A Brief Introduction to Plato’s Republic

J. Principe

The original title of the text that we call the Republic is Politeia; this term basically
refers to the running of the polis, or the ancient Greek social structure often translated into
English as a city-state; “city” given its relatively small size (comparable to a contemporary
small town in terms of population and geography), but “state” given its autonomy in terms of
governance and moral, legal and religious norms. Now, even if the concept of the polis might
be vague to us, all we need to keep in mind as we start is that we should try to avoid the
temptation of immediately and simplistically bringing in our modern notion of a “republic” or
some other form of the nation-state when we try to read the Republic.
In light of what we just stated, it might easily be presumed that this book focuses on
political philosophy. Although that does form a major part of it, what makes the Republic a
fascinating text – arguably one of the most important in the history of philosophy – is how
this conversation between Socrates and his friends opens up into discussions on what we
would now label as ethics, and metaphysics, and epistemology, and philosophy of education,
and aesthetics, with interesting asides regarding the status of women, the viability of war, and
censorship, and theology, just to name a few.
Now how do all these form one coherent whole?1
When we get started in Book I,2 we find that Socrates is recounting having gone with
some companions to Piraeus (port of the city of Athens, outside the city walls) to attend a
religious festival. They are then invited to dinner at a friend’s house; when there, Socrates
engages in a conversation with the friend’s father, Kephalus, a serene old man. When asked

1
I will not be able to cover everything happening in the text, not even all the major
stuff; all I can manage here is to provide some background that might help in our reading of
the particular excepts for our consideration.
2
The text is continuous, but has been artificially divided by later editors into ten books.
The divisions seem to be based on length of text rather than any clear thematic or scenic
breaks, so there is often something awkward to these divisions, but they are still a somewhat
convenient way to situate where one is in the text.
For even more precise citation, Plato scholars follow the system of numbers and letter
called the “Stephanus” page numbers, which refers to the pagination in the first edition of the
collected complete works of Plato. So, whichever modern edition you might happen to have
before you, if it is for scholarship (rather than an edition of Plato for the casual reader), you
should be able to find these Stephanus page numbers at the top or sides of the pages.
As an example, the discussion of the noble lie (rulers creating a fiction to justify the
social order) begins in Stephanus page 414b. If you take a look, this can be found in p. 93 of
the Bloom translation. But a Plato scholar would not bother referring to it as found in the
translation, but use only the standard reference (414b).
the secret of his peace of mind, the old man states that he is at peace as he is meeting death
having discharged all his obligations, to both gods and men, not owing anyone anything, he
has tried to be dikaia – just.3 This would then launch us into the question: but what do we
mean by justice?
After a while, it becomes clear that the question has shifted from one of definition –
what is justice – to one of justification – why bother being just? This is sparked by one of the
other dinner guests – Thrasymachus – challenging Socrates’ conviction that one ought to try
to be just, to try to do what is right even when wronged and positing the alternative view, that
the truly good life is not a mater of trying to be good (in any moral sense) but is in pursuing
goods (what is to one’s interest and pleasure) and having the power to do so unhindered.
This idea will then be taken up again by Socrates’ friends – Glaucon and Adeimantus
– who urge Socrates to come to the defense of justice. Glaucon puts forward the story of the
ring of Gyges (how a man attains the power to become invisible, and uses this to get his way)
in order to demonstrate how “getting away with murder” is something we all would want, if
we were just honest with ourselves. Adeimantus argues that any notion of divine retribution
for being unjust is easily dispelled, as there are all sorts of ways (such as performing some
ritual sacrifice) by which this potential problem can be averted. Taken together, the argument
seems to be that in pursuing the best life that one could, all that is necessary is to seem to be
just (for others to suppose that you are a good person) even if you actually are not being just,
but are pursuing your self-interest instead. This, then, is what Socrates has to contend with.
So, is it actually better for a man to be just – to have justice – rather than not?
Socrates’s strategy is to move from the micro level to the macro level using the example of
reading: a small text can be quite difficult to read, but if this text could be magnified, and I
can trust that the magnified text is pretty much the same (only bigger) of the original, then I
can confidently state what it is I am reading by looking first at the larger text (magnified to
font size 40, what was originally in font size 8 becomes that much clearer). So, instead of
looking at the “smaller” text – an individual man – let’s begin, Socrates states, at this
magnified, so not one man but an entire society (polis), and decide whether it is good for this
to be just.
But we cannot take as our basis for discussion any particular existing polis, because it
would be questionable whether or not this or that polis (Athens or Sparta or Corinth) would
actually demonstrate having justice, so instead we need to hypothesise an ideal society.
On the basis of the idea that people need to come together for the fulfillment of needs
that an individual alone would be hard-pressed to try to fulfill, we have Socrates posit that
society comes together on the basis of the principle of the division of labor.4 This has to be
kept in mind because it will be of prime importance later. Socrates goes on to describe a
somewhat basic pastoral society, about which Glaucon will complain for its apparent

3
The Greek term dike/dikaiosune (adj. dikaia) - which is the main theme of this text –
is often translated into English as justice (adj. just). An English-speaking reader should keep
in mind that “justice/just” here should not only be thought of in legal or juridical terms, but
also in a moral sense (doing what is right, pursuing the good, etc.).
4
Note: not quite phrased in this way in the text; I am summarizing using more modern
terminology.
roughness. Socrates accedes to Glaucon’s request of imagining this society enjoying greater
luxuries, but then positing that such a pursuit of greater luxury will require greater wealth.
With wealth now becoming an issue (either gaining what we don’t have from others
or preserving what we do have from being taken by others), Socrates now introduces the need
for a professional army, a specialized group (note: division of labor) with the characteristics,
and then the subsequent training of being protectors of our city.
A substantial part of the text is then devoted to the consideration of the requisite
characteristics of these guardians, finding them from youth, and bringing them up in a way
that would ensure that they are up to the task. A rigorous primary education is described – in
which Socrates decried much of what passes for upbringing common in that time (and
arguably at present).5
So far, our ideal city is roughly divided into two: the people whose work makes for
the upkeep of the city: cooks, weavers, shoemakers, craftsmen, farmers, fishermen, etc. (let’s
just use the term “commoners”); and then those who are tasked with protecting the city: the
guardians. At a certain point, this later group will be further divided: while some guardians
have the physical prowess as well as the fitness of character (brave rather than cowardly) to
defend the city and its people from enemies, a smaller percentage of this group might
additionally have the intellectual gifts to actually know what is best for the city as a whole
and to push the city in the right direction. The former can now be renamed as “soldiers” (or
auxiliaries) that would be ready to fight, but only under the direction of the latter, smaller,
and more elite group. We can call this smaller group “rulers”, as this seems to be their proper
role in our ideal society.
Our society then is in three social divisions of rulers, soldiers and commoners; but
what would make this an ideal society is if we can see these group exhibiting an excellence
or virtue (areté) that is proper to each one. A society can be called wise not on the basis of
knowledge possessed by its bakers and basket-weavers, but the wisdom of its rulers. Our
soldiers should demonstrate courage, and our commoners ought to show temperance,
characterized by obedience to the ruling class. And perhaps justice is nothing more than each
class understanding it role (note: division of labor) and staying in it proper place such that we
have the harmonious operation of this society.
Thus, we have the so-called “cardinal” virtues.
Recall what we stated earlier about micro and macro levels? The ideal society has
been posited as a magnification to allow us to see better that which is smaller. What happens
when we return to the original? Maybe, the argument now goes, the individual human soul6 I
also in three parts: I know there is in me an appetitive part, which moves me to the pursuit of
my desires (I’m hungry and want to eat), but also something within me that could resist that
(my mind says, I’m hungry but that’s not my sandwich, so I shouldn’t eat it). And then

5
From Books Two to Three, of interest, maybe, to those of you interested philosophy
of education.
6
Most common English translation of the Greek psuché, the principle that animates the
body, and can also be thought of as mind or character; it might be better to avoid making any
association with some Christian/religious notion of soul.
maybe there’s a mediating part in between, a “spirited” part7 that is capable of getting angry
and excited and indignant.
And similar to how the tripartite city may demonstrate virtue, so too should the
tripartite soul express virtue: wisdom in my intellect, courage in the spirit, temperance in my
appetites, and justice in the proper harmony of these. Where do we find injustice? As soon as
appetites overcome what intellect or reason is saying is what is right. And doesn’t experience
prove to us that the pursuit of fulfilling one’s appetite and desire at the expense of one’s
knowing what is right is very often what leads to the doing of unjust actions?
So the answer given to the question on what makes being truly just better than
pursuing self-interest is based on a sense of the desirability of harmony over disharmony, of
order over chaos, both internally (one’s character) and externally (one’s relating to others,
and the polis at large)
At this time, we’re still only at Book 4 of the Republic.
Very quickly, what happens next?
After further detailing on some characteristics not only of the ruling class but of this
ideal city, the question is then asked whether such an ideal city, is, in fact, viable. To which
Socrates replies that that wasn’t really the point in the first place.8 This is where Socrates puts
forward the suggestion that the closest that we can actually get to the ideal city, speaking as
practically as possible, is if those who are currently ruling start doing philosophy, or those
who are currently doing philosophy are put in charge: the philosopher-king. Here is someone
who would not only embody those virtues in his own person, but would be the best ruler
insofar as he would lead his society towards a higher ideal.
This opens up discussions on the role of the philosopher (looking above and beyond
what the day to day presents to a higher and more ideal reality as a pattern to pursue) and
discussions about that higher reality (metaphysics) and discussions about the access that we
can have to that higher reality as opposed to how we ordinarily think (epistemology).
The consolidation of these is vividly and powerfully presented in the story often
called the “Allegory of the Cave” in Book 7.
But we have not left political philosophy behind After having posited the ideal,
Socrates then suggests that we consider the various actual existing poleis, reading their
defects in terms of a problematic lack of harmony of one form or another (using the ideal
picture presented earlier as the standard). And so criticisms of timocracy (timo – pursuit of
honor, basically, leadership of military men), oligarchy (oligos – a few) and democracy
(demos – people) are forthcoming. But following the earlier parallelism, these are considered
not only as descriptive of political forms but also forms of individual character (the timocratic
man, the democratic man, etc.). The culmination is the discussion in Book 9 of the tyrant and
the tyrannical form of government. As the antithesis of the philosopher-king, the tyrant

7
Sadly, there’s no easy way to translate the Greek word thumos. It is commonly
translated as “will” or “spirit”, but, as with the note just above, please do not think of “spirit”
here in terms of “soul” or some supernatural entity.
8
A detail commonly overlooked by critics too eager to put down what is happening
here as an “impossibility”.
embodies the worst of vices as his character is out of harmony, driven by desires beyond any
capacity by reason to determine the good; should such a man be in power, this would result in
the worst situation for the polis, the worst scenario of injustice being done on people in a
massive scale, when the one in power pursues his own desire and in so doing is able to – let’s
return to the phrase – get away with murder.
Book 10 can be summarized as being in two parts: 1) a discussion of art and
censorship; 2) an eschatological story, that describes the after-life consequences of our moral
life, to bring forward the lesson that death should not be thought of as an escape from what
we have done in this life.