npds d 8ri XeKreov,
i ^3mg ( = Ficinus): ff n wBUCQ: ^toi x.
290
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
19. Raised up, then, towards that hy what has
«ai
been saidpne should take hold of that itself, and he
will see also himself and will not be able to say all
that he wishes. But when he sees that in itself he will
put away all reasoning and will set that by itself as
being such that, if it had substance, its substance
would be its slave and as if derived from it. Nor
av would one who sees it still be rash enough to say "as
it happened to be”; nor is he able to utter a word
about it; if he did he would be struck dumb in his
rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to
say "where” about it; it appears everywhere to him
as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he Axes
his gaze, he is looking at him, unless he leaves the
God and Axes his gaze elsewhere and thinks nO more
about him. And one ought perhaps to understand
that it was in this sense that the ancients spoke of
"beyond being” with a hidden meaning,* not only
that he generates substance but that he is not a slave
to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his
principle, but he, being principle of substance, did
not make substance for himself but when he had
made it left it outside himself, because he has no
need of being, he who made it. He does not then even
make being in accordance with his being.
20. "Well then,” someone might say, "does he not
happen to be already before he comes into being? For
if he makes himself, as regards himself he does not
yet exist, hut on the other hand as regards the
making he exists already before himself, as he him­
npd self is what is made.” To this we must reply that he is
* The reference is of course again to Plato Republic VI
509B9.
291
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
5 ais oAcos ov raKTeov Kara rov Troiovfievov, aXXa Kara
Tov TTOiovvra, anoXvTov ttjv TTOirjaiv avrov riBefievois,
Kal ovx Tva dAAo diroTeXeadfi avTOV rijy noi-qaews,
dXXov Ttjs^ evepyeias avrov ovk wnoTeXearLKijs, dAA’
oXov TOVTOV ovTOS' OV ydp Svo, dAA’ iv. ovSe yap
10 ifio^tjreov ivepyeiav r-qv TTpwrqv rldeaOai avfv ovaias,
dAA’ avTO TOVTO rrjv oiov vnoaraaiv dereov. ei Se
VTToaraaiv dvev ivepyeias ns deiro, eAAnnyj q d.pxq xal
areXrjs q reXeiorarT) rraawv earai. Kat el npoadelq
evepyeiav, ovy ev rr^pel. el ovv reXeiorepov q evepyeia
15 rijs ovalas, reXeiorarov Se to TTpairov, Trpwrov dv
evepyeia eirj. evepyqaas ovv qSq earl rovro, Kal ovk
eanv ihs irplv yeveadai ■^v rore^ ydp ovk ■?jv irplv
yeveaOai, dAA’ qSq Trds '^v. evepyeia Sr/ ov SovXevaaaa
ovala Kadapws eanv eXevdepa, Kai ovrws^ avrds Trap’
20 avrov avros- Kai ydp el p,ev eaw^ero els rd eivai im’
dXXov, ov TTpwTOS avrds e^ avrov- el S’ avrds avrdv
dpdcds Xeyerai avvix^ii', avrds eari Kai d napayivv
eavTOv, eirrep, orrep avvex^i Kard ^vaiv, rovro Kai e^
dpx-qs nenolqKev eivai. el p,ev oSv xpdvos -^v, oBev
rjp^aro eivai, rd TreTTOirjKevai Kvpiwrarov dv eXexBq-
26 vvv Se, el Kai npiv alwva etvai oirep eariv tJv, to
-TTeTTOirjKevai eavrdv rovro voelrw rd avvSpopiov eivai rd
TTeTroirjKevai Kai avrd- ev ydp rfj iroi-qaei Kai oiov
yevvrjaei diSlw rd eivai. oBev Kai rd "apyivv eavrov”-
^ H—S^: dAA* outjTjs Enn.
^ Theiler: ore Enn.
^ Nicephorus Gregorius: oSros Enn.
292
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
not at all to be classed as made, but as maker; we
must posit that his making is absolute, and not in
order that something else should be brought to
perfection by his making, since his activity is not
directed to the perfection of something else, but is
altogether this God; for there are not two, but one.
Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first
activity is without substance, but posit this very fact
as his, so to speak, existence. But if one posited an
existence without activity, the principle would be
defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if
one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then
the activity is more perfect than the substance, and
the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. In
his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it
cannot be that he was before he came to be; for then
he was not before coming to be, but already alto­
gether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved
to substance is purely and simply free, and in this
way he himself is himself from himself. For indeed, if
he was kept in being by another, he would not be
first self from himself; but if he is rightly said to hold
himself together, he is both himself and the bringer
of himself into being, granted that what he by his
nature holds together is what from the beginning he
has made to be. Now if there was a time from which
he began to be, "he has made” would be used in the
strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is
before eternity existed, this "he has made” must be
understood to mean that making and self are con­
current; for the being is one with the making and
what we may call the eternal generation. From this
too [it comes that we say] "ruling himself”; and if
there were two, this is properly said, but if there is
293
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8. FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
/cat ei fiev Svo, xvpccDS, et 8c ev, to "apxcov" p,6vov ov one, the "ruling” only; for he does not have what is
30 yap exet to apx6p,€vov. rrais otJv apxov ovk ovtos npos o; ruled. How then can we say "ruling” when there is
ij TO apxov evravda TTpos to irpo avTOV, otl p,r)8ev ijv. el
nothing to rule? Now "ruling” here refers to what
was before him, because there was nothing before
Se prjSev ^v, irpioTov tovto Se ov TCtfei, dAAa KvpiOTTjTi him. But if there was nothing, he is the first; but this
Kai Swdpei avTe^ovalw KaOapws. el 8e KaOapws, ovk means not in rank, but in authentic mastery and
eoTiv e/cet AajSctv to /ti) avTe^ovalws. oXov ovv
purely self-determined power. But if it is purely self-
determined, it is not possible to accept absence of
35 avTe^ovalojs ev avTw. t( odv avTOV, o avTos; tI otjv, self-determination there. He is therefore altogether
o prj evepyel; /cat tI, o prj epyov avTov; el yap ti enj pr) at his own disposal in himself. What then is there of
epyov avTOV ev avTw, ov Kadapws dv eiTj ovTe his which is not himself? What which is not his
activity? And what which is not his work? For if
aiiTe^ovaios ovt€ TravTa 8vvdpevos' eKelvov tc yap ov there was anything in him which was not his work,
Kvpios irdvTa tc ov 8vvdpevos. eKelvo yovv ov 8vvaTai, he would not then be purely and simply at his own
od prj avTos Kvptos els to voielv. disposal and capable of all things; for he would not
be master of that and would not be capable of all
21. ’ESuvoto ovv dXXo Ti TTOielv eavTov rj o eTTolrjaev; things; at any rate he would not be capable of that of
rj ovTTCt)^ /cat to dyadov Troielv dvaipijaopev, oti prf dv whose making he was not himself master.
KaKov TTOiot. ov ydp ovtcu to 8vvaa0ai e/cci, cos /cat tol
21. Could he then make himself anything else
than he did? Now we shall not yet do away with his
dvTiKelpeva, dXX’ d)s daTep(f>el /cat dpeTaKiv-qTcp making himself good because he could not make
5 8vvdpei, f) pdXiOTa 8vvapls eoTiv, OTav prj eftOTiyTat himself evil. For power to make there is not to be
TOO ev /cat' ydp to Ta dvTiKelpeva 8vvaadai d8in’aplas understood as power to make the op’posites, but as
making with power unshaken and not to be de­
eoTi TOO eiTi Tov dploTOv peveiv. 8el 8e Kal Ttjv ttoIt/oiv flected, which is power in the highest degree when it
avTOV, •^v Xeyopev, Kal TavTujv aTra^ eivar KaXrj ydp. does not go out of the One; for to be capable of the
I ' opposites belongs to incapacity to remain with the
Kal tLs dv TTapaTpeipeie jSooA^aet yevopevrjv Oeov Kal
best. But his making which we speak of must be once
10 ^ovXr)aiv ovaav; ^ovXrfaei ovv. prjTTO} ovtos; tI Se for all; for it is beautiful. And who would alter it
I_ I
^ovXtjaiv eKelvov d^ovXovvTos Trj vrrooTdaei; irodev ovv when it has come to be by the will of God and is his
I ‘ will? By the will, then, of a God who did not yet
aiiTO) eoTai -q ^ovXrjais dm ovalas dvevepyrjTov; rj yv
in exist? And what could his will be when he is without
will in his very existence? How will he come to have
* Theiler; ovtw Enn. a will from his inactive substance? Now his will is in
294
295

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.
PovXrjais ev rfj ovaLa- ovx erepov dpa rijs ovaias ovSev.
rj Ti ^v, o jnij '^v, oiov ij ^ovXrjais; vav dpa jSouAijais
15 Kal ovK evi to pT] ^ovXopevov ovSe to TTpd jSouAiyoeojs
dpa. TTpdiTOV dpa i) jSooAr/ots auTO?. Kat to ws ejSooAeTO
dpa Kat otov i^ovXeTO, Kat to Tfi jSooA'^cret iiropevov, o rj
TOiavTT) jSooArjois eyevva—eyevva Se ovSiv €ti ev
avTw—TOVTO yap T]8r] •^v. to Se ovveyecv eavTOV ovtco
20 XrjTTTeov voetv, ei tis opdws avTO <j>deyyoiTO, to? rd pev
dXXa TrdvTO oaa ecrrt vapd tovtov ovvexeTai- peTOvala
yap Tivi avTov eart, Kat ets tovto t) avaywyi) iravroiv.
avTos ^ Se Trap’ avTov ovTe avvoxTjs ovTe peTovaias
Seopevos, dAAct ndvTa eavTw, pdXXov Se ovSev ovSe
25 Twv vdvTwv Seopevos ets avrov dAA’ OTav avTOV eiTrrjs
rj eworjd^s, rd dXXa rravTa d<f>es. d^eXci)v rravTa,
KaTaXirroiv Se povov avTOV, prj ti rrpoaOfjs C^t€i, oAAa
prj tI tto) OVK d4>rjprjKas air’ dvTOV ev yvcoprj Tfj afj. eoTi
yap Tivos e<j>diliaadai Kat ae, wept oS ovKeTi aXXo
30 evSeyeTai ovtc Xeyeiv ovre XaPelv dAA’ vwepdvoj
Ketpevov povov tovto dXrjBeta eXevdepov, oti prjSe
SovXevov eoTtv eavTtp, dXXd povov avTo Kat ovtws avTO,
e“ ye twv dXXcvv eKaOTOv avTO Kat dXXo.
1 ^3mg ( = Ficinus): auTOi? Enn., H-S^.
296
I
FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE
his substance; so there is nothing different from his
substance. Or what was there that he was not, will
for instance? So he was all will, and there is nothing
in him which is not that which wills—nothing, then,
before willing. So he himself is primarily his will. So
then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed,
and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will
generated—^but it generated nothing further in him­
self, for he was this already. But his holding himself
together must be understood, if one is to say it
correctly, as meaning that all the other things that |
exist are held together by this; for they exist by some ^
kind of participation in him, and it is to this that
their origin is to be traced. But he himself has no '
longer any need from himself of holding together or j
participation, but is all things by and in himself— I
but rather none of them, and he does not need all |
things to be himself; but when you speak or think of
him, put away all the other things. When you have '
put away all things and left only himself, do not try
to find what you can add, but if there is something j
you have not yet taken away from him in your mind.
For even you can grasp something about which it is
not possible any more to say or apprehend anything |
else; but it is something which has its place high j |
above everything, this which alone is free in truth, >
because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself
ahd really itself, while every other thing is itself and
something else.
297
 T

t
t

I
)

ENNEAD VI. 9

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
Introductory Note
This early treatise, number 9 in Porphyry’s chronological
order, is the first clear presentation by Plotinus of the One
as the ultimate principle and of union with it as the goal of
the philosophic or spiritual life. It is the first and one of the
clearest and most powerful of his great ascents of the mind,
in which he both uses philosophic reason as far as it will go
to show the way and urges his readers to go on beyond any
thinkable reality to the union which he does not presume
to describe. Though the treatise was probably meant for a
rather wider circle of readers than the more technical
works like VI1-3, the discussion of the Categories, or VI6,
on numbers, it would still be intended to be read only by a
chosen few, those among his friends and hearers who were
capable of making the tremendous moral and spiritual
effort required to travel by this way and reach the goal, and
who already fully accepted the fundamentals of Platonic
philosophical religion and were trying to live the
philosophical life. Beginning from some fairly
commonplace observations on the scale of unity and the
necessity of unity for the existence of anything, it leads the
reader rapidly through the Platonic World of Forms which
is also Divine Intellect (where many Platonists and later
theists wished to stop) to its source, and concludes with a
passage about (not a description of) the mystical union
which has rightly become a classic, though it should not be
read and thought about in isolation from the rest of the
Enneads] the two great works which precede it in the
300
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
Ennead order, though they were written some years later,
VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39], need particularly to be taken into
consideration.
Synopsis
All beings are beings bv tbe one: unity is the condition of
their existence. Soul unifies all beings in this world, but is
not itself the One, but one by something else (ch. 1). Nor is
real being, either individual or universal, the One; the
world of Forms, which is Being, and is alive, and is
Intellect, is manifold, and neither as the totality of real
beings nor as living and thinking can it be the One which
gives it unity (ch. 2). Difficulty of thinking or sneaking
about the One because it is formless; we must first reach
the level of Intellect and then go hevond it; the One is not
one of things it generates, and all which is said of them
must be denied of it (ch. 3). We are aware of the One by a
presence above knowledge; teaching and reasoning can
only help on the way to it (ch. 4). We must first come to an
understanding of the soul and its derivation from Intellect,
and go on from there; inadequacy of all names, including
"One”, for the source of Intellect (ch. 5). yibat wp mpan by
sufficiencv-of the One: it is beyond the need for thinking
(ch. 6). Need to turn inwards, away from all other things,
and even oneself, to find the One (ch. 7). The image of the
circles; how we must turn to the One, the centre, by putting
away otherness (ch. 8). The One is always present, always
giving its gifts, but we must put away all other things to
possess him truly (ch. 9). The vision which is perfect union,
with no consciousness of duality (ch. 10). The final mystery
of that union; how we fall from it and rise to it again
(ch. 11).
301

VI. 9. (9) nEPI TAFAeOT H TOT ENOE
1. IlavTa TO ovra roy ev( eoTiv ovra, oaa re Trpoyrws
eartv ovra, Kal oaa oirwaovv Aeyerai iv rots oSaiv eivai.
rt yap av Kat eir), ei fiTj ev eirj; eTrelirep d<f>aipedevTa tov
€V o Xeyerai ovk eartv e/eeiva. cure yap arparos eartv,
5 et /iij ev earat, oure ;^opoj oiJre dyeXt) p.rj ev ovra. aXX
ov8e oLKia -q vavs to ev ovk exovra, eiretWep ij otVio ev
Kat ij vaus, 0 et’ ctTro/SdAot, ovr’ ctv ij ot’tcia ert ot/cta ovre
ij vavs. rd roivuv avvexy pLeyidy, et /Ltij rd ev auroty
TTapeiy, ovk dv eir;- Tp-yOevra yovv, Kadoaov to ev
10 (XTrcAAiiatv, dAAdaaet rd eivat. /cat Si) /cat' rd rcliv ^urd/v
/cat ^cdcov acdjLtara ev ovra e/caara et (j>evyoi to ev et’s
nXydos OpwTopeva, ri)v ovaiav avTcvv, yv ely^v,
dvwXeaev ou/cert ovra d i)v, dAAa Se yevopeva Kat
eKeiva, oaa ev eart. /cat i) vyUia Se, orov ety ev
16 awTayOy to adipa, Kat /cdAAoy, drav i) rot) evdy rd
popia KaTaaxy <l>vaLS' Kat d/jeri) Se t/taxys, drav et’y ev
/cat et’y juiov opoXoyiav evojdfj. dp’ oCv, eiretSi) ipvxy rd
vdvTa els ev dyei Sypiovpyovaa Kat irAdrrot/aa /cat
pop<f>ovaa Kat auvrdrrouaa, eirt raurijv eAddvray Set
^ The scale of different degrees of unity which Plotinus
uses in this chapter and elsewhere is Stoic. Cp. SVF II
366-8 and 1013.
“ On beauty and unity cp. I. 6. 2. 18-28.
302
V
i
1
VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE '
1. It is by the one that all beings are beings..both
those which are primarily beings and those which
are in any seixsfiJiaidJboJhBjmonglEngs. For~^at
could anything be if it was not one? For if things are
deprived of the one which is predicated of them they
are not those things. For an army does not exist if it
is not one, ift>r a chorus or a flock if they are not one.
But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not
have their one, since the house is one and so is the
ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house
nor the ship a ship. So then continuous magnitudes,
if the one was not with them, would not exist; at any
rate, if they are cut up they change their being in
proportion as they lose their one. And again the
bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if
they escape their one by being broken up into a
multiplicity, lose the substance which they had and
are no longer what they were but have become other
things, and are those other things in so far as each of
them is one.* And there is health when the body is
brought together into one order, and beauty when
the nature of the one holds the parts together^; and
the soul has virtue when it is unifled into one thing
and one agreement. Is it true then that, since the
soul brings all things to their one by making and i
moulding and shaping and composing them, we 1
should, when we have arrived at it, say that it is this i
303 I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
20 Xeyeiv, u)s outtj to iv xopr/yei Kai avTt) iari to ev; rj
woTrep TO dXXa xop'ijyovaa rois awpLaaiv ovk eariv auTi)
o SiScootv, otov P'Op(f>rj Kal eiSos, dXX’ erepa avrfjg, ovtw
XP^> KO-i- SiSwaiv, erepov ov avTrjs vofii^eiv avTrp/
SiBovai Kal TTpos TO €v pXeTTOvaav ev eKaarov rroielv,
25 woTTep Kal irpos dvBpwnov dvdponrov, avXXap,pdvovaav
perd Tov dvOpwTTov to ev avToi ev. twv yap ev
Xeyopevojv ovtcos eKaoTov eoTiv ev, cos eyei Kal o eoTiv,
ware to pev -^ttov ovto •^ttov cyetv to ev, to Se pdXXov
paXXov. Kal Srj Kal i/'vyiy erepov ovaa tov evos <^to^
pdXXov (.evy * eyei KaTa Xoyov tov pdXXov Kal ovtws
30 eivac. [to pdXXov ev] ^ ov prjv avTO to ev i/ioyiy yap pla
Kal avp^ePrjKOS ttcos to ev, Kal Svo TavTa i/'oyi) Kal ev,
woTTep awpa Kal ev. Kal to pev SieOTrfKos, coOTrep
Xopos, TToppcoTaTO) TOV ev, TO Se avveyes eyyvTepw
ilivyri 8e cti pdXXov Koivcovovaa Kal avT-q. el 8‘ oti dvev
35 TOV ev etvai ov8’ dv ’pvxq eiq, TavTrj els Tavrov tls dyei
•jjvxTjv Kal TO ev, npwTOV pev Kal to dXXa (^dy ^ eoTiv
eKaoTa peTa tov ev etvai eariv dAA’ opcos eTepov avTcov
TO ev—ov yap TavTOV acdpa Kal ev, dAAd to adtpa
peTexei tov ev—eneiTa 8e ttoAAtj rj ijivxTl Kal q pla xdv
40 el pq ex pepwv nXeiaTai yap 8vvdpeis ev avrq,
Xoyl^eadat, dpeyeadai, dvTiXapPdveaOai, a tw
cdoTrep 8eap(p aweyeToi. eTrdyei pev 8q fjivxq to ev ev
* transposuimus, ut correctionem.
304
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
which provides the one and this which is the one?
Rather we should consider that, just as with the
other things it provides for bodies, it is not itself
what it gives, shape and form for instance, but they
are other than it, so, even if it gives the one, it gives
it as something other than itself, and that it is by
looking to the one that it makes each and every
thing one, just as it is by looking to [the Form of]
man that it makes something man, taking the one in
it along with the man. For of the things which are
said to be one each is one in the way in which it also
has what it is, so that the things which pre less
beings have the onTless. andtbo^o yvhichare more
bemgs, mOTcTAnd the soul too, which is other than
theoneTEas its being more one in proportion to its
greater and real being. It is certainly not the one
itself; for the soul is one and the one is somehow
incidental to it, and these things, soul and one, are
two, just like body and one. And what has separate
parts, like a chorus, is furthest from the one, and
what is a continuous body is nearer; and the soul is
nearer still, but still participates in it. But if because
without being one it would' not be soul, for this
reason someone makes soul and the one the same,
first of all, all the other things are what they are
along with their being one; but all the same the one
is different from them—for body and one are not the
same thing, but the body participates in the one—
evl
and then the soul is many, even the soul which is
one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there
are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring,
apprehending, which are held together by the one as
by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things
305
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
otiaa* Kai avTT] aAAw' vdcj^^i Se tovto Kai avTr) im’
dXXov.
2. "Ap’ ouv eKaaTO) /x.ev toiv Kara fj,epos ev ov ravTov
ovaia avTov Kai to ev, oXw Se tw ovri Kai rfj ovaia
ravTOv r] ovaia Kai to ov Kai to ev; coare tov e^evpovTa
5 TO ov e^evprjKevai Kai to ev, Kai avTTjv TTjv ovaiav avTo
etvai TO ev oiov, el vovs -q ovaia, vovv Kai to ev elvai
TrpcoTWS ovTa ov Kai TrpcoTOJS ev, pieTaSiSovTa Se toIs
dXXois TOV eivai ovtcos Kai /card tooovtov Kai tov evos.
tL yap dv tis Kai Trap’ avTO. eivai aVTO ijyqaai; rj^ yap
TavTov TW dvTi—d V 6 p w n o s yap Kai eis
10 avdpwTTos T av T 6 v—rj oiov dpidpios tiseKaoTov,
wairep ei Svo tivo. eXeyes, ovtws evi piovov tivos to ev.
el p.€v ovv 6 dpiOpios Twv ovtwv, SijXov oti Kai to ev Kai
CrjTTjTeov Ti eoTiv. el Se 4’^XV^ evepyqpia to apiOpieiv
eTTe^iovarjs, ovSev dv ei-q ev toIs npaypiaai to ev. dXX
15 eXeyev 6 Xdyos, el d-TToXet eKaOTOV to ev, pirjS’ eaeaOai to
irapd-nav. opdv odv Set, el TavTov to ev eKaoTov Kai to
ov, Kai TO oXws ov Kai to ev. dXX’ el to ov to eKdoTov
■nXrjBos eoTi, to Se ev dSvvaTOv irXrjdos eivai, eTepov dv
* ev ovaa ( = Ficinus): evovaa BxUCQ: evovaa w.
“ (= Ficinus): ei Enn.
' That Intellect-Real Being is the first principle was the
view of most Platonists before Plotinus, including his
fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origen the Platonist (to be
distinguished from Origen the Christian). See Origen fr. 7
Weber (= Proclus Platonic Theology II4, p. 31,5-11 Saffrey-
306
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
being also itself one by something else: it too experi­
ences this unity by the act of another.
2. Is it, then, true that for each of the things which
are one as parts its substance and its one are not the
same thing, but for being and substance as a whole
substance and being and one are the same thing? So
that anyone who has discovered being has dis­
covered the one, and substance itself is the one itself:
for example, if intellect is substance, intellect is also
the one since it is primarily being and primarily one,
and as it gives the other things a share in being,
so in the same measure it also gives them a share in
the one.^ For what can anyone say that it is besides
being and intellect? For it is either the same as
being—for "man” and "one man” are the same
thing—or it is like a kind of number of the indiv­
idual; you say "one” of a thing alone just as you say
"two things”. Now if number belongs to the real
beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must
investigate what it is. But if numbering is an activity
of soul going through things one after another, the
one would not be anything factual. But our argu­
ment said that if an individual thing loses its one it
will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the
individual one and individual being are the same
thing, and universal being-and the universal one.
But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity,
but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity,
they will be different from each other. At any rate
Westerink). H. R. Schwyzer has suggested that Ammonius
himself may have held a view closer to that of Plotinus
{Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins, Opladen 1983,
T2r-n).
307
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
et-q eKarepop. apdpconos yovp Kai ^wov Kal XoyiKov Kat "man” and "living being” and "rational” are many
20 voXXa p-ep-q Kal awSeirai epc to. voXXa ravra- dXXo dpa parts and these many are bound together by the one.
avOpoiTTOS Kal €v, el to pep pepicnop, to 8e apepes. Kal "Man” and "one” are therefore different, and one
has parts and the other is partless. And, further,
Bq Kal TO oXop OP ndpra ep avrw eyop to. opra ttoXXol universal being, which has all the beings in it, will
pdXXop dp etq Kal erepop tov epos, peraX-q^ei Se eyop be still more many and different from the one, and
will have the one by sharing and participation. But
Kal pede^ei to &>. e^ei Be Kal ^corjp [icai povp]' to op- ov
being also has life; for it is certainly not a corpse;
25 yap B-q peKpop- noXXd dpa to op. el Be povs tovto elq, being therefore is many things. But if it is intellect,
Kal ovTct) TToXXd dpdyKq elpai. Kal Iti pdXXov, el rd elBq in this way too it must be many; and still more if it
includes the Forms. For the Idea is not one, but
vepiexoi- ovBe yap q IBea ep, dXX’ dpcOpos pdXXop Kal rather a number, both each individual one and the
eKdarq Kal q avpiraaa, Kal ootcos ep, oia-nep dp elq ^ 6 total Idea, and is one in the way in which the
Koapos ep. oXcos Be to pep ep to npcoTOP, 6 Be povs Kal universe is one. But altogether the one is primary
and the Forms and being are not primary. For each
30 Ta elBq Kal to op ov -npdiTa. eiSds Te yap eKaoTOP eK Form is of many parts and composite and posterior;
TToXXwp Kal avpOerop Kal voTepop- e^ cop yap eKaoTop for those elements from which an individual thing is
composed are prior to it. And it is clear also from the
eoTi, TTpOTepa eKeipa. otl Be ovy otdp Te top povp to
following that intellect cannot be the first: it is
TTpdiTOP eipai Kal eK TWpBe BqXop eoTai- top povp dpdyKq necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and
ep T<p poeip elpai Kal top ye dpiOTOP Kal top ov that the best intellect, the one which does not look
outside itself, thinks what is before it^; for in turn­
35 npos TO e£co pXenopTa poeiP to irpo avTOV- els avTOP yap ing to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect
eTnaTpe<j>o)p els dpxqv eTTiaTpe<j>ei. Kal el pep avTOS to itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be
poovp Kal TO poovpepop, BittXovs eoTai Kal ovx d-TrXovs double and not single and so not the one; but if it
looks to another, it must certainly be to that which
ovBe TO ep- €i Be TTpos eTepop ^Xeirei, -ndpTcos -rrpds to
is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to
KpeiTTOP Kal TTpd avTOV. el Be Kal npos avrop Kal npos itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it
40 TO KpeiTTOP, Kal ovrws BevTepop. Kal xpq to*' povp
is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of
such a kind that it is present to the good and the first
TOiovTOP Tideadai, olop napelpai pep T<p dyadw Kal too

' Here Plotinus is developing and correcting Aristotle’s

* del. Harder. account of the self-thinking divine mind in Metaphysics A
® Harder: «’ ^ wBCQ: el -Ijv U: el xat x.
9.1074bl5-1075al2.
308
309
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

TTpwTO) Kat pXeTTeiv eis eKeivov, avveivai Se Kal iavrw and looks to him, but is also present with itself and
voelv T6 Kai eavTov Kal voeiv eavrov ovra rd wavra. thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things. It
is far, then, from being the one since it is richly
voXXov dpa Set to hf etvai ttoikiXov dvra. ov roivvv ovSe various. The one then cannot be all things, for so it
46 TO ev rd irdvra earai, ovtco yap ovKeri ev etry ovSe vovs, would be no longer one; and it cannot be intellect,
for in this way it would be all things since intellect is
Kai yap dv ovtcos etrj rd Trdvra rov vov rd Travra ovtos' all things; and it cannot be being; for being is all
ovSe TO 6v TO ydp ov rd navTa. things.
. It av ovv €17] TO €v KOI Tiva (pvatv €xov; rj ovo€v 3. What then could the One be, and what nature
could it have? There is nothing surprising in its
Bavp-aoTov prj paSiov eineiv eivai, ovov priSe to ov being difiScult to say, when it is not even easy to say
paSiov prjSe to eiSos' dAA’ eoTiv rjptv yvwais eiSeaiv what Being or Form is; but we do have a knowledge
based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul
eTTepeiSopevTj. oa(p 8’ dv eis dveiSeov ij ^vyr) tr),
goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable
6 e^aSvvaTovaa irepiXa^elv tw p-q dpi^eoBai Kat olov to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so
TvirovaOai vno ttolkIXov too twovvtos e^oXiaBdvei Kat to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides
away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all.
^o^evrai, pr/ ovSev exp. Sid Kapvei ev Tots toiovtois
Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often
Kai aapevr] /carajSaiWi noXXaKis dTTOTrlTTTOvaa and gladly comes down and falls away from all this, till it
comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid
TrdvTwv, peypis dv els alodrjTdv ij/cjj hi OTepecp cdoTrep
ground; just as sight when it gets tired of small
10 dvaTTavopevry oTov Kat rj d^is Kapvovaa ev tois piKpots objects is glad to come upon big ones.^ But when the
Tois peydXois dapevws v-epnriTTTei. Kad’ eavTXjv Se rj soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with
it and being one by being one with it, it does not
OTav ISeiv eOeXrj, povov dpcdaa Tip avvetvai Kat ev think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not
oSaa TO) ev eivai avTtp ovk oteral rrw exeiv o ^rjrei, on different from what is being thought. But all the
same this is what one must do if one is going to
Tov voovpevov prj erepov eanv. opens Si) ;^pi) ovtcos
philosophise about the One. Since, then, that which
TTOietv tSv peXXovTa rrept to ev ^iXoao<f>rjaeiv. erret we seek is one and we are considering the principle
15 Tolvvv ev eoTiv o ^rjTovpev, Kat ti)v dpx^v twv rrdvTcvv of all things, the Good and the First, one must not go
far away from the things around the primary by
eTTiaKOTTovpev, TayaOdv Kat to rrpwTov, ovre rroppeo Set
straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away
* Plotinus may be thinking here of Numenius’ among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans).
comparison of the attempt to see the Good to someone
310 311
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
yeveaOai twu nepi rd TTpibra els rd ea^aTa twv ndvTOJV
TTeaovra, dXX’ tepLevov els rd npwra e’Travayayelv eavrdv
dno TWV aladrjTwv eaxdrwv dvrwv, KaKias re iraarfs
20 dmjXXaypievov eivac are rrpds rd dyaddv arrevdovra
yeveaOai, errl re rrjv ev eavrw dpxrjv dva^e^rjKevai Kal
ev eK TToXXwv yeveaBai dpxrjs xai evdj Bear'qv eaopLevov.
vovv rolvvv XPV yev6p,evov Kal rr)v i/'i'X'’?*’ rr)v avrov vw
marevaavra Kal ixjiLdpvaavra, iv’ a ^ dpa eKelvos
eyprjyopvla dexotro, rovrw Oedadai rd ev ov
25 ■npoaridevra atadr^aiv ovdep.(av ovde ri irap’ avrrjs els
eKelvov dexop^evov, dAAd Kadapw rw vw rd KaOapwrarov
dedadai Kal rov vov rw TTpwrw. orav rolvw d errl rrjv
6eav rov roiovrov earaXpevos rj peyeBos rj ax'^pa rj
dyKov rrepl ravrrjv rr^v ^vaiv (l>avTaaBfj, ov vovs rovrcp
30 rjyepwv ylverai rffs Bias, on prj voOs rd roiavra
TTe<f>VKev dpdv, dXX‘ eariv alaBrjoews Kal do^rjs evopevrjs
alaBiqaei ij evepyeia. dAAd del Xa^etv rrapd rov vov ttjv
errayyeXlav (Lv dvvarai. dvvarai de dpdv d vovs [':7 rd
■npd avrov\^ rj rd avrov tj rd rrpd^ avrov. KaBapd
35 Se Kal rd ev avrw, eri de KaBapwrepa Kal dirXovarepa
rd TTpd avrov, pdXXov de rd rrpd avrov. ovde vovs
rolvvv, dAAd rrpd vov- rl ydp rwv dvrwv eariv d vovs'
€Kelvo de ov ri, dAAd npd eKaarov, ovde dv Kal ydp rd
ov oiov pop<j>riv r-qv rov dvros exei, dpop<f>ov de eKelvo
40 Kal pop(l>fis vorjrrjs. yevvqriKrj ydp -q rov evds
ovaa rwv ndvrwv ovdev earcv avrwv. ovre ovv ri ovr'e
TTOidv ovre noadv ovre vovv ovre ^vx-qv ouSe
■ (= Ficinus): Iva Enn.
“ del. Igal.
^ Igal: Trap’ Enn.
312
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
falling down to the last things of all, but as one goes
to the primary one must lift oneself up from the
things of sense which are the last and lowest, and
become freed from all evil since one is hastening to
the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and
become one from many, when one is going to behold
the Principle and the One. Therefore one must
become Intellect and entrust one’s soul to and set it
firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to
receive what that sees, and may by this Intellect
behold the One, without adding any sense-
perception or receiving anything from sense-
perception into that Intellect, but beholding the
most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary
part of Intellect. When therefore he who is embarked
on the contemplation of this kind imagines size or
shape or bulk about this nature, it is not Intellect
which guides his contemplation because Intellect is
not of a nature to see things of this kind, but the
activity is one of sense-perception and opinion fol­
lowing sense-perception. But one must take one’s
information from Intellect where it is competent.
And Intellect is competent to see its own things and
the things before it. The things in it also are pure,
but those before it are purer and simpler—or rather
that which is before it. It is not therefore Intellect,
but before Intellect. For Intellect is one of the
beings, but that is not anything, but before each and
every thing, and is not being; for being has a kind of
shape of being, but that has no shape, not even
intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is
generative of all things it is not any one of them. It is
not therefore something or qualified or quantitative
or intellect or soul; it is not in movement or at rest.
313
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
Ki.voviJ.evov ovS’ aS earws, ovk ev tottoj, ovk ev
dAA’ auTo^ Had’ avr 6 ixovoeiSes, fiaXXov Se
dveiSeov npo eiSovs ov navros, -npo Kivrjaeui?, npd
45 ardaews" ravra yap nepi to ov, d ttqXXo. avTO TTOiel. Sid
Ti ovv, el p,rj Kivovpievov, ovy eardjs; on nepi p.ev to ov
TOVTcov ddrepov rj dpufiorepa dvdyKr], to t€ euTcbs
OTaaei eoTws Kai ov tovtov tt) OTaaef cocrre avpi-
^TjoeTai avTpj Kal ovkSti aTrXovv pievel.^ enei Kai to
50 aiTiov Xeyeiv ov KaTTjyopetv eoTi avpi^e^rfKOS ti avTUj,
dAA’ ’fipdiv, oTi exopiev ti nap’ avTov eKeivov ovtos ev
avTw- Set Se /nijSe to "eKeivov” pirjSe "ovtos”^ Xeyeiv
d»fpij8dis XeyovTa, dAA’ rifias oiov e^codev nepiOeovTas
rd avTwv eppLTjveveiv edeXeiv ndOrj oTe piev eyyvs, OTe Se
dnonlnTOVTas Tats nepi avTO dnopiais.
4. FiveTai Se •q dnopla piaXiOTa, oti piqSe kot
eniOTTjp.'qv Tj avveais eKeivov pnqSe KaTa vorjaiv, (Lanep
Ta dXXa vorjTa, dXXd KaTa napovaiav eniOTrjpirjs
KpeiTTova. ndayei Se q tlivxTj tov ev eivai Tqv dnooTaaiv
5 Kai oil ndvTq eOTiv ev, OTav eniaTrjpirjv tov Xapi^dvr)-
Adyos yap q eniaTrjpirj, noXXd Se 6 Xoyos. napepyeTai
ovv TO ev els dpidpiov Kai nXrjdos neaovaa. vnep
eniOTTjp.'qv Toivvv Sei Spapieiv Kai pnqSapirj eK^aiveiv tov
ev eivai, dAA’ dnooTTjvai Sei Kai eniaTr)p,-qs Kai
10 eniaT-qTOJv Kai navTos dXXov Kai KaXov OedpiaTOS. ndv
' Heintz; dAAd Enn.
to
“ Dodds: fteVct Enn.
^ Page: ovtcos Enn.
314
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
not in place, not in time,' but "itself by itself of
single form’’,^ or rather formless, being before all
form, before movement and before rest; for these
pertain to being and are what make it many. Why,
then, if it is not in movement is it not at rest?
Because each or both of these must necessarily
pertain to being, and what is at rest is so by rest and
is not the same as rest; so rest will be incidental to it
and it will not be the same as rest. For to say that it
is the cause is not to predicate something incidental
of it but of us, because we have something from it
while that One is in itself; but one who speaks
precisely should not say "that” or "is”; but we run
round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our
own experiences of it, sometimes near it and some­
times falling away in our perplexities about it.
4. The perplexity arises especially because our
awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned
knowledge or of intellectual perception, as with
other intelligible things, but by way of a presence
superior to knowledge. The soul experiences its
falling away from being one and is not altogether
one when it has reasoned knowledge of anything; for
reasoned knowledge is a rational process, and a
rational process is many. The soul therefore goes
past the One and falls into number and multiplicity.
One must therefore run up above knowledge and in
no way depart from being one, but one must depart
from knowledge and things known, and from every
other, even beautiful, object of vision. For every
' This comes from an established Platonic-Pythagorean
exegesis of the First Hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides.
“ Plato Symposium 211B1.
315,
T

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

yap /caAov varepov eKeivov Kal Trap’ eKeivov, wanep vav beautiful thing is posterior to that One, and comes
(f>a)s piedTjpLepivov nap’ ijAtou. Sio o ii 8 e p r/T 6 v ov8e
from it, as all the light of day comes from the sun.
Therefore, Plato says, "it cannot be spoken or writ­
Ypamov, <f>r]a(v, dAAa Aeyo/xev Kai 'ypd(j>op,ev nip.novTes ten”, ‘ but we speak and write impelling towards it
(is avTO Kal dveyilpovT€s €k twv Aoyaiv eni rrjv Oeav and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as
wanep 6S6v SeiKvvvres tw ti dedaaaOai ^ovXopLevw. if showing the way to someone who wants to have a
view of something. For teaching goes as far as the
15 pteypi yap rrjs 68ov Kal rfjs nopelas rj SiSa^LS, 17 Se 6ea road and the travelling, but the vision is the task of
avTOV epyov tov iSeiv jSejSouATjpievoa. ei Se pLrj rjXde someone who has already resolved to see. But if
Tis ini TO 9iap-a, p-rfSi avveaiv eayev rj ifivx^ rrjs eKsi someone has not come to the vision, and his soul has
no awareness of the glory there, and he has not
dyXatas jjnjSe enaOe pLrjSi eayev iv iavrw oiov ipcuriKOv
experienced and does not have in himself in seeing a
nddyjjjLa ck tov ISelv ipaarov iv <S ipa dvanavaajj,€vov, kind of passionate experience like that of a lover
20 Se^dfievos^ <f)d)s dXijdivov Kal ndaav r-qv i/'vyiyi' resting in the beloved, then, having received the
nepLijxjvTiaav^ Sid to iyyvTepto yeyovevai, true light and illumined his whole soul through
drawing nearer, but being still held back in the
dva^ePqKevai 8e eri oniado^aprjs vndpywv, a ijinoSia ascent by a burden which hinders the vision, and
■qv TTj dea, Kal ov pidvos dva/SejSijKcoj, dAA’ lycuv to having ascended not alone but taking something
Sielpyov an’ avrov, rj pnqnoj els ev avvayOels—ov yap with him which keeps him from the One, or being not
yet brought together into unity—for that One is not
25 Si) dneoTiv ovSevos eKeivo Kal ndvrwv Si, cvare napwv absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its
pii) napetvai dAA’ rj toIs Sixeadai Svvap.ivois Kal presence it is not present except to those who are
napeaKevaajxivoLS, ware ivapjjLoaai Kal oiov irfrdipaadai able and prepared to receive it,'so as to be in accord
with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their
Kal diyelv ojioioTqrr Kal Trj iv avTw Svvdjxei avyyevel
likeness; and, by the power in oneself akin to that
TW an’ avTOV orav ovtws ixV’ qXdev an’ which comes from the One, when someone is as he
30 avTov, -qSq Svvarai ISelv ws ne(j>VKev iKelvos dearos was when he came from him, he is already able to see
eivai—el ovv jxqnw iarlv iKel, dXXd Sid ravrd iariv as it is the nature of that God to be seen—if then
someone is not yet there but is outside because of
e^w, rj Si evSeiav tov naiSaywyovvros Xdyov Kal nlariv these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to
nepl avTOV napexojJievov, Si’ iKelva piev avrov iv alrla guide him and give him assurance about the One, let
him blame himself for those hindrances and try to
^ Kirchhoff: Be^d^evov Enn.
^ suspic. Harder: nepuftoiTiaas Enn. ' Plato Letter VII 341C5.
316 317
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
Tideadw, Kai Tretpdadct) dnoards travTCDv fj.6vos eivai, a
35 Se €v TOiy Aoyois dniaTei eAAeiTTWv, cLSe Siavoeiadco.
5. "OaTis oierai rd ovra rvyjl xat roi avTOfxdTw
SioiKeladai Kai aa)fj,aTLKals awexeodai airiais, odros
TToppo) dneXt^XaTai Kai deov Kai ivvoias evos, Kai 6
Xoyos OV TTpOS TOVTOVS, dAAct TTpOS TOVS dXXr]v <j>vaiv
5 TTapd TO. acu/iOTa ridepievovs Kai dviovras eni tpax^iv.
Kai Srj Sei tovtovs (j)vaiv i/ivx'^S KaTavevorjKevai rd re
dXXa Kai ois TTapd vov can Kai Xdyov napd rovrov
Koivwviqaaaa dperrjv iaxfr ixerd Se ravra vovv Xa^elv
erepov rov Xoyi^opievov Kai XoyiariKov KaXovp,ivov, Kai
10 TOVS Xoyiapiovs TjSrj oiov iv Siaardaei Kai KivT/aei, Kai
ras €TTiarrjp.as Xoyovs ev i/tvxTj rds roiavras iv (fravepd)
■tjSij yeyovvias rip iv rfj ijtvxfj yeyovivai rov vovv rtvv
eTnarrjp,iov atriov. Kai vovv iSdvra olov aiadrjrdv rep
dvriXrjTTrdv etvai iTravaPe^rjKora rf) i/ivxfj Kai varipa
avrrjs ovra Koapiov vor^rov, vovv rjavxov Kai arpepLij
15 KiVTjaiv (frariov Trdvra exovra iv avrip Kai Trdvra ovra,
TrXfjdos dSidKpirov Kai ad SiaKeKpip,ivov. ovre ydp
SiaKeKpirai cus oi Xdyoc oi ySrj Kad’ ev voovp,evoi, ovre
avyKexvrai rd iv avrip- -n-pdeiai ydp SKaarov x^pis'
OLOv Kai iv rais i-marT^pLais irdvrwv iv dpiepei ovrwv
20 op.oJS iariv eKaarov x^pis avrdiv. rovro ovv to opiov
irXrjOos, 6 Koapios 6 vo-qros, eari piiv o -npos rw npidrip,
318
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
depart from all things and be alone, but as for what
he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reason­
ings, let him consider the following.
5. Whoever thinks that reality is governed by
chance and accident and held together by bodily
causes is far removed from God and from the idea of
the One, and our discourse is not directed to these
people but to those who posit another nature besides
bodies and have gone up as far as soul. Now these
must come to an understanding of the soul, in other
ways and especially that it derives from Intellect,
and that it is by sharing in the rational principle
which comes from it that it possesses virtue; after
this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other
than that which is called reasoning and reckoning,
and that reasonings are already in a kind of separa­
tion and motion, and that our bodies of knowledge
are rational principles in the soul and of a kind
which have already become manifest there because
Intellect the cause of knowledges has become pre­
sent in the soul. And when one has seen Intellect as
something like an object of sense because it is
apprehended as transcending the soul and being its
father, an intelligible universe, one must say that
Intellect is a quiet and undisturbed movement, hav­
ing all things in itself and being all things, a multi­
plicity which is undivided and yet again divided. For
it is not divided as are the rational principles which
are already thought one by one, nor are its contents
confused; for each one proceeds separately; it is as it
is in our bodies of knowledge, where all the items are
in a partless whole and yet each of them is separate.
This multiplicity all together, then, the intelligible
universe, is what is near to the First, and our
319
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
Kai (l>'r]aiv avTO o Aoyos e^avdyKrjs eivai, eiTrep ns Kat argument says that it must necessarily exist, if one
>pvXVv eivai, tovto 8e Kvpiwrepov i/jvx'rjs' ov pJvTOi says that the soul exists, and that it must be of
higher authority than soul; it is not, however, the
TTpwTov, on piTj €v p,rj8f dn^ovv- anXovv Se to ev Kal rj First, because it is not one nor simple; but the One is
25 TravTwv apxv- ’’’o ovat np-icoTarov, simple and the principle of all things. Now that
which is prior to what is most honourable among
eiTTep 8el n irpo vov eTvai. ev p-ev eivai ^ovXopevov, ovk
real beings, given that there must be something
ovTOS 8e ev, evoei8ovs 8e, on avnp p7]8e eaKe8aaTai 6 before Intellect which wants to be one but is not one,
vovs, dXXd avveanv eavnlt ovnos ov 8iapT^aas eavrov but in unitary form, because Intellect is not disper­
sed in itself but is in reality all together with itself
np TrXrjoiov [xerd to ev eivai, dnoaTtjvai de ttcvs tov evos and its nearness after the One has kept it from
30 ToXpiT^aas—ro 8rj npd toutov 6avpa tov ev, o p'q ov dividing itself, though it did somehow dare to stand
away from the One—that which is before this In­
eanv, iva piij nai evravda Kar dXXov to ev, <5 ovopa pev
tellect, this marvel of the One, which is not existent,
KaTd dX-pOeiav ov8ev TTpoarjKOv, eiirep Se Set ovopdaai, so that "one” may not here also have to be pre­
Koivws dv XexOev TTpoarjKOVTcvs ev, ovx dis dXXo, eiTa ev, dicated of something else, which in truth has no
fitting name, but if we must give it a name, "one”
XaXevov pev yvcvadijvai 8id tovto, yiyvcooKopevov 8e would be an appropriate ordinary way of speaking of
35 pdXXov Tw an’ avTOv yevvqpaTi, tij ovaia—Kai dyei els it, not in the sense of something else and then one;
ovaiav vovs—Kai avTov rj ijrvais TOiavrr), ojs mr^ypv twv
this is difficult to know for this reason, but can be
better known from its product, substance—and it is
apiOTwv eivai Kai dvvapiv yevvdiaav Ta ovTa pevovaav intellect which leads to substance'—and its nature
ev eavrfj Kai ovk eXaTTovpevrjv ov8e ev toIs yivopevois is of such a kind that it is the source of the best and
the power which generates the real beings, abiding
vn ayrrijs odaav. o ti Kai npd tovtiov, dvopd^opev ev in itself and not being diminished and not being one
40 e^avdyKTjs Tip a-qpaiveiv dXX'qXois avTTjv Tip ovopaTi els of the things which it brought into being. Whatever
evvoiav . dpepioTov dyovTes Kai Trjv ifivxTjv evovv is even before these, we give the name of "One” to by
necessity, to indicate its nature to one another,
OeXovTes, ovx ovtivs ev XeyovTes Kat dpepes, ojs arjpeiov bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible idea
and wanting to unify our souls; we do not when we
' Normally, in this treatise as elsewhere in the Enneads,
intellect does not "lead to” substance: the two are remind his readers, in the middle of his account of the
identical. Perhaps Plotinus means that it is intellect in us supra-intellectual way to the One, that this can only begin
that leads us to substance, and inserts this parenthesis to when the intellectual way has reached its goal.
320 321
 ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a
rj fjLOvaha Xeyo^iev ’ to yap ovtcos ev ttooov apyai, o oiiK
point or a unit; for what are one in this way are
dv VTTeoTrj jui) TTpoovarjs oooiaj Kai tov irpo ovaias' principles of quantity, which could not have come to
ovKovv Sel evravda |3dAAeiv rrjv Sidvoiav dXXd ravra exist unless substance and that before substance had
46 opLOLWs alei eKelvois ev dvaXoyi'ats toi aTrXcp xai rr) preceded it; so that is not where one should direct
one’s thought; but all the same these correspond to
(ftvyfj TOV TrXiqOovs Kat tov pi,epiap.ov. those higher things in their simplicity and avoid­
6. Ilaiy odv Xeyop,ev ev, /cat ttcvs tji voijaet ance of multiplicity and partition.
e^apjaoareov; tJ TrAedvcoj Tidepievov ev t] cits piovas kol 6. In what sense, then, do we call it one, and how
arjp.eLOV evi^erat. ivTavda p,ev yap p,eye0os "q tjjvyq are we to fit it into our thought? "One” must be
understood in a larger sense than that in which a
a<f>eXovaa /cat dpidp.ov TrXrjOos KaTaXqyei eis to
unity and a point are unified. For there the soul
5 opiiKpoTaTOV /cat eTrepetSerai rtvt apiepel p.ev, oAAd d ■qv takes away size and multiplicity of number and
ev p-epiOTU) /cat d eoTiv ev dXXw" to Se ovTe ev dXXui oi/re comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought
ev /LieptOTtp ovTe ovtois dptepes, cos to ptt/cpoTaTov on something which is partless but was in something
pteytoTOV ydp dwdvTcov ou pteyedet, aAAct Si/vaptet, cooTe divisible and is in something else; but what is not in
something else or in the divisible is not partless
/cat' TOdp,eye9es St/vdpief e77et' /cat' to. fier avTO ovTa either in the same way as the smallest; for it is the
10 Tats 8vvdp,eaiv dpteptCTTa /cat' dp,epri, oil tois dy/cots. greatest of all things, not in size but in power, so that
XqiTTeov Se /cat aneipov avTOV ov tw dSie^iT’qTcp rj tov its sizelessness also is a matter of power; since the
things after it also are indivisible and undivided in
p,eye6ovs q tov dptdptou, dAAd tA aTrepiXiqTTTCp Trjs
their powers, not in their bulks. And it must be
Suvdptecos. dTav ydp dv avTov vo-qaqs oiov q vovv q dedv, understood as infinite not because its size and num­
TrXepv eoTr /cat' ad dTav avTOV eviaqs tt) Stavota, /cat ber cannot be measured or counted but because its
evTadda ttAcov eoTt'v ^7 daov ^ dv avTov etjiavTaadqs els power cannot be comprehended.* For when you
think of him as Intellect or God, he is more; and
15 eivar e<f>‘ eavTOV ydp
TO evt/ccoTepov t’^s a'^S' vo'^aecos
when you unify him in your thought, here also the
eoTiv ovSevos avTcp avpi^e^qieoTOS. tw auTdp/cet S’ av degree of unity by which he transcends your thought
is more than you imagined it to be; for he is by
' Harder: A^ovtcs Enn. himself without any incidental attributes. But some­
^ Gollwitzer: Oeov Enn. one could also think of his oneness in terms of self-

' This is, perhaps, the clearest explanation in the to be taken: they are to point beyond any comprehensible
Enneads of the way in which Plotinus intends his use of the unit or unboundedness.
terms "one” and "infinite” as applied to the First Principle 323
322
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
Tis Kai TO ev avTov evdvfirjdeirj.^ Set fj,€v yap
iKavwTaTov ^ov)>^ dnavToiv Kai avTapKeararov, Kal
dvevSeearaTov etvai' irdv Se ttoXv Kal [m ev] ® evSee? /at)
20 ev €K TToWdiv yevopLevov. Setrat ovv avTOV rj ovaia ev
etvai. TO Se ov Setrat kavrov- avTO yap ioTi. Kai pirfy
TToXXd ov ToaovTwv Setrat, daa eart, Kal e/eaarov roiv ev
avTU) p,€Td rtliv dXXaiv ov /eat ot5/c €<f>’ eavTOV, evSeey rcZiv
dXXaiv VTTapxov, Kai Kad’ ev /eat /eard to oXov to
ToiovTov evSees vapexeTai. eiirep otJv Set rt
25 avTapKeoTaTOv etvat, rd ev efvat Set toiovtov ov piovov,
olov jttijre TTpds avTO /Aijre irpos dXXo evSeej efvat. od yap
rt ^lyrei, Tva odS’ Tva ed j], odSe Tva e/cei tSpudij. rots
/Aev ydp dXXois atrtov ov od wap’ dXXcov eyet d eart, rd
re ed rt dv enj adro) e^o) adrod; eSare od /card
30 avpi^e^TjKds avrw to ed‘ adrd ydp eart. rdwos re odSets
avTCp- ov ydp Setrat t'Spdaecos coawep adrd (j>€peiv ov
Svvdpievov, TO re tSpoOrjodpievov dipoyov Kal dy/eos
TTtwrajv, edv pirpnoD ISpvOfj. tSpt/rat Se /cat rd ctAAa Std
rodrov, St’ ov dwearij dpta /cat eayev et’s dv erdydij
roTTOV evSees Se /cat' rd tottov ^ttjtovv. dpx'^ Se od/c
35 evSees rcdv pter’ adrd' S’ dwdvrcov dpp^ij dvevSees
dwavrcov. d rt ydp evSees, e^teptevov dpyijs evSees' et’ Se
rd ev evSees rot/, ^ijret StjXovoTi to pirj etvai ev coare
evSees earat rod <^depodvros' wdv Se d dv XiyrjTai
evSees, rod ed /cat rod acp^ovrds eartv evSees. wots Tip
^ Gollwitzer: ev ov /xi) 0edy Enn.
^ Harder.
^ del. Puelma.
324
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
sufBciency. For since he is the most sufiScient and
independent of all things, he must also be the most
without need; but everything which is many is also
in need unless it becomes one from many. Therefore
its substance needs to be one. But the One does not
need itself: for it is itself. Certainly anything which
is many needs all the things which it is, and each of
the things in it, since it is with the others and not by
itself, and exists in need of the others, makes a thing
like this needy both in each single part and as a
whole. Given, then, that there must be something
supremely self-sufficient, it must be the One, which
is the only thing of such a kind as not to be in need
either in relation to itself or to anything else. For it
does not seek anything for its being or for its well­
being, or its establishment in its place. For since it is
the cause of the others it does not have from the
others what it is, and what could its well-being be
outside itself? So its well-being is not incidental to
it: for it is itself. And it has no place: for it needs no
establishment as if unable to support itself; and that
which has to be established is soulless and a mass
which falls if it is not yet established. And the other
things are established through him, through whom
.they at once exist and have the place to which they
are assigned; but that which is looking for its place
is in need. But a principle is not in need of the things
which come after it, and the principle of all things
needs none of them. For whatever is in need is in
need as striving towards its principle; but if the One
is in need of anything, it is obviously seeking not to
be one; so it will be in need of its destroyer; but
everything which is said to be in need is in need of its
well-being and its preserver. So that there is nothing
325
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
40 €vi ovSev dyaOou eariv ouSe jSovAijats roCvvv ovSevos-
dAA’ eariv vvepdyaOov Kai avro ovy iavrw, rols Se
dXXois dyadov, ei ri avrov Svvarai fieraXapi^dveiv. ov8e
vorjais, "va fiTj ereporrjs' ovSe Kivyais' irpo yap
Kivrjaecos Kai npo vorjoecos. rl yap Kai vorjaei; eavrov;
45 TTpd vo'qaecos rolvvv dyvodiv earai, Kai vorjoews
herjaerai, "va yvip eavrov 6 avrdpKrjs eavrw. oii rolvvv,
on p/rj yivdiOKei pr]8e voel eavrov, dyvoia rrepl avrov
earar r) yap dyvoia erepov ovros ylyverai, orav
ddrepov dyvofj Bdrepov ro Se povov ovre yiyvwoKei,
ovre ri eyei o dyvoel, ev 8e ov avvov avrw oil 8eirai
50 voTjaectis eavrov. eirei ovde ro avveivai Set npoadirreiv,
"va rripijs ro ev, dXXd Kai ro voetv Kai ro avvetvai^
dtfiaipelv Kai eavrov vdr/aiv Kai rdiv dXXojv ov yap Kara
rov voovvra 8ei rdrreiv avrov, dAAd pdXXov Kara rijv
vorjaiv. vorjais 8e ov voel, dAA’ airla rov voeiv dXXai- ro
55 8e airiov ov ravrov rd) alriardi. ro 8e vdvrwv alriov
ov8ev eariv eKelvcvv. ov rolvvv ov8e dyaOov XeKreov
rovro, o rrapeyei, dAAd dXXws rdyadov vrrep rd dXXa
dyadd.
7. Ei S’ on pT]8ev rovrajv eariv, dopiarels rfj
yvdipr), arrjaov aavrdv els ravra, Kai dm rovraiv Bed)-
Bed} Se pr) e^io plrrnov r-qv 8idvoiav. oil yap Kelral ttov
eprjpdvaav avrov rd dXXa, dAA’ eari np dvvapevip Biyeiv
5 dei^ vapov, r& S’ d8vvarovvri ov irdpeanv. warrep Se
eni rdiv dXXcuv OVK eari ri voeiv dXXo voovvra Kai npos
^ Preller: awicvai Enn.
^ suspic. Harder, approb. Puelma: eKcI Enn.
326
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
good for the One; so then it does not wish for
anything; but it transcends good, and is good not for
itself but for the others, if anything is able to partici­
pate in it. And it does not think, because there is no
otherness; and it does not move: for it is before
movement and before thought. For what will he be
able to think? Himself? Then before his thinking he
will be ignorant, and will need thinking in order to
know himself, he who suffices for himself. There is,
then, no ignorance about him because he does not
know or think himself; for ignorance is of what is
other, when one thing is ignorant of another; but the
One alone does not know and has nothing of which it
is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself
does not need thought of itself. For in order to keep
to the one you should not add the "in union’’, but
take away thinking and being in union and thought
of itself and of the others; for we must not put him on
the level of the thinker, but rather on that of the
thought. But thought does not think, but is a cause
of thought to another; and the cause is not the same
as what is caused. But the cause of all things is none
of them. So we must not even call this One good, the
good which he gives, but the Good in another way
beyond all goods. .
7. But if because it is none of these things you
become indefinite in your thought of it, stand fast on
these and contemplate it from these. But contem­
plate it without casting your thought outwards. For
it does not lie somewhere leaving the other things
empty of it, but is always present to anyone who is
able to touch it, but is not present to the one who is
unable. But, just as with other things it is not
possible to think anything when one is thinking
327
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
dXXa> ovTa, dXXd Set nrjSev TTpoadwTeiv tw voovjxeva),
tv‘ ■§ avTo TO voovfievov, ovrco Set Kal kvravBa et’Sevat,
o)? OVK eoTLv dXXov €;;^ovTa ev rfi ijtvxjj tvttov eKelvo
10 vorjoai ivepyowTOS tov tvttov, oiiS’ aS dXXois
KaT€iXrip.piAvT)v TTjv i/’vx'ijv Kai KaTexop-evrjv TVTTCoBrjvai
T& TOV ivavTiov TVTTU), dAA’ coamp Trepi rfjs vXrjs
Aeyerat, cos dpa diroiov eivai Set TrdvTcov, et pLeXXei
Seyeaflat tovs ndvTcov tvttovs, ovtco Kai ttoXv p,dXXov
15 dveiSeov TTjv yiveaBai, ei jtteAAet p,rjSev epiTToBiov
eyKaB'qp.evov eaeaBai irpos irXripooaiv Kal eXXafitJiiv avTrj
Trjs <f>vaecos Trjs vpcoTTjs. ei Se tovto, TrdvTCov rcov e^co
d<l)€p.€vr]v Set eiriaTpa^ijvai TTpos to etaco TrdvTTj, p/rj
TTpos Tt Tcov e^co K€KXia6ai, dAAct dyvo'^aavTa rd TrdvTa
20 Kal TTpo TOV pev tt) alaBrjaei,^ t6t€ Se Kal rots'eiSeatv,
dyvoTjaavTa Se Kal avTOv iv tt) Bia eKeivov yeveaBai,
KdK€iv(p atyyyevdpevov Kal tVavcos oTov opiXiqaavTa
rjKeiv dyyeXXovTa, ei Sdvatro, Kal dXXcp rijv eicei
awovaiav o"av Tacos Kal Mt' V CO S TTOlOVpeVOS
oapiaTrjs tov Atds itfrripiaBr] eivai, i^s
25 pepvrjpevos eTScoAa adrijs rods vopovs eri^et rp tov
Beiov iTTa<l>fj et’s vdpcov TrXrjpovpevos Beaiv. rj Kal to.
■noXiTiKa OVK d$ia avTOV vopiaas del^ eBeXei piveiv
dvco, ovep Kai tw ttoXv IBovti yivoiTO dv irdBrjpa.
^ Page: SiaOeaet Enn.
“ van Winden: vo)iiaaaa «’ Enn.
‘ A sxunmary paraphrase of Plato Timaeus 50D-E.
^ The quotation is from Odyssey 19. 178-9. But Plotinus
may have taken it from the| account of Minos in the pseudo-
Platonic dialogue of that title {Minos 318E-320D) which he
is using here.
328
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
something else and has one’s mind on something
else, but one must add nothing to what is being
thought about, that it may really be it which is being
thought about, so here one must know that it is not
possible when one has the impression of something
else in one’s soul to think that One while the im­
pression is acting, and that the soul when it is taken
up with and possessed by other things cannot take
the impression of the opposite; but just as it is said of
matter that it must be free from all qualities if it is
going to receive the impressions of all things,* so
much more must the soul be without form if there is
going to be no obstacle settled in it to its fulfilment
and illumination by the first nature. But if this is so,
the soul must let go of all outward things and turn
altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to
any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did
formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm
of Forms), and even ignoring itself, come to be in
contemplation of that One, and having been in its
company and had, so to put it, sufficient converse
with it, come and announce, if it could, to another
.that transcendent union. Perhaps also it was
because Minos attained this kind of union that he
was said in the story to be "the ftuniliar friend of
Zeus’’,^ and it was in remembering this that he laid
down laws in its image, being filled full of lawgiving
by the divine touch. Or, also, he may think civic
matters unworthy of him and want to remain always
above; this is liable to happen to one who has seen
much. Plato says the One is not outside anything,®
® Plato Parmenides 138E4.
329
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
o V S e V 6 s (f>rjaiv e ar iv € ^ co, dAAd Trdai avveariv
30 ovK elSoai. (ftevyovai yap avroi avrov f^ca, paXXov Se
adroiv cfco. ov Svvavrai oSv eXelv ov Trei^edyaffiv, ov8’
avTovs aTToXcaXeKOTes dXXov ^rjretv, ovSe ye Trots avrov
e^o) €v pavia yeyevqpevos etSrjaei rov narepa- 6 8e
p-adcov eavTov etSTjcrci Kat orroOev.
8. Er Tts o8v ^vxfj othev eavrrjv rov aXXov xpdvov,
Kat oi8€v on r) Kivijais avrrjs ovK evOela, dAA’ ij orav
KXdaiv Xd^yi, i) Se Kara <j>vaiv Kivrjais oio ij ev kvkXw
TTepi ri OVK e^cv, dAAd rrept Kevrpov, to Se Kevrpov d^’
5 o8 6 kvkXos, Kiirjaerai nept rovro, d<j>’ o8 ian, Kat
rovrov ^ dvaprrjaerai avp<f>epovaa eavrrjv rrpos to
OUTO, irpos 0 ^xprjv pev rrdaas, j>epovraL Se at decuv der
TTpos o <f>ep6pevai deoC elai. Beds yap rd e/ceivo)
avvrjppevov, rd Se rroppo) d<f>iardpevov dvOpwiros d
10 TToXvs Kat drjpiov. rd odv rrjs ijivxrjs otov Kevrpov rovro
eari rd ^rjrovpevov; rj aXXo ri Set vopiaai, et’s d rrdvra
otov Kevrpa avpirinrei; Kat on dvaXoylp rd Kevrpov
rov8e rov kvkXov; ov8e yap ovrai kvkXos rj >pvxrj <hs rd
axrjpa, dAA’ on ev avrfj Kat rrept avrrjv rj dpyata
' Kirchhoff: toCto Enn.
* The phrase "the ancient nature” of the soul occurs in
Plato at Symposium 192E9 (Aristophanes’ story), Republic
X 611D2 (the simile of the sea-god Glaucus) and Timaeus
90D5 (in the context of the education of the soul). In all
these places it means the true original nature of soul.
33°
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
but is in company with all without their knowing.
For they run away outside it, or rather outside
themselves. They cannot then catch the one they
have run away from, nor seek for another when they
have lost themselves. A child, certainly, who is
outside l^imself in madness will not know his father;
hut he vyho has learnt to know himself will know
from whence he comes.
8. If l;hen a soul knows itself for the rest of the
time, and knows that its movement is not in a
straight line, except when there is a kind of break in
it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle
around something, something not outside but a
centre, and the centre is that from which the circle
derives, then it will move around this from which it
is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord
with that which all souls ought to, and the souls of
the gods always do; and it is by bringing themselves
into accord with it that they are gods. For a god is
what is linked to that centre, but that which stands
far from it is a multiple human being or a beast. Is
then this, as it were, centre of the soul what we are
looking for? Or should we think it is something else
in, which all such centres coincide? And that the
centre of the circle here below is only like it analogi­
cally? For the soul is not a circle in the same way as
a geometrical figure, but because there is in it and
around it the ancient nature,* and because it comes
Plotinus uses it again in this sense at VI. 5. 1. 16 and this
must be its meaning here. Harder gives a different
explanation of the passage based on the interpretation of
"the ancient nature” as matter in I. 8. 7. 6. See his note ad
loc.
331
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
15 if>vai,s, Kal OTi ano roiovrov, Kal eri fidXXov Kai otl
XttJpi'oOeiaaL oXai. vvv 8e, i^rei fiepos -qpLthv Karexerai
vno Tov awp,aTqs, otov e? ns tovs noSas e^oi €v vSari,
T(h S’ dXXqj awp-aTi vvepexoi, T(p Srj pt,ri ^amiaBivTi T<h
awpLari vvepapavres, tovtw avva.TTrop,ev Kara to
20 eavTwv Kivrpov tw otov TrdvTcuv KevTpw, Kaddnep twv
p-eyiOTCOv kvkXwv rd KevTpa tw T'qs a<f>a(pas rijs
Trepiexovarjs Kevrpw, dvanavdp.evoi. el p.ev oSp
awp.arLKol ijaav, ov iJjvxi.koI kvkXoi, tottikojs dp tw
KePTpu) avprjiTTOP Kal uov iceifievou rod Keprpov nepl
25 auTo dp ■^aap- enei Se avral re at ijjvxai porjTal, irrep
povp re eKeiPO, Sopdfieaip dXXais, ^ TretfivKe to poovp
irpos TO KaTapoovfiepop avpdnTeip, olrjTeop T-qp avpa<f>rip
yipeadai Kal nXedpcos to poovp Trapetvai opioioTqTi Kat
TavTOTqTi Kat avpdnTeip tw avyyevel ovSepos
30 SielpyoPTOS. awfxaai p,ep yap adipLaTa /ccuAuerai
Koipoiveip dXXrjXois, to. Se dacu/xara ad>p,aaiv ov
SielpyeTai- ovS’ d<^eaTT)Ke toLpvp dXXijXcup totto),
eTepoTqTi Se Kat Sia<j>opq' OTav ovp y eTepoTys ppy Trapy,
dXXyXois rd p,y eTepa irdpeoTip. eKetvo p.ep odp (xy eyop
35 eTepoTyra det ndpeoTip, ryiels S’ drav p,y eyoopiep-
KOKelpo fxep yn<jt)P ovk ec^ierai, cyare Vepi yfxds elpai,
yp.eis Se eKelpov, woTe yfxets irept eKelpo. Kat det p.ev
■nept avTO, ovk det Se els avTO pXeiTop.ev, dXX’ oTop yopds
e^ys qScop ^ Kaltrep eyoiv nept top Kopv<j>aLOP Tpanely dp
40 els TO e^co Tys Seas, Stop Se eniOTpetfiy, aSet re icaAdis
^ qSojv Puelma: Enn.
332
1
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
from an origin of this kind, and because souls are
wholly separated. But now, since a part of us is held
by the body, as if someone had his feet in water, but
the rest of his body was above it, we lift ourselves up
by the part which is not submerged in the body and
by this join ourselves at our own centres to some­
thing like the centre of all things, just as the centres
of the greatest circles join the centre of the encom­
passing sphere, and we are at rest. If then our circles
were bodily, not soul-circles, they would be in touch
with the centre at a place; the centre would be in
some place and they would be around it; but since
the souls themselves belong to the realm of Intellect
and that One transcends Intellect, we must suppose
that the contact takes place by other powers, in the
way in which the thinker is naturally united to the
thought, and that the thinker is present more com­
pletely by sameness and otherness and joined to
what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart.
For bodies are hindered from communion with each
other by bodies, but incorporeal things are not kept
apart by bodies; nor are they separated in place, but
by otherness and difference; when therefore there is
no otherness, the things which are not other are
present to each other. That One, therefore, since it
has no otherness is always present, and we are
present to it when we have no otherness; and the
One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we
desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always
around it but do not always look to it; it is like a
choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir
keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn
away, so that he is out of their sight, but when it
turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly
333
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
Kal ovTWS nepi avrov e;^ei, ovtcj Kal '^p.eis aet p,ev Trepi
avTOV—KOI orav Xvais rjplv TravreAijs earai /cat
ovK€Ti eaopeOa—ovk det 8e eis aiirov dXX’ orav eis
avTOv iScjpev, rdre qpiv t4Xos Kal dvdiravXa /cat to prj
45 dnaSeiv xopevovaiv 6vto>s Trepi avrov xopeCav evdeov.
9. ’Ev 8e ravrfj rj) xopeia Kadopa rr’qyrjv pev 4,<t)ris,
TT-qyrjv 8e vov, dpxqv ovros, dyaBov airlav, pi^av ifivxrjs'
OVK eKxeopevcvv drr’ avrov, ctr’ SKelvov eXarrovvraiv
ov yap oyKos' q ^daprd dv rd yevvwpeva. vvv S’
5 eariv diSta, on r) dpxq avrd)v coaavrcvs pevei ov
pepepiapevrj eis avrd, dXX’ oXr] pevovaa. Sio KdKeiva
pevei" ocov el pevovros rjXiov Kal ro <f>d)S pevoi. ov yap
drrorerprjpeda ovSe x<^p4s eapev, el Kal napepTreaovaa
■f) awparos <l>vais rrpds avrrjv ■qpds etXKvaev, dAA’
10 eptrveopev^ Kal aw^opeda ov Sdvros, eir drroardvros
eKeivov, dAA’ det x°PlV°Bvros ecus dv fj orrep earl.
pdXXov pevroi eapev vevaavres rrpds avrd Kal rd ev
evravOa, rd (.Se^^ rroppu) eivai pdvov Kal •^rrov elvai.
evravda Kal dvarraverai i/rvxrj Kal KaKwv e^w els rdv
ru)v KaKU)v Kadapdv rorrov dvaSpapovaa' Kal voel
15 evravda, Kal drradrjs evravda. Kal rd dXrjdws ^rjv
evravda' rd yap vvv Kal rd dvev deov lx^°^ eKelvrjv
pipovpevov,* rd 8e eKel t,rjv evepyeia pev vov- evepyeia
8e Kal yevva deovs ev •qavxcp rij rrpds eKelvo eTra^ij,
yevva 8e KaXXos, yevva SiKaioavvrjv, dper-qv yevva.
20 ravra yap Kvei ’pvx'q rrXrjpcodelaa deov, Kal rovro avrrj
dpx'q Kal reXos' dpyr} pev, on eKeldev, reXos 8e, on rd
* Kirchhoff: ^ Enn.
^ Kirchhoff: ev nveofiev Enn.
^ Muller.
^ (= Ficinus): pipovpevov Enn.
334
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
with him; so we too are always around him—and if
we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no
longer exist^—^but not always turned to him; but
ywhen we do look to him, then we are at our goal and
at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance
our god-inspired dance around him.
9. And in this dance the soul sees the spring of
life, the spring of intellect, the principle of being, the
cause of good, the root of the soul; these are not
poured out from him with the result that they dimin­
ish him; for there is no bulk; otherwise the things
generated from him would be perishable. But as it is
they are eternal, because their principle remains the
same, not divided up into them but abiding as a
whole^So they also abide; just as the light abides if
the sun abides. For we are not cut off from him or
separate, even if the nature of body has intruded and
drawn us to itself, but we breathe and are preserved
because that Good has not given its gifts and then
gone away but is always bestowing them as long as it
is what it is. But we exist more when we turn to him
and our well-being is there, but being far from him is
nothing else but existing less. There the soul takes
its rest and is outside evils because it has run up into
the place which is clear of evils; and it thinks there,
and is not passive, and its true life is there; for our
present life, the life without God, is a trace of life
imitating that life. But life in that realm is the active
actuality of Intellect; and the active actuality gene­
rates gods in quiet contact with that Good, and
generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and
generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when
filled with God, and this is its beginning and end; its
beginning because it comes from thence, and its end
335
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
dyadov eKel. Kat eKel yevofievr] yiyverai avT-q Kai oirep
TO yap ivravda Kal ev tovtois eKTrrwais Kal ^vyq
Kal TTTepoppvqais. SqXot Se on to dyadov eK€L Kai 6
25 epcos o Trjs ijivxd^ ° avpL^VTOS, Kadd Kai avvil^evKTai
“Epcos rais 'Pv^a.i^ Kai ev ypa<j>als Kai ev pvdois. etrel
yap erepov deov eKeivq, e^ eKeivov Se, epa avrov
e^avdyK7)s- Kai ovaa e/cei tov ovpdviov “Epcora eyei,
evravda Se TravSypos yiyverai' Kai yap eariv eKel
30 ’A^poSiTi; ovpavia, evravda Se yiyverai rrdvSypos oTov
eraipiadelaa. Kai eari rrdaa ijivyr) ‘K^poSlry Kai
rovTO aivlrrerai Kai rd rys ’A<j>poSlTys yevedXia Kai 6
“Eptos d pier' avTTjs yevopevos. epa ovv Kara <f>vaiv
exovaa 4’VXV evoidyvai deXovaa, diarrep napdevos
35 KaXov rrarpos^ KaXdv epwra. orav Se els yeveaiv
eXdovaa oiov pvqarelais dnarrjdfj, dAAov dXXa^apevrj
dvyrdv epwra eprjpla narpos v^pl^erai' piayaaaa Se
vdXiv rds evravda v^peis dyvevaaaa rwv rfjSe rrpos rdv
rrarepa avdis areXXopevy eimadei. Kai ois pey
dyvwarov eari rd rrddypa rovro, evrevdev evdvpeladw
40 dnd rwv evravda epwrwv, otov eari rvxeiv J)v ns
pdXiara epa, Kai on ravra pev rd epwpeva dvyrd Kai
pXa^epd Kai elSwXwv epwres Kai perarrlirrei, on ovk
•fjv rd ovrws epwpevov ovSe rd dyaddv ypwv ovS’ o
' Kirchhofif: vpos wBRCQ: om. JU.
* From the Phaedrus myth, 248C8.
^ For the distinction of the two Aphrodites (which seems
to have been a sort of Athenian homosexual in-joke,
without foundation in cult or popular belief) see Plato
Symposium 180D-E. It had, of course, a much more serious
history from Plotinus onwards.
® Symposium 203B. Plotinus’ fullest interpretation of the
myth is III. 5. 7-9.
336
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
because its good is there. And when it comes to be
there it becomes itself and what it was; for what it is
here and among the things of this world is a falling
away and an exile and a "shedding of wings”.* And
the soul’s inhate love makes clear that the Good is
there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the
Psyches in pictures and stories. For since the soul is
other than God but comes from him it is necessarily
in love with him, and when it is there it has the
heavenly love, but here love becomes vulgar; for the
soul there is the heavenly Aphrodite, but here
becomes the vulgar Aphrodite, a kind of whore.^
And every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolised
in the story of the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros
who is born with her.® The soul then in her natural
state is in love with God and wants to be united with
him; it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble
father. But when the soul has come into the world of
becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandish­
ments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her
father, to a mortal love and is shamed; but again she
comes to hate her shames here below, and purifies
herself of the things of this world and sets herself on
the way to her father and fares well.^ And if anyone
does not know this experience, let him think of it in
terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to
attain what one is most in love with, and that these
earthly loves are mortal and harmful and loves only
of images, and that they change because it was not
what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what
* Plotinus uses this comparison again at V. 5. 12. 37. But
there it is not the beauty of the world of sense which draws
the daughter away from the father, but the beauty of the
intelligible: on this see my note ad loc.
337
 P-
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
^rjTov^v. €Kel Se TO aXrjOivov epcofxevov, tS eon Kai
45 avvelvai pLeTaXafiovTa avrov Kal ovtcos exovra, ov
TTepnrTvaaofjLevov aap^tv e^coOev. oar is Se eiSev,
oiSev o X € y oj, dis rj ijivx'q ioir]v dXX-qv laxei Tore
KOI TTpoaiovaa ^ Kai 'qSrj TrpoaeXdovaa Kai pieraoxovaa
avTov, (jjare yvdivai SiareOelaav, on Trdpeanv 6
50 x^P'^yos dXrjdivijs ^cDijs, Kai Set ovSevos en. rovvavTiov
Se aTTodeadai to, dXXa Sei, Kai ev piovip aTrjvaL tovtco,
Kai TOVTO yeveadai piovov rrepiKoil/avTa to. Xoind oaa
■nepiKelpieda- djare e^eXSelv arrevSeiv evrevBev Kai
ayavaKreiv eni Odrepa SeSepievovs, iva rip oXui avrcuv
55 TrepLTTTv^wpieBa Kai pirjSev fiepos exoipiev, <L pb-q
€(f>aTTT6p,eBa Beov. opdv Sq eanv evravBa KaKelvov Kai
iavTov d)s opdv Bepiis' eavrov p,h^ 'qyXa'iapievov, ijiojTOs
TrXrjpq votjtov, p,dXXov Se (j>d)S avro KaBapov, dpapq,
KOVROV, Beov yevopievov, pdXXov Se ovra, dva(j>BevTa piev
60 Tore, ei Se vdXiv ^apvvono, wairep piapaivopievov.
10. ndis ovv ov pievei eKei; ij on pi/qnoi e^eXrjXvBev
dXos. earai Se ore Kai to avvexes earai rijs Bias ovKen
evoxXovp.eva> ovSepiiav evoxXrjaiv tov awp-aros. ean Se
TO ewpaKOS ov to evoxXovpievov, dXXd to dXXo, ore
5 TO ecvpaKos dpyel ttjv Beav ovk dpyovv rrjv eTTiaT-qpvqv
TT)v ev dnoSei^eai Kai TTiareai Kai rip rijs ‘I'vx'fjs
SiaXoyiapiep' to Se ISeiv Kai to ecopaKOS eanv ovKen
Xdyos, dXXd piei^ov Xdyov Kai Trpo Xdyov Kai eni np
* Kirchhoff; jrpoi'oOaa Enn.
‘ The phrase seems to have been a fairly commonplace
one, used by a mystery-initiate when addressing others to
avoid divulging secrets. See Pausanias 137. 4-5 (where it is
338
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
we seek. But there is our true love, with whom also
we can be united, having a part in him and truly
possessing him, not embracing him in the flesh from
outside. But "whoever has seen, knows what I am
saying”,* that the soul then has another life and
draws near, and has already come near and has a
part in him, and so is in a state to know that the
giver of true life is present and we need nothing
more. But quite otherwise, we must put away other
things and take our stand only in this, and become
this alone, cutting away all the other things in
which we are encased; so we must be eager to go out
from here and be impatient at being bound to the
other things, that we may embrace him with the
whole of ourselves and have no part with which we
do not touch God. There one can see both him and
oneself as it is right to see: the self glorifled, full of
intelligible light—^but rather itself pure light—
weightless, floating free, having bedome—^but
rather, being—a god; set on fire then, hut the fire
seems to go out if one is weighed down again.
10. How is it, then, that one does/not remain
there? It is because one has not yet totally come out
of this world. But there will be a time when the
vision will be continuous, since there will no longer
be any hindrance by the body. But/it is not that
which has seen which is hindered, bui the other part
which, when that which has seen r^4ts from vision,
does not rest from the knowledge which lies in
demonstrations and evidence and/the discourse of
the soul; but seeing and that which has seen are not
reason, but greater than reason ^nd before reason
used in the very down-to-earth and i^spiritual context of
beans). Plotinus also uses it at I. 6. 7/ 2.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

Aoyoj, (voTrep Kai to 6pu)p,evov. eavrov p.ev ovy tScuv and above reason, as is that which is seen. When
10 Tore, ore opa, tolovtov oifierai, paWov Se avT<p
therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he
will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in
TOiovTw avvearai Kat toiovtov aiadrjaerai dnAovv union with himself as like this and will be aware of
yevopievov. rdya Se ovSe “oi/ierac’’ XeKreov, to Se himself as like this since he has become single and
simple. But perhaps one should not say "will see”,
“6<j>9ev”, eivep Set Sdo ravra Xeyeiv, to re opcbv Kat
hut "was seen”, if one must speak of these as two, the
opdipevov, dAAd /xi) ev dpi,<f>oi- ToXp.T]p6s p,ev 6 Adyos. seer and the seen, and not both as one—a bold
Tore p.ev ovv ovre opa ovSe SiaKplvei 6 6pd)v ovSe statement. So then the seer does not see and does not
distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if
15 (jiavrat^erai Svo, dAA’ plov dXXos yev6p.evos Kat ovk
he had become someone else and he is not himself
avTOS ov8‘ avTov avvreXei eKei, KaKeivov yevopevos ev and does not count as his own there, but has come to
eoTiv wcmep Kevrpw Kevrpov avvdilias. Kat yap evravda
belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it
were, centre to centre. For here too when the centres
avveXdovra ev eon, to re Svo, orav ycopis. ovtoj Kat have come together they are one, hut there is duality
■qpeis vvv Xeyopev erepov. Sio Kat Svacf>paaTov to deapa- when they are separate. This also is how we now
speak of "another”. For this reason the vision is
20 TTws yap dv dvayyecXeie ns dis erepov ovk tSwv eKel ore
hard to put into words. For how could one announce
ededro erepov, dAAd ev rrpos eavrov; that as another when he did not see, there when he
11. ToOto Stj eOeXov SrjXovv to twv pvaryptcuv had the vision, another, but one with himself?
11. This is the intention of the command given in
ToivSe eniraypa, to prj e/ct^epeiv els prj pepvrjpevovs, the mysteries here helow not to disclose to the
(Ls OVK eK<j>opov eKelvo dv, dneiTre SrjXovv rrpos dXXbv to uninitiated; since 'that Good is not disclosahle, it
Betov, OTW prj /cat avrcp ISetv evrvxtjTai. erret tolvvv Svo prohibits the declaration of the divine to another
who has not also himself had the good fortune to see.
6 OVK •fjv, dAA’ ev ijv avrds 6 IScov rrpos to ecopapevov, cos Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself
dv prj ecopapevov, dAA’ ■qvcopevov, os eyevero ore eKelvcp was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but
united to him), if he remembers who he became when
eplyvvTO et pepvcpro, eyoi dv rrap’ eavrcp eKelvov
he was united with that, he will have an image of
eiKova. ijv Se ev Kat avrds Siacf)opdv ev avrcp ovSeplav that in himself. He was one himself, with no distinc­
rrpos eavrov eycov ovre /card dAAa—ov yap n e/ctvetro tion in himself either in relation to himself or to
other things—for there was no movement in him and
10 rrap avrcp, ov Bvpos, ovk erriBvpla dXXov rraprjv avrcp he had no emotion, no desire for anything else when
dvajSejSij/coTt—dAA’ ovSe Xdyos ovSe ns vorjais ovS’ he had made the ascent—^but there was not even any
34° 341
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
oAws avTOS, ei Set Kai tovto Xeyeiv. aXX’ wanep
dpiraadets t) ivdovaidaas '^ovxfl ev ep’qpLip xal
KaTaardaei yeyev-qrai dTpep,et, ryj avTOV ovaia ov8api.ij
16 dnoKXCvcav ovSe nepi avrov aTpe<j>6p.evos, earcbs TrdvTrj
Kai olbv ordais yevdp-evos- ovSe T<hv KaXwv, dXXd Kat to
KaXov -^Srj virepdecov, vnep^ds 17817 Kai tov twv dpercov
Xopov, woTTep Tis eh to etaco tov dSvTov elaSvs eh
TOVTrlau) KaTaXmdiv to. ev tw veip dydXp.aTa, d
20 e^eXOovTi. tov dSvTov rrdXcv yiveTai rrpcvTa p,eTd to
evSov Oea/xa Kai TTjv eKet avvovaiav npos ovk ayaXpia
ovSe eiKova, dAAo avTo- a 817 ylyveTai SevTepa OedpiaTa.
TO Se “ao)s ov 6eap.a, dAAd dXXos Tporros tov ISetv,
eKOTaais Kat anXivais Kai eniSoais avTOV Kai e<j>eais
yrpos d<f)T)v Kai OTdais Kai nepivorjais irpos
25 e(j>appx)yriv, ehrep tis to ev tu> dSvTip dedaeTai. ei S’
dXXcvs jSAeiroi, ovSev avTCp -ndpeoTi. raOra pxv oSv
piipirjpuiTa- Kai Toh oSv ao<j>oh tAv yrpoifirjTwv
aiviTTeTai, oiro)? Beds eKeivos dpatar aoifids Se tepevs
TO aiviypia avvieh dXr/Oivrjv dv ttoioito eKet yevopievos
30 TOV dSvTOV TTjv Oeov. Kai p-r/ yevopevos Se to dSvTOv
TOVTO ddpaTOV ti xpvpo- vopiaas Kai 17177/171' Kai dpx'^v,
elSrjaei toy dpxfl d-px^v dpa Kai ovyyiveTai [/tai]' to>
dpoiip TO opoiov. (^Kaiy ^ ovSev TrapaXiirAv tAv deiiov
* transposuimus.
* This is the only passage in the Enneads where eKoraais
(usually rather inadequately and misleadingly translated
"ecstasy”) is used in any context relevant to the mystical
union, if with Theiler and H-S we read iKrdaei in VI. 7. 17.
40. Theiler would prefer, for this and other reasons, to read
[{kJotoom here and delete xat ardais in the next line: see
Plotins Schriften VI {Indices) p. 174. But even if the reading
of the MSS is kept here, there is no good reason for
342
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if
we must even say this; but he was as if carried away
or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state
of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and
not busy about himself, altogether at rest and hav­
ing become a kind of rest. He had no thought of
beauties, but had already run up beyond beauty and
gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who
enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the
statues in the outer shrine; these become again the
first things he looks at when he comes out of the
sanctuary, after his contemplation within and inter­
course there, not with a statue or image but with the
Divine itself; they are secondary objects of con­
templation. But that other, perhaps, was not a con­
templation but another kind of seeing, a being out of
oneself* and simplifying and giving oneself over and
pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained
thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to
contemplate what is in the sanctuary. But if one
looks in another way, one finds nothing. These are
images; and this, therefore, is how the wise among
the expositors of holy things express in riddles how
that god is seen; and a wise priest who understands
the riddle may make the contemplation real by
entering the sanctuary; and even if he has not been
there, and thinks that this sanctuary is something
invisible, and the source and the principle, he will
know that he sees principle by principle and that
like is united with like. And he will neglect none of
the divine properties which the soul can have even
describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an
"ecstasy”. It gives a very misleading impression of this
austere and quiet mysticism. ^
343
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.
oaa SvvaTai Seas, to Xoittov €k
35 rrjs deas avaiTel- Se Xolttov tw vneppdvTi ndvra to o
to
eoTi T7po TrdvTWV. ov yap Srj els ro TravT-q p,ri ov q^ei q
tjivyqs ^vaiSt dAAd Kaxo) pL€v ^daa €is KaKOV q^ei, Kai
ovTcos els fJiq ov, ovK els to -rravreXes p.q ov. rqv evavrlav
8e SpapLOvaa q^ei ovk els oAAo, oAA eis avrqv, Kai
40 ovTOJS OVK ev dXXip ovca ^ovKy ^ ev ovSevi eaxiv, aAA ev
avTrj' TO Se ev avrij p.6vTj /cai ovk ev T(h ovti ev eKeivip'
ylvexai ydp Kai avTos tis ovk ovaia, aXX eTT e k e iv a
ov a (as TavTT), ^ irpoaopiiXel. ei tis ovv tovto avTOv
yevopievov iSoi, e^ei opioicopia eKeivov avTOV, Kai ei a<f>
46 avTOV p-exa^aivoi cvs elKwv Trpos apyexvirov, t eXos av
e^ot Trjs Trope i as. eKTTiiTTWv 8e Trjs deas naXiv
eyeipas dpeTqv xqv ev avTW Kai Kaxavo-qaas eavxov
xavxais KeKoapvqpCevov -ndXiv KOV^iaQrioexai 8i apexTjs
€7ri vovv ld>v Kai oo^iav Kai 8ia oo^tas eTT avxo. Kai
oStos Oeci>v Kai avdpwirwv Beicvv Kai ev8aifiovo}v ^los,
50 diraXXayq xdyv dXXwv xwv Tq8e, /St'os dvTq8ovos xwv
TjjSe, ^vyq piovov Trpos piovov.
1 Thedinga.
' "Beyond substance” is the often quoted foundation-text
from Plato Republic VI 509B9; "the end of the journey”
from Republic VII532E3, again in the context of the ascent
to the Good.
“ These last words, in the common translation "flight of
the alone to the Alone”, are the only words of Plotinus at
all generally known and remembered. He uses the "alone to
the alone” formula elsewhere in the Enneads when
speaking of our encounter with the Good (1.6. 7.8; VI. 7.34.
7). It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase,
generally, but not always, in a religious context. The
ctosest parallel to Plotinus’ use of it is in Numehius fr. 2 des
344
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
before the vision, and will seek the rest from the
vision; and the rest, for him who has gone beyond all,
is that which is before all. For the nature of the soul
will certainly not arrive at absolute non-existence,
but when it goes down it will arrive at evil and in
this way at non-existence, not at absolute non­
existence. But if it runs the opposite way, it will
arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this
way since it is not in something else it will not be in
nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone
and not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not
substance, but "beyond substance” by this converse.
If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has
oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from
oneself, as image to original, one has reached "the
end of the journey”.' And when one falls from the
vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself, and
considering himself set in order and beautiful by
these virtues he will again be lightened and come
through virtue to Intellect and wisdom and through
wisdom to that Good. This is the life of gods and of
godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the
things of this world, a life which takes no delight in
the things of this world, escape in solitude to the
solitary.^
Places (11 Leemans) 11-12 ipMiaai rut ayaBw povy iiovov. See
E. R. Dodds "Numenius and Ammonius” in Les Sources de
Plotin {Entretiens Hardt V), Vandoeuvres-Geneve 1957,
16-17. It does tell us something important about the
mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered
in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual
life and Porphyry’s account of Plotinus as he knew him.
See my "The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and
Cosmos in Plotinus” (Plotinian & Christian Studies XVIII).
345