1. Alsua-Betts vs.

CA

FACTS:

 Nov. 25, 1949- Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Rella, together with all their living children,
Francisca, Pablo, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje,
entered into a duly notarized agreement, over the existing abaca and cacao lands and urban lands registered in
the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila. On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina (Doña
Tinay) separately executed their respective holographic wills in which were in conformity and in implementation of
the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949.

 Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their
four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future
acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half would belong to the other spouse, and the other half
shall be divided equally among the four children. Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic
will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions of the will of his wife. Spouses Don
Jesus and Doña Tinay filed before the CFI of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective
holographic wills in two separate special proceedings.

 Spouses then executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their
holographic wills in which the codicil also provided that one half of all the properties( conjugal and paraphernal) is
being conveyed to and portioned among the legitimate heirs, but they are reserving the other half and they
reciprocally bequeathed to each other as well as the properties they are to acquire subsequently and that the
surviving spouse would be named executor in properties or administrator. Dona Tinay died, Upon the death of
Doña Tinay Don Jesus was named executor. Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence
of his bookkeeper/secretary He instructed his new lawyer to draft a new will duly signed by Don Jesus and the
attesting witnesses . The will had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the
provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for
the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of Extrajudicial
Agreement of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the
children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as
to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to
be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.

 After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doña Tinay had been paid, all her heirs
including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of partition, the court approved the
partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Doña Tinay.

 Don Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was opposed by her siblings Pablo and Fernando,
on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The will
was disallowed. The daughter argued that the other children, Pablo and Fernando, are in estoppel to question
the competence of Don Jesus by virtue of the agreement previously entered Jesus Alsua died.

Issue: WoN testator is of sound mind at the time the will was executed

Held:

 In the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due
execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will
was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned from the quoted
portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus is neither that of a mentally incapacitated
person nor one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents. From these accepted facts,
We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to
divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft
of the contested will prepared by his lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the
will at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which ran from
problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering.

 We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to reconcile with the ordinary
course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant or
justify disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be
probated during his lifetime while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still
alive is a mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law does
not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any
favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. 

2. Ortega v. Valmonte 478 SCRA 247

FACTS:
  Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then
28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will
and testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9
August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the
notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he
wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The
testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He
reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to
appear dirty.

 Petitioner’s argument:
o 1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of
sound mind.
o 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUE:

 W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.
 W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD:

 YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent
of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity.
There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

 NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of
such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he
executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is
led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging the will bears the
burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some relatives does not
affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and
attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

3. Bellis vs. Bellis

Facts:

 Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

 On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares

 Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. People's Bank and Trust
Company as executor of the will did as the will directed upon.
 Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Issue: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

Held:

 Order of the probate court is affirmed applying the doctrine of processual presumption. The foreign law, whenever
applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the
same as the law of the forum.
 In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
Apply Philippine laws.
  Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate
or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

4. Van Dorm vs. Romillo

Facts:

 Alice Reyes Van Dorn (petitioner) is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton (private respondent) is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after the marriage; they established their
residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively.
The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.

 Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties. Respondent asked petitioner is ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss
in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

 There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

 The Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.

5. Lee vs. Tambago

Facts:

 Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and
the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent
supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to
Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.

 The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was
dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a
deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of
his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and diametrically opposed
from one another in all angle[s].”

 Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their
respective voters’ affidavits.
  Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is spurious.

HELD:

 Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession. The law provides for certain
formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity.

 A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his
demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

 A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was
neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation
of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

 As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of
a will and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

6. Suroza vs. Honrado

Facts:

 Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and
his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became
disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed.
Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of
Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an
illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by
her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her
laundrywoman, Marina Paje.

 Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and issued
orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing
the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed
a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that
Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating
Marcelina’s will.

 Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration
and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of
administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the
probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after
noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid.

 Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that
she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will was
written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the consequences of the preterition of
testatrix’s son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely
pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a
thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all
the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy
was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying
on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and
academic.
ISSUE:

 W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face
is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a
forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary
himself.

HELD:

 YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by
an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the
will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void
because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator.

 The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina
Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been
careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there
was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her
supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an
opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he
could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

7. Testate Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana

Facts:

 On June 29, 1957, a petition to probate the alleged last will and testament of Jose J. Javellana, who died on May
24 of the same year, was presented in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Crsiteta Jimenea Vda. de Javellana
and Benjamin Javellana, widow and brother respectively of the deceased, alleging that the aforesaid Jose J.
Javellana, at the time of his death, a resident of Ssan Juan Rizal, left porperties with an approximate value of
P400,000.00; that he also left a will which was delivered to the clerk of court pursuant to the Rules of Court; that
Oscar Ledesma, therein named executor, had agreed to act as such; that the decedent's next of kin were; the
wido., Criteta J. Vda. de Javellana, his children - Erlinda Javellana, Jose Javellana y Azaola, and Jose Javellana,
Jr. (Pepito), his sister Juanito J. de Ledesma, and brother Benjamin Javellana, whose respective addresses wre
given in the petition.

 To this petition, Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) filed separate opposiytions, both
claiming that the alleged will of Jose J. Javellana deposited by peittioners with the clerk of court was null and void,
the same not having been executed "in accordance with the formalities required by law" and that "the legal
requirements necessary for its validity" had not been complied with.

Issue: WoN the will executed is null and void on the grounds of not in accordance to the formalities required by law.

Held:

 The first basis of oppositor's appeal has no merit. It is true that witnesses, particularly Miss Eloisa Villanueva,
apparently found difficulty recalling who arrived first at the appointed place, or the order of the witnesses' signing
the will, or failed to mention by name the persons present at the time of the witnesses was signing the document.
These details, however, are minor and significant and do not enervate their positive testimony that at the
execution of the will the testator, the 3 witnesses, the notary public and Atty. Vicente Hilado were all together in
the private office of the latter

 For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses
should give an accurate and detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the
document by the said witness. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that
they could have seen each other sign, had they wanted to do so.1 In fact, in the instant case, at least two
witnesses, Yulo and Guevarra, both testified that the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each
and every one of them.

 With respect to the second ground, there is some merit in appellant's contention that the language requirement of
the law on wills has not been satisfactorily complied with in this case. Admittedly, there is want of expression in
the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is
written. It is true that there is no statutory provision requiring this and that proof thereof may be established by
evidence aliunde. But here, there is absolutely no such evidence presented by the petitioners-appellees. Not even
the petition for probate contains any allegation to this effect. No reference to it whatsoever is made in the
appealed order.

 In some cases, it is true, this lack of evidence was considered cured by presumptioin of knowledge of the
language or dialect used in the will, as where the will is executed in a certain province or locality, in the dialect
 currently used in such provimnce or locality in which the testator is a native or resident, the presumption arises
that the testator knew the dialect so used, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; 3 or where the will is in
Spanish, the fact that the testratrix was a "mestiza española", was married to a Spaniard, made several trips to
Spain, and some of her letters in her own handwriting submitted as evidence by the oppositor, are in Spanish,
give rise to the presumption that she knew the language in which the will was written, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.4 In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the contrary, there is evidence
that the testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death. The will was executed
in the City of Manila. Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the language
currently used either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows, therefore, that no presumption can rise that the
testator knew the Spanish Language.

8. Lopez vs. Lopez

Facts:

 On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate
children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana),
Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he
executed a Last Will and Testament4 on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.

 On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the
RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also
adopted by Victoria.

 The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the required statement in the attestation
clause as to the number of pages used upon which the will is written. While the acknowledgment portion stated
that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the
RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not
having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

 ISSUE

 Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of pages in the attestation clause and the actual number of
pages in the will that would warrant its disallowance.

RULING

 YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code
provide that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the
law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. Here, the will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence aliunde.