POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Module in lieu of Session 5

• SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption
of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
o NOTE: Each legislator must make a full disclosure of ALL their financial and business
interests upon their assumption of office. The first sentence must be separated from the
second one, which requires that they apprise the house in which they belong to of any potential
conflict of interest that may arise in connection with the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors. In other words, their disclosure of their financial and business interest
is not limited only to their proposed legislations – they must disclose its entirety. What must
be disclosed only in connection to the filing of proposed legislations are potential conflict of
interest situations.

• SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
o NOTES on DISQUALIFICATIONS: members of Congress cannot accept any other position
in the government for as long as they remain a member thereof. Once they accept such
employment/appointment, they are automatically deemed to have resigned from their seat in
Congress.
▪ In Liban v. Gordon, the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) was held to not be a
government office. Hence, Senator Gordon’s chairmanship of PNRC did not result
in the forfeiture of his membership in the Senate at the time.
o If they resign, normally they can already accept appointments/employments somewhere else
in the government.
▪ Exception: They cannot accept employment in a government office that either a) was
created or b) the emoluments in the office increased during the term of the said
member of Congress. The ban exists until his/her term has lapsed.
▪ For example, in 2011, a law was passed increasing the emoluments of the Chairperson
and the Commissioners of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Senator X’s
term was for 2010-2016. He resigned in 2013. Even if he has resigned, he still cannot
accept an appointment as ERC Chair/Commissioner until June 30, 2016. He has to
wait until the end of his term because he is prohibited from accepting an appointment
in ERC – an office in which the emoluments thereof were increased during his term.
His resignation in 2013 only affected his tenure, not his term.

• SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
 subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
o NOTES on DISQUALIFICATIONS (part 2): The first sentence refers to disqualifications to
members of Congress who are, at the same time, lawyers. They cannot act as counsels for
other people before any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial.
▪ Rationale for the disqualification: they may, intentionally or unintentionally, exert
undue influence on the person making the decision. It may be because of the respect
given them because of their stature, or fear, or even expectation of future favors
because some members of Congress are members of the Commission on
Appointments – and there are a host of other reasons. Whatever the reason may be,
what the provision seeks to prevent is the possibility that the status of the member of
Congress may affect the impartiality of the person deciding the case.
▪ Puyat v. De Guzman – the Court did not allow the intervention of the assemblyman
even if he claimed to represent himself. Again, the prohibition only extends to
representing other people, but they can represent themselves or their own interest in
court. Here, what the assemblyman did to circumvent the prohibition was to buy
shares in the company so he could claim to be representing himself. The Court did
not allow the intervention of the assemblyman, for it was clear that the assemblyman
only bought shares from the company – a very minimal amount – just so he could
claim that he is representing his own interest. The Court saw through the act and
knew it was not genuine. It was simply a ploy to sidestep the prohibition. Hence, they
still applied the prohibition against him.
o Other prohibitions include: (1) being financially interested in any contract, franchise, or
special privilege granted by the government during his/her term in office; and (2)
intervening in any office for his/her own pecuniary benefit, or where he/she may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
▪ Financial and pecuniary benefit is crucial. It is not just any contract – otherwise,
members of Congress would be prohibited from riding the MRT because it would be
a contract with the government. Thus, to be covered by the prohibition, it has to be
a contract or franchise where the member of Congress will stand to gain a financial
or pecuniary benefit.

• SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
o A special session is one called by the President while Congress is in recess.
o Fourth Monday of July – this is when the President’s SONA normally is held. The President
normally addresses Congress with a purpose of setting down the priority projects and the
government’s policies, hoping that Congress would pass legislations to help achieve this.
Congress would then continue to be in session for such number of days as they want, until
the mandatory recess called by the Constitution: “until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.”23we

• SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
o On paragraph 1
▪ Baguilat v. Alvarez – the Constitution only explicitly provided for the election of
the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. All other
officers of a certain chamber, and how they are selected/elected, are for the respective
chambers to decide.
• The Court thus cannot compel a co-equal branch to do something which is
its sole prerogative. Again, the Constitution left it to the chambers of
Congress to decide who its other officers – like the Minority Leader – will be
and how they will be elected. In the absence of any violation of the
Constitution, or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot dictate upon any
house of Congress without offending the principle of separation of powers.

o On paragraph 2
▪ Avelino v. Cuenco – the proceedings conducted during the time that the Senate
President Pro-tempore was presiding were valid because the Senate had quorum
during that time.
• A question of quorum is a justiciable question, as the Constitution itself sets
out what a quorum constitutes. Unlike in Baguilat, the question here is a
justiciable question. In Baguilat, the matter at issue was exclusively under the
prerogative of the house concerned, as the Constitution was silent on the
matter at issue. In contrast, the Constitution was specific in the matter of
quorum. Hence, the matter at issue in Avelino v. Cuenco was justiciable.
• Here, 12 Senators constituted a quorum because they constituted the majority
of the Senate at the time. And this is another reason why this case was
assigned: the decision pegged the majority from 23, not 24. The reason for
this was because one Senator was out of the country and thus beyond the
compulsive powers of the Senate and by the State. Thus, Avelino v. Cuenco
instructs us that when a member of Congress is outside our territorial
jurisdiction, they should not (during that time period only) be considered in
the computation of quorum.
 ▪ Abas Kida v. Senate – according to the Constitution, the “majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business.” Within that majority or quorum, a majority
of that is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
• Thus, when Section 1 of the questioned law provided for a 2/3 supermajority
voting requirement, it violated Article VI, Section 16(2). It also gave the law
in question a semblance of being an irrepealable law.
o This is because the “2/3 of members” voting requirement is higher
than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and
served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise,
or repeal laws it had passed. Hence, the said section was
unconstitutional.

o On paragraph 3
▪ Arroyo v. De Venecia – paragraph 3 gives leeway to each house “determine the rules
of its proceedings.” Here, the passage of the law was being questioned, mainly on the
ground that in process of passing the law, certain internal rules of the House of
Representatives were violated.
• The Court held that where there was no violation of the Constitution or of
private rights, the Court will not declare a law invalid. In other words,
legislative acts will not be declared invalid simply because of non-compliance
with the internal rules of a certain house of Congress. Only when a co-equal
branch of government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction” would the Court exercise jurisdiction. In a way, this case is
similar to Baguilat v. Alvarez, with the difference being the specific paragraph
of Section 16 that was at issue.
▪ Osmena v. Pendatun – this involves the second part of paragraph 3, which provides
for the power of each house to “punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.”
• Like I mentioned when I was discussing Section 11, the immunity of a
member of Congress for speeches applies only against tribunals outside of
their respective houses. The houses of Congress, however, retain the power
to discipline and impose sanctions on its members for disorderly behavior,
including libelous speeches. In the exercise of this disciplinary authority on
its members, the Court cannot interfere.
• Also, there was a discussion here similar to Baguilat and Arroyo, where the
Court upheld the power of the houses of Congress to adopt their own rules
of procedure for the orderly conduct of business, which they may also waive
or disregard without court interference.
▪ Santiago v. Sandiganbayan – also pertains to the power of the houses of Congress
to discipline its members. While the Congressman in the previous case claimed that
the house of Congress did not have jurisdiction over him, the senator in this case
claimed, in contrast, that only the house of Congress concerned can impose a
suspension over her to the exclusion of other bodies.
• The Court held that the suspension under Article VI, Section 16(3) refers to
penalties imposed for misdemeanors committed by members of Congress.
In contrast, the suspension imposed upon her by the Sandiganbayan is not a
penalty, as preventive suspension is not meant to be a penalty. Preventive
 suspension is simply a preliminary measure and does not punish anything. It
was imposed by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of the filing of a corruption case
filed against her.
• Her contention thus failed, for the suspension imposed upon her was not
penalty, and in any event, being a member of Congress did not cloak her
absolute immunity from the law, particularly anti-graft laws.

o On paragraph 4
▪ US v. Pons – the SC concluded that the legislative journals say that the legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on Feb 28, 1914 – and that settles the question. Courts
may not go beyond the journals to determine whether the act in question was
approved on the day it was mentioned that it was approved.
• To inquire into the records of the legislature, when they are clear and explicit,
would be to invade a coordinate and independent branch, and would mean
an interference with the legitimate powers and functions of the legislature.
• This is because public policy requires that the authenticity of laws should rest
upon public memorials of the most permanent character (rather than the
account of witnesses which may or may not be accurate).
▪ Casco v. Gimenez – enrolled bill doctrine
• Individual statements of members of Congress do not necessarily reflect the
view of the body, much less do they indicate the intent of the other house.
• The enrolled bill – which indicates “urea formaldehyde,” not “urea and
formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
• If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the President, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. It would be very
offensive, especially to the principle of separation of powers, should the
Court speculate that there was a clerical error on the copy signed by the
Senate President, Speaker of the House, and the President. This is the main
reason for the existence of the enrolled bill doctrine.
▪ Astorga v. Villegas – the case when the journal was given more credence over the
enrolled bill.
• Does this mean that legislative journals are accorded more weight than
enrolled bills?
o NO. The general rule remains: the enrolled bill is superior and the
courts would normally not inquire beyond it as deference to its co-
equal branches.
• So how do we reconcile this case with Casco and the other enrolled bill cases?
o Here, there was no enrolled bill to speak of, and that is the reason
why the version in the journal was given more credence than the
“enrolled bill.” The President and the Senate President themselves
withdrew their signatures for they, too, recognized that there were
discrepancies between the version of the bill approved and the one
signed by the President.
o In effect, the Court was not offending its co-equal branches. They
were not incorporating any words or amendments to the law. The
 Court simply declared the law invalid because it was not duly passed
– and the proof that it was not so was very clear, and was bolstered
by the withdrawal of the signatures.

• SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
o Please take note of the composition of the electoral tribunals – 3 Justices of the Supreme
Court, and 6 members of the House of Rep. or Senate as the case may be.
o Angara v. Electoral Commission
▪ the purpose of creating electoral tribunals was for there to be an independent and
impartial tribunal to decide on contested elections of its members.
▪ The reason for this was because previously, the legislature had the power to decide
the elections, returns, and qualifications. What happened was that cases were being
decided on the basis of partisan politics, rather than the merits of each case. Thus, it
was deemed better to have an independent and impartial tribunal – a separate body
from the legislature and composed not only by legislators but also members of the
judiciary – to decide these cases.
▪ Thus, the electoral tribunals have the power to prescribe its own rules of procedure,
and the houses of Congress cannot meddle or interfere with these.
o Reyes v. COMELEC
▪ As previously discussed, the doctrine of this case is that the electoral tribunals acquire
jurisdiction only when all three of the following requisites are present: (1) valid
proclamation of the candidate; (2) the candidate has taken the proper oath; and (3)
the candidate has assumed office. Here, the third requisite is absent (even
assuming for the sake of argument that the first two requisites are present), hence the
COMELEC still had jurisdiction.
o Vera v. Avelino
▪ Assigned to emphasize that the electoral tribunals are “the sole judge(s) of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.” In
the absence of contests (election protests or quo warranto), the electoral tribunals do
not acquire jurisdiction on the qualifications of members of the respective houses.
o Abayon v. HRET
▪ COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the qualifications of party-list organizations,
while the HRET acquires jurisdiction over party-list representatives who have
been proclaimed and have assumed office. So if a person desires to question the
qualifications of the party-list itself to run in the party-list system, the person
questioning must file in the COMELEC, not HRET. But if the question is as regards
the qualification of the party-list representative who became a member of the House
of Representatives already – like the facts of this case – then the jurisdiction is with
HRET.
o Abbas v. SET – explains very well the rationale behind the composition of the electoral
tribunals.
 ▪ In providing for electoral tribunals to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
members of Congress, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and
"legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
houses. It is a clear expression of an intent that all such contests shall be resolved by
a panel or body in which their peers in that Chamber are represented. In the same
vein, the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same
process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
▪ Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of the
legislators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the electoral tribunal is 2 to 1
— an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
o Bondoc v. Pineda – this illustrates the evils that were being addressed by the existence of
electoral tribunals, as discussed earlier in Angara v. Electoral Commission.
▪ Here, the party tried to influence the decision of the HRET by removing the
nomination of one of its members who voted against the party.
▪ To this, the Court held that again, the purpose of having electoral tribunals was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. The members of the tribunal
must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence, even independence from the political
party to which they belong.
▪ Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
▪ The removal of the Congressman who did cast a “conscience vote” was therefore null
and void. Members of the electoral tribunals also enjoy security of tenure, and they
may only be removed for cause such as: (a) expiration of the member’s term of office,
(b) death, (c) permanent disability, (d) resignation from the political party he/she
represents in the tribunal; (e) FORMAL affiliation with another political party; or (f)
removal for other valid causes.

• SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
• SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
o Like the electoral tribunals, kindly take note of the composition of the Commission on
Appointments.
o They have the primary duty of confirming the appointments made by the President to the
positions where the Constitution requires such confirmation. [The discussion on which
appointments require confirmation will be discussed under Article VII, Section 16.]
o Daza v. Singson
▪ The composition of the Commission on Appointments is not a political question.
Similar to the quorum question in Avelino v. Cuenco, the Constitution has set a
guideline on the composition of the Commission. It said that the membership in the
Commission shall be “on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein.” Hence, the Court has the power to determine whether this standard of
proportional representation was followed.
▪ Also, this case instructs us that because of the proportional representation
requirement of the Constitution, the houses of Congress may revise the composition
or do a reorganization provided that there are changes of a permanent character
with regard to party affiliation of the members of the house concerned. Temporary
alliances and changes should not and cannot affect the composition of the
Commission. Changes in party affiliation must involve severance of political loyalties
and permanent shift of allegiance in order to affect the composition of the
Commission.
o Coseteng v. Mitra
▪ This case shows how proportional representation is computed. The petition was
dismissed because the Court itself computed the seats in the Commission that should
be represented by the majority (10 seats, as the majority represents 80% of the
membership of the House of Representatives), and it found the same to be
mathematically accurate.
▪ For a party to be represented in the Commission, it needs to reach a required
minimum of representatives (at least 8.4% of the membership of the House). Parties
with a single representative would thus not be entitled to representation in the
Commission.
o Guingona v. Gonzales
▪ Case following Coseteng v. Mitra, again dealing with proportional representation, but
this time in the Senate.
▪ Again, for a party to be represented in the Commission, it needs to reach a required
minimum of representatives (at least 2 Senators). Parties with a single Senator only
would thus not be entitled to representation in the Commission.
▪ Also, parties with half a representation may join with others to have the power to
nominate another representative to the commission.
• For example, Party X has 3 Senators while Party Y has only 1. Party X is
entitled to one representative to the Commission, while Party Y is not entitled
to any. However, if they coalesce or make an alliance, they would constitute
4 Senators, thus entitling them to have another representative in the
Commission.
• (Remember that you need 2 Senators to entitle you to 1 representative.
Therefore, this “coalition” of 4 Senators would be entitled to 2
representatives. Without the coalition, only Party X is entitled to 1
representative because, to reiterate, you need multiples of 2 to be entitled to
another representative.)