TORRENS SYSTEM

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910

MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.

Ramon Salinas, for appellants.

Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs of
Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the
petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July,
1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have
registered the following-described property:

A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan,
upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial
area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada)
of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz
Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the
south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream called
Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.

This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied
by a plan and technical description of the above-described parcel of land.

After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land
described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to
the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.

On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration
asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner
of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations,
are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908,
was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels
of land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited
them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked,

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under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and
that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The
Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by
both parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by
excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this
decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in
reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said
decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding that the two
parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their property.

It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land described in
the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the
owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree.

The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the two small
parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November,
1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Bulacan.

Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several
parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of
property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.

It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was
occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee
does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that
the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his
name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in
their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496,
and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial
court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of
1864.

The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that time. Manuela,
the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother died. So these children were
minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate grant.

On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who were then
minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of
three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners,
rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This
rental contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by
Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December,
1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz
for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did
so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his father
and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners' land,

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nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In
the rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not
described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la
Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according to the
description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said court held that as
this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the
appellee.

The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864, as
is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land
are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was
obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the
petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the
time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any
fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of
the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their
application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an error
in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year?

The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain
the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of
land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made
to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to
state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and
interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with
their names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the
application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in the Official Gazette. This
published notice shall be directed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be
registered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice
in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of
the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the application whose
address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a
conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a conspicuous place on
the chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or
further notice of the application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper.
The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed by the court by publication or
mailing shall be conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person
appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it may
concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be
concluded by the default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated
in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.

Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability
of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or

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 decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)

The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above.

It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest which he admits
but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made
parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."

Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances as
we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the
entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons,
including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.

The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the
part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two
small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor
when the original plan was made.

Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case
and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud.

The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been frequently
raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the
meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its
meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors.
The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or
"moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive
effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the
meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian
Torrens System, p. 834.)

With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it
has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not
merely constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive,
legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and
the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be
"fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is,
for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there
absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential
characteristics of actual — as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in
notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)

By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs.
Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his

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Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning
should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).

The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as
used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would
constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in
each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have determined, is
whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of
February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in
violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which
provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."

The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by
registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party
defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of
the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.

Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of
what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South
Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the
presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands,
under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and
other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition
to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system was
evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest
of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.

At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to
land, because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing,
and there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)

The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted because his
vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor
may feel himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)

The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by Sir Robert
Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:

First. It has substituted security for insecurity.

Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time
occupied from months to days.

Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.

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 Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can
transact his own conveyancing.

Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.

Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but
depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence
of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)

The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr.
(afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens
system title by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general"
law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of
title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes
indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be
effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the
correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system,
them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system.
(Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)

By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with
interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and
certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer.
(Hogg on Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)

Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the Torrens system
has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared
with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in
1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In
Queensland the risk of error was only 1 ½ cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In
Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole
time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries
of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.

The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been the subject
of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs.
Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was copied
substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.

The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those States.

It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it

before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and

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 not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so,
for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126);
Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman,
Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a
judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in
personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other
hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on
the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in
rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although
the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as
to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to determine
the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a
proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and
circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to
deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be, and
the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the
decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Page 7 of 175
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said
wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the
wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed
the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each
of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to
make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

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Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to
him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to
regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration
of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same,
registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of
the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the
time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez,
29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All
the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world
are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the
world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered
title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can
not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief
under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner
of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is
a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world

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are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons
who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed
at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46,
Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can
plead ignorance of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823,
says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part,
comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the
land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter
of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to
include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the
prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was
the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not
expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p.
237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned
by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason,
in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose,
may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in
a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a
person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.

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We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the
Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two
different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule,
of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of
the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under
the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking
to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through
their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment
against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had
their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that
lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated.
If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by
the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six
years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right,
what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into
consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the
present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was
not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants.
He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the
appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions
as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to
oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever
closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he

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acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would
be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that
the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including
the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of
their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to
the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot,
including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase
"innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two
innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the
provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate,
his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never
issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the
knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must
be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well
established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y.,
351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show
that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that
statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of

Page 12 of 175
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there
be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence
of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record
contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one
can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The
conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory
and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the
existence and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the
land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser
of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the
phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered
land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought
under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is
notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that
part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that
Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the
appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his
vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes
the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the
name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants,
the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in
harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that
the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to
his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the
first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in
conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was
innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under
the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens

Page 13 of 175
system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land
registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that
record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises
as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued
in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority
on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title
by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in
permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, and also as
against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no
wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.

But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains
the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an
innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.

As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down
by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no
binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the
facts developed in a particular case.

In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth
in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the
matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two
persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same land, under the Land

Page 14 of 175
Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title and who has complied with all
the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory
provision to the contrary.

Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in cases
of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the
majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration
"mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the
absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of
the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."

But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the
reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the
application of a contrary rule.

The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule
that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the
preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity
rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable
ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc.,
139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping registration the
earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under
the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate.
Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the "just and equitable
rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the title of an
innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the
holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later
certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in
response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the
issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead
of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him adjudicating
title in favor of the second applicant.

The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between the
original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both
such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be
given to the earlier title.

The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it
undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier
certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to
demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is
said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he
claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly
registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title
of an earlier date.

Page 15 of 175
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the
contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file
in the land registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or
any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the thousands
or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the
original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault
should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land
purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison of
the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land
registry office.

But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction
and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that
system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking
farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the
title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with
notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to
acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.

If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead of
making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity
for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the
true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and
uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands
purchased by him.

As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of
land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer
of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others
dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands
furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which
charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be
exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.

Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid
the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the subject
of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should he adopt
in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide
him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which
necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of
such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure
himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful,
laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title
of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be
found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land
Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty
that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as

Page 16 of 175
negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of
double or overlapping registration.

On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered
certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating
all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or
had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such
default judgment was entered.

The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice that
proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is
seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance
in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and
thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or
overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration
which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the
duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject
to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser,
holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping
registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable
rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given
the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly
applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same
land.

Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of
a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can
confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the
holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor of
either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the other
and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of
lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied
and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the
conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."lawphil.net

It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority
opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of
the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he
has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the
pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it
holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and
defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of
publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof,
but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting
a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so
as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding

Page 17 of 175
would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a
certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in
order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to
do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not
contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon
the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely
by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of
another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in
which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons
to appear and default his title.

"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to
me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser
who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who
permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.

I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases
such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.

One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and
uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance
and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other
ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land
registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered
lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has
actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the
cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in
support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor
of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to
increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles,
negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them
adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual
notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any
appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or
inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured,
and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already
been conclusively adjudicated.

The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual
notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands
held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration
can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the pendency of the
proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served
upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made;
and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for
the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property
owners must be rare indeed.

Page 18 of 175
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a certificate
of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of Land
Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was
included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier
certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in the Court of
Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of another
applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an
adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally served
with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no
reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the judgment
of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein
registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other
proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and
probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally,
arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.

Carson, J., concurs.

Page 19 of 175
 [G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellee. ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ
and BASILIO GAYARES, Petitioners-Appellants, v. RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-
appellees.

Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.

Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The prime purpose of the Torrens
System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to
decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable.

2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the offspring of the Torrens System here
known as the Cadastral System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No.
2259), is, like the purpose of the Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1
of the Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that the titles to any lands
"be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. — Many precautions are taken to guard against injustice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership
in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the
court. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if
within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. — For a decree to exist in legal contemplation, it is not
necessary to await the preparation of a so-called decree by the Land Registration Office.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published in the Official Gazette. Trial
judge also issued general notice. S asks for the registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had.
On September 21, 1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, the time
for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final. On July 23, 1917, before the issuance
by the Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, V and G ask that the case be
reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial court. Held:
That since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 21, 1916, has become final, and
since no action was taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of
exceptions, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.

7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. — Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.

8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. — The General Land Registration Office has been
instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land."
(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 174.)

Page 20 of 175
 DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The principal question which this appeal presents is — When does the registration of title, under the
Torrens System of Land Registration, especially under the different Philippine laws establishing the
Cadastral System, become final, conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions are — At
what stage of the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legal contemplation? Does it exist from
the moment that the court, after hearing the evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and
then, or later decrees the land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the Chief of the Land
Registration Office transcribes the adjudication in the prescribed form?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Occidental

Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands, on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were
published in the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all
interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for registration in
his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said
to reside in this municipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases, did not
enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had during September, 1916. On September 21 of this
year, the court issued the following decree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, the following lots be adjudged
and registered in the names of those persons whose names appear next after the lots, and in
accordance with the following conditions: . . .

"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of Victoriano Siguenza and
Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library

On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing decree in the following
language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having become final on September 21,
1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees
corresponding to the lots adjudged by said decision.

"An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as follows, the decrees thereon,
must be suspended until further order by this court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Lot No. 521.

Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of
the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the
minor Estrella Vazquez, came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their
right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and

Page 21 of 175
after stating that they were in complete ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the
court be annulled and that the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.
Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-motion, asking the court to dismiss the motion
presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory
that there being a decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, the court
lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made
an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by
the taking of evidence.

In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear that counsel for petitioners
have not raised the question of fraud as provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor
have they asked to be relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, they
could not well claim fraud because all the proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of
chicanery. As a matter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
would not get them anywhere because more than six months had elapsed after the issuance of a
judgment in this case. The issue fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemental decree issued by the Judge of
the Court of First Instance on September 21, 1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have
become final, petitioners may no bring their appeal before this court, because the time for the filing of
their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings did not become final until the
formal decree was issued by the Land Registration Office, then it was proper for them to ask for a
reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be just as proper for this court to order the trial court
to permit the same.

OPINION.

The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated, to decree land titles that
shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable. Incontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must
accordingly be taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good reason,
may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the cost of possible cruelty which may
result in exceptional cases, it does become necessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce
registration laws. No stronger words can be found than those appearing in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is said that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land,
and quiet title thereto. . . . It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description ’To all whom it may concern,’ Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in
the Court of Land Registration (Court of First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest."cralaw virtua1aw
library

While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, they become even more incisive
and peremptory when we come to consider the offspring of this system, here known as the Cadastral
System. Under the Torrens System proper, whether action shall or shall not be taken is optional with

Page 22 of 175
the solicitant. Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the part of the Government, titles for
all the land within a stated area, are adjudicated whether or not the people living within this district
desire to have titles issued. The purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act (NO. 2259), is to
serve the public interests, by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessive interference with private
property constitutes due process of law and that the Acts providing for the same are constitutional, a
question not here raised, yet a study of the law indicates that many precautions are taken to guard
against injustice. The proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. When the lands have been
surveyed and plotted, the Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney General, files a petition in
court praying that the titles to the lands named be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the
petition is then published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette in both the English and
Spanish languages. All persons interested are given the benefit of assistance by competent officials
and are informed of their rights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court
and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such
decrees, when final, shall be the bases of original certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No.
2259, Sec. 11.) Aside from this, the commotion caused by the survey and a trial affecting ordinarily
many people, together with the presence of strangers in the community, should serve to put all those
affected on their guard.

After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of
the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a
judicial manner. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order
for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is
made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the
decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been
instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land."
(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor,
has as one of his duties "to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases." (Administrative Code of
1917, Sec. 177.) This latter decree contains the technical description of the land and may not be issued
until a considerable time after the promulgation of the judgment. The form for the decree used by the
General Land Registration Office concludes with the words: "Witness, the Honorable (name of the
judge), on this the (date)." The date that is used as authority for the issuance of the decree is the date
when, after hearing the evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of the land.

The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law
says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by
the Land Registration Office is ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated, the
date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the running of the time for the
interposition of a motion for a new trial or for the perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The
date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and
all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of the technical description. If an unknown
individual could wait possibly years until the day before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a
technical description of a piece of land, the defeated party could just as reasonably expect the same

Page 23 of 175
consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the so-called unknown is a party just as much as the
known oppositor for notice is to all the world, and the decree binds all the world.

Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of this court in the case of
Tambunting v. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . That case and the instant case are not the same. In the
Tambunting case the contest was really between two parties each claiming to have a Torrens title; here
one party has the title and the other is seeking to oust him from his fortress. In the Tambunting case the
declaration of ownership but not the decree of registration had issued; here both declaration and
decree have issued. The doctrines announced in the decision in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz ([1910], 17
Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the indefensibility of land titles under the Torrens system are
much more applicable and can, with as much reason, be applied to the cadastral system.

As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and indisputable,
after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a
copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect
an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to
the certificate of title issued by the chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud.

Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able arguments relative to the
applicability of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The view
we take of the case would make unprofitable any discussion of this question.

It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of September 21,
1916, has become final, and that no action was taken within the time provided by law for the
prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is
dismissed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Page 24 of 175
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166838 June 15, 2011

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, Inc., Petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF PASIG, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision 1 and the January 27, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision 3 and
October 9, 1998 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in Civil Case No.
65420.

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels
of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated
that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig5 (Pasig).

The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403,
which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The
two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and
599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.

TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870.

The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia
East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it. 6

Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land
Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with
respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City. 7

On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition 8 for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig
before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
3006, is still pending up to this date.

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, 9 docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia
for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the subject
properties).

Page 25 of 175
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just
like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax
Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial
jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by the
above TCTs had been paid to Cainta. 10

Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground that
its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting
the real property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta further
asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the subject properties
are within its metes and bounds. 11

Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the
pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig,
presented a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case. 12

The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were
conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location, 13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a
Decision in favor of Pasig:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:

1) ₱273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and penalties as of 1996, plus interest of
2% per month until fully paid;

2) ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and

3) The costs of suit.

Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund
to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax payments improperly collected and received
by the former from the latter in the aggregate amount of ₱358, 403.68. 14

After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig, on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC’s August 10, 1998 Decision.

The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasig’s motion in an Order15 and modified its earlier decision to
include the realty taxes due on the improvements on the subject lots:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is hereby modified in that the defendant is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and penalties on the
improvements on the subject parcels of land whereon real estate taxes are adjudged as due for the
year 1996.16

Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include the RTC’s October 9, 1998 Order
in its protest.

Page 26 of 175
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and
Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to warrant the
execution pending appeal.17

On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution against Sta. Lucia.

On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals to assail the RTC’s order granting the execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874,
the petition was raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000,
ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and
GRANTED by this Court. The assailed Order dated April 15, 1999 in Civil Case No. 65420 granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. 18

The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a "prejudicial question which
must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties." 19

Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition for Certiorari filed before this Court on
November 29, 2000, but this was denied on June 25, 2001 for being filed out of time. 20

Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to the (former) Seventh Division of the
Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTC’s judgment:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
P50,000.00 attorney’s fees is DELETED. 21

In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper legal basis to suspend the
proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal meaning of a "prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no
prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil." 23 The Court of Appeals further held that the
elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met.

Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with this Court. Cainta’s petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on April 13, 2005 for Cainta’s failure to show any reversible
error. Sta. Lucia’s own petition is the one subject of this decision.24

In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned
the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Page 27 of 175
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF
THE PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE SITUS
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF
REALTY TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY
TAXES

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME
THAT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING
FINALLY RESOLVED, THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES
ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO PRESERVE THE
STATUS QUO.25

Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly decided the case considering that
the TCTs are clear on their faces that the subject properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction.
Pasig contends that the principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all
inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains that the boundary dispute
case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the complaint for collection of realty taxes which was
filed before the Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of "prejudicial question," which has a definite
meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues,
since there is no legal ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both cases, the suspension of
the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is baseless.

Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over the subject properties, which fall
within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the
subject properties since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax purposes in
1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a discrepancy between the locational entries and
the technical descriptions in the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the
boundary dispute case it initiated.

The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into two basic issues:

1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasig’s Complaint without waiting for
the resolution of the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta; and

2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to
have always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.

Page 28 of 175
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of
the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government unit is
entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.26

The Local Government Unit entitled

To Collect Real Property Taxes

The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution of the complaint lodged
before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the assessment of the parties’ evidence on the metes and
bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals 27 wherein we
said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location. 28 The Court of
Appeals even referred to specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to
support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as the titles
of the subject properties show on their faces that they are situated in Pasig. 29

Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the authority to collect real
property taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated:

Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. — All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised
at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated.

xxxx

Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. — The collection of the real property tax
and all penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code or any
applicable laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or municipality where the
property is situated. (Emphases ours.)

This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local Government
Code, to wit:

Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated.
The Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the classification,
appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.

Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x x.
(Emphases ours.)

The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is authorized under several
laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first
show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.

Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections30 said:

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial

Page 29 of 175
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be
avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must
be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.31 (Emphasis ours.)

The significance of accurately defining a local government unit’s boundaries was stressed in City of
Pasig v. Commission on Elections,32 which involved the consolidated petitions filed by the parties
herein, Pasig and Cainta, against two decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with
respect to the plebiscites scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation of two new Barangays.
Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC
decision to hold in abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation of Barangay Karangalan; but set aside
the COMELEC’s other decision, and nullified the plebiscite that ratified the creation of Barangay Napico
in Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo RTC had been resolved. The aforementioned
case held as follows:

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC
Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null
and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with
finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil
Case No. 94-3006.33

Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must
undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it
would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.

Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location

While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not
preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. In De Pedro v.
Romasan Development Corporation, 34 we proclaimed that:

We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it
bears stressing that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely confirm or
record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner,
nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of other.35

In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, 36 we set aside the lower
courts’ ruling that the property subject of the case was not situated in the location stated and described
in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine that the TCT is
conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the veracity of

Page 30 of 175
the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of
the exact location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.37

In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, 38 this Court reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying
taxes on a property that was outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz:

In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are
expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the
property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross
negligence.39 (Emphasis ours.)

Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia
and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the
TCTs, reveal that they are within Cainta’s boundaries. 40 This only means that there may be a conflict
between the location as stated and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance
therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject
properties’ locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.

The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be
able to best determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both Pasig’s and Cainta’s
respective territorial jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent
and reach of each local government’s authority, a prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers,
one of which is the power of taxation. This was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v.
Commission on Elections,41 and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874.
We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.

The "Prejudicial Question" Debate

It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it already paid simply because
Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that
the boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension of its collection
case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,42 when it sought to nullify the COMELEC’s ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of
the boundary dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We
agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question and
explained our statement in this wise:

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may
be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this
may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the
interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of
another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

Page 31 of 175
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area
are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction
to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until
and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. x x x.43 (Emphases ours.)

It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as appearing in the cases involving
the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary
meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court. 44 Nevertheless, even without the
impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court may
control its own proceedings according to its sound discretion:

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS

Rule 135

SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have power:

xxxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comformable to law and justice.

Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent power in our own decisions, to wit:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another
pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be
stayed.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants.
But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing
that whether or not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its
sound discretion.451avvphil

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the
Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had
to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia
had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the

Page 32 of 175
contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no
controversy at all.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real
property taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2004 Decision and the January 27,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig
and the Municipality of Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in their boundary dispute case
(Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo City, to
determine which local government unit is entitled to exercise its powers, including the collection of real
property taxes, on the properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the lots and
improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow
account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Page 33 of 175
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180027 July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all
represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In
the said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 14 February 2005 ruling 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292. The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals’ decision accordingly reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision dated February 14, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic, Cavite, in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is AFFIRMED
in toto. No costs.4

The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the respondents’ Application for Original Registration of
a parcel of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529.

The antecedents are as follows:

Prelude

In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in
Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite. 5 The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa
Asuncion (Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona,
respectively.6

Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels
of land. Hence, per the consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels were
consolidated into a single lot—"Lot 3"—with a determined total area of nine thousand five hundred
seventy-seven (9,577) square meters.7

The Application for Land Registration

On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an Application8 for Original Registration of Lot 3.
Their application was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292.

Page 34 of 175
On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the application for initial hearing and directing the
satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The
same Order, however, also required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
submit a report on the status of Lot 3. 10

On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its Report 11 to the RTC. The Report relates
that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of
Indang, Cavite per LC12 3013 certified on March 15, 1982." Later, the respondents submitted a
Certification13 from the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.

After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed the lone opposition 14 to the respondents’ application on 13 May 2003.

The Claim, Evidence and Opposition

The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of
land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession
of the said parcels "since time immemorial."15 It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with
their own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the testimonies of Generosa 16 and
the representatives of their two (2) other predecessors-in-interest.17 The said witnesses testified that
they have been in possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the
purchase thereof by the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses also confirmed that neither they nor the
interest they represent, have any objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.19

In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavit20 she executed with Teresita.21 In it,
Generosa revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned
by her father, Mr. Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly and peacefully
occupied and tilled as absolute owner" such lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2."22

To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented various Tax
Declarations23 covering certain areas of Lot 3—the earliest of which dates back to 1948 and covers the
portions of the subject lot previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita. 24

On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence,
not subject to private acquisition and registration. The government, however, presented no further
evidence to controvert the claim of the respondents. 25

The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents’ Application for Original
Registration of Lot 3. The RTC thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default,
decrees and adjudges Lot 3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-003949-D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total area of NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (9,577) square meters and its technical description as
above-described and situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act
496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered

Page 35 of 175
in the name of herein applicants MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C.
SANTOS, and DELFIN C. SANTOS, all residing at No. 60 Rockville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon
City.

Once this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority. 26

The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. 27 As already
mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision on appeal.

Hence, this petition.28

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting
original registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.

The government would have Us answer in the affirmative. It argues that the respondents have failed to
offer evidence sufficient to establish its title over Lot 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian
presumption in favor of the State. 29

The government urges this Court to consider the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the
DENR-CENRO Certification, both of which clearly state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or

Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982. 30 The government posits that since Lot 3 was only classified as
alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of prescription against the State should also
commence to run only from such date.31 Thus, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application—filed
nearly twenty (20) years after the said classification—is still premature, as it does not meet the statutory
period required in order for extraordinary prescription to set in. 32

OUR RULING

We grant the petition.

Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree

We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine. 33 Jura Regalia
simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of
all private titles.34 Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired
from native title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. 36 Absent
a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land
is presumed to belong to the State. 37

Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It is basic that
those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish that it
has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.

In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, or otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The said section provides:

Page 36 of 175
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
(Emphasis supplied)

Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their application for land registration and subsequent
pleadings, it appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the first or the second
paragraph of the quoted section.

However, after perusing the records of this case, as well as the laws and jurisprudence relevant
thereto, We find that neither justifies registration in favor of the respondents.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles to
public land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or
the Public Land Act, as amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect"
titles, to wit:39

1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;.

2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership, and;

3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed
to establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of Lot 3
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier." An examination of the evidence on record reveals so:

First. The testimonies of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives were

patently deficient on this point.

Page 37 of 175
None of them testified about possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land dating back to 12
June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of
their lands "for over thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997. 40

Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be considered as sufficient to prove
compliance with the third requisite. The said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general claim that
Valentin had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of
Generosa and Teresita even "before the outbreak of World War 2" — which lacks specificity and is
unsupported by any other evidence. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation,41 this Court dismissed a similar unsubstantiated claim of possession as a "mere conclusion
of law" that is "unavailing and cannot suffice:"

Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed
by the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim
that they came into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual
proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice. 42 Evidence of this nature should have
been received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also fall short of proving
possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the respondents i.e.,
Tax Declaration No. 9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously
pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared
improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as of 1948—posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of
Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.

Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not qualify as the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
kind that is required to prove title thru possession and occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.44 Clearly, respondents are not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for registration, this time, under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were at least able to establish
possession and occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire title over the same
via prescription.45

As earlier intimated, the government counters the respondents’ alternative plea by arguing that the
statutory period required in order for extraordinary prescription to set in was not met in this case. 46 The
government cites the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both
of which state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982. 47 It posits that
the period of prescription against the State should also commence to run only from such date. 48 Hence,
the government concludes, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application is still premature.49

We find the contention of the government inaccurate but nevertheless deny registration of Lot 3 under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by
prescription "under the provisions of existing law." In the seminal case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.

Page 38 of 175
Republic,50 this Court clarified that the "existing law" mentioned in the subject provision refers to no
other than Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public domain that are "patrimonial in character" are
"susceptible to acquisitive presecription" and, hence, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.51 Applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, 52 Malabanan further
elucidated that in order for public land to be considered as patrimonial "there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial."53 Until
then, the period of acquisitive prescription against the State will not commence to run. 54

The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by Malabanan is separate and distinct from
the mere classification of public land as alienable and disposable. 55 On this point, Malabanan was
reiterated by the recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr. 56

In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the State,
attesting to the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove
that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have acquired title
to Lot 3 by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the subject
land as alienable and disposable is not sufficient. 57 We are, therefore, left with the unfortunate but
necessary verdict that the respondent are not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case. We accordingly
overturn the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not being supported by the evidence at
hand.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9 October 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300 affirming the 14 February 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents’ application for registration is, accordingly, DENIED.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Page 39 of 175
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 171726, February 23 : 2011]

VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assails the Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution 2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the April 28, 2000
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in LRC No. P-115, LRA Rec.
No. N-68012, which granted petitioners' application for registration of title over two parcels of land,
denominated as Lots 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre.

The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On March 22, 1949, petitioners' father, L. Yu Chang4 and the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur,
through its then Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property 5 wherein
the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in
Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece of land located in
San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the property thus obtained
and erected a residential house and a gasoline station thereon. He also declared the property in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 01794 6 and 017957 and paid the real property taxes thereon as
evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L.
Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the
property and succeeded in the possession of the property.

On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation 8 of their rights over the property was executed
by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein
petitioners. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and subdivided into two
lots, Lot 21999 and Lot 220010 of Plan SWO-05-000888, Pili Cadastre. Petitioners also declared the lots
in their names for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 02633 11 and paid the real
property taxes thereon.

On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother
and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition 12 for registration of title over the aforementioned
lots under the Property Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners
of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest "have been in actual, physical, material,
exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100
years"13; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property
in the concept of owners. Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance and
registration of title in their names.

In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following documents, to wit:

1. Agreement to Exchange Real Property;

Page 40 of 175
 2. Deed of Transfer and Renunciation;
3. Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre;
4. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199;
5. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200;
6. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044 for Lot 2199 Cad. 291;
and
7. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043 for Lot 2200 Cad. 291
Pili Cadastre.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition 14 to the application,
alleging, inter alia, that: (1) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the
muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of
the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation.

No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an Order of General Default 15 was
issued by the trial court.

After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The fallo of the trial
court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Confirming the imperfect title of the herein applicants Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang
over the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph two (2) page 2 of the Petition, particularly Lot
2199, Plans S"0-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre and Lot 2200, Plan SWO-05-000888, Cad. 291,
Pili Cadastre; both Filipino citizens, residents of #14 Joaquin St., Corinthian Garden, Quezon City and
San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur respectively;

2. Ordering the dismissal of the application in the Cadastral proceeding with respect to Lots 2199 and
2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre under CAD Case No. N-9;

3. After finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority to the herein applicants above-mentioned.

SO ORDERED.16

The Republic appealed the decision to the CA on the ground that the court a quo erred in granting
petitioners' application for registration of Lots 2199 and 2200 despite their failure to show compliance
with the requirements of the law. In addition, the Republic asserted that the land was classified as
public forest land; hence, it could not be subject to appropriation and alienation.

As aforesaid, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on August 26, 2005, and dismissed petitioners'
application for land registration. The CA considered the petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were
not able to present incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are
alienable and disposable.17 The CA relied on the testimony of Lamberto Orcena, Land Management

Page 41 of 175
Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to October 30, 1986, the entire area
encompassing the right side of the Naga-Legaspi Highway, including the subject properties, was
classified as forest land. According to the CA, even if the area within which the subject properties are
located is now being used for residential and commercial purposes, such fact will not convert the
subject parcels of land into agricultural land.18 The CA stressed that there must be a positive act from
the government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. 19

Additionally, the CA noted that the lands sought to be registered were declared disposable public land
only on October 30, 1986. Thus, it was only from that time that the period of open, continuous and
notorious possession commenced to toll against the State.

Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court via the present appeal, raising the sole issue of
whether the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for registration of title on the ground
that they failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended.

Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land
since there are buildings, residential houses and even government structures existing and standing on
the land.20 In their Memorandum,21 petitioners point out that the original owner and possessor of the
subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was established in 1930. The land was
originally part of the municipal ground adjacent to the Municipal Building located at the right side of the
Naga-Legaspi National Highway.22 From 1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the property through barter
and up to the filing of petitioners' application in 1997, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in actual physical and material possession of the land in the concept of an owner, notorious and
known to the public and adverse to the whole world.

The Republic, through the OSG, for its part, maintains that petitioners failed to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots for the period of time required by
law. The OSG also submits that the subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 30, 1986.

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, under which petitioners' application
was filed, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Property
Registration Decree, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Page 42 of 175
x x x x23

Under this provision, in order that petitioners' application for registration of title may be granted, they
must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.24 Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the
public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names
arising from an imperfect title.25

In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their
application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the
subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building
structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing and standing on the area. This,
however, is hardly the proof required under the law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of Jose
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,26 a forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out-
of-the-way places. The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 27 Unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 28 As
aptly held by the appellate court:

[T]he fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is being used for residential
and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land. It
is fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that
land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first
declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 29

Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic presented a Report 30 of Rene
Gomez, Land Investigator/Inspector, CENRO No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots applied for by the
petitioners were classified as alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393 and
released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A Compliance31 dated January 19, 1999
submitted by OIC-CENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court also stated that Lots. 2199
and 2200 of Cad. 291 were "verified to be within Alienable and Disposable area under Project No. 9-E,
L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the then Bureau of Forestry". Evidently,
therefore, the subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to
that period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners' possession
of the subject forest land prior to the date when it was classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. 32 To
reiterate, it is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its classification as alienable and
disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not be considered as possession in the
concept of owner.33 The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared and alienable. 34

Page 43 of 175
Much as this Court wants to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our
hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. 35 Here, petitioners
failed to present "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to prove their compliance of the
requirements under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing their application for confirmation and registration of title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 26, 2005 and the
Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Brion,* J., see: separate opinion.

Bersamin, Abad,** and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Page 44 of 175
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186961 February 20, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision 1 and February 20, 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, the
CA affirmed the August 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De
Oro City. The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.3

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioner’s August 29, 2008 Motion for
Reconsideration.4

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area
of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject property consisting of
4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario
U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12,
1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the
respondent’s petition for registration of the land in question, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence
on the matter, particularly the provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant
application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to issue a decree in the name of the
applicant East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation covering the parcel of land, Lot 9039, Cad
237, having an area of 9,794 square meters covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this

Page 45 of 175
petition. Based on the decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is hereby
directed to issue an original certificate of title in the name of the applicant covering the land subject
matter of this application.5

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTC’s August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008
Decision,6 the CA found no merit in the petitioner’s appeal, holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform to three requisites: (1) the land
is alienable public land; (2) the applicant’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements. Anent the first requirement, both
the report and certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
shows that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone classified under BF Project
[N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.

Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive government act, an
administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. It is a settled rule that the classification or
re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is now a prerogative
of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains uncontested
and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the contents of the
said certification. Thus, the alienable and disposable character of the subject land certified as such as
early as December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence of the petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required to prove his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx

In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the subject land to that of its
predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax declarations and real property historical ownership
pertaining thereto were presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in 1948, a portion of the
subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel. Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the
same was declared under the name of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the
name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental that
previous tax declarations pertaining to the said portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no
longer be located as the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously declared in 1948 under the
name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the
name of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A certification
was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of previous tax declarations under the
name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.

In 1991 or upon ESRDC’s acquisition of the subject property, the latter took possession thereto. Albeit it
has presently leased the said land to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant,
nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Page 46 of 175
Corollarily, oppositor-appellant’s contentions that the court a quo erred in considering the tax
declarations as evidence of ESRDC’s possession of the subject land as the latter’s predecessors-in-
interest declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner-appellee are
incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence
to contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject property and their
possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation purposes until ESRDC filed an
application for land registration in 1995, ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the
concept of an owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for forty seven (47) years
already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious in the concept of an owner.7 (citations omitted)

The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-
in-interest possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of time required under
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA), and
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree"
(P.D. No. 1529). According to the petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and competent
witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the
subject property. The respondent’s sole witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and
competent witness as he is the respondent’s liaison officer and he is not related in any way to the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were planted on the subject property only
shows casual or occasional cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has proven itself entitled to the
benefits of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this
Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of whether the respondent had presented sufficient
proof of the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact,
considering that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. 8 However, that a petition for review
should be confined to questions of law and that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual

Page 47 of 175
findings of the CA are not without exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are:
(a) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not
sustained by the evidence on record.

This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by the respondent
fell short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b)
of the PLA. The respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis of either
Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of
evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11
thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles".9 On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified
possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied
for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the
laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not
received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted
subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

Page 48 of 175
and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of ten (10)
years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in
the PLA until it was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a period
of thirty (30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977 that it was
required that possession and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration of
property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable
land" while Section 14 (2) covers "private property". As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 10 the distinction between the two provisions lies with the
inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil
Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1). 11

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned.12 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
following properties are of public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial
property,13 hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.14

Page 49 of 175
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into
private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth". (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.15

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription
against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established.
Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot
be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or prior to June
12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted the
following tax declarations:

a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the year 1948;

b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974,
1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;

c) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;

d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;

e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and
1990; and

f) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.

Page 50 of 175
Pursuant to Agapita Claudel’s 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10)
banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were supposedly four years old, hence, the
reasonable presumption that she had been in possession even before June 12, 1945. 16

The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:

"Q – Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor has started to possess this land
subject matter of this application?

A – Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war but the Municipality of El Salvador
was created on June 15, 1948 by virtue of RA 268 and it’s started to officially function only on August 2,
1948[.]

Q – From whom did you acquire this information?

A – From the seller and the adjoining lot owners."17

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, the
respondent claimed that per Francisca Oco’s Tax Declarations, the following improvements were
introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963;
thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree and
three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut
trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tan’s Tax Declarations, there were
fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990. 18

A reading of the CA’s July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant of the respondent’s
application given its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on
the evidence submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register the subject property in its name
under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-interest commenced after
June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject property by
prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the Philippines, 19 the CA held that even if possession
commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and possession in the
concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and disposable public land into private property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On the premise that the
application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that
the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in the
manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per
the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from
agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.21 Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El
Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone. 22 Therefore,
it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the
prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain,
it may not be acquired by prescription.

Page 51 of 175
On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would
likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the
earliest that the respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948.
That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in Agapita Claudel’s 1948 Tax
Declaration cannot be considered a "well-nigh controvertible evidence" that she was in possession prior
to June 12, 1945 without any evidence that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan
Lay Cho, the earliest tax declaration in his name is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he
occupied and possessed Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the
respondent’s lone witness that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of
the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for being hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect
title over an alienable and disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious"
in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, 23 this Court explained that the intent behind the
use of "possession" in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the need for actual and not just
constructive or fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.24 (citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus,
requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118
thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be "in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful
and uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon,25 this Court expounded on the
nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or
the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove
the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. 26 (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove compliance with the
possession required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations covering
Area B for a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not qualify as
competent evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the
Philippines:27

Page 52 of 175
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967,
1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type
of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence,
tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarant’s right to registration of
title.28 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," by which the respondent
describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of
proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law.29 It is
therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the
allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis
of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence
of the oppositors.30

The respondent’s claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone. In
Cequeña v. Bolante,31 this Court ruled that it is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.32 In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.33

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were four years old at the
time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as evidence that her possession
commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she planted and cultivated them.
Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these trees, such can only be
considered "casual cultivation" considering the size of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay
Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or prior to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed
from his 1948 Tax Declaration.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation or harvesting was made does not
constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled
in Wee:

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number of coffee
plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or
harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient
to demonstrate petitioner’s right to the registration of title in her favor. 34

Fourth, Vicente Oco’s testimony deserves scant consideration and will not supplement the inherent
inadequacy of the tax declarations.1âwphi1 Apart from being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay.
Vicente Oco lacks personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent
started to occupy the subject property and admitted that his testimony was based on what he allegedly
gathered from the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot. Moreover,
Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed by the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they
came into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual proof of

Page 53 of 175
possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice. 35 Evidence of this nature should have been
received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Finally, that the respondent’s application was filed after only four years from the time the subject
property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR’s October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of
possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in Heirs
of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo: 36

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership
and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the
State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. 37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision and
February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the respondent’s application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Page 54 of 175
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185092 June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the November
21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its appeal
and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in
LRC Case No. 026.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with
the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792
square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their
mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not
within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely: (1) Tax
Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their
mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description which
was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management Service, Region III, of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate
issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject
property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the
registered owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and
others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry
on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there
was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain
Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

Page 55 of 175
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by
the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on December
3, 1998.

Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.

During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over
the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the
evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from
the public prosecutor.

The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.

On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the registration of the subject property in
the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and the applicants
having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to
registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter of this petition
which is more particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding
technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.

Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-
in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants,
whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the accepted norm that
open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC noted that
evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered by land patent or a public land
application as certified to by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared and secured
from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified
and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.

On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No.
81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the
public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is
entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.

Page 56 of 175
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as
alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would
start.

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of the subject property. Save
for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject
property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or
that they had introduced improvement thereon.

On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision 5 affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003 of the MTC of
Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public document,
having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subject property was indeed
alienable and disposable.

With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession
was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on
July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4,
1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was
built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public
prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject
property.

The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed by
the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor,
representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment
of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-
19015-01557 were respondents.

The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.

Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

ISSUES

Page 57 of 175
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE APPROVED
SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION

FOR REGISTRATION.

The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case, the CA
relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It is
well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land sought to be registered
is alienable and disposable. What respondents should have done was to show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration fell within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.

To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance
but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed to present
specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said that it clearly manifested
their adverse claim on the property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim of
ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from the start of their
supposed occupation.

Position of Respondents

On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land was alienable
and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by the
DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are
sufficient to establish that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.

Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated that a DENR Regional
Technical Director’s certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.

Page 58 of 175
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied the doctrine
of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion,
through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the subject land from
the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was built in
the said land and was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the registration of land
title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the
same statute. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, 9 provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an
application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The
absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.

Page 59 of 175
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among
others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC
Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military
reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office
III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell
short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.

In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court
reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed
was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption
that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State..."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
(Citations omitted and emphases supplied)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land

Page 60 of 175
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable. 14

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 16

Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of
the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified
by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of
land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18

In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the
earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation
of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject
land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of
the subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date
expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of land
title was legally infirm.

The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

xxxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In
the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

xxxx

Page 61 of 175
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus,
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law. 20

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate
against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The
applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared
through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject
land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. 22

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529.
Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and
(b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the
alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more cannot apply for
registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to
acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as
alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether
respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were of the character prescribed
by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

Page 62 of 175
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal
justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and resolution
and deny the application for registration of land title of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the October 8, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
in Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 63 of 175
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 189970 June 9, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CRISANTO S. RANESES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated June 18, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90383, which affirmed the Orders dated October 11, 2007 3 and
November 27, 20074 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Pasig City (Taguig City Hall of Justice),
Branch 153 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11573-TG.

The facts follow.

On March 26, 2007, respondent Crisanto S. Raneses (respondent) filed an Application 5 for Original
Registration of Land Title docketed as LRC No. N-11573-TG over two parcels of land identified as Lot
No. 3085-A, Csd- 00-001621 and Lot No. 3085-B,Csd-00-001621 both located at Barangay Napindan,
Taguig City, Metro Manila with a total area of twenty-two thousand six hundred (22,600) square meters
(subject properties).

On September 24, 2007, during the initial hearing, respondent marked several documents to establish
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. There being no opposition filed, the RTC issued an
Order of General Default6 against all persons except herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) and granted respondent’s Motion to Present his Evidence Ex-Parte.7

On October 1, 2007, respondent testified that despite the fact that the earliest tax declaration on record
over the subject properties was issued only in 1980, his parents had been in continuous possession
and occupation of the same as early as June 1945. 8 He narrated that his father, the late Pedro
Raneses (Pedro), was a farmer who cultivated the subject properties by planting palay and other crops
thereon. Respondent further narrated that since the subject properties were near the lake, Pedro used
a portable irrigation system to suck water from Laguna de Bay and a mechanized harvester to harvest
the palay. However, he claimed that when Pedro died on November 15, 1982, 9 the cultivation of the
subject properties was likewise stopped. Respondent averred that Pedro declared the subject
properties for real estate tax purposes, as evidenced by several tax declarations 10 issued in Pedro’s
name. Respondent claimed that he acquired ownership over the subject properties when his mother,
Nina Raneses,11 and his sisters, Annabelle R. San Juan and Belinda R. Bayas, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Waiver 12 (Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate) on April 24,
1997,whereby they agreed to partition and adjudicate among themselves the subject properties, and
thereafter, waive all their rights, interest and participation over the same in favor of

Page 64 of 175
respondent.13 Subsequently, respondent had the subject properties declared for real estate tax
purposes under his own name.14

Respondent also testified that there were no other persons or entities who occupied the subject
properties. Correlatively, a Conversion Subdivision Plan 15 covering the subject properties was prepared
by a private Geodetic Engineer named Andrew DG.Montallana (Engr. Montallana). 16 Said Plan noted
that the subject properties were "[s]urveyed in accordance with Survey Authority No. LMS-SA-007607-
310 dated August 29, 2006 issued by the CENRO, South [S]ector" and that the subject properties were
"inside alienable and disposable land area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968."17 Respondent also presented before the RTC an Inter-Office
Memorandum18 dated March 26, 2007 (Inter-Office Memorandum) prepared and signed by the
Engineering and Construction Division (ECD) of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
composed of Engineer Ramon D. Magalonga, Jr. (Engr. Magalonga), Fredisvindo A. Latoza and
Renato Q. Medenilla (ECD Team) and addressed to the Division Chief-III of the ECD. Said
Memorandum provided that after an actual field verification, the ECD Team found that the subject
properties are "presently above (back filling) the reglementary 12.5-meter elevation."

Catalina Raneses (Catalina), the mother of respondent, also testified that she and her husband Pedro
had been in possession of the subject properties since the Japanese occupation. She narrated that
Pedro cultivated the subject properties for palay production. However, after Pedro’s death in 1982, the
subject properties were no longer used for palay production, and were, instead, at times leased out for
the production of watermelons. Catalina corroborated respondent’s testimony that sometime in 1997,
she, her daughters and respondent executed the aforementioned Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
wherein all of them waived their rights and interests over the subject properties in favor of respondent
for a consideration.19

On October 11, 2007, the RTC issued its first assailed Order 20 granting respondent’s application for
land registration, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the application is Granted. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring applicant Crisanto S.
Raneses, the owner in fee simple of Lot 3085-A, Csd-00-001621, with an area of Fifteen Thousand
Two Hundred Forty (15,240) square meters situated in Brgy. Napindan, City of Taguig, Metro Manila;
and Lot 3085-B, Csd-00-001621 with an area of seven thousand three hundred sixty (7,360)square
meters situated in Brgy. Napindan, City of Taguig, Metro Manila.

After this Order shall become final and executory, let the Land Registration Authority issue the
corresponding decree of registration.

SO ORDERED.21

On October 25, 2007, the LLDA filed its Opposition 22 to the application alleging that the subject
properties are below the 12.50-meter elevation, hence, forming part of the bed of Laguna Lake and are,
therefore, inalienable, indisposable and incapable of registration. To support its cause, the LLDA
attached to its Opposition a Memorandum 23 dated September 24, 2007 (ECD Memorandum) prepared
and signed by no less than Engr. Magalonga of the ECD and concurred by the ECD’s Division Chief-III,
Engr. Donato C. Rivera, Jr. which stated that upon the projection of the subject properties in the LLDA’s
topographic map, the same were below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters.1âwphi1 Moreover,
the LLDA posited that in the absence of any declaration by the Director of Lands, the subject properties
remain inalienable and indisposable.

Page 65 of 175
In its Order24 dated October 25, 2007, the RTC directed respondent to comment on the Opposition of
LLDA. In the meantime, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of
Appeal25 on November 7, 2007. For orderly proceedings, the RTC took note of the Notice of Appeal as
it awaited the respondent’s comment in order for it to judiciously resolve the pending Opposition of the
LLDA.26 In compliance with the RTC’s Order, respondent filed his Comment and Motion 27 to the said
Opposition, arguing that the RTC should give more credence to the Inter-Office Memorandum as the
findings therein were based on an actual field inspection rather than the ECD Memorandum, the
findings of which were based on a mere table survey. Moreover, respondent argued that the ECD
Memorandum should not be considered by the RTC as the same was not formally offered in evidence.
Respondent prayed that his Comment and Motion be noted. He also manifested before the RTC that he
is amenable to the reopening of the case so that the LLDA can present controverting evidence, if it
wants to, and for him to present his rebuttal.

Thus, on November 27, 2007, the RTC issued its second assailed Order, 28 finding merit in respondent’s
arguments and dismissing LLDA’s Opposition, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, no probative value is therefore attached to the basis of LLDA’s
opposition filed fourteen (14) days late after the application for registration of Crisanto S. Raneses was
granted.

SO ORDERED.29

For the LLDA’s failure to take any action against its second assailed Order, the RTC, in its
Order30 dated January 8, 2008,approved the Notice of Appeal filed by the OSG and directed the
transmittal of the records of this case to the CA.

On June 18, 2009, the CA upheld the RTC which gave more credence to the findings contained in the
Inter-Office Memorandum than that of the ECD Memorandum and in granting respondent’s application.
The CA found that respondent had adequately proven that the subject properties form part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Orders dated October 11, 2007 and November 27, 2007
rendered by Branch 153 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Pasig City in LRC Case No. N-11573-TG.

SO ORDERED.31

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration 32 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution 33 dated
October 5, 2009.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
LANDS ARE PART OF THE DISPOSABLE AND ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN[;
AND]

Page 66 of 175
 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION
COURT WHICH GRANTED RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SAME ARE
CONSIDERED PART OF PUBLIC LAND, BEING BELOW THE 12.50-METER ELEVATION AS
CERTIFIED BY THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA). 34

Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent, having the burden to prove by incontrovertible
evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, failed by relying simply on the
Conversion Subdivision Plan and the Inter-Office Memorandum of the LLDA. Invoking this Court’s
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 35 the OSG argues that respondent as an applicant and in order
to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. Lastly, the OSG posits that the EDC Memorandum being a later issuance should be given more
credence than the Inter-Office Memorandum.36

On the other hand, respondent counters that, as held by the RTC and the CA, no consideration should
be accorded to the EDC Memorandum as it was not formally offered in evidence. He asserts that, even
if considered, the Inter-Office Memorandum should be given more credence than the EDC
Memorandum because the former was the result of an actual verification inspection while the latter was
merely based on a table survey. Relying on the findings of the RTC and the CA, respondent claims that
the subject properties had already been classified as alienable and disposable as provided in the
Conversion-Subdivision Plan’s annotation.37

Essentially, the sole issue the petition presents is whether or not the subject properties in this case are
alienable or disposable land of the public domain.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support
by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 38

In this case, the records do not support the findings made by the RTC and the CA that the subject
properties are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Respondent bases his right to registration of title on Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529,otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

Page 67 of 175
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The afore-quoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in accordance with Section 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073, which reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Thus, under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the
following requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain 39 for land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It must be proved.40 And the applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable.41

Respondent failed to hurdle this burden.

It bears noting that in support of his claim that the subject properties are alienable and disposable,
respondent merely presented the Conversion Subdivision Plan which was prepared by Engr.
Montallana with the annotation that the subject properties were "inside alienable and disposable land
area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968"42 and the Inter-Office Memorandum from the LLDA.

Respondent’s reliance on the said annotation and Inter-Office Memorandum is clearly insufficient.

In Republic v. Dela Paz43 citing Republic v. Sarmiento,44 this Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by

Page 68 of 175
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by
the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome
the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

In contrast, this Court has held that the applicant must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)45 or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)46 of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 47

Clearly, the pieces of evidence submitted by respondent before the RTC in this case hardly satisfy the
aforementioned documentary requirements. Given the lack of evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve whether the Inter-Office
Memorandum should be given more credence over the ECD Memorandum. On this matter, this Court’s
ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Lydia Capco de Tensuan 48 is enlightening:

While we may have been lenient in some cases and accepted substantial compliance with the
evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties, we cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case
at bar.

We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration Authority (LRA) or the DENR
oppose the application for registration on the ground that the land subject thereof is inalienable. In the
present case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to oppose Tensuan's Application for
Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition, precisely argued that the subject property is part of the
Laguna Lake bed and, therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate the evidence
presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof
that the subject property is alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the
LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90383, affirming the Orders dated October 11, 2007 and November 27, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153 in Land Registration Case No. N-11573-TG, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of title filed by respondent Crisanto S.
Raneses over two parcels of land identified as Lot No. 3085-A, Csd-00-001621 and Lot No. 3085-B,
Csd-00-001621 both located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig City, Metro Manila, is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 69 of 175
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187144, September 17, 2014

CARMEN T. GAHOL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, RICARDO T. GAHOL, MARIA ESTER

GAHOL PEREZ, JOSE MARI T. GAHOL, LUISITO T. GAHOL AND ALCREJ
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. ESPERANZA COBARRUBIAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Decision 1 dated October 6, 2008
and the Resolution2 dated March 4, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96144.

Carmen M. Tionko-Gahol (Carmen), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner of a

parcel of residential lot denominated as Lot 27-B-1 of LRC Psd-36727, situated in Residential Section
“H,” Baguio City, with an area of 243 sq. meters, covered by TCT No. T-24457,3 The lot has a two
storey residential house. On May 2, 1997, Carmen filed a Townsite Sales Application (TSA)4 with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Baguio City, for a 101 sq. meter land
adjacent to her titled property with the purpose of using the land solely for additional and protection
purposes.

On October 2, 1997, respondent Esperanza Cobarrubias filed a protest5 against Carmen's TSA
claiming that the late Esperanza Cascolan, respondent’s mother, and her heirs are the actual
occupants of the subject lot since 1970 and continuously having built thereon a residential building with
a store and a barbecue stand; that they had also planted on the lot several fruit-bearing trees, a narra
tree and plants; that the subject lot is likewise used as an access or as a road right of way being the
only ingress to and egress from the properties of Apolonia Cascolan and Esperanza Cascolan; that
Esperanza Cascolan was issued a tax declaration over the existing improvements on the said lot and
has been religiously paying real estate taxes thereon; and that the earlier TSA filed by Esperanza
Cascolan on a land which included the subject lot was not accepted by the Bureau of Lands on the
ground that the said property was within the Health Center Reservation. Respondent also filed her own
TSA over a 215 sq. meter-lot which included the subject lot. 6cralawlawlibrary

On March 21, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Cordillera Administrative Region (DENR-CAR) issued an Order7 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the instant protest is hereby DENIED. The Townsite Sales
Application in the name of Carmen T. Gahol over a lot located at Res. Sec. “H”, Teodora Alonzo Street,
Baguio City be given further due course. Further, the subject lot shall be utilized strictly, solely,
exclusively for gardening, beautification and driveway purposes only. 8chanrobleslaw

The DENR-CAR held that to sustain respondent's argument that she is entitled to a direct award of the
subject lot because of her and her predecessor's claims of long years of possession and occupation of
the same was misplaced. It ruled that all lands within the limits of Baguio City are declared as Townsite
Reservation disposable under Chapter IX, Section 58, in relation to Section 79 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (CA 141), as amended, which provides that such lands are sold by way of public auction to the
highest bidder, and not as an agricultural public land disposable under Chapter VII, Section 44 of the

Page 70 of 175
Public Land Act or under the so called Free Patent Application and/or confirmation of an imperfect
complete title. The DENR-CAR further opined that it could not adjudicate the said lot to respondent
based on Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 504 Clearing Committee Resolution No. 93-1,
particularly SITUATION B which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SITUATION B. Sandwiched between a road and a titled property

Policy: After providing for the required road-of-way (r.o.w.), minimum area must not be less than 200
sq.m.; and its minimum depth, measured perpendicularly from edge of right of way to titled property lot-
line should not be less than 15 meters, otherwise, the subject area is reserved for greenbelt
purposes.9chanrobleslaw

The DENR-CAR also found that Carmen's handwritten request for an increase from 101 sq. meters as
appearing in the sketch plan attached on her TSA to 161 sq. meters cannot be given due course at this
stage of the proceedings. but the matter can be tackled during the execution of the final survey to
rectify any error.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. which the DENR-CAR denied in its Order10 dated
October 9, 2000. Respondent appealed the Order to the DENR proper.

In an Order11 dated May 21, 2004, the DENR dismissed the appeal. In so ruling, the DENR reiterated
that the subject lot is part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, disposable in accordance with CA
141 which does not give preferential right to actual occupants of lots within townsite reservations.
Further, the DENR said that respondent's actual occupation of the subject lot will not bar Carmen's TSA
for the purpose of conducting a public bidding on the said lot. The DENR then ruled that respondent's
TSA cannot be given due course based on A.O. No. 504 Committee Resolutions 93-1 and 93-2, and
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Resolution No. 93-2 requires, as a general policy, that townsite sales applications for lots within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation should have a minimum area of 200 square meters. Additionally,
Resolution No. 93-1 of the Committee requires, as a general policy, that applications for lots
sandwiched between a road and a titled property, should have a minimum area of 200 square meters
and a depth of not less than 15 meters. Otherwise, the applications shall be returned unacted and
unrecorded to the respective applicants, and the lots reserved for greenbelt purposes. x x
x12chanrobleslaw

The DENR found that respondent's application did not meet the area requirements under Resolution
Nos. 93-1 and 93-2; and that respondent intended to use the subject lot for residential/commercial
purposes when the above-cited Resolutions require that the same could be used for greenbelt
purposes only. Thus, the DENR held that it was but reasonable to give due course to Carmen's TSA
because the subject lot is narrow, fronts Carmen's property, and is to be used only for the purposes
stated in the TSA.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order13 dated July 15, 2005. Dissatisfied,
respondent filed an appeal to the Office of the President (OP).

In an Order14 dated May 16, 2006, the OP dismissed the appeal, and reiterated the disquisitions
made by the DENR-CAR and the DENR. It also denied respondent's motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution15 dated August 17, 2006.

Page 71 of 175
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 seeking to set aside the OP decision.
Carmen filed her Comment thereto and respondent her Reply.

On October 6, 2008, the CA issued its assailed decision which reversed the OP decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 16 May 2006 Decision of the Office of the President is
hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered giving DUE COURSE to petitioner's protest by declaring
private respondent Carmen Gahol DISQUALIFIED from applying for a Townsite Sales Application over
the subject property. 16

In so ruling, the CA found that Carmen was a titled owner of a piece of land; thus, in accomplishing and
filing her TSA form which carried the undertaking that she was not a lot owner, there was already a
basis to have such application rejected. Moreover, the area applied for by Carmen was way below the
minimum required area of 200 sq. meters set forth in Resolution Nos. 93-1 and 93-2 issued by A.O. 504
Clearing Committee of the DENR-CAR; and that she also stated in her TSA that the lot she was
applying for “contains no improvements or indication of occupation or settlement except rip-rapping,
plants with economic values” when the truth was that structures had been put by respondent's mother
as early as 1974. Despite all these, the DENR-CAR, the DENR, and the OP did not discuss these
matters of Carmen's disqualification and/or lack of certain qualifications. The CA found it surprising that
the restrictions laid down in Resolution Nos. 93-1 and 93-2 of AO 504 Clearing Committee of the
DENR-CAR were applied against respondent but not to Carmen when both were essentially applying
for the same lot. The CA also found that contrary to the DENR's appreciation, the subject lot applied for
was not fronting Carmen's property but located at its side.

The CA, however, ruled that it was precluded from resolving respondent's own TSA as the
administrative agencies only resolved the denial of respondent's protest and the adjunct granting or
giving due course to Carmen's TSA; and that the discussions of respondent's alleged disentitlement
was merely for that purpose and no other.

In a Manifestation17 dated October 29, 2008 and motion for reconsideration, notice was given of
Carmen's death in 2007, and that she was being substituted by her children and the family-owned
corporation, ALCREJ Corporation, now the registered owner of Carmen's property in Baguio, as
petitioners. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 14,
2009.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on the following issues,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A. THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN THAT

(1) it declared “Carmen Gahol DISQUALIFIED from applying for a Townsite Sales Application over the
subject property, despite her qualification under the Public Land Act (C.A. 141) and Resolution Nos. 93-
1 and 93-2 of A.O 504 Committee of the DENR-CAR, as correctly found and applied by the
administrative agencies concerned, the DENR and the Office of the President of the Philippines;

(2) it misapplied the laws or erred in not applying the applicable laws.

B. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED, IF NOT DISREGARDED, WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Page 72 of 175
CONCERNED IN THE CASE, IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
THAT:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
with the regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies,” since, “By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over
matters falling within their jurisdiction, they were in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.”

C. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RULE ON THE
PROCEDURAL MATTERS RAISED BY PETITIONERS THAT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED
WITH IT BY RESPONDENT ESPERANZA COBARRUBIAS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE BUT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.18chanrobleslaw

Petitioners raise both procedural and substantive issues.

Anent the procedural issue, petitioners point out that personal service to her counsel was the most
practical mode of service as both counsels of respondent and petitioners reside and have their law
offices in Baguio City, instead of mailing the copy for petitioner's counsel in Malacanang Post Office,
Manila on October 4, 2006. Thus, the CA should not have given due course to the petition for violating
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

We are not persuaded.

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the
court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing
was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

Personal service of pleadings is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service is the exception,
so that where personal service is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service is mandatory. 19 Only when personal service is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. Based on this explanation will the court then
determine whether personal service is indeed not practicable so that resort to other modes is
made.20 At this stage, the judge exercises proper discretion but only upon the explanation given. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, the court shall consider not only the circumstances, the
time and the place but also the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading involved. 21cralawlawlibrary

Here, both counsels for the parties have their law offices in Baguio City, thus, personal service to
petitioner's counsel would have been more practicable than mailing the copy of the petition for
petitioner's counsel in Manila. It appears, however, that the petition for review was filed in the CA,
Manila by personal service, and the copies of the petition for the OP and DENR whose offices are
located in Manila and Quezon City, respectively, were also personally served to them. The copy
for petitioner's counsel was thus sent by registered mail from Manila on the same day the copies for
the other agencies were served personally, thus a written explanation stating that the pleading was sent
by registered mail due to time and distance constraints, as well as lack of office personnel. Based on

Page 73 of 175
such explanation, the CA can exercise its discretion on its plausibility which is ought to be guided by the
principle that substantial justice far outweighs rules of procedure. 22 Thus, the CA accepted the petition
taking into consideration the prima facie merit of the case sought to be expunged for violation of the
rule.

As to the merits of the case, we find no error committed by the CA in granting the petition.

Petitioner Gahol applied for TSA over the 101 sq. meter lot located at Residential Section “H”, Baguio
City. One of the requirements for the issuance of a TSA form is a certificate of no homelot, but Carmen
had not submitted any and was issued a TSA.

Also, the TSA to which Carmen affixed her signature, stated among others
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“I am not the owner of any lot in Baguio City, except the land applied for.”

I have been upon and examined the land applied for and it contains no improvement or indication of
occupation or settlement, except as follows: rip-rapping, plants with economic values and to the best of
my knowledge and belief it is neither timber nor mineral land and contains no valuable deposit of
guano, coal or salt.

I understand that any applicant who willfully and knowingly submit false statements or executes affidavit
in connection with his application shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished accordingly, and that
any person who, not being qualified to apply for public land, files an application or induces or permits
another to file in his behalf shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand pesos and by
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in addition thereto, his application shall be
rejected or canceled and all amounts paid on account thereof forfeited to the Government, and he shall
not be entitled to apply for any public land in the Philippines.

When Carmen filed her TSA, she is the registered owner of a lot in Baguio. In fact, she is the titled
owner of the lot adjacent to the subject lot. Therefore, there is no truth to the statement in the TSA that
she does not own any lot in Baguio. We find apropos what the CA said,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the instant petition, Cobarrubias persistently questioned the qualifications of Gahol to apply for TSA.
And among the requisites of Administrative Order 504 Clearing Committee of the DENR-CAR is the
Certificate of No-Homelot from the City Assessor's Office. This is found listed in the very
mimeographed list of requirements distributed by DENR-CAR to prospective applicants. But this is
more evident in the TSA form itself which requires every applicant to undertake or guarantee that he or
she is “not the owner of any lot in Baguio City except the land applied for.” Now, Gahol did not only fail
to file such certificate, she in fact was a titled owner of a piece of land which is adjacent to the very
subject property she is applying for in her TSA. And this fact was not unknown to DENR-CAR for it was
reported by its own land investigator, a certain Mr. Victor Fernandez, that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Ocular inspection appears that lot is adjacent to her titled property. x x x23chanrobleslaw

Moreover, Carmen failed to state in her TSA the fact that there were signs of improvement or indication
of occupation on the subject lot. The minutes 24 dated November 18, 1999 on the ocular inspection of
the subject lot established such improvement and occupation, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Page 74 of 175
We arrived at the place at exactly 9:15 in the morning in the presence of the applicant-protestee
Carmen Gahol and Atty. Maita Andres and the applicant-protestant Esperanza Cascolan. We observed
a big narra tree standing at the north-east edge of the subject lot. Likewise, we could see two small
structures where one serves also as a residence, which the protestee claimed to have been introduced
by the protestant and the predecessor-in-interest. At the middle of the subject lot is an alley which
traverse the subject lot measuring one and one half meters more or less.

At the edge of the subject lot is a cemented portion being used by the protestant Esperanza Cascolan
as their parking space. There are also plants with economic value such as coffee, avocado tree and a
guava tree and alnus tree are not being claimed and are not being claimed by the protestee, Mrs.
Carmen Gahol.25chanrobleslaw

Carmen had also filed complaints for violations of PD 1096, National Building Code of the Philippines,
and PD 772, anti-squatting and other similar acts, against Camilo Coscolan and Rolando Clemente with
the end in view of evicting them from the subject lot which are indications of occupation of the subject
lot.

Thus, pursuant to paragraph 10 of Carmen's TSA, her application should have been rejected at the first
instance or canceled. However, as correctly observed by the CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While Cobarrubias pointed all this out at the outset neither the DENR-CAR, the DENR, or the OP
touched and discussed the matter of Gahol's disqualification and/or lack of certain qualifications. They
simply denied the protest of the former and gave due course to the latter's TSA without any explanation
as to how Gahol was able to hurdle these disqualifications and/or satisfy her lack of certain
qualifications. x x x26chanrobleslaw

The DENR-CAR, DENR and OP denied respondent's TSA because of AO 504 Clearing Committee
Resolution No. 93-1 and which we quote again for ready reference, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Situation B. Sandwiched between a road and a titled property

Policy: After providing for the required road of way (r.o.w.), minimum area must not be less than 200 sq.
m.; and its minimum depth, measured perpendicularly from edge of r.o.w. to titled property lot-line
should not be less than 15 meters, otherwise, the subject area is reserved for greenbelt purposes.

The last paragraph of the same resolution reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED FINALLY, that any or all land applications, Town Site or Miscellaneous Sales, that fail to
satisfy the prescribed requirements, hereinabove specified be returned unacted/unrecorded to the
applicant/s concerned and such land shall be appropriated and reserved for greenbelt purposes and/or
conservation of both natural and boundaries and legal easements.

The DENR-CAR and DENR denied respondent's TSA based on said Resolution No. 93-1. The DENR
concluded that respondent's application did not meet the area requirements and failed to show how it
arrived at such conclusion. On the other hand, the area applied for by Carmen was only 101 sq.
meters which was less than the minimum area required of the resolution, which was 200 sq. meters.
She had also stated untruthful statements in her TSA. Thus, her TSA should have been rejected in the
first place instead of giving due course to it.

Page 75 of 175
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated October 6, 2008 and the
Resolution dated March 4, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96144 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawred

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Page 76 of 175
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014

HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ,
LORENZO MANALAYSAY, RICARDO MARCELO, JR. AND LEONCIO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Land on which no agricultural activity is being conducted is not subject to the coverage of either
Presidential Decree No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).

The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 27, 2011, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the decision issued by the Office of the President (OP) on March 1, 2010, 2 and reinstated the
order of the OIC-Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Regional Office III rendered
on August 18, 2006.3

Antecedents

Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located in Brgy. Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan (Dakila property)
registered in the name of Freddie Santiago under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-103698 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan with an area of 212,500 square meters. The Dakila property used to
be tenanted by Susana Surio, Cipriano Surio, Alfonso Espiritu, Agustin Surio, Aurelio Surio, Pacifico
Eugenio, Godofredo Alcoriza, Lorenza Angeles, Ramon Manalad, Toribio Hernandez, Emerciana
Montealegre, Pedro Manalad, Celerino Ramos and Cecilia L. Martin, 4 but in August 1991, these
tenants freely and voluntarily relinquished their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their
respective sinumpaang pahayag5 in exchange for some financial assistance and individual homelots
titled and distributed in their names, as follows: 6

TCT No. Name of Tenant/Successor Area (sq. m.)

T-73006 Susana Surio 186
T-73007 Cipriano Surio 150
T-73008 Alfonso Espiritu 300
T-73009 Agustin Surio 300
T-73010 Aurelio Surio 264
T-73011 Pacifico Eugenio 300
T-73012 Godofredo Alcoriza 300
T-73013 Lorenza Angeles 300
Ramon Manalad 300
T-73014 Toribio M. Hernandez 300
Emerciana Montealegre 300
Pedro Manalad 300
T-73015 Celerino Ramos 300
T-73016 Cecilia L. Martin 300

Page 77 of 175
 T-73017 Pablo dela Cruz 300
T-73018 Aurelio dela Cruz 300
T-73019 Julita Leoncio 300
Anicia L. de Guzman
T-73020 Ramon Centeno 300
T-73021 Miguel Centeno 300
TOTAL 4,500

On September 17, 1992, the petitioner purchased the remaining 208,050 square meters of the Dakila
property from Santiago,7 and later caused the transfer of the title to its name as well as subdivided the
Dakila property into six lots,8 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

TCT No. Area (sq. m.)

81618 50,000
81619 50,000
81620 50,000
81621 54,810
73022 2,401
73023 839
TOTAL 208,050

The petitioner then developed the property by dumping filling materials on the topsoil, and by erecting a
perimeter fence and steel gate. It established its field office on the property. 9

On March 4, 1998, the Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No. 16-98
reclassifying four of the six subdivided lots belonging to the petitioner, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION NO. 16-98

A RESOLUTION RE-CLASSIFYING AS RESIDENTIAL LOTS THE FOUR (4) PARCELS OF LAND

SEPARATELY COVERED BY TCT NO. 81618, TCT NO. 81619, TCT NO.81620 AND TCT NO. 81621
CONTAINING AN AREA OF 50,000 SQ MTS, 50,000 SQ. MTS, 50,000 SQ M (sic) AND 54,810 SQ M
(sic) RESPECTIVELY ALL LOCATED AT DAKILA, MALOLOS, BULACAN REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF THE HOLY TRINITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

WHEREAS, Ms. Jennifer M. Romero, Auditor Representative of Holy Trinity Realty and Development
Corporation in [her] letter to the Sangguniang Bayan made a request for re-classification of four
parcel(s) of land registered in the name of Holy Trinity and Development Corporation under TCT NO.
81618, TCT NO. 81619, TCT NO.81620 AND TCT NO. 81621 with an area of 50,000 sq. m., 50,000
sq. m., 50,000 sq. m. AND 54,810 sq. m. respectively all located at Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan.

WHEREAS, after an ocular inspection of the subject lots and matured deliberation, the Sangguniang
Bayan found merit in the request for the following reasons, thus:
1. The Properties are untenanted;cralawlawlibrary

2. That they are not fitted (sic) for agricultural use for lack of sufficient irrigation;cralawlawlibrary

3. There are improvements already introduce[d] on the property by its owner like construction of

Page 78 of 175
subdivision roads;cralawlawlibrary

4. Lack of oppositor to the intend[ed] subdivision project on the properties by its owner;cralawlawlibrary

5. That they are more suitable for residential use considering their location vi[s]-à-vi[s] with (sic) the
residential lots in the area.

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Romeo L. Maclang as seconded by all Sangguniang Bayan
members present,

RESOLVED, as is hereby resolved to re-classify into residential properties four (4) parcels of land
separately covered by TCT NO. 81618, TCT NO. 81619, TCT NO.81620 AND TCT NO. 81621 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an area of 50,000 sq. m. respectively, registered in ownership
of Holy Trinity and Development Corporation located and adjacent to one another in Barangay Dakila of
this Municipality pursuant to the power vested to this Sangguniang [sic] by the Local Government Code
of the Philippines.

RESOLVED further that the owner and/or developer of the said property shall provide adequate
[illegible] to protect the adjacent lots and its owners from any inconvenience and prejudice caused by
the development of the above mentioned property.

APPROVED.10

Consequently, the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) of Malolos, Bulacan issued a
Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion (Certificate of Zoning Conformance),11 as well as a Preliminary
Approval and Locational Clearance in favor of the petitioner for its residential subdivision project on the
Dakila property.12

On August 23, 1999, the petitioner purchased from Santiago another parcel of land with an area of
25,611 located in Barangay Sumapang Matanda, Malolos, Bulacan (Sumapang Matanda property) and
covered by TCT No. T-103697 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. 13

In April 2006, a certain Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila
property.14 This was followed by the letter request of Sumapang Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) Chairman Numeriano L. Enriquez to place the Dakila property within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, which was docketed as A-
0302-0608-06, A.R. Case No. LSD-0324’06.15

Several days later, the DAR Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a petition to annul the sale of the Dakila
property with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan, docketed as DARAB
Case No. R-03-02-2873’06.

Ruling of the DAR Regional Office

On August 18, 2006, the OIC-Regional Director in San Fernando, Pampanga issued an order granting
the letter request of BARC Chairman Enriquez in A-0302-0608-06, A.R. Case No. LSD-
0324’06,16viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Page 79 of 175
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and for the reason indicated therein, this Office
resolves to give due course to this instant request. Accordingly, the MARO and PARO concerned are
hereby DIRECTED to place within the ambit of PD 27/RA 6657 the following titles TCT Nos. T-81618,
T-81619, T-81620, T-81621, T-81622 and T-73023, all situated at Sumapang Matanda, Malolos City,
Bulacan, registered in the name of Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation for distribution to
qualified farmer beneficiary (sic).

Finally, the DAR reserves the right to cancel or withdraw this Order in case of misrepresentation of
facts material to its issuance and for violation of pertinent agrarian laws including applicable
implementing guidelines or rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.17

The OIC-Regional Director opined that the sale of the Dakila property was a prohibited transaction
under Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 665718 and DAR Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 1989; and that the petitioner was disqualified from acquiring land under Republic Act
No. 6657 because it was a corporation.19

Aggrieved, the petitioner assailed the order through its Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside,20 citing
lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process. It argued that the letter request was in the nature of a
collateral attack on its title.

Pending resolution of the Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside, the Register of Deeds issued
emancipation patents (EPs) pursuant to the order of the OIC-Regional Director. The petitioner’s titles
were canceled and EPs were issued to the respondents as follows:21

Emancipation
TCT No. Beneficiary/ies Area (sqm)
Patent No.
T-2007-EP22 00783329 Victorio dela Cruz 50,000
T-2008-EP23 00783330 Lorenzo Manalaysay 50,000
T-2009-EP24 00783331 Ricardo Marcelo, Jr. 50,000
T-2010- 00783332 Leoncio de Guzman 54,810
EP25cralawred
T-2011-EP26 00783334 Gonzalo Caspe 2,401
T-2012-EP27 00783333 839

Almost two months after the EPs were issued, the OIC-Regional Director denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.28

Ruling of the DAR Secretary

The petitioner appealed to the DAR Secretary, submitting that: (1) the letter request for coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and the subsequent filing of the petition for annulment of sale in the DARAB
constituted forum shopping; and (2) the EPs were prematurely issued.

On November 22, 2007, DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman issued an order denying the
appeal,29 and holding that forum shopping was not committed because the causes of action in the letter
request and the action for cancellation of the deed of sale before the DARAB were distinct and
separate; that the EPs were regularly issued; and that the resolution of the DARAB would not in any

Page 80 of 175
manner affect the validity of the EPs.

Ruling on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary said that the Dakila property
was not exempt from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No. 6657 because
Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 did not change or reclassify but merely re-zoned the Dakila property.30

Ruling of the Office of the President

On March 1, 2010, the Office of the President (OP) reversed the ruling of DAR Secretary
Pangandaman upon its finding that the Dakila property had ceased to be suitable for agriculture, and
had been reclassified as residential land pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 16-98, thus:31

We find merit in the appeal.

Under Section 3 (c) of RA 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in
the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are
arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.

In this case, the subject landholdings are not agricultural lands but rather residential lands. The lands
are located in a residential area. Likewise, there are agricultural activities within or near the area. Even
today, the areas in question continued (sic) to be developed as a residential community, albeit at a
snail’s pace. This can be readily gleaned from the fact that both the City Assessor of Malolos and the
Provincial Assessor of Bulacan have considered these lands as residential for taxation purposes.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that appellant’s landholding cannot in any language be considered as
“agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands
upon approval of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. The authority of the municipality (now City) of
Malolos to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. Section 20, Chapter 2, Title I of RA 7160 specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils
to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations within its territorial jurisdiction. A zoning
ordinance/resolution prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land
uses as present and future projection of needs. The power of the local government to convert or
reclassify agricultural lands to non-agricultural lands is not subject to the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

It bears stressing that in his Decision dated April 30, 2002, as affirmed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its Resolution dated March 17, 2006, Bulacan Provincial
Adjudicator Toribio Ilao, Jr., declared that the properties were not tenanted and/or agricultural and that
the alleged farmers-occupants are mere squatters thereto. These decision and resolution were not
appealed by the farmers-occupants and, as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in its
assailed Order of November 22, 2007, that the properties subject of the suit, were agricultural lands,
the DAR Secretary thereby reversed the said DARAB rulings, issued more than a year before, and
nullified Resolution No. 16-98 of the Municipal Council of Malolos, approved nine (9) years earlier, on
March 4, 1998. Thus, the DAR Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the November 22, 2007
Order and February 22, 2008 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Page 81 of 175
The respondents moved to reconsider, but the OP denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence, they
appealed to the CA by petition for review. 33

Ruling of the CA

In the now assailed decision promulgated on July 27, 2011, 34 the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the OP. It declared that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988
and even after the passage of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 on March 4, 1998, the Dakila property
was an agricultural land; that there was no valid reclassification because Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code) and Memorandum Circular No. 54 required an ordinance, not a
resolution; and that findings of the DAR on the Dakila property being an agricultural land should be
respected,35 subject to the clarification to the effect that its determination was only limited to the issue of
whether the Dakila property was an agricultural land covered by Republic Act No. 6657.

The petitioner sought reconsideration but its motion for that purpose was denied. 36

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

The petitioner presents the following issues for our consideration:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY OMITTED TO RULE

UPON, ALBEIT WITHOUT CITING ANY VALID REASONS, THE VARIOUS INTERRELATED ISSUES
PROFFERED IN PETITIONER’S COMMENT RELATIVE TO DAR’S INCLUSION OF THE SUBJECT
DAKILA PROPERTY UNDER THE COVERAGE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, TO WIT: A.)
RESPONDENT-GRANTEES OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS FROM DAR ARE NOT LEGITIMATE
TENANTS OF THE DAKILA PROPERTY; B.) THE SALE AND TRANSFER OF TITLES IN THE NAME
OF PETITIONER HAVE NOT HERETOFORE BEEN NULLIFIED EITHER BY THE DARAB CENTRAL
OFFICE OR THE REGULAR COURTS; C.) THE BONAFIDE TENANTS OF THE DAKILA PROPERTY
HAVE VALIDLY SURRENDERED THEIR TENANCY RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER’S
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; D.) THE DAKILA PROPERTY WAS NO LONGER TENANTED AND,
FURTHER, WAS NO LONGER SUITABLE TO AGRICULTURE, AT THE TIME OF ITS COVERAGE
UNDER AGRARIAN REFORM, ITS ACTUAL USE BEING ALREADY RESIDENTIAL

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FAILING TO

RULE ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MANNER BY WHICH THE DAR CAUSED THE SUMMARY
COVERAGE OF THE DAKILA PROPERTY UNDER THE CARP, ITS EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER’S TITLES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND ITS
PREMATURE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE

PROVISIONS OF RA 6657 IN RESOLVING THE SUBJECT PETITION, EVEN THOUGH THE DAR

Page 82 of 175
PLACED THE SUBJECT DAKILA PROPERTY UNDER THE COVERAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 27

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT HEREIN RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR REVIEW A QUO OUGHT TO HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 37

The petitioner argues that the CA ignored issues vital to the complete determination of the parties’
respective rights over the Dakila property.

Firstly, the CA should have ruled on the propriety of issuing the EPs. In view of the pending petition
before the DARAB, the DAR should have withheld the issuance of the EPs. Even granting that a final
decision had already been rendered by the DARAB, the issuance of the EPs remained premature
inasmuch as the DAR had not yet commenced any court proceedings for the cancellation of the
petitioner’s title. Accordingly, the petitioner’s title remained indefeasible and could not be disturbed by
the collateral orders by the OIC-Regional Director and the DAR Secretary.

Secondly, the petitioner was deprived of due process because the requirements of notice and the
conduct of a public hearing and a field investigation were not strictly complied with by the DAR pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1998.

Thirdly, the CA erred in placing the Dakila property under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 when
the order of the OIC-Regional Director applied the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27. The two
laws should be differentiated from each other; on one hand, Presidential Decree No. 27 required the
beneficiary to be a tenant-farmer of an agricultural land devoted to rice or corn, while on the other
Republic Act No. 6657 was relatively broader and covered all public and private agricultural lands
regardless of the tenurial arrangement and the commodity produced.

Lastly, the CA should have dismissed the respondents’ petition for review due to its defective
certification, pointing to the verification having been executed by the respondents despite the letter
request having been signed by BARC Chairman Enriquez; and assailing the verification for containing
the statement that the allegations therein were based on their “knowledge and belief” instead of their
“personal knowledge and authentic records” as required by the Rules of Court.

The respondents countered that: (1) the CA correctly set aside the issue of whether or not they were
qualified beneficiaries, because that was not the issue raised in the letter request; (2) the CA could not
have ruled on the validity of the sale of the Dakila property in light of the pending action in the DARAB;
(3) it was within the jurisdiction of the DAR to determine whether or not the respondents were qualified
beneficiaries; (4) the waivers by the tenants were illegal; and (5) the issuance of the EPs was a
necessary consequence of placing the Dakila property under the coverage of Presidential Decree No.
27.

In view of the foregoing, the Court needs to consider and resolve the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Did the CA gravely err in limiting its decision to the issue of whether or not the Dakila
property was subject to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657?

Page 83 of 175
 2. Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657
or Presidential Decree No. 27?

3. Was the issuance of the EPs pursuant to the August 16, 2006 order of the DAR
Regional Office proper?

Ruling

We reverse the CA, and reinstate the decision of the OP.

I.
Procedural Issue

We first resolve the issue of the supposedly defective verification.

The verification of a petition is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the
petition have been made in good faith, are true and correct and not merely speculative. 38 This
requirement affects the form of the pleading, and its non-compliance will not render the pleading
defective. It is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite.39 The courts may order the correction of the
pleading if the verification is lacking, and may even act on an unverified pleading if doing so will serve
the ends of justice.40

Under the foregoing, the CA rightly allowed the petition for review of the respondents despite the
statement that the allegations therein were based on their “knowledge and belief.” We underscore that
the defect was even lifted upon the voluntary submission by the respondents themselves of their
corrected verification in order to comply with the Rules of Court.

We cannot also subscribe to the argument that the respondents were not appropriate parties to sign the
verification. They were, considering that when the DAR issued the EPs, they became the real parties in
interest in the proceedings, giving them the requisite personality to sign the verification. Moreover, there
is no question that the party himself need not sign the verification, for it was enough that the party’s
representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleadings could sign the verification. 41 In any event, the respondents, as the identified beneficiaries,
had legal standing and interest to intervene to protect their rights or interests under Republic Act No.
6657. This is clear from Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9700, 42 which amended Republic Act No. 6657
by adding Section 50-A, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding
Section 50-A to read as follows:
Section 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. – x x x

In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform
beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest
to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP.

xxxx

Page 84 of 175
 II.
Courts can pass upon matters
related to the issues raised by the parties

As a general rule, appellate courts are precluded from discussing and delving into issues that are not
raised by the parties. The pertinent rule is Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

In Philippine National Bank v. Rabat,43 the Court explained how this rule operates,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section,

thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some substantial
changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and
assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the
subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.

Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of
errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued
in his brief, such error may now be considered by the court. These changes are of
jurisprudential origin.

2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals,
unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German
Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983).

It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to consider a
plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion,
76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities. 44 (Emphasis supplied)

Conformably with the foregoing, the CA is vested with sufficient authority and discretion to review
matters, not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at
a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice.45 In fact, the CA is possessed with inherent authority to review unassigned errors
that are closely related to an error properly raised, or upon which the determination of the error properly
assigned is dependent, or where it finds that consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.46

Page 85 of 175
It cannot be gainsaid that the validity of the EPs was closely intertwined with the issue of whether the
Dakila property was covered by the agrarian reform laws. When the CA declared that the Dakila
property came within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, the CA barely scraped the surface and
left more questions unresolved rather than writing finis on the matter. To recall, this case originated
from the letter of BARC Chairman Enriquez requesting that the Dakila property be placed under the
OLT pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. But, as the petitioner correctly argues, the two laws,
although similarly seeking to alleviate the plight of landless farmers or farmworkers from the bondage of
tilling the soil, are distinct from each other. Republic Act No. 6657 is broader in scope than Presidential
Decree No. 27, for the former applies to all agricultural lands in which agricultural activities are
conducted, while the latter requires that the covered agricultural land be tenanted and primarily devoted
to rice or corn cultivation.

In Sigre v. Court of Appeals,47 the Court also stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D.
27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while,
P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the mechanism of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: “(P)residential Decree No. 27, as
amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x” It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And
whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter,
and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A.
6657.48

In addition, the tenurial instruments issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries differ under these laws.
Ownership of the beneficiary under Presidential Decree No. 27 is evidenced by an EP while a
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA) is issued under Republic Act No. 6657. For this reason, the
CA could not have simply set aside the issue of whether the EPs issued to the respondents were validly
made by the DAR considering its declaration that the Dakila property was subject to Republic Act No.
6657.

III.
The Dakila property was not an agricultural land
within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657 or P.D. No. 27

The CA declared that the Dakila property as an agricultural land; and that there was no valid
reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 because the law required an ordinance, not a
resolution.

We agree in part with the CA.

Under Republic Act No. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are
vested with the power to reclassify lands. However, Section 20, Chapter II, Title I of Republic Act No.
7160 ordains:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed
by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification
of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:

Page 86 of 175
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
concerned: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed
after the conduct of public hearings.

The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the
foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a
mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was
temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed
a general and permanent character. 49 We also note that the petitioner did not show if the requisite
public hearings were conducted at all. In the absence of any valid and complete reclassification,
therefore, the Dakila property remained under the category of an agricultural land.

Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.

Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 is that it
must either be primarily devoted to or be suitable for agriculture. 50 Perforce, land that is not devoted to
agricultural activity is outside the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. 51 An agricultural land, according
to Republic Act No. 6657, is one that is devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 52Agricultural activity includes the “cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such
farm products; and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.” 53

Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, two requisites
must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land
must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Considering that the
Dakila property has not been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial, the
second requisite is satisfied. For the first requisite to be met, however, there must be a showing that
agricultural activity is undertaken on the property.

It is not difficult to see why Republic Act No. 6657 requires agricultural activity in order to classify land
as agricultural. The spirit of agrarian reform laws is not to distribute lands per se, but to enable the
landless to own land for cultivation. This is why the basic qualification laid down for the intended
beneficiary is to show the willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive
as possible.54 This requirement conforms with the policy direction set in the 1987 Constitution to the
effect that agrarian reform laws shall be founded on the right of the landless farmers and farmworkers
to own, directly or collectively, the lands they till. 55 In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform,56 we even said that the framers of the Constitution limited agricultural lands to the
“arable and suitable agricultural lands.”

Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity – like cultivation of the land,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, or poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such farm products, and other farm activities and practices – were being performed on the Dakila
property in order to subject it to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. We take particular note that the
previous tenants had themselves declared that they were voluntarily surrendering their tenancy rights

Page 87 of 175
because the land was not conducive to farming by reason of its elevation, among others.57 Also notable
is the second Whereas Clause of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98, which mentioned that the Dakila
property was not fit for agricultural use due to lack of sufficient irrigation and that it was more suitable
for residential use, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREAS, after an ocular inspection of the subject lots and matured deliberation, the Sangguniang
Bayan found merit in the request for the following reasons, thus:
1. The properties are untenanted;cralawlawlibrary

2. That they are not fitted [sic] for agricultural use for lack of sufficient irrigation;

3. There are improvements already introduce[d] on the property by its owner like construction of
subdivision roads;cralawlawlibrary

4. Lack of oppositor to the intend[ed] subdivision project on the properties by its owner;cralawlawlibrary

5. That they are more suitable for residential use considering their location viz-a-viz (sic) with (sic) the
residential lots in the area.58 (Emphasis supplied)

The terse statement by the OIC-Regional Director that the Dakila property would still be subject to
Republic Act No. 6657 should Presidential Decree No. 27 be inapplicable59 did not meet the
requirements under Republic Act No. 6657. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6657 identified rice and corn
lands subject to Presidential Decree No. 27 for priority distribution in the first phase and implementation
of the CARP. Insofar as the interplay of these two laws was concerned, the Court has said that during
the effectivity of the Republic Act No. 6657 and in the event of incomplete acquisition under
Presidential Decree No. 27, the former should apply, with the provisions of the latter and Executive
Order No. 22860 having only suppletory effect.61

Even if we supplemented the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, the outcome is still the same,
because the Dakila property was still not within the scope of the law. For land to be covered under
Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, the land must be excluded.
Hence, exemption from coverage followed when the land was not devoted to rice or corn even if it was
tenanted; or the land was untenanted even though it was devoted to rice or corn.62 Based on these
conditions, the DAR Regional Office erred in subjecting the Dakila property under the OLT.

The first requirement, that the land be devoted to rice or corn cultivation, was not sufficiently
established. In this regard, the OIC-Regional Director inaccurately based his holding on the report
submitted by the Legal Services Division that—

[P]ortion of the property embraced under TCT No. 103697 with an area of 2.5611 hectares more or
less, was placed under PD [No.] 27 and subsequently an approved survey plan (Psd-03-020270) has
been prepared which was then the basis of the issuance of titles in favor of Felix Surio and Silvino
Manalad under EP Nos. 345262 and 342561. On the other hand, the land subject of this controversy
was, likewise, subdivided and now covered by an approved plan ASP No. Psd-031410-066532.63

What can be gathered from the report of the Legal Services Division was that the land owned by the
petitioner and covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was the Sumapang Matanda property under TCT
No. 103697. As to the Dakila property, we can only infer from the report that it was merely subdivided.
The report did not mention whatsoever the agricultural activities performed in the Dakila property. Nor

Page 88 of 175
was there a finding that the Dakila property was devoted to either rice or corn cultivation as to justify its
coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27. Such a finding was necessary, for the Court has observed
in Solmayor v. Arroyo:64

Although this Court will not disregard the evidence presented by petitioners that the land is devoted to
rice and corn crops in 1993, when the ocular inspection by the DAR personnel was conducted, it must
be noted that around the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 up to 1978, when the
subject property was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the available evidence
issued and certified by the different government agencies, closer in time to the mentioned time frame
will show that respondent’s property has, indeed, been classified as within the residential and
commercial zones of Davao City. It cannot escape the notice of this Court that more than a decade
before the issuance of the said ocular investigation report stating that the land is devoted to agricultural
production, government agencies equipped with the technical expertise to determine the proper
classification of the subject land have already determined that the land is part of the residential and
commercial zones of Davao City making it suitable for other urban use. Therefore, it is only reasonable
to conclude, based on the certification of various executive agencies issued when this controversy
arose, that at the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27, respondent’s property was not
agricultural.65

For land to come within the coverage of the OLT, indeed, there must be a showing that it is devoted to
the cultivation of rice or corn, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining on
October 21, 1972, the time when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect.66 Unfortunately, no such
evidence was presented, nor was there any field investigation conducted to verify whether or not the
landholding was primarily devoted to the cultivation of rice or corn. Accordingly, the Dakila property
should be excluded from the OLT.

The DAR Secretary affirmed the validity of the EPs in favor of the respondents only “pursuant to the
Order of the Regional Director.” 67 We note, however, that the evidence to establish in the proceedings
below that they or their predecessors had been tenants of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest to
make them the rightful beneficiaries of the Dakila property was severely wanting. For tenancy to exist,
there must be proof that: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is consideration; 68 and (6)
there is a sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship,
and the absence of one or more of them will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.69 Unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure; nor is he
covered by the land reform program of the Government under the existing tenancy laws. 70 Here, the
consent to establish a tenant-landlord relationship was manifestly absent. In view of the petitioner’s
repeated denial of the tenancy, the respondents ought then to establish the tenancy relationship, but
did not do so. Tenancy could not be presumed, but must be established by evidence; its mere
allegation is neither evidence nor equivalent to proof of its existence. 71

There was also no showing that the respondents were engaged in any agricultural activities, or agreed
with Santiago or the petitioner on the sharing of harvests. The OIC-Regional Director obviously
disregarded the affidavit of Barangay Captain Felino M. Teodoro of Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan stating
that the respondents were never the actual farmers on the Dakila property.72

IV.
The petitioner was deprived of due process

The petitioner posits that it was denied due process by the failure of the OIC-Regional Director to see to

Page 89 of 175
the compliance with the procedures outlined by Republic Act No. 6657 and Presidential Decree No. 27.
It claims that the OIC-Regional Director resorted to “procedural shortcuts” and irregularities 73 in issuing
the EPs to the respondents.

We agree with the petitioner’s position.

In Reyes v. Barrios,74 we identified the procedural requirements that must be followed prior to the
issuance of an EP, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Primer on Agrarian Reform enumerates the steps in transferring the land to the tenant-tiller, thus:
a. First step: the identification of tenants, landowners, and the land covered by OLT.

b. Second step: land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the tenant to determine parcel
size, boundaries, and possible land use;cralawlawlibrary

c. Third step: the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). To ensure accuracy and safeguard
against falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer Center (NCC) at Camp
Aguinaldo;cralawlawlibrary

d. Fourth step: valuation of the land covered for amortization computation;cralawlawlibrary

e. Fifth step: amortization payments of tenant-tillers over fifteen (15) year period; and

f. Sixth step: the issuance of the Emancipation Patent.

Thus, there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. x x x.

xxxx

Furthermore, there are several supporting documents which a tenant-farmer must submit before he can
receive the Emancipation Patent, such as:
a. Application for issuance of Emancipation Patent;cralawlawlibrary

b. Applicant's (owner's) copy of Certificate of Land Transfer.

c. Certification of the landowner and the Land Bank of the Philippines that the applicant has tendered
full payment of the parcel of land as described in the application and as actually tilled by
him;cralawlawlibrary

d. Certification by the President of the Samahang Nayon or by the head of farmers' cooperative duly
confirmed by the municipal district officer (MDO) of the Ministry of Local Government and Community
Development (MLGCD) that the applicant is a full-fledged member of a duly registered farmers'
cooperative or a certification to these effect;cralawlawlibrary

e. Copy of the technical (graphical) description of the land parcel applied for prepared by the Bureau of
Land Sketching Team (BLST) and approved by the regional director of the Bureau of
Lands;cralawlawlibrary

f. Clearance from the MAR field team (MARFT) or the MAR District Office (MARDO) legal officer or trial
attorney; or in their absence, a clearance by the MARFT leader to the effect that the land parcel applied
for is not subject of adverse claim, duly confirmed by the legal officer or trial attorney of the MAR

Page 90 of 175
Regional Office or, in their absence, by the regional director;cralawlawlibrary

g. Xerox copy of Official Receipts or certification by the municipal treasurer showing that the applicant
has fully paid or has effected up-to-date payment of the realty taxes due on the land parcel applied for;
and

h. Certification by the MARFT leader whether applicant has acquired farm machineries from the MAR
and/or from other government agencies.
Majority of these supporting documents are lacking in this case. Hence, it was improper for the DARAB
to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent without the required supporting
documents and without following the requisite procedure before an Emancipation Patent may be validly
issued.75

Furthermore, Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 outlines the procedure in acquiring private lands
subject to its coverage, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice
to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in
a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with
the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18 and other pertinent provisions hereof.

(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered
mail, the landowners, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the former.

(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed
of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of
title.

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision.
The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.

Page 91 of 175
Under Republic Act No. No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, two notices should be sent to
the landowner — the first, the notice of coverage; and the other, the notice of acquisition.

The Court cannot consider and declare the proceedings conducted by the OIC-Regional Director as a
substantial compliance with the notice requirements. Compliance with such requirements, being
necessary to render the implementation of the CARP valid, was mandatory. As the Court observed
in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:76

For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage
and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of
the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12,
Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the
CARL.

The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the
CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." The CARL was not intended to take away
property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that
due process be observed in the taking of private property.

xxxx

Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set
forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A. O. No.
12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A. O. No.
1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall
be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also notifies him,
pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field
investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993,
the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be
conducted where he and the other representatives may be present. 77 (Emphasis supplied)

The procedures provided by Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 and its relevant DAR administrative
issuances are to ensure the compliance with the due process requirements of the law. The result of
their non-compliance is to deprive the landowner of its constitutional right to due process.

The Court has carefully explained in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the taking under the
CARL is an exercise of police power as well as of eminent domain. The taking of the landholding by the
State effectively results in the surrender by the landowner of its title and physical possession to the

Page 92 of 175
beneficiaries. Hence, compensation should be given to the landowner prior to the taking. This is the
clear-cut directive of Section 16(e) of Republic Act No. 6657 which mandates the DAR to take
immediate possession of the land only after full payment and to thereafter request the Register of
Deeds to transfer title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and later on to the intended
beneficiaries.

However, there was no evidence of payment prior to the cancellation of the petitioner’s TCTs submitted
here. The requirement of prior payment was found in Republic Act No. 6657 and Presidential Decree
No. 27, under which full payment by the intended beneficiary was a condition prior to the award of an
EP. We have explicitly pronounced in Coruña v. Cinamin78 that the emancipation of tenants does not
come free. The transfer of lands under Presidential Decree No. 27 remained subject to the terms and
conditions provided in said law. In Paris v. Alfeche,79 we said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x. Section 2 of PD 266 states:

“After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under
Presidential Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or Grant shall be issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform on the basis of a duly approved survey plan.”

On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to
this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 ½) times the average
harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this
Decree;cralawlawlibrary

“The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per annum, shall be paid
by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations[.]”

Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are
still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is
transferred to them.80 (Emphasis supplied)

The unquestioned non-compliance with the procedures set by Republic Act No. 6657 and its relevant
rules and regulations further denied to the petitioner the exercise of its right of retention.81 In doing so,
the OIC-Regional Director disregarded this constitutionally guaranteed right. We cannot understate the
value of the right of retention as the means to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by
balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social
justice is not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.82

We also consider the manner by which the Dakila property was apportioned to the respondents highly
suspect. It appears from the face of the EPs that the individual lots were allocated based on how the
landholding was subdivided by the petitioner. Moreover, all the respondents were awarded lots
exceeding three hectares in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 6657, which provides that “[n]o
qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.”

In fine, the order of the OIC-Regional Director was patently null and void. The denial of due process to
the petitioner sufficed to cast the impress of nullity on the official act thereby taken. A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.83 All the resulting acts
were also null and void. Consequently, the EPs awarded to the respondents should be nullified.

Page 93 of 175
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 27, 2011 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the assailed
decision of the Office of the President issued on March 1, 2010; DIRECTS the cancellation of
Emancipation Patents No. 00783329, No. 00783330, No. 0078331, No. 0078332, No. 0078333, and
No. 0078334 issued to the respondents for being NULL and VOID; and ORDERS the respondents to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

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 CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw
the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by
this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide
this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to
render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a
constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because
we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is
a question involving different considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the
majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the
Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new
circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers
of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by

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the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the
the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of
this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was
pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his
appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is
material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and
complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long
deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional
mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be
ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national
patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the
circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court,
because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions,
and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the
possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our
indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days
and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands
of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for
the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision,
with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral
lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws
and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification
had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional
Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.

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As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is
also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in
long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.)
And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government
(13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into
a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or
forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land,
not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress
contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or
urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not
only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of
the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber,
and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not
timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this
well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.

Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such
words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers
and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical
meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed.,
648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given
the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the
framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in
legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a
written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to
have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning
prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the
words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been
so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative
interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the

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Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be
regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J.,
1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law
and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of
residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is
equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under
the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning
is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands"
for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other
purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No.
141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands
under said statute and under the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land
Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes,
but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer
to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII)
of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for
purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .

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 Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural
or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula
Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for
agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or
not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to
use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the
Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was
firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive
— have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and
timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure
the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for
they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are
disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of
both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be
attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase
repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land"
under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to

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ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the
conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property
regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated
above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private
residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the
constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential
lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used
and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural
land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final
drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural
purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other
purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft,
unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since
under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be
superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is
supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never
be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of
private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus
the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific
with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which
was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national
policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public
agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the

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Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.)
And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright
should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and
as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may
cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were
born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a
part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego
says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating
objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego,
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional
Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and
Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not
even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to
own a pieace of land.

This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth
Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as
follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by
their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire,
hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any
interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such
laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public
Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations
who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of
the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and
only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but
not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of
the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being

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 transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations
shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the
precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in
the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the
right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their
charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated,
or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters
authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by
judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the
same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be
obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them
no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members
of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional
Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions
of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain,
otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of

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Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it
prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin
might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
"private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and
private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of
any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold
to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize
mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was
the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that
prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional
prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even
in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by
the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines
is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by
the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes,
Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future
generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to
do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share
the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a
conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land
which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending
generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying
dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the
day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our
history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm
and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat

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to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth,
for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending
failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe.

On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our
decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when
an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the
residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the
application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to
acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."

On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of
Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo,
appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one
stated in the first assignment of error as follows:

The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant
who, according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos —
who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the
Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the
same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by
appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici
curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.

As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of
1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941.
After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among
those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case
had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on
January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for
final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.

After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on
the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An
overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a
majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital,
pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the
conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our
opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question
was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided,
notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of
Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs
filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in
which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the
question.

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The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we
deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.

On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional
question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us,
more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.

While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out.
On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose
of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important
constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.

Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave
its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any
ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February
24, 1947?

Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether
this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken
on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for
the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.

After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice
Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny
the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice
Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect
of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is
equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied." And we
proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.

Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the
opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days
later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice
Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6
votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for
granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.

But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the
registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic
flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and
culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which
reads as follows:

TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual,
corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five
years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)

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 "(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of
urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an
alien, who is not an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed
included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the
Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those who are not
qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No.
284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for
nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.

"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-
called Parity Amendment to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as
citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such are
deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the
Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."

ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:

Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest
therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be
entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall
be denied — unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a
competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could
avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition
contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and
sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the
Commonwealth Act No. 615.

The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result
of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted
on August 29, 1947:

In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision,
the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After
full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and
Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr.
Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr.
Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was consequently
had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be
asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for
retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore,
under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is considered denied.

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 Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the
previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.

Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy.
He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and,
on a moment's notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the
members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one
member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56
requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the
majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the
resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes
of all the members be taken in cases like this.

Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when
the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this
petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the
opinion that since then, according to the rules, the petition should have been considered denied.
Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.

Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the
result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided
to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was
had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the
dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones expressed
the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month
afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the
result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if
advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice
Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no
one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a
previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros
had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's
vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote,
be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that
opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I
counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.

The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last
two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the
Court and to cast his vote on the question.

Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that
it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us
a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme
Court the decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We
denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation
of our decision.

If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official
actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946,

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that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to
the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines,
and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.

The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public
interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt
among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will
be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme
Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold
and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and
Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people
may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.

The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of
the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of
our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and
colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose
enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro,
the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and
German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest
navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the
hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.

Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless
struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on
grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who
were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other
religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the
bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable
religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and
credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and
practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and
bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all
compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and
other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain
by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the
eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under
the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants
and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable
iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under
the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only against the
Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.

Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to
insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of
which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that
scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices
to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads
or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival.

Page 108 of 175

When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be
needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the
ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our
action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.

One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very
words, that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to
all departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more
specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural
resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural
resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they
should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession — the only
exception allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of
land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional
Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the
dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the
Committee on Style — the drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution, and that was what
was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally
Japanized Davao.

The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot
be overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been
transferred to and registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in
which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create complications and
problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we
can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled
"Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:

It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in
1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void.
It involved a national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of
Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our
history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature repealed the
statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the
deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had
bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents
an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave
an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the
obligation of a contract.

But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New
Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and
he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told
Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for
the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. Yet
Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that
Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest
proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous,
would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge.
The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions.

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We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to
legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia,
the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no
national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not
be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional
Convention will surely be in no remote offing.

We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per
se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the
Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down
and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which
may have taken place should be corrected.

We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a
Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale
made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court
acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.

HILADO, J., concurring:

Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in
behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I
ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the
votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation,
with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of
the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the
withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when
appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in
an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the
court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the
court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a
motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the
merits.

After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government
like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that
the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the
three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should be maintained supreme in their
respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own
peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be striven for
and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure
take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I
believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court.

I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of
Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential,
commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview of

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the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-
same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this
Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate,
the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its
own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance
of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree
from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the
other governmental departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue.

I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question
here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land."
(Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building
thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.

With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the
Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.

BRIONES, M., conforme:

Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su
acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para
unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular
y extraordinario.

I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas

deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año, confirmandose
la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de
la prensa — impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la
vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del
patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la
sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.

A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha
habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y
justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido
normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes
de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en
que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se
discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto
finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no habian
transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en
Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a
paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron
los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion
es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun
fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General,
tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.

Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido
arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa.

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Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que
cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y
extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato
igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de
saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este
asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid con
los abogados del apelante.

Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la

sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose
casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en
que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para
conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el
asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las
disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor
de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio
siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta
manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la
sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo
dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e
industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el
asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la
cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida,
como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva
de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la
Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso — la
interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la
Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.

Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente
todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador
General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de
nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el
12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la
apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en
la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. En
breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de
Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e
inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales
terrenos privados residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier
derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional
enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la
prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion que
precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba y
ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o
documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se
tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos
objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."

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La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple
tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la
prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es
precisamente el objeto del presente asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida,
lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el
Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte,
anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante
la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.

A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida
insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso
podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de
terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos
abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la
reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como
fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa
circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias
palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:

In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends
Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and
in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the
appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the question is now moot. For
this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.1

Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino
de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en
los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde
existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias
del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar
vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a
alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion
y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo —
tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el
inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando
venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era
tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy
sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo
la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de
todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo
bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene
derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia
hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron
gobernantesde otra raza!

No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y
dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en
Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir
circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando

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instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la
circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi
sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade
esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del
Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que
tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia.
Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto
o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso.
Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la
sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo
Administrativo:

SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at
Manila. — When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth branch of
the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of
deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the
party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by the
record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing,
shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.

Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al

Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion
contenida en la circular num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal
Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el
23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala
decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque
estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la
prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia
pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:

. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless and /or until
otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party
in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal
therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.

La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus
funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones
que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la
intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los
poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si
esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la
situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada

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con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En
casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion
constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si
bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el
opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa
la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos
Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages ni
eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.

Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la

apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b)
para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de
soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon
serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un
asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de
la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como
sigue:

Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of
appelle's brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)

Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad

de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el
litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico,
como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o
de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino —
ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro
pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.

Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener
queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que
se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra
mañera. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos
decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de
laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que
no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir
si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para
denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se
puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador
como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o
interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.

El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade
las disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion
constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual
Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente
concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto
porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que
bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos

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terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. ¿ Podemos hacer la
misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley?
Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes,
consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan
bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado
paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.

Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto
que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de
Rellosa contra Gaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan
sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la
evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay
casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo
a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley
pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe
soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otra manera, reservando dicha
cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un
simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no
ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros
asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco
de parsimonia, lentitud.

¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia
alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario,
nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo
debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia
de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o
negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin
zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir
sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de que
se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8
contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de
retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora
naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de
la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como
digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que se la
pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado
de la Constitucion.

No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner
en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de
las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho
menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones,
una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres
poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con
respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio
de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla
especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este
articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre

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registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir
tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.

Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto

para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num.
!28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en
virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco
hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de
que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion
deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la
retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la
expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la
reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera
podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada
ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.

Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale

"a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento
de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio
nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe,
de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por
razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.

Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la
votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a
tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba
presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel
numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte
Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado
Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se
leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no
obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5
contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde
esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?

Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba
como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la
conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de
Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo
denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr.
Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por
eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno
de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor
delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.

II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas
observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea,

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aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque
fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.

Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural)

usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:

SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?

Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.

Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe
interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben
interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el
texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas
significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el
legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.

Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de
dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.

La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos
enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de
corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales
ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."

La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may
determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may
acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law" 4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que
queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente
la frase "private agricultural land."

No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte
comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del
apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se
define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir
solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de
la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie
consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala
doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902
(LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales,
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir,
que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen
nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.

Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene
talsignificado — y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra
empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado?

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¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno
privado? ¿Donde esta esa definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud
de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de
terrenopublico o privado?

Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno

privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi
expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir
la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica
establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona
terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion de la
jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser
ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros
ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.

Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me
cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar
la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero
indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia
un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba
el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la
Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y
humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras
autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia
figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon
Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-
miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la
Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el
ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.

No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de
un articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una,
aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta
la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica,
diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en
cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas
logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos
publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente
la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin — la establecida en la
jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que
la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales,
comerciales, e industriales.

A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense
and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the
rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according
to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from
the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)

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Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural"
referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario
o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la
definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los
miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda
confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely
autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia
ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?

Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en
la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los
disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario
Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in,
tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo
Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate
agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of
agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra
"agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.

Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos,
"land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation
but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . .
The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to
one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel
terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la
industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las
afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la
agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no
mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes
estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere
colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y
convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y
de los que le sostienen.

Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y
de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras,
concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras
inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria
hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de
diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e
industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero ¿resolveria esto la dificultad?
Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado
poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este
criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos
son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice:
'La montaña mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del
hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las siguietes
observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que nos
ocupa, a saber:

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 . . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de
cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de
lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en
la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada
a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y el
paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de
naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.

La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este

respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano;
en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas
rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes
extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice
aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian
establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas
de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones,
so pretexto de ser industriales?

Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la
idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el
Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido
en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos
concomitantes citados — criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad,
y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard,
(supra, p. 185).

Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo
determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous,
corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la
aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos
residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian
excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion
3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no
habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e
industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por
elapelante.

Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las
deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio
no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade
se añadio la palabra calificativa agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela
adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que
sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a los
propia o estrictamenteagricolas.

La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en

estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon
de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e
industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente
bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo

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terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se
admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la
Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay, despuesde todo,
entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es
mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en
que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular.

En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando
pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia
del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion
popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar —
una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de
la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley
es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las
escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga,
que dijo un gran abogado español? 6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en
cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas
seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no
ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal
por lo sabida.

Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion
delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin
cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon
de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np
tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la
palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo.

III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de
inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente
y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de
inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha
hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado
sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:

When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or

the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine
the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly
point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the
question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable
assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)

¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema
capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y
¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo
mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?

Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono

predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la
Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio

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nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad.
Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si
es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes
de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el
curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de
palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que desempeñaban
en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo
representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:

. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse

que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y
recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del
cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete
instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente,
inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).

Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre
propiedad publica y privada.

El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de
agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:

La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder
se dueños de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de
terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos'
(Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)

Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos

Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion
de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:

Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia
exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian
bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag.
595.)

La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea
Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe
breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un
rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel
patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:

The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government
that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence
under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y
recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el
Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd

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asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los
cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y
losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el
abreviamiento dela vida?

Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las
cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de
nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia
agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas —
centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas
partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon,
sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista.
Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de
Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli
una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la
integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente
Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.

Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba
y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion
el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.

Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente

se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional,
entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.

Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un
articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha
dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas;
(b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como
la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por
extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y
complicaciones internacionales.

No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales
comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros
quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una
clase de terrenos como para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un
terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada
unaformidable industria o fabrica?

Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente
que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos
no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les
coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma
constitucional — la llmada reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.

The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the
intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to
admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent

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 prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the
act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it,
the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal
interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)

IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la
propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa
en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante
interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del
Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.

Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia.
Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los
tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una
reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela
ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.

El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se
escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto
tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la
Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.

En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma
como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.

Se confirma la sentencia.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important
question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural
land."

There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion,
lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt,
also, that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under
any of the three classes.

But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval
of the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion —
which is at once absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or
assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber
and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the
Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to
the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The

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contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber and
mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely proclaims ownership by the
Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the
Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral
lands theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held,
quite recently, that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time
immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said
lands had been private properties even before the Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43
Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cariño vs. Insular Government (212 U.S.,
446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a
trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there
are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral
lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in
sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?

SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to
the enactmentof such law.

SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain in the Philippines.

Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the
enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter
section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive
classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have
shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in
authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the
prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.

In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands,
and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as
denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within
the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to
"private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The
insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation
to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting
limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition may readily
affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand,
should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to
remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to
time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The
power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted
alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in

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which the more general terms "private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective
"agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same,
would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of
expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made
knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5.
Following the line of reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be
expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of
course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there
cannot be any private timber or mineral land.

Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon
Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section
3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and
such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention
(delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the
agriculturists."

Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta
cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion
de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que
politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran
interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, señores. Parece que es
meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como
siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y
a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy
buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si
procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues. En el
presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no
tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya
presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran.
Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje
en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es
imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola
parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola
que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado
desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas,
y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en las zones
rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños
propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente
la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con
pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su
existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas
propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la
region agricola, la region menos explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si
queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes
capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.

Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera.
Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que

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existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños
a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los
latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos conocen.
Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los
opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues,
entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo
demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al
causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de
familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley.
Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea
Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella
porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no
podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.

Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede
dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con
las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero
determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del
paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque el Comite
precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha
querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la
prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.

Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de

que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros
opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que
el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una
ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida, primero, de que
la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea
Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion.

Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos
es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.

Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana —
y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los
comunistas hagan un issue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas
pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y
ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo yo,
es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que
ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos
condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que
trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir:
"Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"

Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos
ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites
de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no;
ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de
venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida

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 no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el
aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos
de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un
pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.

Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin
a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)

I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and
acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the
agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are engaged in
commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr.
President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed discontent, I see no
reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I
do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been
given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)

Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of
Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the
sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as
that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution.

We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to
the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of
owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate
Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the
remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate"
must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the
principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands,
sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of
both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of
Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound
to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who
were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate
Sotto.

The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is
surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it
was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in
section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only
definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says
that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of
the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the only definition that
can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land"

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 as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)

The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the
approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in
any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of
law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands
of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.)
They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act."
The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to
lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal
provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands
that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are
the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they
become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be
alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement
the constitutional objective. In the case before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by
the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.

The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public
Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of
aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the
Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act
No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid
while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of
"public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of
the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes
public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a
legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of
private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.

The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial,
Legislative and Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading
and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers
exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential lands are not embraced
within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize in somewhat
chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939,
quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial
lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope
of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice
dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable."

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 This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of
the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated
July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding
among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article
XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or industrial lots for
purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the
Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore,
the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines
does not apply.

There is no conflict between the two opinions.

Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public
agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A
holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that
phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion
that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included
within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of
the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners,
the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the
prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and
exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands, the opinion that
residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within
the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article
XII) governs.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against
transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or
other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29,
1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private
residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During
theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost
verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act
providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or
indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other
improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases,
unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497,
February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on
the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the
previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the question. Very recently, the
Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941.
Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of
private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of
the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government has
constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.

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I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself
to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to
any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to
convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities
may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to
supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action.

There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the
conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should
have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we
reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a
constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only possible but
absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there
might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing
of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this
discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will
thereby be avoided.

In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason)
that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven
members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous
notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one
Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes
were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality
provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros,
who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and
requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally
was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that
the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration
transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by
this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that
petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the
decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court."
The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of
course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived
with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to
dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.

In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of
Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the
appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of
Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in
defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private
residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs.

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Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was
whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and notwithstanding
the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as
hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a
decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to
evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case
which already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against, so
to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the
present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department
of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the
majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of
today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest
implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any
deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator
Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in
the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the
remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question,
because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345),
in which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of
the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there
will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the
constitutional prohibition.

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition.
Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the
issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to
other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That
is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.

There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional
problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from
passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an
overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity
to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot
agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the
fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the registers of deeds under his
command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1)
a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of
the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in
a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do
full justice. It is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps
essential, to make sure that in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our
attention shall be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly considered.

It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales
will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity

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out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that
such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots
have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in
Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such
transfers.

The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the
conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international
cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:

(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners
at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become
landowners after the approval of the Constitution; 7

(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in
the United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the
worlds; and

(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the
United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under
the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty
during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?

The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the
parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to
cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are
popularly understood — not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is
founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if
erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a
liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of
a constitutional amendment.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or
intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.

The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence
is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In
support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term
"private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of
this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public
domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the

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fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural
land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902,
commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into
agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those
belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which
was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public
agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the
real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are
lands, such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same come under the
classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain
suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or
index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It
is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that
have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act
No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations
or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could
acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the
general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:

No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last
preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination
or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was
originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon,
or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however, That persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold
agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence
purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent
improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands and improvements, having
acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition, shall
be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or
partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber,
convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships not included
in section twenty-three of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and
acknowledged by competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:

Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any
person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the
provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial
or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued
for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)

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Section 121 of the Act provides:

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or
of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in
force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands
of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land
of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or
held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)

Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that
were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens
disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No.
2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land
Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations
or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public
Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to
section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No.
2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning
lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of
excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private
agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen
years — from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore
adopted.

If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase
or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence
purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens
from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to
the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and
improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in the
prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of
the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the
prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable
or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure
from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private
ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of
implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such
lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5,
Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used
for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation,
to the raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for

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industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all
other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among
the excluded, because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land
grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal
Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act
No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always
been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of
the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the
term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the
people that adopted it.

The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the
Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the
appellant who is an alien.

There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the
appellant — whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a
private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S.,
449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, which providesthat —

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance,
royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with
regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that
were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: . . .

is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section
unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as
the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates
section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by
section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit
alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending
against the constitutional provision referred to above.

Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of
the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If
discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid
passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on
other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question except
when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is
no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such
provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only
persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of

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course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from
and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct
interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and
primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an
interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and especially what the
people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on
the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is
unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate
branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved.
If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny, that eagerness might be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to
the interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The
interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will
be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such
opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the
Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had
granted the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the
constitutional provision in question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act
according to their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues.
These are not of the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be
accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law
should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as
costly a process as a constitutional amendment.

In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant
and consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons
hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the
Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we
were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things
the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble
understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal
result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave
his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:

5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in
this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule

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in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law
authors.

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed
so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in
the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as
expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or
contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)

Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common
sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions
are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical
propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or
judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the common business
of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed
to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any
recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)

Marshall , Ch. J., says:

The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said."
(Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).

Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis

for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some
unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to
render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty to
declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-
703.)

There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal
interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no
technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is
understood by the men in the street.

That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed
from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential,
commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the
alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the
same kind.

Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can
see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international
Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as,
the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to
the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other

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kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either residential,
commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential,
commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to
imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as
agricultural land.

If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under
consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution
as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.

Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the
committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report
recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:

SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be

transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the
Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by persons, or
corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or
hold lands in the Philippine Islands.

In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of
seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee
on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources:

SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of
the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the
committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides
as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be

transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)

The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh
alteration in the phraseology.

It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft
of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private
ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended
that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from
this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing
the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character. The insertion

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of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its
implication was not comprehended.

In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in
this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions
do not follow the premises.

According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope
of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."

If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of
messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land"
produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness
the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.

But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final
draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by
sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional
Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of
endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the
President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty to
presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force
of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any
reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not operate
according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is
against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have
expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of
the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words
which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who
framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in
their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)

When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally
proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of
reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men
of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar,
inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from
this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of
interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.

If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land
or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private
ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not
agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential, commercial
or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according
to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.

Page 141 of 175

The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for
home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential,
commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this
well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."

As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The
classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private
lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and
not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were
agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the
question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for
construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands.

In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very
simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands —
agricultural — can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are
preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and
there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it would
be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will
not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the
conveyance of private forests and mines.

In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in
view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose
principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July
1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated
and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural
resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands
may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a
dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-
agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural resources are defined
in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States
Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.

It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above
mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a
Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the
circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as
expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United
States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration,
exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local
authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.

It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered
small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the
Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of
its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public
swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural

Page 142 of 175

lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this
Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and
residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of
judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of
agricultural lands.

On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim.
This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as
faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision.
This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This
Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands,
compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands, agricultural lands.
When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to
compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest
resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there
were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different
standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different
angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do
not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is
within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.

The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the
special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there
is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus
regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between
different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article
XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture.

It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional
law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley:

"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it
occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary
rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically,
that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the
same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the
framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and
objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject
the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek
for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense
which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to
measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed
of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it,
when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where
they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many
instances where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different
meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight,
and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)

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As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that
the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands.
If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to
be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious
refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the
construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the
rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in
view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it
means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase having become definite
in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ
language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the general
rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical
sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the
words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular
rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural
land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even
among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that
public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture
are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.

The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The
sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have
reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If
they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not
speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law
or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article
XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands,
without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was
not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute
convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is
specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings,
always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."

The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that
one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals,
forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In
underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included.
This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement
expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that
"lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one
knows we don't.

The decision says:

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified
into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means
that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its
broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither
timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No.

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 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into
lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes;
lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these
lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said
statute and under the Constitution."

If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble
opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me
seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's
theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of
public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as
residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies
disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the
public domain.

The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII,
which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public
lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse.
Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and
industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to
the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted
the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of
foreign policy, economics and politics.

From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any
comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that
opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a
homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes,
which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the
opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-
officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but
which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent,
should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the
government in a judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more
incorrect both in theory and in practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for
withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line
presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.

The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should
banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands
that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee
simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we
precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they public or private. The
fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by
persons other than FIlipino citizens.

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Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of
Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner
under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or
any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent
testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be
looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the Constitution already
barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.

The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate
a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece
of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a
jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service
that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or
airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a
jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the
operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe
insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's
economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for
communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of
subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their
operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or
minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of
the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of the
nation.

This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private
agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result
will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves
but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place
where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a
provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or
hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience
or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well
known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.

Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General
dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such
excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has
not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent
the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private
lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated,
in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses,
cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the
country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of
Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the
political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by

Page 146 of 175

foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth
Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act
No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all
private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have
been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible
sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion
which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the courts (if
needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to
represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis
on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had
been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author
of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the
Constitutional Convention?

Page 147 of 175

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.

Bautista, Salva, Arrieta, Salva for petitioner.

Arthem Maceda Potian for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993, which dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CV
Nos. 28391-92.

On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to private
respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po,
died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. The said sale was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.

According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to petitioner
Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that
the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said
premises.

On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching
Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court dismissed her case. The
dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The decision of
the Court of Appeals became final and executory.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said
parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in

Page 148 of 175

Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B"). An English translation of said document
(Exh. "C") read as follows:

Deed of Sale

I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot
located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square
meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum
of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I
have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of
the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the
purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.

Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another
document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong
Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register
of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this
fact.

Lot Seller:
Ong Joi Jong

(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)

On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his
children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private
respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David Ong filed
an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No. 85-33962.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching
Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No.
86-36818. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with Civil Case No.
85-33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On
appeal by petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the said court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.

Hence, this petition.

II

According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred:

(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B" and its translation, Exh. "C") in favor
of petitioner Ong Ching Po.

(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and

Page 149 of 175

 (3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and
private respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).

As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in dispute ". . . is not so much as to which between Exhibit
"A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty, but whether this document is what it purports to be (i.e., a deed of
conveyance in favor of Soledad Parian [private respondent] or it was only resorted to or executed as a
subterfuge because the real buyer (Ong Ching Po) was an alien and it was agreed upon between Ong
Ching Po and his brother (Ong Yee, Soledad Parian's husband) that the land be registered in the name
of Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate registration and transfer and
that the said title would be transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or his successors-in-interest and
that she would be holding the title in trust for him" (Rollo, pp. 19-20).

We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a
dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was
disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be
giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot claim
ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred

or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed

except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands in the public domain.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified
to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988
ed.]).

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they
have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

Page 150 of 175

Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been
established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of private
respondent (Exh. "A") is a notarized document.

To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document, petitioners claim that private
respondent admitted that she did not pay anything as consideration for the purported sale in her favor.
In the same breath, petitioners said that private respondent implied in her deposition that it was her
husband who paid for the property. It appears, therefore, that the sale was financed out of conjugal
funds and that it was her husband who handled the transaction for the purchase of the property. Such
transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs.

It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law,
possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article
1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." If what petitioners meant was that private
respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in
Iloilo.

There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as
trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not even Exhibit "B" can be considered as such a document
because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said "deed of sale," was
not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice. Under
Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No express trust concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."

Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an
implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because
such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be made
to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf. De Leon
v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267 [1962]). Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a
financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu
Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a
stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.

The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its translation, Exhibit "C", because
these documents had not been properly authenticated.

Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and
lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.

Page 151 of 175

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence
of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This
order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602
[1993]).

Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale,
Exhibit "B".

The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons who executed it; by
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw
it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the
parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the trial
court rejected her claim and held:

If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a
witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was
married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where
she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does not
believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale
involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6, Records
p. 414).

As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale
(Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private respondent explained that she
and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion,
as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his
appointment or employment (Rollo,
p. 10).

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The
rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Page 152 of 175

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO
CATANIAG, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may no longer be reviewed
and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The transfer of
an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the
entire parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.

The Case

These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this petition under Rule
45 to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on
September 14, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states: 3

WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below dated March
10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED without pronouncement
as to costs.

The Facts

The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by the parties. We
reproduce them in part, as follows:

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties
in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein private
respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private
respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9,
1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning [,] transferring
and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of
land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.

Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer

Page 153 of 175

 Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim
having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was
issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.

On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee
[also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's name. 4

Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances — between
Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag — and claiming
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 5 of the Civil Code.

In its decision6 dated March 10, 1992,7 the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen
Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional
prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply
authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution
and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the
subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal.
Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban.
Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma,8 and Yap vs. Grageda,9 it further held that, although the transfer of
the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no
more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and
was thus already owned by a qualified person.

Hence, this petition. 10

Issues

The petition submits the following assignment of errors:

. . . the Honorable Court of Appeals —

1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is
urban, not rural

2. Erred in denying petitioners' right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil
Code

3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son
David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and void[.] 11

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Page 154 of 175

 First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption

The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated — the determination of the first
being a prerequisite to the resolution of the second — shall be discussed together

Subject Land Is Urban

Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not
reviewable by this Court. 12 Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial
judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits
of only a few exceptions, such as when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion
in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a
misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the
specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are
contradicted by evidence on record. 13

The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of
the trial court — that the subject property is urban land — is based on clear and convincing
evidence, as shown in its decision which disposed thus:

. . . As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national
ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential,
commercial or industrial establishments. Lined up along the Bagbaguin Road are
factories of feeds, woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for tires,
upholstery materials, feeds supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were
the Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment
buildings for commercial purposes and construction firms. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the community is a commercial area thriving in business activities.
Only a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax
Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed
agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated
October 3, 1991, the Land Regulatory Board attested that the subject property is
commercial and the trend of development along the road is commercial. The
Board's classification is based on the present condition of the property and the
community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the tax
declaration.14

No Ground to Invoke
Right of Redemption

In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right
to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is
rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:

Page 155 of 175

 Art. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption
when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is
alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.

xxx xxx xxx

Under this article, both lands — that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot belonging to
the person exercising the right of redemption — must be rural. If one or both are urban, the right
cannot be invoked.15 The purpose of this provision, which is limited in scope to rural lands not
exceeding one hectare, is to favor agricultural development.16 The subject land not being rural
and, therefore, not agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the
right of redemption under Art. 1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it.

Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid

Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the sale of the
subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionally
of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey.

True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim — in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her
husband — collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which provides:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be

transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 17 settled the issue as to who are qualified
(and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long
discourse maintaining that the "public agricultural lands" mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then
stated:

Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution, "natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,"
and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly
to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of

Page 156 of 175

 Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec.
2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very same
persons who under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified "to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both
sections is the same, namely, the non transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens . . . .18

The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 19 which
involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition,

exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 20

In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession. 21

But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified
Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid." 22

Thus, in United Church Board of Word Ministries vs. Sebastian, 23 in which an alien resident
who owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American non-stock corporation part of
his shares of stock in a Filipino corporation that owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the
Court sustained the invalidity of such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the
American corporation has passed on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that
the defect in the will was "rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property."

The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan. 24 In that case, a residential lot was sold to a
Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby
said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not
allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason
that the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.

Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco, 25 Godinez vs. Pak Luen, 26 Vasquez vs. Li Seng
Giap 27 and Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 28 which similarly involved the sale of land to an alien

Page 157 of 175

who thereafter sold the same to a Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the
subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.

The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:

. . . [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands,
as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.29

Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino
citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Page 158 of 175

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration
in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision
of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

Page 159 of 175

 6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land
or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court
during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings
have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect,
the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

Page 160 of 175

 (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48
of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred
to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in
the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two
lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on
the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title
and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Page 161 of 175

 Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language,
in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to
a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874.
If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of

Page 162 of 175

Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.

11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to
be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under

Page 163 of 175

the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was
no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to
the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical

Page 164 of 175

person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration
in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there
any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application
being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go
through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the
same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense,
it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered
as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Page 165 of 175

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,

1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . .
and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through
the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that
"it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the
decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

Page 166 of 175

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation
of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of
the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of
such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962
under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding
public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication
and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and
notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso
jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended
to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented

Page 167 of 175

along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction
and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer
from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural
result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and
stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may
prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period,
tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of
juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for
the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers
on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law
that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their
title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the
application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale
of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have
the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper
with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

Page 168 of 175

 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of
Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the
case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS
should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

Page 169 of 175

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the
legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which
the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part
of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor
Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for
the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

Page 170 of 175

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,

1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . .
and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through
the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that
"it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the
decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm
the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure
or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title.")

Page 171 of 175

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of
such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962
under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding
public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication
and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and
notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso
jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended
to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented
along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction
and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer
from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural

Page 172 of 175

result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and
stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may
prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period,
tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of
juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for
the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers
on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law
that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their
title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the
application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale
of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have
the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper
with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

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Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of
Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the
case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS
should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the

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legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which
the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part
of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor
Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for
the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

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