VELASCO VS.

REYES

EN BANC G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016 LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN[1] B. BARUA-YAP
AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of a sitting
Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be.done as dictated by law and justice solely
for that reason.

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker,
House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap), Secretary General, House of
Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque.

Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this]
Honorable Court;"[2] thus, he seeks the following reliefs:

1. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. be issued
ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; and allow petitioner to
assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of said
position of Marinduque representative;
 
2. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be issued
ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina O. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein
petitioner, in her stead; and
 
3. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and PROHIBIT
respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY
VACATE said position.[3]

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are,:

On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition[4] to deny due course or
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several material
misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she
is a natural-bom Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is
eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to."[5] The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled
''Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC was
accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.[6]

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were held on May
13, 2013.

The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby  AFFIRMED.[7]

A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque, through
Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.

Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the HRET
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P. Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality[8] in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) which
provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the date of the
promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the
Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.[9]

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 207264, entitled
"Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy (for material
misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC docketed as SPC
No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the
proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.

On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-010.

On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's petition, viz.:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming
the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.[10]

Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her since
she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid
proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.[11]

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he
prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this Honorable
Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD
ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections.[12]

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the functions of a
Member of the House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the COMELEC En
Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and without legal effect
the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is declared
NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is
hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the House of Representatives for
the province of Marinduque.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)

Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's motion
for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new PBOC of
Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly, a new
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be composed of the
following:

1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz -Chairman

2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman
3. Dir. EsterVillaflor-Roxas -Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs

For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of the New
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC
Session Hall. 8th Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections.

Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of Canvassers
(NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013
National and Local Elections.

Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the Certificate of
Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the House of Representatives.
[14]

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes
obtained from 245 clustered precincts.[15]

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On
the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with
the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker
Belmonte, Jr.

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without waiver of her
arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper
forum."[16]

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration[17] (of this Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution in G.R.
No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of
Judgment is ordered.[18]

On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was denied by this
Court.

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially
demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the
same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that he be
allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by
Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and enforce the May
14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013
Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of Marinduque. It is
further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be personally served and delivered by the
Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation and enforcement of the
aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of
Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission.[19]

the COMELEC issued an Order[20] dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its
Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the
Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and furnished
to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above-mentioned
request but to no avail.

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier requests (July 12
and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his name in her place as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests to
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for
Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she continues
to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or Injunction anchored on the following issues:

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and allow
him to assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barua-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include the
name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of PERMANENT. Injunction can
be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing
the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office.[21]

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal right and basis to
warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus."[22] He insists that the final and executory decisions of the
COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of
respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (z) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to administer the oath
to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque
representative;"[23] and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xxxas the duly elected
member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members."[24] Velasco anchors
his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,[25] citing a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of
the House of Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him
(Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.[26]

With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of such
position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already
received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque
Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of thousands of
pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
permanent Injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the
position."[27]

In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus given
that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her
place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of
Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as
enunciated by the Court in several cases.[28]

As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo Warranto cases
involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be
treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right
on the part of [Velasco] "[29] She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there
is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon
her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over  quo
warranto cases[30] filed against Reyes by several individuals.

Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation"[31] But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the
proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he was
not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:

I.

UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO

RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF
HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.

Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed against respondent
Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory, respondent Reyes may not be
restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes's name from the Roll of Members of the
House.
 

II.

CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER, BEING
MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE
POST OF MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.

Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to,
respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of
the House.
 

III.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.[32]

The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court to revisit its twin
Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in G.R. No. 207264, given that (i) this Court was
"divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this
Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no hindrance for this Court to do
the same in G.R. No. 207264.

Moreover, the OSG contends that:

Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution, upholding the
cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw its
recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence of any specific order or
directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in  Reyes v.
COMELEC  that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor
respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.

Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent Reyes:

(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;  and

(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled  Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.[33]

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:

If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the winner, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction
between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases
should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013
Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, at noon of June 30
following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests filed on or after said date would be
dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners have
already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June 14.[34]

In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015 dismissing HRET
Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,[35] the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of Victor Vela
Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.[36]

In the said Resolution, the HRET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264 is the COGENT
REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution"[37]

To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a Petition-In-
Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of merit.''
Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto
against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed"[38] Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration of the said
September 11, 2014 HRET Resolution based on the argument that the latter was contrary to law and
jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-

The Tribunal's Jurisdiction

It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo warranto, considering the
parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same  vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in
G.R. No. 207264.

The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE
to sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the
petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No.
207264.

On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his  Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright dismissal of the
present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent
Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of evidence by the
contending parties.

The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives."

x x x x

In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the COMELEC  En
Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC
First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency
requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC
actions, the Supreme Court  En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions.
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the
Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member  of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

x x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member
of the House of Representatives x x x.

x x x x

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled

that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins, x x x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must
be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office xxx.
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential element
before a candidate can be considered a Member  of the House of Representatives over which the Tribunal could
assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was
nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the
Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No.
207264. It further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there
can be no valid and effective assumption of office."
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x. As a
rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme
Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take their bearings from the decisions
and rulings of the Supreme Court.[39]

Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 177 (Usurpation of Official
Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been filed in court,[40] entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."[41]

The Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to compel
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.

The Ruling

The petition has merit.

At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to re-litigate what
has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been
issued therein on October 22, 2013.

After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil
action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the
respondents.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office.[42] In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court
in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in
SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title.
That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if
it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.[43]

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.[44]

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or
not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque.

The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond dispute
- Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of the Province
of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. Instead, it is
the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election, the returns of such
election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she has already
been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three
acts in this case - her proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation
between Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was
cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque
- for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a
duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes's
proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and
October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the PBOC
who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes's COC,
still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16,
2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision cancelling her
COC. These points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said
COMELEC En Banc Resolution.

That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present petition
for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into consideration:

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC En Banc in its
final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as
Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of five (5) days
as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming, the
PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.

Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of
June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are already final and executory.

Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 cancelled respondent Reyes's
proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives in
representation of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been
challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.

Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in open session, Reyes
had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.

Thus, to consider Reyes's proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this case will paradoxically
alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.

Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of the
House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO
LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the
HRET.

And this is precisely the basis for the HRET's December 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and ruling that it
has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the
existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not a bona fide member
of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its
Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections  [45]-

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial
question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was
there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without
the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office,
there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
x x x x

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc  had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's
[Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives, x x x."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the basis of her
"due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat
that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis
supplied.)

Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco, who should
be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the leadership of the
latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme Court

Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the HRET had
actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless,
their dismissal pursuant to the HRET's December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear
and certain right to the subject office.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and
Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the
latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon
to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and
(if) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual and legal
milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are
no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap.
They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives
for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S
compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.

It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-
General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,[46] the Court decreed:

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus  is a ministerial act or duty, and  not
purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on
the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as
against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second
Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC  en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner.
The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and
said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law
demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except
the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This
decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC  en
banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10,
2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is
the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ
of Mandamus.

As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are
not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered therein
nor argue that the doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the public
respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's judgment in G.R. No.
207264,  i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes's COC for Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible
for the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year residency
in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to
be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a party to a case to question the final decision of
this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judicata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the
Court's final judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position.[47]

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take judicial notice of
the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position had already been long affirmed
by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of Law and should
not be countenanced.
In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, there is no
longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque;
therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,[48] "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public
respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register the name
of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)
Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro,
respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor.
Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition
on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto
Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June,
the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of
the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice
and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in
the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of
the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium
unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in
the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the
remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned
decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again,
assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner
is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less
than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of
canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous
disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was
repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence.
If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
Electoral Tribunals
Date: October 27, 1988
Ponente: Gancayco J.
SUMMARY:
This is a petition to nullify the resolutions of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal denying a petition for mass
disqualification of 22 senators. The Senate Electoral
Tribunal is composed of 3 justices and 6 senators. House
rules state that the minimum to have a quorum would be
to have at least 3 senators and 1 Justice. All the senators
who are members of the tribunal have interest in the case
of disqualification given that they are respondents. The
issue is then is if the 3 justices alone, being the only
remaining members of the SET, did not commit grave
abuse of discretion denying the petition. The court holds
that the SET can render judgement given the unusual
circumstances. Petition Dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the SET can render judgement
given a lack of Senator-members?
FACTS:
1. This is a petition to nullify the resolution of the SET
denying the Motion for Disqualification/ Inhibition
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who
were proclaimed senators elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on
Elections.
2. The Petitioners filed with the SET a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senator-Members
thereof from the hearing and resolution of the case
on the ground that all of them are interested parties
to said case. Senators Saguisag and Paterno also filed
for disqualification of Senator-Members.
3. Senator Enrile voluntary inhibited himself from
performing and the 5 senators were disqualified to be

part of the tribunal leaving only the 3 Justices to be

part of the Tribunal.
4. Petitioners argue that the SET cannot make a
judgement because there are no senator-members.
HOLDING:
Art VI Sec 17 is a clear expression of an intent that all
(such) contests shall be resolved by a panel or body in
which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are
represented The Constitutional provision clearly
mandates the participation in the same process of
decision of a representative or representatives of the
Supreme Court.
In this situation where senators cannot sit in the tribunal
due to the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
The overriding consideration is that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
RULING:
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused
its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to
must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well
within law and principle in dismissing the petition for
disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners.
The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.

Related Provisions:
Art VI Sec. 17 1987 Consti. The Senate
and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered
under the partylist system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)—

requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature—is a
proviso that where more than four
(4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute
a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote
with no abstentions.
The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior
Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada
(Replaced by Juan Ponce Enrile) , Neptali A.
Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr.,
Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
Bondoc vs. Pineda Digested
Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are
members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the
NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to
join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET
received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from
the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge
of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may
not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof
that he has formally affiliated with another.
Lazatin v. HRET
CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET,
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988

FACTS:
During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election
returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the
Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26,
1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and
to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent
thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private
respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the
second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of
petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec 9 of the
HRET Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. The
COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of
the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusivepower to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the
period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET,
the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
81 Phil. 818

MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Nicetas A. Suanes to compel the Chief Accountant and the
Disbursing Officer of the Senate of the Philippines to pay him his salary as secretary to Senator
Ramon Diokno, member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in accordance with his appointment issued
by the Chairman of said tribunal.

The facts are as follows:

In a resolution dated June 28, 1948, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "resolved unanimously to propose
the appointment" of "nine secretaries, one for each member of the Tribunal at P3,600.00 each."

On July 1st, 1948, the Secretary of the Senate, with the approval of the President of the Senate, issued
to petitioner Suanes an appointment as Secretary to Senator Ramon Diokno "with compensation at
the rate of P200 per month, the appointment to take effect on July 1, 1948, to continue until the
electoral protest cases pending consideration by that body are finally disposed of, but not beyond
June 30, 1949, unless sooner revoked."

On July 12, 1948, petitioner Suanes took an oath of office as Secretary to Senator Diokno, member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

On August 20, 1948, the Chairman of said Tribunal issued an appointment to petitioner as "Secretary
to Senator Ramon Diokno, member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, with compensation at the rate of
P3,600.00 pesos per annum, the appointment to take effect July 1, 1948."

On August 27, 1948, petitioner Suanes presented for payment to the Chief Accountant and to the
Disbursing Officer of the Senate, respondents in this case, a general voucher certified by the Secretary
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and approved by its Chairman, covering petitioner's salary from July
1, 1948, to August 15, 1948, at the rate of P300 per month. The respondents refused to honor said
voucher and alleged that they were authorized to pay petitioner Suanes only the salary fixed in the
appointment issued by the Secretary of the Senate and approved by the President of the Senate,
namely, at the rate of P200 per month.

It appears that in Republic Act No. 320, in the appropriation for the Senate there is included the sum
of P180,000.00 for the expenses of the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate. The President of the Senate
has the power to appoint the employees of the Senate according to sections 79 and 88 of the
Administrative Code. Upon the other hand, in the rules approved and promulgated by said Electoral
Tribunal for the effective performance of its constitutional functions, the power of appointment of its
subordinate personnel is lodged in its chairman with the approval of the Tribunal. There seems to be
no question as to the authority of the Tribunal to promulgate said rules as is expressly recognized by
section 182 of the Election Code.

The question before the court is which of the two appointments should prevail, whether the
appointment issued by the President of the Senate or that issued by the Chairman of the Electoral
Tribunal. This question depends upon the broader issue of whether the Electoral Tribunals, as created
by the Constitution, are mere agencies of the Philippine Congress, or they are entities distinct from
and independent of the Philippine Congress to the extent of possessing complete control of their
internal affairs.

Our Constitution has unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal the responsibility of being the
sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislative houses. We have ruled unequivocably in the case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139, that the Electoral Tribunals are independent constitutional creations with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform and the avowed purpose in creating them is to
have independent constitutional organs pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if Congress were to retain that power. The purpose of the Constitution we said
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not
so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the
long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted
the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court. And the Court concluded that an electoral tribunal "is a body separate from and
independent of the Legislature."

Considering then that the Electoral Tribunals are constitutional creations, designed as bodies distinct
from and independent of the Congress, so that they may carry out their constitutional mission, with
independence and impartiality, it follows that within the precise sphere of their functions, they are as
sovereign over their internal affairs as each of the other powers of government over their respective
domains. Consequently, the employees of an Electoral Tribunal are its own, and not of the Senate nor
of the House of Representatives nor of any other entity, and it stands to reason that the appointment,
the supervision and the control over said employees rest wholly within the Tribunal itself. The
President of the Senate may have the power to appoint the employees of the Senate, but there is no
existing provision of law, even in the Appropriation Act, which vests in him the power to appoint the
employees of an Electoral Tribunal. Upon the other hand, in paragraph k of the Rules of the Electoral
Tribunal for the Senate, approved in 1947, it is provided, among other things, that the Chairman
thereof shall have the power to appoint the employees of the Tribunal "with the approval of the
Tribunal, and in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law." The adoption of said rules is
in conformity with section 182 of the Election Code and in harmony with the intention of the framers
of the Constitution in creating independent Electoral Tribunals.

The fact that the appropriation for the Senate Electoral Tribunal is included in the budget
corresponding to the Senate, does not and cannot mean that the employees of the Electoral Tribunal
are also employees of the Senate, for both institutions are separate and independent of each other
under the Constitution. Such inclusion is due merely to section 182 of the Election Code which
provides that expenses of the Electoral Tribunals shall be paid from the funds of the respective houses
of the Congress, not because said tribunals are dependencies of Congress, but because as separate and
independent bodies they are designed to try and settle issues for the benefit of Congress.

This view was supported by the late president Manuel A. Roxas who had been a prominent member of
the Constitutional Convention. Mr. Justice Paras recounted the following in his speech delivered
during the necrological services for the late President Roxas -

"Very shortly before his death, in a conference wherein the matter relating to the administrative
personnel of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was taken up, President Roxas supported the stand that
said personnel should be named by, and under the control of, the members of the Tribunal with a
view to making it an independent constitutional body in all respects. He accordingly recommended
the inclusion in the next Budget of an appropriation for the Electoral Tribunals, unattached to and
separate from the outlays for the Congress. As this recommendation was made some thirty-six hours
before President Roxas died, it may well be treated as his last will, unmistakably expressive of the
kind of judiciary he wanted his country to have."
Respondents proffer section 3 of the Appropriations Act for 1948 (Republic Act No. 320) in support of
their argument that "the intention of Congress is to place the Electoral Tribunal under the control and
supervision of the heads of the two bodies of Congress not only with regard to its administrative
functions but specially with regard to the disbursement and disposition of the funds appropriated for
it." The pertinent section reads as follows:

"3. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the President of the Senate is
hereby authorized, within the limits of the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Senate, to
transfer items of appropriations, to abolish or consolidate items or positions, and to create new items
or positions as may be necessary to effect simplification, economy and efficiency in the service,
whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires." (Special Provisions, No. 3, Appropriation
for the Senate, Rep. Act No. 320, p. 10).
Whatever power is conferred upon the President of the Senate under this provision of law is
specifically qualified and confined "within the limits of the appropriations authorized in this Act for
the Senate." But the appropriation for the Senate Electoral Tribunal is not for the Senate but for such
Electoral Tribunal as an independent and distinct entity. Therefore, those funds do not come within
the payer granted to the President of the Senate by section 3 of Republic Act No. 320. There is no
other logical conclusion. The mere fact that the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are to be taken
from the funds of the Senate do not make those funds for the Senate. Precisely, when the law (Revised
Election Code, sec. 182) provides that the expenses of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are to be paid
from the funds of the Senate, it separates the amount of those expenses and takes it out of the Senate
funds and, therefore, out of the control of the President of the Senate. If the Senate President can
control the appropriated funds for such expenses, he can control those expenses. If he can control
such expenses, he can influence the actuations and command the very subsistence of the Tribunal,
thus defeating its independence and its existence in violation of the Constitution.

Respondents maintain that the constitutional provision creating the Electoral Tribunals and defining
their powers appears in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution which refers to the Legislative
Department, and from this they infer that said tribunals are thus intended as parts of the Legislature.
And this is alleged to be corroborated by the language of said section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. * * * Since these tribunals, as elsewhere adverted to were created by the
Constitution as separate and independent organs so that they may perform their constitutional
functions with independence and impartiality completely devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, the topographical location of section 11 in Article VI of the Constitution becomes
innocuous and immaterial and the words "shall each have" above referred to can have no other
meaning than that the houses of Congress are each provided with independent constitutional organs
to settle issues pertaining to Congress which, in the eyes of the Constitution, Congress cannot
adequately decide. It may be said furthermore that the inclusion of the provision creating the
Electoral Tribunals in Article VI of the Constitution, may be attributed to the circumstance that the
settlement by said tribunals of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Legislature, being a matter vitally concerned with the organization and membership
of the Legislative Department, should be placed in the very same article relating to that body. Such
inclusion does not mean that the Electoral Tribunals are dependent upon the Legislative Department,
in the same manner that the non-inclusion of the Civil Service in Article VII relating to the Executive
Department does not mean that the Civil Service is independent from the executive branch of the
Government.

The fundamental purpose of the Constitution in creating impartial and fearless Electoral Tribunals
must not be defeated by doubtful conclusions founded on mere matters fit form, such as inferences
from the location of certain provisions in the Constitution and from the use of possessive words which
do not necessarily imply superiority. Such inferences which are vague and uncertain must yield to the
vital purpose of the Constitution of safeguarding such impartiality and independence in the actuations
of the Electoral Tribunals as are necessary for the effective and faithful performance of their
constitutional function of ascertaining the true will of the sovereign people in connection with the true
membership of the Legislative Department of the Government.

Respondents maintain that the constitutional independence of the Electoral Tribunals has reference
only to their judicial functions, but not to the selection of their administrative personnel. This
distinction finds absolutely no support either in the provisions of the Constitution or in our statutes.
As above indicated, under the Constitution, the electoral tribunals must be independent because they
are created to settle with absolute impartiality partisan issues between members of Congress. If it is
conceded that their actuations should be absolutely free from partisan considerations, it must follow
that the electoral tribunals must be independent not alone when they are deciding cases before them,
but also when they are selecting their personnel which will aid them in the performance of their duties
and when they are disposing of their funds for their necessary expenses. The selection of such
personnel and the disposition of such funds have a substantial bearing upon the judicial functions of
the electoral tribunals. If they may be forced to accept employees who deserve no trust from them and
they may be dictated to in the disposition of their funds, the integrity of their proceedings and the
correctness of their decisions may easily be impaired and defeated.

Respondents compare the status, of the electoral tribunals with that of the Courts of First Instance
which, although pertaining to the Judicial Department, are nevertheless administratively subject to
the Executive Department through the Secretary of Justice. The comparison is not right, though the
inferior courts are to a certain extent under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice
who is truly designated as one of the high officers of the Executive Department, yet the nature of the
position of Secretary of Justice is not necessarily nor solely political. He need not be a party man. He
may belong to the majority or to a minority party, or even to no party whatsoever, and there would be
nothing legally anomalous in such selection. In his actuations on the administration of justice in the
country, he is deemed a part and a member of our judicial system. In fact, he is usually chosen from
the ranks of the judiciary, particularly from members of the Supreme Court, in order to promote
confidence in his actuations with regard to the courts and to keep the impartial administration of
justice with a minimum of political taint. It is true that, from time to time, this situation of an
Executive official being burdened with direct intervention, in the administration of the courts, has
been the object of appraisal and criticism by certain members and groups of the legal profession who
offer the remedy of transferring the administration of courts to the Supreme Court. Whatever may be
the merits of such criticism and proposal, which we do not in the least consider in this case, it must be
noted, however, that the tendency is towards assuring the independence of judicial tribunals.

On the other hand, none of these considerations apply to a head of the Legislative Department who
holds an essentially political position. He is a member of Congress by virtue of a political election and
he is elected head of a house of Congress by virtue of an election by his colleagues. He is first and
foremost a man. of the party which has raised him to that position and he is legitimately expected to
keep vigil over the interests of his party. Commendable as is this trust bestowed upon him,
nevertheless, this is precisely the reason why his influence and control must be barred from an
impartial and independent judicial body such as the electoral tribunal. Absolutely all the cases before
such electoral tribunals constitute party interests, and it is obvious that it would be unfair to a
majority party to demand aloofness and impartiality of its head in Congress in the settlement and
outcome of these electoral cases, as it would be doubly unfair to a judicial entity to be under any
control or supervision whatsoever of a political party head in its sacred trust of dealing impartial,
untainted justice in the decision of these same cases. It is the essence of judicial bodies that they be
kept from the undue influence and control, not alone of the Legislative Department, but from all
departments of the Government as well.

It may be stated, in this connection, that the Chief Justice, in the exercise of his constitutional power
to designate associate justices as members of the electoral tribunals, has established the policy in
conformity with what lie believes to be the true meaning of the Constitution, that associate justices
thus designated cannot be changed by him during the periods of their incumbency except in cases of
vacancy. The evident purpose is to maintain the independence of each associate justice in the
performance of his duties as a member of an electoral tribunal.

In closing, it may be stated that this Court deplores the fact that some issues in this case have been
personalized. We highly disapprove all such statements and remarks and we have completely ignored
them in the consideration of the case. This Court will be the last, if ever, to cast aspersions on the
dignity, the office and the personality of any responsible official of our government, whether of an
elective or appointive office.

In view of all the foregoing, the appointment issued to Petitioner by the Chairman of the Electoral
Tribunal, "at the rate of P3,600 per annum," should prevail. The Writ of Mandamus is hereby granted
and the respondents are ordered to honor and to pay the voucher issued in favor of Petitioner as
certified by the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and approved by its Chairman. No costs.

Feria, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Perfecto and Briones, JJ., concur., besides their separate opinions.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

Ozaeta, J., abstaining:

This case having been argued and voted before I became a member of the Court, I had no opportunity
to take part in the deliberation and to express an opinion.

CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

Petitioner seeks the collection of his salaries in arrears as private secretary to Senator Ramon Diokno,
one of the members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. He has been duly appointed by Mr. Justice
Paras, Chairman of the Tribunal, which authorized the appointment and fixed the salary for the
position at P300.00 a month.

Under the rules of the Tribunal, the power to issue the appointment is lodged in its Chairman. The
rules have been adopted in virtue of the powers held since 1936 to be inherent in the Tribunal Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 1395 and expressly recognized by Section 182 of the Election Code,
which provides that the Tribunal shall have the power of making the necessary rules for the effective
performance of its constitutional functions.
Petitioner's salaries are charged against the sum of P180,000, set aside by the current appropriation
act for the expenses of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Respondents refused and are refusing to pay the salaries. Their ground is that said salaries are not
authorized by the Senate President who, according to them, is the official authorized to handle and
dispose of all the appropriation for the Tribunal.

The amount in question has been included among the appropriations of the Senate, although
specifically earmarked for the Tribunal, in line with the provision of Section 182 of the Election Code,
that all the expenses of the Tribunal and its members "shall be paid from the funds" of the Senate.

The appropriation of P180,000 in question is the first of four items for "Special Purposes" in the
appropriations for the Senate, which read:

"IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES    

     
"1. For the personnel and expenses of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, its members,
P180,000  
commissions, delegates and helpers
 
"2. For traveling and other expenses of the President of the Senate, the Senate
Committees and subordinate personnel when authorized, by, the President, of 150,000  
the Senate to undertake studies in and outside of the Philippines
 
"3. For other services, including transportation and additional secretarial
services for the members of the Senate, or expenses incurred by direction of the 160,000  
President of the Senate
 
"4. For the alteration, repair and maintenance of the offices of Senators in the
70,000  
City Hall, including the maintenance of one elevator
 
"Total for special purposes P560,000" 
(Italics supplied.)    

A comparison of the four items will show right away that, when the intention of the law is to grant the
Senate President the power over the expenditure, it says so expressly', as can be seen from the
underlined words in items 2 and 3. That intention does not appear in item 1, the one for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.

Par. 3 of the Special Provisions of the Appropriations for the Senate is invoked by respondents in
support of their theory upholding the Senate President's authority over the item in question. Said
special provision reads as follows:

"3. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the President of the Senate is
hereby authorized, within the limits of the appriations authorized in this Act for the Senate, to
transfer items of appropriations, to abolish or consolidate items or positions, and to create new items
or positions as may be necessary to effect simplication, economy and efficiency in the service,
whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires."

Without entering into any discussion of the validity of the tremendous delegation of legislative powers
involved, to our mind, the delegation is clearly unconstitutional, everybody may see that the scope of
the provision is limited to the appropriations of the Senate, which does not include the Electoral
Tribunal, a body that, in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution, is separate and
independent from all other departments of government.

According to the Constitution, the Tribunal shall be the "sole judge" of the protests under its exclusive
jurisdiction. The exclusiveness implied in the adjective "sole" is self-evident.

All parties agree that in its judicial functions, the Tribunal is completely independent. The
performance of judicial functions needs means, in personnel and in material. Judicial functions have
to be recorded, and paper is indespensable for their recording. Judicial functions entail processes that
need to be executed by officers and employees of the Tribunal. Because such means are necessary for
the performance of judicial functions, they have to par take of their judicial nature. The function of
authorizing or ordering expenditures from the appropriation for the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
judicial in character. As such, it has to belong exclusively to the Tribunal.

The functions of the Tribunal which are strictly judicial, cannot be separated from the executive,
administrative, or financial functions indispensable for the exercise of those which are strictly judicial.
When the Constitution granted the Tribunal the power of a "sole judge", it gave it that power
complete, including the executive, administrative and financial powers which are accessory and
complementary to the power to judge.

The silence of the Appropriation Act as to who has the power to authorize expenditures against the
item of P180,000 for the Senate, must be interpreted in line with the Constitution and in a way that
will not defeat its purposes. That interpretation cannot be other than to give the Tribunal the
exclusive power as to how the funds in question must be used and spent.

The interpretation that respondents propose to adopt is violative of the fundamental law. It is
elementary in statutory construction that such interpretation must be avoided when there is another
compatible with the Constitution.

The authority that they would give to the Senate President to control the funds in question is
expressly described by the respondents as a function executive in nature. It is already settled by the
decision of this Supreme Court in Government v. Springer (50 Phil. 259) that the presiding officers of
legislative chambers cannot exercise executive or judicial functions without violating the fundamental
law.

To give to the Senate President power to control the use and expenditure of the appropriation for the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is contrary to the very nature of things highly inimical to public interest, to
principles of good government, to the tenets of elemental morality. Respondents admit that it is
possible for the Senate President to be one of the protestees in a case before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. There is no more effective control by any person or body of persons than control in the
money they need. No Tribunal can render efficient judgment in a case where one of the parties has the
power over the funds of the Tribunal, over the means by which it has to perform its judicial functions,
over the, personnel rendering the necessary official help. No one can deny that an outsider controlling
the funds of the Tribunal may cripple it at his will at any time, or block it effectively from the exercise
of its judicial functions.

Congress, by its power on the purse of the nation, is duty bound to appropriate funds for the support
and functioning of all the departments and offices of the government. It has the duty of providing
funds, not only for its two houses, but for the executive and judicial departments, not only for one
office but for all the offices of the government, without any exception. One of the permanent bodies
created by the Constitution in the government setup is the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Congress must
provide it with funds in the same way that it has to appropriate funds for the Supreme Court.

Through Section 182 of the Election Code, the legislative will imposes on the Senate and on the House
of Representatives respectively the duty of supplying funds to the Two Electoral Tribunals. The duty
of the Senate to provide funds to the Senate Electoral Tribunal is to be ministerially performed by the
financial officers of the Senate, on orders of the Tribunal. They have the ministerial duty of paying the
salaries of the personnel of the Tribunal and all the expenses that the Tribunal may provide.
Respondents are such financial officers.

The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner's prayer must be granted and that respondents should be
ordered to pay, without delay, petitioner's salaries as fixed in his appointment issued by the Chairman
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, pursuant to the authority given by said body. Respondents shall pay
the costs.

The present Electoral Tribunals have been created through constitutional amendment introduced by
the Second National Assembly and duly ratified by the country's electorate. They were created as a
necessary consequence of the constitutional amendment creating Congress, the present bicameral
legislature composed of the Senate and House of Representatives, in substitution of the unicameral
National Assembly created in the original text of the Constitution and which has functioned from 1935
up to 1941. They are the successors of the Electoral Commission which functioned during the
existence of the national Assembly.

The Second National Assembly could have aptly named the two tribunals as the Senate Electoral
Commission and House Electoral Commission, because their composition, organization and functions
are substantially the same as those of the Electoral Commission which they have replaced. But the
Second National Assembly, with complete deliberation, accepted the proposition of some members,
one of them the writer of this opinion, that each one of the new bodies be named Electoral Tribunal,
for the evident connotation of the last word. As correctly stated by Mr. Justice Abad Santos, later
Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion in Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 184), the power
vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution "is judicial in nature". The Electoral
Commission was a veritable tribunal. Its functions, were essentially the same as those entrusted to
any court of justice with limited jurisdiction. But, why did the Constitutional Convention name it
Electoral Commission instead of Electoral Tribunal?

As truthfully stated by authors of books on Philippine Constitution, the members of the Constitutional
Convention were divided by two schools of thought. One side was conservative, and wanted to retain
in the legislative chambers the power to judge contests on the election and qualifications of their
respective members. The other side was progressive and urged the transfer of said power to tribunals.
We belonged to the last, lie were convinced that the traditional, system of legislative administration of
justice was fundamentally, wrong and had to be discarded if we were to eliminate one of the strongest
causes of revolution.

Since we took interest in public affairs, we learned that injustice, partiality, blind partisanship were
the rule in the disposal of protests by legislative bodies. That knowledge was only strengthened by our
personal and direct experience, when, in the practice of the law profession, we handled legislative
protests in the pre-Commonwealth Senate and House of Representatives, and during our membership
in the latter for two consecutive terras. Of course, the minority members have always insisted on the
impartial appraisal of the facts and the application of the law, and that justice should be the only
consideration to be taken, but the majority members found always pretexts to defeat, in the sacred
name of justice, the true will of the people and to want only trample down the rights of the minority.
Even now we cannot avoid shuddering upon the mere memory of the iniquities that have been
committed and how with the same rulings, the majority candidates were usually proclaimed
triumphant and the minority candidates declared defeated.

As a matter of justice, we may state that there had been magnificent exceptions, in which real justice
has been administered. The whole country may yet remember how the election contest affecting the
sixth senatorial district was disposed of by the pre-Commonwealth Senate, under the courageous and
dramatic leadership of President Quezon. No one could then complain of the annulment of one of the
most scandalous elections. Again, when the election of Senator Alejo Mabanag, member of the
opposition Democrata Party, was contested, and the majority was about to railroad his ouster, to be
replaced by the majority candidate who was defeated by him at the polls, to stop impending injustice,
Senate President Quezon, as he himself recounted to us the dramatic incident, upon receiving the
information from Senator Veloso, rushed from his sickbed to the Senate to successfully frustrate the
iniquity.

These two outstanding exceptions served only to emphasize the imbearable general situation,
prompting us to stage a relentless campaign through the press and public meetings for the transfer of
the power to judge legislative protests to the Supreme Court, then the only Tribunal from which
justice could be expected in litigations involving powerful politicians and the political party
controlling the government.

We could not propose that the cases be transferred to the cognizance of inferior courts, which were
subject to political influence that deprived them of the independence indispensable for an impartial,
upright and courageous administration of justice. They were, as they are now, under the
administrative supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, a political official, who, in turn, was
under the direct influence of the majority members, of the most powerful political leaders in the
government, the majority of them always bent on seeking to seat their party's candidate without any
discrimination as to means.

The conviction we have been entertaining during the last fourth of a century that the administrative
control of the Secretary of Justice over inferior courts is not satisfactory, from the point of view of an
independent and fearless administration of justice, is fast gaining ground, as shown by the movement
started by two prominent majority Senators, seeking the transfer of said administrative control to the
Supreme Court.

The clash between the two schools of thought in the Constitutional Convention was long and hard.
Finally the two camps entered into a compromise which no one could fail to accept. Those who were
advocating for the retention by legislatures of the power to try election protests could not reject a
proposal for the creation of a body with a membership two-thirds of which were members of the
legislature. Those of us who were in the opposing camp, agreed to the proposal because the six
legislative members were to be equally divided between the majority and the minority. Should they
happen to vote following party lines, the balance of power would have been placed in the hands of the
three Justices. Were they to act as true judicial officers as it was their duty, there was no harm even if
they should out vote the three Justices, because, regardless of the result, all would have acted
according to the dictates of their own conscience. Thus we created the Electoral Commission, which,
notwithstanding its legislative majority, could and actually function independently from the National
Assembly. So as not to hurt the feelings of those of the legislative school, we, of the judicial school,
agreed to name it Commission.

The fact that the provision for its creation was placed under the title of the legislative department
neither affects its independent character nor made it an integral or organic part of the national
Assembly. It is a matter of form that does not affect the substance, the Convention placed the
provision creating the Electoral Commission where it was placed because the limited jurisdiction
granted to it had a direct bearing with the membership of the National Assembly.
The Constitutional Convention created also two other separate and independent bodies, the
Commission on Impeachment and the Commission on Appointments. Each one, in the exercise of the
constitutional powers granted to it, was completely independent from the National Assembly. The
provisions regarding them were, notwithstanding, placed also under the title of the Legislative
Department, because of the intimate relationship regarding their memberships. Because all their
members were also members of the National Assembly, they functioned effectively without separate
means, which they could have dispensed with entirely in view of the nature of their tasks. It was,
therefore, of no moment that their negligible personnel was appointed by the Speaker.

The Commission on Impeachment was abolished with the creation of the bicameral Congress, its
functions having been transferred to the House of Representatives. The Commission on
Appointments was retained, and it continues to be an independent body, separate from the Senate
and from the House of Representatives.

There is no question that the Electoral Tribunals are independent in their judicial functions.
Respondents say so in so many words, adding that "such was the intention of the framers of our
Constitution in creating the original Electoral Commission for the National Assembly". But they
allege, upon inaccurate information or erroneous knowledge of facts, that it never occurred to the
members of the National Assembly, many of whom were delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
that the independent judicial power granted to the Electoral Commission carried with it complete
administrative independence and organic separation from the legislative department. They assert that
from the very beginning, the subordinate personnel of the commission were appointed by the Speaker
and its expenses were paid out of the Assembly funds, and not a single voice of protest was raised
against this state of affairs and everyone concerned or affected acquiesed in the arrangement.

We are in a position to state the truth on the matter. He have been one of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, one of the members of the two National Assemblies, and one of the
members of the Electoral Commission during its existence. From the very beginning we have been
trying hard to secure separate appropriations for the Electoral Commission. The National Assembly
and, especially, the Committee on Appropriations, of which we were also one of the members, were
fully acquainted with our efforts. We failed because of jealousy, the majority of the other members of
the National Assembly would not permit that the six assemblymen, members of the Electoral
Commission, with the separate appropriations, could enjoy a wider power of patronage with the
appointments of the personnel of the Electoral Commission. They insisted on enjoying equal
opportunity in obtaining the appointments of their recommendees. They wanted that whatever
personnel the Electoral Commission may need, be drawn from persons appointed by the Speaker,
who was equally accessible to all the members of the National Assembly. I was assured,
notwithstanding, that the Electoral Commission will not suffer for any lack of personnel or of funds
for all its expenses, the assurance proved to be true for all practical purposes.

All the expenses of the Electoral Commission were paid with funds from the National Assembly, the
commission was provided with all the personnel we needed. The arrangement worked satisfactorily
under the special circumstances then prevailing. Although there was still prevailing the division of
pros and antis, all the members of the National Assembly belonged to one single national political
party. Given by the Assembly administrative control over our personnel, we were able to free all our
employees from all undue influence and they performed their duties with complete loyalty to the
commission. We enjoined, in this respect, the complete cooperation of Speakers Montilla and Yulo,
who presided respectively over the two National Assemblies, and the strictly judicial attitude adopted
by the legislative members of the Electoral Commission commanded the respect; even of the other
members of the Assembly who were protestees. No one dared to illegally interfere with or influence
our employees, because everybody knew that the guilty one would have been punished. As a matter of
fact, a protestee who dared to commit an irregularity in the revision of ballots, was denounced by an
employee to the commission and, upon the commission's report, said protestee was punished with
expulsion by the National Assembly.

Although the arrangement worked satisfactorily, and for said reason no one voiced any protest, it was
a known fact that we have never been agreeable to the arrangement. We accepted it as inevitable, but
we have always expressed our opinion that separate and independent appropriation should have been
voted for the Electoral Commission.

We are not alone to entertain such an opinion. The same was shared by other members of the
Electoral Commission, including those who have been delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
among them, Mr. Justice Claro M. Recto, the President of the Convention, and Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, the Chairman of the Committee on Bill of Rights. President Roxas, who was also a delegate to
the Convention and then was also a member of the National Assembly, was also of the same opinion.

At the Roxas necrological service held at Malacañan Palace in April, 1948, the then Acting Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras, solemnly said in his oration regarding the late President the following:

"Very shortly before his death, in a conference wherein the matter relating to the administrative
personnel of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was taken up, President Roxas supported the stand that
said personnel should be named by, and under the control of, the members of the Tribunal with a
view to making it an independent constitutional body in all respects. He accordingly recommended
the inclusion in the next Budget of an appropriation for the Electoral Tribunals, unattached to and
separate from the outlays for the Congress. As this recommendation was made some thirty-six hours
before President Roxas died, it may well be treated as his last will, unmistakably expressive of the
kind of judiciary he wanted his country to have.

"President Roxas could not have pursued a different course of action towards the Judiciary, because,
as he himself postulated in his message to the Congress three months ago, 'We will continue to enjoy
our liberties so long as we have independent courts and courageous judges who will relentlessly battle
for the preservation of those liberties.' "

In line with the same conviction, since they started to function in 1945 the year of their first
organization, we have been working to secure independent appropriations for the two Electoral
Tribunals. We even prepared a budget for Commissioner Mathay of the Budget. We wanted it to be
submitted by President Osmeña to Congress, but we failed to convince the good commissioner that an
independent appropriation should be allotted to the Electoral Tribunal.

There is no sensible ground for respondents' position that, under the Section 182 of the Election Code
and the last two Appropriation Acts No. 156 and 320, Congress assumed that the Electoral Tribunals
are organic parts of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, respectively, because of the mere
fact that the expenses of the Tribunals are to be taken from the funds appropriated for each chamber.
At any rate, Congress is the one organ of government duty bound to provide with funds the Electoral
Tribunals as well as all other departments, branches and organs of the government. The Constitution
has entrusted to Congress the authority and duty of appropriating public funds for said purpose, a
function essentially legislative in nature. But even if Congress had made the assumption attributed to
it by respondents, such assumption cannot have any weight because it is violative of the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution

Respondent's statement to the effect that since liberation the Electoral Tribunals continued to be
treated as organic parts of Congress, under the administrative supervision of their respective
presiding officer, may only be based on the subjective personal attitude of said presiding officers, but
neither one of the two Electoral Tribunals has ever accepted such administrative supervision. No
independent appropriation has been made by Congress for the Electoral Tribunals until the sum of
P180,000.00 was lately set aside for the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The two Tribunals had to resign
themselves to the use of any personnel that the legislative chamber could lend them, but both
tribunals have always resented the scandalous dereliction of national duty committed by Congress, in
failing to provide the necessary funds for the efficient function of the Tribunals, so much so that we
could not avoid denouncing such dereliction in speeches we delivered months ago.

The allegation that at no tine did any one suspect that the Electoral Tribunals would declare their
independence from Congress on administrative matters, until the President of the Senate scaled down
the proposed salary of the secretary to a member of the Tribunal, is not based on fact. As soon as the
appropriation in question had been approved, the Senate President gave assurance to a Senator,
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that the latter will enjoy complete free hand in the
expenditure of the fund. In line with said commitment, which was communicated to all the members
of the Tribunal, the Chairman addressed to the Senate President, a letter dated July 1, 1948, copy of
which is attached to the record. Contrary to his commitment, the Senate President refused to give
effect to almost all the items proposed in said communication.

Efforts have been made to carry out the-resolution of the Tribunal as embodied in the communication
sent by its Chairman, but the Senate President insisted in refusing to honor his word.

The difference between the salaries for personnel approved by the tribunal and those which the
Senate President would pay, is dismissed by the respondents (who take a narrow point of view) as
such a "petty difference" as not to be the rallying point for those who advocate administrative
independence for the Electoral Tribunals.

Of course, if the amount of more or less pesos is to be taken as the standard of measurement, its
pettiness would easily be manifest, but that would be missing the point. The difference between the
Tribunal and the Senate President must be measured in terns of the basic principles involved judicial
independence of the Tribunal, untramnieled administration of justice, unfettered control of the
means needed to perform a constitutional function, public trust and confidence in the Tribunal, clean
and honest senatorial elections, delimitation of constitutional functions, democracy or dictatorship,
effectiveness of the Constitution. Only by taking into consideration the great principles directly
involved in the controversy can any one take the proper perspective, and see that the difference
cannot be enclosed in a thimble because it would even overflow the vastness of a geographical
continent.

Respondents have absolutely no basis to assume that their position can find any support in the
attitude of the two National Assemblies or that of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, or in
the attitude of the Electoral Commission or of the Justices of the Supreme Court who had acted as
members thereof.

One argument in support of respondents' position is the idea of possessiveness in the words "shall
each have" of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. But this method of interpretation is violative of
the elemental principle of legal hermeneutics that commands that all the parts of a legal text should
be interpreted in relation with the rest, not as isolated and independent units. The main idea in the
whole section in question is embodied in the following words: "shall be the sole judge of all contests".
That idea is characterized by the exclusiveness implied in the adjective "sole". Reason advises us that
to be "sole judge", the Tribunals must have to enjoy complete independence, not only in the direct
performance of their judicial functions, but in the control of the means, financial or administrative,
they need for the performance of their judicial functions.
Respondents' theory that the Tribunals are organic parts of the Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, may be met by their own reference to the fact that the Electoral Tribunals are jointly
mentioned in Section 13 of Article II of the Constitution with the Commission on Appointments,
which they describe as "another new constitutional body". Their assumption that the Commission on
Appointments is an organic part of the Senate, House of Representatives, or Congress, has no validity
in the face of their own admission that the Commission on Appointments is another "new
constitutional body", the description being evidently incompatible with that of a mere organic part of
other constitutional bodies such as the Senate or House of Representatives.

That the Commission on Elections and the General Auditing Office are created under two separate
articles of the Constitution  X and XI, does not make the Electoral Tribunal less independent. By their
respective nature and functions, the Commission on Elections and the General Auditing Office have
no close connection with the two legislative chambers.

Perhaps it would have been better to dedicate separate articles, one to the Electoral Tribunals and the
other to the Commission on Appointments. This is a matter of form upon which honest differences of
opinion may be legitimately entertained according to the literary culture and tastes of anyone. But
because the Constitutional Convention adopted a form with which we may disagree now, that is not a
reason for closing our eyes to the realities of the substance, to the ideological contents of the present
to what the authors really meant.

The provision in Section 10 (3) of Article VII of the Constitution, permittins Congress to vest by law in
the President the power to appoint inferior officers, including subordinate personnel of the judiciary,
holds no strength as argument against petitioner's position. The Constitutional Convention
entertained no fear that appointments by the President could impair judicial independence, because it
had the conviction that the President of the Philippines would not violate the obligations exacted from
him by the oath provided by Section 7 of Article VII, to preserve and defend the Constitution, execute
the lavs and "do justice to every man". Besides, in practice, although the President would attempt to
exert an undue influence on the subordinate personnel of the judiciary, it would be impossible for him
to achieve such purpose as the magnitude and number of official matters he has to attend to would
not give him time to pay attention to so many subordinate personnel.

Respondents allege that the Senate President has not done one single act that has actually prevented
the Senate Electoral Tribunals from performing its functions, but do not deny that the Senate
President has refused to pay petitioner the salary of P300 fixed by the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
because he had reduced it to P200. They also admit that the Senate President has appointed guards
for ballot boxes without the consent or knowledge of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. May these acts of
the Senate President not be considered as an omen of how he may crime the Tribunal? Respondents
admit the possibility of a Senate President being involved as one of the protestees in a contest under
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. They also admit that in the pending protest, where seven of his fellow
Liberal Senators are the protestees, the Senate President's leadership in the Senate is involved, as if in
case said protestees should lose, he will also lose said leadership. Everybody knows that there are
many who resort to fraud and illegality to retain the mayoralty even in the most insignificant town of
the country. The position of President of the Senate, being one of the most exalted in the government,
second only to the President of the Philippines in the magnitude of political power, would it be
surprising that he, without resorting to any fraud or illegality, should deny the Senate Electoral
Tribunal the necessary means for it to proceed with the trial of the pending protest, thus closing all
doors to eventuality of the protestees' defeat in the case and his loss of leadership in the Senate?

Legal traditions, the same as social traditions, when running into conflict with the times of progress,
had to give way to new concepts that will establish the traditions for the future. Man is not stagnant. It
cannot afford to be stagnant. It has to progress if it has to survive.

The traditional tri-partite division of the powers and departments of government has given way to the
new legal concepts recognized by the Constitutional Convention that it embodied in the fundamental
law, and it our duty to accept such concepts and not to cringe on outworn legal ideas.

The three departments, executive, legislative and judicial, in which Aristotle and Montesquieu had
divided and among which distributed all the powers of government, under our constitutional set up,
cannot embrace anymore all our government offices and agencies. Profiting by the lessons of national
political experience, the drafters of our Constitution could have not held fast to the classical tri-partite
division. They created independent bodies, with powers of their own, separate from the three
tradional departments. Among them are the Commission on Appointments and the two Electoral
Tribunals. These Tribunals do not belong either to the legislative or judicial departments, much less to
the executive. They are independent powers by themselves. The majority of their members are
members of Congress and their functions are judicial in nature, but they are not subordinate either to
Congress or any of its houses or to the Supreme Court. In the official hierarchy, they occupy the same
top level in government occupied by the President of the Philippines, Congress and the Supreme
Court.

"The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. x x x It  is preservation in its
integrity and effectiveness is necessary to the present form of Government. It is clear that each
department is bound to preserve its own existence if up to the duty imposed upon it as one or the
coordinate branches of the government. x x x

Therefore, courts have not only the power maintain their life, but they have also the power to make
that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate
means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their integrity,
maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for, if
the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be
seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence disappears and
subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to control, and the power to control is the
power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life to the judiciary and nothing less than the
sovereign power can take it away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything
really essential for the administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the
efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power,
permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator did not Itself
subordinate them." (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322, 331, 332.)

Respondents admit that the Senate President may paralyze the work of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and the paralyzation of the Tribunal means miscarriage of justice and flagrant betrayal of the aims of
the Constitution.

Resuming, we hold that the following propositions are in accordance with the Constitution, with
applicable statutes, and with the elemental rules of reason and logic;

1. The Senate Electoral Tribunal is an independent constitutional body, separate from all others
departments and branches of the government.

2. It is a tribunal in the true and strict sense of the word, with the limited jurisdiction granted to it by
the fundamental law,and its functions are properly judicial
3. The necessary means to exercise a power or jurisdiction partake of their nature and are and should,
accordingly, be so classified in the legal nomenclature.

4. The means needed by the Senate Electoral Tribunal to perform its judicial functions, such as
personnel, material, funds, should be considered as essential part of said judicial functions and,
therefore, are judicial in character. No legislative official may control them without violating the
Constitution.

5. The power granted by the Constitution to the Senate Electoral Tribunal as the "sole judge" of
senatorial contests, is not abstract or as empty as a carcass, but real, positive, with all the attributes
for effective manifestation in the external world, and, like all human powers, needs the tools and
instruments linking cause and effect.

6. The Senate Electoral Tribunal, like all government organs, has to be provided with public funds for
all its expenses, and the power and duty of providing such funds have been lodged by the Constitution
in Congress.

7. That constitutional duty has been and is presently recognized by Congress in the provisions of
Section 182 of the Election Code.

8. The general constitutional duty of Congress to provide funds to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by
the clear provisions of Section 182 of the Election Code, is specifically entrusted for actual
performance to the Senate.

9. The appropriation of P180,000 made in the current Appropriation Act for the expenses of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, after three years of congressional neglect, has been placed among the items
of the Senate, in accordance with the provisions of Section 182 of the Election Code.

10. The text of the Appropriation Act, considering the place and wording of the item of P180,000 in
question, does not authorize an interpretation that would place said amount under the control of the
Senate President, but, even on the contrary assumption, such interpretation should not be entertained
because it would be violative of the Constitution.

11. When a statutory provision is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the one that would not
make it contravene the Constitution should be adopted.

12. To place the amount in question under the control of the Senate President is contrary to public
morals and policy, because it would give to a party directly affected in a pending litigation the power
to incapacitate the Tribunal in the performance of its judicial functions.

13. The location of the item in the Appropriation Act is a matter of fora that cannot affect the
substance and nature of the control over the use and expenditure of the item that is inherent in the
Tribunal, in the same way that regardless of the place the appropriations of the Supreme Court may
occupy in the Appropriation Act cannot transfer the power of the Supreme Court to control said
appropriation to other offices or officers.

14. For the effective performance of its functions the Tribunal should never be placed in the position
of subservience to any other department, branch or agency of government, and to transfer the control
over the funds appropriated for its expenses to any official and any other offices is to make it
subservient to said officials.
15. The power granted by the Constitution to the Tribunal carries with it the power to issue rules for
the effective performance of its judicial functions and such power is expressly recognized by Section
182 of the Election Code.

16. The appointments of the personnel of the Tribunal are, according to its rules, to be signed by the
Chairman of said body, and the petitioner's appointment as signed by said Chairman is the one that
must be recognized to be valid and not the one issued by the Senate President or by the Secretary of
the Senate.

17. The Tribunal is the one empowered to fix the salaries which its officers and employees must
receive, the appropriation for its expenses having been made by Congress in a lump sum, and no
power can change or revoke the amounts approved by the Tribunal.

18. In virtue of the provisions of Section 182 of the Election Code, the Senate and its officers are to
perform only the ministerial duties to faithfully execute the resolutions of the Tribunal regarding
payment of salaries and expenses against the item in question.

19. When respondents failed to carry out to the letter the resolutions of the Tribunal, they may be
compelled to do their duty by mandamus.

Before ending this opinion, we will devote some space to respondents' move to disqualify three
Justices from sitting in this case.

There is no law upon which the move may be based. There is no law providing for any disqualification
of members of the Supreme Court and there cannot be any such law until the Constitution shall have
been amended to permit its enactment.

The provisions of Rule 126 are not applicable to members of the Supreme Court. They are applicable
exclusively to judicial officers of inferior courts.

Rule 126 has been enacted by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power granted to it
by Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution. The qualifications and disqualifications of the members of
the Supreme Court are matters beyond the scope of said rule-making power. To contend otherwise Is
to contend that Congress may legislate on such natters, because it has the power of altering the
judicial rules that the Supreme Court has enacted or may enact, and such result will be violative of the
clear intention of the framers of the fundamental law to place such matters outside of the power of
statutory legislation.

Sec. 8 of Art. VIII of the Constitution empowers Congress to legislate on the qualifications and,
consequently, on disqualifications of judges of inferior courts, as can be seen in the following text:

"SEC. 8. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of inferior courts, but no person
may be appointed judge of any such courts unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and has been
admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The constitutional silence with regards to Justices of the Supreme Court places them beyond the
reach of the legislative grant. "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." When the framers of the
Constitution intended to include the members of the Supreme Court with judges of inferior courts in a
general provision, they had done it expressly as they did in Sec. 9 of Art. VIII, regarding judicial
tenure of office.
The Delegates to the Constitutional Convention had not thought of the need then or in any forseeable
future of any legislation to disqualify Justices of the Supreme Court from sitting in judgment on any
case or group of cases. Although they agreed on the necessity of some reforms in the Supreme Court,
to correct practices that were not satisfying to the bar or conducive to bolstering public faith and trust
in the administration of justice, as can be seen in the revolutionary provisions of Secs. 10, 11, 12 and 13
of Art. VIII of the Constitution, they shared the prevalent general opinion as regards the character of
the men elevated to the highest tribunal of the land. They could not have attained the exceptionally
coveted honor of sitting therein with it having hurdled the most acid tests as to intellectual and moral
fitness and willingness to administer reasonable, impartial and fearless justice. Many, the Delegates,
three-fourths of whom were lawyers, whenever they wanted to mention the highest specimens of
human wisdom or to point out paragons of sterling moral character among the living Filipinos, could
not avoid looking in the direction of the men sitting in the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
judicial dictums of such men had decisively influenced the Constitutional Convention in the adoption
of a great number of the clauses of the fundamental law.

The Delegates believed that on the matter as to whether or not a Justice of the Supreme Court should
take part in the cognizance, deliberation, and decision of a case, there is no better law than his own
conscience. Many of them knew of the case of a Chief Justice who, when still presiding over an
inferior court, refused to inhibit himself from trying a criminal case in which his own son was the
accused and, finding him guilty on the evidence, sentenced him, as provided by law to imprisonment.
When in a case, to break a deadlock, on a legal question, we voted to convict the accused, defended by
our son, and in another case we joined the majority in imposing upon the same son a fine of P50.00
for contempt (People v. Guillen, L-1477) [1], we have only done what we believed should be expected
from all judicial officers. It was not necessary to bring to memory the examples of sterness of
the pater familias of Roman history, who had not the least compunction of exercising to the limit of
cruelty the power granted to them by the Twelve Tables on the life and death of their offspring.

Consonant with the Constitution, this Supreme Court declared null and void per se the provision of
the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) disqualifying the seven Justices, including the
Chief Justice, who held positions in the puppet governments during the Japanese occupation, from
taking cognizance of collaboration cases, criminal cases of treason on appeal, where the accused also
held positions in said puppet governments, our far-reaching resolution having been rendered in the
leading case of Vargas v. Rilloraza [1] (L-1612) and promulgated since February 26, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3847.

We held invalid the legislative disqualification because, under the Constitution, Congress lacks the
power to legislate on such matter. We also declared in the same decision that no person or officer,
whether Justice of the Court of Appeals or judge of any other inferior court, may sit even temporarily
in the Supreme Court, that privilege and right being reserved exclusively to Justices of the Supreme
Court regularly appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and that such sitting
by an outsider is also unconstitutional.

It is true that it was necessary for us to insist for two years in the invalidation of the unconstitutional
provisions of the People's Court Act before the decision in the Vargas case was rendered and that
during those two years the Supreme Court, with our consistent and repeated dissenting votes, had
been giving effect in a great number of cases to the unconstitutional provisions, but such long
reluctance or hesitancy to overthrow them, instead of weakening the effect of the vital decision, gives
it rather the rock strength and permanence of primary doctrines that, because of their essential truth
and justice, withstand the corroding action of the ages. The length of time for the collective mind to
reach a definite conclusion measures the magnitude of the mature deliberation that usually precedes
and characterizes the ultimate in human actions.
Human complexes do not and should not enter in the actions of the dispensers of justice, much less
when destiny has placed them in the Supreme tribunal, the highest pedestal attainable for the
ambitions of the most sanguine lawyer. Having reached the last goal in their legal career, in the
performance of their official duties, they should not act with a weaker attitude than the person giving
an ante-mortem declaration; the attitude of a man facing the infinite mystery of eternity, into which
he will soon plunge in a final dive from which there is no possible return and for which he will not be
allowed to carry any mortal baggage, earthly possessions, or temporary riches, and human relations
cannot offer him anymore the terrors of hate or the promises of love or vanitas vanitatis any
allurement.

On the other side, all those appearing before us should rather base their causes on the superior
reasons that they may offer, than on any other factor, such as trying to eliminate members of this
Supreme Court. They should not follow the example of those persons, in public office or in private life,
including highest officials in the judiciary and in Congress, that use to end their arguments against the
stand are have taken on controverted issues of public interest by suggesting or asking us to resign
from our position as Justice of the Supreme Court. The attitude constitutes a confession that they
recognize the inherent weakness of their arguments. Unable to invalidate our reasons with better
ones, they would eliminate us in the false hope of suppressing the reasons they cannot destroy.
Unable to destroy the ideas, they would destroy the man expressing them. Their hope is false, because
our elimination will not eliminate all the sponsors of our ideas. If they are based on truth, if they are
supported by justice, if they are in accordance with the laws of the universe, sooner or later, others
will take our place and raise the standard to expose the sham and crush the pretensions of error and
evil. Men are perishable but ideas are not. Men are ephemeral, but ideas are eternal.

Coming to the instant case, perhaps the disqualification of three members of this Court is sought in
obedience to the inner violitions of subconsciousness, based on the recognition of the inherent
strength of petitioner's cause. When on September 15, 1948, one day after it was argued, are started to
deliberate on the case, the correct decision was so evident right away, that almost all the members
reacted as a single individual, and the written memoranda of the parties only served to ratify and
fortify the unanimous reaction. The Supreme Court seldom has considered a clearer case.

The petition shall be granted.

"SEC. 182. Contests before the Electoral Tribunals of Congress. In contests under their respective
jurisdiction, the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives; if shall have and
exercise the same powers which the law confers upon the courts, including that of summarily
punishing contempts, ordering the taking of depositions, the arrests of witnesses for the purpose of
compelling their appearances and the production of documents and other evidence, and the
compulsory payment of costs and expenses which it may have assessed against the parties and their
bondsmen; of giving notices of its decisions, resolutions, and orders and the enforcement of judicial
orders; and of making the necessary rules for the effective performance of their constitutional
functions. All the expenses of the said Tribunals and of their respective members shall be paid from
the funds of the House of Congress to which each Tribunal pertains, and their telegrams and
correspondence shall be transmitted free of charge."

Y los arts. 4 y 5 del reglamento del tribunal electoral del Senado disponen lo siguiente:

"THE CHAIRMAN
"4. The powers and duties of the Chairman of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be as follows:

(a) Issue calls for the meetings of the Tribunal;

(b) Preside at the hour previously fixed for the meeting;

(c) Preserve order and decorum during the session and for that purpose take such steps as may be
convenient or as the Tribunal may direct;

(d) Pass upon all questions of order, but from his decision, any Member may appeal to the Tribunal;

(e) Enforce the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the Tribunal;

(f) With the approval of the Tribunal and In accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service
Law, appoint or remove any employee of the Tribunal.

"CONTROL OF OWN FUNCTION

"5. The Senate Electoral Tribunal shall have the exclusive control, direction, and supervision of all
matters pertaining to its own internal operation."
CASE DIGEST: DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON,Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S.
DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 189466; February 11,
2010.

FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered
voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee,
petitioner Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a
national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, woelecmen, youth, urban
poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for
quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration
of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo
but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on prompting Abayon to file the present petition for
special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group
that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents
Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a
petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan
was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue
of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
ISSUE: Does respondent HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that
such organizations won in the 2007 elections?
HELD: HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v.
Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the
House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they
ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for
him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of
the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of
the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by
Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan
met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932
according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May
15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955
as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a
job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware
business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure
for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his
citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has
already been laid to rest
ANTONIO Y. CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR Nos. 92191-
92, 1991-07-30
Facts:
petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
(HRET).
HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Northern Samar
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On
1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative... are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,... Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)      Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)      Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar
2)      Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
Issues:
whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ON THE ISSUE OF
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
Ruling:
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.  The reason is obvious.  He was already a citizen.  Not only
was his mother a... natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.  He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship.  For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be... less binding.  Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations... of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.  Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries.  There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when... he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.   How can a Filipino citizen
elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.  It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino.  Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country.  Concededly, it was the law itself that had... already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
LIBANAN VS. HRET

Not Cited Recently

EN BANC G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997 MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, PETITIONER, VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JOSE T. RAMIREZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The 28th May 1997 decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"), which
affirmed the proclamation of herein private respondent Jose Tan Ramirez declaring him to be the duly
elected Representative of Eastern Samar for having obtained the plurality of votes over petitioner
Marcelino Libanan, and the 20th June 1997 resolution of the HRET, which denied with finality
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are sought to be annulled in this special civil action for
certiorari.

Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for
the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the
returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed
respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District with a total of forty-one
thousand five hundred twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to petitioner's forty thousand eight
hundred sixty-nine (40,869) votes, or a margin of six hundred fifty-four (654) votes over those of
petitioner.

Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other
things, that the 08th May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral
irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as well as his leaders and followers, in
the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of Eastern Samar with the aid, in various
instances, of peace officers supposedly charged with maintaining an orderly and honest election.
Petitioner contested seventy-nine (79) precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also maintained that the
election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were tampered with, substituted, or systematically
marked in favor of respondent Ramirez. Libanan prayed that, after due proceedings, the HRET
should issue an order to annul the election and proclamation of Ramirez and to thereafter so proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.

In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the special and
affirmative defenses, respondent Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results of the
elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera,
terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise voters therein listed. Accordingly, he
prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal of the protest and the confirmation of his election as the duly
elected representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.

After some peripheral issues were settled by the HRET, the revision of ballots in the protested
precincts commenced on 20 February 1996. The HRET noted that Libanan contested a total of
seventy-nine (79) precincts. It was noted during the revision, however, that six (6) of the contested
precincts, namely, Precincts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of Arteche, were found to have been
merged during the 08 May 1995 elections into three (3) precincts, i.e., Precincts Nos. 14 and 19,
Precincts Nos. 15 and 16 and Precincts Nos. 18 and 20. Thus, only seventy-six (76) ballot boxes
were actually opened for revision, one of which, Precinct No. 4-1 of Guiuan, did not contain any
ballot.

On 22 February 1996, while the revision of the counter-protested precincts was being held, Ramirez
filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest in Specific Municipalities/Precincts"
praying that he be granted leave to withdraw and abandon partially his counter-protest in certain
precincts. [1] Libanan filed an opposition thereto but the motion was eventually granted by the
Chairman of the HRET and subsequently confirmed in a resolution by the tribunal.

On 21 March 1996, the HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy Hearing
Commissioner for the reception of evidence. Following that reception, the respective memoranda of
Libanan and Ramirez were filed.

The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET related mainly to
the proper appreciation of the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the parties during the revision. No
evidence was presented in support of the other allegations of the protest (like the alleged tampering
of election returns) and of the counter-protest (such as the alleged tearing of some of the pages of the
computerized list of voters to disenfranchise legitimate voters and the use of goons to terrorize and
compel voters to vote for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda of the parties.
The HRET thus concentrated, such as can be rightly expected, its attention to the basic appreciation
of ballots. [2]

The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be spurious ballots;
on this score, the HRET has explained:

"No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot
must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the
signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the
present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.

"The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his Memorandum that the absence of
thumbmark or BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot rendered the ballot spurious. The
applicable law on this issue is Sec. 24, R.A. 7166. It reads:
"'In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to so
authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board of election inspectors and shall constitute an
election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.'

"As may be gleaned above, unlike the provision of Section 210 of the Omnibus Election Code where
the BEI Chairman was required to affix his right thumbmark at the back of the ballot immediately after
it was counted, the present law no longer requires the same.

"Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to
authenticate the ballot shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which
provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be considered invalid. In fact, the members of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the
absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make a ballot
spurious.

"Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
mentioned during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was 'to
require the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by
affixing his signature on (sic) the back thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious,' R.A. 7166, as
approved, does not contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole
(House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots
without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is clearly provided
under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not the
disenfranchisement of the voter."  [3]

In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez; it concluded:

"WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Tribunal Resolved to DISMISS the instant election
protest, including the parties' mutual claims for damages and attorney's fee; AFFIRM the
proclamation of Protestee Jose Tan Ramirez; and DECLARE him to be the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar, for having obtained a plurality of 143 votes
over second placer Protestant Marcelino Libanan."  [4]
Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the HRET arguing, among other
grounds, [5] that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots could not but
indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections. He averred that the
law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the
voter. Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the HRET credited petitioner Libanan with
thirty (30) votes because of the error in the computation of the base figure and rejected twelve (12)
ballots for respondent Ramirez. Respondent Ramirez, nevertheless, remained to be the winner with a
lead of ninety-nine (99) votes in his favor. As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the
back of the ballots, the HRET stressed:

"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides in part that 'in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.' In the instant case,
there is no evidence to support protestant's allegation that the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for
Reconsideration are substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of
the ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching or substitution. At best, such absence of BEI
Chairman's signature is a prima facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in
their duty of authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to the
validity of the ballots."  [6]
Thus, the present recourse.

A perusal of the grounds raised by petitioner to annul the HRET decision and resolution boils down to
the issue of whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the absence
of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious.

Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which have been for
private respondent Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of the BEI, but which had the
COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers, should be invalidated. It is the position of petitioner
that the purpose of the law in requiring the BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot
when he issues it to the voter is "to authenticate" the ballot and, absent that signature, the ballot must
be considered spurious.

Prefatorily, the Court touches base on its jurisdiction to review and pass upon decisions or resolutions
of the electoral tribunals.
The Constitution mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective members. [7] In Laza tin vs. HRET, [8] the Court has
observed that -

"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as 'intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.'
Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ''full, clear and
complete.' Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution."  [9]
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
even affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs.
HRET, [10] the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, [11] the Court has ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET, [12] venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial
of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
itself calls for remedial action.

In the instant controversy, it would appear that the HRET "reviewed and passed upon the validity of
all the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts, including those not contested and
claimed by the parties." [13] The Tribunal, added, that "(t)his course of action was adopted not only to
give effect to the intent of each and every voter, but also to rectify any mistake in appreciation,
deliberate or otherwise, committed at the precinct level and overlooked during the revision stage of
this case." [14] In holding that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI at the back of
the ballot does not invalidate it, the HRET has ratiocinated in this wise:

"No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot
must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the
signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the
present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
"xxx xxx xxx

"Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to
authenticate the ballot shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which
provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be considered invalid. In fact, the members of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the
absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make a ballot
spurious.

"Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
mentioned during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was 'to
require the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by
affixing his signature on (sic) the back thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious,' R.A. 7166, as
approved, does not contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole
(House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots
without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is clearly provided
under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not the
disenfranchisement of the voter."  [15]

The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:

"SEC. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. - In every case before delivering an
official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of
the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes
of the Board of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section
263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code."
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall
thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure.
The courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace
situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute
are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined
from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there should be no room
for construction. [16]

As so aptly observed by the Solicitor-General, House Bill ("HB") No. 34811 (which later become R.A.
No. 7166), approved by the House of Representatives on third reading, was a consolidation of
different bills. Two of the bills consolidated and considered in drafting H.B. No. 34811 were H.B.
34639 and H.B. No. 34660. Section 22 of the two latter bills provided that:

"In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Any ballot which
is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious. Failure to so authenticate shall constitute an
election offense."  [17]
During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on 08 August 1991,
the members agreed to delete the phrase "Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed
spurious." Pertinent portions of the transcript of stenographic notes ("TSN") taken during the Meeting
of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms read:
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Mercado.

"HON. MERCADO. I think, Section 22, we go to the intent of the provision. I think the intent here is to
sanction the inspector so I would propose a compromise. The ballot should not be deemed as
spurious. However, it would rather be failure of the inspector to, or the chairman to affix his signature
would rather be a circumstance which would aggravate the crime, which would aggravate the election
offense, on the part of the inspector, but not to disenfranchise the voter. Because the intention here is
to punish the election inspector for not affixing the signature. Why should we punish the voter? So I
think the compromise here . . .

"THE CHAIRMAN. A serious election offense.

"HON. MERCADO. Yes, it should be a serious election offense on the part of the chairman for not
affixing the signature, but not to make the ballot spurious.

"HON. RONO. Mr. Chairman.

"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Rono.

"HON. RONO. One thing that we have to guard against is when we deal with the ballot and the right
to suffrage, we should not really make law that would prevent the flexibility of the Commission on
Elections, and the Supreme Court from getting other extraneous efforts to confirm authenticity or the
spuriousness of the ballot, by making a provision that by that single mistake or inadvertence of the
chairman we make the ballot automatically spurious is dangerous. It should be ... what I'm saying is
that the Commission or the proper bodies by which this matter will be taken up may consider it as
one of the evidences of spuriousness but not per se or Ipso Facto it becomes; it should look for
other extraneous evidence. So what I am suggesting is let us give them this kind of flexibility before
we determine or before we say that this ballot is spurious, we give the COMELEC some flexibility in
the determination of other extraneous evidence.

"HON. GARCIA. May I offer a suggestion?

"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Garcia.

"HON. GARCIA. That the fact that a ballot does not contain the signature, I think, initial will not be
sufficient, the signature of the Chairman should be noted in the minutes. Noted in the minutes. So
that in case of protest, there is basis.

"HON. RONO. Oo, may basis na. Iyon lang. I think that would solve our problem.

"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

"MR. MONSOD. Your honor, we're willing to accept that amendment. Take out that sentence
spurious, with the introduction of the proposed measure x x x."  [18]
The TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral conference Committee on Election Law, held on 29
October 1991, in turn, would show these exchanges:
"CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ: Are there anything more ?

"HON. ROCO. There is a section in the Senate version about the ballot being signed at the back.

"CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ. Counter side.

"HON. ROCO. If it is not signed then it is being spurious which is a very dangerous, I (think) (it) is a
very dangerous provision and so...

"MR. MONSOD. We agree with the House version that anyway when chairman of BEI doesn't sign
subject to an election offense. But it should not be a basis for disenfranchisement of the voter. So, we
believe we set this in the hearings in the House that we should strike out that sentence that says that
this ballot is automatically spurious."  [19]
Thus, the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166, no longer included the provision "Any
ballot not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious." The intention of the legislature even then was
quite evident.

The reliance on Bautista vs. Castro [20] by petitioner, is misdirected. It must be stressed that B.P. Blg.
222, [21] otherwise known as the "Barangay Election Act of 1982," approved on 25 March 1982, itself
categorically expresses that it shall only be "applicable to the election of barangay officials." Section
14 of B.P. Blg. 222 and its implementing rule in Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539 have
both provided:

Section 14 of B.P. 222:

"Sec. 14. Official barangay ballots.- The official barangay ballots shall be provided by the city or
municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by the Commission on Elections.

"Such official ballot shall, before it is handed to the voter at the voting center, be authenticated in the
presence of the voter, the other Tellers, and the watchers present by the Chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers who shall affix his signature at the back thereof."

Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539:

"Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. - x x x

"b. Delivery of ballot. - Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the chairman shall, in the presence of
the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back
thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No.
'1' for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number
shall be entered in the corresponding space of the voting record. He shall then fold the ballot once,
and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter, together with a ball pen.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"e. Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix his
right hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon, and shall give the
folded ballot to the chairman. (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its
contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members of the Board, verify if it bears his
signature and the same serial number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be
authentic, the voter shall then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in
the voting record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded ballot in
the compartment for valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter
shall then leave the voting center.

"f. When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon
already detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial
number that does not tally with the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the
voting record, shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed by the members of the
board and shall not be counted." [22]

The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The stringent requirements in B.P. Blg.
222 should be justifiable considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided by the city or
municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official
ballots in B.P. Blg. 222, being supplied and furnished by the local government themselves, the
possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited might not have been discounted. The absence of
authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the Board of Election
Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the
ballot.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no similar stringent provisions such as
that seen in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The pertinent part in Resolution No.
2676 on the requirement of the signature of the chairman is found in Section 73 thereof which merely
provides:

"Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. -- In every case, the chairman of the
board shall, in the presence of the voter, authenticate every ballot by affixing his signature at the back
thereof before delivering it to the voter. FAILURE TO SO AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN
THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE."
Again, in Resolution No. 2738, [23] promulgated by the COMELEC on 03 January 1995, [24] which
implemented, among other election laws, R.A. No. 7166 (that governed the election for Members of
the House of Representatives held on 08 May 1995), the relevant provision is in Section 13 which
itself has only stated:

"Sec. 13. Authentication of the ballot.-- Before delivering a ballot to the voter, the chairman of the
board shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof."
It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was prompted because of the express
declaration in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, implementing Section 14 of B.P. Blg.
222, that: "Any ballot returned to the chairman . . . which does not bear the signature of the
chairman . . . shall be considered as spoiled . . . and shall not be counted." This Court thus stated in
Bautista:

"The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539)
leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the
authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot."
It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned 3rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly Fernandez vs.
COMELEC," [25] the Court en banc had the opportunity to debunk the argument that all ballots not
signed at the back thereof by the Chairman and the Poll Clerk were to be considered spurious for
non-compliance with Section 15 of R.A. No. 6646, [26] i.e., "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,"
reading as follows:

"Sec. 15. - Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk at the Back of Every Ballot. - In addition to the
preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the
chairman and the poll clerk of the board of election inspectors shall affix their signatures at the back
of each and every official ballot to be used during the voting. A certification to that effect must be
entered in the minutes of the voting."
The Court declared:

"The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention
of the voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of the said section as
suggested by the petitioner for it would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly
accomplished by the voter, and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the
election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional right of suffrage on the specious
ground that other persons were negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was
purely ministerial and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a premium on official ineptness and make it
possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence - or, worse, their deliberate inaction -
to frustrate the will of the electorate."  [27]
Petitioner Libanan suggests that the Court might apply the "ruling" of respondent HRET in the case of
Yap vs. Calalay (HRET Case No. 95-026). He states that "it is the HRET itself, ironically, that deals
the coup de grace to its ruling in HRET Case No. 95-020." The "ruling" cited by petitioner is actually a
"Confidential Memorandum," [28] dated 28 April 1997, from a certain Atty. Emmanuel Mapili addressed
to "PA Committees in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay)" which has for its subject "(n)ew
rulings to be followed in the appreciation of ballots in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay) and
other concerns." Petitioner Libanan quotes the pertinent portion of the said Memorandum, viz:

"WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved that the following rules and guidelines on the appreciation of
ballots shall be given effect in the resolution of this case and shall be applied prospectively to other
pending cases:

"1. The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot shall nullify the same
and all the votes therein shall not be counted in favor of any candidate." [29]

Reliance by petitioner on this alleged "ruling," obviously deserves scant consideration. What should,
instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid
and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC
watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those
cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. [30] It is only when none of these marks appears extant
that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

It is quite clear, in the opinion of the Court, that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in its issuance of the assailed decision and
resolution.

One other important point. Regarding the membership of certain Justices of this Court in the HRET
and their participation in the resolution of the instant petition, the Court sees no conflict at all, and it,
therefore, rejects the offer of inhibition by each of the concerned justices. As early as Vera vs.
Avelino, [31] this Court, confronted with a like situation, has said unequivocally:

"x x x Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings about the coincidence. Their designation
to the electoral tribunals deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this Supreme Court,
and did not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor will their deliverances hereat on a given question
operate to prevent them from voting in the electoral forum on identical questions; because the
Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor
want, justices opining one way here, and thereafter holding otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral
tribunal, or vice-versa."  [32]

Such has thus been, and so it is to be in this petition, as well as in the cases that may yet come
before the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., Without prejudice and filing separate to qualify.

[1]
 "1) All the forty-five (45) precincts of Dolores; 2) All the thirty (30) precincts of Taft; 3) All the
protested precincts from the municipalities of Maydolong, Llorente, Salcedo and Giporlos (Rollo, p.
38).
[2]
 "Re: Multiple Ballots Written By One Person (Ibid., p. 51)

Re: Ballots Accomplished by Two (2) Persons (Ibid., p. 52)

Re: Marked Ballots (Ibid., 57)

Re: Spurious Ballots (Ibid., 60)

Re: Ballots Objected to on Miscellaneous Grounds (Ibid., p. 63)

Re: Ballots Objected to on Combination of Grounds x x x" (Ibid.)

[3]
 Ibid., pp. 60-62.
[4]
 Ibid., p. 74.
[5]
 "a) Error in computing "base figure" for protestant (Ibid., p. 235); b) Recourse to the election returns
is not warranted when tampering of the ballots was designed to preclude challenge of votes reflected
in the election returns (Ibid., 236); c) absence of BEI Chairman's signature on ballots indicates that
they were substituted of stuffed into the ballot boxes after the election (Ibid., 238); and, d) ballots for
the protestee which are clearly multiple ballots written by one hand but which were not rejected as
such." (Ibid., p. 241).