111.

KATIGBAK V SOLICITOR GENERAL

FACTS:
The law RA 1379, “"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor” is assailed as
an an ex-post facto law that:

a. authorizes the confiscation of private property acquired prior to the approval of the law and obliges the
public official or employee to explain how he acquired his private property thereby compelling himself to
incriminate himself, and to a certain extent authorizes the confiscation of said property without due
process of law
b. And authorizes the confiscation of property previously mortgaged in good faith to a person.

There were two actions that led to the proceedings. First is the case instituted by spouses Katigbak praying: (1)
that the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under RA 1379;
(2) that the above law be declared unconstitutional as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its
approval; (3) that the properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the government service be
excluded from forfeiture proceedings and (4) that the NBI officers and Investigating Prosecutor be sentenced to pay
damages.
The second is the case instituted by the Republic of the Philippines vs the Katigbak spouses and their son
Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by
him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding
various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some
of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.

The cases were jointly tried. The trial court held that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the
enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; that with respect to things
acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; that Alejandro Katigbak may not be
deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. The Court of
appeals certified to the Court the same cases since the question involved is the constitutionality of RA 1379

ISSUE:

WON RA 1379 is an ex post facto law.

RULING:

Yes.
The nature of RA 1379 is penal. Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture
to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such ... and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ...
to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically
civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from
the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable thereto.”
 The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being
axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions
made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto
laws or bills of attainder.

112. GEORGE H. GANAWAY vs. J. W. QUILLEN, Warden of Bilibid Prison

FACTS:

The petitioner in this original action in habeas corpus asks that he be released from Bilibid Prison because of
imprisonment for debt in a civil cause growing out if a contract. The return of the Attorney-General alleges as the
reason for petitioner's incarceration in Bilibid Prison an order of the Hon. George R. Harvey, judge of First Instance
of the city of Manila, issued under authority of Chapter XVII of the code if Civil Procedures. As standing alone the
petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court on its motion, ordered before it the
record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey et al. vs. George H. Ganaway.
The complaint in the civil case last mentioned is grounded on a contract, and asks in effect for an accounting. That
this is true is shown by the phraseology of the complaint which repeatedly speaks of an agreement entered into by
the plaintiffs and the defendants, by Exhibit A, relating to the publication of a book named "Forbes' Memoirs," and
which describes itself as "this contract," by the receipt attached to Exhibit A, which mentions "the contract," and by
the order of the trial judge on demurrer which says that "the plaintiffs allege a contract with the defendant and a
breach of the contract by the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of non-imprisonment of debt was violated.

RULING:

The "debt" intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions
relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent the commitment for debtors to prison for liabilities
arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to conclude damages arising in actions ex
delicto, for the reason that the damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between
the parties, but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as a punishment
therefor, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. It is
clear that the action ending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in which Thomas Casey et al. are
plaintiffs and George H. Ganaway is the defendant, is one predicated on an obligation arising upon a contract.
Consequently, the imprisonment of the petitioner is in contravention of organic law. It is for us in the Philippine
Islands to let no obstacle interfere with a reasonable enforcement of the enlightened principle of free government
relating to imprisonment for debt. It may, however, be appropriate to remark that our holding need not be taken as
going to the extent of finding Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure invalid and should be understood as
limited to the facts before us and as circumscribed by the various exception to the constitutional prohibition.

This court has, heretofore, in a minute order, directed the discharge from imprisonment of the petitioner and this
decision is in explanation thereof. The minute order will therefore, stand as the authoritative adjudication of the
court.

113. THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDRO CARA

FACTS:

The defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered in this case by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
on October 19, 1916, in which he was found guilty, as principal by direct participation of the crime of estafa. The
complaint set forth that, on May 7, 1912, in the municipality of Santo Domingo of the Province of Nueva Ecija, the
defendant fraudulently and by means of the pretense, statement, and representation that he was the owner of, and
possessed, a certain tract of rice land, situated in said municipality, of 10 hectares in area, the metes and bounds
of which are mentioned in the complaint, did induce one Juana Juan to believe in said false pretense, statement,
and representation, for in fact he knew that he was not the owner of, and did not possess said land, and to buy
from him, as in fact she did, said land for the sum or P327, Philippine currency, and 60 cavanes of
rice (palay) which were paid by the said Juana Juan to the defendant, who received the said sum and appropriated
it to himself to the injury and prejudice of said Juana Juan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty of imprisonment arise from ex contractu or ex delictu.

RULING:

In the judgment appealed from the defendant was found guilty of the crime of estafa, not because Juana Juan
could not get possession of the land that he had offered as security for the payment of his debt, but because,
according to the facts proven at the trial, the defendant pretended to be the owner and possessor of the land, when
in fact such land did not exist, deceived said Juana Juan in order to obtain from her P327 and the 60 cavanes of
rice which were delivered to him by her, and to her prejudice, appropriated to himself said money and rice. These
acts defined in paragraph 1 of article 535 of the Penal Code, and punished in paragraph 2 of article 534 of the
same code, constitute the crime of estafa, as the court below so held. The later, therefore, did not err in not
acquitting the defendant and, in imposing upon him instead, the penalty corresponding to said crime in the medium
degree, since it was not found that its commission was attended by any circumstance modifying criminal liability.
114. SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG

FACTS:

Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife
Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her.

Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the
case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa
are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law.
Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-
payment of debt?

RULING:
Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to
her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money
and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her
promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore
in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the
"evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

115. AJENO V INSERTO

FACTS:

In a verified complaint dated October 25, 1975, complainant Ludovico Ajeno of Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo, charged
Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance, Iloilo City for ignorance of the law, particularly Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 1 and Article n, Section 13 of the 1973
Constitution 2 by sentencing complainant "to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor to
indemnify Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the cost of the suit." 3 Complainant claims that the indemnity of Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos is a civil liability
and to order his imprisonment for non-payment thereof is in violation of the constitutional provision that "no person
shall be imprisoned for debt." 4 He thus prays this Court to remove respondent Judge from office "for
incompetence and for lack of the highest degree of intellectual responsibility and integrity required of him by the
nature of his office 
Admitting his error, the respondent claimed that it was not his intention to oppress anyone, much less the
complainant, and that the error was due to oversight and honest belief that what the Constitution prohibits is
imprisonment for non-payment of debt arising from action ex-contractu but not damages arising from action ex-
delictu.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge can be administratively held liable for his error in imposing upon complainant
the subsidiary imprisonment of forty (40) days in case of his insolvency to pay the indemnity of P200.00 to the
offended party in the criminal case filed against him.

RULING:
The Supreme Court found no reliable evidence to show that the judicial acts complained of were ill-motivated,
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
Nevertheless, the Court admonished respondent to be more cautious in the application of the law to cases
submitted to him for decision with warning that a repetition of the same will be severely dealt with.