SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
BATTAD
SINCO v LONGA
51 Phil 507
STREET; 1928
INA
FACTS
- Hacienda Rosario was owned by Escolastico Sinco, who was
married to Saturnina Lopez. They had 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz,
and Coloma. Coloma had 3 children of her own, Vicente, Pilar, and
Desemparados. Coloma’s children are the plaintiffs in this case.
- When Escolastico died, his estate was indebted for P14k. In order
to pay for this, Saturnina and their children leased the hacienda for 7
years to Longa & his sister-in-law (Longa). The lease agreement was
such that the lessees would assume the indebtedness and the
rentals would be applied to the payment of the estate’s debts. The
lease was extended for 2 years.
- Coloma predeceased Saturnina. When Saturnina died, she left a
will acknowledging the encumbrance of the hacienda. Sergio and
Maria Paz tried to question the right of Coloma’s children (plaintiffs)
to inherit, but the opposition was abandoned (kasi medyo obvious
diba).
- After Saturnina’s death, Sergio was hard-pressed for money to
sustain his huge family, so he offered to sell his 1/3 undivided share
in the hacienda to Longa. Longa wanted to buy the whole property
because he was trying to borrow money from the Tabacalera
Company to pay the purchase price of the hacienda and the
company wasn’t secure in having a 1/3 undivided share as security
for the loan. Maria Paz got on board. They sold their undivided
shares to Longa. So what was left to sell was the share of Coloma’s
children, who at that time were all minors under the guardianship of
Emilio Tevez, which couldn’t be sold without court approval.
- Before the approval of the court to sell, uncle and auntie executed a
document, guaranteeing to Longa that (1) they will not take back their
2/3, regardless of the decision of the court; and (2) they will not
oppose the sale of the children’s share, once approved by the court.
- The court approved the sale. And so the children’s share was sold
to Longa. The children brought a case, questioning the regularity of
the sale of their property.
ISSUE
WON the sale of the property of the minors was attended with fraud
(of Longa).
HELD
NO.
- In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches
the danger of accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years
after the transaction in question was accomplished, when death may
have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by
time may have given a totally different color to the cause of
controversy. In the case before us the guardian, Emilio Tevez, is
dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant
Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now living in Spain. It will be
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borne in mind also that, in so far as oral proof is concerned, the
charge of fraud rests principally of the testimony of a single witness
who, if fraud was committed, was a participant therein and who
naturally would now be anxious so far as practicable, to put the
blame on others. In this connection it is well to bear in mind the
following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:
xxx But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and
as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify
the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It
would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact
proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect
a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with
which it may be incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and
human infirmity, is that the material facts can be given with certainty
to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest
in confidence, and in parol agreements the most that we can hope is
to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general
presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust,
ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption
is the other way; and as to the dead, who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence
of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt. (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
Wheat. [U. S.], 481, 498.)
- The attorneys for the appellees criticize the order of the court of
November 16, 1910, authorizing the sale of the share of the minors in
the hacienda as irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. We
are unable to concur in this view. The petition presented by the
guardian stated a case, we think, for a sale of a portion of the
guardianship estate for reinvestment, as contemplated in section 569
of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it was clearly set forth
that the income of the children's property was insufficient property to
maintain and educate them and that it was for their benefit that their
share should be sold. It was also therein stated that the property was
encumbered. Admitting that these statements of the petition were
untrue the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale was not
thereby affected, because the jurisdiction of the court rests on the
averments of the petition and not upon the truth of those averments.
The suggestion that the order was irregular and beyond the
jurisdiction of the court because publication was not made over the
whole period required by law losses its force in view of the fact that
the next of kin of the minors are stated in the order to have
personally appeared in court.
* The court here said that the minors here were really in a dangerous
position since no one intervened in the sale who was really looking
out for the minors’ interests. Uncle and Auntie were protecting theirs.
Even the guardian was after the cash that would be realized from the
sale to apply to his own uses, instead of reinvesting it. Especially
considering that the minors were not in dire need of the proceeds as
was reflected in the petition for the authorization to sell. They had
sufficient properties aside from the 1/3 share in the hacienda to
PROF.
support them (as evidenced by the fact that they got by without even
using the proceeds kasi nga kinuha ni Tevez). Tsk tsk tsk.
MARGATE V RABACAL
7 SCRA 894
PAREDES; April 30, 1963
APPLE
FACTS
-This is an application for the registration of a residential land, with a
house, containing an area of 465 square meters, situated in Iriga,
Camarines Sur, by Jose Margate, who claims to have purchased the
property from Julia Rabacal for P4,000.00.
-Rabacal and her minor children opposed the application, on the
ground that the property was under guardianship proceedings when
sold; that the sale was not authorized by the court ; that the purchase
price of P4,000.00 was not fully paid, as there was a remaining
balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot and house
was P10,000.00.
-After due hearing, the registration court confirmed the title of the
applicant, and ordered that the same be registered in the name of
Margate
-Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the
case to SC stating that the issues involved are purely legal in
character.
**(facts as found by trial court)
-the parcel of land and house, was owned by Dr. Julio Berina, who
died on October 15, 1945, survived by his widow, Julia Rabacal, and
his minor children, the oppositors herein.
-Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minor children and letters of
guardianship was issued in her favor. She filed a petition alleging that
it was necessary to sell parcel 4 of the inventory, in order to defray
the expenses in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 919 and for the
support and education of the wards. This petition was approved by
the court, authorizing the guardian to sell the residential lot and its
improvements.
-Rabacal offered to sell to Margate the residential lot in question, for
P5,000.00. After negotiations, the parties agreed on the selling price
of P4,000.00. After the agreement, Rabacal began getting money
from Margate, such that when Rabacal secured the authority to sell
from the court, she had already obtained from Margate the sum of
P500.00, and after having secured the order of authority to sell,
Rabacal showed to Margate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, a
deed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal, acknowledged before a
Notary Public, selling the land in question to Margate for P4,000.00,
on which date Margate paid the balance of P3,500.00 to Rabacal.
-Notwithstanding the fact that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the
inventory, and executed a deed of sale on May 27, 1948, Rabacal, in
the guardianship proceedings, asserted that despite her efforts, she
was unable to find a buyer for said parcel of land, leading the court to
cancel the granted authority to sell
ISSUE
1
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
WON the sale of the land to Margate was valid
HELD
Yes.
-Appellants argue that the deed of sale executed by Rabacal had no
binding effect because the authority to sell was cancelled and the
sale was not approved by the guardianship Court.
-the cancellation of the authority to sell did not, and could not, affect,
the rights of the buyer, because at the time that the order cancelling
the authority to sell was entered, the guardian, Julia Rabacal, had
already acted in accordance with authority, and sold the land to Jose
F. Margate.
-The authority of the Court had already been exhausted, after it was
fulfilled by the guardian, and there was nothing to cancel.
-Moreover, the cancellation of the order to sell was entered by the
Court due to the deception of the guardian. If the court had been
informed of the sale, the court would certainly not have revoked the
authority.
-Moreover, the revocation was entered without notice to the
purchaser Jose F. Margate
-With respect to the lack of approval of the sale by the court, the law
merely requires that the guardian should be authorized, and that the
authority to sell did not impose the condition that the deed of sale
executed by the guardian should be approved by the Court. The
approval of the sale by the court, under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case, would then be merely pro-forma, since the
appellants were not able to show any reason why the guardianship
would have refused to approve the sale which was already a fait
accompli and within the authority given by said court.
-Being the petitioners-vendors, appellants cannot validly attack the
proceedings had in the sale, on certain formal technicalities,
considering the fact that they were the very persons who requested,
obliged and prayed the court in the guardianship proceedings to
approve the said sale, and that they had derived the utmost
advantage and benefit out of the proceeds thereof.
LICHAUCO VS TAN PHO
ROMUALDEZ; November 21, 1923
ATHE
NATURE
Appeal from the judgments of the CFI of Manila
FACTS
- Galo Lichauco, Geronimo Jose as guardian of the spendthrift
Zacarias Lichauco, and Amparo N. Jose as guardian of the minors
Luis and Julita Lichauco entered into a contract of lease of land with
Tan Pho in his capacity “as general atorney-in-fact of Tan-U, widow
of the late Chua Piengco, and administrator of all of the property of
the latter’s heirs.” The contract of lease provided for the erection of
a building of strong materials for the period of twenty years, from the
date of the execution of the contract, for the price or rent of P1,560
monthly. Upon the termination of the period of the lease, all the
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improvements or buildings constructed on the leased land shall
become the property of the owners of the land, without the lessee
being entitled to payment or compensation of any kind, either by
reason of said building or by the improvements on the land.
- At the time the contract of case was executed, the owners of this
and were: Galo Lichauco, of one-third pro indiviso; Zacarias
Lichauco, at that time incapacitated, of another one-third pro indiviso;
and Luis Lichauco then a minor and Julita Lichauco also at that time
and still a minor coowners of the remaining one-third part pro
indiviso.
- Faustino Lichauco, the new guardian ad litem both of the minors
Luis and Julita Lichauco, and of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco,
filed a case against the lessee Tan Pho, his principal Tan U ( alias
Tan O), the children of the latter and against Galo Lichauco one of
the lessors. In said case, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment finding, among other things, that said contract of
lease is valid. From this judgment plaintiff appealed. Faustino
assailed the contract as void raising the following issues:
ISSUES
1. WON the contract of lease is valid
a. WON the guardians of the incapacitated person and of the
minors could not execute it
b. WON the contract was not, and could not have been
authorized by the court;
c. WON Tan Pho had no power to enter into it.
2. WON the registration of the said lease in the registry is final and
conclusive.
HELD
1. NO. That the contract of lease is void as regards the plaintiffs, and
the effects of this declaration of partial nullity retroacts to September
17, 1920, the date on which the complaint for nullity was presented.
a. YES. Article 1548 of the Civil Code provides that “No lease for a
term of more than six years shall be made by the husband with
respect
to the property of his wife, by the father with respect to that of his
children, by the guardian with respect to that of his ward, or by a
manager in default of special power with respect to the property
entrusted to him for management.”
Reasoning:
- The lease was for a period greater than six years and the
respective guardians of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco and the
minors Luis and Julita Lichauco lacked the special power required by
this legal provision.
b. Although the lease in question could be approved by the court,
nevertheless, such approval was neither obtained in due time, nor
subsequently.
Reasoning
- There was an allegation that Amparo Nable verbally requested the
presiding Judge Crossfield to execute said lease. Judge Crossfield
also executed an affidavit stating that he approved of the lease, in
PROF. BATTAD
the presence and with the complete approval of all the parties
interested and he ordered that clerk to prepare orders for entry in the
record. However, F. Canillas, the deputy clerk denied that Crossfield
ordered him to prepare orders for entry in the record nor did the
judge give him any orders or instructions with reference to the
approval of the lease. Thus, the alleged approval signed by Judge
Crossfield was not attached to the court records of the case, nor did
ever form part thereof. Consequently, the approbatory nunc pro
tunc1 order impliedly entered in the judgment appealed from, is
invalid on account of having been entered without a sufficient legal
basis therefor.
c. NO. If Tan Pho was the administrator of the estate of Chua
Piengco, then he had the power to manage to manage the property
of said estate. The employment of funds of the latter for the
construction of a building on leased land, for the purpose of obtaining
rents from such building is an investment of capital which may be
considered as included in the powers of an administrator of a
decedent's estate. We cannot force ourselves to believe that, in view
of the facts of the case, Tan Pho took part in this lease as direct
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of the deceased Chua Piengco. If at the
time, the estate had not been partitioned, as it appears in the case,
such heirs had as yet no hereditary property to dispose of, nor to
answer for their acts, seeing that the estate was legally in the hands
of the administrator.
2. NO.
DISPOSITION: the judgment appealed from is reversed and it is
hereby declared and ordered:
1
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court
done at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and the
power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record
evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to
make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak
but ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might
or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper
judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the
entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment
nunc tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to
enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had
not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power
to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a
judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an
entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
          The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done
now that shall have the same legal force and effect as if one at the time it ought
to have been done. A court may order an act done nunc pro tunc when it, or
some one of its immediate ministerial officers, has done some act which for
some reason has not been entered of record or otherwise noted at the time the
order or judgment was made or should have been made to appear on the
papers or proceedings by the ministerial officer. (Secou vs. Leroux, 1 N. M.,
383, 389.)
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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
1. That the contract of lease here in question executed by Galo
Lichauco and the respective guardians of Zacarias Lichauco and the
minors Luis and Julita Lichauco on the one side, and by Tan Pho on
the other, is void as regards the plaintiffs, and the effects of this
declaration of partial nullity retroacts to September 17, 1920, the date
on which the complaint for nullity was presented.
2. Without prejudice to any contract or contracts which the interested
parties herein may desire to execute in accordance with the law and
in harmony with this opinion, the plaintiffs, from the time Tan Pho is
notified of this decision, shall be entitled to appropriate two-thirds part
pro indiviso of the buildings and improvements constructed by the
party represented by said Tan Pho on the property in question, upon
payment of the proper indemnity, according to the provisions of
articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code in force or said plaintiffs
shall have the right to compel the party represented by the defendant
Tan Pho to pay to the plaintiffs the value of two-thirds pro indiviso of
the land.
3. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to demand and to receive from the
party represented by the defendant Tan Pho a rental for the
occupation of two-thirds part pro indiviso of the land, from September
17, 1920, until said two-thirds part pro indiviso of the buildings and
improvements constructed by said Tan Pho becomes the property of
the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, or until the two-thirds part pro indiviso of
the land belonging to the plaintiffs becomes the property of the party
represented by said Tan Pho in the manner specified in the
preceding paragraph. The amount of this rental mentioned in this
paragraph shall be fixed by the interested parties, reserving them the
right to resort to the courts for its determination, in case they cannot
reach an agreement; provide that the rents, which by virtue of the
lease in question the plaintiffs may have received or may receive
from Tan Pho from September 17, 1920, shall be applied upon said
rent to be agreed upon by the interested parties or judicially fixed.
4. The registrar of deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to amend the
certificate of title to the land in question issued under decree No.
17729 in registration proceeding No. 9667, as also the corresponding
books of registry, as well as the copies of said certificate of title, to
the effect that said lease therein registered, as far as the plaintiffs are
concerned, has been extinguished and rendered void and of no
effect by virtue of this decision.
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF INCHAUSTI, V MANUEL
SOLER
G.R. No. L-15119             - Rationale of notification upon petition by friend: Notification to the
STREET, J.; January 19, 1920
TERRY
FACTS
- On January 18, 1915, CFI Manila ordered the appointment of Maria
Consuelo Rico, mother of Inchausti, as guardian of the person and
property of her son Jose R. de Inchausti, as he had become
demented and incapable of properly caring for himself and estate,
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after which he was sent to Barcelona, Spain, where he has continued
to reside.
- On August 30, 1915, Manuel Soler, Inchausti’s friend, petitioned the
court to rehabilitate him and end the guardianship.
- This was opposed by the guardian, on the grounds (1) that the ward
had not been given sufficient notice of the hearing and (2) that it had
not been satisfactorily shown that he is now capable of taking care of
himself and property.
- Upon hearing the petition the trial judge overruled both of these
objections and adjudged the ward, Jose R. de Inchausti, to be of
sound mind, notwithstanding an ordering to the guardian for an
accounting of the estate of Inchausti
ISSUES
1 WON the proper procedure of due notice to ward was followed
2 WON there was a sufficient showing that Inchausti was already
capable of taking care of himself
HELD
YES
- The clerk, by order of the court, sent a cablegram to the United
States Consult at Barcelona, requesting him to notify Jose R. de
Inchausti that the petition for his restoration to capacity would be
heard in the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 19, 1918.
[a] In reply to this, a cablegram was received from Barcelona on
October 14, 1918, signed by the Consul General of the United States
in that city, advising that Inchausti had been duly notified according
to instructions. [b] The trial judge held that notice to the ward had
been given as required by law, and he proceeded, on the appointed
day, to dispose of the petition upon its merits in accordance with the
proof then submitted.
- The notification of the ward required in section 562 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is not intended as a personal service of process in
the sense necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the ward. It is,
therefore, of no moment that the person to be notified was living in a
foreign country and thus beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
Manila court. Nor is the manner in which the court procured service
of the notice of any importance. It is sufficient that the notice was
given.
ward � where the petition to rehabilitate him is presented by a friend
� is required merely as an assurance that the individual chiefly
concerned shall have cognizance of what is being done. It at least
gives him an opportunity to advise the court in case action taken by
the mover of the petition was officious or unauthorized. That the
messages were sent and received by cable, as above stated, affords
sufficient evidence, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that
notification was duly effected, as reported in the return of the Consul
General.
PROF. BATTAD
2 YES
- The violent access of dementia which manifested itself prior to the
original appointment of the guardian passed off after Inchausti was
taken away from Manila in 1915 and the same extreme
manifestations of derangement have not reappeared. Furthermore,
the evidence shows that at the time the petition for his rehabilitation
was heard, the ward was in normal mental state and had been in this
condition for a period sufficiently long to justify the belief that he is
permanently restored
- The opposition to the termination of the guardianship seems to be
based chiefly on the fear, entertained by his mother, that Inchausti, if
placed in control of the large property to which he is heir, will prove to
be a spendthrift. Even though this fear should be well-founded, it
affords no reason for maintaining a guardianship which had its origin
in his mental incapacity. Anyway, proper proceedings can be
instituted to protect him from wasteful proclivities in the event the
derangement reoccurs. But present mental capacity being proved, he
is entitled to be discharged from tutelage.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
MINOR, EDWIN VILLA
LUIS & EDIPOLA SANTOS V REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR L-22523
ANGELES; September 29, 1967
MAIA
NATURE
Appeal from decision of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
dismissing the petition for adoption of Edwin Villa
FACTS
- Santos spouses filed the petition on January 8, 1963, to adopt
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, and brother of petitioner-
wife Edipola.
- the spouses are both 32 years old, Filipinos, residing in Manila.
They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of
their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged
natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
- Edwin is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza (Edwin is
the younger brother of Edipola). Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with
various business interests. His income is approximately P600/month.
His wife Edipola, is a nurse, with an average monthly earning of
P300
- Edwin was born on May 22, 1958 and was a sickly child since birth.
Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the
petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter,
3
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the
child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents
of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to
the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their
written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully
understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by
the petitioners.
- trial court dismissed the petition, saying that “the adoption will result
in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate
brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of
the court, that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances
absent herein, should prevent the adoption.”
ISSUE
WON an elder sister may adopt a younger brother
HELD YES
Ratio There is no provision in the law that relatives, by blood or by
affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another.
Reasoning The only objection raised is the alleged “incongruity” that
will result in the relation of the adopter and the adopted, in the
circumstance that the adopted who is the brother of the adopter, will
also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, that adoption
among people who are related by nature should not be allowed, in
order that dual relationship should not result
- It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a
blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of
the US, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes
authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction expressly
provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a
certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some
states hold that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a
blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to
the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption
where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am.
Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption
statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It would
seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law
countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed,
while in other states where common law principles predominate,
adoption laws are more strictly applied because they are regarded to
be in derogation of the common law.
- Art.335, CC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it
has been shown that adopters herein are not among those prohibited
from adopting. Art.339 names those who cannot be adopted, and the
adoptee here is not one of those excluded by the law. Art. 338, on
the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or
mother, and of a stepchild by the stepfather or stepmother. This last
article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is
not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a
relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted
are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in
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Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how
far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which
in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of
the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration .
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should
be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by
person who can properly rear and educate them
- wrt objection that the adoption here will result in a dual relationship
between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of
the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the
adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The
relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be
considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments
to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. So even
considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari
materia, the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable
on the ground alone of the resulting relationship between the adopter
and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law
on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by
affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within
the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed
notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship. And as there is no
provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among
relatives, they ought not to be prevented.
Disposition Decision reversed. Adoption granted
REPUBLIC VS HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO
& SPOUSES CLAVE
233 SCRA 9
Puno ; June 8, 1994
MEL
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of RTC Zambales (Iba)
in Special Proceeding entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the
Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala”
FACTS
- In a verified petition filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales, private
respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse. The petition was set for hearing.
- The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He
married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United
PROF. BATTAD
States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally,
and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old
minor.
- Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and
custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to
the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her
son.
- Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct
the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of
the petition for adoption.
- Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption
will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent
judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption
- Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s argument is correct (won Alvin and Evelyn are
qualified to adopt under Phil law)
HELD
YES
Ratio
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her Filipino spouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
- There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is
not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he
is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February
21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
- Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may
appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O.
209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
4
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
- Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184. 3
- This was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for
adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that
husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned
before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted
REPUBLIC VS MILLER
G.R. No. 125932
PARDO; April 21, 1999
EVA
NATURE
CA certified the case to the SC because the petition raised only
questions of law. SC treated the appeal as one via certiorari from a
decision of the RTC.
FACTS
- July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller,
filed with the RTC Angeles City a verified petition to adopt the minor
Michael Magno Madayag.
- At the hearing spouses Miller adduced evidence showing that:
1. Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of
age, both American citizens, are husband and wife, having been
married on June 21, 1982.
2. They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their
union on account of a medical problem of the wife."
3. Claude A. Miller was a member of the US Air Force assigned at
Clark Air Base. The family maintains their residence at Angeles City,
since 1985.
4. The minor Michael has been in the custody of respondents since
the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the
future of their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible
means of livelihood to have their child adopted by respondents. They
executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by
respondents.
5. DSWD recommended approval of the petition.
- RTC rendered decision granting the petition for adoption petitioners.
- Solicitor General interposed an appeal
ISSUE
WON aliens may adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under
the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for
adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.
A2010
HELD
YES. The SC has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the
filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying
him.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3,
1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt
a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of
filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law
then in force.
- As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it
was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an alien who filed a petition
for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied
the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his
petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.
- Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objective of the law.
DISPOSITIVE Affirmed.
SANTOS VS. ARANZANSO
16 SCRA 345
BENGZON; February 28, 1966
JP
FACTS
- Eight years after the order of adoption of then minors Paulina and
Aurora Santos, one of their adoptive parents, Juliana Reyes, died
leaving substantial properties.
- In the settlement of her estate, her cousins, respondents Gregoria
Aranzanso and Demetria Mendoza intervened alleging the invalidity
of the marriage of Juliana Reyes to Simplicio Santos, and the
adoption decree of the two minors.
ISSUES
1 WON adoption is valid adoption
2 WON adoption can be attacked collaterally
HELD
1 YES.
PROF. BATTAD
- After holding that it matters not whether the marriage was valid or
invalid, the deceased can still adopt, the Court addressed the
allegations of the respondents upholding the adoption decree.
- Parental Consent. “Consent of parents not an absolute requisite if
child was abandoned. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not
an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their
children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.” (Simplicio was
guardian ad litem)
- Meaning of abandonment. In adoption proceedings imports “any
conduct on the part of the parent which evidences a settled purpose
to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”
- The Court further said that adoption proceedings being proceedings
in rem, constructive notice, such as the publication duly made in a
newspaper of general circulation, is enough where the residence of
the parents is unknown. Notice is not required in adoption cases in
regard to the abandoning parent.
2 NO, adoption cannot be attacked collaterally.
- On the MR, the Court said that the adoption cannot be attacked
collaterally, and that the action appealed with the CA was not the
adoption decree but the settlement, the adoption cannot be attacked
collaterally there being no evidence to be re-examined in the present
action. The court also declared that leaving children in the custody of
others constitutes abandonment especially when permanently and
indefinitely.
DSWD v. BELEN
275 SCRA 645 (1997)
DIANNA
FACTS
- Administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social
Welfare Officer IV of the DSWS Field Office in La Union.
- Respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen is charged with rendering an
erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 and the corresponding SC Circular No. 12.
- Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is
charged with disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12.
1. Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
2. Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner
spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
3. Belen based his decree primarily on the “findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one
hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed
love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
demonstrated to the minor.”
5
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
4. On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Judge says the DSWD
findings and recommendations are contained in the “Adoptive Home
Study Report” and “Child Study Report” prepared by the local office
of the DSWD through respondent Vedaña.
5. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain
the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her
adoptive parents in the United States, it turned out that the DSWD
did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that
there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a “Home and Child Study Report” in the case.
6. FURTHER, there was no directive from respondent judge for the
social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD
on the matter of the required reports for said minor’s adoption.
7. ARTICLE 33, PD 603 states: Petitions for adoption shall be
granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case
study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents.
Circular No. 12 directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:
(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency
thereof with respect to those cases already filed; (2) to strictly
COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree…
The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if
any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and
Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of
such case study.
8. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaña
had asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting
parents in order to expedite the adoption case with the DSWD.
9. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith, claimed that he
directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study,
and thereafter submit the required reports thereon. Belen contends
that, except only for direct coordination with the DSWD in the
preparation of said reports, no approval from the DSWD is necessary
for the home and case study reports and it need not be furnished
therewith.
10. The OCA recommended that respondent judge be
administratively punished for violating Circular No. 12 and Article 33
of PD 603.
11. Vedaña meanwhile, pointed out that there never was any
directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD
concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to
conduct the case study and submit her report thereon to the court at
least one week before the initial hearing of the case, as was also the
practice in the other RTCs.
ISSUE
WON approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case
study reports (and whether a judge may decide based on such
report).
HELD
NO.
A2010
- Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the
provisions of Article 33 and Circular No. 12 and Vedaña should have
coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the
home and case study reports.
Ratio
1. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent
judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about
the commencement of the Special Proceeding so that the
corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by
said department.
2. DSWD has the necessary competence, more than that possessed
by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation.
3. Belen should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for
the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the
adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see
to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption
proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
4. Belen may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the
welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under
consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal
device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate
child.
5. As for Vedaña, she has compromised the prescribed process in
the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under
consideration.
6. Belen acted in good faith however in presumably believing that it
was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a
Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. Also,
there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaña sought to
obtain any amount from the adopting parents.
DUNCAN V CFI OF RIZAL
69 SCRA 298
February 10, 1976; ESGUERRA, J.
LORA
FACTS
- Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen are husband and wife, the former a British national
residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an
American Citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines.
- A child, only 3 days old was given to petitioners for them to adopt,
by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized
as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned spouses
appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents of said child
- Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez received the infant from the
child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the
mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not
want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child.
PROF. BATTAD
The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her
child
- In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners Atty. Velasquez, as
the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the
adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law
- Learning from the testimony of witness Atty. Velasquez that the
natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the
court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said
mother. The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that
there existed an attorney and client relationship between them. She
had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity.
She could not now violate such privileged communication.
- The petition for adoption was dismissed. The principal reason given
for the dismissal of the petition was that ". . . the consent given in this
petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express
requirement of the law."
- CFI: The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez,
the witness for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the
adoption of the child in her capacity as loco parentis to said child) to
reveal the identity of the mother would be violative of the client-
attorney relationship existing between her and the mother cannot
hold water, because in the first place, there was no such relationship
existing between them in so far as this case is concerned and
secondly, it is not only a question of revealing the identity of the
mother but rather, of giving consent to the adoption by that alleged
unwed mother.
ISSUE
WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this
case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person
required by law to give such consent.
HELD
YES.
- Art. 340 of the Civil Code. The written consent of the following to
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
- Rule 99, Sec. 3.Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if
fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's
spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child,
or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian
ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the
proper officer or officers of such asylum, home or society, or by such
person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized,
the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
- Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons
particularly described by law may be considered here as legally
capable of giving the required written consent. They are:
6
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
1. Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent, guardian or person in
charge of the person to be adopted
2. Rule 99.3 of the Rules of Court: each of the known living parents
who has not abandoned such child.
- The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is
illegitimate and unrecognized.
- The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of
the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid-year of said
1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the
condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood,
maintenance and care of the same.
- In short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as
"known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned such child."
- Said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child.
Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child .
Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in
this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having
abandoned her child with all legal consequences attached thereto.
- Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an
unknown parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require
the written consent to such parent of the child to the adoption.
- Santos vs. Aranzanso: the parental consent required by the law in
adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned
their child.
- Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural
mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners,
nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the court
despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law,
there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as
the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child.
Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the
child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home
or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other
than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be
called the guardian of said infant.
- It was she who had actual physical custody of the infant and who,
out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of
protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could
have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap
as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies.
- Court stated that the least that it could do is to recognize and
acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby
extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian
exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.
- The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient
Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the
hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally
finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of
children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with
less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for
adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly
A2010
those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in
their mouths.
- The herein petitioners appear to be qualified to adopt the child.
There is no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications
under the law. Above all, they have the means to provide the child
with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing child
needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs.
- The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and
adoption of the infant they have already showered it with love and
care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the records of the
baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire
of petitioners to have the child as their very own. The child was born
in May, 1967, and he will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age.
In all the years, from the time he was turned over to the herein
petitioners when he was only about a week old, (there is no showing
that the said child was ever placed at any time in the care and
custody of some other persons) he had been cared for and loved by
the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen. He must have known no other parents than these
persons.
- To sustain the decision of the court below, Court will be doing a
graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and
worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and
on all other children who might be similarly situated.
- Court considered it to be justifiable and more humane to formalize a
factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the
petitioning spouses and the minor child baptized by them as Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel
interpretation of the law that was done by the respondent court and
Judge.
Disposition Decision annulled and the minor Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan declared the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin
Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.
CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS [& SPS. CLAVANO]
296 SCRA 128; ROMERO; Sept 25, 1998
MARGE
FACTS:
-Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano begot 3 children:
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. During the early years of
their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the
Clavanos.
-Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie
filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the
then JDRC of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live
separately and apart or from bed and board.” They further agreed
that their children shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000,
constituting constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house
and lot jointly owned by the parties.
PROF. BATTAD
-Herbert Cang then for Nevada, USA where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie. The divorce decree was granted. Sole custody of the
three minor children was granted to Anna Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to Herbert.
-Thereafter, Herbert took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife
and never remarried. While in US, a portion of his income was
remitted to the Phils for his children’s expenses and/or deposited in
the bank in the name of his children.
-Sept 25, 1987: Sps. Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano [brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie] filed Spec Proc No. 1744-CEB for the
adoption of the three minor Cang children before RTC Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-yr-old Keith signifying consent
to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal obligation to support”
his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that
because she would be going to the US to attend to a family business,
“leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper
(her) job-seeking venture abroad;” and that her husband had “long
forfeited his parental rights” over the children.
-Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Herbert immediately
returned to the Phils and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
although the Sps Clavano were financially capable of supporting the
children, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of
his parental authority over his beloved children.”
-Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the US thereby leaving custody of their children to Sps
Clavano.
-Jan 11, 1988: RTC Cebu City Br. 19 issued an order finding that
Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court
then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
Herbert.
-March 27, 1990: RTC Cebu City Br. 14 issued the decree of
adoption, citing as impelling reasons the ff:
(1) the Cang children’s “close filial ties with the Clavano family;
(2) the childless Clavano spouses had substantial assets and
income;
(3) the natural mother Anna Marie approved of the adoption;
(4) the Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual
direction;
(5) the children manifested their desire to be adopted by the
Clavanos.
-RTC further ruled that Herbert’s opposition rested on “a very shaky
foundation” because of its findings that:
(1) Herbert is “morally unfit to be the father of his children”
(2) Authenticity of joint deposit of around $10,000 could not be
verified
(3) Possibility of reconciliation w/ Anna Marie was “dim if not nil”
(4) as US citizen, his attachment w/ Filipino children is an open
question
7
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
-RTC quoted with approval the evaluation/recommendation of the
RTC Social Worker in her Child Study Report, that the oppositor
Herbert Cang has abandoned his children thereby dispensing with
his consent to the adoption.
-CA affirmed the decree of adoption, ruling that:
(1) Consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct
on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish
parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children or the
withholding of the parent’s presence, his care and the opportunity to
display voluntary affection.
(2) Oppositor’s argument that he has been sending dollar
remittances to the children is belied by the fact that he was woefully
in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. His claim that he
has maintained bank accounts in the children’s name is negated
when we consider that such bank accounts were “withdraw-able by
him alone.”
-Herbert filed MFR but CA denied the same.
ISSUE:
WON the minor children be legally adopted without the written
consent of their natural parent
HELD: NO.
Both RTC and CA failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that
should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of WON
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent
to the adoption unnecessary. But here, there was no abandonment.
[guys, sorry ang haba ng digest. ang dami kasing doctrines, eh.. ^_^]
-Written consent of natural father is required by Art.31(2) of PD No.
603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code 2, and Art.188(2) of the Family
Code3.
2 petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
PD 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by EO 91:
“Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. - The written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services
and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed
child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.”
3
Family Code. “Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption
shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper govt
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, 10 yrs of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, 10yrs of age or over, of the adopting parents, if
living with said parent and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.”
A2010
-Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when
Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption on September 25,
1987, the applicable law was the PD 603, as amended by EO91.
-During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on Aug 3, 1988,
the Family Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides
for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
-Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of
the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99.3 of
the RoC.
GenRule: The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Exception: if the parent has abandoned the child OR
if such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate”
>In these cases, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to
warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance
with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption.
>In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural
mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Herbert’s consent,
as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently
alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the
natural father. This allegation vested the court with jurisdiction.
-However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether
he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the
-In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely,
to forsake or renounce utterly. xxx The dictionaries trace this word to
the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality
and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment.
-In the case at bar, while admittedly, Herbert was physically absent
as he was then in the US, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained
regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their
PROF. BATTAD
whims. Herbert also presented certifications of banks in the US
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he
had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. This is further
evidenced by copies of checks sent by Herbert to the children from
1985 to 1989.
-The courts below attached a high premium to the prospective
adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological
well-being of the children. True, Keith had expressed his desire to be
adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness
on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his
feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at
all farfetched to conclude that Keith’s testimony was actually the
effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have
engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his
father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
-The courts below emphasized respondents’ emotional attachment to
the children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their
young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such
attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones’ act of
snuggling close to Ronald was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. The Clavano spouses, being the uncle
and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when
they needed help as when Keith got sick and Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.
-Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because
he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. It is enough that the natural parent is earning a decent
living and is able to support his children according to his means. In
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. The welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration.
-The record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the
children was not exactly the “paramount consideration” that impelled
Anna Marie to consent to their adoption. The adoption appears to be
a matter of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is
financially capable of supporting her children but is often out of the
country leaving her children to the care of her relatives. When the
family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that
the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie’s brother Jose.
However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to
devolve the task upon Ronald (businessman) and Maria Clara
(international flight stewardess) who however could not always be in
Cebu to care for the children.
-A close analysis of the testimonies of siblings Ronald, Anna Marie
and Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted
to keep the children away from their father, allegedly a “womanizer.”
-Herbert described himself as single in status and denied being a
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. As to whether he
was telling the truth is beside the point. In any case, the actuality that
Herbert carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as
sufficient basis for the conclusion that he was necessarily an unfit
father. Conventional wisdom and common human experience show
8
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father. That
a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a
sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to
parental authority over the children.
-Sps Clavano themselves explained why Herbert failed to abide by
the agreement re: support of the children: he was an illegal alien in
the US. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment.
Counsel for Clavanos argue that the authority given to Anna Marie
by the legal separation decree to enter into contracts was “all
embracing” and included giving her sole consent to the adoption.
SC: This conclusion is anchored on the wrong premise that the
authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. The transfer of
custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of
legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive Herbert of parental
authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. The
law only confers on the innocent spouse the “exercise” of parental
authority.
-Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.
-As such, in instant case, Herbert may not be deemed as having
been completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the
award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To
reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of
the agreement of the spouses.
-While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject
to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation
case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should
be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under
the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the
legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of
custody over the children from Anna Marie back to Herbert. The
order was not implemented because of Anna Marie’s MFR thereon.
The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of
custody to Herbert, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt
charge against them.
-The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over
the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in
the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue
is WON Herbert had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because
the finding of the courts below on the issue of Herbert’s
abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation,
A2010
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. [In other words,
there was no abandonment ^_^]
-As regards the divorce obtained in the US, this Court has ruled that
a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil
Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State
policy. While Herbert is now an American citizen, as regards Anna
Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has
no legal effect.
-Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil
Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in
adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples
for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the
love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has
impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry
Adoption [approved 7 June 1995] and Republic Act No. 8552
establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino children
[approved 25 February 1998].
-The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of recent laws 4.
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its
officials are also duty bound to comply with its mandates 5. Underlying
the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle
that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is
not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of
the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The
rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible.
4
R.A. No. 8552. Domestic Adoption Act. Art. 1, Sec. 2.
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards
the full and harmonious development of his/her personality.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set
forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child.
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s).
5 Petitioner however contend that the Bundocs are the
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Art. 5. “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the
rights recognized in the present Convention.”
Art. 9, par. 3. “States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is
separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the
child’s best interests.”
Art. 10, par. 2. “A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the
right to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances
personal relations and direct contacts with both parents. . .”
Art. 14, par. 2. “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the
parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in
a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”
PROF. BATTAD
-Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is
approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be
endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their
parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot
and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their
adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for
adoption was filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed
without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Disposition Petition for review on certiorari granted. Questioned CA
Decision and Resolution, as well as the RTC Cebu decision, set
aside thereby denying the petition for adoption.
TAMARGO V CA
209 SCRA 518
FELICIANO; June 3, 1992
MONCH
FACTS
- Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death.
-Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents filed a complaint for damages against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident.
- A case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was also
filed against Adelberto. It was dismissed on the ground that
he was exempted from criminal liability since he acted without
discernment.
- Prior to the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted
after the incident.
- Spouses Bundoc claim that the Rapisuras are the
indispensable parties since parental authority has already
shifted to the latter upon the filing of the petition to adopt.
indispensable parties since Adelberto still lived with them,
thus, parental authority has not yet shifted.
ISSUE
WON parental authority has shifted from the filing of the petition for
adoption
HELD
NO
Reasoning Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which reads as follows:
9
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement
agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied
that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the
child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree
of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the
original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
- The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should
be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents , except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent; xxx
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
- Uthe Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor
child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
- Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall
have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
- We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable.
- Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. � No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts
a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess
their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During
the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
- Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e.,
before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not
A2010
yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle
shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
SAYSON V CA
Cruz; GR 89224
23 January 1992
ICE
FACTS
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for themselves to the
exclusion of all others.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children- Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno and Rafaela died. Teodoro,
who had married Isabel Bautista, died after them. His wife died 9 yrs.
later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo,
and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's
lawful descendants.
A different action was filed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their
own complaint, for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate
of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving
children. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted
children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his
parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE
WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted
WON Doribel is a legitimate child using the Birth Cert as only basis
HELD
1 YES. On two grounds argumentative inconsistency and timeliness.
They argue that Delia and Edmundo could not be adopted because
Doribel was born already prior to the adoption and such disqualifies
the couple from adopting while they also argue that Doribel was born
of another perso, Edita Abila.
It is also untimely made. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way
back in 1967. Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties,
what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and
Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they
should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
PROF. BATTAD
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10)
days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners
could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and
perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed
a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although
the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and
EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally,
as in their action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts
exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity
of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven.
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered
void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such
as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption,
this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the
decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since
the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might
be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while
another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
2 YES, Doribel is a legitimate child. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth
certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar. Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must
fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
10
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have
this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of
the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or
as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose . . .
JOHNSTON V REPUBLIC
205 SCRA 1040
LABRADOR; April 30, 1963
REAN
FACTS
- Petitioner Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of
one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, 2 yrs and
10 mos. old, then under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an
orphanage situated in Manila. The petition shows that petitioner is 48
years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino; that the
couple are childless; that the consent of the mother Superior of the
orphanage and the husband of Isabel was obtained.
- After due notice and hearing petition was granted by the CFI of
Rizal. Petitioner filed a motion, praying that the surname given to the
minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion
was denied by the lower court in. Hence, this appeal.
- Petitioner argues: [a] Since she is now using the surname of her
husband (A370, par. 1 NCC), and bec. “Valdes Johnston “ is the
surname she used in filing the petition in the present case, under
which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and
acquaintances, she had ceased to be known by her maiden
surname, so CFI should have decreed that the minor she adopted
should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. [b] The use
of surname "Valdes" by adopted child will create the impression that
she is the illegitimate child of petitioner begotten before her marriage,
a situation humiliating to both adopter and adopted.
- SolGen: Although a married woman is permitted to add to her
surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that petitioner’s
surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a
surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname
if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname
Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public
would be misled into believing that she was adopted by Isabel’s
husband also, which is not true in this case.
ISSUE
WON CFI erred authorizing or prescribing the use of the surname
Valdes by the adopted child
HELD
A2010
NO.
- Art. 341, par. 4, NCC which entitles the adopted minor to the use of
the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not
to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Isabel's real surname
is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly w/o
her husband’s concurrence, and not as a married woman, her name
as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal
relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent
of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by
her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting
father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own
surname.
- Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1,
NCC), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out
by the SolGen, if the minor child were allowed to use the surname of
the spouse who did not join in the adoption.
- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the
adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she had also
been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later,
questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the
adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in
the adoption.
Disposition: CFI’s order prescribing the use of the surname "Valdes"
by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion
Georgiana, is AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC V WONG
209 SCRA 189
REGALADO; May 21, 1992
BAUZ
FACTS
-Respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,
Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was 2 ½ yrs old and then
known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret, was then 9 yrs
old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order
of the court in SP Case 593 issued on Sept 9, 1967, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized
Filipinos. Hoong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while
Concepcion was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the
children as they remained childless after 15 yrs of marriage. The
couples showered their adopted children with parental love and
reared them as their own children.
-Upon reaching 22, Maximo, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that
his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his
relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of
alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
PROF. BATTAD
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.
-On July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of Maximo, TC
decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully
complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo
Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. On appeal to respondent
CA, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the
SolGen, TC decision was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES
1. WON the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for
change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the
granting of said petition
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The purpose of the law in allowing of change of name under
Rule 103 is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality
and to provide his best interest. In granting or denying the petition for
change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is
required.
Reasoning Art 364 to 380,CC provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surnames. Art 365 mandates that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Art
341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to "entitle the adopted
person to use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an
adopted child is maintained in Art 39(3), PD 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The Family Code echoes the
same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter. Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred
that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is
both an obligation and a right.
Under Art 376, CC, "no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority." The application for change of name
thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and
conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 and one which involves
substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial
proceedings being the prevention of fraud. Its purpose is simply to
have, wherever possible, a record of the change
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a
person involving his his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of
the community. It is a proceeding in rem, so strict compliance with all
jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For this purpose,
the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register.
The change of name under Art 376 and reglementarily implemented
by Rule 103 must not be confused with and cannot be effected
through the summary proceeding proposed in Art 412, as
procedurally regulated by Rule 108, which refers only to correction of
11
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious
to the understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a
mistake in copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous
change.
We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that
private respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to
the use of his present surname is unsubstantiated. The testimony of
private respondent in the lower court bears out the existence of valid
cause in his bid for change of name:
Q Now, after you adopted the surname "Wong?" in your studies,
what did you observe?
A I observed that "Wong" as a surname embarrassed me to my
friends and when I go with Chinese friends I cannot talk Chinese. I
am living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can
believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of Furniture but I
have little (sic) customer because no one believes me that I am
Muslim.
This was materially corroborated by the testimony of private
respondent's adoptive mother.
From the testimony of Maximo and of his adopter mother, it can be
discerned that he was prompted to file the petition for change of
name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name
brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends. Another cause is
his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held
that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former
alien nationality which only hampers social and business life, is a
proper and reasonable cause for change of name. Justice dictates
that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as
long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown
in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest
of the state or of other persons would result in the change of
petitioner's name.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not
only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid
confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Art 365 is to the effect that
an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, that of parent and
child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and
A2010
affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so
related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family
of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on
it a title to the rights and privileges of such.
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the
natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's
person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal
consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same
manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in
lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions
as may be by statute imposed.
The SolGen maintains that to sustain the change of name would run
counter to Art 365 and the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic that "one
should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not
permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to
other persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on
lame excuses.
We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private
respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by
law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person
may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly
prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such
recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. If we were
to follow the argument of the SolGen to its conclusion, then there will
never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of
status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent
violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event
that the petition is granted. Rule 103 would then be rendered inutile.
Sec 1 of Rule 103 uses the generic term "persons" to signify all
natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may,
under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition
the court for a change of name, there is no legal basis or logic in
discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted
child.
Herein respondent is already of age and as such he can decide what
is best for him. His experience with regard to his social and business
dealings is personal and it is only he who can attest to the same.
Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely through legal
process, herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to
Rule 103 which was granted by theTC.
It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to
the use of the name of his parents by nature as crass ingratitude. To
go by the SolGen's suggestion that private respondent should have
his adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname of his natural
father would be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an
appropriate and valid remedy available under the law.
Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of
name, asked for his adoptive mother's permission to do so. As proof
of her assent to the filing of said petition, Concepcion executed an
affidavit in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985.
There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to
first secure his adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the
questioned legal recourse other than the parental respect and
reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child.
PROF. BATTAD
Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's
adoptive mother emphasized that she executed the above affidavit
"without affecting the legal adoption granted by the Court on Sep 9,
1967, making him as one of my legal and compulsory heirs." This is
incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any misgivings or
reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise
dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent's legal status
or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, a
change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing
family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does
not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; all that is
altered is the name.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
REPUBLIC v. CA, CARANTO
255 SCRA 99
MENDOZA; March 15, 1996
RICKY
FACTS
- Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed a petition for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, with prayer for the correction of the
minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael." Midael, then 15 years old,
had been living with Jaime Caranto since he was 7 years old. When
respondents were married in 1986, the minor stayed with them under
their care and custody.
- The SolGen opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction
of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that
although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was
basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the ROC.
- The RTC granted the petition for adoption and dismissed the
opposition of the SolGen on the ground that Rule 108 applies only to
the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited
Rule 108, § 1, which provides that "any person interested in an act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of the persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil registry is not
one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to
cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could
be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners. The CA
affirmed.
ISSUES
1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption.
2. WON the trial court erred in granting respondents' prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.
12
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
HELD
1. YES.
Reasoning SolGen's contention is that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by
publication did not state the true name of the minor child, invoking
the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the
notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the
child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth
("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a "substantial defect
in the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was
a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could
very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common
experience would indicate.
- The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in
the name of the child. The correction involves merely the substitution
of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael"
as given name would read "Michael." Even the SolGen admits that
the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child
from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause
any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those
who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection
known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this
case.
2. YES.
Reasoning The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to
be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons. This case falls under letter "(o)" of §2 referring to
changes of name. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court
that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to implement which Rule 108 was
inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers "those harmless and
innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled."' Thus, in Yu vs. Republic' it was held that "to change
'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the substitution of the first
vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the
righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic it was held
that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein
a summary proceeding is appropriate."
- Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this
Rule provides:
§ 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
- The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in
this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of
the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of
entry, is void.
A2010
- Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as
required by Rule 108, § 4. While there was notice given by
publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
made in compliance with Rule 99, § 4. In that notice only the prayer
for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The necessary
consequence was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far
as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
Disposition Decision of the CA MODIFIED by deleting from the
decision of the RTC the order to the local civil registrar to change the
name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child.
AFFIRMED with respect to the adoption.
REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ
253 SCRA 509
REGALADO; February 9, 1996
JOEY
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari of the decision of RTC Pasig
FACTS
- Spouses Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to adopt the minor
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran.  In the very same petition, they prayed
for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by
his adoptive family, relatives and friends since he arrived at their
residence.
- The Republic opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these petitions should
be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
- RTC granted the adoption and change of name.
ISSUES
1. WON TC erred in granting the change of the registered proper or
given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for
adoption
2. WON there was lawful ground for the change of name.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the
civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s
name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out
and accordingly determined.
PROF. BATTAD
Reasoning
- Art. 189 of the FC enumerates the legal effects of adoption:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and
other blood relatives.”
- The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of
the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the
given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil
register.  The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer
upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered
Christian or first name.  The automatic change thereof, premised
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption.  Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of
an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted
in a petition for adoption cannot properly be granted.
- The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be
used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be
so used until the court orders otherwise.  Changing the given or
proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order.  The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever
possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally
make its decree recording such change.
- A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules.  A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding.  To consider it as a mere incident or
an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our
remedial law system.
- Neither can the allowance of the subject petition be justified under
the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.  While
joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Rule 2.5 allows causes of action to be joined in one
complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
13
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b)
the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of
the same nature and character.
- While it is true that there is no express prohibition against the
joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not
believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their
joinder.
- A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from each other.  Each action is individually governed by particular
sets of laws and rules.  These two proceedings involve disparate
issues.  In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate
the proposed adopter’s fitness and qualifications to bring up and
educate the adoptee properly .  On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what
is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds
supporting the proposed change of name.
- We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon
private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the
change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted
child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of
the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit.  Nor is the
said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or
a relaxation of the Rules.  name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by
2. NO
Ratio Grounds sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by
a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the
change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice
to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
Reasoning
- A person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is
known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of
or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest
that every person must have a name.  The name of an individual has
two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family
name.  The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals.  The surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.  The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but
the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A2010 PROF. BATTAD
- By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in CHRIS CAPS
the civil register.  The official name of a person is that given him in
the civil register.  That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once
FACTS
the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article
- Gil GO was born in Tacloban. His name in civil register is Gil CO.
376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
- When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedly given the name Gil
person can change his name or surname without judicial
Yao Eng Hua. Baptismal certificate wasn’t presented.
authority. The only way that the name of person can be changed
- Go testified that since childhood, he was known as Henry Yao
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103. For
among relatives and friends. In biz & govt transactions, he used the
purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
name Gil CO. No third person corroborated his testimony.
the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only
- In his alien registration certificate, his is registered as Gil GO.
name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in
- He wants to use the name HENRY YAO.
the civil register. 
- Lower court granted. City fiscal appealed.
- A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider
ISSUE
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the
WON lower court correctly granted Go’s petition
same unless weighty reasons are shown.  Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, he must show proper and
HELD
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such
NO.
change.
1. Lack of jurisdiction by lower court
- A petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
- Proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem.
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and
Jurisdiction is acquired after publication of order, setting it for
which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal
hearing, w/c order shld contain data incl the name sought to be
names is not sanctioned. Baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
adopted, a matter w/c shld be indicated in title of petition.
change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been
- The reason for the rule is that the ordinary reader only glances
using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper
fleetingly at the caption of the order or title of petition. Only if the
and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A
caption or title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents.
Probability is great that he doesn’t at all notice the other names or
which he is known in the community - when at variance with that
aliases of applicant if these are mentioned only in body of order /
entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as
petition. Noninclusion of names or aliases of applicant in caption /
his real name.
title defeats the purpose of publication.
- The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for
- It was not indicated in the title / caption that Gil Go desired to
was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in
change his name to Henry Yao. Nor was it indicated that his
keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was
registered name is Gil Co. In his petition, he used Gil Go.
the name by which he had been called and known by his family,
2. Insufficient reason to change name
relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private
- Change of name is a matter of public interest. It’s a privilege, not a
respondents.
right. Court shld weigh consequences of change of name and deny
- While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
unless weighty reasons are shown. State has interest in names
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot YU CHI HAN v. REPUBLIC
be favorably considered.  To repeat, the change of the surname of 15 SCRA 454
the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
BAUTISTA ANGELO; 1965
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given
name.  INA
Dispositive Assailed order is MODIFIED.  The legally adopted child
of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin FACTS
Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected - Yu Chi Han sought to change his name from Yu Chi Han to
in accordance with law. Alehjandro Go Yu on the grounds that his given name is YCH, but
that since birth, he had always been called AGY, that he was
baptized according to Catholic rites, and given the name.
GIL GO V. REPUBLIC
- The court found no compelling reason to grant the request for
77 SCRA 65 change of name.
AQUINO; May 25, 1977
14
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
ISSUE
WON the petition for change of name should be denied
HELD
YES
- This Court has already had the occasion to express the view that
the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a matter of right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied. The following may be considered,
among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant
the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
- This situation, can easily be remedied by merely asking his friends
and business associates to call him simply Yu Chi Han instead of
asking for a judicial authority to change his name. His instant petition
does not come under any of the cases which may warrant the grant
of a petition for change of name as above adverted to.
SILVERIO V REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373
CORONA; October 22, 2007
APPLE
FACTS
-On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila
-Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as "male."
-He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, and that he
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation, and later on, sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand, and that from then on, he lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married.
-He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
-The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, saying that: 1.
the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity; 2. no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition; 3. no evidence
was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
A2010
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
-On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru
the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
-On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or
sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery.
-Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
WON the change of petitioner's name and sex in his birth certificate
is allowed under the law
HELD
No.
1. A person's first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment
-The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
-RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
PROF. BATTAD
-RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds 6 for which change of first
name may be allowed
2. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex
on the ground of sex reassignment
-The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes
-In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
-Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.
-Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
-Among the entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 4077 and 4088 of the Civil Code
6
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
-A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.
-RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
-Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
7
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
8
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
-To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
-A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
-ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
-But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
-Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
-While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
-Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be
changed on the ground of equity
-The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences.
-The statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
REPUBLIC v VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-32181
GUTIERREZ JR.; March 5, 1986
JOJO
FACTS
- Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go filed with the Cebu CFI a petition for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo and
Jessica in the Civil Registry of the Cebu City, seeking to change the
nationality or citizenship of the two minors from "Chinese" to "Filipino"
and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also
the status of the mother from "married" to "single" and her nationality
from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
A2010
- SolGen filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition
for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and
correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous
changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc.
- The trial court issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof,
duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City and Go Eng.
- Leonor Valencia replied, alleging that substantial changes in the
civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if ---- (1) the proper suit is
filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations
of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have
complied with these requirements by filing the present special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
pursuant to Rule 108 of the RoC and that they have caused
reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition
and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
- Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed an MTD on the ground that
the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial,
involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning
minors and the status of their mother.
- The lower court denied the MTD. After trial, the lower court granted
the petition.
Hence this appeal by the Republic.
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in granting the petition of Leonor Valencia
HELD
NO.
- It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for
the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature,
but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the SolGen admits
that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding."
Appropriate adversary proceeding - One having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
PROF. BATTAD
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an
adoption proceeding."
The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown
adversary proceedings which are conducted under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
- The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in
the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded
therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best
ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system.
- Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued
jointly by the Association of American Law Schools and the American
Bar Association explain why:
"An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms
of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The arguments of
counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two
opposing interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the
case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of its
peculiarities and nuances.
"These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the
public hearing of the cause. When we take into account the
preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality of
the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding
the hearing inquiries must be instituted to determine what facts can
be proved or seem sufficiently established to warrant a formal test of
their truth during the hearing. There must also be a preliminary
analysis of the issues, so that the hearing may have form and
direction. These preparatory measures are indispensable whether or
not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by
advocates.”
"Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage
in the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an
exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel. Without
the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the
parties, this essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible.
But here again the true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper,
touching once more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It
is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may
remain in fact what it purports to be in theory; a public trial of the
facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to
present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his
arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected
as inadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb these possible
disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to
the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that
any fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any
particular way of stating a litigant's case is the most effective
expression of its merits."
- Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
16
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is "appropriate."
- Under pertinent sections of Rule 108, the persons who must be
made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are ---- (1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty
of the court to ---- (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: ---- (1) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
- If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even
if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt
that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries
sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings.
- In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of
the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January
27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February
4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the
Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order
likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar
and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under
the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to
the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed
by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial
followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting
her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on
the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.
- The petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a
special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the
recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very
well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
- To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an
appropriate proceeding without in any way intimating what is the
correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result
in manifest injustice.
- Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are 4 other sisters
and 1 other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are
all five registered as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers
which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To
emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding professional
examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board
A2010
exams for pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural born
citizenship.
The sisters and brother are: 1. Sally Go - licensed Pharmacist; 2.
Fanny Go - Registered Nurse; 3. Corazon Go - fourth year medical
student, qualified to take the government board examinations after
successfully completing the requirements for a career in medicine,
and presumably is a licensed physician now; 4. Antonio Go -
engineering student during the 1970 trial of the case and qualified by
citizenship to take government board examinations; 5. Remedios
Go - licensed Optometrist.
- The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The
petitioner failed to refute the citizenship of the minors Bernardo and
Jessica Go.
- In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome
substantive findings by arguing that the proper procedure was not
followed.
- There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered
voter and had always exercised her right of suffrage from the time
she reached voting age until the national elections immediately
preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother
are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of
suffrage.
- An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government
having been elected twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia has
purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land. These allegations
are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic.
As correctly observed by the lower court.
- "The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This
is also true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The
evidence further shows that her children had been allowed to take
the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens
only."
- It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by
the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother
born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens,
are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct
procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.
LIM vs ZOSA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
ATHE
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from two Orders of the respondent judge
dismissing a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in
the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national
instead of a Filipino citizen.
FACTS
- The petitioner filed a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong
entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese
national instead of a Filipino citizen.
PROF. BATTAD
- The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces
of evidence, among them an earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph
describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his seven
brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision
of the Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino
citizen.
- On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, however, the
respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the contention
that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary
proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were not
covered as held in several cases. In effect, it was held the petition
was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed
under existing rules.
ISSUE
WON change in the birth entry regarding a person’s citizenship is
now allowed
HELD
YES. Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the
civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order."
Changes in the birth entry regarding a person's citizenship is allowed
as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a change is
ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only
correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as
authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so
does not violate the Constitution (Valencia ruling).
We note that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright
without a trial being held, on the justification that it was not permitted.
In the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge
must now be reversed, to give way to the appropriate proceedings
necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the
petitioner. The records show that the publication requirement has
already been complied with. 13 The next step, therefore, is for the
petitioner and all adverse and interested parties to be given their day
in court in a regular trial on the merits.
DISPOSITION
The challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special Proceeding
No. 3596-R of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is
reinstated for trial on the merits without delay. No pronouncement as
to costs.
REPUBLIC v. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-35316
FERNAN; October 26, 1987
GLAISA
NATURE
17
SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
Petition for review on certiorari to annul the judgment of the then CFI
of Rizal
FACTS
- Petitioner Imelda Mangabat Sorensen testified that she is married
to Bo Huage Sorensen, a Danish citizen and begot two children,
namely: Launny and Raymund. In the birth certificate of her second
son Raymund, her husband's nationality was erroneously stated as
'American.’
- Bo Huage Sorensen testified that he was born of a Danish father in
Denmark, and presented a certification issued by the Royal Danish
Consulate of Manila. He is still considered tourist and living with his
wife and two sons in Pasay.
- The Republic opposed the petition and moved for the dismissal on
the ground that a correction of entry in the Civil Registry is allowed
only when the same refers to mere clerical errors or mistakes, but not
to substantial changes affecting the civil status, nationality or
citizenship of the person concerned.
- CFI ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City as prayed for to
make the necessary corrections in the entry of birth of minor
Raymund Mangabat Sorensen.
A2010 PROF. BATTAD
proper notice was published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in the Rizal Weekly Bulletin, a newspaper of general
circulation. The Republic appeared through a trial attorney of the
OSG who was present and did not object to the presentation of
evidence, although after the hearing, the said trial attorney filed an
opposition and or motion to dismiss on the ground that the correction
being sought did not refer to a mere clerical mistake but to a
substantial change involving the nationality of a person.
- In the light of the foregoing which show compliance with Sections 2,
4 and 5 of Rule 108, the proceedings undertaken in the lower court
were unmistakably adversary, thus removing the initial apprehension
of the State that "if the entries in the civil registrar could be
corrected . . . through a mere summary proceeding and not through
an appropriate action wherein all the parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented, we would set wide open the
door to fraud or other mischief, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far-reaching."
Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
is hereby denied for lack of merit and the decision of the court a quo
is affirmed.

ISSUE
WON the challenged decision which involves the question of
citizenship is a matter which can legally be treated under the
provision of Article 412 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. 3

HELD
YES. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.
- If the procedural requirements provided in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
the Rules of Court are followed, the procedure ceases to be
summary and becomes litigious. Proceedings following the
aforementioned sections may then be appropriate for the correction
of substantial matters in the civil registry.
- The consistent rule laid down was that the revision of any entry
pursuant to Article 412, as implemented by rule 108, referred to
those changes that are harmless and innocuous. In those cases,
however, it was intimated that rectifications regarding nationality or
citizenship in the civil register may be undertaken as long as the
appropriate remedy is used.
- The appropriate remedy may well be a petition filed by way of
special proceeding for the cancellation and/or correction of
substantial entries in the civil register with the requisite parties,
notices, publications and the proceedings to be taken thereafter
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 108 because then the
proceedings will be adversary in character.
- In the present case, the records show that the Pasay City Local
Civil Registrar and the Solicitor General were made parties to the
petition for correction of entry in the civil registry filed in the CFI. The

18