Chapter 5

Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization: All

Behind the King
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The masses say

The one solution
Is to bring down the government
Dissolve parliament
Change the constitution
Free the justice system
Free the media
Listen to the voice of the people
…
The Makhzen needs to leave
And Morocco is a free land
Slogan raised during the February 20 protests. (Larbi 2011)

As was the case elsewhere in the region, Morocco also witnessed a strong
mobilization dynamic during the first half of 2011. On February 20, 2011, a large
coalition of human rights militants, university students, far-left sympathizers,
Islamists, union members, traditionally apolitical university students and local
personalities seized the historical momentum created by the revolutionary
upheavals in the region and took to the streets to denounce the corruption of
the country’s political elite (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August 26,
2014), increasing unemployment and economic inequality. In the following three
months, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators joined one or more of the weekly
protests that were organized all over the country, eventually forcing the King to
make major political concessions. Yet, despite the promise demonstrated by the
early concessions made by the regime, the pro-democracy protests gradually
petered out in the subsequent months before dying out completely by mid-2012.
The Moroccan ‘false-positive’ case is particularly interesting as it illustrates
the absolutely crucial role played by local intermediate actors whose actions
helped generate a strong mobilization dynamic in the country between February
and April 2011 and whose decision to support the King after April 2011 abruptly
interrupted the momentum of local mobilization. As will be shown later in this
chapter, Morocco’s trajectory during the Arab Spring experienced two defining
phases. The first “ascending” phase lasted from February 20 to the end of April
2011 and had many of the ingredients of a successful informational cascade,
with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators from very different social and
economic groups taking to the streets and successfully forcing the palace to grant
 94 Protest and Mass Mobilization

unprecedented concessions. The second phase, which marked the reversal of the
local informational cascade that was forming in the country, was characterized
by the end of the participation of local intermediate actors and the qualitative
shrinkage of the country’s protest to the country’s traditional opposition groups.*
After reviewing some of the historic strategies used by the monarchy to quell
social mobilization in the country, this chapter will examine the evolution of social
protest in the first half of 2011 and will show that the ascending mobilization phase
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was “sparked by international factors and nourished by local groups who acted as
a transmission belt” (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).
The chapter will also examine the subsequent April 2011 shift of the country’s
main intermediate actors and will show how actions taken by these influential
actors explain both the development and the early interruption of the Moroccan
informational cascade.

Managing the Opposition before the Arab Spring: The Role of the Monarchy

In the months immediately preceding the February 20 protests, the reformist pro-
democracy scene in the country was experiencing a strong sense of fatigue fed
by years of co-optation and repression. For a young Moroccan journalist, “pro-
democracy militants often felt abandoned and left out of the political game”
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014), which was dominated by a range
of clientelized groups and personalities who were all fiercely loyal to the palace.
The pacification of the Moroccan political sphere was the result of a long and
established strategy of exclusion and co-optation (Vermeren 2001; Lust-Okar
2004; Mekouar 2013) used by the palace since the country’s independence. Both
Hassan II and Mohammed VI succeeded in dividing the opposition by rewarding
loyalist groups and excluding those who questioned the supremacy of the palace.
While Hassan II rested on rural notables and, later on, nationalist members of the
Istiqlal Party to neutralize the Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party (USFP)
in the 1970s and 1980s (Lust-Okar 2004), Mohammed VI used the former to
neutralize the Islamic Justice and Development Party (PJD) throughout the late
1990s and early 2000s (Mekouar 2013). When more militant Islamic groups started
questioning the monarchy, the King then turned towards the PJD to better contain
its less compromising rival of al-Adl wal-Ihsane. Combined with regular cosmetic
constitutional reform which gave the impression of change at particular historical
junctures (Marx 2010; Mekouar 2013, 2014), the divide and rule strategy used by
the monarchy proved to be particularly successful. For Ghassan Wail, for instance,
a young Moroccan journalist, “the institutionalization of the political game prior to

* Even though some of the biggest protests of the February 20 movement occurred
after the retreat of the country’s intermediate actors, these protests were far less
heterogeneous than those that occurred previously and did not have the symbolic appeal of
the more inclusive protests which took place in the first part of the year.
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 95

the start of the Arab Spring devitalized the local protest movements, particularly
after 2008” (G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014).
Indeed, in the years preceding the Arab Spring, the local Moroccan protest
movement seemed to be running out of steam. The local 2009 elections were
dominated by the newly created Party of Authenticiy and Modernity (PAM), a
loose coalition of fiercely pro-government clients, while even previously vocal
social movements resigned themselves to joining the formal political game by
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running for elections (G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014). Perhaps
even more than under Hassan II, the reign of Mohammed VI was characterized
by an even stronger reliance on clientelistic networks which preyed on the new
economic opportunities brought about by the liberalization of the country’s
economy.

The February 20 Movement: Inclusive Demands for an Inclusive Coalition

The unexpected Tunisian revolution took both the palace and local militants by
surprise. After the first days of bewilderment at the unexpected fall of some of the
region’s most established regimes, a wide coalition of pro-democracy demonstrators
seized the historical momentum created by the revolutionary upheavals in the
region and took to the streets to articulate a series of political, economic and
social demands. Political demands included calls for constitutional reform, the
dissolution of parliament and the establishment of a genuine parliamentary
monarchy, the adoption of a truly popular constitution (H. Al-Mokhlis, personal
interview, December 9, 2014 and O. Radi, personal interview, December 16,
2014), the trial of corrupt officials and the confiscation of their assets (Hima 2011),
the respect of basic freedoms of association and expression, the reform of the
security services and the end of economic privileges being granted to associates
of the regime (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014). Economic
demands spoke to the widespread frustration at the perceived inequalities and
called for an answer to the unemployment problem in the country, the end of
the privatization of strategic public institutions1 (Hima 2011), an increase in the
salaries of public sector employees, increased spending on public infrastructure,
etc. Finally, social demands also included a series of progressive demands such
as the implementation of universal health coverage (Hima 2011), full equality
between men and women, more rights for single mothers and an increase in
subsidies (and decreased taxes) in favor of the most vulnerable members of society
(Hima 2011).
In the words of Omar Radi, a young journalist and human rights militant, the
February 20 movement was “a rally for all those left outside the public space
who wished to re-claim that space, democratize it, and transform it into a genuine
avenue for debate” (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014). As was the

1 Particularly the local educational system (Hima 2011).

 96 Protest and Mass Mobilization

case elsewhere in the Arab world, the structure of the movement was generally
horizontal with no clear leadership (O. Radi, personal interview, December
16, 2014), with local groups usually spearheaded by young university students
frustrated with the traditional political actors (H. Al-Mokhlis, personal interview,
December 9, 2014).
Like their counterparts in the region, Moroccan activists used various social
media tools2 to communicate with each other and build a unified platform of
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political, economic and social demands (Y. Rguig, personal interview, December
10, 2014). In particular, support committees created in the few days immediately
following the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions served as a basis for discussing
the platform of demands to be raised by the February 20 movement (G. Wail,
personal interview, December 14, 2014). The movement also adopted the
organizational structure used by other protest movements in the past, notably the
direct democracy and general assemblies system used by pre-existing militant
structures such as the Coordinations Against the Excessive Cost of Living3
(O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014).
One important characteristic of the movement was its wide and inclusive nature.
As underlined by Ghassan Wail, members of the movement included the usual
established anti-government militants4 from the far left and Islamic groups from
the opposition such as Al-Adl wal-Ihsane, but also a new generation of previously
apoliticized youth who did not feel any connection with the usual political forces
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014).
More importantly, a wide range of political, economic and social groups, some
of which were traditionally close or were even formally part of the regime, joined

2 As was the case elsewhere in the Arab world, the February 20 movement was
born on the Internet. Because of the lack of credibility of the official media outlets, most
Moroccans follow the news through online portals (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December
17, 2014). Thus, the Internet enabled the acceleration of the mobilization dynamic both
spatially and temporally (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). Social
media platforms helped citizens located in isolated parts of the country to synchronize their
activities and demands with the rest of the country (G. Wail, personal interview, December
14, 2014). The government reacted very quickly to the threat coming from online news
portals by creating its own platforms, hiring technicians to tackle online criticisms and
write pro-government comments on the most popular pages (K. Ryadi, personal interview,
December 17, 2014), while arresting some of the most prominent independent journalists
active online.
3 Or “Coordinations de lutte contre la chèreté de la vie” in French.
4 From this perspective, it is important to note that the movement was not born out of
a vacuum. Interviewees often traced the 2011 mobilization dynamic in the country to other
instances of popular protest that had occurred in the past, such as the 2008 Sidi Ifni protests,
the Bouarfa demonstrations (Y. Rguig, personal interview, December 10, 2014), or the
movements against the increase in living costs, while underlining the importance of formal
fora such as the World Social Forums of the early 2000s (G. Wail, personal interview,
December 14, 2014 and O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014).
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 97

the February 20 pro-democracy protests. As will be shown later in this chapter,

the first demonstrations organized by the movement witnessed the involvement
of prominent political and business personalities, union members, members of
the non-parliamentary left, loyalist Islamic parties (notably the pro-palace PDJ),
Salafist personalities, a wide range of pro-government NGOs such as the Moroccan
Human Rights Organization (OMDH), as well as local academics, popular artists
and a (small) number of women’s rights activists (O. Radi, personal interview,
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December 16, 2014) who crucially broadened the appeal of the movement to the
rest of the population.
The inclusive nature of the movement was noted by many interviewees who
underlined the moderate character of many of its early members, which in turn
helped increase the base of incoming supporters. For Fouad Abdelmoumni, a
Moroccan economist and human rights militant, an important “characteristic of
the slogans raised by the February 20 movement was their general and inclusive
nature which allowed very different groups to identify with the movement”
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). Other interviewees
noted the fact that the “moderate nature “of the demands made by the February 20
movement reassured large parts of the population, who could identify with the
platform put forward by the protesters. For Sara Bousta Sonjar, a (then) 21-year-
old law student from the coastal city of Mohammedia, “the demands [made by
the February 20 movement] were reassuring to both the elite and to the rest of the
population. Everyone could relate to them” (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview,
August 26, 2014).
Thus, while a minority of supporters of the February 20 movement expressed
radical views (such as a public distrust of the institutional monarchy as a whole),
most (if not all) of the country’s first participants in the movement shied away
from direct criticism of the monarchy and preferred instead to call for economic
and social reform. The following slogan, which was directly aimed at those in the
political sphere deemed responsible for the sense of economic degradation and
political alienation shared by large parts of the population, is a case in point:

Why are we here? Why are we protesting? The cost of living is too high for us!
Why are we here? Why are we protesting? Water and electricity bills are too
expensive for us! Why are we here? Why are we protesting? For the change that
we want! Why are we here? Why are we protesting? The cost of living is too
high for us! (Larbi 2011, cited in Mekouar 2013)

Similarly, while the need to curb the predatory behavior of the King’s entourage
was one of the most important demands made by the movement, supporters of
the movement largely refused to make the King responsible for the behavior of
his friends and family members. As documented by Larbi, a popular Moroccan
blogger, slogans used during the protests were careful not to target the person
of the King directly, even though some slogans veered surprisingly close to that
symbolic red line, as illustrated by the following excerpt:
 98 Protest and Mass Mobilization

Your kids, you got educated! Your kids, you got educated! The people’s kids, you
got expelled! Your kids, you got stuffed (with food)! Your kids, you got stuffed
(with food)! The people’s kids, you got starved! Your kids, you got employed!
Your kids, you got employed! The people’s kids, you pushed them to leave the
country (illegally)! The sons of the people you oppressed! And the sons of the
people woke up! And the sons of the people screamed! This is Morocco and we are
its people! Oh El-Himma [a childhood friend of the King]! Get your act together!
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This is Morocco, and we are its people! Oh Majidi [another childhood friend of the
King]! Get your act together! This is Morocco, and we are its people! (Larbi 2011)

Old and New Activists: All United for Reform

As underlined earlier, one major characteristic of the February 20 movement

during the first months of 2011 was the presence of a wide coalition of political
forces uniting traditional actors from the opposition (notably the far-left and
Islamic parties of the opposition), groups and individuals traditionally close to the
regime (or even formally part of the ruling circle), as well as a wide range of first-
timers who had never previously been involved in politics.

The Usual Suspects: Communists and Republicans Islamists

For Omar Radi, groups traditionally opposed to the palace were naturally present
en masse during the protests, while the core of the February 20 movement was
made of “all those who fell into disfavor out of the official political system or were
considered as a threat by the regime” (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16,
2014).
The usual suspects included the country’s small far-left political parties, notably
Democratic Way (Al-Nahj al-Dimocrati), a Marxist party whose members were the
subject of heavy state repression during the 1970s and 1980s, the Unified Socialist
Party or Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU), a formerly radical Maoist organization, as
well as the National Ittihadi Congress and the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party
(Hizb al-Tali’a al-Dimocrati al-Ichtiraki) (Y. Rguig, personal interview, December
10, 2014). Members of these parties were often working in close coordination with
the independent Moroccan Human Rights Association5 (AMDH), which provided
logistical and moral support to the movement (Y. Rguig, personal interview,
December 10, 2014). Both the AMDH and the far-left parties helped militants
organize the first protests. Militants joined the protests, offered meeting spaces
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014) and mobilized friendly media
outlets to advertise the demands made by the pro-democracy movement.

5 Not to be confused with the pro-government Moroccan Human Rights Organization

(OMDH), whose members also attend the very first pro-democracy protests before ending
their participation a few weeks later.
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 99

Finally, a number of radical organizations such as anti-globalization group

ATTAC, the national association for unemployed graduates, and locally based
social movements (such as Stop Lydec) (O. Radi, personal interview, December
16, 2014 and G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014) were also amongst
the early participants in the first demonstrations. Using the different protests as
a political amplifier for their specific demands, members of these more militant
organizations actively linked their local demands to larger issues of bureaucratic
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corruption and political impunity (See Collectif Citoyen Stoplydec 2011).

In addition to leftist groups, the first protests witnessed the massive involvement
of Islamic groups from the opposition, most of which were already openly at
odds with the state. The most important Islamic force was indubitably the late
Sheikh Yassine’s movement of al-Adl wal-Ihsane, a popular Islamic movement
unauthorized by the authorities and staunchly opposed to the monarchy. With
hundreds of thousands of supporters mobilizing at times, al-Adl wal-Ihsane’s
demographic weight in the first demonstrations was clear to all. For Mohamed
Salmi, a sociologist and one of al-Adl-wal-Ihsane’s General Secretaries, members
of al-Adl wal-Ihsane constituted 50–70 percent of all demonstrators in the big
cities and more than 90 percent in the smaller ones (M. Salmi, personal interview,
December 19, 2014). This assessment was shared by pro-democracy militants
outside of the religious movement who confirmed the major demographic weight
of the movement in the 2011 protests. For Yassine Rguigui, a then 20-year-old
student who wrote some of the movement’s public statements, al-Adl wal-Ihsane
“played a central role and was massively present despite what people would like
to think or say” (Y. Rguig, December 10, 2014).
Other Islamic groups from the opposition included the unauthorized Hizb-
al-Umma and al-Badil al-Hadari (M. Salmi, personal interview, December 19,
2014) as well as a very wide range of Salafist groups, which were usually in
opposition with each other and with different ideological orientations, but which
all experienced harsh governmental repression after 2003 (M. Salmi, personal
interview, December 19, 2014), as well as family committees for the defense of
political prisoners (M. Salmi, personal interview, December 19, 2014) who were
interned during the government’s harsh crackdown on Islamic groups suspected
of terrorism in the mid-2000s.

Morocco’s Intermediate Actors: Testing the Waters

In addition to those actors whose anti-regime stance was largely expected,

one defining characteristic of the early February 20 protests was the surprising
involvement of a wide range of groups and individuals who were thought to be
close to the regime (or even, at times, formally part of it). As in Tunisia and Libya,
the presence of these actors during the first protest sent an important signal to
the rest of the population by showing that the grievances of the pro-democracy
activists were not only legitimate but were also shared by the country’s highest
economic and political spheres.
 100 Protest and Mass Mobilization

While previous instances of social mobilization in the country were usually

spearheaded by the usual activist organizations (notably the small far-left political
parties and the AMDH), the first 2011 protests in Morocco were marked by the
surprising involvement of established political organizations that were traditionally
supportive of the regime.
As in the early days of the Tunisian revolution, a number of union members
took to the streets despite the opposition of their leadership. In particular, workers
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affiliated with the Democratic Confederation of Labour (CDT) and the Moroccan
Workers’ Union (UMT) actively supported the emerging pro-democracy movement
by helping to print pamphlets and providing logistical support6 and equipment
necessary for the organization of the first protests (S. Bousta Soujar, personal
interview, August 26, 2014 and H. Al-Mokhlis, personal interview, December 9,
2014). While other established unions such as the General Union of Moroccan
Workers (UGTM)7 and the Democratic Federation of Labour (FDT)8 (G. Wail,
personal interview, December 14, 2014) refused to join the demonstrations, the
support of workers belonging to the UMT and the CDT clearly helped give more
visibility to the movement between January and April 2011.
Union members were joined by supporters of the established PJD, a generally
independent but solidly loyalist party. While the leadership of the PJD did not
want to oppose the palace, to which it remains solidly faithful, the leadership of
the organization realized the importance of seizing the historical opportunity to
reinforce its bargaining power vis-à-vis the state (K. Ryadi, personal interview,
December 17, 2014). From this perspective, both rank-and-file members and
some of the most prominent leaders participated in the first protests organized
by the February 20 movement. As noted by Khadija Ryadi, the former head of
the AMDH, prominent members of the PJD such as Abdellilah Benkirane, the
country’s future Prime Minister, and Moustafa Ramid, the country’s future
Minister of Justice, were seen walking with pro-democracy activists carrying a
banner reading “a people’s scream” and re-stating some of the slogans used in the
first demonstrations9 (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014).
In addition to the PJD and a number of political personalities who joined the
protest in a personal capacity, the February 20 movement witnessed the largely
unexpected involvement of the youth sections of some of the country’s most

6 While the CDT allowed the pro-democracy activists to use its premises to organize
the demonstrations (while allowing its members to join the protests), the UMT prevented
its militants from using its premises for anti-regime activities (K. Ryadi, personal interview,
December 17, 2014).
7 Linked to the Istiqlal Party then in government (G. Wail, personal interview,
December 14, 2014).
8 Linked to the socialist USFP party, also present in government (G. Wail, personal
interview, December 14, 2014).
9 While it participated in the protests, the party also attempted (but failed) to hijack
the movement by changing its name (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014).
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 101

prominent political parties, such as the youth sections of the Parti du Progrès et
du Socialisme (PPS) (then part of the government) (M. Salmi, personal interview,
December 19, 2014) and the fiercely pro-government socialist USFP and PAM10
(H. Al-Mokhlis, personal interview, December 9, 2014). The most unexpected
support came from the youth sections of the fully co-opted USFP and PAM parties,
whose members took the risk of upsetting the leadership of their party (K. Ryadi,
personal interview, December 17, 2014 and O. Radi, personal interview, December
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16, 2014). While the interviewees all shared the feeling that the involvement
of these actors was the result of a political calculation aimed at controlling or
slowing down the pro-democracy movement (O. Radi, personal interview,
December 16, 2014), the signaling effect created by the involvement of these
actors played a major part in the development of the local informational cascade in
Morocco.
Dozens of civil society organizations11 also joined the first protests and supported
the demands made by demonstrators (Y. Rguig, personal interview, December
10, 2014). Amazigh cultural organizations, such as Tamaynut (Movement for the
Sharing of Power, Wealth and Values) and to a lesser extent Azetta (Amazigh
Citizenship Network) strongly came out in favor of the demands raised by the
movement (Y. Rguig, personal interview, December 10, 2014), particularly in the
north of the country. Other associations such as local neighborhood associations
or the Citizens’ Forum for Democratic Change, which includes prominent
businessmen and public servants in some of the country’s biggest parastatal
companies, also mobilized alongside the pro-democracy activists (G. Wail,
personal interview, December 14, 2014).
Prominent businessmen such as Karim Tazi or Miloud Chaabi also came out
in support of the demonstrations, which they helped to finance (H. Al-Mokhlis,
personal interview, December 9, 2014). They were joined by academics/
local intellectuals such as Abdellah Hammoudi (M. Salmi, personal interview,
December 19, 2014), Aboubakr Jamai or Fatima Ifriqui. Even members of the
pro-government OMDH joined the first protests (O. Radi, personal interview,
December 16, 2014).

10 While a number of activists such as Al-Mokhlis questioned the true motivation

of the USFP members and argued that their involvement was an attempt to dilute the
demands of the February 20 movement, this study argues that regardless of the true nature
of the party’s motivations, the involvement of members of the USFP did have an important
signaling effect during the first days of mobilization.
11 One notable absence was the country’s feminist movements, who, with the
exception of the Federation of the Democratic League for Women Rights (Y. Rguig,
personal interview, December 10, 2014), largely refused to join the protests organized by
the February 20 movement. For the former President of the AMDH, the relative absence of
women during the demonstrations was the result of the visible presence of Islamic groups
(K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014), whose social views were worrying to
feminist groups.
 102 Protest and Mass Mobilization

As underlined by one young journalist member of the February 20 movement,

the protests of the first half of 2011 were “visibly [socially] mixed, even in the
peripheral parts of the country” (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014).
More importantly, however, most of the activists were previously apolitical youth
who had never previously engaged in the political game or even “joined a protest”
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014). The most visible personalities
of the movement were young and non-“politically marked” (F. Abdelmoumni,
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personal interview, December 19, 2014).

Finally, while the early organizers only expected the “usual suspects” to show up at
the first protests, interviewees recalled their surprise at the unexpected involvement
of “normal people” (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August 26, 2014).
As noted by a young journalist-militant, the first protests witnessed the involvement
of young members of the middle and upper middle classes, many of whom were
students from local private schools (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16,
2014). Similarly, for Fouad Abdelmoumni, some of the most important early
protestors were non-partisan petty bourgeois who wanted a genuine democracy
able to effectively end the authoritarianism of the monarchy while putting a check
on the King’s entourage economic predatory practices (F. Abdelmoumni, personal
interview, December 19, 2014). Abdelmoumni described those local political agents
as “a range of urban elements socialized in the public sector with some experience
in local associations, political parties or unions, who abandoned formal politics but
kept hoping for some sort of political transformation” (F. Abdelmoumni, personal
interview, December 19, 2014). These actors were “more than happy to participate
in the one or two protests but were not willing to engage in radical activities.” More
importantly for Abdelmoumni, this “social body was largely demobilized and had
no real plan for the future and [was] not willing to pay a high price for change”
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).

The Two Phases of the Moroccan Informational Cascade

February–April 2011: Hope for a New Coalition

As seen above, the first protests in the country were characterized by the
involvement of a large coalition of institutional and non-institutional actors,
many of whom were traditionally close to the regime and/or rarely involved in
contentious politics. Ordinary Moroccan citizens thus made the same shortcut that
their Tunisian and Libyan counterparts had made a few weeks earlier: the country
was indeed experiencing a historical momentum that needed to be seized.
On February 20, an estimated 150,000 people answered the call for protest
put forward by the first organizers and took to the streets in more than 50 cities
and villages (Baylocq and Granci 2012). While some protests were marked by
instances of limited violence, the demonstrations remained largely non-violent and
signaled to both the organizers and the regime that new segments of the population
were seeking reform.
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 103

Over the following weeks, protestors continued mobilizing every Sunday

throughout the country and helped maintain the visibility of the movement. On
March 9, the King was forced to address the population and answer some of the
demands made by protesters. He announced a series of ambitious constitutional
changes aimed at empowering the elected executive, upholding human and
cultural rights, reinforcing the independence of the judiciary and entrenching
genuine democratic mechanisms in the country’s institutions (Rue89 2011). While
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the goal of the King’s speech was to placate demonstrators by granting a series
of important symbolic concessions, the speech actually signaled to the general
population the presence of a historic moment for mobilization while legitimizing
the demands made by protestors (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December
19, 2014). For the general population, the King’s speech was a major step in the
right direction, but mobilization had to be sustained until the promised changes
were effectively implemented. From this perspective, the mobilization dynamic
continued to grow in the country, eventually culminating on April 24, when
Morocco witnessed its biggest wave of protest yet, with more than 300,000 people
demonstrating (Baylocq and Granci 2012).
In addition to the perception of exceptionality created by the involvement of a
coalition of reformist forces, it is important to note that the call for mobilization put
forward by the February 20 movement occurred in the first weeks of 2011 when
large parts of the Moroccan population, including some prominent institutional
actors, were particularly receptive to regional events. Between December 17, 2010
and February 20, 2011, “the population was actively following regional events on
international satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera” (O. Radi, personal interview,
December 16, 2014). As noted by Fouad Abdelmoumni, “the international context
created the hope that the country was ready for a significant transformation …
[while] the feeling that there was an opportunity to be seized was very present”
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). Similarly, for Ghassan
Wail, “the Moroccan mobilization dynamic would have never occurred without
the window of opportunity created by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions”
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014). Others also mentioned the
importance of the links forged between young Egyptian and Tunisian militants
on the one hand and local militants on the other during the World Social Forum
(S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August 26, 2014), which was held in Dakar
during the first week of February 2011, which heightened the sense of political
awareness and fed the process of regional diffusion.

April 2011 and After: The End of the Alliance and the Failure of the Cascade

While the wide pro-democracy coalition succeeded in creating a historic

mobilization dynamic in the country, internal divisions and the defection of some
of its most prominent actors gradually slowed the momentum that was forming in
the country.
The first cracks in the movement appeared after the King’s speech of early
March 2011, when a number of civil society organizations assumed that the first
 104 Protest and Mass Mobilization

demonstrations had achieved their goal and started expressing their desire to end
their participation in the local demonstrations (Y. Rguig, December 10, 2014).
The first to abandon the weekly demonstrations were lukewarm liberals who
were put off by the massive presence of Islamic party sympathizers (G. Wail,
personal interview, December 14, 2014). The fears of these moderate liberals were
reinforced by the victory of the Islamic Nahda party in Tunisia and the increasing
religious nature of the Libyan and Syrian conflicts (K. Ryadi, personal interview,
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December 17, 2014). For Khadija Ryadi, the few women involved in the movement
also “prefer[red] the Makhzen (or Moroccan deep state) to the Islamists” (K. Ryadi,
personal interview, December 17, 2014) and were amongst the first to end their
participation in the demonstration.
Another blow came in late April after the defection of the country’s participating
workers’ unions. Members of the UMT and CDT who had mobilized with the pro-
democracy activists (often against the recommendations of their senior officials)12
also ended their involvement, after their respective unions signed a side-deal with
the government (H. Al-Mokhlis, personal interview, December 9, 2014) on April
26. While the leadership of the two unions initially failed to prevent rank-and-
file members from joining the pro-democracy demonstrations in the first weeks of
the protests, the successful negotiations with the government, which granted a 600
MAD (approximately US$60) pay increase to all workers in the public service and
a 15 percent increase in the minimum wage (G. Wail, personal interview, December
14, 2014) gave the leadership of the UMT and the CDT the leverage necessary to
quell the internal sedition that the unions had been experiencing since the beginning
of February 2011 (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014). Following
the signing of the agreement, the leadership of the UMT and the CDT thus quickly
moved to expel the pro-democracy militants who wished to pursue their protest
actions against the government (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014).
Finally, the withdrawal of the PJD marked the end of the Moroccan
informational cascade. In particular, the constitutional reforms announced by
the palace and the promise of early elections (which the PJD planned to run for)
encouraged many PJD supporters to end their participation in the pro-democracy
movement. The end of the involvement of the PJD also illustrated the victory
of the majority loyalist13 wing of the party over the reformist minority. While

12 As in Tunisia, the unions’ senior officials did not hide their support of the
government and actively sought to prevent rank-and-file members from joining the weekly
demonstrations organized by the February 20 movement.
13 In 2011, the PJD was ultimately dominated by a pro-monarchy wing which
considered that “the best outcome for the country is a strong monarchy influenced by the
Islamists” (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). For many members
of the PJD, rendering the monarchy powerless would mean exposing the party to risky shifts
in popular opinion. Instead, the leadership of the party, particularly Abdelilah Benkirane,
considered that a strong monarchy would be the best tool to impose the religious agenda of
the party (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 105

a minority of PJD members led by Mostafa Ramid and Abdelali Hamidine,

the general secretary of the party, were more genuinely attached to democratic
ideals, these reformist voices also decided to shift their support in favor of the
monarchy after the latter offered limited concessions14 (F. Abdelmoumni, personal
interview, December 19, 2014). Thus, as underlined by Fouad Abdelmoumni,
for most moderate actors, “there was enough consistence and coherence in the
government’s response to popular mobilization to justify giving a chance to the
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government” (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).

All Those Left: Between the Project of the Caliphate and the Dictatorship of
the Proletariat

After the departure of the more moderate groups in mid-2011, the February 20
movement qualitatively15 shrank to the set of usual anti-regime groups (mostly
unrecognized Islamic groups and far-left parties). While the departure of members
of the liberal middle class did not initially affect the overall number of people
who joined the protests (with some of the biggest protests happening after the
departure of the intermediate actors), their departure had an important effect on
the nature of the signal sent by the demonstrations to the rest of the population.
For Omar Radi, for instance, “the protests became suddenly and visibly less
mixed” (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16, 2014) after March 2011,
while simply reflecting the demographic weight of Al-Adl wal-Ihsane. The
gradual replacement of the liberal members of the middle class by the seemingly
more extremist Islamist members of al-Adl wal-Ihsane ended up breaking the
national mobilization dynamic in the country. For average citizens, the February
20 movement was no longer a new movement of “normal citizens,” but a rather
strange alliance between the country’s far-left parties and non-loyalist Islamists
(both groups traditionally opposed to the monarchy).
The remaining activists were not only unrepresentative of the general
population but their demands also went far beyond those expressed in the first
stage of the movement by other members of the February 20 movement. In
particular, while most pro-democracy activists asked for the establishment of a
genuine constitutional monarchy (largely in line with the pro-monarchy sentiment
of the general population), those of al-Adl wal-Ihsane and far-left parties started
making increasingly radical demands that went far beyond the original consensus
(M. Salmi, personal interview, December 19, 2014). The core of the new
alliance made by the AMDH, the Socialist Unified Party and the Islamist al-Adl

14 Notably after the palace ended the overt support it was providing to the PAM party
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).
15 Although the country witnessed some very large demonstrations in the summer of
2011, these demonstrations were far less diverse than the earlier protests and reflected the
demographic strength of only one group: al-Adl wal-Ihsane.
 106 Protest and Mass Mobilization

wal-Ihsane thus tried to transform the movement from a pro-democracy project

into an anti-monarchy movement (G. Wail, personal interview, December 14,
2014), which in general proved to be unpopular. The increasingly anti-monarchical
tone of the alliance was not only out of sync with the pro-monarchy feeling of the
vast majority of the population, but the two ideologically opposed groups offered
two extremely opposing societal projects (the Caliphate and the dictatorship of the
proletariat, respectively), which could not “reassure [the rest of the population]”
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(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).

With the increasing presence of al-Adl wal-Ihsane in the protests, the few
remaining members of the middle and upper classes who were still involved
started seizing the consequences of the end of the advantages brought about by
authoritarianism in the country (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December
19, 2014). These largely apolitical individuals were increasingly alarmed by
the demographic weight of the Islamists (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview,
December 19, 2014), particularly after the terrorist attack of April 28, 2011 in
Marrakech, which claimed 17 lives (Radio-Canada 2015).
Finally, while a number of small groups such as the Association of Unemployed
Graduates or the Organization for Access to Housing remained committed to
the movement until the very end, internal divisions placed a heavy strain on the
movement (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August 26, 2014), especially
during the negotiations regarding the new constitutional project spearheaded by
the King (G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014).
Thus, the subsequent efforts of the far left and al-Adl wal-Ihsane were a
last-ditch effort to re-awaken public interest in protest, which petered out in the
final months of 2011 and eventually died almost completely after al-Adl wal-
Ihsane, which had been bearing most of the cost of mobilization16 since March
2011, finally decided to withdraw its participation (K. Ryadi, personal interview,
December 17, 2014).

The Regime’s Response: The Proverbial Carrot and Stick

Unlike their Tunisian and Libyan counterparts, the measured response of the
Moroccan authorities to the threat created by the first demonstrations of late
February 2011 also explains why the local protests did not escalate as quickly as
they did elsewhere in the region. From the palace’s viewpoint, the biggest risk
was the formation of a unified front linking Islamists, the leftists and the liberal
middle class “which could deprive the monarchy of its crucial arbitrating role”
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). The regime thus actively

16 As noted by Khadija Ryadi, the Islamic movement was not only facing the
government’s repressive apparatus but was also under financial stress as it was paying for
the transportation and food costs related to its members’ participation in the demonstrations
(K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014).
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 107

avoided taking any action that could strengthen that front, preferring instead to
use a double strategy based on selective concessions on the one hand and selective
repression on the other.

Selective Concessions

As underlined earlier in this chapter, the political supremacy of the palace was the
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result of a decade-old balancing exercise in which the King pitted one opponent
against the other while rewarding loyalist groups with access to generous institutional
rent channels (Lust-Okar 2004). Faced with one of the biggest threats he had faced
since his accession, Mohammed VI chose to reaffirm the same strategy by opening
the official political institutional channels to the PJD while taking a series of highly
symbolic actions aimed at strengthening the support he received from the liberal
middle class and the co-opted established political and economic networks.
By granting important concessions17 to cultural groups, women’s rights
advocates, pro-democracy activists of the middle class and established political
parties, the constitutional reform spearheaded by the palace broke the alliance
between established members of the opposition, new activists from the middle
class and the various opportunistic members of the political sphere who were
testing the resolve of the palace, and interrupted the informational cascade forming
in the country.
In particular, the first symbolic concessions announced by the government
combined with the signature of the social dialogue agreement between the state
and the unions in late April 2011 all gave the false impression that the February
20 movement had already succeeded and that the more radical demands would
eventually be addressed in due course after the constitutional referendum and
subsequent elections. Women’s movements, Amazigh groups, union members
and traditionally apolitical members of the middle class thus all ended their
participation in the movement after deciding that the concessions made during the
King’s speech fulfilled their demands and that the coming elections were going to
settle the more difficult issues (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August 26,
2014).

Selective Repression

In a context where the state security services were initially unable to guarantee the
loyalty of their own members, who could have, like their Egyptian and Tunisian
counterparts, been tempted to side with the protestors (F. Abdelmoumni, personal
interview, December 19, 2014), the Moroccan regime first chose to avoid a violent
confrontation with the pro-democracy movement. For local activists, the relative
restraint of the security services was due to the conscious fear that a violent
confrontation with protestors could spiral out of control and create a popular

17 See Desrues 2013.

 108 Protest and Mass Mobilization

backlash. Instead, the authorities preferred to use to a wide range of non-violent

means to discredit the movement and its most prominent leaders, while using
direct violence only on a limited number of occasions.
Non-violent strategies included a wide span of actions ranging from the
publication of doctored videos discrediting the most visible leaders of the
movement as pro-Algerian separatists, atheists, unbelievers, etc. to the organization
of counter-protests led by regime loyalists and the mobilization of popular artists,
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journalists18 or academics to denounce the pro-democracy activists. In parallel, the

country’s security services also sought to sabotage the movement by infiltrating
the general assemblies organized by militants, bogging down their activities or
attempting to dilute their demands (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August
26, 2014). The authorities also attempted, and at times succeeded, in co-opting
some of the most fragile leaders of the pro-democracy movement.19
As underlined earlier in this chapter, one of the biggest blows to the February
20 movement occurred on April 27, 2011 when the government signed a deal with
the unions. As was rightly noted by one local observer, the agreement with the
government not only deprived the February 20 movement of many of its supporters
but also opened up the way for a more open crackdown on the remaining militants
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014). Thus, only two weeks after
the signing of the agreement, the authorities started banning public protests while
resorting to increasingly violent means during the weekly protests (G. Wail,
personal interview, December 14, 2014).
While the level of violence increased significantly after the defection of the
most symbolically influential groups (notably the youth of the PJD) and the
unions, the state was still careful not to create unnecessary pushback by using
violence in a very selective fashion. For Fouad Abdelmoumni, for instance,
the main goal of the authorities was to “discourage normal people and frighten
those who did not usually define themselves as militants” (F. Abdelmoumni,
personal interview, December 19, 2014). With the exception of a few episodes,
such as the relatively harsh repression of the May 17 picnic in front of the
Temara torture center and the May 29 crackdown in the popular neighborhood
of Sbata in Casablanca, the Moroccan state largely refrained from using direct
violence against protestors, especially20 in urban centers. For Ghassan Wail, the
regime preferred to target “radical personalities with no clear political support”
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014). Similarly, for another
militant, “the police were very polite and used violence in a selective way. They
tried to separate the usual militants from the general population. They were

18 See Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghally 2012, 878.

19 A case in point is Oussama El-Khlifi, dubbed by some as “the Che Guevara of the
Feb 20, movement,” who left the organization to join the pro-palace PAM party.
20 Police repression was much more intense in rural or remote areas, where the
inhabitants had less access to the media and or to local political institutional channels (such
as the traditionally restive city of Al-Hoceima or Sefrou).
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 109

very polite with normal folks” (H. Al-Mokhlis, personal interview, December 9,
2014). This analysis was shared by other interviewees, who noted, for instance,
that the police generally attempted to use violence on weekdays only (rather
than during weekends, when the violent actions by the police could have created
an uncontrollable popular backlash) and at night (O. Radi, personal interview,
December 16, 2014) in order to limit the risks21 associated with repression
(G. Wail, personal interview, December 14, 2014).
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As soon as the political risks associated with more severe forms of repression
seemed to be more under control, the government switched back to a targeted
“revenge campaign” (K. Ryadi, personal interview, December 17, 2014) against
the remaining perceived hardcore militants of the far left and al-Adl wal-Ihsane.
Instead of directly repressing the various demonstrations, the regime preferred to
intimidate (or at times arrest) some of the movement’s most visible leaders. Omar
Radi, one interviewee for this work, received death threats after being arrested
by members of the security services (O. Radi, personal interview, December 16,
2014). Similarly, members of al-Adl wal-Ihsane were increasingly harassed22 after
protests, denied administrative documents and under pressure in their workplace
(M. Salmi, personal interview, December 19, 2014).
Finally, independent figures from the business world who had publicly sided
with pro-democracy demonstrators were also targeted by the authorities. The regime
mobilized the bureaucracy and the judiciary to penalize the economic activities

21 Violent strategies included strong physical crackdowns of a number of perceived

risky protests such as the May 15, 2011 demonstration organized in front of the Temara
torture center south of Rabat and the May 29 protest in the popular neighborhood of Sbata
in Casablanca. However, the heavy-handed reaction of the police on May 29, which created
a large media backlash as well as attracting official condemnation from the EU and human
rights organizations (La Nouvelle Tribune 2011), marked the upper limit of the blind strategy
of containment. While May 2011 was characterized by a relatively high degree of regime
repression, the renewal of protests in June 2011 highlighted the negative consequences
linked to the repressive-paradox. Al-Adl wal-Ihsane and leftists groups (which bore most
of the costs linked to state repression) mobilized even more than they did in the past, with
some protests reaching 100,000 people.
22 For some interviewees, the government’s heavy-handed repression of the
movement was an attempt to force al-Adl wal-Ihsane to abandon its commitment to non-
violence, which had the potential of resonating with the rest of the population. For Fouad
Abdelmoumni, for instance, the government tried using all means “to show that non-
violence was nothing but a tactical action that would be abandoned [by the movement]
later on” (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). The leadership of
al-Adl wal-Ihsane was also very aware of the unpredictable consequences that might stem
out of an indiscriminate use of regime violence. For Mohamed Salmi, “the only outcome of
state violence is a social explosion and more violence. Police violence does not intimidate
members of the movement because they have been used to it for the last 40 years and
know how to deal with it in a peaceful way. However, the movement was unsure that other
components that were active in the February 20 movement would react in the same non-
violent way” (M. Salmi, personal interview, December 19, 2014).
 110 Protest and Mass Mobilization

of the most visible figures, such as Karim Tazi or Milou Chaabi. According to
some accounts, the latter lost up to one-third of his fortune due to administrative
and judicial restrictions initiated by the state in reaction to his political stance
(F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014).

Conclusion
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In summary, both the relative growth and the subsequent interruption of the
informational cascade in Morocco can be explained by a shift in the involvement of
intermediate actors. As was the case in Tunisia and Libya, the first demonstrations
organized in the country were characterized by the presence of a wide range of
institutional and non-institutional actors whose unexpected involvement with
the February 20 movement clearly demonstrated to the rest of the population the
universality of demands made by the pro-democracy activists. Union members,
local politicians, traditionally apolitical students from the middle class, local artists
and prominent businessmen involved in the early protests all fed mobilization by
legitimizing the demands made in the streets and helping demonstrations spread
to the rest of the population. However, the rapid concessions made by the King
and the start of a national referendum campaign relating to the new ambitious
constitutional reform spearheaded by the palace interrupted the dynamic forming
in February and March 2011. Convinced by the King’s seeming commitment to
political reform, these actors chose to end their participation and crucially broke
the momentum of the pro-democracy movement.
For Sara Bousta Soujar, the movement eventually failed because “of the absence
of strong political movements able to defend a social project clearly unifying the
elite and the rest of the population” (S. Bousta Soujar, personal interview, August
26, 2014). Bousta Soujar compared Morocco to Tunisia and noted that, unlike
the Tunisian case, the Moroccan pro-democracy movement was unable to benefit
from a common unified platform of demands. Similarly, another militant wished
that there were “more popular personalities able to influence the public opinion
and attract new supporters that would have joined the movement” (Y. Rguig,
December 10, 2014). In particular, actions taken by influential personalities could
have “nourished a more positive image of the movement while making it immune
to [the state’s] attempts to distort its image” (Y. Rguig, December 10, 2014).
For other militants, however, far from being a failure, the February 20
movement highlighted the limits of the King’s absolute power and forced the
palace to grant unprecedented concessions. Although the palace was ultimately
able to retain the upper hand, popular mobilization forced the King to hide his
prerogatives behind a new constitutional text, which provided important symbolic
concessions (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). While
the decrease in the King’s power is clear to Fouad Abdelmoumni, the danger is
that the reduction in the prerogatives of the palace is not occurring in favor of
genuine pro-democracy actors, but is actually empowering a range of clientelized
 Morocco’s Aborted Social Mobilization 111

and populist actors,23 and that genuinely liberal groups will be unable to regenerate
themselves (F. Abdelmoumni, personal interview, December 19, 2014). Given the
regular attempts by the palace to delegitimize all local actors with a strong identity
in order to remain the only valid political reference (F. Abdelmoumni, personal
interview, December 19, 2014), the fears of some of the country’s pro-democracy
activist may be warranted for the moment.
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23 Often linked to the bureaucracy, business and drug trafficking (F. Abdelmoumni,
personal interview, December 19, 2014).