ORGANO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 133535 (SEPTEMBER 9, 1999)
PARDO, J.

FACTS:
 August 1997: An Information was filed by Special Prosecution Officer Jose
T. de Jesus, Jr. with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia B. Organo et al.
together for the crime of “plunder” or violation of R. A. No. 7080, as
amended by R. A. No. 7659.
 BIR employees Lilia B. Organo et al. unlawfully acquired funds belonging to
the national government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the
Landbank of the Philippines in behalf of the BIR and deposit money belonging
to the government consisting of revenue tax payments, then withdraw the
total sum of P193,565,079.64 between November 1996 to February 1997,
without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves
and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above named private persons.
 August 1997: Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
information for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan no
longer had jurisdiction over the case under R. A. 8249, approved on February
5, 1997.
 Without first resolving petitioner's motion to quash information, the
Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused in the case.
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion to quash the information for lack
of merit. Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for
reconsideration, reiterating the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249. Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration ruling that she should first surrender to the
court before she may file any further pleading with the court. Hence, this
petition.
 PETITIONER: Since none of the accused holds a position with Salary Grade
27 and higher, jurisdiction over the case falls with the Regional Trial Court.
 RESPONDENT: Republic Act No. 7080 which defines and penalizes the crime
of “plunder” vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof, and since it is a
 special law, it constitutes an exception to the general law, Republic Act No.
8249.

 Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3 provides:

“Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.”
This law was enacted on September 23, 1991, and was effective on October
7, 1991.

 Republic Act No. 8249 Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in sub-section a
of this section in relation to their office.
xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

ISSUE:

WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case in view of enactment of RA
8249

RULING:

NO. The crime of “plunder” defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan “until otherwise provided by law.” Republic Act No. 8429, enacted
on February 5, 1997 is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan “otherwise” than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused
occupied positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan
incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed
for.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS

the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated November 20, 1997, and April 28,
1998, in Criminal Case No. 24100. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to
forthwith refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction. No costs.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148560 (NOVEMBER 19, 2001)
BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS:

 On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of

pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
 April 2001: The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case
No.26558, finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Etrada, President
of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be
prosecuted under RA 7080.
 Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than
one offense. Same was denied.
 PETIITONER: RA 7080 is unconstitutional on the ground that 1.) it was
vague 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under the RPC, thus violating the fundamental rights of the
accused.

ISSUES:

1. WON the RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague

2. WON plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum

RULINGS:

1. NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in 2 respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

2. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter
that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

DISPOSITION:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148965 (FEBRUARY 26, 2002)
PUNO, J.

FACTS:

 In connection with the impeachment proceedings against President Joseph

Estrada, five criminal complaints were filed against him, the members of his
family, his associates, friends, and conspirators in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Respondent Ombudsman found probable cause warranting the
filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal information against the
former President and the other respondents. One of the information filed
was for the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080 and among the respondents
was petitioner Jinggoy Estrada.
 Petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: 1) no probable
cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing
that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. 7080; and 2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 Respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and
proceeded to arraign petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the charge against the petitioner be dismissed on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Information is too general

RULING:

NO. In the crime of plunder, different parties may be united by a common

purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the
tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase
shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, and kickbacks; rather, it is that
each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly,
in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.
Under the Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a
general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime
only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to
commit treason, rebellion, and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law,
the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.  When
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of the
said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. The requirements on
the sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.
There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information
because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is
significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the
conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and
each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of
one is the act of all.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties
therein has performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts
connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither
is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or
conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
Following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege
conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know
what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
Thus, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the

respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SERAPIO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148468 (JANUARY 28, 2003)
CALLEJO SR., J.

FACTS:

 Edward Serapio filed a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused
together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada
and several others.
 Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He received on its behalf a donation in
the amount of Php200million from Governor Luis Chavit Singson. Petitioner
received the donation and turned it over to the Foundations treasurer who
later deposited it in the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
 In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in
several illegal activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman several
criminal complaints against Estrada. Petitioner was among the persons
included in the criminal charges. A subsequent warrant of arrest when
apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered on the same day to
PNP Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp
Crame for said charge.
 He filed a petition for bail but such was postponed several times. The bail
hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended
Information.
 PETITIONER: Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions
postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to
due process of law. The issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders
canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and
academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said
orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail.
The fact that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process
 does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In
support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile, where the
Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the detention,
while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
 However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because
petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information which was
earlier filed in court, the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was
valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. The
Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the
petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001
to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of
petitioner.
 However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions
of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June
29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari praying that the Court
declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his
right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right to
present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the
failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner was deprived of his right to due process and should thus be
released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus

RULING:

No. The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because
petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the
amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on
April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when
the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to
its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes. Thus, in previous
cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying for
its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because the
hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier,
the delay in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on
the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is
partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate
remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the
latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with
the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to
proceed.

 DISPOSITION:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED;
and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner
on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan (November 30, 2020)

G.R. Nos. 157294-95

Facts:

• In the plunder case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel filed
before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the
issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank to produce
the following documents regarding the bank accounts of the petitioner and to testify on
the hearing.

• Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas were accordingly issued.

Sandiganbayan also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for by the Prosecution Panel in
another later date.

• Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate motions to quash the two
subpoenas issued.

• Petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein.
He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned
subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by
an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank.

• The protection afforded by RA 1405 is, however, not absolute, there being
recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case,
two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

• Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his
accounts are not exempted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v.
Gancayco holds otherwise.

Issue:
Whether the accounts of the Petitioner does not fall within the exemption of R.A. 1405
because plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty.

Ruling;

The Court ruled that the accounts of the Petition falls within the exemption.

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no
reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making
bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to
the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far
as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080
states so.

SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million
pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office.
Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall
likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court.
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

An examination of the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)" of R.A. No.
7080 would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since
bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:

d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material

possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes.

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by
public officers, and in either case the noble idea that "a public office is a public trust and
any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny" applies with equal force.

Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of
bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
G.R. No. 163972-77

Daan vss. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

• The accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this
Court for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of ₱3,293.00,
₱1,869.00, and ₱13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by
falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers
worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected
their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition
to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.

• In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not
guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in
their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed
instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto
with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts.

• Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as

acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of
falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution explained:

"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the
accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual
defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our
cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be
the master mind of these criminal acts."

• Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise
amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
₱18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted

• Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary
basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only ₱18,860.00, which
he already restituted.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
plea bargaining offer.

Ruling:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the accused’s request to Plea Bargain.

Section 2, Rule 116 authorizes Plea bargaining which provides that: “At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged . After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment
of the complaint or information is necessary.”

Here, the Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the
Special

Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Moreover, the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Accounts by an Accountable
Officer are

necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of

Public Funds. Specifically, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it
does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly
falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein,
with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the informations contain
allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent
the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render
account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an
accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs Sandiganbayan and Republic of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 170122/G.R. No. 171381

2009-10-12he Facts

• To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita,
children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly
amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB),
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,[3] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October
29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.

• Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting
to PhP 202,005,980.55.

• Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I,
the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under
an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was
raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties’
pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.

• Petioners contends that the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107),
with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th
Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion
of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate
possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from
these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division
for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to
consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Issue: Whether or not SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against
the Garcias.

Ruling: Petitioner’s contention is untenable. Let it be stated at the outset that the SB has
jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder
is civil in nature.

As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability
for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to
recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a “public
officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x.”[14]
Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
[15] Thus “if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the
property aforesaid shall become property of the State.[16] x x x (Citations in the
original.)

Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is
Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a
cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that
the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a
prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal
acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA
7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is “sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth].” On the
other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA
1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the
Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA
1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.[19]

Petitioner’s thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of

conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law
concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, suggesting that double
jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are,
to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be
proceeded against for a criminal offense.

Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where
the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with
the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this
Court’s Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the
Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the
state or vice versa.

Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a
conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and
circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2)
cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the issues
sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a
bearing on the other.

There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the
forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder
case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and
vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and the petition
for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.[21]

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted
service of summons. There is merit in petitioner’s contention.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service
or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much
time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to
do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard
for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.”[24] Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at
least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office
or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons
was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did
not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted
service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with
as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP
Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age
and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D.
Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before
the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three
children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
Arthur Balao, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

G.R. No. 186050,

13 December 2011

Facts

• On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao-
Strugar, siblings of James Balao, and Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo2 in favor of James
Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La
Trinidad, Benguet. Named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr.,Interior and Local Government, et al.

• James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the

Philippines-Baguio (UP-Baguio). In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of non-government organizations (NGOs) working for the
cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. As head of CPA's education and
research committee, James actively helped in the training and organization of farmers. He
was also the President of Oclupan Clan Association which undertakes the registration and
documentation of clan properties to protect their rights over ancestral lands. In 1988,
while working for the CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation of the Anti-
Subversion Law but the case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence.

• It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008, around 7:00 in the morning,
James sent a text message to Nonette informing her that he was about to leave his rented
house in Fairview Central, Baguio City and that he was going to their ancestral residence in
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet to do his laundry. The travel time from Fairview, Baguio City to
Pico usually takes only 20 to 45 minutes. Around 8:00 a.m., Nonette, after discovering that
James never reached their parents' house at Pico, started contacting their friends and
relatives to ask about James's whereabouts. No one, however, had any idea where he was.
The family likewise went to Baguio Police Station 7 to report James's disappearance.

• Petitioners, moreover, enumerated in their petition several incidents of

harassments and human rights violations against CPA officers, staff and members.
• Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion5 for the immediate
issuance of a writ of amparo pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

• On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo6 was issued directing respondents to file
their verified return together with their supporting affidavit within five days from
receipt of the writ.

• Respondents in their Joint Return7 stated: (1) that President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is immune from suit and should thus be dropped as party-respondent; and other
executive official should be dropped in the petition. He also contended that the petition
failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that claims must be
established by substantial evidence. He further argued that it is the PNP as the law
enforcement agency, and not the respondent military and executive officials, which has
the duty to investigate cases of missing persons.

• Executive officers in the petition responded on the issue.

• On January 19, 2009, the RTC issued the assailed judgment, ISSUE a Writ of
Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or
confined, (b) to release James Balao considering his unlawful detention since his abduction
and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person; and DENY the
issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION
ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same.

Issue: Whether or not the abduction of James Balao can only be attributed to the
Respondents who have command responsibility of all the actions of their subordinates and
who are the primary persons in the implementation of the government's all-out war policy.

Ruling: The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo34 had the occasion to expound on the
doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo
proceedings.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development
of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in
its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission
mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as
opposed to crimes he ordered).

The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual
responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control.
The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in
this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.

While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine
law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.

Amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded-not
actually on the basis of command responsibility-but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,37 the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these
terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
xxx

Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military
and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The
identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military
or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the
trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to
disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention
or confinement, and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person.
Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made
given the insufficiency of evidence.39 However, we agree with the trial court in finding
that the actions taken by respondent officials are "very limited, superficial and one-
sided." Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents
are borne by the evidence on record, thus:

x x x the violation of the right to security as protection by the government is

unmistakable. The police and the military miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of James Balao's abduction as revealed by the investigation report of
respondent's own witnesses Honorable Chief Superintendent Eugene Martin and Honorable
Senior Superintendent Fortunato Albas. The investigation was - to use the words in The
Secretary of National Defense, et. al., v. Manalo et. al. - "verylimited, superficial and one-
sided."
THE WELLEX GROUP, INC., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187951 | 2012-06-25

FACTS:

• On 12 September 2007, the Sandiganbayan, through its Special Division,

promulgated a Decision in Criminal Case No. 26558, the plunder case filed against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (former President Estrada). The said Decision found
him guilty of the crime of plunder and ordered the forfeiture of several bank deposits and
real properties.

• On 25 October 2007, President Arroyo granted former President Estrada

executive clemency through a Pardon, which he accepted on 26 October 2007.2 The
Pardon, however, expressly stipulates as follows: The forfeitures imposed by the
Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.

• With this development, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan on 26 October

2007 ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of the judgment,
which was not covered by the Executive Clemency granted to former President Estrada.4
On 05 November 2007, the Writ of Execution5 was issued against him.

• On 09 November 2007, former President Estrada filed a Motion to Quash Writ of

Execution.6 He alleged that the Writ of Execution expanded the 12 September 2007
Decision by including within the scope of forfeiture "any and all" of his personal and real
properties. He believes that the added portion in the writ is tantamount to the imposition
of a penalty and is thus a nullity.

• On 21 January 2008, Wellex wrote a letter11 to Banco de Oro expressing the

desire to retrieve the Waterfront shares the former had used as collateral to secure an
earlier loan obligation to Equitable-PCI Bank. It was at this time that Wellex became
aware of the Writ of Constructive Distraint issued by the BIR to Investment Management
Account (IMA) Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 in relation to the plunder case. While
petitioner admits the existence of its loan and acknowledges Equitable-PCI Bank as the
lender, the former wants the mortgaged shares back. Alleging that its loan obligation for
which the shares were given as collateral has been extinguished.
• On 28 January 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution13 partially
granting the Motion to Quash of former President Estrada. It qualified its ruling by
stating that the forfeiture process under the Plunder Law was limited only to those proven
to be traceable as ill-gotten.

• On 22 February 2008, Sheriff Urieta submitted a Sheriff’s Progress Report on the

implementation of the Amended Writ of Execution. The report stated, among others, that
Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO), having acquired Equitable PCI-Bank, informed his office
that the Jose Velarde Account was under the Constructive Distraint issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus, the assets under the said account could not yet be
delivered to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Writ of Execution, pending the
termination of the investigation conducted by the National Investigation Division of the
BIR.

• On 24 September 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution dated 15

September 2008 acknowledging the validity of the claim of the BIR against the former
President and his spouse for income tax deficiency. However, the Resolution noted that
despite the prior issuance by the BIR of a Constructive Distraint over the subject trust
account, it failed to issue a formal assessment to the spouses Estrada. The Sandiganbayan
noted that the BIR had not yet finished its investigation to determine the deficiency
income tax of the spouses for the taxable year 1999. The anti-graft court held that it
could not wait for the BIR to finish the investigation of the matter before the former
could proceed with the forfeiture of the IMA Trust Account, considering that its Decision
convicting the former President had already become final. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ruled
that the subject IMA Trust Account was ripe for forfeiture after the conviction of
former President Estrada in the plunder case had become final and executory.

• On a resolution, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the former’s right to forfeit the
subject IMA Trust Account was anchored on the Decision convicting former President
Estrada under the Plunder Law and had already become final and executory. It ruled that
the CIR’s claim over the IMA Trust Account rested on flimsy grounds, because the
assessment issued to the spouses Estrada over an alleged deficiency in their income tax
payment was not yet final. Hence, it concluded that the Constructive Distraint could not
defeat the court’s preferential right to forfeit the assets of the subject IMA Trust
Account, which was included in the Decision on the plunder case.

• The Sandiganbayan also denied the MR of Wellex. It ruled that petitioner failed to
rebut the 28 May 2008 BDO Certification, stating that the latter had not yet settled its
loan obligation to Equitable-PCIBank (now BDO). The court even suggested that, for
Wellex to retrieve the mortgaged Waterfront shares of stock, petitioner should pay its
outstanding loan obligation to BDO, so that the latter could remit the payment to the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

• Petitioner asserts that the subject shares of stock should not be forfeited as part
of the execution process in the plunder case, because Wellex is not a party to the case.
Petitioner also argues that since the dispositive portion of the 12 September 2007
Decision in Criminal Case No. 26558 does not explicitly mention the IMA Trust Account,
its inclusion in the assailed Resolutions unduly expands the Decision.

ISSUE: W/N the subject shares of stock should be forfeited.

HELD: YES.

• The 12 September 2007 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558
convicted former President Estrada of the crime of plunder under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7080, as amended. In convicting him in the plunder case the court unmasked him as the
beneficial owner of the Jose Velarde accounts adjudged as ill-gotten wealth. It was also
established during the trial of that case that the P 500 million lent to herein petitioner
came from the former President and was coursed through the said trust account. This
fact is supported by documentary as well as the testimonial evidence coming from the
former President himself.

• The 12 September 2007 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in the plunder case

highlighted the testimony of former President Estrada with regard to the circumstances
surrounding the P500 million loan to herein petitioner. It traced the source of the funding
to IMA Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 in the name of Jose Velarde, who turned out to be
the former President. Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not
come via the debit-credit authority, nonetheless, the funding of the P500,000,000.00
came from S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde.

• From the above findings, it is clear that the funding for the loan to Wellex was
sourced from Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 and coursed through the IMA Trust
Account. This savings account was under the name of Jose Velarde and was forfeited by
the government after being adjudged as ill-gotten. The trust account can then be traced
or linked to an account that was part of the web of accounts considered by the
Sandiganbayan as ill-gotten.

• When petitioner Wellex contracted the loan from then Equitable PCI-Bank, the
former voluntarily constituted a chattel mortgage over its Waterfront shares, with the
subsequent addition of the subject Wellex shares as added security for the loan
obligation. Thus, the Wellex loan and the Chattel Mortgage, which were constituted over
the Wellex and Waterfront shares of stock, became the asset of the aforementioned
IMA Trust Account. In this case, the loan transaction between Wellex and Equitable PCI-
Bank, as Investment Manager of the IMA Trust Account, constitutes the principal
contract; and the Chattel Mortgage over the subject shares of stock constitutes the
accessory contract.

• It was established during the trial of the plunder case that the source of funding
for the loan extended to Wellex was former President Estrada, who had in turn sourced
the fund from S/A 0160-62501-5 and coursed it through IMA Trust Account 101-78056-
1. After his conviction for the crime of plunder, the IMA Trust Account under the name of
Jose Velarde was forfeited. As a consequence, all assets and receivables of the said trust
account were also included in the forfeiture, which was without any legal basis.

• There is no dispute that the subject shares of stock were mortgaged by petitioner
Wellex as security for its loan. These shares being the subject of a contract that was
accessory to the Wellex loan and being an asset of the forfeited IMA Trust Account, the
said shares necessarily follow the fate of the trust account and are forfeited as well.
However, the forfeiture of the said trust account, together with all its assets and
receivables, does not affect the validity of the loan transaction between BDO the creditor
and Wellex the debtor. The loan continues to be valid despite the forfeiture by the
government of the IMA Trust Account and is considered as an asset.

• Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 2 of R.A. 7080 is narrow and rigid and

defeats rather than serves the ends of justice in plunder cases. Section 2 of R.A. 7080
mandates the court to forfeit not only the ill-gotten wealth, interests earned, and other
incomes and assets, but also the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit
or investment. The Sandiganbayan Decision imposed the penalty of forfeiture when it
convicted the former President Estrada of the crime of plunder. It is beyond cavil that it
found the subject IMA Trust Account traceable to the accounts declared to be ill-gotten
by the former President. Thus, to rigidly construe the mandate of Section 2 of R.A. 7080,
as petitioner would want us to do, is to render the Plunder Law inutile.
• It is beyond doubt that IMA Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 and its assets were
traceable to the account adjudged as ill-gotten. As such, the trust account and its assets
were indeed within the scope of the forfeiture Order issued by the Sandiganbayan in the
plunder case against the former President. Thus, it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the forfeiture of the trust account in BDO, including the
assets and receiveables thereof.

RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LlGOT, RIZA Y.
LIGOT, MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners, Vs. Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council, Respondent.

G.R. No. 176944 | 2013-03-06

FACTS:

• The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti-Money

Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a
freeze order with the Court of Appeals (CA) against certain monetary instruments and
properties of the petitioners, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160, as
amended (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). This application was based on the letter of
the Office of the Ombudsman to the AMLC, recommending that the latter conduct an
investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA No. 9160.

• The Ombudsman attached the Complaint it filed against the Ligots for perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and for violations of Section 8 of RA No.
6713 and RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Complaint alleges that
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that
as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of P3,848,003.00. In contrast,
his declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only P105,000.00. Aside from these
declared assets, the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family
had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least
P54,001,217.00.

• Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot’s main source of income was his salary as an
officer of the AFP, and given his wife and children’s lack of any other substantial sources
of income, the Ombudsman declared the assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot’s name, as well
as those in his wife’s and children’s names, to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth,
pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the
State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefore).

• The Ombudsman’s investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligot’s younger brother,
Edgardo Tecson Yambao. Despite Yambao’s lack of substantial income, the records show
that he has real properties and vehicles registered in his name, amounting to
P8,763,550.00, which he acquired from 1993 onwards. The Office of the Ombudsman
further observed that in the documents it examined, Yambao declared three of the Ligots’
addresses as his own.

From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy
and/or nominee of the Ligot spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambao’s name
actually belong to the Ligot family.

• The CA granted the applications and issued a freeze order against the Ligots’ and
Yambao’s various bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days
from the date of issuance.

• The Republic then filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze
Order, arguing that if the properties were not continuously frozen, they could be placed
beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the government’s efforts to recover
the proceeds of the Ligots’ unlawful activities would be frustrated. The motion was
likewise granted.

• The Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order, principally arguing that
there was no evidence to support the extension of the freeze order. They further argued
that the extension not only deprived them of their property without due process; it also
punished them before their guilt could be proven.

• The CA denied this motion in a resolution. The Ligots filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied. They then filed this present petition.

• The "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and

Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or
Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No.
9160, as Amended" (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) subsequently took effect. Under this
rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months.
ISSUE: Is the issuance of the freeze order proper?

HELD: YES.

• Based on Section 10 of RA No. 9160, there are only two requisites for the issuance
of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of
probable cause by the CA.

• The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the
probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action. As defined in the law, the
probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe
that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has
been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject
thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense.

• Probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful

activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of
RA No. 9160, as amended.

• It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would justify the
issuance and the extension of the freeze order has likewise been established in this case.
From the ex parte application and the Ombudsman’s complaint, it was shown that Lt. Gen.
Ligot himself admitted that his income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet,
the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that the bank accounts, investments and
properties in the name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than
P54,000,000.00. Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligot’s income,
as well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA
properly found that probable cause exists that these funds have been illegally acquired.
On the other hand, the AMLC’s verified allegations in its ex parte application, based on the
complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the CA’s finding that probable cause
exists that the monetary instruments subject of the freeze order are related to, or are
the product of, an unlawful activity.
• A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the CA to prevent
the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds
of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended.
The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments
or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by
preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The
relief is pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property
and thwarting the State’s effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture
proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.

• An examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the

point of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the
maximum period of time that the freeze order can be extended by the CA. The final
sentence of Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 provides, "the freeze
order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court." In contrast,
Section 55 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension "for a
period not exceeding six months" "for good cause" shown.

• The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Court’s own power
under the Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights xxx and procedure in all courts." Pursuant to this power, the Court
issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six
months – to otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA,
which may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time –
carries serious implications on an individual’s substantive right to due process. This right
demands that no person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any
governmental action that amounts to a denial. The right to due process, under these terms,
requires a limitation or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the
governmental action.

• The freeze order over the Ligots’ properties has been in effect since 2005, while
the civil forfeiture case – per the Republic’s manifestation – was filed only in 2011 and the
forfeiture case under RA No. 1379 – per the petitioners’ manifestation – was filed only in
2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to access the properties subject of
the freeze order for six years or so simply on the basis of the existence of probable
cause to issue a freeze order, which was intended mainly as an interim preemptive remedy.
• As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary
effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedy - which means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main
action – of asking for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where
the petition is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a
preservatory and preemptive remedy.

• The six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the government to act
against the suspected money launderer and to file the appropriate forfeiture case against
him, and is a reasonable period as well that recognizes the property owner’s right to due
process. In this case, the period of inaction of six years, under the circumstances, already
far exceeded what is reasonable.

• The Republic has not offered any explanation why it took six years (from the time
it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the
clear tenor of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order
for only a period of six months. All the Republic could proffer is its temporal argument on
the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases; in effect, it glossed over the
squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these circumstances, we cannot but conclude
that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period violated
the Ligot’s right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines (2016)

G.R. No. 220598 and G.R. No. 220953 | 2016-07-19

FACTS:

• In July 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), together with several officers and the directors of
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman
Reynaldo Villar, and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B.
Plaras with plunder under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659.
• The information alleged that the accused, taking advantage of their public
positions, conspired to accumulate Php 365,997,915 in ill-gotten wealth by means of,
principally, “diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, and converting [or] transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund,
also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their
personal gain and benefit”

• The Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia (PCSO Chairman) ,
Morato and Roquero (PCSO Directors) upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them
was not strong. In the case of GMA and Aguas (PCSO Budget and Accounts Officer), the
Sandiganbayan denied their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt
against them was strong.

• During trial, the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against
all the accused. As Chairman of the PCSO Audit Committee, she found that the former
management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the
operating fund, and maintaining them in only one main account in violation of the PCSO
Charter (RA 1169). The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). It appears that Uriarte
(PCSO General Manager) would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo
approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. A summary of all the
disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010 showed a total of P365,997,915.

• In 2008, the CIF disbursement totaled P86,555,060 when the CIF budget for that
year was only P28 million. In 2009, the CIF disbursement was Pl39,420,875 but the CIF
budget was only P60 million. In 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010, was
P141,021,980 but the budget was only P60 million. For each year, there were no savings for
PCSO because they were on deficit. The President (GMA) approved the release of the
fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the same in violation of
LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals and specifications
accompanying the request for additional CIF. Also, for one to get a cash advance on the
CIF, one must state what the project is. In this case, the vouchers themselves are
couched generally and just say cash advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's
office. There is no particular project indicated for the cash advance. Also, the
requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to be given
was not followed.
• The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and
Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced P13.3 million. The rest was
made by Uriarte. All of these cash advances were made in excess of the appropriation and
were never liquidated.

• The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming
from different law enforcement agencies to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the
effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any intelligence
operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.

• After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
against them.

• The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc

and Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused who were
members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any PCSO
funds to themselves.

• However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia,
holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit
plunder. Specifically, as to GMA's participation, the Sandiganbayan stated that GMA's
"OK" notation and signature on Uriarte’s letter-requests signified unqualified approval of
Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds.

• In denying the Motion for Reconsideration of GMA, the Sandiganbayan declared

that although [GMA] did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF
funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided
and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. She is therefore
rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover,
the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.

• Hence, the present petition for certiorari filed by GMA. GMA pleads that the
denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic Act No.
7080, the law on plunder.

ISSUE: W/N GMA is guilty of plunder.

HELD: NO, the charge was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• The Sandignabayan's conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was
plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did not aver
at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted
capriciously and arbitrarily.

• In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of GMA's handwritten

unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that
such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by
the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, an act or conduct becomes an overt
act of a crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act
or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.

• GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of
any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire
illgotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and
competent proof thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified,
could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime
considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

• Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating

and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable
that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer.
As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only
P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far
below the threshold value (P50 Million) of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.

• We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be
prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification
of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification,
but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be
properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose
of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is
to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.

• An examination of Uriarte' s several requests, which were approved by GMA,

indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:
(a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the
explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c)
the particular aims to be accomplished. A reading of the requests also reveals that the
additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of
its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the
requests for not being compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282
did not detail any qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we
should not make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were
compliant with LOI No. 1282.

• COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be
approved only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests
that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the
budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and used. The
suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the PCSO were co-
mingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's
revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the
remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still
sustain the additional requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw
the additional requests for CIFs.

• The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to

impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is
misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and
cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that
command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil
actions for human rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA's actions
as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the
absence of any conspiracy between them.
• Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were
insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money because there
was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might
have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

• The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-

gotten wealth valued at not less than PS0,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus
delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

• As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50 Million, the Prosecution adduced no evidence
showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest
possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or
Uriarte.

• After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50
Million, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and dismissed the
criminal action against them.

• To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it

were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit;
50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or
not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially."
The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used
the property taken.

• Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other
terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury
similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden
act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, “raids on
the public treasury” requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his
personal benefit.

• Not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond
reasonable doubt.

NOTES ON CONSPIRACY IN RELATION TO PLUNDER

• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a
crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.

• As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime and
prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is found in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal
to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion
or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code.
When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to
commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal design must
be alleged and competently shown.

• The community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy

transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by
positive and conclusive evidence.

• In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the
express conspiracy, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have
been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied
conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or
from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.

• The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the
instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are
multiple conspiracies.

• The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is

successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer,
and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain
to achieve a criminal objective.

• Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-
conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he
have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the
criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and independent.

• To be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to

have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for
without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may
only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.

• The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as
the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states
that plunder is committed “by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or
series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof.” Surely, the law requires
in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main
plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of
course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be
properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.