Case Digest: REPUBLIC

vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American

citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when
a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire
American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA,
however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be

declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was
a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution
or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable

social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.”
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS JENNIFER
CAGANDAHAN G.R. NO. 166676
9/8/2019

0 COMMENTS
 

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner 

vs
Jennifer Cagandahan, Respondent
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth.  During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her
ovarian structures had minimized.  She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. 
Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much
secretion of male hormones, androgen.  According to her, for all interests and appearances
as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.  She filed a petition at
Regional Trial Court Branch 33  in Siniloan, Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to
Jeff.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
 
HELD:
 
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.  Supreme Court  is of
the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex.  As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male.  Sexual development in
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.  It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. 

Supreme Court: " In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case."

ARTICULO MORTIS – Whether or not the marriage of Respondent and Dela Cruz
solemnized in Articulo Mortis is void for absence of a marriage contract and failure of the
priest to file an affidavit and recorded such to the local civil registry

FACTS:
- Respondent and Dela Cruz were married in Articulo Mortis by Fr. Bautista

a) Petitioner’s Arguments (De Loria, el al. - Lost)

- Argued that Respondent’s marriage with Dela Cruz is void for there was no marriage
contract signed and the priest filed no affidavit nor recorded the marriage with local civil
registry

b) Respondent’s Arguments (Felix - Win)

-

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the marriage of Respondent and Dela Cruz solemnized in Articulo Mortis is
void for absence of a marriage contract and failure of the priest to file an affidavit and
recorded such to the local civil registry

RULING:
Conclusion:
- The marriage of Respondent and Dela Cruz is valid. The appeal is dismissed.
Rule:
- In the celebration of the marriage in articulo mortis, where all the requisites for its validity
were present, the marriage is not voided by the failure of the priest to make and file the
affidavit required in sections 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law and to register said marriage in
the local civil registry
- Signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value, the omission
of which does not render the marriage a nullity.
Application:
- In this case,
Conclusion:
- Thus, the marriage of Respondent and Dela Cruz is valid

036 People vs. Janssen

Ponente: J. Villa-real | G.R. No. L-31763 | December 27, 1929| Topic

Doctrine:

FACTS:

 Cerdena and Del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father Janssen, a Catholic parish
priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the
marriage registry
 Since the classes will open on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked Fr.
Janssen to marry them before that date.
o Their request was granted as per the dispensation granted to them by the
Bishop of Jaro. The authority to solemnize marriage was also issued by the
Municipal Secretary.
 Section 2 of Act No. 3412 however provides that a notice setting forth the full names
and domiciles of the applicants for marriage license shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in the city hall or municipal court of Manila.
o The same law however provides that in case the applicant states in writing and
under oath that the rules and practices of the church, sect, or religion under
which such applicant desires to contract marriage require banns or
publications prior to the solemnization of the marriage, it shall not be
necessary for the municipal secretary to make the publication
 The only doubt therefore is whether said proclamation must be made during ten days,
as in the publication in case the marriage is not celebrated in a church.
o The first proclamation was made December 30, 1928, the second proclamation
on 1st of January, 1929 while the marriage was solemnized on January 6, 1929
(less than 10 days)

ISSUE:
 1. W/N the marriage is valid-YES

HELD: YES since the law is silent as to the number of days the proclamation must be made before
marriage
RULING: By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from
the information, with costs de oficio. So ordered
RATIO:

1. The law simply says that if the marriage takes place in a church whose rules and
practices require proclamation, the license applied for shall at once be issued, and it
does not say that the proclamation required by said church is to be made during ten
days.
 As section 2 of Act No. 3412 is penal in character, it should be strictly construed.
 As to the opinion of the Trial Court that Fr. Janssen should investigate whether the
license was issued by an official duly authorized by law where the woman resides, the
Court ruled that the law does not impose this duty upon priest or ministers of religion.
 It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it
may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied
with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides
habitually in his municipality

EUGENIO V VELEZ G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, 

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de
Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus",
namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE,
NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN,respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29,
and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11
October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a
temporary restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and
sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for  habeas
corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly
taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal
authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living
with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was
returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to
the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
(PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28
August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were
incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September
1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in
Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation
to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend
their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the
filing of thehabeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who
is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking
Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are
the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to
dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the
body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by
the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988,
that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second
amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to
be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the
custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to
the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that
under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
 (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:

xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case.
The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful
jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations
of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January
1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as
an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief,
and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5
and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and
Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original
petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been
restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial
of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate
facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction
to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because
the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to
the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this
case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead
body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the
basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman. 11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law,
basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both
cases.12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status
quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio
has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas,
which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover
custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants
are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one
for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new
Family Code) which states:
 Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are
obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not
the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts
alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was
dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts
must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie  entitle the
petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and
substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make
a  prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very
critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to
make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a
brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the
minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and
morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said
respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its
giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to
award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after
summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation
disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity
of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice
in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of
cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which
the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein
not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of
Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and
that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs.
CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to
'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de
facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial.  — The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve
upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any
kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased,
if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient
means to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.  The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to
surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings.  Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s
residence.  The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and
sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
      
“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin;
the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does
not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to
be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions”.  In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.  Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

RAQUEL G. KHO V. REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA
B. KHO , G.R. NO. 187462, JUNE
01, 2016
BY  S HE DY LER P OR MANE S   - J ULY 31 , 201 7

Case Digest
RAQUEL G. KHO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO ,
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

Facts: The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by
herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as
follows:

Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk
to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage
between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so
as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony; 4. Petitioner and Respondent
thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around
3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the
town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and
the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;5.
Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license
and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement
of a marriage license;6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk
of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972
so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage
was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of
the most essential requisite;7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's
marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement
of such marriage license;
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho
and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil
Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the
application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.The RTC found that petitioner's evidence
sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58
and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA
promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel
Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.The CA held
that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties' marriage. 

Issues: 

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING

A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY
VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING
WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT,
IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE
OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10 

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give
due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at
the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA
erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what
the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner
in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

Held: The Court finds for the petitioner.The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated
on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs
their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;(2) Their consent, freely given;(3) Authority of the
person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in
remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.17

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no
record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on
the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid
as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge
that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain
any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding
the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all
attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a
marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be
said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which
would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that
the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official
duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. 
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33
As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under
Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged
illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite
under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is
REINSTATED.
__________
endnotes: formal requisites