Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances: 1. Self-Defense
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances: 1. Self-Defense
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances: 1. Self-Defense
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
those wherein the acts of the actor are in accordance with law,
hence, he is justified. There is no criminal and civil liability
because there is no crime.
Self- defense
Defense of relative
Defense of stranger
Avoidance of greater evil or injury
Performance of duty
Obedience to an order made by superior officer
1. Self-defense
embodied in any penal system means that it is a man natural instinct to protect,
repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger. It is baseds on the impulse
of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being.
Elements:
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Requisites:
Battery – Refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon woman or her child
resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.
ELEMENTS:
That The battering husband with whom the battered wife has a
marital, sexual and dating relationship, inflicted physical harm
upon her
That the infliction of physical harm must be cumulative
The cumulative abuse results to physical and psychological or
emotional distress to the woman.
Kinds of Self-Defense
Burden of proof – on the accused (sufficient, clear and convincing evidence; must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution).
4. Unlawful aggression
5. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
6. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Defense of relative V. Defense of Stranger
In defense of relative, where the relative In stranger, the accused must not be
provoked the offended party in induced by revenge, resentment, or other
perpetrating unlawful aggression, the evil motive in defending the stranger
accused must not have part therein from the unlawful aggression by the
victim.
2. Defense of Relative
Elements:
1. unlawful aggression
2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
3. in case provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the
defense had no part in such provocation.
The third element need not take place. The relative defended may even be the
original aggressor. All that is required to justify the act of the relative defending is
that he takes no part in such provocation.
General opinion is to the effect that all relatives mentioned must be legitimate,
except in cases of brothers and sisters who, by relatives by nature, may be
illegitimate.
The unlawful aggression may depend on the honest belief of the person making
the defense.
3. Defense of Stranger
Elements:
1. unlawful aggression
2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
3. the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
2. A relative not included in defense of relative is included in defense of stranger.
3. Be not induced by evil motive means that even an enemy of the aggressor who
comes to the defense of a stranger may invoke this justifying circumstances so long
as he is not induced by a motive that is evil.
-Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
Requisites:
1.That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2.That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
3.That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Elements:
1. that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office;
2. that the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of the duty, or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
3. A police officer is justified in shooting and killing a criminal who refuses to stop
when ordered to do so, and after such officer fired warning shots in the air.
4. shooting an offender who refused to surrender is justified, but not a thief who
refused to be arrested.
5. The accused must prove that he was duly appointed to the position he claimed he
was discharging at the time of the commission of the offense. It must be made to
appear not only that the injury caused or the offense committed was done in the
fulfillment of a duty, or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, but that the
offense committed was a necessary consequence of such fulfillment of duty, or
lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. A mere security guard has no authority or duty to fire at a thief, resulting in the
latter’s death.
Elements:
2. there is an order;
3. the order is for a legal purpose;
4. the means used to carry out said order is lawful.
5. The subordinate who is made to comply with the order is the party which may
avail of this circumstance. The officer giving the order may not invoke this.
6. The subordinate’s good faith is material here. If he obeyed an order in good faith,
not being aware of its illegality, he is not liable. However, the order must not be
patently illegal. If the order is patently illegal this circumstance cannot be validly
invoked.
7. The reason for this justifying circumstance is the subordinate’s mistake of fact in
good faith.
8. Even if the order be patently illegal, the subordinate may yet be able to invoke the
exempting circumstances of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear.
CASES
PEOPLE v. OLARBE
FACTS:
Olarbe and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their house in Barangay San Antonio,
Sitio Pananim, Luisiana, Laguna. Suddenly they were awakened by the sound of a
gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be drunk. Arca was holding a rifle (an
airgun converted to a calibre .22) and shouted "mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin
ko kayo." Then, Arca forcibly entered their house and aimed the gun at them. OLARBE
immediately grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its possession. OLARBE
managed to wrest the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, OLARBE shot Arca causing the
latter to lean sideward ("napahilig"). Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from
his waist and continued to attack them. OLARBE grabbed the bolo and in their struggle
for its possession, they reached the outer portion of the house. OLARBE was able to
wrestle the bolo and instantly, he hacked Arca. After the killing incident, OLARBE
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities.
DECISION:
RTC - finds that herein accused was unable to prove the justifying circumstance
of self-defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on his part and further, he employed treachery when he killed the
victim Romeo Arca. Thus, this Court finds the accused Rodolfo Olarbe y
Balihango GUILTY of "Murder".
CA- On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe because the factual
findings of the RTC were consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with
human experience; and because- treachery had attended the killing.
RULING:
YES.
First, there was no credible showing that the shot to the head had rendered Arca too
weak to draw the bolo and to carry on with his aggression in the manner described by
Olarbe. The conclusion of the RTC and the CA thereon was obviously speculative.
Secondly, the State did not demonstrate that the shot from the airgun converted to .22
caliber fired at close range sufficed to disable Arca from further attacking with
his bolo. Without such demonstration, the RTC and the CA clearly indulged in pure
speculation. Thirdly, nothing in the record indicated Arca's physical condition at the
time of the incident. How could the CA then reliably conclude that he could not have
mounted the bolo assault? And, lastly, to rule out any further aggression by Arca with
his bolo after the shot in the head was again speculative. On the other hand, our
substantial judicial experience instructs that an armed person boldly seeking to assault
others - like Arca - would have enough adrenaline to enable him to persist on his assault
despite sustaining a wound that might otherwise be disabling.
To us, Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly plausible. At
the minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein described conformed to
human experience and the natural course of things. Armed with both the gun and
the bolo, Arca not only disturbed Olarbe's peace but physically invaded the sanctity of
latter's home at midnight. Given that the aggresse' by Arca was unprovoked on the part
of Olarbe, and with no other person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see
and understand why Olarbe would feel that his and his common-law spouse's lives had
been put in extreme peril. In addition, Olarbe's conduct following the killing of Arca - of
voluntarily surrendering himself to the police authorities immediately after the
killing (i.e., at around 12:30 o'clock in the early morning of May 8, 2006), and reporting
his participation in the killing of Arca to the police authorities - bolstered his pleas of
having acted in legitimate self-defense and legitimate defense of his common-law
spouse. Such conduct manifested innocence. To disbelieve Olarbe's account is to give
primacy to surmise and speculation. That is not how courts of law who’s bounden and
sworn duty is to dispense justice should sit in judgment in a criminal trial. Judges
should assiduously sift the records, carefully analyze the evidence, and reach
conclusions that are natural and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the court REVERSES and SET ASIDE the decision, ACQUITS
accused RODULFO OLARBE on the grounds of self-defense and defense of a
stranger, DECLARES him NOT CIVILLY LIABLE to the heirs of the late
ROMEO ARCA and DIRECTS his IMMEDIATE RELASE FROM
CONFINEMENT.
PEOPLE V. DULIN
FACTS:
That on or about August 22, 1990, accused Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie,
armed with a sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him several stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.
In his defense, Dulin testified that in the evening of August 22, 1990,Batulan,
stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to
Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill
you; that he ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who
stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he was able to
wrest it from Batulan; that he stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until
he felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he regained consciousness only
the next day at the hospital. Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and
Batulan, but interjected that the barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan
home each time the latter got drunk at night.
RTC - the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder.
CA - On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the
modification of the civil liability.
ISSUE:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE,
IN THE EVENT THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS
UNAVAILING.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF
FRANCISCO.
RULING:
I.
There was no self-defense
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of
self-defense in his favor because all its elements had been present in the commission of
the crime. In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had
initiated the attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively
ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. We uphold the finding and
holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the
aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still
went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again
grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to
aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that
point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon –
constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as
self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when
the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when
the accused injured the aggressor.23 As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin. Still, Dulin vigorously insists that
the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the latter followed him
into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was no
gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.24 The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin
admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running away from him. With
the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any
imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression
when Dulin fatally stabbed him. It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal
examination indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the
cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by
the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not
defending himself.
II.
Incomplete self-defense was not proved
Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must prove the existence of the
majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful aggression, being an
indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may be
absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or
the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Dulin
posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete
self-defense, and must be appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance. Dulin’s
position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of
incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from
the moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any
incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several
times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to
inflict injury on Batulan.
III.
ISSUE:
WON Dela Cruz is liable for the crime of HOMICIDE.
RULING:
YES.
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact. It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses
and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying. This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA
and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would
have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the
CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense. In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s
contention that since the incident transpired in Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the
prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey
and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. The fact that they are officemates of
Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories
in favor of Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially
since they are testifying under oath. All told, we find no basis to doubt or dispute, much less
overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA that the elements of homicide are present in the instant
case as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.