6. Arvin Pascual vs.

SitelPhilippipnesCorportion, Michael Lee, AswinSukumar, Phoebe

Monica Argana, RemilCandaband Amor Reyes.
G.R. No. 240484,March 9, 2020

FACTS

Arvin Pascual was a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married and with residence and postal
address at 28-B 14th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City 1109, where he may be served with
summons and other processes of this Honorable Court. Respondent SITEL PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.

On Oct. 27, 2006, respondent Sitel Philippines Corp. (Sitel) hired petitioner Arvin A.
Pascual as agent. In 2014 Sitel promoted him to the Comcast Customer Service Group (Comcast
CSG) account as coach/supervisor.

On Oct. 9, 2014, a notice to explain was served upon him for his failure to take the
necessary action in the case of an agent who has been inactive since May 2014. On Nov. 21,
2014, he was served a notice of decision suspending him for five days from Nov. 26 to 30, 2014.
On Dec. 2, 2014, another notice to explain was served upon him requiring him to explain of his
absences without permission. Petitioner alleged that P6, 896.58 was withheld from his salary.

When his request for clarification was unheard, he was prompted to send an e-mail
manifesting his intention to resign, to recover his unpaid salary and the issuance of a certificate
of employment. This was not again given any attention. On Dec. 11, 2014 he brought a copy of
his letter of resignation to respondent Amor Reyes. Later, he found out that P7, 842.11 was
further withheld from his salary.

The contents of Pascual’s resignation letter are fraught with colors of gripes,
disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against respondents. Contents that would
undeniably reveal that the element of voluntariness is absent. Deeply concerned that an offense
of job abandonment may be imputed against him and to prevent respondent Reyes from further
inflicting harm or damage against his person and professional career, Pascual personally met
respondent Reyes on 11 December 2014 at the Comcast CSG production floor and tried to
furnish her with a copy of his resignation letter.

However, respondent Reyes refused to acknowledge in writing her copy of the notice. At
the risk of a protracted legal battle against an employer such as respondent Sitel with vast and
superior resources as well as skilled legal services, coupled with the uncertainty of winning and
the prospect of a prolonged unemployment, Pascual nevertheless is vigorously pursuing the
litigation of his action against respondents for the protection of his constitutional right to security
of tenure.

Pascual’s job being his only possession and means of livelihood. Thus, he filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal against respondents.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED
THE NLRC’S DECISION DATED 4 MARCH 2016 AND RESOLUTION DATED 27
APRIL 2016 WHICH DECLARED THAT PASCUAL WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY
DISMISSED NOTWITHSTANDING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT
DIMINUTION IN PAY IS TANTAMOUNT TO CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT

THE PHYSICAL ACT OF SENDING RESIGNATION LETTER VIA EMAIL AND
REGISTERED MAIL IS CONCLUSIVE THAT PASCUAL’S RESIGNATION IS
VOLUNTARY NOTWITHSTANDING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE
 TEST OF VALIDITY OF RESIGNATION IS DETERMINED BY CONSIDERING
THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
RESIGNATION.

RULING:

No. Petitioner’s resignation was voluntary and Sitel is not guilty of constructive
dismissal.

Since petitioner submitted his resignation letter on several occasions, it is incumbent

upon him to prove with clear, positive and convincing evidence that his resignation was not
voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive dismissal or that it is a product of coercion or
intimidation. He has to prove his allegations with particularity.
Pascual, at the time of his constructive dismissal by respondents, has already rendered eight (8)
long and faithful years of service. His employment is his sole source of livelihood in order to
support three (3) children who are fully dependent on him for their education, health, food,
clothing, shelter, etc. It is most unlikely, therefore, that he will disregard eight (8) years of
employment service and sacrifice the vital needs of his family by rendering himself jobless most
especially on a month of December without any extremely compelling reason. Thus, bringing
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent upon him for support. Considering the hard
times in which we are in, it is incongruous for Pascual to simply give up his work after receiving
a mere suspension from respondents.

No employee would recklessly abandon his job knowing fully well the acute
unemployment problem and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood nowadays. With a
family to support, we doubt very much that respondent would so easily sacrifice his only source
of income and unduly expose his family to hunger and untold hardships. Certainly, no man in his
right mind would do such thing.

Equally telling at this point is the jurisprudential yardstick laid down by this Honorable
Court in Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corp. The pertinent portions of which
state that: “Another basic principle is that expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code – that all
doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor
of the workingman. This principle has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee. As shown above, Peñaflor has, at very
least, shown serious doubts about the merits of the company’s case, particularly in the
appreciation of the clinching evidence on which the NLRC and CA decisions were based. In
such contest of evidence, the cited Article 4 compels us to rule in Peñaflor’sfavor.”

In the end, all that Pascual pleads before this Honorable Court is to carefully re-examine
the facts, carefully apply the proper laws and jurisprudence in their appropriate perspective and
in accordance with their intent, and hopefully, arrive at a more circumspect decision to ensure
protection of a lowly working man like petitioner herein.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision of 15 January 2018, discussed the nature of
resignation citing the jurisprudential principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Chiang Kai
Shek College vs. Torres (G.R. No. 189456, 2 April 2014).

The obvious intention is to buttress its conclusion that Pascual voluntary resigned on the
basis of the following acts of Pascual:

On December 8, 2014, Pascual sent an email to Sitel’sCEO, Phil Lee manifesting his
intention to resign; on December 11, 2014, Pascual brought a copy of the resignation e-mail he
sent to Phil Lee to Reyes, asked her to read it and acknowledge its receipt; on December 12,
2014, Pascual e-mailed a copy of the resignation letter to Reyes; On December 15, 2014, Pascual
sent a hard copy of the resignation letter via registered mail; andon December 18, 2014, Pascual
went back to the petitioner’s office with a resignation letter dated that same day. The
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Chiang Kai Shek case regarding the nature of
resignation, as follows:

“Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes
that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather
than stay employed. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact,
intended to sever his or her employment.

From the foregoing nature of resignation, two factors are indispensably necessary to be
assessed in order to establish with utmost certainty whether the execution of the resignation letter
by the employee is voluntary or involuntary. In this regard, none of the acts mentioned by the
Court of Appeals in paragraph no. 31 is determinative that Pascual voluntarily resigned.

In Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. 191460 & 191464, Jan. 31, 2018, 853 SCRA 446, 449, the
Court held that an unconditional and categorical letter of resignation cannot be considered
indicative of constructive dismissal if it is submitted by an employee fully aware of its effects
and implications.

Similarly, Panasonic v. Peckson, G.R. 206316, March 20, 2019, teaches that the Court
does not sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances which, at most, create only suspicion;
otherwise, it would be indulging in speculations and surmises. Petitioner failed to show any
substantial evidence that he was treated unfairly and, thus, he was forced to resign. He failed to
show any tangible acts of harassment, insults, and any abuse that would warrant a possible
finding of constructive dismissal.

Here, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, Sitel aptly established that petitioner’s e-mails
and resignation letter showed the voluntariness of his separation from the company. While the
fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the burden of proof, it is still incumbent
upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. In petitioner’s case, the facts
show that the resignation letter is grounded in petitioner’s desire to leave the company as
opposed to any deceitful machination or coercion on the part of Sitel. His subsequent and
contemporaneous actions belie the claim that petitioner was subjected to harassment by Sitel.
Interestingly, even when given the opportunity to explain his side regarding Diosdado Jayson
Remion’s case, petitioner conspicuously failed to do so. He consistently evaded the issue and did
not attend the hearing on the matter.

The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter that petitioner’s claim of dismissal was also
negated by the fact that he was simply suspended for five days, albeit the charges against him
merit his dismissal. Verily, Sitel was attentive and considerate with petitioner’s situation. It was
petitioner who misinterpreted Sitel’s decision.