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(JP 3-06) Doctrine For Joint Urban Ops (Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense) (16 September 2002) PDF
(JP 3-06) Doctrine For Joint Urban Ops (Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense) (16 September 2002) PDF
Doctrine for
Joint Urban Operations
16 September 2002
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication addresses the planning and conduct of joint urban operations and explains
how they differ from other operations. It focuses on the operational level of war and addresses
issues across the range of military operations. It provides doctrinal guidance focused on
capabilities and tasks that are unique to, or significantly challenged by, the urban environment at
the operational level of warfighting. It does not attempt to replace or reiterate doctrine in
overlapping areas; instead, it examines the special considerations required when conducting
operations in the complex modern urban environment.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces
of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement
in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of
authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes
doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed
Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the
authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC
deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.
3. Application
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except
when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise
between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will
take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally
in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and
specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition)
military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States.
i
Preface
For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow
the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law,
regulations, and doctrine.
JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
ii JP 3-06
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS FOR PLANNING AND CONDUCTING JOINT URBAN
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONAL TASKS AND CONSIDERATIONS
iii
Table of Contents
CHAPTER IV
NONCOMBATANTS
CHAPTER V
INFRASTRUCTURE
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
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Table of Contents
v
Table of Contents
Intentionally Blank
vi JP 3-06
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
Introduction
Joint urban operations Rapid urbanization is changing the physical and political face of
(JUOs) are all joint nations. Demographic studies indicate a vast increase in the
operations planned and number and size of urban areas throughout the world; medium-
conducted across the sized towns have become large cities, and large cities have become
range of military the modern megalopolis. In many places, this rapid urbanization
operations on, or against has overburdened already weak infrastructure, scarce resources,
objectives within, a and fragile economic bases.
topographical complex
and its adjacent natural This population concentration has ensured that many future
terrain, where manmade military operations will be taking place in urban areas. US forces
construction or the density must be prepared to conduct effective joint urban operations
of noncombatants are the (JUOs) more than ever before.
dominant features.
All urban areas share Urban areas are complex, dynamic environments. However, three
three main interrelated distinguishing characteristics — an “urban triad” — can be
characteristics — a identified. The physical terrain of an urban area consists of
complex manmade three-dimensional surface areas; internal and external space of
physical terrain, a buildings and structures; subsurface areas; and the airspace above
population of significant the topographical complex. The noncombatant population is
size and density, and an characterized by the interaction of numerous political, economic,
infrastructure that and social activities. This population is, in turn, supported by the
supports the population urban area’s physical and service infrastructure.
and perhaps the region or
nation. Military operations in urban areas span the range of military
operations. Although these operations may vary considerably in
detail, they tend to share common characteristics, which provide
a number of operational lessons.
vii
Executive Summary
Battlespace includes the Urban operations span the levels of war. Urban areas may be
environment, factors, and strategic centers of gravity and will probably contain a number
conditions that must be of operational centers of gravity and decisive points. The nature
understood to complete of urban areas affects operational art.
the mission. In urban
battlespace, this includes Urban battlespace contains elements significantly more complex
manmade terrain, than those of many other operational areas. Understanding the
population, and urban battlespace calls for different ways of visualizing space
infrastructure. and time.
viii JP 3-06
Executive Summary
Fires may be used to isolate the urban area and, particularly with
precision munitions, to engage adversary targets within the urban
area. Noncombatant casualties and collateral damage have the
potential for adversely affecting operational objectives and thus
fires require careful planning and coordination.
ix
Executive Summary
Noncombatants
In urban operations, any The commander should consider two overall objectives regarding
action can have far- the civilian populace of an urban area: to minimize interference
reaching effects. Large with military operations, and to observe the necessary legal, moral,
numbers of and humanitarian obligations. This will likely require the
noncombatants will affect commander to take certain actions with regard to noncombatants,
military operations, and including protection, control, support, and influence. These
military operations will actions can be accomplished by a number of means such as
affect the lives of the information operations, populace and resources control, health
noncombatants. service and logistic support, civil-military operations, and foreign
humanitarian assistance.
Infrastructure
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Urban warfare, fighting in cities, war in ‘complex terrain.’ To the casual observer,
the words seem detached, almost pristine. However, the words are strikingly real
to military professionals who have seen the images of great destruction and
excessive casualties in cities such as Berlin, Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. Urban
warfare, a subject that many military professionals would prefer to avoid, is still
with us. Moreover, it may be the preferred approach of future opponents.”
1. General
a. US military operations, whether war or military operations other than war (MOOTW),
are inherently joint, and the last two decades of the 20th century show that military operations
will continue to occur with some frequency. Cities have played a strategic role in military
campaigns throughout history, from the Trojan War to the fall of Berlin and up to the present
day. Whether because of their geographic location, concentration of wealth and power, or symbolic
value, cities have been strategic objectives in most of history’s conflicts. Trends in world
demographics indicate a significant increase in the number and size of urban areas throughout
the world, ensuring that many future military operations will take place in urban environments.
In fact, that trend has already begun. US military operations in the 1990’s (such as Baghdad,
Khafji, Kuwait City, Monrovia, Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, and cities in Bosnia, Serbia, and
Kosovo) indicate the frequency with which joint US forces operate in urban areas. US experience
in these operations, and that of other military forces, shows that urban areas offer significant
operational challenges across the range of military operations, but particularly for combat. Further,
the great complexity of the urban environment requires military forces to pay particular attention
to the unique and demanding requirements of operations in those areas. It is therefore imperative
that commanders and staffs understand those requirements and consider them in the planning
and conduct of operations in the urban environment.
b. Joint urban operations (JUOs) are defined as all joint operations planned and
conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives within, a
topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where manmade construction or
the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. This definition is similar to that of
military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), which is used by the Army and Marine Corps,
but MOUT has strong connotations of urban ground combat at the tactical level. The term “joint
urban operations,” on the other hand, connotes an operational-level approach that considers the
use of joint forces across the range of military operations.
• JUOs take place in an environment influenced by complex natural and manmade terrain.
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Chapter I
• JUOs are also heavily influenced by populations of significant size and density and by
an infrastructure on which that population depends.
• A joint force commander (JFC) may conduct JUOs either as a major operation or as part
of a campaign.
• JUOs may include almost any type of military operation, singly or in combination.
• JUOs can be conducted across the range of military operations (war and MOOTW) and
will require the synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power
(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve strategic and operational
objectives.
a. General
• Urban areas present the most complex physical terrain that exists. This physical terrain
consists of manmade structures of varying types, sizes, materials, and construction
arranged sometimes orderly and sometimes randomly. Urban areas are frequently defined
according to size, from villages of fewer than 3,000 inhabitants to large cities with
populations of over 100,000. But large cities vary enormously in size, ranging in
population from 100,000 to over 20,000,000 and in area from several to hundreds of
square miles. Cities vary in ways other than size: a city may be the only large urban area
in a nation or one of many; its physical layout may be orderly or chaotic; it may be
modern or built around an ancient core; it may contain towering buildings or none over
three stories. A city will certainly have a significant influence beyond its boundaries on
the region or even the nation in which it exists.
• All urban areas, though, share three main characteristics, an urban triad, that are generally
so intertwined as to be virtually inseparable.
•• A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade
and natural terrain.
•• An infrastructure upon which the area depends may also occupy manmade terrain
and provides human services and cultural and political structure for the urban area and
often beyond, perhaps for the entire nation.
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Introduction
• These three characteristics interact to make each urban area a complex and dynamic
system of systems, with a unique physical, political, economic, social, and cultural
identity. Considered in isolation from the other elements of the urban triad, the physical
terrain of urban areas presents significant challenges to military operations. However,
physical terrain, both natural and manmade, is only the foundation upon which the
population and infrastructure of the urban area are superimposed. Rather than terrain
considerations, it is the impact of military operations on the urban population and vice
versa that fundamentally distinguishes JUOs.
b. Physical Terrain
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Chapter I
metal shops to petro-chemical plants. They may be closely packed where land space is
at a premium or spread out for miles. The infinite ways in which these features can be
combined make it necessary to approach each urban area as a unique problem.
•• Airspace. The area above the ground usable by aircraft and aerial munitions. In
urban areas, airspace is broken up at low levels by manmade structures of different
heights and densities in addition to the irregularities in natural terrain. This produces an
“urban canyon” effect that can adversely impact operations.
•• Surface Areas. Exterior ground level areas of streets and roads, parks and fields,
and any other exterior space. These surface areas follow the natural terrain and are
themselves broken up by manmade features.
•• Supersurface Areas. The roofs and upper floors of buildings, stadiums, towers, or
other structures that can be used for movement, maneuver, firing positions, or other
advantage.
•• Subsurface Areas. Areas below ground level that consist of sewer and drainage
systems, subway tunnels, utility corridors, or other subterranean spaces. These areas
can be used for cover and concealment, movement, and engagement, but their use requires
intimate knowledge of the area.
• Equally important are considerations of exterior and interior space: what is visible
from outside buildings or subsurface areas, and the significant range of people,
infrastructure, and activity that occurs unseen in the interior of those structures.
Understanding the full physical nature of an urban area requires a multidimensional
approach, with an appropriate awareness of the lateral, horizontal and vertical, and interior
and external nature of the city. Figure I-1 illustrates the types of space found in urban
terrain.
c. Population
• The primary difference between urban areas and other environments is the large numbers
and density of noncombatants. The concentration of noncombatants has its own
demographic characteristics: population density, neighborhoods and their make-up,
ethnicity, race, age considerations, the daily movement in and around the city, and a host
I-4 JP 3-06
Introduction
URBAN TERRAIN
Supersurface
Airspace
Airspace
Interior
Exterior
Surface Surface
Subsurface
of other considerations tied to the nature and behavior of the populace. Other socio-
cultural characteristics may include religion, political leanings and activity, economics,
clan or tribal affiliation, criminal organizations and activities, and class divisions.
• Understanding the population of an urban area entails knowledge of its size, location
and density, and composition. These elements may be examined in terms of the city as
a whole, but complete understanding will only come by examining those same elements
for each geographical area and each demographic group within the urban area.
d. Infrastructure
• Urban areas will contain varying degrees of physical infrastructure. This infrastructure
will at a minimum include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings,
hospitals, schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities.
The infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be highly complex and sophisticated.
For example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets;
in another city it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large
highways, subways, and other modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a
city would be the transportation hub for the region in which it is located — if not the
entire nation.
I-5
Chapter I
a. Historical Characteristics. Military thinkers and planners have long been aware of the
pitfalls of fighting in urban areas. As early as circa 500 B.C., Sun Tzu advised that “the worst
policy is to attack cities,” and that advice has been echoed in military writings and doctrine to
this day. However, despite that sensible advice, wars have been fought in cities repeatedly
throughout the centuries, from the sack of Troy to the battles of Grozny. The control of political,
industrial, commercial, transportation, and communication centers may decisively affect the
outcome of battles, campaigns, and wars, and urban battle has become particularly common in
the 20th century. The “total” wars of the first half of the century saw war being waged on whole
cities — physical terrain, populations, and infrastructure. Revolutionary insurgencies have
frequently found cities to be fertile ground for action. Technological advances, particularly in
I-6 JP 3-06
Introduction
aviation, have made it possible to take war to the cities in a more precise manner with significantly
fewer combatant and noncombatant casualties and less collateral damage. Cities themselves
have increased in number, size, and strategic importance, and with urbanization has come an
increase in military operations that fall short of full-scale war. This late 20th century increase in
MOOTW in urban areas has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the constraints
placed upon military forces conducting these operations.
• Since the beginning of World War II, military operations in urban areas have run the full
operational gamut: full-scale ground combat with huge numbers of casualties (Stalingrad,
Manila, Seoul); aerial carpet bombing producing hundreds of thousands of casualties in
a single day (Dresden and Tokyo); civil war (Beirut, Monrovia); revolution (Managua,
Budapest); precision bombing (Baghdad, Belgrade); counterterrorism (Belfast);
noncombatant evacuation (Monrovia); peacekeeping (Sarajevo); foreign humanitarian
assistance (FHA) (Mogadishu); nation-building (Port-au-Prince); and others. Figure
I-2 compares urban operations with those in other environments.
• Although these urban operations vary greatly in detail, they share a number of common
characteristics.
•• Cities reduce the advantages of the technologically superior force. The physical
terrain of cities tends to reduce line of sight (LOS) and the ability to observe fires, inhibits
command, control, and communications capability, makes aviation operations more difficult,
and decreases the effectiveness of naval surface fire support and indirect fire support. It also
degrades logistics, and often reduces ground operations to the level of small unit combat. In
Figure I-2. Comparison of Operations in Urban Areas and Other Types of Environments
I-7
Chapter I
addition, the constraints imposed by a need to minimize civilian casualties and preserve infrastructure
further reduce technological advantage. During the 1968 battle for Hue, US forces had a
distinct technological advantage yet were unable to bring the full weight of that advantage to
bear on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the city. The result was a drawn out street
battle that was won only at a high cost.
•• Ground operations become manpower intensive. While the mission often requires
the military force to control the vast horizontal and vertical spaces of a city, it also
frequently includes the need for additional personnel to feed and succor its civilian
population and protect or restore its infrastructure. In combat operations the need to
secure cities building by building, room by room, requires large numbers of infantry.
The 1942-43 battle for Stalingrad resulted in the loss of the entire German 6th Army,
with 200,000 killed and wounded and 100,000 taken prisoner. Soviet losses were higher
(over 700,000).
“Fighting in a city is much more involved than fighting in the field. Here the ‘big
chiefs’ have practically no influence on the officers and squad leaders commanding
the units and subunits.”
General Chuikov, During the Battle for Stalingrad, Aug 1942 – Feb 1943
I-8 JP 3-06
Introduction
•• Physical terrain changes weapons and munitions effects. Targets are easily masked
by structures. The composition of buildings and surrounding structures changes weapons
effects. In urban battles from World War II to Lebanon, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and
anti-aircraft weapons have proven more valuable in a direct fire role against structures
than in their primary roles.
•• Logistic support requirements are different and often more demanding in urban
areas. Urban operations result in a significant increase in ammunition expenditure,
need for personnel replacements, medical personnel and supplies, casualty evacuation,
and food and water. Vehicles often cannot be evacuated for maintenance. Clothing and
equipment are damaged at higher rates. During the 1978 siege of Beirut, Syrian forces
required up to 120 truckloads of artillery ammunition per day.
I-9
Chapter I
• The human dimension of the urban environment is important and has the potential for
affecting the conduct of urban operations.
• Although there will be many circumstances under which JUOs may be undertaken,
while planning campaigns and major operations the JFC must consider whether JUOs
are required to accomplish operational and strategic objectives.
• As with other military operations, tactical objectives in urban operations should be directly
linked to strategic and operational objectives.
• Despite its many disadvantages, ground combat may be the most effective and efficient
way for a commander conducting JUOs to accomplish operational or strategic objectives.
• Isolation of an urban defender affords the attacker a significant, often decisive advantage.
• Urban ground operations, although infantry intensive, require effective combined arms
integration at all levels.
• The requirements to protect and/or aid noncombatants and to preserve and/or restore
infrastructure can prove to be highly significant constraints in urban operations.
• Operations in urban areas will be conducted under increased visibility of the media.
• Nonlethal weapons and chemical control agents may have greater utility in urban
operations.
• Logistic support requirements for military urban operations are different and often more
demanding than those for non-urban operations.
I-10 JP 3-06
CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS FOR PLANNING AND CONDUCTING
JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS
“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced
refugees — providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be
holding two warring tribes apart — conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally,
they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all
within three city blocks. It will be called the three-block war.”
1. General
a. Planning for JUOs generally follows the same basic process as planning for other
operations. However, the challenges inherent in urban operations are sufficiently different and
complex to require that commanders and planners give due consideration to urban requirements.
c. Prior to the conduct of JUOs, the joint force can significantly enhance its capabilities and
competencies through a program of professional education, training exercises, modeling and
simulations, and rehearsals. The focus of this effort should be on urban situational awareness;
general knowledge and understanding of urban areas; cultural awareness; understanding of the
nature of urban combat; and tactics, techniques, and procedures of urban combat.
a. General. Urban operations span all levels of war. Events at the tactical level may (because
of media coverage, effects on noncombatants, or other reasons) have significant ramifications at
the operational or even strategic levels. Often, the decision whether or not to undertake urban
operations is itself a strategic one, taken to control, dominate, or otherwise accomplish objectives
and desired effects in a strategically significant area. Such a decision may also occur at the
operational level of war, as part of a campaign plan. In any case, as recent history indicates,
urban operations will likely have implications at all levels of warfare — strategic, operational,
and tactical.
• Urban areas may be strategic centers of gravity (COGs), and as such will be significant
strategically, operationally, and tactically. Major urban areas are frequently the locations
for the airports, harbors, and major road junctions vital for the sustainment of a campaign.
Major urban areas also house the centers of government, communications, and culture.
II-1
Chapter II
The opening phases of the German offensive were very successful: German
forces — the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army — entered the outskirts of
Stalingrad in late August 1942. By late September, after a month of intense
fighting, the Germans possessed 90 percent of the city. The Soviet 62nd
Army’s defense was reduced to a front only a few hundred meters deep and
a couple of kilometers long on the banks of the Volga. The Soviet defense
hinged on fortress-like concrete industrial buildings and the fanatical bravery
and tenacity of Soviet soldiers and civilians fighting within the remnants of
the city. Regiments and divisions fought for a few square blocks or even
single factories. Some were swallowed whole by the intense fighting,
suffering nearly 100% casualties. Beginning in mid-September the Soviet
command began looking at how to convert the defense of Stalingrad into an
operational opportunity. Throughout October and November, the 62nd Army
held on to its toehold in Stalingrad.
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Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
were even more devastating to the Germans: the drive toward the Caucasus
was halted and the oil fields given up; German armies to the south withdrew
northward to resist the Soviet offensive; Hitler made major changes in his
General Staff and distanced himself from his military leadership; and the
confidence of the German Army and the German people was shaken.
JFCs must carefully consider the full implications of urban operations on their strategic
responsibilities. They must determine whether an urban area itself is a COG or whether
any strategic and operational COGs are located within that urban area. Once JFCs
identify the COGs, they must decide how the military power at their disposal can be
applied in the most effective manner.
• Because strategy is the basis for all operations, decisions whether to initiate urban
operations are linked to national or theater strategic objectives.
• At the operational level, commanders plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major
operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.
A JFC may conduct JUOs either as a major operation or as part of a campaign. The
requirements and nature of urban operations will make unified action more difficult and
complex, influence the organization and capabilities of forces and functions, and present
the JFC with significant challenges in the practice of operational art.
• Because of their physical and human complexity, urban operations tend to be extremely
demanding in terms of time, manpower, and certain types of information, equipment,
and supplies. The synchronization and integration of time, space, and purpose within
the theater or joint operations area (JOA) thus becomes more difficult. Commanders
must carefully analyze urban areas in relation to the overall campaign and determine
how best to synchronize and integrate operations and prevent urban areas from disrupting
the tempo of operations or diverting attention from the accomplishment of higher priority
operational objectives.
d. Operational Art in JUOs. With proper application of operational art, a JFC can
successfully conduct urban operations, even in situations where an adversary has been able to
use the urban environment to achieve a temporary asymmetrical advantage. Such a temporary
II-3
Chapter II
advantage can still have lasting strategic effects. Commanders can mitigate this situation by an
appropriate use of operational art as applied to the urban environment. In addition, since
asymmetric advantages are not exclusively the domain of the adversary, commanders should
employ friendly asymmetric advantages to fully leverage joint force capabilities.
In Hue, for example, the North Vietnamese Army took advantage of US and
South Vietnamese reluctance to bombard a place of national cultural
importance inhabited by a friendly population. When the heavy ground
fighting made it necessary to use air and artillery against targets within the
city, all carried out under the lens of the news cameras, the US tactical victory
of Hue became part of the strategic defeat resulting from the Tet offensive.
• Synergy becomes more complicated, requiring the synchronization and integration not
only of military forces both inside and outside the urban area, but also of civilian agencies
and organizations both local and international.
• The reduced speed of urban operations, the presence of noncombatants, and the
constriction of the urban battlespace affect simultaneity and depth. Simultaneity will
mean not only the conduct of combat operations against an adversary, but also the
simultaneous conduct of FHA and other actions within the battlespace. Depth in urban
operations can extend outside the actual urban area or be measured in a matter of city
blocks.
• Balance is more difficult to achieve, and may require combining forces and capabilities
in ways outside the normal organization of forces.
• Urban areas can affect the ways in which leverage is achieved. US forces frequently
use technological superiority to achieve leverage. However, the advantages afforded
by technological superiority may not be as significant in urban combat as in other types
of operations. Activities such as information operations (IO) and civil-military operations
(CMO) can provide a force with greater leverage in JUOs.
• Timing and tempo are potentially the factors most affected by urban operations. Slowing
down the pace of operations and buying time are often priorities of the urban defender.
More time may lead to more casualties and a greater chance of an intervening event
influencing strategic objectives. The JFC must recognize that the speed of urban
operations, particularly ground operations, will probably be slower than that of other
operations, but the operational tempo may be very high. The JFC must still achieve a
synchronization and integration of timing and tempo that leaves the opponent unable to
II-4 JP 3-06
Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
act effectively. The tempo with which the commander can react to events, take action,
and maneuver the force is key to success in urban operations.
• Operational reach and approach are often significant aspects of urban operations.
Urban operations may be conducted initially for the seizure of lodgments (e.g., ports,
airfields, and railheads) that facilitate future operations; they may also be conducted to
secure lines of communications (LOCs) that extend the operational reach of the force.
In either case, the urban area must be within the operational reach of the joint force, and
the extent of that reach will be affected by the demands of the urban operations to be
conducted. The approach may be direct, either through secure points of debarkation or
forcible entry, or indirect, by the seizure of terrain from which urban operations can be
undertaken. Once urban operations commence, operational reach may be foreshortened
and approach significantly affected by the nature of the urban area.
• Forces and functions provide the greatest dilemmas for the JFC, who must defeat
adversary forces without causing unacceptable noncombatant suffering and must destroy
or disrupt adversary functions that may be deeply intertwined in the area’s infrastructure.
To this end, the ability to take precise action is critical, whether that entails fires using
precision munitions, direct action against very specific targets, use of nonlethals against
selected infrastructure, or some other type of action.
• JFCs must determine the best arrangement of major operations, including JUOs, to
achieve dimensional superiority. This arrangement will often be a combination of
simultaneous and sequential operations to dominate and achieve the desired end state
conditions. Commanders consider such factors as geography of the operational area,
logistic buildup and consumption rates, adversary reinforcement capabilities, and public
opinion. These factors are often intensified in urban operations and, along with the
urban triad, can significantly affect considerations for arrangement.
• Operational COGs within the urban area may be physical or psychological. They may
be adversary forces and capabilities, key infrastructure, the civilian population, or aspects
of each. The JFC must use knowledge and understanding of both the adversary and the
urban area to identify and then destroy or neutralize them. The JFC must also anticipate
and influence those events that may affect friendly COGs, such as public opinion.
• To the extent possible, commanders attack adversary COGs directly. The JFC conducts
direct attacks on COGs using symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to exploit friendly
strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future
operations. However, adversary COGs will frequently be well protected, making direct
attack difficult and costly. This situation may require indirect attacks until conditions
are established that permit successful direct attacks, and technological or psychological
means may be preferred. In considering whether to opt for direct or indirect attack of
COGs, the JFC needs to understand the nature of the COG and its relation to the urban
area.
II-5
Chapter II
• Decisive points (DPs) may be geographical, but are not necessarily traditional military
terrain features, particularly in urban operations. They are not COGs; they are the keys
to attacking protected COGs. They may be key cultural or political locations or locations
for key infrastructure. They may also be psychological, such as the co-opting of a key
tribal leader in order to undermine the influence of the main adversary leader or the
molding of public opinion in friendly favor.
• Urban areas have their own underlying political, cultural, and religious forces that can
affect conditions for termination. Particularly in urban operations, termination requires
an orderly transition to civilian control, either local or otherwise, and such considerations
as FHA and restoration of services will influence the nature and timing of that transition.
3. Urban Battlespace
a. General
• Battlespace is defined as “the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood
to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This
includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities;
weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within
the operational areas and areas of interest.” Urban battlespace includes the above
factors, but focuses on the urban triad of complex manmade physical terrain,
population, and infrastructure.
• The concept of battlespace gives commanders a vehicle for expanding their thinking in
order to develop a vision for dominating the adversary and operational area. Battlespace
extends outside the urban area of operations and includes the urban triad and all friendly
combat power and support that can be brought to bear, and the dimensions of military
operations such as time, tempo, depth, synchronization, and integration.
• Understanding the urban battlespace allows commanders to develop their options, protect
and sustain their forces, and achieve unity of effort by synchronizing and integrating the
full power at their disposal. It allows them to visualize the relationship of friendly forces
to the adversary and the area in terms of time, space, and resources.
• In the context of JUOs and the joint definition of battlespace, urban battlespace
includes the urban triad. The urban physical terrain adds new supersurface and
subsurface dimensions to the normal ones of surface and air and significantly affects
II-6 JP 3-06
Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
Near the end of 1994, Russia’s Yeltsin Administration, faced with the
continuing dissolution of the Soviet empire, committed military forces to
restore the Russian Federation’s authority throughout the Caucasus region.
The Russians originally thought the operation would be a simple
demonstration of force in the capital city of Grozny that would rapidly
culminate with the collapse of the “rebel” government. This show of force
quickly evolved into a military campaign that eventually ended in total failure.
Russian commanders may well have avoided this failure, however, had they
correctly understood and shaped the battlespace within their theater of
operations. Instead, they believed the erroneous assumptions generated at
the strategic level and subsequently directed a woefully inadequate effort to
understand the battlespace in all its complexity. This disregard for intelligence
adversely affected virtually every other warfighting function at the operational
level. On the other hand, the Chechen rebels made extensive use of their
familiarity with the region and their own first-hand knowledge of the strengths
and weaknesses of the Russian Army to the fullest advantage.
force capabilities. The civilian population forms perhaps the most significant part of the
urban battlespace, since most actions taken will have a noticeable effect on noncombatants
and may require a diversion of resources. Some adversary personnel may pose as
noncombatants and easily move from one group to the other. Infrastructure will influence
both the types of action taken and the synchronization and integration of those actions.
All will affect the commander’s own forces and functions.
• The type of threat present in a particular urban area may vary. The threat may consist of
a conventional hostile military force, an unconventional militia or guerilla force such as
those found in Beirut or Mogadishu, terrorists, criminal organizations or gangs, an
opposing political group, or a phenomenal threat such as a force of nature, hunger, or
disease. Friendly forces conducting JUOs may encounter these threats in isolation, but
the nature of urban areas makes it increasingly likely that these threats will be found in
combination. Combat operations may lead to hunger and disease in the civilian population;
natural disaster may produce enough instability to encourage action by guerillas or militia
groups; destruction of infrastructure may lead to increased criminal activity. In any
case, the existing and potential threats must overlay the characteristics of the urban area
in the commander’s thinking concerning the urban battlespace.
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• Understanding the urban battlespace is a prerequisite to shaping it, and both are crucial
for the conduct of urban operations.
a. General
• All campaigns strive for unity of effort among air, land, sea, space, and special operations
forces. Additionally, they serve to coordinate and focus the activities of all participating
agencies, allied and US Government (USG) departments and coalition forces, and
international organizations and NGOs. A campaign plan describes the commander’s
intent and arrangement of major operations to achieve strategic and operational objectives
that will lead to success. As with any other type of operation, there is no single prescription
for success in urban operations, but there are recurring themes which can serve as an
overall framework for applying the principles of war.
• A framework for planning and conducting urban operations is provided by the activities
of “understand,” “shape,” “engage,” “consolidate,” and “transition.” Although
discussed sequentially, they function together in an interdependent, continuous, and
simultaneous cycle. Understanding is continuous, and while shaping, engagement,
consolidation, and transition may be considered as sequential, these activities are strongly
interrelated, with the joint force potentially conducting several activities at the same
time. Depending on the specific contingency, some activities may take on greater or
lesser significance. This framework also illustrates how a JFC might arrange operations
through phasing. Phases may be sequential or concurrent, they may overlap, and the
point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute
terms. So it is with the concept for JUOs. In some cases, all five phases may not be
required. In others, activities of the concept may have to be conducted more than once,
in different parts of the urban area, and at different times.
b. Understand
• Understanding is continuous. The JFC evaluates the urban battlespace, including the
urban triad and the threat, to determine the implications for military operations. This
evaluation extends from complex terrain considerations to the even more complex impact
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Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
of the sheer number of actors operating in an urban battlespace. On one hand there may
be adversary military troops, criminal gangs, vigilantes, and paramilitary factions
operating among the noncombatant population. On the other hand, especially in MOOTW,
the situation may be further complicated by the presence of nonmilitary government
departments and agencies, to include intelligence, law enforcement, and other specialized
entities. Crucial to planning urban operations is the understanding gained by both
intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and mission analysis.
For additional information, see Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.
• IPB for JUO will involve numerous agencies, some of which are not only external to
the Department of Defense (DOD) but the USG well. Joint forces must have the technical
capability and the operational acumen to use multi-source information and intelligence
fusion, rapid analysis, and dissemination down to the lowest level in the command chain.
Before and during hostilities within the theater, ground, airborne, maritime, and space-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets may bridge the
information gap often present in an enclosed and quickly changing environment such as
urban terrain. Key to understanding the urban area is understanding the urban triad.
IPB must particularly consider the impact of the noncombatants, whose presence in the
urban area may be substantial and dynamic. Determining the ethnic and religious
composition of the population and, if possible, their intent (for example, to flee or remain
in the urban areas) may prove crucial. Human behavior is difficult to control on a mass
scale; to do so with persons of a different culture under the strains of conflict can be
nearly impossible. The availability of highly trained individuals who understand the
culture and the language will prove indispensable to commanders at all levels in sorting
out combatants and noncombatants. These intelligence needs in an urban setting highlight
the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT).
• During mission analysis, commanders and staffs review their organization and available
assets. The complexities and demands of urban operations will likely require a complete
understanding of the friendly situation. JUOs require unique unit combinations; larger
numbers of certain types of assets, units, and equipment; and a specific level/type of unit
training. The JFC should accurately determine the capabilities of friendly forces, to
include units’ proficiency in urban operations and the availability of specialized
equipment. Through all phases of the joint campaign, the JFC and staff should consider
the following questions as a minimum.
•• What operational objectives must be achieved in urban areas to support the overall
campaign plan?
•• What activities and events, and sequencing of these events, are needed to achieve
operational objectives?
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•• What resources and application of resources are required to bring about and sustain
these activities and events?
•• What degree, if any, of political and/or military control of the urban area is necessary?
•• Should the joint force encourage noncombatants to leave the city, or to remain behind?
If the noncombatants leave, planning should include designated evacuation routes that
will not interfere with joint operations. If they remain behind, efforts should be made to
ensure that they are persuaded to at least remain neutral. Basic emergency services
should be planned for those noncombatants under the JFC’s control.
c. Shape
• Shaping includes all actions that the JFC takes to seize the initiative and set the conditions
for decisive operations to begin. The JFC shapes the battlespace to best suit operational
objectives by exerting appropriate influence on adversary forces, friendly forces, the
information environment, and particularly the elements of the urban triad. Methods of
shaping may include the following.
•• The phased deployment and employment of joint forces. Rather than deploying
combat forces initially, the JFC may, in many cases, need to deploy non-combat forces
early, such as civil affairs (CA), public affairs (PA), medical support, and psychological
operations (PSYOP) units.
•• The use of fires to create conditions favorable for operational movement and maneuver.
•• The use of operational movement and maneuver to create conditions favorable for
employing fires.
•• Conducting operational movement and maneuver to set forces in place for decisive
operations to begin. Depending on the forces used, operational movement and maneuver
may be dependent on the availability of strategic transportation (e.g., intertheater airlift
and sealift) and the availability of ports of debarkation. Depending on the situation and
objectives, operational movement and maneuver may require forcible entry, which could
include conducting urban operations.
•• Establishing and operating the ISR architecture in support of the JFC’s mission. Special
emphasis should be given to joint forces whose mission, equipment, training, and organization
are focused to conduct shaping operations. The JFC’s ISR system must be in place and able
to support subsequent missions.
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Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
• Critical to shaping operations is the isolation of the urban area to support the campaign.
Shaping operations can lead to physical, informational, and moral isolation and have a
major effect on the ultimate success of JUOs. At the operational level, isolate means
cutting the adversary off from the functions necessary to be effective. Isolation has both
an external aspect of cutting off outside support and information and an internal aspect
of cutting off mutual support. Isolating the adversary also includes precluding any retreat.
•• The physical isolation of a large urban area clearly has ground, air, space, and likely
naval implications for the identification and control of the movement of personnel and
equipment. The capabilities provided by space-based command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
support systems may also be used to isolate urban areas.
•• While physical isolation is very difficult, this is only one aspect of a larger issue. The
JFC may also isolate the urban area in terms of information. The JFC should have the
capability to achieve and sustain information superiority over adversaries and potential
adversaries. As quickly as possible, and to the maximum extent possible, information
going into and out of the urban area should be under the control of the JFC. The joint
force may not only cut off internal and external adversary communications, but may
also control indigenous radio, television, and other media. IO are critical to isolation
and shaping. To control the information flow into and out of an urban area is to separate
the adversary C2 system from its operational and strategic leadership. Informational
isolation also can prevent the adversary from communicating with the civil population
through television, radio, telephone, and computer systems. The overall result is to
prevent adversary unity of effort within the urban area.
•• Moral isolation is a function of both physical actions and IO and can both deny the
adversary political and military allies and separate the political leadership from the civil
populace. The presence of legitimate international news organizations places special
importance on the JFC’s PA operations. The JFC’s goals are thus to physically and
psychologically isolate the adversary force and to ensure that the noncombatants in the
area receive the JFC’s messages and reject any messages from the adversary force.
• Precision effects can enable joint forces to deny the adversary the protection that may be
gained from the urban environment. These fires must provide reasonable certainty of
achieving the desired effect on the adversary, but with reduced risk of injury to
noncombatants and collateral damage. Every attempt must be made to reduce the
likelihood of fratricide. Operational fires and maneuver outside the urban area can deny
the flow of reinforcement and supplies necessary to wage a protracted defense within
the urban area. The JFC employs these capabilities early in order to shape the battlespace
by expanding friendly freedom of action and degrading adversary capabilities.
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d. Engage
• To engage, the JFC brings the full dimensional capabilities of the force to bear in order
to accomplish operational objectives. Engagement can range from full combat in
war to FHA and logistic support for disaster relief operations. It consists of those
actions taken by the JFC against a hostile force, a political situation, or a natural or
humanitarian predicament that will most directly accomplish the mission. In all cases,
the speed and precision with which the JFC engages will largely determine any degree
of success.
e. Consolidate. In war and MOOTW, the focus of consolidation is not just on protecting
what has been gained, but also retaining the initiative to disorganize the adversary in depth. This
calls for an ongoing process of organizing and strengthening the joint force position with respect
to the city, combined with controlling the adversary within it, when required. Consolidation also
requires activities geared at neutralizing bypassed adversary forces and processing adversary
prisoners. Consolidation may place heavy emphasis on logistic support and CMO. The nature
of the urban triad ensures that the JFC will have to contend with issues concerning physical
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Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
damage, noncombatants, and infrastructure as part of consolidation. CMO and PSYOP units may
continue to be especially critical in this aspect, as well as engineering efforts ranging from destruction to
repairs to new construction. Equally important are the expected issues of infrastructure collapse and the
tasks of FHA and disaster relief.
f. Transition. In general, the end state of JUOs is the termination of operations after strategic
and operational objectives have been achieved. This may include the transfer of routine
responsibilities over the urban area from military to civilian authorities, another military force,
or regional or international organizations. Transition planning is an integral part of operational
planning and mission analysis. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent.
Combat forces are redeployed for follow-on tasks and the JFC shifts support priorities toward
accomplishment of CMO. In JUOs, transition may occur in one part of an urban area while
engagement still is going on in another. In MOOTW, quick and efficient transition may be a
critical mission objective, and thus a fundamental goal is setting the conditions for transition. In
all operations, it is essential that routine activities such as providing sanitary services, food, law
enforcement, and health services be returned to civilian agencies as quickly as possible because
of the demand they can place on joint force resources. An exit strategy is usually thought of in
terms of military redeployment. However, until the local authorities have established a relatively
safe and secure environment, law enforcement unit, a judicial presence, and a recognized and
functioning governmental office with oversight of civilian reconstruction efforts, US capabilities
(both military and nonmilitary) may continue to be required.
Planning had been conducted for such a contingency for some time.
Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander of the Joint Task Force, had identified
the critical nodes for the operation beforehand, targeting Panamanian Defense
Force (PDF) strongholds, including garrisons, airports, ports, transportation
centers, and media locations. Also, units had been quietly sent to bases
throughout Panama, augmented by Spanish-speaking personnel with Panama
experience. On 20 December 1989, five task forces simultaneously attacked
twenty-seven major targets and gained operational control in and around
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Panama City. Every major PDF installation along the Panama City to Colón
north-south axis and along the Fort Cimarron to Rio Hato east-west axis was
either hit directly or PDF forces were blocked at these points from moving
into Panama City. Task Force Bayonet, the major fighting force in Panama
City, captured and neutralized La Comandancia — Noriega’s headquarters
and the PDF’s largest weapons cache. With La Comandancia in US hands
and reinforcement routes blocked, the possibility of organized resistance by
the PDF collapsed.
a. General. Urban operations can take place across the entire range of military operations,
from war to the most benign FHA operation. The activities making up the concept of urban
operations remain viable across that range and have the strong potential for simultaneity — a
single JUO may involve both war and MOOTW missions concurrently.
b. Urban Operations in War. Urban operations in war also cover a spectrum of possible
actions. Ground combat — either offensive with the purpose of securing an urban area and
destroying the adversary defending it, or defensive with the objective to deny the urban area to
the adversary — is the most difficult and costly type of military urban operation. All those
aspects of urban ground combat that have historically extracted a terrible price on attacker,
defender, and noncombatant alike remain present today, multiplied by the increased size and
complexity of urban areas and increase in the number of inhabitants. However, other types of
operations exist in war that may accomplish strategic and operational objectives without ground
offensive combat. Aviation assets can destroy and disrupt adversary forces and functions and
the infrastructure on which they depend. Special operations can accomplish similar missions.
Application of IO can lessen popular support for its leaders. If ground combat operations are
necessary, appropriate shaping of the battlespace, identification of COGs, and application of
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Fundamentals for Planning and Conducting Joint Urban Operations
force may prevent full-scale urban combat. It is important that the commander consider forces and
functions in unusual combinations and relations when planning urban operations, befitting the nature of
the urban battlespace.
d. Multiple Operations. The nature of modern urban operations often requires different
types of operations to occur simultaneously or in rapid sequence, sometimes in close proximity.
Referred to as multiple operations, a situation can easily arise where members of the same
friendly unit may at one moment be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, at the next holding
two warring tribes apart, and the next fighting a highly lethal battle — all within the same urban
area. In a larger context, the joint force may have to conduct FHA and other operations at the
same time and in the same area where combat operations are taking place. Such action may not
wait for consolidation and transition, but may be an integral part of the overall urban operation
synchronized and integrated with all other facets. Urban combat will bring with it requirements
normally associated with non-combat MOOTW; operations directed toward non-combat
MOOTW may very well entail urban combat.
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OPERATIONAL TASKS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Clausewitz
b. JUOs may occur within the context of a larger campaign. A single JUO may also consist
of a focused urban operation taking place entirely in a single urban area and its immediate
surroundings. The JFC will need to determine whether or not urban operations are essential for
the conduct of the campaign and, if so, where and when to conduct JUOs. A number of strategic
and operational considerations and requirements may determine whether or not JUOs are
necessary:
• An opposing military force must be destroyed, and that force chooses to position itself
in an urban area.
• An urban area may have infrastructure or capabilities that have strategic or operational
value, and these critical features must be seized.
• The geographical location of an urban area may cause it to dominate a region or avenue
of approach.
• The political and cultural significance of the urban area may be such that it is itself a
strategic COG.
c. When faced with the prospect of JUOs, the JFC should carefully consider whether or not
the means are available to conduct the operation successfully considering the demands of urban
operations. As outlined in Figure III-1, the JFC should consider force strength, force types,
required munitions and equipment, potential casualties, the effects of time and momentum, the
potential for collateral damage, the prospects of escalation, and alternative courses of action
(COAs). These alternatives might include seizure or construction of alternate facilities (such as
port or airfield) or bypassing and isolating the urban area rather than entering it.
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Chapter III
Can the Joint Force Accomplish the Necessary Operational Objectives with
the Means and Time Available?
d. The commander must set the conditions and accomplish certain tasks. These include the
appropriate application of the concept for urban operations; collection of information and resulting
understanding; isolating the urban area; tempo of operations; thorough understanding of
operational objectives; the avoidance of “template” planning and predictability; accurate
situational awareness; taking advantage of local expertise; and the use of disciplined troops,
with applicable skills gained through realistic urban training and experience. Figure III-2 details
some of the keys to minimizing the human and material cost of urban combat operations.
e. While planning and conducting JUOs, the commander should remember that the line
between the tactical and the operational levels is neither fixed nor well-defined, but unfocused
and changeable. Particularly in JUOs, the nature of urban operations at the tactical level may
have a profound effect on the planning and conduct of operations by the JFC. Tactical actions
can have significant operational as well as strategic consequences, sometimes immediately.
a. General
• The ability of the JFC to influence the outcome of JUOs is the result of leadership and
ability to control forces and functions in order to execute the intent. C2 are supported by
an intelligence infrastructure and a reliable and secure communications and computer
system that processes and integrates information and passes it to where it is needed.
This combination of C2 and the tools for its implementation — C4ISR — is fundamental
to the conduct of modern military operations. The nature of urban operations accentuates
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Operational Tasks and Considerations
the difficulties of the commander both in war and in MOOTW, and offers significant
hindrances to effective C2 and ISR.
• The concept of JUOs requires the JFC to understand and shape the urban battlespace
and to engage any adversary standing in the way of accomplishing strategic and
operational objectives. The key to understanding the urban battlespace at all levels is
the ability to rapidly collect and disseminate information. Critical to shaping the
battlespace is the ability to implement command decisions based on continually
changing information. Since any urban operation contains a great deal of uncertainty,
and since knowledge is a perishable asset, then speed and precision are necessary to
get the right information in the right hands as expediently as possible.
• The complex physical terrain of urban areas inhibits the performance of some
technologies associated with C4ISR, including LOS communications and overhead
surveillance. Subterranean and interior space makes knowledge and understanding of
the urban battlespace more difficult. The combination of exterior and interior space
also does not lend itself to normal planning factors for personnel and support, and
urban operations have frequently been manpower intensive. The presence of key
political and cultural centers within the urban area affects planning in a number of
ways, from the identification of key nodes and COGs to targeting and the development
of ROE. See Figure III-3 for further information concerning C4ISR and the urban
triad.
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Operational Tasks and Considerations
On the other side, Chechen mobility and innate knowledge of the city
exponentially increased their ability to command and control their forces.
The Chechens generally did not maintain strongholds, but remained mobile.
Hit and run tactics made it very difficult for the Russian force to locate pockets
of resistance and impossible to bring its overwhelming firepower to bear
against the enemy force. Moreover, high-rise buildings and structures
impeded Russian transmissions, especially those in the high frequency and
very high and ultra high frequency ranges, making it difficult to communicate
unit locations. The Chechens overcame this problem by using cellular phones
and commercial scanner systems, which allowed them to communicate easily
with one another and ensured the coordination of their combat operations.
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operations, types and quantity of fires and munitions, types and amounts of logistic
support, and many other areas. Whether a JUO is conducted as a major operation during
a phase of a campaign or throughout the entire campaign, planning must give appropriate
weight to considerations of noncombatants, infrastructure, the cultural and political
situation, demographics, and other urban characteristics that may affect the outcome of
the operation. In MOOTW, those considerations are likely to assume even greater
importance to the planner.
•• In JUOs, the planning for branches and sequels should consider the potential
effects not only of adversary action, but also of such events as political changes, public
reaction to press reports, suffering among noncombatants, damage to infrastructure or
culturally important structures, and breakdown of order. How well planners can anticipate
and plan for branches and sequels may in large part determine how closely the JFC
attains the desired end state.
•• In either war or MOOTW, the end state normally includes the disengagement of the
military instrument and the transition to HN control or to civilian agencies. In either
case, the JFC must clearly understand the military conditions that will achieve the strategic
objectives. Another military consideration is the follow-up political exploitation of completed
military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters
such as CMO and FHA, and requires planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national
level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.
•• Commanders and planners should consider two aspects when addressing forces and
resources. One aspect looks outward and one looks inward. The first aspect concerns
how these functions can best support full spectrum JUOs. The second concerns the way
the urban area affects the conduct of service support functions, particularly when those
functions are located or performed within an urban area. JUOs normally will require
more of many types of resources (e.g., personnel, munitions, subsistence, medical
support, etc.) than other operations. Commanders and planners must make every
effort to anticipate and specifically plan for these resources. It is important for the JFC
to clearly specify appropriate supporting and supported relationships to ensure that
subordinate commanders conducting JUOs will have sufficient forces and means. The
JFC may also need to task organize forces in innovative formations depending on the
characteristics of the urban area and the operational objectives. In order to preclude
stripping other theater forces of assets required for JUOs, the JFC should identify early
in planning those capabilities required from supporting commands.
•• Crucial to the commander’s ability to organize, arrange, and employ forces in JUOs
is the accurate identification and analysis of adversary COGs and DPs. These may be
located within the urban area (in fact, the area may itself be a COG) or outside the urban
area but with a strong influence on it. Since the JFC will base the operation plan largely
on this identification, a thorough knowledge and understanding of all aspects of the
urban area is of great importance.
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•• The JFC will probably establish operational areas within the theater of operations. In
JUOs, it is likely that a JOA will be established that will include the urban area and
sufficient surrounding area for the joint force to achieve its objectives. The area of
interest should include any area from which influence can be exerted on the urban area.
Other operational areas may be designated outside or inside the JOA. Maneuver and
movement control measures must be carefully considered and delineated to allow
maximum flexibility on the part of subordinate commanders and to prevent fratricide.
•• The joint force headquarters should similarly be organized with a view toward the
nature and requirements of JUOs. The JFC may need to establish centers or cells
specifically tasked to deal with some aspect of urban operations. In particular, the JFC
must coordinate with allies, coalition partners, and other government agencies to ensure
cooperation, mutual support, and understanding. In JUOs, that coordination will include
HN agencies, local elements, international organizations, and NGOs. The support of
these organizations may be critical to the accomplishment of strategic and operational
objectives. These groups can offer the JFC a wealth of information, knowledge, and
insight concerning the particular urban area, and their cooperation may enhance the
JFC’s understanding of the area and provide critical assistance in dealing with local
groups and the civilian populace. In any case, close support and cooperation will help
ensure uniformity in priorities, procedures, and objectives. The extensive liaison required
by JUOs means that it is very likely that many of these organizations will be represented
in the force headquarters. The force will also provide liaison to them, as well as to HN
agencies such as police or local government, different tribes, clans, or factions, or any
other of the myriad groups that may be influential in a particular urban area.
•• Urban operations tend to be time-consuming in urban areas. The nature of the terrain
and the presence of noncombatants slows down the actions of ground forces; constraints
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tied to civilians and infrastructure inhibits and delays fires, from the conduct of air operations to
fires in support of ground forces; difficulties in communication make coordination difficult. Yet
the complexity and demands of urban operations will likely result in a very high operational
tempo. When JUOs are part of a larger campaign, this may result in two major operations
being conducted at very different tempos and timings, making overall synchronization and
integration difficult to achieve. The urban operation may be slow but intense, while a second
major operation could take less time but have fewer demands. Within urban operations
themselves, the effects of tempo and coordination on synchronization and integration must be
taken into account by operational planners.
•• Depending on the type of urban operation being planned, there will almost certainly
be operational constraints placed on the JFC in the accomplishment of the strategic and
operational objectives. In the development of ROE, the President and Secretary of
Defense will provide guidance based upon input from the operational commander and
attempt to balance operational constraints, mission accomplishment, applicable law, and
protection of the force. Recent operations have shown potential adversaries may try to
take advantage of the fact that US military forces will comply with the requirements of
the law of armed conflict (LOAC). The commander should anticipate the effects of
ROE on operations and plan accordingly. In developing ROE, the commander must
consider the effects on JUOs, particularly the potential for civilian casualties, collateral
damage, or friendly casualties to adversely influence the accomplishment of operational
objectives. See paragraph 15 of this chapter for a discussion of the legal aspects of
JUOs.
See JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations, for a full discussion of C4 planning considerations.
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•• As the single control agency for the management and operational direction of the
joint communications network, the joint communications control center (JCCC) must
be knowledgeable concerning the requirements of communications in the urban
environment, especially in the specific operational area. The JCCC should be aware of
the capabilities present in the urban area, their potential use, and any problems associated
with that use.
•• Information superiority is an integral and necessary part of the concept for JUOs,
and intelligence is one of the primary means to achieve that information superiority.
During JUOs, the JFC relies on comprehensive intelligence to determine the social,
political, and cultural environment, the physical terrain, adversary capabilities,
demographics, and other characteristics of the urban battlespace.
A detailed discussion of joint IPB for JUOs is found in Appendix A, “Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace in Urban Areas.”
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Operational Tasks and Considerations
political, cultural, economic, and other considerations. These requirements will also
have different priorities in JUOs, with intelligence concerning civilian population or
infrastructure potentially as important as that concerning the adversary. Intelligence
centers must concentrate on determining intelligence requirements, collecting information
concerning the urban area(s) in the theater and JOA, and producing intelligence products
that focus on a specific urban area for a specific operation. Among the areas for the
centers’ attention might be the threat, biographic information on urban leaders, and
economic, geographic, socio-cultural, and political factors.
•• A large amount of the information needed to support JUOs is available well before a
decision is made to commit US forces to a particular urban area. Information is often
readily available on urban terrain, demographics, and infrastructure, but the precise and
detailed information required to conduct operations may be more difficult to obtain.
Imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) have often provided
timely and fairly complete information to the commander, but both of these sources
contain drawbacks when used to gather information in urban areas. IMINT can provide
an accurate and up-to-date picture of the layout of a city, the functions of some structures,
the location of communications sites, vehicular movement patterns, and other facilities
and activities that can be viewed from the outside. However, IMINT has difficulty
viewing the interiors of buildings and cannot view the subterranean areas of a city, and the sheer
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•• Special operations forces (SOF) and other joint reconnaissance assets can provide
support to the JFC in the collection of operational information, including target
intelligence. These assets may already be deployed to the JOA or can be deployed early
to help bridge the gap between other forms of information and the current situation. The
presence of these assets in the urban area can be beneficial in understanding and shaping
the battlespace, target identification, and meeting critical information requirements.
•• When conducting MOOTW in urban areas, identification of the threat must take
into consideration the mission and all aspects of the urban area. In some operations, the
threat may be environmental, as in the case of a natural disaster. In others, it may be
hunger. In still others there may not be a direct adversary at the onset of operations, but
the potential increases for numerous adversaries to arise as the operation develops. The
threat may include organized military units, militia groups, clans or tribes, criminal
elements, insurgents, terrorists, political factions, or a combination of two or more. For
each potential threat, a determination should be made concerning the operational
capabilities, COAs, and intentions.
For more information, see Appendix A, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
in Urban Areas,” and Appendix B, “Joint Fires for Urban Operations.”
III-12 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
a. General. Operational movement and maneuver allow the JFC to engage the adversary on
terms most favorable to friendly forces. If movement positions forces to the best advantage, then
maneuver leverages that position to accomplish operational objectives. Operational maneuver has an
impact beyond the realm of combat, and can reduce the amount of combat necessary to achieve a
successful outcome of the campaign or operation.
b. Once the decision has been made to conduct JUOs, movement can range from the
disposition of forces to best conduct forcible entry into an urban area to advantageous positioning
in preparation for an operation other than war unlikely to involve combat. Maneuver may
consist of the tactical or operational actions of forces to engage or disrupt adversaries or to
destroy their ability to achieve planned objectives.
• The physical terrain of most urban areas makes the movement of large forces difficult,
even in times of peace and stability. In situations of turmoil, the difficulties are magnified.
The patterns of streets and structures can be confusing to navigate, tend to break up large
formations, are easily interdicted by fire, and can be easily turned into obstacles and
barriers. Conventional avenues of approach in urban areas — highways, wide
thoroughfares, railways, and rivers — are easily blocked or interdicted. Debarkation
and staging areas, such as ports or airfields, may also be located within or close to
significantly built-up areas and suffer the same difficulties.
• Ports and airfields are frequently located within or adjacent to urban areas and may
themselves be vulnerable to interdiction. Routes to and from ports and airfields often
pass through the very densely populated and built up areas the joint force is trying to
control. There may be no suitable areas for reception and staging near the debarkation
points. Roads, railway lines, and rivers may also offer routes into the urban area, but
they are also subject to interdiction and blockages. Air routes into the urban area may be
less prone to obstruction. However, a determined adversary with even rudimentary air
defense weapons can impede movement of aircraft during both operational strike and
logistic support operations. The capabilities of required infrastructure may be insufficient
for the introduction of joint forces and may require substantial improvement before
being fully usable. Other infrastructure considerations such as dependable electric power,
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Chapter III
water, and sanitation may also affect the movement of forces into the urban area. For operational
maneuver, the quality of the transportation system within the urban area can be key to the joint
force’s ability to maneuver. Adversaries with knowledge of the transportation system — roads,
subways, utility tunnels, alleys, sewers, and other routes — can both enhance their ability to
maneuver and prevent friendly maneuver from achieving its desired effects.
• Forces designated to perform JUOs should, if possible, move to reception and staging
areas outside the urban area where they will conduct operations; however, that may not
be possible depending on the particular urban area.
• Since most ports and many airfields are located within or adjacent to large urban areas,
the only place for debarkation and staging may be within the urban area itself.
• Even if the debarkation points are part of the urban area, commanders should attempt to
find a secure area large enough to stage and posture operational forces. This is particularly
true for MOOTW, where forced entry into the JOA is not expected.
• Although airmobile operations offer another option for movement and maneuver in
urban areas, the close spacing of buildings and narrow streets may, in some circumstances,
negate the joint force’s ability to conduct these operations. Consequently, the airdrop
and airland of personnel, equipment, and supplies may have to be conducted at a staging
area outside of the urban area.
• In MOOTW, debarkation will frequently take place within the urban area, and the
commander should be aware of the effect this influx of joint military force may have on
the local population. These effects may be in the form of resentment or anxiety, disruption
of normal movement patterns, displacement of port or airfield workers, overburdening
of services such as water and electricity, or other disruptions. The JFC should take steps
to lessen any adverse effects among the civilian populace during this initial deployment
of forces.
• The infrastructure required for debarkation and movement within the JOA may require
improvement or restoration before it can be fully utilized. Port facilities, runways, and
roads may be inadequate for the movement of forces and may require the early deployment
of assets capable of making the necessary modifications to enable full deployment to
occur.
• In MOOTW, the JFC should consider the physical and psychological effects on the
urban triad, particularly noncombatants, of the posturing and concentration of forces
within the urban area. Although the actual requirements will differ from those of combat
operations and from one urban area and mission to another, forces should be postured
with regard for those aspects of the urban operation that will require action by the joint force.
III-14 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• JUOs, like other operations, must be conducted in depth. Whether war or MOOTW, the
JFC plans and conducts various types of operations throughout the theater or JOA to achieve
a position of advantage. Operations in depth may consist of attacks far beyond the
urban area itself, on targets that can affect urban operations in some way, or they may
take place within or near the urban area itself. When the urban area itself is the focus of
the campaign or major operation, the battlespace is constricted and operational depth may be
measured in miles, not hundreds of miles. Even in that case, however, operations in depth may
include such distant targets as water supply, power plants, communications relay sites, adversary
C2 or assembly areas, or key transportation nodes. Within the urban area, an example of
operations in depth could be the simultaneous seizure of key objectives in different parts of the
urban area. Such operations may frequently be conducted by air, sea, space, or special operations
forces in addition to land forces.
• While all forms of maneuver apply to urban combat, some have greater application than
others. Key to maneuver in any form is the ability to disrupt the adversary’s decision
cycle through a combination of surprise, speed, tempo, and precision. The JFC may use
ground, air, maritime, and space-based assets to isolate the urban area. In addition,
ground forces provide the capability to seize important objectives and DPs, to facilitate
the removal of noncombatants, monitor and enforce desired behavior, and conduct
systematic sweeps of the urban environment. Air assets can be employed to penetrate
an area on multiple axes and rapidly project power. In any urban combat maneuver, the
best approach is to use the full range of combined arms technology and weaponry available
to the joint force, supported by information operations. Figure III-4 provides examples
of operational maneuver and urban operations.
• Maneuver Within the Urban Area. The urban environment significantly affects the
ability of the joint force to maneuver by canalizing, increasing vulnerability, reducing
options, and slowing movement. Structures pose obstacles that force movement along
streets and block movement between streets, thus canalizing and compartmentalizing
units and exposing them to fires. This in turn affects the joint force’s ability to change
directions, reposition, reinforce, bypass adversary resistance, and/or maneuver to the
flank. Buildings and the urban population provide adversary cover and concealment
and increase the vulnerability of the maneuvering forces, whether ground or air. The
nature of urban terrain slows maneuver, partly because of the barriers and obstacles
either already present or created during JUOs and because of the physical demands of
JUOs. In addition, the urban defender generally has interior LOCs, allowing defenders
to quickly react to maneuver on the part of an attacking force. Coordinated and integrated
horizontal and vertical maneuver in the urban area can slow the defender’s ability to
react and use interior lines.
•• Envelopment inside an urban area can be difficult to accomplish. The density of the
adversary force and the physical terrain it occupies may make it difficult to find an exposed
surface flank or make an airborne assault impractical. In those cases, it may require a frontal
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Chapter III
ENVELOPMENT
The Israelis struck to the east of Beirut during the 1982 Operation PEACE FOR
GALILEE, linking up with the Christian militias and severing the Beirut-Damascus road,
thereby cutting off all supply and reinforcement to the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
During the Summer 1942 offensives on the Eastern Front, German forces enveloped the
heavily defended fortress city of Sevastopol by land, sea, and air, isolating it from Soviet
reinforcements. Despite difficult terrain, determined military and civilian defenders, and
rough parity in ground forces, the Germans were able to secure the town.
TURNING
MOVEMENT
Operation CHROMATE (1950) uncovered Seoul and caused the headlong retreat of the
North Korean armies.
The sweep westward during Operation DESERT STORM (1991) forced the Iraqis to
abandon Kuwait City without offering a significant resistance.
INFILTRATION
In Hue, the North Vietnamese Army quietly infiltrated two regiments and seized most of
the city in a single day (1968).
In Operation JUST CAUSE (1989), units were staged unnoticed at bases throughout
Panama and special operations forces infiltrated key locations. The simultaneous
attack on key locations throughout the country made adversary response weak and
disjointed.
PENETRATION
After crossing the Suez Canal in 1973, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attempted a
quick armored penetration to seize Suez City. Egyptian regular and irregular forces
turned back the attack and inflicted heavy losses on IDF units.
In the initial attack on Grozny in 1994, Russian forces tried a similar armored
penetration, with even worse results.
FRONTAL ATTACK
Operational level frontal attacks include the German attack at Stalingrad, the Marines’
battle to retake Hue, and the Russian attack on Grozny after the failed penetration.
assault to create an assailable flank. Effective employment of air, land, sea, space, and special
operations forces can significantly increase the speed of maneuver to exploit the situation.
III-16 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
•• Penetration requires surprise and careful planning. Care must be taken to secure the
flanks of the penetrating force.
•• In JUOs involving combat, frontal assault by surface forces may be inevitable. The
joint force’s chances of success in executing this form of maneuver can be greatly
enhanced by its ability to apply overwhelming combat power against specific objectives
with speed, firepower, and shock.
• As difficult as urban maneuver may be, there are several actions the JFC can take to
reduce the cost and increase the likelihood of success.
•• Isolation of the urban area is nearly always a prerequisite for success. The joint
force can cut off or control outside support, information, and influence through air,
space, land, and sea dominance by interdiction, physical presence, control of basic
services, and control of lines and means of communications. The purpose is to control
the flow of supplies, personnel, and information into and within the urban area and to
physically and psychologically isolate the area. Within the urban area itself, isolation of
selected areas may be a prerequisite for controlling them. The JFC should consider both
the beneficial and detrimental effects of such control and isolation on the civilian populace.
•• Combined arms organization ensures that forces have all the elements at hand
to conduct JUOs. The difference between combined arms in JUOs and in other
operations is the proportion and organizational level of different types of forces. For
example, armored forces may not be required in the same strength and organization as in
operations in open country, while need for engineer capability increases.
• In MOOTW, the JFC may employ maneuver options that are not appropriate in war.
The early seizure of key operational objectives by urban penetration can facilitate control
of the populace and local infrastructure. Shows of force throughout the urban area can
discourage resistance. Accurate intelligence will enable joint forces to maneuver with
speed and precision to disrupt the decision cycle of any potential urban adversary.
• It may be necessary to conduct urban defensive operations, either to deny the adversary
strategic or operational objectives, to retain a key economic or political center, to control
LOCs and avenues of advance, or for reasons of economy of force. Operational
considerations in urban defense mirror those of offensive operations: the purpose of the
defense; the degree of delay and denial desired; effect on noncombatants; acceptable
friendly casualties; the type of defense; whether to defend inside or outside the city;
whether to defend the entire urban area, a key sector, or COGs; and the amount of
physical destruction anticipated and allowable.
III-17
Chapter III
• The JFC must counteract the effects of natural and manmade barriers, obstacles, and
mines. In JUOs, these may include ports and airfields and their approaches, transportation
systems (roads, railroads, and canals), natural formations such as mountains or rivers,
minefields, risks from industrial and chemical hazards, and even highly congested sections
of the urban area itself. In order to overcome urban barriers and obstacles and
provide operational mobility, the JFC may have to employ substantial engineering
or other support assets immediately after initial seizure of the immediate area around
the barrier or obstacle. Sea mines and some land minefields can be cleared prior to the
introduction of land forces, but other barriers and obstacles require hands-on preparation,
restoration, or improvement. These actions can be more difficult in urban areas because
of the difficulty in securing areas dominated by vertical structures or natural terrain, and
a substantial investment in forces may be necessary to protect the mobility effort.
• The JFC may take steps to dominate or control those aspects of the urban environment
whose possession or command provides either side with an operational advantage.
Aspects of the urban environment include the physical (land, air, sea, and space), the
virtual (electromagnetic and information), and the social, cultural, economic, and political.
Denial of an operational area can be accomplished either by occupying the key area
itself or by limiting use or access to the area. For an area or environment to be operationally
key, its dominance or control must achieve operational or strategic results or deny the
same to the adversary. In JUOs, the key areas or environment may be approaches to the
urban area, dominating physical terrain and airspace within or near the urban area,
manmade features important to the success of the operation, or non-physical activities
such as the social, cultural, economic, or political. The joint force can dominate or
control an operationally significant land area by physical occupation, through fire, or
through the threat of fires. It may be possible to dominate key areas without entering the
urban area, or by entering only in selected places, through effective maritime, air, or IO.
III-18 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
4. Fires
a. General
• Fires play a key role in the JUO concept of operations. In the case of operations involving
combat, the JFC can use fires to shape the battlespace and to engage the adversary, but
perhaps the most important use of fires is in the isolation of the urban area or points
within the urban area. The development of precision munitions makes attack on specific
urban targets much more effective, and recent operations such as those in Yugoslavia
and Kosovo have made operationally significant use of precision fires. Even if the
urban operation is not likely to involve combat, fires are an essential tool in force protection
and must be available to the JFC.
• Even when the joint force employs precision weapons, fires can still adversely affect the
achievement of the desired end state. Fires can cause displacement of the civilian
population, destruction of critical infrastructure, alienation of local inhabitants and the
international community, and increased determination on the part of the adversary.
• JUOs present unique considerations for the planning and execution of fires. In JUOs,
both the ability to use fires to produce the desired effects and the ability to synchronize
and integrate fires are considerably more difficult than in other operations. Direct fires
sometimes become the firepower means of choice, and can have operational-level
significance. In many urban operations, restrictive ROE and political constraints may
compound these problems. In urban combat, experience has shown that a strong combined
arms capability is necessary for success; fires and maneuver are complementary functions
that are essential to achieving JFC objectives.
• The complex physical terrain of urban areas — horizontal and vertical surfaces, interior
and exterior space, surface and subsurface areas — can severely limit the ability of joint
forces to employ fires. The vertical surfaces of buildings can easily mask targets from
surface attack and create urban canyons that diminish air capabilities. Height and
proximity of surrounding buildings, different types of structures, construction materials,
structural density — all may have an adverse effect on fires. Interior and subterranean
spaces offer an adversary positions that are both difficult to locate and hard to reach.
Damage caused by combat can create even more protection. The clutter of closely
spaced structures can also adversely affect targeting and assessment. Communications
difficulties caused by urban terrain can interfere with effective fire support and control. The
characteristics of some weapons systems also make them less suitable in urban terrain than in
other areas.
III-19
Chapter III
• The presence of large numbers of noncombatants can also severely inhibit the use of fires.
Since most JUOs will include constraints designed to minimize civilian casualties, the joint force
will be required to use fires accordingly. These measures can take several forms: prohibiting
attacks on targets located in heavily populated areas, restricting munitions used in attacks,
restricting attacks to certain times of the day, giving warning prior to attacks so that noncombatants
can evacuate the area, and aborting attacks unless precise accuracy can be guaranteed.
• The JFC should consider such matters as the potential for collateral damage, the possibility
of hazardous material contamination, the effects on the civilian populace, and any other
possibilities that may affect the achievement of operational and strategic objectives.
Because JUOs contain the real potential for the elevation of tactical events to the operational or
strategic level — particularly events such as civilian casualties or damaged infrastructure — the
JFC must ensure that targeting guidance extends to the routine support of tactical maneuver.
For a detailed discussion of precision targeting, see Appendix B, “Joint Fires for Urban
Operations.”
III-20 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• Because the conduct and coordination of indirect fires in urban areas is difficult, fires in
support of operational maneuver must be closely coordinated and planned in detail, to
include considerations of weapons effects, psychological effects on the populace, and
potential collateral damage. For air-delivered munitions, terminal control and guidance
can help ensure the delivering platform has acquired the correct target, thus reducing the
risk of fratricide. Effective airspace control measures can ensure other missions (for
example, reconnaissance and strike packages) can transit or operate in the airspace above
and around the urban area.
Ground and air control measures are discussed further in Appendix B, “Joint Fires for
Urban Operations.”
• The use of nonlethal weapons in JUOs may give the commander the ability to shape
the battlespace while minimizing noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. As
additional nonlethal capabilities are developed, their applicability to JUOs should be
considered and they should be employed whenever they can contribute toward the
achievement of operational objectives.
See Appendix B, “Joint Fires for Urban Operations,” for a discussion of nonlethal
weapons employment.
• Interdiction is a crucial step in isolating and shaping the urban area. Interdiction is an
action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy an adversary’s surface military potential before
it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction in JUOs can divert adversary
forces intended for the urban battle, disrupt command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other systems and capabilities, and delay or destroy
forces and supplies.
5. Logistic Support
a. General. The nature of urban operations creates unique support demands. The quantities of
supplies required will differ from other types of operations, as will the types and amount of medical
services required. Forces will need reconstitution more frequently. All movement will entail more risk
and be more difficult to accomplish. Sustaining bases may not be possible, or may be difficult to secure.
Support requirements to HN and civilian agencies will likely be much greater than in other operations,
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Chapter III
and may be the focus of the urban operation itself. Support activities will play a large role in the transition
phase of JUOs.
• The complex physical geography of urban areas can have significant effects on support.
Asphalt, concrete, and heights cause injuries not normally seen in large numbers in
other types of terrain. The close spacing of buildings and streets can have an effect on
mobility. There may not be large spaces available for bases. The need to operate in
buildings, on streets, and in sewers offers a variety of medical challenges. Urban terrain
can have restrictive natural terrain features such as rivers as well as narrow roads and
closely built structures.
• The presence of large numbers of noncombatants can easily affect the ability to support
joint forces. Sickness and injury can burden medical services. Crowds and congestion
can inhibit vehicular movement. The sheer numbers can drain the support capability of
the joint force if not considered beforehand.
• Infrastructure can help or hinder operations. Existing services may be able to support
the joint force to some extent, but it is more likely that the joint force will need to support
local services, to include food and water, health service, transportation management,
and law enforcement. Local government can be of assistance in the contracting of
services and supplies, but may be too ineffectual to help in a meaningful way. The
failure of basic services can place on the joint force the burden for providing them. The
presence of a capable local infrastructure means that the joint force must only support
itself, but the likelihood in JUOs is that such will not be the case. Local infrastructure
will likely either be incapable of fully meeting the demands of the population or absent
altogether. Because of this, any JUO will probably see a significant presence of NGOs
and international organizations. It is important that the JFC and staff coordinate fully
with these agencies in order both to relieve any potential burden on the joint force and to
ensure that the needs of the civilian population are met. The joint force is better able to
accomplish its objectives with the active and efficient cooperation of the NGOs and
international organizations.
See JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I, for detailed
guidance on integrating civilian organizations and agencies with joint operations.
• Support requirements for JUOs can increase dramatically from those encountered in
other types of operations. Add to that the potential requirement for the joint force to
support noncombatants and the support burden can grow considerably heavier. In
MOOTW, the JFC should plan for support of combat operations regardless of the original
mission.
III-22 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• The JFC’s responsibility for equipment maintenance in the JOA usually entails the
establishment of facilities in rear areas or offshore for the repair and replacement of
materiel. In JUOs, the establishment of such facilities may not be feasible if there is no
rear area as such or any area large enough for the repair of major items. In urban
combat, it is difficult to evacuate damaged equipment, and in a constantly shifting urban
battle there may be no secure routes to maintenance facilities. Maintenance service
providers may be forced to come to the equipment rather than have the equipment come
to them. In urban combat, it is often easier to replace than to repair, and planners should
allow for increased replacement of what might normally be repairable equipment.
• Historically, it is necessary to pull units back for rest and reconstitution far more
frequently in urban combat than in other types of operations. In intense fighting, units
often can last only a few hours before needing relief. When that is coupled with the high
casualty rates normally associated with urban combat, the problem of reconstitution
becomes a serious one, requiring foresight and prior planning and preparation.
• In JUOs, water consumption can be particularly high. Water supply and delivery can be
difficult.
• Personal clothing and equipment will need replacement on a regular and frequent basis.
Tactical units will desire special urban equipment such as knee and elbow pads, ropes,
goggles, gloves, small-unit radios, and others.
• Health services face potentially the biggest challenges in support for forces.
•• Infectious diseases pose one of the greatest threats in JUOs. Planning for dealing with large
numbers of noncombatants (and casualties) should include measures to protect friendly forces
in the JOA from communicable diseases. Proper sanitation and preventive medicine, including
animal, rodent, and pest control, should be part of all health service planning.
III-23
Chapter III
•• Combat stress reactions are magnified in urban combat and require effective
psychological prevention and management. Urban combat is mentally, physically, and
emotionally exhausting, and the psychological effects on all participants (including health
care personnel) can be devastating. While rapid treatment and/or removal from the
combat area can often enable combatants to quickly return to duty, it may be more
difficult to take these actions with scarce medical personnel. JFCs must plan for the
timely recognition and treatment of psychological casualties among both combatants
and health care personnel and arrange for replacement of affected personnel.
•• The physical terrain of urban areas may preclude vehicular or aerial evacuation of
casualties. Consequently, units may require more litter bearers to move casualties to
collection points where they can be further evacuated by ground or air transport. Lengthy
evacuation routes will increase the number of litter bearers required due to fatigue, so
commanders may need to augment combat units with additional personnel to perform
evacuation. Commanders and staff at all echelons must develop detailed medical
evacuation plans, to include engineer support to clear routes for medical evacuation.
The compartmented nature of urban operations, transportation restrictions,
communications difficulties, and the finite number of combat medics increases the demand
for self-aid and buddy aid. Commanders should plan and train their units accordingly.
•• Civilian medical facilities that joint forces can use may be present in the urban area,
at least in the case of MOOTW. However, it is likely that these facilities will not have
the required capabilities to even meet the medical needs of the local population. The
joint force should include sufficient organic medical capability to treat its wounded,
sick, and injured and either return them to duty or evacuate them from the theater or
JOA.
•• When local capabilities or operations of port or air facilities are insufficient, the JFC
provides that capability. There also may exist a need to expand the capabilities of these
ports of debarkation early in the deployment process. The JFC may also need to provide
rail and road management and control within and perhaps outside the urban area itself in
order to ensure efficient movement.
•• Basing and Sustainment. Sustainment activities for JUOs should be located close enough to
the urban area to ensure provision of adequate support. Yet, if they are located within the urban
area, they are subject to actions by the adversary and the local populace and to the difficulties
inherent in the urban infrastructure. There may not be a single area that can house a complete
base, and it may be necessary to construct smaller bases for specific types of support. Engineer
intelligence and early involvement of the joint force engineer are crucial to this element of
mission planning.
III-24 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
Recent urban conflicts suggest that the psychological casualty rates are much
higher in urban operations than in other types. The tempo and experience of
urban operations is so intense that soldiers tend to “burn out” quickly.
After Russia’s 1994-1996 conflict with Chechnya, one medical survey found
72 percent of the soldiers screened had some sort of psychological disorder
symptoms. Further, 46 percent of the soldiers exhibited asthenic depression
(a weak, apathetic, or retarded motor state) and the other 26 percent exhibited
psychotic reactions such as high states of anxiety, excitement or
aggressiveness, and a deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations.
The statistics also revealed that the percentage of troops with combat stress
disorders was higher than experienced during their 1980s war in Afghanistan.
One of the primary differences was that, in Chechnya, Russian forces
conducted combat mostly in cities rather than in mountains, valleys, and
other rural areas.
•• The requirement to provide law enforcement and prisoner control can range from support
only for the joint force to extensive support to the local government and populace. An increasingly
likely scenario for an urban operation is one in which local law enforcement is ineffective, and
criminal elements pose a threat to the HN or the joint force. Significant law enforcement
support may be required.
• In some urban operations, the largest single operational task is the requirement to provide
support to other nations, groups, and agencies. Actions in this area range from
providing security assistance to the HN to CMO, from interagency support and
coordination to transition to civil administration. These activities can occur in urban
operations in both war and in MOOTW, and include the whole range of CMO support.
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Chapter III
6. Force Protection
a. General
• Protection of forces will often constitute a friendly COG, and nowhere is this more
likely than in MOOTW operations — where minimizing friendly casualties is often an
operational constraint. Although force protection will not ensure the success of JUOs,
failure to take adequate protection measures can cause the operation to fail. The
requirements of operational protection vary from one operation to another, but their
general aspects are the same: protection of operational forces, means, and noncombatants;
protection of systems and capabilities; the conduct of deception operations; and security
for operational forces and means.
• As is the case with other operational tasks, force protection can be substantially more
difficult in JUOs due to the urban triad. Operational threats to the force can include the
range of military activities of a sophisticated adversary, hard-to-detect indigenous
unconventional forces, or a single terrorist with a car bomb.
• The physical urban terrain makes protection more difficult in many ways. The vertical
terrain means that observation of friendly formations, movement, and bases is much
easier. Urban terrain breaks up friendly formations and canalizes movement, inhibiting
with both protection and identification. It becomes difficult to secure LOCs, rear areas,
bases, and installations when the nature of urban terrain means that they are easily observed
and interdicted. Taller structures may overlook and provide observation of bases and
installations. Dispersion within the urban area means that more sites and nodes require
hardening and defense.
• Noncombatants pose an even more severe problem. Their large numbers and their
presence in all parts of the urban area make operations security challenging. Adversaries
may use noncombatants as camouflage, shields, and even targets. Their presence inhibits
protective fires and adds to the difficulty of evasion and personnel recovery. The effects
of attacks using WMD, terrorism, or conventional attacks on friendly forces are magnified
by the presence of noncombatants. Their suffering, even when controlled, can have
operational and strategic consequences.
• Some HN infrastructure can aid in the protection of the joint force. However, local infrastructure
—when used by the joint force — may become a protection responsibility that can be more
difficult than military infrastructure. Civilian buildings are more difficult to defend and maintain
security for. Civilian communications facilities are difficult to secure. The often large and
sprawling nature of water systems, power plants, transportation systems, and government
buildings make their protection a challenging proposition. Communications security and electronics
security should take into consideration the presence and potential use of local communications
and electromagnetic radiation.
III-26 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• The first priority in planning for protection is risk management. The JFC must identify
and control hazards to provide the most appropriate means and degree of protection,
including a review of approved ROE to ensure they are adequate for the circumstances.
•• Urban operations offer a unique set of actual or potential hazardous conditions. The
JFC must identify hazards, actual or potential, that can result in injury, illness, or death
to personnel or noncombatants, damage to equipment, property or infrastructure, or any
other condition that can degrade the operational mission.
•• To assess the identified operational hazards in terms of probability and severity, the
JFC must have an accurate understanding of the threat, the urban area itself, and the
current conditions within the urban area. The JFC can then determine the risk level of
each identified hazard or condition that can adversely affect the achievement of operational
or strategic objective, either directly or through branches or sequels. An urban hazard
such as terrorist use of a WMD would likely have catastrophic effects on operations, so
despite the fact that such an event is not considered likely, the commander is alerted to
take protection measures against it. A sniper attack on joint force personnel in the urban
area may only marginally degrade operational capability, but since its likelihood is judged
to be frequent, again the commander is obliged to take preventive measures.
•• Based on the assessment of hazards in the urban area, the JFC develops controls to
either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk. Some hazards can be partially controlled
by a thorough understanding of the urban area and urban operations by members of the
joint force. Other controls may take the form of barriers and defenses, IO, increased
security precautions, population and movement control measures, personnel rotation,
development of response plans and capabilities, drills, warning systems, communications,
or intelligence. Despite control measures the residual risk is likely to be high due to the
inability to fully control all conditions in such a large and complex area.
•• Urban areas offer terrorists both a variety of means of attack and a wide range of
targets. Terrorists conduct sabotage, direct actions (DAs) `with conventional munitions,
or attacks using WMD. Targets may include barracks and bases, military movement
routes, small units, individual personnel, USG agencies, NGOs, civilian or military
infrastructure, or noncombatants. US forces have been frequent victims of terrorist
actions in recent history, and remain so. Terrorists receive significant operational and
strategic results from even a low-level attack. Further adding to the protection problem
is the presence of large numbers of noncombatants and key civilian infrastructure. Attacks on
III-27
Chapter III
civilians may provide terrorist organizations with similar benefits and less risk than attacks on
US forces.
•• The JFC should include terrorism prevention, deterrence, and response measures in
force protection, including full implementation of the Antiterrorism Program Concept.
This concept includes threat estimations, vulnerability assessments, prevention and crisis
management planning, and prevention measures. To add capability to antiterrorism
measures, the JFC should coordinate early and continuously through the intelligence
directorate to tap into organizations specifically concerned with terrorism, members of
the national intelligence community, organizations such as the Department of State
(DOS), and local sources of information.
•• In order to establish and maintain this coordination of effort, the geographic combatant
commander, through the commander’s intelligence directorate Joint Intelligence Center
and Counterintelligence Support Officer, in consultation with Defense Intelligence
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, embassy staff, country team, and applicable HN
authorities, obtains intelligence and counterintelligence specific to the urban area. The
commander then issues intelligence and counterintelligence reports, advisories, and
assessments to the units within the combatant command’s control or operating within
the combatant command’s area of responsibility. This network is the backbone for
communicating intelligence and counterintelligence information, advisories, and warning
of terrorist threats throughout the region.
See JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, for more
information.
7. Consequence Management
a. General
• Consequence management (CM) comprises those measures taken to protect public health
and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to
governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive situation. In urban areas, this
may include population evacuation, decontamination, transportation, communications,
public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource
support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials control,
food distribution, and energy provision. CM continues until casualties become patients, the
threat of further casualties becomes minimal, humanitarian assistance is provided, and public
safety is reestablished.
• In most cases, the JFC will not conduct unilateral CM operations, but will participate in
collaboration with the HN, either with allies or as part of a multinational relief effort.
CM may be the primary focus of an urban operation, or an event may occur during an ongoing
urban operation that requires the joint force to conduct CM. The joint force, if not on the
III-28 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
scene, may be the first capable force to respond. In any case, combatant commanders should
develop and maintain regional CM plans, including urban CM, in coordination with the DOS
CM program and appropriate embassies.
• Possible triggers for urban CM operations include natural disasters and WMD
events. Each of these events poses unique and challenging problems to the JFC. WMD
events are likely to take place in urban areas for the simple reason that they are meant to
kill large numbers of people. Potential terrorist use of WMD in an urban setting would
likely be directed against civilian as well as military targets. In the decade of the 1990’s,
terrorists conducted a number of failed or limited chemical or biological attacks in large
urban areas, and for this reason commanders should consider the aspects of urban areas
and operations when planning CM response.
• The complex physical urban terrain works against the joint force in CM operations.
The physical destruction wrought by a natural disaster or nuclear detonation can make
any CM efforts extremely difficult. Subways and interior spaces offer ideal areas for
limited chemical or biological attacks. Nuclear attacks can produce catastrophic results
due to the effects of collapsing structures, flying debris, and fires. The urban terrain can
hinder rescue and relief efforts, either because of destruction or simply because of urban
complexities, and significant engineering efforts may be required as part of CM.
• The key factor in urban CM is the civilian population. A large-scale event has the
potential to produce casualties in the hundreds of thousands, and even a limited attack
may require the evacuation and screening of huge numbers of noncombatants. Panic or
civil disorder may accompany an event, bringing a requirement to restore order as well
as provide relief services. Sizable numbers of refugees can clog the transportation system
and overload support capabilities. The size of the event, the capabilities of the HN, and
the effects on the civilian population will have an influence on the type and amount of
response a joint force will provide.
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Chapter III
enforcement services. In fact, the entire service infrastructure normally found in urban areas
may not function, potentially affecting hundreds of thousands. Even if safe food, water, and
medicines are available, the HN and relief organizations may not have the capability to distribute
them. Supporting physical infrastructure may be unusable due to contamination or destruction,
and streets and roads could be blocked. On the other hand, in the case of a limited event, the
HN may have relatively sophisticated response ability and require only materiel and manpower
support.
JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,
details the critical response tasks that must be considered during foreign CM operations.
c. CM Considerations in JUOs
• Incidents requiring CM operations may occur in two situations: when the joint force is
located elsewhere, necessitating movement to the operational area; and when the joint
force is located in the area of the event, perhaps even the target. In the first case, the
geographic combatant commander is responsible for providing a headquarters and
assessment element to serve as the initial DOD response to an incident and for functioning
as the initial C2 element for the initial DOD assets committed to a particular foreign CM
operation. In the latter case, the joint force will certainly be among the first to respond,
but its own abilities may be affected by the incident. In any case, the joint force will not
be the only respondent. It is necessary to establish liaison with appropriate government
agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and allies and coalition partners.
• The initial response to an incident can be critical in gaining control of the situation. A
number of factors may affect urban CM planning, as indicated in Figure III-5.
•• Port and airfield facilities may be affected and therefore unusable until repaired.
•• Dispersion patterns are affected by the urban terrain and more difficult to predict and
monitor.
•• C2 is complicated both by the nature of the urban area and by the presence of HN and
III-30 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
civilian actors.
•• Requirements for decontamination, medical services, and basic life support may
overwhelm the force’s capabilities, even with augmentation of personnel and equipment
from the continental United States.
8. Special Operations
a. General
• SOF give the JFC the flexibility to tailor a response to meet a wide range of potential
urban requirements. Unique SOF capabilities can support the JFC’s campaign by
identifying and destroying critical nodes, seizing key terrain or facilities in denied areas,
securing or capturing key personnel, countering adversary urban insurgencies through
an active foreign internal defense (FID) initiative, or conducting unconventional warfare
(UW) activities in an adversary-held urban area. SOF can emplace sensors, provide
clandestine intelligence collection, and provide target acquisition information in the highly
restricted terrain of the urban environment. In these ways, SOF can achieve results not always
attainable with the application of a larger conventional force. SOF can enhance the JFC’s unity
of effort by providing coalition support teams with trained, culturally aware, language proficient,
military liaison personnel with communications connectivity that can offer the commander a
conduit to multinational forces operating under the JFC or in concert with the operation. The
day-to-day regional access SOF maintains provides the JFC accurate information and area
assessments to enhance situational awareness in preparation for JUOs.
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Chapter III
• PSYOP and CA capabilities provided by SOF can also shape the urban environment, isolate
adversary forces, and help set the conditions for transitioning the urban area back to civilian
control. This may be accomplished through DA against adversary critical target systems or
through strong PSYOP designed to isolate the adversary mentally and emotionally from the
populace. Isolation may also involve those actions taken to deny outside influences on the
urban environment, such as logistic resupply, media, or the influx of additional adversary forces.
This may involve restricting air traffic into urban airfields, denying road and rail access into the
urban area, or shutting down or manipulating all sources of media information broadcast toward
the populace. CA forces are instrumental in this effort through the conduct of populace and
resource control (PRC) operations.
See Chapter IV, “Noncombatants,” for a discussion of PRC operations in urban areas.
• Although the complexities of the urban environment change the way missions are
conducted, SOF can perform their nine primary missions, along with collateral activities,
in an urban environment unilaterally and in conjunction with conventional forces. These
missions categorize potential SOF activities conducted throughout the range of military
operations, from war to the vast range of MOOTW.
• The physical terrain of the urban area hinders SOF less than other forces or technologies.
The ability of language-proficient, culturally astute SOF to blend into the local population
facilitates their ability to traverse the urban area more readily than conventional forces.
SOF can gain timely and first-hand knowledge of the urban terrain difficult to obtain
from imagery or overhead observation, and their ability to position themselves to observe
key targets in detail facilitates precision actions against those targets. In doing so, SOF
offers a critical surveillance and intelligence source, a reliable form of HUMINT.
• SOF can aid in both the preservation and neutralization or destruction of urban
infrastructure. In FID, CA activities, PSYOP, and HN support operations, SOF can
support the provision of basic service and communications. The capability to mount or
support precision strikes against key infrastructure is a critical tool for minimizing
collateral damage.
• SOF can contribute to each element of the concept for JUOs. The nine primary SOF
missions lend themselves to urban operations, from understanding the battlespace
through local familiarity and direct observation to transition support gained by habitual
contact with NGOs. In the often politically charged environment of urban operations,
III-32 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
the ability to have eyes on the ground with local and regional expertise can help the JFC
control the effects of operations.
• Combatting Terrorism. The role of SOF in CBT is both in antiterrorism (AT) and
counterterrorism (CT). In CT, SOF can provide indications and warning of impending
hostile actions against friendly forces and preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist
incidents. CT missions in JUOs may include hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material
from terrorist organizations, and attack of terrorist infrastructure. In AT, SOF can aid in
the protection of people and facilities from terrorist attacks in urban areas by providing
training and advice on reducing vulnerability and on a limited basis when directed, by
providing highly specialized and technical assistance to existing security forces.
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Chapter III
reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, coastal patrol and interdiction, target and threat
assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.
• Foreign Internal Defense. FID provides SOF local access in much of the world. These
same programs provide SOF personnel with invaluable experience in the cultural
complexities of numerous nations. SOF urban counterinsurgency operations, as part of
FID, can provide the JFC a tool for consolidation and transition of operations, and also
to combat an urban insurgency without the use of large scale, visible conventional force
involvement.
• Civil Affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units are organized,
trained, and equipped specially to conduct CA activities and to support CMO. CMO are
the activities of a commander to affect relations between military forces, governmental
and nongovernmental organizations and authorities, and the civilian population within
the urban environment. CA augment CMO staffs of JFCs and selected component
commanders. CA activities are performed or supported by CA and embrace the
relationship between military forces and civil authorities in urban areas and involve
application of CA functional specialty skills in technical sectors normally the responsibility
of civilian government. In JUOs, these activities include PRC, humanitarian assistance,
and emergency services. All CA activities support CMO.
For a more detailed discussion of CA, CMO, and CA activities, refer to paragraph 13 of
this chapter, “Civil-Military Operations.”
III-34 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• Information Operations. The unique capabilities of SOF enable the JFC to access,
alter, degrade, delay, disrupt, deny, or destroy adversary information systems throughout
the range of military operations and at all levels of war. IO apply across all phases and
across the range of urban operations. Special operations missions that support IO may
include DA, SR, PSYOP, CA, and FID.
See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Forces, for detailed
discussions of C2, characteristics, and planning guidance for special operations.
9. Space Operations
a. General. Space power is the total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence
activities to, in, through, and from space to achieve its objectives. Space-based systems are unconstrained
by political boundaries and can provide support before, during, and after JUOs. The information
provided by these systems can improve situational awareness and help enable information superiority
for the joint force.
III-35
Chapter III
See JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, for a full discussion of space operations.
b. Space Support and the Urban Triad. The same urban characteristics that interfere
with the ability to communicate on the ground can diminish the information derived from space-
based ISR systems. The physical terrain is complex and crowded, with equipment and movement
masked by the huge amount of activity in the urban area and thus making surveillance and
reconnaissance more difficult. Space systems have little capability to observe interior or
subterranean activity. Because urban areas tend to be communications hubs, SIGINT must be
gleaned from the multitude of signals that are not operationally significant. The complex physical
terrain, large numbers of civilians working and moving in the urban area, and presence of
significant communications, transportation, and other infrastructure can affect the rapid fusion
of information to create a complete picture of the battlespace.
• Space systems may be employed during peacetime or times of crisis to monitor an urban
area before friendly forces are established. To aid in planning an urban operation, the
JFC may request the deployment of a joint space support team to assist in planning and
integration of space operations into the overall joint force plan, as well as act as liaison
with Commander, United States Space Command.
• ISR operations normally have a number of inherent tasks, most of which are made more
difficult by the characteristics of urban areas.
•• Space systems can normally detect disturbances such as buried facilities and
construction sites, but built-up areas contain many such areas that are part of the city
landscape and not related to militarily important sites.
•• Of particular importance, space systems can provide route and target information for
mission planning — critical to the precision strikes that can be necessary in urban fires.
•• Space systems can also detect camouflage and assess adversary movements and
operations. However, in urban areas concealment is often provided by buildings and
structures themselves and not by camouflage. The movement of civilian traffic and the sheer
volume of vehicles can mask adversary movement and make identification difficult.
•• Space systems may be able to provide warning of hostile acts and reconnaissance
against friendly forces, depending on the size and nature of the urban area, but the
availability of covered avenues of approach make that capability problematic.
•• The ability of space systems to detect, track, assess, and report aircraft and vehicular
threats is a valuable one, even in urban areas. Again, the presence of a significant
number of civilian aircraft and vehicles may make timely identification a problem.
III-36 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• The space-based global positioning system (GPS) provides a critical capability during JUOs.
•• GPS can provide position, location, and velocity for weapon accuracy, ingress and
egress, location, and silent rendezvous coordination.
•• The ability of space systems to provide real time terrain information that, enhanced
by imagery data, can be used on the ground is crucial to the success of ground forces.
For several reasons, the level of news media coverage in urban operations is often higher
than in operations in other areas. Urban areas make it generally unnecessary for the media to
depend totally on logistic or PA support from military forces. Urban areas tend to be easily
accessible and contain the technological resources required by the media representatives. The
close proximity of numerous civilians and cultural and political centers makes it relatively easy
for media representatives to find colorful stories to report. The JFC may have little control over
the flow of information that the news media present to the public. The JFC must therefore plan
and execute PA operations in such a way as to produce maximum cooperation between the media and
joint forces. This is best accomplished by issuing accurate, credible, and timely information concerning
military operations and the urban situation. Providing insufficient information to the media can hamper
the force’s ability to conduct operations, and poor relationships with the media can result in inaccurate
reporting, which can in turn cause a public reaction that influences the ability to achieve operational
objectives. On the other hand, successful engagement of the media can aid the dissemination of information
in the operational area and help produce and maintain domestic and international support.
Including PA in the operation planning process is critical to the success of any military campaign, but
even more important in an urban environment due to the abundance of competing media. Commanders
must understand that the information most available to the news media at the tactical and operational
levels is also the most perishable in terms of timeliness. Decisions about information release must reflect
III-37
Chapter III
that understanding. PA operations may exploit operational information despite the natural tension between
traditional operations security and the commander’s desire to send a clear signal to the adversary. The
prudent use of operational information in the news may deter potential adversaries, driving a crisis back
to peace before use of force becomes necessary.
a. General. IO capitalize not only on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance
on information technology but also on the human factors associated with every JUO.
For further information, see JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
b. IO and the Urban Triad. Of the three elements of the urban triad, two may be influenced
by IO — noncombatants and infrastructure. These, in fact, are targets of IO. Leadership may
include not only military leadership, but civilian political, social, and cultural leadership as well.
Urban infrastructure may include communications and information, transportation and
distribution, energy, economics and commerce, and administration and human services. All of
these are most likely to be located in an urban area, whether they are national or regional in
authority and scope. Also located in the same urban areas are the means to influence them —
news media, communications, cultural and societal organizations, political headquarters, and
concentrated popular opinion. Even when JUOs are but part of a larger campaign, many of the
targets of IO will be located in urban areas. Figure III-6 lists targets of and threats to IO.
c. IO Considerations in JUOs
• IO are a means to shape the battlespace and also a tool to engage the adversary by
selectively targeting infrastructure and weapons systems. In order to fully integrate the
many capabilities and activities that conduct IO, the JFC forms an IO cell with full
representation from staff elements, components, and supporting agencies responsible
for integrating IO capabilities. In JUOs, the IO cell should also include representatives
of those elements or agencies specifically concerned with the urban aspects of the operation or
campaign.
• Communications support for urban IO is subject to the same limitations and vulnerabilities
caused by the nature of the urban area as other communications.
• There are a number of activities important to the planning and conduct of IO that may themselves
be critical to JUOs. The planning for IO must be integrated with planning for these related
urban activities to ensure efficient execution for optimal effect. These activities may include
III-38 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
IO TARGETS
Military Leadership
Civilian Leadership
Human Factors Troops
Populace
Processors
Nodes Communications
Satellites
IO THREATS
Insiders
Hackers
Criminals
Industrial Espionage
Economic Espionage
Foreign Powers
Terrorists
IO: Information Operations
intelligence, logistics, policy, C4, training, PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), operations security
(OPSEC), deception, computer network attack, special technical operations, counterintelligence,
PA, legal, CA, targeting, and any other activity that may contribute to or be affected by IO.
a. General
• For any type of urban operation, PSYOP is an important element at both the operational
and tactical levels. In JUOs, whether in war or in MOOTW, emphasis on the psychological
or informational objectives places PSYOP in a unique and vital position. PSYOP can
be used independently of or in conjunction with economic, social, and political activities
to limit or preclude the use of military force. In some cases, the military objective may
be relevant only in terms of the psychological effect. In other cases, PSYOP can augment
and support military operations to achieve desired objectives. History indicates that armed
conflict is a battle of wills where often the intangibles of morale and willpower can be defeated
more easily in psychological than physical terms.
• The psychological dimensions of operations affect those fighting the battle, their military leaders
III-39
Chapter III
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
US forces defeated the North Vietnamese on the battlefield during the Tet
offensive of 1968, but the information battle was the strategic battle that US
forces most needed to win, both within South Vietnam and at home. By
ignoring the information battle, the overwhelming US tactical victory was a
strategic defeat. Had US leaders made winning the information battle a central
part of the campaign plan (for example, by exposing the American people to
the North Vietnamese Army’s brutality by publicizing the mass executions in
Hue), things may have turned out differently.
Having lost the propaganda war in 1995 by default, during the second
Chechnya campaign of 1999-2000 the Russian government made every effort
to control the media and ensure that the Russian view of the war dominated
public opinion. Russia won this information war from day one of the fighting.
One analyst noted that “after the first Chechen war, the Russian military came
to the conclusion that they had to first play out the information war against
III-40 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
and staffs, the political leaders, and the civilian population — not only military targets but also
political, economic, or social structures within the urban operations operational area. PSYOP
objectives are listed in Figure III-7.
• PSYOP are also an integral element of IO. Along with OPSEC, EW, military deception,
physical attack and destruction, computer network attack and defense, PA, special IO,
and CMO. However, in supporting the JFC’s objectives, PSYOP may be the predominant
application of IO used in JUOs.
• The physical terrain of the urban area does not have the adverse effect on PSYOP as it
does for many other activities, since PSYOP generally depend on open sources to
disseminate information. If anything, the physical nature of the urban area allows the
concentration of people and institutions and makes them easier to reach with PSYOP.
• The civilian populace forms one of the primary audiences of PSYOP, and the urban area
contains large numbers of civilians in a relatively small physical area. However, that
density also makes it easier for local, tribal, gang, or other group leaders to counteract
joint force PSYOP efforts. Still, across the range of urban operations, the support and
cooperation of the civilian populace is desirable, and perhaps essential. The potential
complexity of the civilian populace can make PSYOP efforts challenging, but this complexity
also offers a multitude of options and resources for PSYOP activities. Consideration must be
given to those aspects of the civilian populace that can affect the success of PSYOP, such as
ethnicity, cultural identity and custom, religion, or economic factors.
• The physical and service infrastructure of an urban area may enhance PSYOP by providing
the means to disseminate information throughout the operational area. Existing
communications systems — television, radio, computers, newspapers and journals —
can provide multiple avenues for PSYOP that are already used by the civilian populace.
• PSYOP have a fundamental role in JUOs, where the civilian populace and infrastructure
often are as important as adversary forces. PSYOP can do much to shape the urban battlespace
before, during, and after actual engagement, whether in war or MOOTW. The general
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Chapter III
•• Support and enhance FHA, FID, and/or foreign nation assistance military operations.
• The results of PSYOP should be continually evaluated for relevance to the mission
and to national and military goals. The complexity of the urban area enables changes
in opinion or attitude to occur quickly. In addition, a PSYOP activity that is effective for
a portion of the target audience may leave another target or segment indifferent or even
hostile. Continuous evaluation, in coordination with up-to-date intelligence, can reduce
the possibility of adverse effects resulting from PSYOP activities and enable PSYOP
planners to make necessary adjustments.
• In JUOs, PSYOP can be instrumental in supporting the campaign or operation plan. PSYOP
III-42 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
can be crucial in undermining adversary will. It takes a formidable willpower to fight the urban
battle, especially when the resulting destruction is of one’s own city, and PSYOP should be
considered an essential weapon in the commander’s arsenal. Support from the local populace
can enhance the success of JUOs. Accordingly, PSYOP can gain support for the joint force
while reducing support for adversary forces.
• In MOOTW, PSYOP can support all types of JUOs, whether or not they involve the use
or threat of force. Urban areas are rich with PSYOP opportunities and resources.
For additional information, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.
a. General
• CMO may occur before or during military operations as well as during post-hostility
operations. They may also occur, if directed, in the absences of other military operations.
In any operational area, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population
are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers and density of
civilians, any urban operation will require a significant CMO effort on the part of the
joint force.
• Strategic CMO focus on long-term global and regional issues such as economic development
and stability, national or host government infrastructure, and reestablishment of national power
grids, transportation networks, and telecommunications. At the operational level, CMO support
strategic CMO objectives and focus on near-term and immediate issues such as medical readiness,
noncombatant evacuation, movement and sheltering of displaced civilians, police and security,
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN RECENT US OPERATIONS
III-43
Chapter III
PSYOP forces played a key role during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995-
1996), as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. After the conflict in Bosnia ended, many rural sections were
abandoned and the numerous cities and towns in the country were swollen
with displaced persons. PSYOP forces were instrumental in helping to start
the US State Department-sponsored Open Broadcast Network, an alternative
daily television venue for the people of Bosnia. In addition, Robert Frowick,
the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Bosnian
mission, overseeing the Bosnian national elections in 1996, credited the
actions by PSYOP forces in helping ensure the elections were peaceful and
successfully administered.
integration of interagency operations with military operations, and synchronization and integration
of CMO support to tactical commanders. Figure III-8 provides further details about CMO.
III-44 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
• As with other activities, the complex, physical urban terrain can hamper CMO. The
urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly FHA. It may be
difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more
difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. Although urban areas
normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support,
the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or manmade disaster
can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties.
• Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of
civilians, ranging from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will
be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The
requirement to control and support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
OBJECTIVES
Support National Objectives
Reduce Negative Impact of Military Operations on Civilians
Enhance Military Effectiveness
TYPES
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Population and Resource Control
Nation Assistance
Military Civic Action
Civil Preparedness and Emergency Operations
Civil Administration
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
Psychological Operations
Civil Affairs Activities
Engineering
Health Service Support
Military Police and Security Forces
Transportation
III-45
Chapter III
capabilities. Effective urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and
attitudinal characteristics of the populace. Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely
homogenous, and effective CMO will require understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations,
and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants.
• JUOs will certainly include CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives
or be the main focus of operations, but are in any case the responsibility of the combatant
commander to plan and conduct. CMO may be conducted to shape the battlespace or to
engage a civil problem, but their more likely role is in the transition to civil authority.
• Urban CMO may consist of any or all of a number of types of operations, as reflected in
Figure III-8.
For further discussion on CMO assistance to FHA and PRC operations, see Chapter IV,
“Noncombatants.”
• Planning Considerations
•• CMO planning must carefully consider the nature of the urban area and urban
operations. For example, if the JFC considers administrative, logistic, and
communications support requirements, additional requirements necessitated by the urban
area must be considered by the JFC, both for CMO support and for support of other
aspects of the operation. Where CMO is not the main focus of the urban operation, the
JFC may wish to establish a joint civil-military operations task force.
•• CMO planners should carefully consider those aspects of the urban area — terrain,
human, and infrastructure — that may impact CMO, in addition to potential human or
environmental threats. Some of these planning factors include legal implications,
communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and administrative
considerations. Since these factors are also key items of intelligence planning, CMO planning
should be closely coordinated with intelligence efforts.
•• Whether CMO is planned to support urban combat actions or operations not involving
combat, certain planning considerations apply: (1) The purpose and objectives of the operation;
III-46 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
(2) the nature and capabilities of all potential urban threats; (3) the nature and characteristics of
the urban area; (4) coordination and liaison requirements with other organizations, to include
the Department of Defense, other USG agencies, allies, HN officials and agencies, other foreign
government officials, NGOs, international organizations, and other public and private groups;
and (5) transition criteria and procedures.
• CMO must be synchronized and integrated both internally and with other operations. The
relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal. JUOs could easily require the
full conduct of CMO in one part of an urban area while another is still being contested in
conventional combat, thus calling for close synchronization and integration of combat and CMO
requirements and actions. It could be that initial CMO takes place in the urban area itself or, in
the case of massive civilian displacement, in areas nearby. CMO may be the focus of MOOTW
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Chapter III
in urban areas, but with combat occurring between the joint force and hostile elements within
the urban area. In either case, the JFC should synchronize and integrate planning, employment,
and support for both CMO and combat missions.
• CMO will require support in a number of key areas from forces and organizations who
themselves understand the nature of urban operations.
•• PSYOP will be a key element in any urban operation, not just in CMO.
•• Health Service Support (HSS) may be the most immediately critical asset of CMO.
HSS activities in urban areas may consist of medical and dental treatment, preventive
medicine services, medical logistics, training, and medical evacuation. In JUOs, HSS
activities should pay particular attention to the development of HSS intelligence and threat
analysis due to the strong potential for epidemic outbreaks.
•• Transportation support is necessary for the distribution of food, water, and medicines,
for medical evacuation, and for the movement of dislocated civilians to a safe environment.
In urban areas, transportation is easily hindered by the nature of the area or by the results
of destruction, and support should be planned accordingly.
•• Military Police and Security Forces may be vital to establish sufficient control for
CMO activities to successfully take place, as well as providing a normal law enforcement
capability when none is present.
• The most important urban operational consideration is that CMO will most likely occur
simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operations including combat. The JFC
must therefore identify sufficient forces and synchronize and integrate the planning and
execution of these operations as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other
operations in JUOs will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation. In full-scale
III-48 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
combat operations, the commander must also accomplish CMO; in MOOTW where the use
or threat of force is unlikely, the commander still must maintain the capability to conduct both
combat operations and CMO.
•• During defensive JUOs, CMO contributes to the military effort by maintaining liaison
with civil and interagency organizations and officials, which provides better situational
awareness and contributes to force protection. Additionally, coordination with the
international relief community can result in a diminution of requirements for US military
support to nonmilitary missions, helping to conserve military resources. Finally, PRC
measures minimize adversary access to the area (which supports force protection) as
well as adversary access to HN logistic support. The commander must also consider the
effects of defensive operations on the civilian populace and take the appropriate CMO
measures.
•• CMO contributes to the military effort during offensive operations, as well. Liaison
with local officials and the local populace again provides an additional source of situational
awareness, some of which can be used for the targeting of adversary forces and positions.
Coordination with the relief community continues to help conserve military resources.
Most importantly, PRC measures can be used to minimize civilian interference with
military operations, supporting the JFC’s mobility requirements. Again, the JFC must
consider the effects of operations on the civilian populace and conduct CMO both to
support that populace and to enhance operational capabilities.
For additional information on CMO and CA activities, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine
for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
Personnel recovery (PR) is the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain
the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas
whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. This includes US, allied, coalition, friendly
military or paramilitary, and others as designated by the President or Secretary of Defense. PR
is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing,
or isolated personnel from harm’s way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and
rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape;
evasion and escape; tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and the coordination of negotiated
as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by NGOs,
other USG-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these.
Refer to JP 3-50, National Search and Rescue Manual Vol I: National Search and Rescue System.
15. Legal
a. General. Legal support can be critical to JUOs, whether in war or MOOTW. JUOs are likely
to involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations in addition to the normal constraints
III-49
Chapter III
associated with deployments and operations. The senior Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), as the JFC’s
legal advisor, is usually in the best position to provide the legal knowledge and advice required by the
joint force. Because of the nature and complexity of the operational legal issues involved, (LOAC,
ROE, dislocated civilians, negotiations and involvement with local and HN governments, etc.), the SJA
must be consulted early and frequently in the deployment.
See JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,
and JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.
b. Legal Considerations and the Urban Triad. The large numbers of noncombatants
potentially affected by urban operations are a major legal concern and increase the requirement
for knowledgeable and active legal support to the joint force. Whether these noncombatants
suffer the negative effects of urban combat or benefit from FHA, there are legal requirements
and ramifications to every aspect of the operation. Further, the impact military operations have
on the local infrastructure must be carefully monitored. Some infrastructure provides service to
noncombatants which, if destroyed or significantly curtailed, could result in their displacement.
• Operational law is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly
affects the conduct of military operations. There are a multitude of treaties, conventions,
protocols, and international agreements that influence the legal aspects of deploying and
employing military forces. The set of international agreements governing warfare is
collectively known as Law of Armed Conflict, or Law of War.
•• In JUOs, the principles contained in LOAC are the same as those applicable to other
military operations. However, the difficulty faced by the JFC centers on the concentration of
people and property and makes these military actions more complex. Virtually any activity in
JUOs can have a legal aspect or consequence, from targeting to control of dislocated persons.
III-50 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
noncombatants, who may not be attacked. (2) Military Necessity. Justification of only
those measures not forbidden which are necessary for securing the military objective as
soon as possible, unless forbidden by international or domestic law. (3) Unnecessary
Suffering. The prohibition of using weapons, projectiles, or other materials which, by their
nature or manner of use, are calculated to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. (4)
Proportionality. The injury to persons and damage to property incidental to military action
must not be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.
•• One of the major areas of consideration in the LOAC is that of targeting. There are
few absolutes in targeting, but the application of the general principles applies.
Commanders must confirm that targets support military objectives. The following
may be considered to be in that category: (1) members of the armed forces having
the status of combatants; (2) noncombatants who lose their protected status by taking a
direct part in hostilities; (3) objects that by their nature, location, purpose, or use
are either military property, or they contribute to the adversary’s war effort, and their
destruction provides a military advantage. Although civilians, noncombatants, and civilian
property may not be specifically targeted, incidental injury and collateral damage are
not unlawful if: caused incident to an attack on a lawful target, and the incidental injury
and collateral damage are not excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage
from the attack. Targeting issues are important not only in urban combat operations, but
also in unconventional situations where an adversary, in violation of the LOAC, may use civilians
to mask attacks or as unlawful combatants.
•• LOAC prohibits or regulates the use of certain weapons such as landmines and booby
traps, incendiary devices, and lasers. Some aspects of the LOAC provisions are particularly
relevant to JUOs and uses of these weapons must be part of the legal review conducted of all
operation plans. See Figure III-10 for LOAC weapons prohibitions.
Discrimination
Military
Necessity
Unnecessary
Suffering
Proportionality
III-51
Chapter III
•• War crimes are violations of the LOAC committed by any member of the force, military or
civilian. Commanders are responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates when
the commander ordered the act; knew of the act or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and failed
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress
their commission. The key to preventing war crimes by US or allied forces lies in awareness of
the factors that have historically led to their commission. A look at these factors shows that
several of them are frequent products of urban combat, whether in war or MOOTW: (1) high
friendly losses: (2) high turnover rate in the chain of command; (3) dehumanization of the
adversary; (4) poorly trained or inexperienced troops; (5) the lack of a clearly defined adversary;
(6) unclear orders; and (7) high frustration level among the troops.
• There exists a large body of agreements containing provisions for the protection of
civilians. These agreements include not only the LOAC, but also recent international
human rights treaties. The decisions by commanders and civilian leaders are often
influenced by recognized international law, domestic law, and policy. As the United States finds
itself employing forces more often in MOOTW, the operational difficulty represented by civilians
in the operational area increases. US forces abide by LOAC and apply these principles in
MOOTW. This practice forms the basis of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s standing
rules of engagement.
•• JUOs typically involve large numbers of noncombatants, and the legal requirements and
III-52 JP 3-06
Operational Tasks and Considerations
prohibitions regarding those civilians are not found in a single legal source. During armed
conflict, the SJA or legal advisor can turn to the analytical structure built into the Hague
Conventions and the four Geneva Conventions. For MOOTW, law protecting civilians offers
an approach to the wide array of treaties, laws, agreements, and policy that cover civilian
protection. These laws consist of four tiers of protection — fundamental international human
rights, HN law, domestic law, and law by analogy. This allows the SJA or legal advisor to
examine the purpose and method of the operation to determine how and to what extent civilians
might be affected. The SJA or legal advisor can then advise the commander on the legal
ramifications of the operation and, more importantly, provide significant support as the specific
ROE for the operation are developed.
• ROE delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE are the means
by which the President and Secretary of Defense and operational commanders regulate
the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and
domestic and international law. Legal factors are but one element of the ROE; nonlegal
issues such as national policy and political objectives also play an essential role in the
drafting of ROE. Often the ROE will include some restrictions on weapons and targets,
and provide the operational commander with guidelines to ensure the greatest possible
protection of noncombatants consistent with military necessity.
• Special operations do not fit neatly into the legal framework that supports conventional military
operations. Nevertheless, these operations are not exempt from the requirement to comply
with domestic and international law, including the LOAC. SOF missions are politically sensitive,
particularly in peacetime or in MOOTW, and so the area of special operations is full of potential
legal pitfalls. Special operations have unique legal issues that can only be addressed by SJAs
familiar not only with the law, but also with the nature and requirements of those operations.
• Other legal considerations applicable to JUOs fall into the area of administrative law,
including environmental law, acquisition, claims, contracts, and fiscal law. These areas
require knowledge of US and HN laws, international law, and USG regulations, and
they are generally applicable to peacetime exercises and deployments as well as military
operations.
III-53
Chapter III
Intentionally Blank
III-54 JP 3-06
CHAPTER IV
NONCOMBATANTS
“If you don’t understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions in
these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values
and in their taboos — you aren’t going to be successful.”
1. General
a. The dense populations inherent to urban areas require that JFCs pay greater attention to
the relationship between noncombatants and military operations than in other types of operation.
The presence of large numbers of noncombatants will affect military operations, and military
operations will affect the lives of the noncombatants. In examining those effects, the commander
should keep in mind two overall objectives regarding the civilian populace: to minimize
their interference with military operations, and to observe the necessary legal, moral, and
humanitarian obligations toward them. Failure in either case may adversely influence the
achievement of strategic and operational objectives.
b. Noncombatants can influence the conduct of JUOs in two ways. Their presence levies
certain requirements on the joint force, certain actions the force must perform. Noncombatants
also cause the force to operate under additional restrictions and constraints.
• The joint force is required to take certain actions toward noncombatants, whether in war
or MOOTW; these may include protection, control, support, and influence.
•• Protection can take the forms of security against terrorism, law enforcement, removal
from combat areas, separation of hostile factions, or other actions.
•• Control includes control of civil unrest and restoration of order, managing civilian
movement, and controlling the resources and services on which the populace depends.
•• Inherent in support are all those aspects of support operations designed to relieve
conditions caused by manmade or natural disaster or other endemic conditions, including
provision of basic sustenance, health services, and restoration of services.
•• Influence includes those actions taken by the force to foster support for US objectives
by the civilian populace.
• Restrictions on the joint force can take the form of restrictions on actions in regard to
noncombatants or restrictions on operations themselves. The LOAC identifies those
restrictions regarding noncombatants, and they may be supplemented by specific
constraints provided by the Secretary of Defense. ROE may be a method of restriction
that covers both forms. The presence of large numbers of noncombatants can also affect
mobility, fires, and the employment of obstacles.
IV-1
Chapter IV
c. Urban operations can have either a negative or positive impact on the noncombatant
population. Negative effects will most likely result from urban combat. Even within the constraints
of the LOAC and restrictive ROE, urban warfare can cause significant civilian casualties, destroy
property, disrupt basic services, cause mass dislocation, encourage criminal activity, and bring
about conditions conducive to disease. On the positive side are actions and operations designed
to provide support to an already suffering populace or prevent adverse effects from disruptive
elements.
d. When planning JUOs, the JFC should consider the effects of noncombatants on
operations and vice versa. These assessments should be part of the planning for the various
operational tasks, as discussed in Chapter III, “Operational Tasks and Considerations.” In addition,
the effects of operations on the civilian populace will likely influence both the commander’s
ability to conduct operations and the determination of the operational end state. Therefore,
noncombatant considerations should form a discrete overall planning area.
• In war, the JFC should consider, as part of the overall determination of operational
objectives, the objectives in regard to noncombatants. In doing so, the JFC will determine
the desired physical and psychological condition of the civilian populace upon termination
of hostilities. The commander may then examine noncombatant considerations in three
stages: actions prior to, during, and after combat operations.
IV-2 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
• Actions concerning noncombatants taken prior to combat are numerous and may include
such areas as PSYOP, development of ROE, operational planning, development of
HUMINT sources, building local relationships, assessing humanitarian needs, and the
need to remove civilians from the areas to be contested.
• Actions taken during combat may include operational restraints, PSYOP, and PRC.
• Actions taken after combat may include PRC, civil action, and humanitarian assistance.
• In MOOTW, the JFC should also determine the operational objectives in regard to
noncombatants. In MOOTW, since political considerations permeate all levels of activity,
noncombatants generally are a key part of operational focus. In these operations, the
principles of MOOTW should be applied to all actions involving or affecting
noncombatants.
e. In any urban operation, several activities regarding the civilian populace assume greater
importance than perhaps in other operations.
• Health support to civilians is likely to be of vital concern in JUOs and may require
significant action by the joint force.
• The joint force may need to provide logistic support to noncombatants and civilian
agencies, particularly in the early stages of JUOs.
• Security issues relating to noncombatants include protection of the joint force, security
of the noncombatant population, and security of civilian agencies.
• Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are a type of MOOTW, but some form of
humanitarian support may be required by the joint force in all JUOs. Whether in war or
MOOTW, the joint force will have to plan and conduct activities in support of
noncombatants. Although these support activities are primarily the responsibility of the
HN, that nation may be incapable of providing that support, and the joint force may be
the only capable support organization for a period of time. It is also highly likely that in
any situation where support of large numbers of civilians is required, there will be a
strong presence of civilian agencies of various types also trying to relieve suffering and
provide for the needs of the civilian populace. The JFC will have to coordinate with
those agencies.
IV-3
Chapter IV
b. PRC can be applied across the range of military operations and at all levels of war.
Successful PRC mobilizes and provides security for the population and material resources of an
urban area. It can deny an adversary ready access to the population and to both internal and
The key to controlling the urban population has been the synchronization of
military and police responsibilities within the city. The nature of stability
operations has blurred the line normally present between military and police
objectives. While the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) is the law enforcement
agency within Northern Ireland, it has evolved into more of a paramilitary
force in order to deal with the extreme cases of violence in the city. To support
the RUC properly, British commanders have adapted their military force to
accomplish both military and police tasks. For example, British forces have
modified their intelligence units to enable tracking of informants, often
exploiting typical police tools such as working dogs. Special Air Service
units have adopted many of the functions of a special weapons and tactics
team to extract terrorists. More generally, British forces have taken on basic
policing duties such as street patrolling.
IV-4 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
To accomplish their tasks, the military forces in Northern Ireland have been
granted special legal and police powers, to include the authority to:
• Stop and question any person about his identity and movements
Exercise of these powers has been instrumental in enabling the British forces
to assist the RUC in maintaining a stable environment. However, in some
instances, real or perceived abuses of these powers have incited the local
populace. The nationalists (and some loyalists) have always felt these
“special powers” were too broad and allowed the soldiers to violate their
civil rights. In recognition of these sentiments, British commanders have
generally been extremely careful in monitoring the use of these powers and
ensuring that their soldiers do not abuse them. The British rules of
engagement (ROE) have allowed their soldiers to use reasonable force to
prevent a crime or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected
offenders. Violations of ROE by British soldiers have been prosecuted under
United Kingdom law, and the offenders have been punished, although too
lightly in the eyes of some factions. Despite some criticism, the British have
been generally successful in exercising control of the urban population
without provoking popular backlash by their presence. In large part, they
have done this by adapting to the exigencies of the mission and by
coordinating extensively with their police counterparts.
IV-5
Chapter IV
external sources of supply. PRC measures seek to reduce, relocate, or access populace and
resources that may impede or otherwise threaten the success of military and supporting logistic
operations.
c. Populace controls normally used in PRC include curfews, movement restrictions, travel
permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Resource controls can include licensing, regulations,
checkpoints, ration controls, and inspection of facilities. In JUOs, however, the size and density
of the civilian populace and the nature of JUOs add a number of complications to PRC operations,
particularly in war.
• The potential magnitude of the PRC task in JUOs cannot be overstated. The JFC could
be at least partially responsible for the care and control of hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of civilian noncombatants, no matter what the original mission.
• With the potential of huge numbers of noncombatants, urban PRC will be difficult to
enforce. The standard control measures of passes, permits, and resettlement may be
beyond the capabilities of the joint force for some time.
• The JFC must give great care in the establishment of population control measures,
depending on the situation and characteristics of that population. Inappropriate controls
could exacerbate the PRC problem.
Soldiers from the 709th Military Police Battalion in Humvees make their way
through a hostile crowd in Sevce, Kosovo on April 4, 2000.
IV-6 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
• PRC measures must take into consideration the presence of factions, ethnic groups, and
criminal organizations that may be hostile to one another or to the joint force. Further,
these groups may have ways of controlling their members that are not readily apparent
to the joint force.
• The complexities of the physical urban terrain could result in fragmentation of effort
and difficulty in imposing controls in a consistent manner throughout the urban area.
• There is a strong potential, in war or MOOTW, for the use of noncombatants by the
adversary. This use can range from using them as human shields to fomenting riots to
conducting terrorist attacks on civilians to influence US policy and actions.
• As with any dealings with the civilian noncombatant population, PRC operations require
an understanding of the culture.
• In JUOs, the objectives of PRC are to move noncombatants away from combat areas or
other areas of concern within the city, to centralize them into one or more locations, to
provide for their basic needs, and to foster cooperation and good will.
• Dislocated civilians are often a long-term problem and require enormous resourcing.
Responsibility for these dislocated civilians could fall under the joint force until long-
term aid is fully established. These responsibilities will likely fall into one of five areas:
protect these noncombatants from combat operations; centralize or otherwise control
the large numbers of dislocated civilians; coordinate with civil authorities or relief
organizations; mitigate and control the outbreak of disease; or provide for their basic
life-sustaining needs.
f. The commander of the joint force must analyze the requirements for PRC and then make
some fundamental decisions:
IV-7
Chapter IV
REFUGEES
Refugees are a perennial problem of war. Their presence affects the ability
of commanders to conduct combat operations, and their behavior is difficult
to predict.
In 1968, American forces had immense difficulty in caring for the several
thousand South Vietnamese refugees in Hue.
In 1982, the return of thousands of refugees to their homes in Tyre during the
battle significantly hampered Israeli operations. Similarly, the need to impose
cease-fires and open lanes for civilians to escape the fighting in Beirut slowed
Israeli Defense Force operations in that city. Many Israeli military planners
presumed that civilians in urban combat zones would follow “common sense”
and abandon areas where fighting was taking place. In many cases, this did
not occur. Civilians would instead try to stay in their homes, leaving only
after the battle had begun.
• Whether or not to attempt to relocate all or part of the civilian population, and if so
where and how to relocate them; and
• The HSS mission is to conserve the fighting strength of the joint force and to provide the
combatant commander with a source of trained manpower. For combat operations,
HSS focuses primarily on the treatment and evacuation of wounded and injured and the
prevention and treatment of disease. Chapter III, “Operational Tasks and Considerations,”
discusses the particular aspects of HSS in support of the joint force during JUOs. The
presence of large numbers of noncombatants, however, will probably require HSS
units also to support the civilian populace to some degree in all JUOs within the
IV-8 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
• During urban combat operations, civilian casualties will occur from wounds, disease,
exposure, or lack of safe food and water. Local medical services may be nonexistent, or
at least unable to provide sufficient care for the sick and injured. Relief agencies may or
may not be able to alleviate the situation. Military HSS may be the only source of
medical relief for noncombatants until other agencies and organizations are functioning.
Infectious Diseases
Biological Warfare
Chemical Warfare
Directed-Energy Weapons
Nuclear Warfare
IV-9
Chapter IV
• Many JUOs will be conducted in areas where there is little or no medical infrastructure.
US forces will be at risk from a wide variety of endemic diseases requiring extensive
planning for surgical support, patient movement, appropriate immunizations, preventive
measures, and veterinary and combat stress requirements based upon the disease threat.
Environmental and industrial hazards may pose a threat to deployed forces. An HSS
plan must be developed and include a medical surveillance program, the establishment
of a joint patient movement requirements center, and the activation of the joint task force
Joint Blood Program Office.
• The JFC should organize HSS elements based on the anticipated needs of both the
joint force and the civilian populace, within the limits of applicable laws and
regulations. HSS representatives should be members of all groups, centers, or teams
concerned in any way with the civilian populace, such as the humanitarian assistance
survey team, the humanitarian assistance coordination center, or the civil-military
operations center (CMOC). In order to adequately anticipate noncombatant needs, health
service planners must conduct a health service assessment that examines the factors
listed in Figure IV-2.
• Using the information developed in the HSS assessment, the HSS plan should consider
factors significant to the urban area.
IV-10 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
•• Most immediate threats in urban area. Often, regardless of the major event
precipitating HSS, the most immediate threats will result from extreme environmental
conditions in the form of heat, cold, and high humidity.
•• Patient movement. The need for clear guidance concerning the medical evacuation
and treatment of civilians is critical. Unless otherwise specifically authorized by the
stated mission, force members will provide only emergency medical services to civilian
casualties. Unless otherwise authorized, civilian casualties will be transferred to the
nearest available civilian treatment facility when the medical condition is stabilized.
• All HSS units must have the capability to react quickly and decisively to a terrorist
incident. Medical treatment facilities should have well-conceived mass casualty control
plans and contingency support plans. These plans should consider the urban terrain,
population densities, major roads, possible landing zones, location of all medical facilities,
and reaction procedures.
b. Logistic Support
IV-11
Chapter IV
• Logistic support to noncombatants will fall into one of four categories. It may
comprise more than one, or even all, depending on the mission and the situation. This
support is limited by applicable laws and regulations, and consultation with Service
legal personnel is critical to assure compliance. These categories are as follows.
4. Security
a. Three main areas constitute security in JUOs, and all involve the security of
noncombatants to some degree.
• Security of the joint force. Force protection is a required task in any operation. In
JUOs, where support and protection of noncombatants is a legal requirement and may
be a mission objective, the ability of the force to provide support depends on the security
with which it can do so.
IV-12 JP 3-06
Noncombatants
noncombatants, while not part of the local populace, may require various forms of security
from the joint force, ranging from perimeter and point security to armed escort.
b. Aggressive actions on the part of the joint force enhance security, both for
noncombatants and the force itself. These actions include close contact and communications
with local civilians and organizations and with other civilian agencies, extensive patrolling,
PSYOP, barrier construction, mine and obstacle clearance, movement control, and provision of
needed support.
a. General
• The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or
other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might
present a serious threat to life or loss of property. US forces generally supplement the
efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility
for providing humanitarian assistance by conducting operations limited in scope and
duration. The primary responsibility for US response to FHA requirements lies within
the US Agency for International Development.
• In JUOs, however, many types of operations will have a requirement for some type
of humanitarian assistance. Some degree of assistance may be undertaken in concert
with combat operations, peacekeeping, or other operations whose intent is not the
provision of FHA. Because a UN or US civilian framework may not exist within
which the JFC can support FHA, the joint force may need to perform humanitarian
assistance in addition to its other missions until clarifying authority and direction are
received. The conditions under which FHA is warranted can certainly result from
manmade actions as well as the forces of nature. Warfare, ethnic or religious violence,
political instability — all can lead to suffering and privation on a significant scale.
b. FHA falls into three main categories. It is easy to see that the conditions for any of the
three types of FHA may exist in the urban area at the same time as the causes of other types of
operation. These conditions may stem from the same causes, or they may result from the JUOs
themselves — especially urban combat.
• Relief operations are intended to respond to the conditions caused by natural or manmade
disaster to provide the basic materials and services required to sustain life.
• Dislocated civilian support provides care for refugees, displaced or stateless persons,
evacuees, and other victims of conflict or natural disaster.
IV-13
Chapter IV
c. When assigned an FHA mission in an urban area, the JFC should take into consideration
the characteristics of the urban area and take all the specific planning and organizational steps
required for JUOs. When FHA is not assigned as part of JUOs, the JFC should nevertheless be
prepared to conduct FHA if directed. These preparations should include the readiness to:
• Assess the nature and extent of humanitarian requirements in the urban area, to include
available food and water, civilian casualties and loss of life, dislocated civilian population
and location, status of local government or authority, and degree of destruction to property
and infrastructure;
• Take steps to alleviate the suffering and hardship of the civilian population until
government agencies, NGOs, or international organizations are on-scene and functioning.
• Particularly in urban combat operations, it may be difficult to provide relief for the
civilian populace. There may be no agency immediately available to accept primary
responsibility for FHA. By necessity, the JFC may find that the joint force must perform
some FHA, and possibly provide extensive support, as well as conduct combat operations.
• The urban environment will affect the ability to conduct FHA, in combat or not. The
same tendency toward fragmentation, hindrances to movement and communications,
proximity of the press, and security requirements that accompany other types of JUOs
will also affect urban FHA.
• Interagency operations are key to successful FHA. Normally, the accessibility of urban
areas makes it easier for NGOs and international organizations to participate, therefore
increasing the number of agencies with which the joint force must deal.
• FHA requirements are more concentrated in urban areas, but so are the dangers: disease
spreads more rapidly, unrest is more concentrated, rivalries are exacerbated by close
contact, media attention is more pervasive, security is more problematic, and the
population is significantly more dense.
IV-14 JP 3-06
CHAPTER V
INFRASTRUCTURE
1. General
a. A city is a system of systems that supports the total functioning of an urban area.
Infrastructure is one of those supporting systems and is itself composed of other systems. Urban
infrastructure forms the city’s foundation, and each component of infrastructure affects the
population, the normal operation of the city, and the nature and long-term success of JUOs.
Military planners must understand the functions and interrelationships of these systems in order
to achieve success.
b. Like noncombatants, infrastructure plays a key role in the planning and execution of
JUOs of all types. The nature of that role can vary depending on the type of operation, the
operational objectives, even the phase of an operation. For example, it may be necessary to
protect electrical power facilities during FID operations, disrupt them during urban combat
operations, and restore electrical power during the transition phase. The commander must
determine the role and importance of key infrastructure for each phase of the urban
operation and for the end state. The role and importance falls into two categories: the
impact of individual services, facilities, or systems on planned JUOs; and the impact
operations may have on key infrastructure. In either case, the impact may be either direct or
indirect — direct, for example, in the disruption of electrical power or the restoration of water
services; indirect in the damage to buildings of cultural significance or the improvement of
roadways.
• The impact of operations on infrastructure also depends on the same factors, but
with the additional consideration of operational effects and their relation to mission
accomplishment.
c. The JFC needs to perform an analysis of the infrastructure to determine the relationship
between infrastructure and operations. Such an analysis of key facilities will help the commander
make certain informed decisions, such as: action to be taken in regard to key infrastructure;
requirements for protection, restoration, and joint usage; and estimate of the likelihood and
potential effects of collateral damage, both physical and environmental.
V-1
Chapter V
a. Before a key facility analysis is conducted, the commander determines what factors make
facilities important enough to be considered “key.” These factors may include such elements as
whether and by whom a facility or service is required, the probable effects of its neutralization or
use by friendly or adversary forces, and its importance to the noncombatant population. Planners
take these factors and examine all systems and subsystems of the urban infrastructure, both
physical and service, in order to identify the key facilities. These systems can generally be
grouped as one of the following.
• Energy.
• Administration and human services which includes law enforcement, health and sanitation
services, water distribution, and structures of social political, or cultural significance.
V-2 JP 3-06
Infrastructure
• Determine how the system acts as infrastructure: how it affects the civilian population,
how it might function both in support of and in opposition to JUOs, and what potential
effects different operational actions might have.
• Analyze each facility making up each infrastructure system, using the same terms of
reference used for the system as a whole.
• Recommend COAs for each key facility, with short and long-term potential effects.
c. The simplified example of a key facility analysis for the transportation system in Figure
V-1 illustrates the procedures involved.
Characteristics
May include length, width, type, structure make-up, number of spans,
condition, clearances, and other information
Organization
May include obstacle crossed, route designation, condition of bypasses
and approaches, condition of banks and support structures, safety and
security features, traffic control, and others
Capabilities
May consist of maximum load capacity, daily traffic use, effect of weather
and climate, and others
Role as Infrastructure
How the bridge functions in the overall transportation system and its role
in support of the civilian populace
Use by Friendly Forces
Whether and how friendly forces might use the bridge in the future
Use by Adversary Forces
How the bridge is or may be used to support adversary forces and actions
V-3
Chapter V
a. Protection. The initial steps in the key facility analysis will identify certain
infrastructure to be preserved, protected, or to which damage should be minimized. These
systems and facilities may be protected for several reasons:
• Infrastructure which, for strategic or other reasons, is protected by the ROE; and
• Infrastructure that the joint force will require for its own use.
The JFC has several methods of protecting selected infrastructure. The targeting process
should recognize these facilities or structures to be protected and give careful consideration to
potential collateral damage resulting from attacks on nearby targets. ROE can include restrictions
on actions related to protected sites. If it becomes necessary to attack them, restrictive measures
such as weapons restrictions or the use of nonlethals can preclude serious damage.
b. Restoration
• In the case of certain infrastructure, the JFC will desire to minimize damage on an
otherwise legitimate target. In this case, the objective will be to temporarily disrupt
the service that infrastructure provides in order to accomplish strategic or operational
objectives, but be able to restore that service when desired. Planning should therefore
include an understanding of the functioning of that infrastructure system and what
may be required in order to repair or restore it. For example, if the JFC decides to
disrupt electrical power to an urban area, planners would require advice from an engineer
familiar with the provision of electrical power to an urban area. That engineer would
advise planners concerning key parts of the system, feasible ways to disable those parts,
and the requirements in time and assets required to restore the system to operation. The
JFC can then take the necessary steps to restore usage when appropriate.
c. Joint Usage
• In any ground operations in an urban area, use by the joint force of existing infrastructure
will occur. This usage may be as simple as driving vehicles on city streets, the
appropriation of an entire system such as an airport, or a complex sharing of many
V-4 JP 3-06
Infrastructure
infrastructure systems that serve the urban area. Before a decision is made to use existing
infrastructure, planners must examine its characteristics, functions, availability and
suitability, and the effects of joint use on operational objectives.
• Most of the information required to plan joint usage will be forthcoming from the key
facility analysis, particularly data concerning characteristics, capabilities, and functions.
From that data and the needs of the joint force, planners must determine the availability
and suitability for joint use. When infrastructure is selected for possible joint usage,
planners should determine the potential effects joint use would likely have on the civilian
populace, local government, and other infrastructure. In turn, these effects could impact
on the accomplishment of operational objectives. Finally, the legal advisor should review
any plans for joint force use of infrastructure for adherence to applicable laws and
regulations.
a. Coordination of JUOs through the joint targeting coordination board can significantly
reduce collateral and environmental damage. The objective is to control as carefully as possible
the effects of operations on infrastructure and the civilian populace.
• Key facility analysis can aid in the selection of targets in urban infrastructure to ensure
that they meet specific objectives. Target analysis and weaponeering can determine the
potential for collateral and environmental damage resulting from attack of a particular
target.
• In the urban concentration of people and infrastructure, the potential for serious
environmental consequences is greater than in some other areas. To accurately predict
the environmental damage and its consequences that may occur as a result of attacks,
planners require expert advice in the particular areas concerned. For example, an attack
on a chemical plant in a predominantly rural area is likely to affect directly fewer people
than if the plant were in an urban area. When assessing key facilities as targets, only
expert opinion can predict the extent of the resulting effects — such as spillage, pollution,
or toxicity. Subject matter experts can then determine the impact of those effects. For
example, one expert may determine that an attack will result in a certain level of toxic
spillage; another might predict where that spillage would go. The experts should be able
to determine whether the nature and location of the spillage could contaminate the city’s
water supply.
b. In the end, analysis of potential collateral and environmental damage must be weighed
against the importance of the target in achieving operational and strategic objectives. In making
that determination, the JFC should examine the short- and long-term operational and strategic
consequences that any damage might have on the conduct of operations, friendly forces, the
civilian populace, infrastructure, and public perception.
V-5
Chapter V
Intentionally Blank
V-6 JP 3-06
APPENDIX A
JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLESPACE IN URBAN AREAS
1. General
a. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is the analytical process used by
joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other
intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decisionmaking process. It is a continuous process
that involves four major steps: defining the battlespace environment; describing the effects of
the battlespace; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential
COAs.
• Although the JIPB process assists joint forces in achieving information superiority, JIPB’s
main focus is on providing predictive intelligence. JIPB assesses adversary COGs,
focuses intelligence collection at the right time and place, and identifies adversary COAs
(particularly the adversary’s most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to mission
accomplishment).
• The JIPB effort must be fully coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the separate
IPB efforts of the component commands and Service intelligence centers. All staff
elements of the joint force and component commands fully participate in the JIPB effort
by providing battlespace information and data relative to their staff areas of expertise.
b. JIPB is a remarkably versatile process that can be adapted to support a wide variety of
joint missions across the range of military operations. For this reason JIPB is particularly useful
in supporting JUOs during force-on-force confrontations or during MOOTW.
a. All urban operations are likely to be joint, whether part of a larger campaign or focused
operations within an urban area. In JUOs, tactical level detail often has operational or strategic
significance. Therefore, JIPB support to JUOs must provide a finer degree of detail than would
be required of operations over a broader operational area. JIPB products (e.g., modified combined
obstacle overlays [MCOOs], doctrinal templates, situation templates, and event templates) should
be tailored to the situation, but should follow the general formats prescribed in JP 2-01.3, Joint
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. JIPB
support to urban area operations follows the basic four-step process outlined below.
b. Define the Battlespace Environment. The joint battlespace includes the operational
area and areas of interest for each battlespace dimension of potential concern to the command
(e.g., information environment, subsurface dimension, and political constraints). The full multi-
dimensional, geographic and non-geographic spectrum of the battlespace should be defined
based on the following factors:
A-1
Appendix A
• Potential sources of influence outside the actual urban area (e.g., dependence on
surrounding rural areas for water, hydro-electric power, and food).
• General characteristics and capabilities of potential manmade and natural threats (e.g.,
disease, environmental hazards, criminal gangs, and insurgents).
c. Describe the Battlespace Effects. The urban battlespace contains significant differences
from that of other environments, consisting as it does of more complex physical terrain,
concentrated infrastructure, and relatively dense population in addition to typical battlespace
elements. This requires JIPB to focus on providing an extremely high level of detail in the
description of the battlespace’s effects. The analysis must consider the following factors that
should be depicted on the MCOO:
• Urban terrain.
•• Building construction.
•• Subterranean features.
•• Basic demographics.
• Infrastructure.
• Key facilities.
• Power plants.
• Water system.
• Medical facilities.
A-2 JP 3-06
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace in Urban Areas
• Airfields.
• Roadways.
• Railways.
• Bridges.
• Subways.
• Civil defense.
• Surrounding environs.
• Multinational capabilities.
•• Multinational forces.
d. Evaluate the Adversary. In JUOs, the adversary could be greatly different from an
adversary normally associated with operations in non-urban environments. Adversaries may
choose to make widespread use of snipers, ambushes, and HUMINT networks, and may choose
to deliberately avoid decisive engagements. In some situations, as in MOOTW, the term
A-3
Appendix A
“adversary” must be broadly applied to include organizations, groups, decision makers, or even
physical factors that can delay, degrade, or prevent the joint force from accomplishing its mission.
The following factors should be analyzed and depicted on adversary doctrinal templates.
• Conventional force order of battle (air, ground, missile, anti-air, and electronic).
e. Determine Adversary Courses of Action. The final step in the JIPB process integrates
the results of the previous steps into a product to assist in identifying the adversary’s most likely
COA and most dangerous COA. It begins by defining likely adversary objectives (geographic
and/or political) and developing potential COAs for accomplishing those objectives. Each COA
should be reflected on separate situation templates. The situation templates are integrated to
form an event template that facilitates the identification of named areas of interest. The following
factors should be considered when determining adversary COAs relative to urban operations.
A-4 JP 3-06
APPENDIX B
JOINT FIRES FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
a. Urban military operations are intimately involved with the urban triad of physical terrain,
noncombatants, and infrastructure. Very few actions can occur that do not affect at least one of
these elements of the urban environment, if not all three. Urban combat almost always will
affect all three in greater or lesser degree, and fires have the potential for the greatest destruction
and loss of life. In order to maximize the effect of urban fires on the adversary while at the same
time minimizing the adverse effects on the city and its inhabitants, these fires must often be as
precise as technology and planning will allow. Technology only allows a weapon to go where
the planners intend it to go. The targeting process must take into consideration all the
factors associated with urban fires and the urban operation when developing target lists.
Neither art nor science, target development is a combination of the two that systematically
examines the components and relationships of potential military, political, or economic systems
to establish their criticality and vulnerability to attack. Understanding the system enables the
attacker to undertake precision attacks on those parts that will achieve the desired effect on the
whole. It is important to remember that destructive weapons are not the only means for precision
attack on target systems; other means such as IO or nonlethal weapons may also be used.
• Although single targets exist, most often a target’s importance lies in its relationship to
other targets. A group of targets related functionally and geographically forms a target
system. The basis for target development is to identify and analyze target systems.
Since the urban area is itself a system of systems, this approach to target development is
also applicable to urban targeting. The target system method of targeting is appropriate
for all planned targets in urban areas.
See Appendix B of JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, for additional information on
Time-Sensitive Target Considerations.
• Target systems also display some general systems characteristics that are useful concepts
in urban target development. Although models exist that attempt to demonstrate visually
the interrelationship of systems within an overall adversary system, their applicability
can vary greatly depending on culture, state of development, geography, or situation in
the area under consideration. Although all urban areas rely on various systems to some
B-1
Appendix B
degree, the functions and value of these systems may not be readily apparent to us or
consistent with western ways of thinking.
b. There are two basic causes of urban fratricide — procedural and technical.
Procedural causes can be either loss of technical control of weapons or weapons systems or
failures of fire support coordination. Technical failures may include failures of controlling
equipment or mechanical malfunctions.
a. The effects of weapons and munitions in urban areas can be significantly different from
the effects in other environments. The characteristics of the terrain and the nature of urban
combat affect both the results and employment of weapons of all types.
b. Specific urban weapons effects considerations include the type and size of the weapon
and round, the construction of the building, and the ability to engage the target.
Nonlethal weapons are weapon systems that are explicitly designed and primarily
employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent
injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. IOs such as
EW and psychological warfare, are not designed specifically to minimize fatalities, but they
may be used with the same intent. Nonlethal weapons can help commanders maintain the
desired balance between force protection, mission accomplishment, and safety of noncombatants
by expanding the number of options available when the use of deadly force poses problems.
This type of situation most often occurs during MOOTW, although urban combat operations
may also contain situations where nonlethal weapons are useful.
B-2 JP 3-06
Joint Fires for Urban Operations
The JFC may prohibit or restrict joint force attacks on specific targets or objects without
specific approval based on political considerations, military risk, collateral damage risk, the
LOAC, and ROE. Targeting limitations generally fall into two categories: no strike targets and
restricted targets.
B-3
Appendix B
Intentionally Blank
B-4 JP 3-06
APPENDIX C
PORT AND AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS
1. General
a. Ports and airfields play a vital role to an expeditionary force. They are generally located
in, or very near, urban areas. In many countries, ports and airfields provide the only means
through which large numbers of personnel, equipment, and supplies can enter the operational
area.
b. Most coastal cities were built around a port, it being the reason for the city’s existence in
the first place. Although some port cities have built new port facilities some distance from the
urban area, in most cases the port is located right in the center of the most heavily populated and
congested part of the city. Airfields are generally located farther from the built-up sections of
the urban area, depending on their size and when they were built. Older airfields are often closer
to the heart of the city, while newer ones can be miles away from even the outskirts of the urban
area.
2. Planning Considerations
a. The JFC must plan for both the entry of the joint force into the operational area and the
sustainment of that force. Most of the time, this means planning for the use of available ports
and airfields.
b. Although planning for the use of ports has somewhat different considerations than planning
for airfields, certain general planning considerations pertain to both.
c. In urban combat operations, it may be necessary to target a port or airfield to prevent its
use by the adversary. In this case, the same considerations apply as for other key infrastructure,
and if future use by the joint force is contemplated, steps should be taken to limit damage as
much as possible. The same is true if ground forces need to physically seize the facilities.
3. Port Considerations
a. The planning and execution of port operations at the operational level requires a detailed
analysis of a wide range of factors.
b. The probable location of port facilities within the urban area makes smooth operations
problematic. The most significant factors influencing operations of the port are physical layout,
the handling capabilities, the transportation infrastructure, and security.
C-1
Appendix C
4. Airfield Considerations
a. Air terminal operations involve numerous interdependent functions ranging from ensuring
that sufficient airlift facilities are available to meeting any threat to operations.
b. Many large urban areas have relatively modern airports serving them, even if they are
some distance from the central parts of the city. Other urban areas may be serviced by smaller,
less modern facilities. Factors influencing airfield operations in JUOs include the need to use
the airfield for different types of flight operations (including civilian operations in MOOTW),
the distance from joint force units and supply facilities, road capabilities, security, and airfield
capabilities.
5. Security Considerations
a. Both port and airfield facilities will be susceptible to attack by conventional and
unconventional means. As stationary targets, they are vulnerable to air or missile attack. Their
size and probable locations, along with the presence of civilians, may encourage sabotage,
terrorism, mining, and espionage.
b. The first step to providing security is threat assessment. Based on the assessed threat, the
JFC can determine where to accept risks, where to focus protection efforts, and how much of the
force should be devoted to protection of port and airfield facilities. Most terminals, ports, and
airfields are physically laid out so that limited dispersion can be achieved within the boundaries
of the port itself. In any case, dispersion does not permit maximum port use. The extent to which
a commander uses the established port of airfield represents a calculated risk.
C-2 JP 3-06
APPENDIX D
URBAN AIRSPACE CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
1. General
• The need for each Service or functional component within the joint force to operate a
variety of air vehicles and weapon systems, both high and low speed, rotary- and fixed-
wing (manned and unmanned), within the combat zone airspace control area.
• The need for each Service or functional component to use the airspace with maximum
freedom consistent with the degree of risk operationally acceptable to the JFC.
• The need for airspace control activities to be performed in congruence with air defense
operations to integrate and synchronize surface-to-air defense weapons and air defense
aircraft for maximum effectiveness.
• The need to discriminate quickly and effectively between friendly, neutral, and adversary
aircraft and vehicles.
• The need for the combat zone airspace control system to be responsive to the requirements
of the joint force. The airspace control system needs to be capable of supporting high-
density traffic and surge operations as may be required by the JFC.
• The need for close coordination and integration of surface force operations, supporting
fires, air operations, air defense operations, special operations, and airspace control
activities.
• The need to accommodate US, HN, and multinational airspace control activities within
the joint combat zone.
• The need for temporary restrictive airspace control measures on certain areas of airspace
to allow subordinate commanders total freedom of operations.
D-1
Appendix D
b. The airspace of the combat zone is a crucial dimension of the urban battlespace and is
used by all components of the joint and multinational forces to conduct assigned missions. A
high concentration of friendly surface, subsurface, and air-launched weapon systems must be
able to share this airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power.
c. The distinguishing features of urban airspace are compressed airspace and a three-
dimensional ground environment.
• Compressed airspace brings separate and diverse missions into close proximity.
• The location of major airports in or near urban areas often puts the aerial port of
debarkation inside the urban airspace.
• During MOOTW, a number of different types of aircraft may share the urban airspace
— tactical aircraft, airlift assets, rotary-wing aircraft, UAV, and civilian aircraft.
• The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC) to
integrate the capabilities and C2 of joint air assets. The JFC also designates both the
airspace control authority (ACA) and the area air defense commander (AADC). The
responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned
to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the situation
dictates. Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign the JFACC, AADC, or
ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all three positions is essential.
The ACA is responsible for coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control
area, and developing the airspace control plan (ACP).
For more information regarding the responsibilities and relationships of the JFACC,
ACA, and AADC, see JP 3-56.1, Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Air
Operations; JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, and JP
3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.
• The methods of airspace control may vary depending on the range of military operations
and the nature of the urban area. Methods range from full positive control to full procedural
control of all air assets, or any effective combination of the two. Urban air control, in
most instances, will require both positive and procedural control methods.
D-2 JP 3-06
Urban Airspace Control Considerations
• The completed ACP will fully describe the airspace considerations, methods, and
procedures that govern air and air defense operations in the urban area, including
procedural airspace control measures.
• The control of urban airspace demands careful coordination to limit the potential conflict
among aircraft needed for operations within that airspace. The ACA establishes airspace
control measures to facilitate this control.
b. In JUOs, the methods and procedures for airspace control depend on the type of operation,
the mission of the joint force, and physical conditions such as the operational situation, weather,
and urban terrain.
D-3
Appendix D
Intentionally Blank
D-4 JP 3-06
APPENDIX E
REFERENCES
1. Joint Publications
e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlespace.
g. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and
Services Support to Joint Operations.
E-1
Appendix E
s. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Environments.
bb. JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).
cc. JP 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue.
ff. JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.
mm. JP 4-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint
Operations.
E-2 JP 3-06
References
nn. JP 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint
Operations.
oo. JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.
pp. JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement and Integration.
uu. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
Support to Joint Operations.
yy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List.
E-3
Appendix E
3. Army Publications
c. MCIA. Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation. Quantico, VA: Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity, February 1999.
E-4 JP 3-06
References
f. MCDP 2, Intelligence.
h. MCDP 4, Logistics.
i. MCDP 5, Planning.
m. MCWP 3-33.6, Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Joint and Multi-
Service Environments.
5. Navy Publications
6. Miscellaneous Publications
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Fort Drum: 10th Mountain Division, Headquarters. June 1993.
E-5
Appendix E
c. Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Ft. McNair: National Defense
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d. “The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part II.” Air Power Journal. Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall
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e. Bowden, Mark. Blackhawk Down. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1999.
g. Celestan, MAJ Gregory J., USA. Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military
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h. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Fort Leavenworth: US Army Combined
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i. Chuikov, Vasili I. The Battle for Stalingrad. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
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j. Cole, Ronald. Operation Just Cause: Panama. Washington, DC: Joint History Office,
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l. Connaughton, Richard, John Pimlott, and Duncan Anderson. The Battle for Manila:
The Most Devastating Untold Story of World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
m. Cooling, Norman L. Shaping the Battlespace to Win the Street Fight. United States
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n. Craig, William. Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. New York: Dutton,
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o. Doerrer, Eric A. “Civil Affairs in Haiti.” Military Review. March/April 1996: pp. 73–
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p. Ellefsen, Richard and Liu, Jack. Urban Terrain Zone Based GIS for MOUT.
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r. Gall, Carlotta and De Waal, Thomas. Chechnya, Calamity in the Caucasus. New
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E-6 JP 3-06
References
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t. Glenn, Russell W. and others. The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND
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x. Glenn, Russell W. Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the
Impending Urban Operations Threat. DASW01-96-C-0004. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998.
y. Glenn, Russell W. “… We Band of Brothers”: The Call for Joint Urban Operations
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z. Grau, Lester W. “Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for
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aa. Grau, Lester W., ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1996.
bb. Grau, Lester W. and Jorgensen, Dr. William A. “Handling the Wounded in a Counter-
Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya.” U.S. Army Medical
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cc. Grau, Lester W. “Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny.” National
Defense University’s Strategic Forum. Institute for National Strategic Studies.
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ff. Grau, LTC Lester W., USA (Ret.) and Thomas, LTC Timothy L., USA (Ret.). “‘Soft
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E-7
Appendix E
gg. Hammel, Eric. Fire in the Streets: The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968. New York: Dell,
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hh. Hahn, Robert F., II and Jezior, Bonnie. “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of
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jj. Krulak, Gen. Charles C., USMC. “The Strategic Corporal.” Marine Corps Gazette.
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kk. Mordica, George J., II. It’s a Dirty Business, But Somebody Has to Do It (Urban
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nn. Owen, Robert C., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. “The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part
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rr. Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA. Future Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army
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ss. Shelton, Lieutenant General. H. Hugh and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Vane.
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tt. Simmons, Dean, Phillip Gould, Verena Vomastic, and Phillip Walsh. “Air Operations
over Bosnia.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1997.
uu. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University
Press, 1963.
vv. Taw, Jennifer Morrison. Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other Than
War. Santa Monica: RAND. 1996.
E-8 JP 3-06
References
ww. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat.”
Parameters (Summer 1999): 87-102.
xx. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed
Forces Confront Chechnya.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 8. No. 2 (June 1995): 233-
290.
yy. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed
Forces Confront Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1–16 January 1995.” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, Vol. 10 (March 1997), pp. 50–108.
zz. Vick, Allen, et. al., Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New
Concepts, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000.
aaa. Zinni, Gen Anthony C., USMC. Director of Operations, United Task Force Somalia
(November 1992-May 1993) and Special Envoy, Somalia (October 1993). Interview. PBS On-
Line, 11 October 1999.
bbb. United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: The 1999 Revision.
New York, NY: United Nations, 1995.
E-9
Appendix E
Intentionally Blank
E-10 JP 3-06
APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116
Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the United States Marine Corps. The Joint Staff doctrine
sponsor for this publication is the Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment (J-8).
3. Change Recommendations
Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with
info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that
directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.
The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint
Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
c. Record of Changes:
4. Distribution
a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers
listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication
is not available from the Service.
F-1
Appendix F
b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the
combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication
to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy
(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative
support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the
Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.
Commander
USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102
Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
F-2 JP 3-06
GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
DA direct action
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DP decisive point
EW electronic warfare
HN host nation
HSS health service support
HUMINT human intelligence
GL-1
Glossary
PA public affairs
PR personnel recovery
PRC populace and resources control
PSYOP psychological operations
GL-2 JP 3-06
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
airborne battlefield command and control center. A United States Air Force aircraft equipped
with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne
command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility. Also called ABCCC.
(JP 1-02)
antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also
called AT. (JP 1-02)
battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully
apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land,
sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the
electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas
and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)
campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a
strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)
centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force
derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)
civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained,
and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military
operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)
GL-3
Glossary
established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC.
(JP 1-02)
command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)
consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses,
and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-
yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority
rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required.
Also called CM. (JP 1-02)
counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also
called CT. (JP 1-02)
course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A
possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the
accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4.
A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)
critical node. An element, position, or command and control entity whose disruption or destruction
immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat
operations. Also called target critical damage point. (JP 1-02)
decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome
of an attack. See also centers of gravity. (JP 1-02)
defensive information operations. The integration and coordination of policies and procedures,
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information
systems. Defensive information operations are conducted through information assurance,
physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter-psychological operations,
counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations. Defensive
information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying
GL-4 JP 3-06
Glossary
adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own
purposes. (JP 1-02)
direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations
forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage
on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations
forces or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics;
emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or
maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct
independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)
electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The
three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection,
and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare
involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to
attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or
destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA
includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons
that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism
(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of
electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities,
and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that
degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic
warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under
direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or
localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the
purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations.
Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving
electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting,
and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals
intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement
and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)
evasion and recovery. The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery
forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated
in hostile territory to friendly control. (JP 1-02)
force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense
personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions
conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate
the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective
GL-5
Glossary
employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does
not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also
called FP. (JP 1-02)
foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation
that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.
Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration.
The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host
nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.
FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions.
Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)
host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners,
and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.
Also called HN. (JP 1-02)
human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided
by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)
information operations. Use of offensive and defensive information means to degrade, destroy,
and exploit an adversary’s information-based process while protecting one’s own. Also called
IO. (JP 1-02)
intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis,
evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation,
analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)
interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination
that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies,
GL-6 JP 3-06
Glossary
nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of
accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)
interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential
before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)
joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in
coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 1-02)
joint intelligence center. The intelligence center of the combatant command headquarters.
The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence
required to support the combatant commander and staff, components, subordinate joint forces
and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. (JP 1-02)
joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical process used by joint
intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence
products in support of the joint force commander’s decisionmaking process. It is a continuous
process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace’s
effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses
of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace,
and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent’s capabilities to
operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the
joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied
during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Also called JIPB. (JP 1-02)
joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant
commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally
a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission.
Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and
geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.
Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)
joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense,
a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.
Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)
joint urban operations. All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military
operations on, or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain
where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. Also
called JUOs. (JP 1-02)
GL-7
Glossary
logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its
most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and
development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition
of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or
construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing
of services. (JP 1-02)
measurement and signature intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative
and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation,
plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying
any distinctive features associated with the target, source, emitter or sender measurement of the
same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called MASINT. (JP 1-02)
military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to
friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five
categories of military deception are as follows. a. strategic military deception — Military deception
planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary
military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and
operations. b. operational military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and
in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the
originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in
a theater to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception — Military
deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary
actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception
is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception —
Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint
operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities
of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC) —
Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the
prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions.
Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide
cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02)
military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across
the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement
any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.
Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)
GL-8 JP 3-06
Glossary
nonlethal weapons. Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate
personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property and the environment. a. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their
targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than
gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. b. Nonlethal weapons are intended
to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: (1) They have relatively reversible effects on
personnel or materiel. (2) They affect objects differently within their area of influence. (JP 1-02)
offensive information operations. The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities
and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers to
achieve or promote specific objectives. These capabilities and activities include but are not
limited to operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare,
physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could also include
computer network attack. (JP 1-02)
operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational
objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns,
major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy
into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all
levels of war. (JP 1-02)
operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational
areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives
needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational
objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.
These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the
logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical
successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02)
operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly
actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems
might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be
useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable
level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)
GL-9
Glossary
personnel recovery. The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release
or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether
they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military,
or paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel
recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering
captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm’s way. PR includes but is not limited to
theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion,
resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as
forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by nongovernmental
organizations, other US Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through
any of these. Also called PR. (JP 1-02)
public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations
activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department
of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)
rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and
paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by
unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are
conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations
of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape
special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the
national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and
GL-10 JP 3-06
Glossary
political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support,
and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO.
(JP 1-02)
strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and
guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities
at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives;
define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power;
develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military
forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)
targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to
them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02)
target system. 1. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally
related. 2. (DOD only) A group of targets that are so related that their destruction will
produce some particular effect desired by the attacker. (JP 1-02)
technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign materiel, produced for
strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when
an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper
steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a
countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary’s technological advantage. Also
called TECHINT. (JP 1-02)
terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear;
intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)
urban triad. The three distinguishing characteristics of urban areas: complex manmade physical terrain,
a population of significant size and density, and an infrastructure upon which the area depends.
(Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
GL-11
Glossary
weaponeering. The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons
required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability,
weapons effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability.
(JP 1-02)
weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or
of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass
destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons,
but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a
separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
GL-12 JP 3-06
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
WARFARE
JP 0-2
UNAAF
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-06 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of
the development process:
STEP #1
Project Proposal
STEP #5 ! Submitted by Services, combatant commands, STEP #2
Assessments/Revision or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void Program Directive
! The combatant commands ! J-7 validates requirement with Services and
receive the JP and begin to combatant commands ! J-7 formally staffs with
assess it during use Services and combatant
! J-7 initiates Program Directive commands
! 18 to 24 months following
publication, the Director, J-7, will ! Includes scope of project,
solicit a written report from the references, milestones,
combatant commands and and who will develop
Services on the utility and quality drafts
of each JP and the need for any
urgent changes or earlier-than- ! J-7 releases Program
scheduled revisions Directive to Lead Agent.
Lead Agent can be
! No later than 5 years after Service, combatant
development, each JP is revised command, or Joint Staff
Project (JS) Directorate
Proposal
Assess-
ments/ Program
Revision Directive
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
CJCS Two
Approval Drafts
STEP #4 STEP #3
CJCS Approval Two Drafts
! Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff ! Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA)
to develop the pub
! Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required
changes and prepares pub for coordination with ! PRA develops two draft pubs
Services and combatant commands
! PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands,
! Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP Services, and Joint Staff