JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

G.R. No. L-12191, October 14, 1918

Fisher, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons
not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."

FACTS:
Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San
Mateo which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel
by trade to the office located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, about 7 to 8 o’clock on
a dark night, on his way home by rail and when the train drew up to the station in San
Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off from
the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to
slip off from under him and he fell violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn
under the moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized which
resulted to amputation of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in
CFI of Manila founding his action upon the negligence of the employees of defendant in
placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having
found negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not defendant Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages.

RULING:
YES. Defendant Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages. It cannot be doubted
that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the
platform in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for
the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory
negligence. It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage.
However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court
cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence
and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the
latter’s act. The fundamental distinction between obligation of this character and those which
arise from contract, rest upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. When the source of
obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in contractual
undertaking, proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from
liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising from
breach of their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff,
whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or
contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of
the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission
productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The
contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. Contributory
negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by defendant is untenable. In determining the
question of contributory negligence in performing such act- that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. It is
to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily routine. Our
conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore was not
guilty of contributory negligence.

SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL, vs. SPOUSES LUZ SAN PEDRO AND
KENICHIRO TOMINAGA
G.R. No. 164601, September 27, 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either
as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates
a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally
bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or
negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and
which increases the liability from such already existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is
governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles;
while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.

FACTS:
The spouses Luz Kenichiro are the owners of a parcel of land, on which their house
was erected, situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. The spouses Luz and Kenichiro
then contracted the services of petitioner Frank to survey their lot; subsequently,
petitioner Frank, for an additional payment, was again hired by the respondents to
determine the exact boundaries of the same by which they will base the construction of
their perimeter fence. Thereafter, respondents’ perimeter fence was built – with 250,000 as
cost of such building. Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz and Kenichiro
before the barangay on the ground that the northern portion of their fence allegedly
encroached upon a designated right-of-way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification with
another surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found that their wall indeed overlapped the adjoining
lot. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a
licensed geodetic engineer. During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank
admitted that he made a mistake and offered to share in the expenses for the demolition
and reconstruction of the questioned portion of Luz and Kenichiro's fence. He however
failed to deliver on his word, thus the filing of the instant suit. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents finding that the encroachment was caused by the negligence of the petitioners.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damage for their negligence.

RULING:
Yes, petitioners are liable for damages for breach of their contract with the
respondents. It is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual obligations,
failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete
perimeter fence that was later constructed. The placement of the markings had been done
solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later discovered that it
was not he but his wife, petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer and
who is, therefore, the one qualified to do the work. Petitioner Frank Batal's installation of the
concrete cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate supervision of his wife,
Erlinda. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the
dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner Frank Batal that
they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence by relying on the purported
accuracy of the placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out to
encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, the respondents had to
demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered damages.

Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered
by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code, which state:

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor
who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, vs. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO.,
LTD. And FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012
Perez, J.:

DOCTRINE:
“In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following
differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa
contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while
in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict,
the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as
parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is
not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees. In
quasi- delict , there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the
injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s
complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so
long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on
the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms
of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.

FACTS:
A Complaint for Damages was filed by petitioner Dr. Huang against Dusit Hotel
alleging negligence of its Hotel’s staff, in the untimely putting out all the lights within the
hotel’s swimming pool area as well as the locking of the main entrance door of the area,
prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding wooden counter top,
which she lifted as she reached for a hotel phone, fell on her head causing her serious brain
injury. Said Petitioner undergone various of medical treatments in the Philippines and even
in the US. However, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent Hotel by finding that
Huang’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of her injury, she cannot
recover damages. Huang elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the decision of trial
court. Huang, on Appeal, contended that an implied contract existed between them in view
of the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its service sits
patrons and invitees. It follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its facilities,
including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like her, are generally
regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, Dusit Hotel is responsible by implied contract for
the safety and welfare of Huang while the latter was inside their premises by exercising
due care, which they failed to do. She argues that a person who goes in a hotel without a
"bukol" or hematoma and comes out of it with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res
ipsa loquitur.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for damages.

RULING:
No, respondents are not liable for the injuries suffered by the petitioner.
The Supreme Court held that there is no negligence on the part of the respondent
Hotel. Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account of their
negligence but not on any breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that an
implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the latter
were liable for breach of their obligation to keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation
was never an issue before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the
petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals. Presently, petitioner claims that
her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. However, the
Supreme Court found that petitioner’s complaint evidently showed that her cause of action
was solely based on quasi-delict.
Petitioner’s change of theory or cause of action from quasi-delict to breach of contract
only on appeal would necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the
latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence to contradict petitioner’s new
argument. Second, the burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and
DTPCI. Petitioner’s change of theory from quasi-delict to breach of contract must be
repudiated.
As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to
prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held
liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.78
Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of her action.79 The burden of proof is upon petitioner.
Therefore, the SC affirmed the trial court and CA’s ruling that the petitioner failed to
prove the alleged negligence of the respondent Hotel, for her allegations were not backed-up
by evidence.