US STARATEGY ON INDO PACIFIC:

The new catchphrase coming out of Washington regarding U.S. Asia policy is “a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Brian Hook, a State Department adviser, asserts that this order “is the foundation
of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and also around the world. When China’s
behavior is out of step with these values and these rules, we will stand up and
defend the rule of law.”

According to then U.S. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, the core tenets
of the concept include freedom of navigation, the rule of law, freedom from
coercion, respect for sovereignty, private enterprise, and open markets, and the
freedom and independence of all nations. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an
attempt to unify and integrate these widely accepted principles in one rhetorical
concept.

Within this framework, the United States is proposing – and pushing for – a
renewal of the so-called “Quad” – a potential security arrangement among the
four large democracies of India, Australia, Japan, and the United State

One obstacle to its successful implementation is that China thinks this policy
gambit and its conceptual framework are aimed at containing and constraining it.
China is pushing back. Although the United States is the established dominant
hard and soft power in the region, a rising China has increasing leverage over each
of the potential U.S. security partners.

The 30-page report, entitled “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared
Vision,” details the state of U.S. government’s progress with respect to FOIP thus
far with respect to five components: engaging partners and regional institutions;
enhancing economic prosperity; championing good governance; ensuring peace
and security; and investing in human capital. As U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s introductory message in the report states, the report is not so much an
interagency strategy report as it is a “implementation update” describing how the
United States is working with allies and partners to implement a shared vision.

The release of new report is not without significance. Its unveiling in the midst of
the latest round of ASEAN summitry reinforces the U.S. government’s emphasis
on showcasing the inroads being made on FOIP to the region in spite of the
challenges and uncertainties that continue to cloud it, whether it be the attention
given to ongoing U.S.-China competition or questions about aspects of U.S.
engagement and policy. In terms of optics, the document serves as the most
comprehensive publicly released cataloging of FOIP’s progress thus far through
the whole-of-government approach that U.S. officials have been rhetorically
stressing thus far across several subregions within the Indo-Pacific, including
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands.

Substance-wise, the report also hits on several of the right notes for usual U.S.
policy. It places allies and partners at the heart of the strategy – down to the title
which stresses a “shared vision” – which, much like IPSR, helps counter the
perception of FOIP being an externally imposed U.S. vision. It reinforces the
breadth of the FOIP approach, with attention to significant inroads made across
all of the five aforementioned developments, including the elevation of the Quad
to a ministerial-level meeting between the United States, Australia, India, and
Japan; the launch of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network to
address connectivity and infrastructure issues in the region; and a new
governance program for free and fair elections in Myanmar ahead of next year’s
elections. It also attempts to address some of the earlier critiques of FOIP amid
the evolution of other approaches and responses, whether it be resourcing
(offering some figures and metrics that indicate increased U.S. involvement since
the strategy was released) or the perception that this is all about China rather
than a broader U.S. approach to the region (indeed, the document remains
squarely focused on advancing U.S. policy rather than merely critiquing China,
with China and the PRC only getting six mentions total in the entire document,
mostly in the governance and the security sections).