Rourkela Steel Plant: EIA/ EMP Studies For HSM, Beneficiation Plant, Pellet Plant & Expansion of SPP

ROURKELA STEEL PLANT
EIA/ EMP Studies for HSM, Beneficiation Plant,

Pellet Plant & Expansion of SPP
7.0 ADDITIONAL STUDIES
7.1 RISK ASSESSMENT
Industrial activities, which produce, treat, store and handle hazardous substances, have
a high hazard potential endangering the safety of man and environment at work place
and outside. Recognizing the need to control and minimize the risks posed by such
activities, the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate control have notified the
“Manufacture Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules ”in the year 1989 and
subsequently modified, inserted and added different clauses in the said rule to make it
more stringent. For effective implementation of the rule, Ministry of Environment, Forests
and Climate Controlhas provided a set of guidelines. The guidelines, in addition to other
aspects, set out the duties required to be performed by the occupier along with the
procedure. The rule also lists out the industrial activities and chemicals, which are
required to be considered as hazardous.
RSP is engaged in the production of Steel from iron ore and other required raw
materials. During the process of manufacture of steel and other associated materials
hazardous gases are generated which are stored and used in the plant. In addition to
this also some other hazardous chemicals, which are required in the manufacture of
steel or produced as a by-product also, being stored and handled by RSP. The major
chemicals handled / stored by RSP includes coke oven gas (COG), blast furnace gas
(BF gas), basic oxygen furnace gas (BOF gas), different acids etc.
In view of this RSP’s present and proposed activities are being scrutinized in line of the
above referred “Manufacture, storage and import of hazardous chemicals rules” and
observations / findings are presented in this chapter. Further RSP is already having a
well documented Disaster Management Plan for their existing plant covering all the
chemicals / gasses handled by RSP. During the current project only one additional
chemical / Propane will be handled. Accordingly this plan covers mainly this Propane,
which is going to be handled and stored after the current project.
The assessment has been made in a systematic manner covering the requirements of
the above-mentioned rules. Accordingly subsequent sections have been divided as
follows:
i) Process description
ii) Applicability of the rule
iii) Description of hazardous chemicals
iv) Hazard identification
v) Hazard assessment
vi) Consequence analysis
vii) Brief description of the measures taken and
viii) On site emergency plan
Accordingly next sections are elaborated. However since RSP is already having a well-
documented On Site Emergency plan, contents of the report has been covered briefly
here.
© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 177

Propane will be used in Pellet plant and the storage capacity of Propane will be 5X150t.
7.1.1 Process Description
a) Beneficiation Plant
Beneficiation is a process which removes the gang particle like Alumina, Silica from the
Iron Ore. Basically it separates Fe2O3 or Fe3O4 from other impurities in the iron ore. In
this process the Fe content is improve to maximum possible extent. The highest can be
70% i.e. purest form.
b) Pellet Plant
Pelletizing is the process of compressing or molding a material into the shape of a pellet.
Iron ore pellets are spheres of typically 8–18 mm (0.31–0.71 in) to be used as raw
material for blast furnaces which allow air to flow between them, decreasing the
resistance to the air that flows up through the layers of material during the smelting.
They typically contain 67%-72% Fe and various additional materials adjusting the
chemical composition and the metallurgic properties of the pellets. Typically limestone
and dolo-stone is added and Bentonite is used as binder.
The process of pelletizing combines mixing of the raw material, forming the pellet and a
thermal treatment baking the soft raw pellet to hard spheres. The raw material is rolled
into a ball, and then fired in a kiln to sinter the particles into a hard sphere. Propane gas
is being used for hardening process in travelling grate furnace. Five (5) mounted storage
tanks of capacity 150 T each will be provided for storage.
c) Hot Strip Mill
Slabs coming from the Steel Melting Shops are fed to the Hot Strip Mill for converting the
slabs into strips/sheets of required dimensions. The slabs are reheated in a reheating
furnace, rolled to the required dimensions, sheared, cooled down at ambient
temperature and coiled and sent for storage.
For reheating furnace, mixed gas is being used as the fuel to heat the slabs to the
required temperature.
d) Special Plate Plant
Input slabs from Plate Mill are brought to SPP. After primary inspection, the plates are
charged onto the heat treatment line charging roller table (approach roller table to the
austenising furnace). The plate are heated and soaked in the austenising furnace,
quenched at the inline quench station and tempered in the inline tempering furnace.
Mixed gas will be used as the fuel for the heat treatment line.

7.1.2 Applicability Of The Rule
From the above description of the process, it is observed that the chemicals handled and
involved are:
(i) Blast furnace gas (ii) Coke Oven gas (iii) Propane
To decide whether the above mentioned industrial activities are likely to come within the
scope of the above mentioned “Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules”, the threshold quantities mentioned in the rules are used as given in
Table 7.1.
Table: 7.1: Threshold Quantity & the Chemicals Stored and Handled at RSP
SN Chemical Stored / Qty. Stored / Whether Lower Upper

Handled Handled (In Included in Threshold Threshold
Tonne) And The List of Qty. (In Qty. (In
Storage / Hazardous Tonne) Tonne)
Handling & Toxic
Conditions Chemicals
3
1 Blast Furnace Gas 8295 Nm /hr Yes 15 200
(Major Constituents
Carbon Monoxide)
3
2 Coke Oven Gas 29705 Nm /hr Yes 15 200
(Major Constituents
Hydrogen &
Methane)
3 Propane 4.50 tph Liquid & Yes 15 200
pressurized
After comparison of the stored / handled and threshold quantities, the applicable portion
of the flow chart pertaining to this plant is marked. It can be noticed that all the chemicals
are below the upper threshold quantities. Accordingly, rule nos. 7,8,9,13,14, and 15 will
be applicable. Accordingly only rule 17 i.e. preparation and maintenance of material
safety data sheets for these chemicals are required. Rule -7 i.e. notification of site
requires submission of a written report containing among other information the
followings:
a) Identification of major accident hazards

b) The conditions or events which could be significant in bringing one about
c) Brief descriptions of the measures taken
d) Area likely to be affected by the major accident etc.
7.1.3 Description Of Hazardous Chemicals
The chemicals, which are expected to be handled after the current project, are
presented in Table 7.1. The Material Safety data sheet of Propane is presented in
Annexure 7.1.

7.1.4 Hazard Identification
Hazards associated with the above mentioned chemicals are presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Type of Hazards
Name of the Type Hazard Rating IDLH Vap. Remarks

Chemical of Health Flammability Reactivity Value Press @
Hazard latm.
Propane 1, 9 1 4 0 -- -- Liquified under
pressure &
stored at ambient
temp.
Hydrogen 1, 6, 9 0 4 0 -- -- Gas stored under
pressure at
ambient temp.
Carbon 1,3,9 2 4 0 Gas stored under
monoxide pressure at
ambient temp.
Methane 1 4 0 Gas stored under
pressure at
ambient temp.
Note:
Type of Hazard
1. Flammable substance
2. Oxidising substance, reacts with reducing agents
3. Emits a toxic gas or vapour
4. Emits an irritating gas or vapour
5. Emits a narcotic gas or vapour
6. Gas or vapour not dangerous other than displacing air
7. Causes skin irritation or burns
8. Toxic substance
9. Explosive material under certain conditions
Hazard Rating
a. Health
1 None
2 Minor
3 Moderate, could cause temporary incapacitation or injury
4 Severe, short exposure may cause serious injury
5 Extreme, short exposure may cause death
b. Flammability
1 None, Material does not burn

2 Minor, material must be preheated to ignite

3 Moderate, moderate heating is required for ignition and volatile vapours are
released
4 Severe, material ignites at normal temperature
5 Extreme, very flammable substance that readily forms explosive mixtures
c. Reactivity
1 None, stable when exposed to fire

2 Minor, unstable at high temp. or press and may react with water
3 Moderate, unstable but does not explode, may form explosive mixture with water
4 Severe, Explodes if heated or water added
5 Extreme, readily explosives under normal condition
From the above table it can be observed that Propane and mixed gas are dangerous
materials since both are gaseous under ambient condition. Further, mixed gas is stored
more or less under ambient temperature and pressure. The catastrophic potential of a
hazardous substance depends both on toxicity and volatility. The ambient temperature
vapour pressure of a substance is used as a measure of the ability to become air borne.
Since Propane is gaseous at ambient temperature and pressure and is stored in
pressurised condition to keep it in liquid form, the catastrophic potential of this chemical
is maximum. Accordingly, the consequence analysis carried out subsequently covers
analysis of Propane only since the release of this quantity and in case of any eventuality
it may affect the maximum area.
7.1.5 Hazard Assessment
In the earlier section, type of hazard associated with different type of chemicals and the
event of release of these chemicals is being identified. It has also been identified the
category of hazard associated with different chemicals. Propane is stored under
pressurised condition with elaborate arrangement for controlling storage pressure and
distribution facilities whereas all other chemicals are stored under ambient temperature
and pressure or in liquid condition.
In any plan, hazardous situations arise due to:
• Failure in the monitoring of crucial process parameters e.g. pressure,

temperature, flow quantity etc.
• Failure in the utilities e.g. cooling water
• Failure of control elements e.g. pressure, temperature level, flow controllers etc.
• Failure of components such as pumps, compressor etc.
• Failure of safety systems, safety valves / relief valves, sprinkler systems, alarm
etc.
• Mechanical failure of vessels or pipe work due to excessive stress, over
pressure, corrosion etc.
• Wrong operation, failing to adhere to the safety norms etc.

It has been mentioned that release of Propane may lead to hazardous situation in case
of accidental release of large quantity. Such situation is possible from the storage area
where bulk quantities are being stored. It is unlikely that small leakage through pipes,
gaskets, glands or any other means within the plant proper itself (user points) will create
a hazardous situation unless allowed to be released for a long time as will be
established in the subsequent sections. It is expected that during such small leakage
preventive steps will be taken within a specified time span.
7.1.6 Consequence Analysis
In this section, accident consequence analysis to determine the consequence of a

potential major accident on the installation, the neighbourhood and the environment are
being discussed by evaluating the consequence of incidence involving hazardous
materials vis-a-vis Propane. Consequence analysis also involves assessment of release
quantity which is again dependent upon chemical, storing condition, type of release,
duration etc. Catastrophic flammable material normally involves the air borne release of
these materials. A potential catastrophic release of flammable material would involve air
borne release and subsequent explosion or fire i.e. a sufficiently large fuel – air mixture
within flammable mix rapidly developed and finds a source of ignition. However Propane
will be stored under pressurized condition in liquid form and is expected to be distributed
to the user points in gaseous form. Accordingly possible release quantities under
different conditions have been computed and presented in Fig. 7.1. From the figure it
can be noticed that release rate & quantity of liquid Propane is much more than gaseous
Propane. The threshold quantity for flammable material (Propane) as per Hazardous
Chemicals Rule, 1989 is 15000 Kg. Release of this quantity of flammable vapour in a
few minutes has been used for deciding the catastrophic potential. From Figs 7.1(a) &
7.1(b) even though the pressure is different it can be noticed that this quantity of
Propaneliquid can be released through a 50mm diameter hole in 5 to 6 minutes whereas
it will take more than 70 minutes. Thus spillage of Propane could be more catastrophic
as it will be a steady continuous source of vapour.

RELEASE RATE OF LPG THROUGH DIFFERENT DIA HOLES @ 14Kg / Cm2 PRESSURE
60
50
40
R E L E A S E R A T E IN K g / S
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
HOLE DIA IN MM
Fig 7.1(a): Computed Possible Release Quantities Under Different

Conditions

RELEASE RATE OF LPG GAS THROUGH DIFFERENT DIA HOLES @ 7Kg / Cm2
3.5
2.5
R E L E A S E R A T E IN K g / S e c
1.5
0.5
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
HOLE DIA IN MM
Fig. 7.1(b): Computed Possible Release Quantities Under Different

Conditions
When a pressurised liquefied gas is released from containment, a portion flashes off.
Following flash off, residual liquid is at its boiling point and the vapourisation continues
as a rate limit process. The second stage of rate limit vapourisation is usually regarded
as relatively less important compared with the initial flash off. Fraction flash off is
approximately 17% at 15°C as Propane. From the above it is clear that release of liquid
Propane is potentially more catastrophic than release of vapour.
Flammable releases cause harms as a results of fire or explosion. Flammable vapour

cloud resulting from rapid release of Propane is being calculated. Since the cloud center
cannot be predicted, a conservation approach has been followed and it has been
assumed that the cloud drifts towards downwind from the point of release when the
danger of ignition occurs. Assuming that the cloud would drift in any direction, the
“Hazard Area” around Propane storage area has been established by drawing a circle of
radius equal to the distance, which may be affected due to heat intensity, if BLEVE
occurs. A `BLEVE’ can occur, if a pressure vessel becomes completely filled with liquid.
The temperature rises and pressure relief capacity is insufficient to keep the internal
pressure from exceeding tank strength. One of the hazards of a `BLEVE’ of a
pressurized tank containing liquefied gas is the fireball created by combustion of the

mixture of vapour liquid that is explosively dispersed by the sudden rupture. The sudden
expansion of compressed vapour and the large quantities of vapour suddenly produced
by liquid flashing combine to create a large ball of liquid droplets and vapour. The heat
created by the burning of the dispersed liquid and vapour causes a powerful thermal
updraft. As already explained, sudden release of a liquid stored at a temperature above
its boiling point will result in the instantaneous and adiabatic vaporization of a fraction of
the liquid. It is usually taken as half the tank capacity while calculating the radiative flux
incident, on a target some distance away from the Propane tank. In the proposed
project it is expected that Propane will be used in the pellet plant. The storage capacity
of the tanks will be 150t each (5 X 150T). Assessments have been made for
catastrophic explosion with assumptions that total storage quantity of one tank is
released.
Unconfined vapour cloud explosion is one of the most serious hazards of Propane. A
vapour cloud explosion may cause harm by direct or indirect blast effects. It is the
flashing superheated liquid, which tends to give rise to the largest vapour clouds. Most
unconfined vapour cloud explosions have been caused by such flashing liquids. The
impact zone at over pressure 0.02068 bar and above is shown in Fig. 7.2. It can be seen
that in case of catastrophic rupture of the tank the safe distance is around 2 km from
point of release. In a circle of about 400 m radius walls and roofs of buildings may
collapse. And in a radius of 300 m heavy machines may suffer some damage.
The heat radiation intensity in the down wind distance and impact zone at Heat
Radiation intensity of 2.5 kW/m2 and above are shown in Fig 7.3. It can be seen that the
objects in a radius of around 1200 m may suffer blistering after an exposure of 30 sec
and within 700 m platic materials will melt. Severe damage may occur to equipments
within 400 m radius of the release point.
Impact of various different types of releases vs. distance is shown in Table 7.5.
The effect of thermal radiation on unprotected skin is also presented below in Table 7.3.
Relation between Heat Radiation Intensity, Time and Effect on Man is shown in Table
7.4.
Table 7.3: Effect of Different Overpressure
Over Type of Damage

Pressure
(Milibar)
0.0014 Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 10–15 Hz).
0.0021 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain.
0.0028 Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom, glass failure.
0.0069 Breakage of small windows under strain.
0.0103 Typical pressure for glass breakage.
0.0207 Safe distance" (probability 0.95 of no serious damage below this value);
projectile limit; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken.
0.0276 Limited minor structural damage
0.03 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window
frames.
0.048 Minor damage to house structures.

Over Type of Damage

Pressure
(Milibar)
0.069 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable.
0.09 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
0.138 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.
0.158 Lower limit of serious structural damage.
0.172 50% destruction of brickwork of houses.
0.207 Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffered little damage; steel
frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations.
0.276 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured.
0.345 Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press (40,000 lb) in building slightly
damaged.
0.482 Loaded, lighter weight (British) train wagons overturned.
0.551 Brick panels, 8–12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure.
0.62 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished.
0.689 Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools (7,000 lb) moved and
badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive.
20.68 Limit of crater lip.
Table 7.4: Relation between Heat Radiation Intensity, Time and Effect on Man
Heat Radiation Level (Kw / m2) Effect

37.5 Damage to equipment
30.0 Limit for Class 1 building material
12.5 Melting Plastic
4.0 Blistering
1.6 Severe Hot Feeling
Table 7.5 - Impact of various different types of releases vs. distance
Type of Intensity radii (m) Flash Fire Envelop (m)

Release 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 10000 ppm 20000 ppm
B 2m/s F B 2m/s F B 2m/s F B 2m/s F B 2m/s F
1m/s 1m/s 1m/s 1m/s 1m/s
10mm 14 - - - - - 2.7 2.2 1.15 0.9
20mm 31 27.1 - - - - 5.5 5.5 2.1 1.8
Rupture 940 960 550 550 310 310 - - - -
From the figures and tables below it can be seen that the least of the effects of leakage
from one of the storage tanks doesn’t cross the plant boundary in any case. However,
considering worst case scenario, explosion of one of the tanks can cause serious
injuries to nearby building and typical glass breakage and windows shattering of the
buildings near the north-east boundary of the plant. Fireball resulting from this explosion
will not have serious effects close to the plant boundary if the duration of exposure is
less than 10 seconds.

Fig 7.2: Early explosion Overpressure radii
0.2068 bar
0.1379 bar
0.02068 bar
0.2068 bar
0.1379 bar
0.02068 bar

Fig.7.3: Intensity Radii for Fireball

7.1.7 On Site Emergency Plan
As indicated earlier onsite emergency plan for the existing plant has been already
prepared by the RSP. The same will be extended to the proposed units also. The
contents of the on site emergency plan are briefed here under.
a. Identification:
Three major hazards of the steel plants are
1. Fire
2. Explosion
3. Toxic release
b. Elements of assessment:
1. Potential sources – Storage, tanker loading points, plant equipment, pipe lines.
2. Vulnerable points – Flanges valves etc.
3. High risk points to be mapped
4. Emission rate and dispersion behavior were estimated
The major hazard information, facilities available for combat along with preliminary
Hazard analysis are given for each unit.
c. Action plan
1. Persons and actions immediately to be taken in case of emergency in the total plant
2. Red alert situations and actions to be taken
3. Actions to be taken in case of emergency of leakages of gas holders.

MAJOR HAZARDS AFFECTING TOTAL PLANT:
The following actions are to be taken immediately in case of a disaster.
1. The concerned department has to inform : Plant Control

who in turn will inform Station Engineer to
S/I I/C CPP-1 to low danger siren service
OHSC, Safety Engg. Are also to be
informed.
2. people around the are should be asked by : Shift In Charge
unit coordinator to move out from the area
and go to safer places (Assembly Point).
3. Persons who will be required to work in the : Shift In Charge
area should immediately be intimated to
move to the site of the disaster to take care
of Different operations, with the safety
precautions.
4. Fire Brigade and OHSC should be put into : Unit coordinator S/I, Head
service immediately of Fire Services DD OHSC
5. Area I/C EMD to take necessary action to : Unit Coordinator Head of
reduce the Line pressure start purging of EMD
6. The WMC and Unit Coordinator are to take : WMC / Unit Coordinator
charge4 of the entire situation strategies for
both on site and off site planning to be
drawn.
Fire & Explosion in the System will be a Major Emergency for the Complete Plant. In
case of such emergency following actions are to be taken:
1. The concerned department has to inform the plant : Unit coordinator Station
control who in turn inform Station Engineer CPP-I Engineer CPP I
to blow danger Siren (Coded Siren)
2. Inform Fire Services, OHSC, Safety Engg. and : Shift In Charge

EMD.
3. People around the area should be asked to move : Unit Coordinator Shift In
cut form the area and go to safer places. Charge
4. Persons who will be required to work in the area : Unit Coordinator Shift In
should immediately be intimated to move to the Charge
site of the disaster to take care of different
operation.
5. The control actions to be taken under the :

respective situation to be governed by the details
given in the PHA of TOP-II.

d. Hazard management
In order to handle the emergency situation and the action to be taken immediately the
entire plant has been divided into following zones.
District-I : Coke Ovens, Coal Chemical departments
District-II : Blast furnaces, Captive plant-I, Sintering plant -I
District-III : Sintering plant –II, Ore Bedding and Blending plant
District-IV : SMS-I, Tonnage Oxygen Plant-I, Lime & Dolomite Brick Plant &
Foundries
District-V : SMS-II, Tonnage Oxygen Plant-II & Calcining plant -II
District-VI : CRM and Silicon steel Mill
District-VII : HSP, PM, Roll shop and pipe plants
District-VIII : Special plate plant, Repair shop Electrical, Repair shop Mechanical,
Air condition in Dept, Structural & Fabrication shop, Mech. Shop.
District-IX : Power Distribution, Water Supply (Plant), Traffic & raw material
Department, Ref. Engg. (Services), Capital Repair Organization
Crane Main. & Crane Capital Repair, Repair & Construction
(Mech.), Civil Engineering (services), Field Machinery (Maint.) and
Scrap & Salvage Department.
The site incident controllers and unit co-coordinators have been fixed for the above
districts to take care of emergency situation in their respective area of operation.
Elements for plan:
The main command structure will be as shown in the Fig 7.4.

Figure 7.4- Emergency Command Structure

MAJOR HAZARD: FIRE EXPLOSION IN DIESEL/PETROL/PROPANE TANK
WORKS MAIN CONTROLLER

Mr. BP Verma,
Executive Director (Works)
Phone No- 2510025/7517 (Int. Com)
ALT
Mr. B. Mohapatra,
GM I/C (Services)
Cell No- 8895500814/7978 (Int. Com)
SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Mr. J.P. Rath
DGM I/C (MM Stock Control)
Cell No- 8895501039
ALT.
Mr. D.K. Mishra
DGM (MM. Stock Control)
Cell No-8895501042
COMBAT TEAM LEADER RESCUE TEAM LEADER AUXILIARY TEAM LEADER

Mr. B.P. Das, DGM (FS) Mr. D.M. Srivastava, DGM Mr. R. N. Panda, DGM I/C
Cell No- (O) (PI) Works
8092/8895500753 Cell No- 7795/8895500199 Cell No-8895502174
ALT ALT ALT
Mr. J.B. Pattnaik, Mr. S.K. Nayak AGM (O) Mr. A. Acharya, DGM I/C(PI)
Sr. Mgr (FS) Cell No- 8895500325 W
MEMBERS MEMBERS MEMBERS

1. Mr. B. Saho, DGM 1. Mr. P.S. Thakre, 1. Mr. A.K. Banarjee,
(Transport) Manager (FS) DGM I/C,PD
Cell No-8895502195 Cell No-8895500758 Cell No-8895501468
2. Mr. A. Mishra, 2. Dr. T. Mishra, 2. Mr. B.K. Dash
DGM(MM) Cell No-8895501243 DGM I/C (T & RM)
Cell No-8895501010 3. Mr. B. Kindo, Cell No-8895500924
3. Mr. P. Gupta, Sr. Mgr. Transport 3. DSO (Stores)
DGM I/C RC (M) Cell No-8895500592 Cell No-8895501555
Cell No-8895500500 DSO (Transport)

e. Personnel with specified responsibilities
Role of key persons
Works Main Controller (WMC):-
• On being informed, rushes to the scene and takes overall charges of the situation.
• Makes quick assessment of the situation and decides declaration of emergency, by
blowing the siren in appropriate code [five times intermittently (each 10 seconds)].
• Directs leaders of the Combat, Rescue & Auxiliary teams through Site Incident
Controller to take control of the situation in the affected area.
• Makes continuous review and assess the possible developments to determine the
extent of damage to plant and human beings.
• Directs shut-down of the plant, if necessary.
• Orders evacuation process by consulting with key persons.
• Ensures that casualties are receiving adequate attention.
• Liaises with the fire services, police services and other statutory authorities.
• Declares closure of the emergency by blowing the siren [only once long siren for 3
minutes continuously].
• Issues the authorized statements to the media services.
• Reports all statutory authorities in the prescribed manner.
Site Incident Controller
• On hearing Emergency siren, rushes to the scene and reports to the Works Main
Controller.
• Carries out the instructions of Works Main Controller.
• Makes quick assessment about the gravity of the situation and appraises Works
Main Controller.
• Orders Combat Team Leader, Rescue Team Leader and Auxiliary Team Leader to
discharge their responsibilities immediately.
• Extends all sorts of help through different agencies, to minimize the damage to
human being, plant, property and environment.
• Reports the development of the situation, time to time to Works Main Controller.
• Provides the required information to the Govt. fire brigade team for firefighting.
• Preserves the evidences for the subsequent inquiries.
Combat Team Leader
• On hearing the emergency siren, rushes to the scene along with the firefighting
team, with sufficient equipments in the minimum possible time and reports to Site
Incident Controller time to time.
• Carries out the instructions of Site Incident Controller.
• Ensures that, the team members resume their position with appropriate equipments.
• Monitors the firefighting operation to control the situation.
• Ensures that, the situation is controlled by arresting spillage, shutting/closing of the
valves etc. by the team, in consultation with Site Incident Controller.

• Assists the Site Incident Controller, till the situation is under control.
Combat Team Members
• On hearing the emergency siren, rush to the scene with firefighting equipments, in
the minimum possible of time and report to their team leader.
• Carry out orders of the team leader.
• Operate the firefighting equipments for controlling the situation.
Rescue Team Leader
• On hearing the emergency siren, rushes to the scene and reports to the Site Incident
Controller.
• Carries out the instruction of the Site Incident Controller.
• Ensures the arrival of his team members.
• Keeps necessary equipments of first-aid for preliminary treatment.
• Keeps the ambulance ready to carry the injure persons to the hospital.
• Ensures the use of proper personal protective equipments by the team members,
before the rescue operation.
• Informs the Works Main Controller about the development time to time.
• Guides the Mutual Aid Partners for their course of action at the site.
• Guides the rescued workers to reach the assembly point.
• Searches the missing person(s) on the roll call basis.
Rescue Team Members
• On hearing the emergency siren, rush to the scene with appropriate personal
protective equipments and report to their team leader.
• Carry out orders of the team leader.
Auxiliary Team Leader
• On hearing the emergency siren rushes to the site and reports to the Site Incident
Controller.
• Carries out the instruction of Site Incident Controller.
• Ensures the arrival of his team members.
• Intimates statutory authorities over phone.
• Intimates nearest Fire Station over phone.
• Intimates Mutual-Aid Partners over phone.
• Keeps the first-aid trainers ready with essential medicines & dressing materials, to
give first- aid to victims.
• Takes care of victims’ family.
• Makes all arrangements like transport, other needs, finance etc.
• Ensures that all casualties are shifted to hospital for medical treatment.
• Keeps records of casualties and provide information of the matter to Works Main
Controller time to time.

Auxiliary Team Members
• On hearing emergency siren, rushes to the site and reports to their team leader.
• Carry out the orders of the team leader.
Activation Procedure:
Functions of various coordinators of different zones are outline above. However, some of
the major hazards are common to more that one district. As such the common hazards
are dealt with a common perspective rather than a specific department wise. The
functions of the unit coordinators and also of some common coordinators are given
below:
The steps to be taken immediately after the occurrence of the major hazards are given in
Table 7.6.
Table 7.6- Steps to be taken during occurrence of hazard and responsibilities
STEP
INITIATOR ACTION TO TAKE
NO.
1. The person Informs the Security Gate and the concerned Shift-in-charge
noticing the who in turn informs Combat Team Leader immediately regarding
emergency (fire) the fire hazard.
2. Combat Team Rushes to Emergency Site and observe the ongoing activities.
Leader
Takes stock of the situation in consultation with the Site Incident
(CTL) Controller.
Moves to Emergency Control Room.
Takes decision on declaration of emergency and asks for

emergency wailing siren.
Advises the Auxiliary Team Leader to inform the statutory

authorities and to seek help from Mutual- aid Partners, if
required.
Decides the declaration of normalcy of emergency, after the

situation is overcome.
Ensures that the emergency operations are recorded

chronologically.
3. Site Incident Informs Works Main Controller (WMC) and rushes to site. In
Controller case of failure of the electronic communication system, arranges
(SIC) the standby available provision i.e. a runner with bike to convey
the message about the emergency to the works Main Controller
Discusses with the Combat Team Leader (CTL), assesses the

STEP
INITIATOR ACTION TO TAKE
NO.
situation and call the Rescue Team Leader (RTL) & Auxiliary
Team Leader (ATL) to the site.
Arranges to evacuate the unwanted persons and call for

additional help.
To Passes information to the Works Main Controller (WMC)

about the situation of site, time to time.
4. Works Main Informs Site Incident Controller (SIC) through common dialing
Controller system and rushes to the spot for combating the situation. Takes
(WMC) charge of the situation, arranges for evacuation of people from
the affected area.
Organizes trained personnel equipped with fire fighting

appliances.
Start combating by shutdown plant &equipments and takes steps

to extinguish fire with available firefighting facilities.
Finds out the root cause of fire and to takes necessary action for
prevention of fire.
5. Rescue Team Consults with Site Incident Controller (SIC) and rushes to the
emergency site through safe route along with the team members
Leader
and starts rescue work.
(RTL)
Shifts the injured persons to hospital by ambulance after
necessary first aid.
Informs the Auxiliary Team Leader for necessary help from

Mutual Aid Partners.
6. Auxiliary Team On being directed by Works Main Controller (WMC) informs

Leader about the emergency to Statutory Authorities.
(ATL) Seeks help from Mutual- Aid Partners and coordinate the Mutual
Aid Partners to render their services, if required.
Takes role call to find out the missing persons, if any.
Arranges to inform the relatives of casualties.
Takes care of visit of the Statutory Authorities to the emergency

site.
7. Team Members Each team member should follow the instructions of his team
leader to mitigate the emergency.

f. Procedure for Reporting Emergencies:
During emergency, telephone numbers are available to contact the essential services.
The telephone numbers are as follows:
DETAILS OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF KEY PERSONNEL
A. For BF Gas Leak

DESIGNATION AS PER TELEPHONE/
Sl. No. NAME & DESIGNATION EMERGENCY COMMAND
STRUCTURE CELL NUMBER
Mr. B P Verma, Works Main Controller O-0661-2510025

1
ED (Works) (For all Command Structures) Res- 0611-2640310
Mr. B. Mohapatra, Alt. Works Main Controller 0661-25112471

2
GM I/C (Services) (For all Command Structures) Mob- 8895500814
Mr. U K Singh, Site Incident Controller

3 8895500163
GM I/C (B/F) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. M.N. Roy, Alt. Site Incident Controller

4 8895500165
DGM (BF) I/C (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. A. Sapru Combat Team Leader

5 8895500164
DGM I/C(OP) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. A.K. Bhowmick , Alt. Combat Team Leader

6 8895500173
DGM(O) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. D. M. Srivastava, Rescue Team Leader

7 8895500199
DGM (O) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. S.K. Nayak, Alt. Rescue Team Leader

8 8895500189
AGM (O) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. R.N. Panda, Auxiliary Team Leader

9 8895502174
DGM I/C (PI-Works) (For all Command Structures)
Mr. Anup Acharya, Alt. Auxiliary Team Leader

10 8895501324
DGM (PI-Works) (For all Command Structures)

B. For Coke Oven Gas Leak


1

2
Mr. C Bhattacharya Site Incident Controller

3 8895500272
GM I/C (CO,CCD) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)
Mr. U K Panda Alt. Site Incident Controller

4 8895502075
DGM I/C (CDD) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)
Mr. G Ramchoudhury Combat Team Leader

5 8895500258
DGM I/C (O) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)
Mr. S.K. Ghose Alt. Combat Team Leader

6 8895500262
AGM (O) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)
Mr. G. Raychoudhury Rescue Team Leader

7 8895500259
DGM (O) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)
Mr. N.C. Mohanty Alt. Rescue Team Leader

8 8895500319
DGM (O) (For Coke Oven Gas Leak)

9 8895502174

10 8895501324
DGM (PI-Works) (For all Command Structures)

C. For LD Gas Leak


1

2
Mr. P.K. Amatya Site Incident Controller

3 8895503355
GM I/C (Steel) (For LD Gas Leak)
Mr. P.K. Mohanty Alt. Site Incident Controller

4 8895500147
GM (BF) (For LD Gas Leak)
Mr. R.K. Singh Combat Team Leader

5 8895502029
DGM I/C (O) (For LD Gas Leak)
Mr. M. Mishra Alt. Combat Team Leader

6 8895502032
8895502032 (For LD Gas Leak)
Mr. B.K. Mohanty Rescue Team Leader

7 8895502011
DGM (M) (For LD Gas Leak)
Mr. B. Sadual Alt. Rescue Team Leader

8 8895500147
DGM (M) (For LD Gas Leak)

9 8895502174

10 8895501324
DGM I/C(PI) (For all Command Structures)

D. For Fire Explosion in Diesel/Petrol/Propane Tank


1

2
Mr. J.P. Rath

Site Incident Controller
3 DGM I/C (MM Stock 8895501039
(For Fire Explosion)
Control)
Mr. D.K. Mishra

Alt. Site Incident Controller
4 DGM (MM Stock 8895501042
(For Fire Explosion)
Control))
Mr. B.P Das Combat Team Leader

5 8895500753
DGM (FS) (For Fire Explosion)
Mr. J.B. Pattnaik Alt. Combat Team Leader

6 8895500755
Sr. Mgr (FS) (For BF Gas Leak)
Mr. D.M Srivastava Rescue Team Leader

7 8895500199
DGM (O) (For Fire Explosion)
Mr. S.K. Nayak Alt. Rescue Team Leader

8 8895500325
AGM (O) (For Fire Explosion

9 8895502174

10 8895501324
DGM I/C(PI) (For all Command Structures)

DETAILS OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Sl.No. AUTHORITY TELEPHONE NUMBER
1. District Collector, Sundergarh 06622-272264/272225
2. Addl. District Magistrate, Rourkela 0661-2500239/2500006
3. Superintendent Police, Rourkela 0661-2500020
4. Chief district Medical Officer, Sundergarh, RGH 0661-2407939
5. District Fire Officer, (Rourkela) 101/0661-2510095
6. Police Station (Tangarpali Police station) 7421/0661-2560621

RGH-0661-2407939
7. Nearest Hospital/ Dispensary. IGH CWS Hospital-0661-
2473931
8. Nearest Fire Station, Power house road 101/0661-2510095
9. Director of Factories and Boilers, Odisha, BBSR. 0674-2396070/2396130
10. Dy. Director of Factories & Boilers, Rourkela 9042/9437357396
11. Asst. Director of Factories & Boiler, Rourkela 9668117930

ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS
SL. OFFICE RESIDENCE

NAME
NO. DOT I/C DOT I/C
LIST OF CONTROL ROOM
PLANT CONTROL (MAIN EMERGENCY

1. 2511005 7600
CONTROL ROOM)
2. GAS CONTROL ROOM 2522029 7510
3. FIRE CONTROL ROOM 2510142 7000
MEDICAL CONTROL ROOM:

7555
(A) OHSC PLANT
4. 2511238 9114
4573
(B) IGH-CASUALITY 2640324 4500
5. TRANSPORT CONTROL ROOM 7228
6. CIVIL DEFENCE 4156
7. CISF CONTROL ROOM 2510958 6000 8000
8. CANTEEN 8151 7235

LIST OF HOSPITALS IN AND AROUND ROURKELA
Sl. Approx. Distance in Km.

Name Phone
No. from Plant
1. Ispat General Hospital 5.0 Km. 2642703
2. Rourkela Gov. Hospital, Rourkela 3.0 Km. 2467939
3. E.S.I. Hospital, Uditnagar 5.0 Km. 2507484
4. Vesaj Patel Hospital, Rourkela 4.0 Km. 2400261
5. Railway Hospital, Bondamunda 5.0 Km. 2530755
6 Life Line Hospital, Rourkela 3.0 Km. 2401655
7 Govt. Hospital, Panposh 5.0 Km. 2664009
8 Police Hospital 5.0 Km 2507432
9. CWS Hospital, Jagada 10 Km 2473931
SPECIAL
Ispat General Hospital, the main medical unit of Rourkela Steel Plant, is a well equipped
hospital with modern gadgets and facilities like ICU, Scanning, Endoscopy, Dialysis,
Neuro Surgery Dept. etc.
g. Facilities available for combating disaster
Rourkela Steel Plant is an integrated Steel Plant and is provided with lot of measures to
combat any possible disaster, which detailed below:
1. ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN : - A detailed on-site emergency plan available, which

envisages all action plan in case of exigency. This is a clear cut guide line which
indicates what is to be done, in case of emergencies. Department wise possible
disaster situation is given separately.
2. There are 3 main Control Rooms i.e. Emergency Plant Control, Control Room at main
Gate and Main Control Room at Fertilizer Plant. The Control Room are manned round
the clock by efficient coordinator.
3. The Control Rooms are provided with Public Address system and systemic
communication net-work for effective communication at the time of exigencies.
4. FIRE FIGHTING : - RSP has been provided with a Captive Fire Service Unit. There
are 5 nos. of Fir Tenders with the Fir Services Deptt 1 No. of Hydraulically operated

Snorkel for rescue operation and fire fighting at height.
5. MEDICAL : - A full fledged First-Aid Center known as JNOHSC (Occupational Health

Service Center) is functional inside the plant premises. Ambulance are available and
are pressed into service whenever necessary There are also 2 Medical Aid Center is
operating inside the plant. This unit is manned by 3 nos. of specialists and 3 nos. of
Medical Officers, assisted by 26 nos. of para medical staff.
6. Ispat General Hospital is specially provided for the Treatment of RSP Employees. It
has got all the modern facilities like Intensive Care Unit. Endoscopy, Dialysis Unit,
CAT scanning, heart care center, Burn Center etc. There are 715 nos. of Beds
available at IGH. There are 66 Medical Officer and 71 Specialists at IGH.
7. The Company has got a full fledged Transport Deptt. with Buses Trucks, Dumpers,
Dozers, Mini Trucks etc. All these can be pressed into services when required.
8. The plant is provided with a complete unit of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)
who are entrusted with the job of watch and ward of Rourkela Steel Plant. The unit of
CISF can gainfully used for law and order situation in case of a disaster.
9. MUTUAL AID – RSP is surrounding by small scale industries / medium scale

industries like L&T UTMAL, Kansbahal, Orissa Cement Limited, Rajgangpur, Orissa
Industries Limited, Lathikata, etc. There is no written agreement for mutual aid. But it
has so happened that RSP has always rise up to the occasion and extended
assistance to all. The same is expected tobe reciprocated.
10. RSP GOT A NUMBER OF First Aiders, properly trained by Orissa Chapter of National
Safety Council of India and OHSC of RSP. The detailed lists of department-wise First
Aiders are available in concerned control rooms. The First Aiders will be activated
quickly to spring into action for medical assistance.
h. Fire hazard & fighting facilities
Fire Hazard and its prevention is also of paramount importance in an integrated Steel
Plant. Fire incidence may be of the following-3 types.
1. Liquid Flammable Liquid Fire

2. Gasses Fire CO Gas, BF Gas, Mixed Gas
3. Solid Fire Coal Heap Fire, Sulphur Fire
All the above said gases are used as Fuel gases in Steel Plant so, it may catch fire if
exposed and finds passage to atmospheres with source of liquidation.
The most important Fire incident is fire of inflammable chemicals.

Coal Chemical Deptt. used to handle many chemicals, which are highly inflammable in
nature. The chemicals are : -
1. Light Oil
2. Benzol
3. Wash Oil
4. Crude Tar
5. Pitch
6. Anthracene Oil
7. Road Tar
8. Naphthalene flakes
The fire fighting arrangement at Coal Chemical Deptt. requires the standards maintained
at oil refineries. Lot of precaution has been taken to prevent fire in case it breaks out.
i. Fire fighting facilities
1. RSP Rourkela is provided with Centralized Fire Services Deptt. with 5 nos. of Fire
Tenders and one no of Snorkel. It has got fully activated / disciplined work force to
take up the exigencies of fire fighting at any point of time. The snorkel is a
hydraulically operated mobile platform which not only facilitates fire fighting at
elevated places but also extends helpful assistance in rescue operation.
2. In Addition to the centralized fire services. There is also a special fire post at Coal
Chemical Deptt & Fert. Plant because of the priorities attached to both the fire prone
are. The posts are equipped with fire tenders and required skilled staff.
3. Pressure water hydrants are installed all around the plant, total 134 nos of hydrants
are available and are connected to a common ring main with final connections to high
level water tank. The pressure water hydrants are a source of water for fire fighting.
j. Communication with outside agencies
In case of off-site emergency, the effects will be felt not only within plant premises, but
also out side i.e. by general public living around the factory premises. The possibility of
off-site emergency arises only when there is heavy leakage of B.F. Gas, LD & Coke
Oven Gas (containing CO’s) from Gas Holder or Gas Line. Even though it is very rare,
RSP has taken a number of actions to meet emergency situations.
k. CISF Unit
CISF Personnel will be responsible for complete Law & Order situation and the crowed
control. CISF Personnel is having Snifter DOG Squad which might help rescue
operation.

7.1.8 Integrated Management System Policy
Integrated Management System (IMS) is a management system for quality, environment,

occupational health & safety and social accountability covering all business sectors that
include Transportation, Water, Power, Buildings & structures, Ports, and Oil & Gas.
The quality policy is pursued by means of:
• Observing the legal requirements concerning production of goods, environmental

protection and health & safety (H&S);
• Striving to constantly improvement of the H&S conditions, preventing accidents at
work and eliminating the risk of situations which may result in occupational injuries or
diseases;
• Improving qualifications and taking the role of employees and their commitment into
account when deciding on actions designed to increase occupational health and
safety;
• Preventing natural environmental pollution and other hazards as well as ensuring
proper waste management;
• Maintaining good relations with suppliers, end-users and Clients on a partnership
basis.
Rourkela Steel Plant which is an integrated part of Steel Authority of India is committed
to the following –
• Rourkela Steel Plant provide defect free product to all its customers on time and
every time by establishing and effective Quality Management System.
• Control and prevent pollution as much as possible and maintain a clean green and
sustainable environment in and around steel plant as a part of its Corporate Social
Responsibility.
• Prevent injury and ill health by providing health and safe working environment for the
working of employees and for all those working in the plant
• Provide socially accountable work culture to all its stakeholders.
• Comply with applicable legal and other requirements related to the Integrated
Management System
• Adhere to all the requirements of internationally recognized QMS, API Q1, EMS,
OHSMS & SA standard and review the objective and the targets periodically for
effectiveness and continual improvement.
7.1.9 Safety System
Safety System is an integral part of Integrated Management System Policy at RSP.

There is a safety manual where the guideline for the safe work procedure is mentioned.
The safety management system is further strengthened by the implementation of
OHSAS-18001 in Rourkela Steel Plant. Half yearly internal audit, yearly external audit
and monthly monitoring of occupational Health and Safety Management Systems
(OHSAS) parameter is done. Standard Operating Practice (SOPs) and Standard
Maintenance Practices (SMPs) performed to address process safety. Inspection at each
level is committed from weekly apex safety committee inspection by each Dept. to

monthly GM level departmental inspection to Inter departmental inspection by DSOs.

Road Safety checking is by HOD, ASO& a team of DSOS while some specific
inspections such as Roof inspection, cable gallery inspections, gas holder inspections is
also performed. Our motivational schemes are Zero accident recognition scheme,
housekeeping competitions amongst various Departments of RSP etc.
a) Safety Management System
Five-Tire Safety Monitoring System

Level Frequency Mode
At CEO Weekly & monthly • Safety in Mass Contact
level • Review with DSOs
• Review of OHSAS
At ED Daily, weekly & • Tele-conference
(W) level monthly • Coordination meeting
• Review of OHSAS
• Counselling of injured person
At GM Daily & monthly • Safety review in morning meeting
level • Team Inspection at Deptt
At HOD Daily, weekly & • Safety review in morning meeting
level monthly • Apex Inspection
• Review of apex points & OHSAS parameters
At SHIFT Every shift • Shift Beginning Safety Talk
I/C level
Workers of the company participate in various meeting such as Mass contact exercise
chaired by CEO, Central Safety committee meeting chaired by ED(W), Central
consultative committee meeting chaired by GM I/C(Services), Zonal Safety committee
meeting chaired by GMs, Departmental Safety meetings chaired by HODs, HIRA
preparation which is a Group exercise, Apex safety inspection organized weekly, Safety
awareness campaign and Safety Srujani.
Safety training programmes is given to the Regular employees, contract employees and
house wives and special training programmes on Height safety, Disaster management,
behavioral safety, radiation safety, electrical safety etc. Various safety boards, bulletins
& stickers message through Local TV, house magazine are displayed in order to
educate people about safety.
b) Project Safety management system
Safety code is given in tender document and 172 qualified safety officers and safety
stewards are engaged in different Agencies. Making HIRA , Safe trg. to all , Height pass
test is the procedure for safety Clearance. Daily check list is made for key risk areas.
Monitoring is done by Project executives, Agency safety officers, Safety Dept. RSP and
reviewed by GM (Project) & ED (Project). Penal action is taken for violation of safety
rules. Public hearing is conducted to hear the safety and health related problems of
people. Safety Month campaigns are organized by Agencies.

Infrastructure facilities available with the fire services are given in Table 7.7. Various
new initiatives taken by RSP for Project Safety management system are listed below:-
• Implementation of Behavioral Based Safety(BBS )at RSP

• Inter departmental safety inspections by a team of DSOs
• BBS at RSP
Table 7.7- Infrastructure available with the Fire Services
Fire Stations 04 Nos

Manpower 154 Nos(Executive-06 Nos,
NonExeutives-148)
Foam Fire Tender 06 Nos
DCP Cum Foam Fire Tender 01 No
Air Field Crash Fire Tender 01 No
Water Tender 01 No
High Capacity Water Bouser 01 No
High Landing Platform 01 No
Emergency Rescue Tender 01 No
Towing Tenders 02 Nos
Fire Personnel Carrier 03 Nos
Portable Fire Pumps 12 Nos
Mobile Long Range Foam-Water Monitor 01 No
Trailer Pump 01 No
BA Sets (Air-22 & Oxygen-19) 41 Nos
CO Monitors 02 Nos
Fire Extinguishers 4500 Nos
Fire Hydrants 1435 Nos
Fire Fighting Pump Houses 13 Nos
Total Gas Flooding Systems 12 Nos
Fire Water Spray System 41 Nos
Fire Detection & Alarm System 52 Nos
Passive Fire Protection Measures Critical Underground Areas
c) Fire Prevention and Protection system
Joint Fire Prevention Inspections of Fire Prone Areas like Cable Galleries, Oil Cellars,
Conveyor Belt Galleries, Transformers, Electrical Installations, and Buildings are
scheduled. Follow-up & Monitoring of Identified Hazards are done by Fire Service for
Liquidation. The process is reviewed by HODs, GMs, ED(W) & CEO. Thermo-Laser Gun
is used for Temperature monitoring of Cables / Joints / Panels. Regular Checking,
Maintenance, Testing of Fire Fighting Equipments & Systems is being done. Mock Drills
& Topography Study are done at regular intervals to ensure Effective Emergency
Preparedness. Awareness Enhancement Training Programmes at Shop floor, HRD
Centre, Institutions & Public Places are being organized. In-House Refresher / Capacity
Building Training for Fire Service Employees is being given for Skill Development
Hazardous Areas are having 100% Fire Insurance Coverage. Uniform Codification is

done for Identification of Fire Extinguishers. These services are also rendered to
Townships, Airstrip & Periphery Area. In-House Maintenance Facilities are provided for
Fire Appliances & Equipments
Following Resource Up gradation & Technological Improvement have been done
• Phasing out of Halon Fire Extinguisher with Clean Agent (HFCs)

• Phasing out of SCCCOBA Sets with SCOCCABA Sets
• Motor Bike Mounted CAFFFS Rapid Intervention Fire Fighting Unit
• Emergency Portable Inflatable Light Tower
• Use of Clean Fire Fighting Gases in upcoming new projects
• Induction of New Multipurpose Foam Fire Tender with Advanced Gadgets.
Various New Initiatives taken for Fire Prevention and Protection system are-
• On-line Software for Monitoring & Follow-up

• Centralized Maintenance of FDA & Fire Protection System
• High Capacity Foam Nurser & High Landing Hydraulic Platform
• Centralised Command Station / Work Station for FDA System at Central Fire Station
• Snake Helpline Introduced. In-House Snake Catching Kit developed.

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ROURKELA STEEL PLANT

EIA/ EMP Studies for HSM, Beneficiation Plant,

7.0 ADDITIONAL STUDIES

7.1 RISK ASSESSMENT

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 177

7.1.1 Process Description

c) Hot Strip Mill

d) Special Plate Plant

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 178

7.1.2 Applicability Of The Rule

SN Chemical Stored / Qty. Stored / Whether Lower Upper

a) Identification of major accident hazards

7.1.3 Description Of Hazardous Chemicals

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 179

7.1.4 Hazard Identification

Table 7.2: Type of Hazards

Name of the Type Hazard Rating IDLH Vap. Remarks

1 None, Material does not burn

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 180

2 Minor, material must be preheated to ignite

1 None, stable when exposed to fire

7.1.5 Hazard Assessment

In any plan, hazardous situations arise due to:

• Failure in the monitoring of crucial process parameters e.g. pressure,

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 181

7.1.6 Consequence Analysis

In this section, accident consequence analysis to determine the consequence of a

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 182

Fig 7.1(a): Computed Possible Release Quantities Under Different

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 183

Fig. 7.1(b): Computed Possible Release Quantities Under Different

Flammable releases cause harms as a results of fire or explosion. Flammable vapour

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 184

Over Type of Damage

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 185

Over Type of Damage

Heat Radiation Level (Kw / m2) Effect

Table 7.5 - Impact of various different types of releases vs. distance

Type of Intensity radii (m) Flash Fire Envelop (m)

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 186

Fig 7.2: Early explosion Overpressure radii

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 187

Fig.7.3: Intensity Radii for Fireball

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 188

7.1.7 On Site Emergency Plan

Three major hazards of the steel plants are

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 189

MAJOR HAZARDS AFFECTING TOTAL PLANT:

The following actions are to be taken immediately in case of a disaster.

1. The concerned department has to inform : Plant Control

2. Inform Fire Services, OHSC, Safety Engg. and : Shift In Charge

5. The control actions to be taken under the :

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 190

District-I : Coke Ovens, Coal Chemical departments

District-II : Blast furnaces, Captive plant-I, Sintering plant -I

District-III : Sintering plant –II, Ore Bedding and Blending plant

District-V : SMS-II, Tonnage Oxygen Plant-II & Calcining plant -II

District-VI : CRM and Silicon steel Mill

District-VII : HSP, PM, Roll shop and pipe plants

The main command structure will be as shown in the Fig 7.4.

© 2016 MECON Limited. All rights reserved Page No. 191

Figure 7.4- Emergency Command Structure

WORKS MAIN CONTROLLER