Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

100388, [December 14,

2000], 401 PHIL 132-154

After the death of her husband, Margarita Tana, widow of the late Ignacio Tana, Sr.,
became aware of the fact that her husband's employer, Conchita Ayalde, never reported
him for Social Security System (SSS) coverage. Margarita filed a petition before the
Social Security Commission and prayed that Ayalde be ordered to pay the SSS premium
contributions and that SSS should grant her the funeral and pension benefits due her.
The SSS, in a petition-in-intervention, revealed that Ayalde was never registered as a
member-employer of the SSS, and consequently, Tana, Sr. was never registered as
member-employee. Respondent Ayalde belied the allegation that Tana, Sr. was her
employee, admitting only that he was hired intermittently as an independent contractor to
plow, harrow, or burrow the plantation she owned and rented. After hearing both parties,
the Social Security Commission held that Tana, Sr. had been employed continuously from
January 1961 to March 1979 with a salary based on the minimum wage prevailing during
his employment. Not having reported the petitioner's husband for coverage with the SSS,
respondent Conchita Ayalde was made liable to pay damages equivalent to the death
benefits and funeral expenses of Tana, Sr. Not satisfied with the Commission's ruling,
Ayalde appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment in
favor of Conchita Ayalde and dismissed the claim of Margarita Tana. The SSS, as
intervenor-appellee, filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether
or not an agricultural laborer who was hired on "pakyaw" basis can be considered an
employee entitled to compulsory coverage and corresponding benefits under the Social
Security Law.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
resolution of the Social Security Commission was reinstated. There was no shred of
evidence to show that Tana was only a seasonal worker. All witnesses, including Ayalde,
testified that Tana and his family resided in the plantation. The only logical explanation
for this set up was that Tana was working for most part of the year exclusively for Ayalde.
A closer scrutiny of the records revealed that while Ayalde may not have directly imposed
on Tana the manner and methods to follow in performing his tasks, she did exercise
control through her overseer. Under the circumstances, the relationship between Ayalde
and Tana has more of the attributes of employer-employee than that of an independent
contractor hired to perform a specific project.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM LAW (REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 1161, AS AMENDED); EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP;
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS REQUIRED. — The mandatory coverage under the SSS Law
(Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by PD 1202 and PD 1636) is premised on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, and Section 8(d) defines an "employee"
as "any person who performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and
physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services where there
is an employer-employee relationship." The essential elements of an employer-employee
relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with regard to the means
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control being
the most determinative factor.||| (Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
100388, [December 14, 2000], 401 PHIL 132-154)

SSS v. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006.
CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:
Ø Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died.
Ø Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death
benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn
Ø Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
Ø SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting
Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family
abode approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another man on whom she
has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with
Rosanna.
Ø The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary.
Ø CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Ø It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Ø Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the
signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil
Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that
Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until
the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during
Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
Ø Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
Ø The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate
bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with
petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
Ø For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying
factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the
member for support.
Ø A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is
proved that the were till living together at the time of his death, it is presumed that she
was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of
providing for herself.
Ø Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she is his
legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there
are no legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise
not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that
at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were
already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other siblings.
Dycaico vs. SSS, G.R. No. 161357, 30 Nov. 2005

Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-
employed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and
their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.• In June 1989, Bonifacio was
considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued
to receive the monthly pensionuntil he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months
prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.• Shortly
after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors
pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d)
of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law[2] she could not be
considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said
proviso reads:Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (d) Upon the death of the retired member,
his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension.• the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the
petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the petitioners contention that primary beneficiaries
need not be legitimate family members by citingthe definitions of primary beneficiaries
and dependents in Section 8 ofRep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said
provision, primary beneficiaries are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph
(e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines dependents as the following: (1)
[t]he legal spouseentitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitatedand incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent
who is receiving regular support from the member.• Based on the foregoing, according to
the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones
capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and
dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.• Under
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to
survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the
deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of
Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary
beneficiary.• Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review. the appellate
court dismissed the petition• The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got
married in January1997, a few months before he passed away, they merely intended to
legalizetheir relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, sinceRep.
Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally infavor of claimants
like the petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncementthat the sympathy of the law on
social security is toward its beneficiaries,and the law, by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberality intheir favor.[5]• The SSS posits that the statutes intent is
to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of
the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and
cannot be subject of change by the SSS.• Issue: won petitioner wife, who was not then
the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could be considered
his primary beneficiary.

Ruling:The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d)
of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional
for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.[7]• In an
analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros …The proviso,
which denied a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period, was
declared offensive to the due process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits
due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso
was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent
spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years
before they qualified for their pension.• For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the
proviso as of the date of hisretirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.The proviso
infringes the equal protection clause• the petitioner belongs to the second group of
dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement.
She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as
of the date of his retirement disqualifies them from being considered primary beneficiaries
for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension.• the proviso was apparently intended
to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse
to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.

This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and

determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration
of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the
law,i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting
in loss of income or financial burden."[14] Put differently, such classification of dependent
spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective.• Further, the classification of
dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS
member were contracted prior to or after thel atters retirement for the purpose of
entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is
arbitrary and discriminatory.The proviso infringes the due process clause• Thus, it was
ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires
a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy
a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under
pre-existing law.[20] Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent
spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a widows right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.[21]• Even
the retirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been
included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282[25] are not mere gratuity
because they are required to pay both the employer and employee contributions.• under
Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the
death of the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit following
the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters
contractual compensation.The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d)
of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the
surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to
be heard.• In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio
got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud.
This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in
fact, during that time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However,
the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios
bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as
his primary beneficiary.Conclusion Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of
entitlement tosurvivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons
are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282: (1) The dependent
spouse until he or she remarries; and (2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children. In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the
dependent spouse and dependent children as follows:(1) The legal spouse entitled by
law to receive support from the member;(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not
reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while stilla minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of
self-support, physically or mentally. Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not
raise the issue of the validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.[29] However,
the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper
resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their
arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in
her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing
upon the death of her husband.
SSS v Davac G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966

Facts:
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay, became a member of the
SSS. He designated Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship
to her as that of "wife". He died then each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and
Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. The deceased
contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second with
Candelaria Davac. The processing was withheld. The SSS filed this petition praying that
the two parties be required to litigate their claims.
The SSS issued the resolution naming Davac as the valid beneficiary. Not satisfied with
the resolution, Lourdes Tuplano brought the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring
respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits in
question.

Held: Yes. SSS resolution affirmed.

Ratio:
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under
such conditions as the Commission may define, …his beneficiaries, shall be entitled to
the following benefit…
The beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to the death
benefits.
The appellant contends that the designation made in the person of the second and
bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code,
and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her
own and her child's legitime in the inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security System
partakes of the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same
qualifications and disqualifications should be applied. Article 739 and 2012 of the civil
code prohibits persons whoi cannot receive donations from being beneficiaries of a policy.
The provisions mentioned in Article 739 are not applicable to Candelaria Davac because
she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the
previous marriage of her husband Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from membership
in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership
of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by
Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish
gradually and perfect a social security system which ... shall provide protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from salary contributions.
Under other provisions, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid,
it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are
the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no designated
beneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable.
The Social Security Act is not a law of succession.