BaTHAN’s PRE-WEEK NOTES FOR 2019 REMEDIAL LAW BAR pecially CIVIL PROCEDURE (Part -A-) \/ CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE (Pai SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS & SPEC. RULES, (Part -c-) Part -A. OBJECTIVE TYPE APPROACH: KO 4. What is *Obiter Dictumn’? > Itis a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a jud that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly uy not necessarily involved in the determination gf t analogy or argument. > Itdoes not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks oa of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an decision upon a cause by the way, question before him, or upon a point Se, or introduced by way of illustration, or ‘opinion with no binding force for pul ‘Pes judicata (LBP vs. Santos, 2016). 2. What is Pro Hac Vice Decision? > PHV means for this one parti be relied upon as a pre‘ Development Corp. vs, sion. PHVD is a ruling expressly qualified as such cannot 7avern other cases (Tadeja vs. People, 2013 cited in HighPoint » 2018). 3. Discuss the concept of Me \dum. Decision? > The law does not gefine the MD and simply suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of fact Bad the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. No’ lar form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Big. 129 even employ the term "memorandum decision” in Section 40 or elsewhere in the re ‘Statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this jurisdiction not by that Yection 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines: “The judgment or final resolution of a sppealed cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law wed in the decision or final order appealed from.” b ‘ay be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the peal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. MD can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice, But expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Big. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down (Francisco vs.Permskul, 1989). 4. What is residual jurisdiction (RJ)? In the trial court, when is RJ available? > Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided theseare done prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition (Angeles vs. CA, 2014), > The "residual jurisdiction” of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the Tecords on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-calied residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal (Angeles vs. CA, 2014) > Ru over a case to become available in the trial court, atrial on the merits must have been Gens the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom (DBP xt arpio, 2017). Case: > DBP vs, Judge Carpio, 2017: The complaint for replevin and damages Prercees by the trial court on the ground of improper venue. DBP argued that the trial court has RJ {0 rule on its application for damages. The SC said: it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC iy rule on DBP’s application for absent. damages pursuant to its residual powers, because all the require 5. Explain the substantial distinctions between ‘jurisdiction o\ A=. matter” from ‘exercise of Jurisdiction”. > Trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a part incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdict iction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exerci isdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the of led from time to time by the Court. In The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court CF ‘@ matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the bh question of jurisdiction. Cases: > Gonzales vs. GJH [J. Bernabe]: Intra-corporate case was filediraffied to a Fegular court Branch YA Iniftead of referring the case to the OCC for re-raffle to commercial court, Br. 276 dism; case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. HELD: Br. 267 w , because the incident merely involved a matter of procedure. Its, therefore, from the titeeof such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, ° n, 2013 [J. Bernabe]: |t is settied that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the of a statute. Family Courts are special courts, also an RTC designated by the SC Courts having original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC, and therefore, Wurisdiction to pass upon the validity of RA 9262. 6. Explain Ne substantial distinctions between “interlocutory Order" from ‘Final Order’. @ /nterlocutory” refers to intervening developments between the commencement of a suit and its mplete termination; hence, it is a development that does not end the whole controversy. An “interlocutory order’ merely rules on an incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose Of the case; it leaves something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits (Marmo vs. Anacay, 2009). As to remedy, certiorari 65 is available so long as there is GAD. > When an order completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing to be done by the court, itis a final order. The remedy is appeal (Martinez vs. Buen, 2017), unless the rules provides otherwise. > An order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives ‘an end to the litigation. When the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory. A final order or judgment disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the right, or some right or rights of the parties, either onthe entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where there is no issue left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the judgment or order, such judgment or order is final and appealable (Investment inc. vs. CA, 1987). Case: » Bonifacio Construction Management vs. TH EP-B, 2006 [J.ASGJ: JB denied defendant's motion to dismiss and the MR thereto for failure of the plaintiff to implead the STATE as an indispensable party. Elevated to CA via certiorari 65. HELD: The ruling is not certiorariable. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal afier a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. It is resorteg only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent (0 lagk of jurisdiction. ts function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction, jieve Persons from arbitrary acts - acts which courts or judges have no power or law to Perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions courts (Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED, 2001) appeal. It is because, by its Motion to Dismiss on the alleged ground! lure to implead or indispensable party, defendant is dictating to plaintiff whom to select dtlefendant. Such is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bank of America NZ & SA vs. CA, 186 SCRA 417, where it was held thus: id fi urse, the plaintiff will have exercising his option, for the ‘The PROPER remedy is to file answer, proceed to trial and await sone fre interposing an to suffer the consequences of any error he might coy defe hat he does not implead or drop from the’ , May well be an indispensable party. There was no GAD. Besides, even granting arguendo that the party s to be impleaded by petitioner is an indispensable party, Procedure ‘Neither may be dropped or ‘order of the courte motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such 65: as are just x x x. Clearly therefore, the MTD was 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurally improperly filed, and ju denied. ON INDISPENSABLE PARTY: ( BUT TAKE NOTE: If plaintiff is of trial court to implead an indispensable party and plaintiff refused to do so, complaint is ngdi le on the ground of failure to implead, but dismissible on ground of failure to comply with of the court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of RC (Macababbad vs. Masirag, 2009). a 7. Discuss the of ‘two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and what is the. ‘of the "two-dismissal rul > A complal dismissed by the plaintiff by fling a notice of dismissal at any time before service, 'swer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the ‘without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits sag ue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the di id by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or uding the same claim. Vis the so-called “dismissal upon notice by plaintiff”. he rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court > Dismissals are without prejudice; except when it is tie second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. The dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e., with prejudice to the re-fling of the same claim. Plaintiff is barred from seeking relief on the same claim. > For a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, the following requisites must be present» There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court; > Both cases were based on or include the same claim; > Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff, and > When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former. > The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation" (Ching vs. Cheng, 2014). 8. What is the concept of “dismissal upon motion of plaintiff"? » Except as provided in Section 1, Rule 17, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The gismissal ‘shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in {separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his, to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified rder, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall n issed or compromised without the approval of the court (see Section 2, Rule 17). > The rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been plgaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. It wifione of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared court (Ching vs. Cheng, 2014) > In Ching vs. Cheng, 2014, the dismissal of the first case defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b. lack of jurisdiction Civil Procedure, therefore, the subsequent dismissal operate adjudication upon the merit. ie at the instance of the bject matter) of the Rules of tance of the plaintiff does not 2: Blay vs. Bana, 2018 [J. Bernabe]: After Counterciaim in a declaration of nullity of mi case, petitioner withdrew his petition. RTC ordered the petition as withdrawn, but decial pondent's counterclaim ‘as remaining for independent adjudication’ and gave petitioner-defendant in the counter-claim 15-day period to file his answer to the counterclaim. Ther HELD: RTC was wrong. S2, R: endant prior to the service up nt filed his Answer with Compulsory ys: Xxx {ta counterclaim ‘of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, glowed the counterclaim to remain for independent adjudication before Keghse the respondent failed to file his manifestation within fifteen (15) ce of the motion to withdraw petition, and failure to comply with that requirement, lent's counterclaim shall be prosecuted in a separate action. 9. Give inst of dismissal without prejudice", and the appropriate remedy available to the aggrieved pS of initiatory pleading: Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the certification of non-forum > iil en: dismissal is without prejudice (unless otherwise provided in the order) (see Section 5 of e 7, 1997 Rules of Court). REMEDY: Refile the complaint. aintiff fails to appear during the pre-trial conference, or plaintiff fails to file pre-trial brief: Dismissal is always with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court (see Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Court; see also Rules on summary Procedure on failure to appear during PC). REMEDY: MR (optional); Appeal (R40 or R41) > On Small Claims, plaintiff fails to appear during the hearing: Dismissal is always without prejudice (see Section 18, Rule on Small Claim): REMEDY: REMEDY: Refile the Statement of Claim. If the refiled Statement of Claim is Dismissed on the ground that the dismissal of the first with prejudice: REMEDY: Certiorari under Rule 65 (Jurisprudential Basis: A.L. Ang Network vs. Mondejar, 2014 [J. Beabe]. MR is prohibited, because Dismissal Order is a final order.> On Environmental Cases, plaintiff's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, or to file pre-trial brief: Dismissal Order is always without prejudice (see Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases). REMEDY: Refile the complaint. > Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff under Section 1 of Rule 17, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal is without prejudice, (except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who was once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim, therefore, with prejudice). If without prejudice: Refile complaint. If with prejudice, MR and/or Appeal. RULES ON MOTIONS: 10. What is the effect if a litigious motion is directed to the clerk of court and not to the adversd party? > Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errorg of fdafhent. Considered as a mere scrap of paper, which should not be accepted for filing, ae is not entitled to judicial cognizance. > To comply with the requirements of notice, as part and parcel of procedural due process, it is Necessary that all motions be addressed to all parties concerned@phis is a mandatory Tequirement, and the failure of the movant to comply with this requisite is\@tgetreated as a mere scrap of paper for want of the required notice, they must be deemed, foal legal intents and Purposes, as if they were not filed, and any subsequent action githe court thereon will not cure the flaw (Obrero vs. Acidera, 2002). ON CONDITION PRECEDENTS: A + THINGS TO REMEMBER: ¥ Provisions of KP: Q Section 408. Subject Matter for Amice jent; Exception Thereto. - The lypon of ‘each barangay shall have authority toNqing together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable setftefnent of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the g¢ nf, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, (b) Where one party is officer or amployee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his offi ‘ ns; (c) Offenses pur x imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand mee 0); (d) Offenses wheusAhere is no private offended party; (©) Whecing dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities ties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an upon; Isputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or unicipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; Y (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of Justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Jupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial motu propio refer the case to the /upon concemed for amicable settlement. ‘Section 409. Venue: (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complaint. (©) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated (@) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay ‘where such workplace or institution is located. Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay, otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred \ mpy be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representati ruling thereon shall be binding, Y Articles 150 and 161, Family Code: no suit between membgts of the same family (between husband and wife; between parents and children; jong brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood, shall prosper unless it shold appear from the Verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no su@ya¥orts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. > Gayon vs. Gayon (1970); Guerrero vs. RTC of Ilocos r. 16 (1994): the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same famil jot comprehend ‘sisters-in-law’, > Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Judge A\ ): once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same famil fo longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a co before the action can prosper, because Article 151 of the Family Code applies to covel len the suit is exclusively between or among family members, and may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family. > O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit (1993): the fo compromise as well as the inability to succeed is. ‘a condition precedent to the filin jetween members of the same family, absence of ‘such allegation in the complaint und for the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. 'e allegation in the complaint that the parties had passed ings with issued certificate to file action (Katarungang Pambarangay), in co} with P.D. No. 1508 (now Article 412 of RA 7160) is sufficient ‘compliance with Articl@{eQof the Family Code. > Blardony, Jr. vs, Judge Coscolluela (1990); Racpan vs. Barroga-Haigh (June 6, 2018): through barangay conci Barangay con is not necessary in actions coupled with provisional remedies such ‘as preliminary i 9, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite. > Section 3), RA 7160: Parties may go directly to court if the action is coupled with provisi fedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property indent lite. CASE ts: Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings. Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, } and Claudine, which make them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. Jose had a land diSuAe against them. Considering that all of Jose’s relatives were all abroad, except his niece Rene, Jose brought the matter against Rene to the barangay Lupon for conciliation proceedings. No settlement was reached, and the case was filed. However, RTC motu proprio dismissed Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the provision of Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before suits may be filed between family members. Issue/s and Ruling: : 1s the RTC correct in dismissing the complaint motu proprio based on that ground? Article 151 provides that “no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the casemust be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.” RTC was wrong. The non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise, deemed waived. The defect may however he waived by falling to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dj claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judical prescription of action. : More importantly, family relations include those: (1) Between husband and gy inren Parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants: and (4) Amor hers and sisters. whether of the full or half-blood. ‘Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit, the eamest effort reql nt is no longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper. In this case, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo arg. full-blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Clafine gi considered "strangers" to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned. In this teli¥jon, it is apt to clarify that while it the was the disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that direct! ted in the filing of the suit the fact remains that Rene" Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rigt fp leaded as co-defendants in Jose's complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in disp jiew of the inclusion of "strangers" to beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family erforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's complaint due to noncompliance ‘earnest effort requirement therein. ismiss a complaint for failure to comply condition Besides, trial court cannot motu p1 precedent (Aquino vs. ure, 2008) oS * ON APPEALS AND CERTIORARI: 44. Enumerate the three (3) peal from decisions of the RTC: > (1) ordinary appeglor by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action JTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; > (2) petition for reviews judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate ered by Rule 42; and review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are sy Sey 9, the Court concludes that the suit is with ind law. AS mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on “questions of law." ibbad vs. Masirag, 2009). inguish “question of law” from “question of fact”. [> question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law. The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a calibration of the evidence (Macababbad vs. Masirag, 2009). 13. When is prescription issue consideréd question of law, and when considered question of fact? > Issue on prescription may either be a question of law or fact; it is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of an allegation of fact; it is a question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a given state of facts. The test of Whether a question is one of law or fact is not the appellation given to the question by the partyraising the issue; the test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Prescription, evidently, is a question of fact where there is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run (Crisostomo vs. Garcia, 2006). 14. Explain the substantial distinctions between “Appeal” and “Certioran”. As to the Purpose: > Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by @ court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would bea void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive syn ayrule. ‘Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari. The supervisory juris over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be cxercised for the pl intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the AW or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if¥e findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correcti ally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an efor of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy. As to the Manner of Filing: > Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appeliate jurisdiction ower of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in ‘with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. Ar is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original anc indent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judi order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. nye the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the Paifloner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively). As to the Subject Matter: y > Only judgments or final orders that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdicti iginal action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the I rior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, spe jequate remedy. AAs to the Period of Filing: a > Ordinary appeals should filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from,Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal ‘and a recor al within thirty (30) days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A the petition jould be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from the notice of denial of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration: In an degs! certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of j final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or motion for BeSersin (On the other hand, a peti n for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty (60) m the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for Ss ApBbrsctraton was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion. Qe. Need for a Motion for Reconsideration: ‘A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order. NOTE: With these distinctions, it is plainly discernible why a party is precluded from filing a petition for certiorari when appeal is available, or why the two remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion (Tible & Tible Company, Inc. vs. Royal Savings and Loan Association, 2008).15. Explain the two (2) concepts and/or distinctions of res judicata principle? » The principle of res judicata has two concepts, the first is the so-called ‘bar by former judgment’ and the other one is ‘conclusiveness of judgment’. > There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject ‘matter, and causes of action. Where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, there is conclusiveness of judgment. The first Judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, not as to matters merely involved therein, > There is no question that where as between the first case where the judgment is renga and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject and cause of action, the judgment on the merits in the first case constitutes an abs ir to the ‘Subsequent action not only as to every matter which was offered and rece fustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also as to any other admissible matter. which m@Mt have been offered for that purpose and to all matters that coul¢ have been adjuc in that case. This is designated as ‘bar by former judgment.’ ney > But where the second action between the same parties is upon a differentfaim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to $apse matters in issue or points Controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or j oy was rendered. In fine, the 7 Ane) Previous judgment is conclusive in the second case, only atters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters mer therein. This is the rule.on ‘conclusiveness of judgment. > To be easily remembered, in the first (bar by former t), the primordial consideration is the existence of two (2) cases; the identity of the par ‘Subject matter and the cause or causes of action; there is judgment on the merits in iy css the judgment on the merits in the first case may be invoked as an absolute bar to the Sadbnd case; the absolute bar to the subsequent action also covers any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that Purpose and to all matters that could have begfagiudged in that case, because the absolute bar to the subsequent action is not only limit Tnatter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand fs second aspect (conclusiveness of judgment), if the ‘second action between the ties is based upon a different claim or demand, the as an estoppel and conclusive only as to those matters in judgment in the prior actio issue or points conan the determination of which the finding or judgment was rendered (Tingson “CF SCRA 429). BASICS IN DETERMINING/ACQUIRI IRISDICTION: 46. Some of the B luick Formula on Jurisdiction > Paj jarkable Laundry, 2017: Breach of contract as cause of action for specific perfor IPE > RTC. Breach of contract as cause of action for damages MTC or RTC, ypon the amount involved. ions involving ownership, possession or interest over real property, depending on the AV, ITC or RTC, P20K/P20K+(prov)/ P50K/P50K+(NCR). Roldan vs. Barrios, 2018: Foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a real action. AV is terminative of trial court's jurisdiction. » San Miguel Properties vs. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, 2013: HLURB, DARAB, BFAR (as. the case may be) vs. First or Second level court. If the resolution of the case requires expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of a particular government agency or agencies in resolving an issue, apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, > Capioso vs. Capioso, 2002: If the case involves joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the Jurisdiction of the RTC.> Malana vs. Tappa, 2009, Salvador vs Patricia, 2016: RTC, if declaratory relief action is govemed by Section 1, paragraph 1 of Rule 63, MTC or RTC, depending on the AV, if declaratory relief action is governed by Section 1, paragraph 2 of Rule 63. However, Sabitsana vs. Muertegui, 2013, said that quieting of title action may be brought to the RTC regardless of AV. > Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Marcos, 2003: RTC vs. Sandiganbayan in cases involving civil forfeiture under RA 1379. Consider the SG. Civil forfeiture is action in rem and civil nature. Cases: > Bilag vs. Ay-ay, 2017 [J. Bernabe]: If the quieting of title case involves untitled and Unregistered land and classified as land of public domain, jurisdiction is exclusively lodgegewith the Director of Lands/DENR, NOT the regular courts. \ ) > Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 2015; Galang vs. Wallis, 2019 [CJ. Peralta toa reivindicatoria accion, or one of the parties are not all members of the indigenous grot n if the Property subject of the case is ancestral land, the regular court, not National mmission on Indigenous Peoples (NCJP) has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case, or when the case is in the nature of an AIPE, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case, > Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 2012 [. RTC may property take cognizance of reversion suit so long as the AV is within the jurisdictional threshold, and so long as it does not call for an annulment of judgment” judgment acting as a Land Registration court. REASON: Becduse “reversion suit’ belonas@owie pias of cases that involves title to, or possession or interest over real property ~ a real > Mitsubishi vs. Bureau of Customs, 2015 [J. alee tax collection after it was dismissed by the RTC on demurrer was wrongfully a the CA, but the CA referred the record to the CTA for proper disposition of the appeal. HELD: CA was wrong in referring the aled case to the CTA, because the CTA, not the CA has exclusive crete ag over appeals from the RTC judgments, resolutions or orders in tax collect cases originNylecided by them, and therefore, CA cannot perform any action on the appealed case except to order its dismissal pursuant to $2, R50, RC. CA's only power is to dismiss the appeal, Failure to perfect an appeal with 198d fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and executory. Appeal to the CTA shall be, Miling a petition for review (not notice of appeal) within thirty (30) days after the receipt of aN In or ruling (citing Section 11, RA 1125, as amended by Section TAN 9, RA 9292). BUT TAKE NOTI 'S appellate jurisdiction over RTC's Final Order becomes operative only when the has rules on a (local tax) issue/case (Ignacio vs. QC Treasurer's Office, 2017, [J. Bernabe)) * *All Investment, Ltd., 2017, [J. Bernabe]: Case involved a complaint with Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary fit of Preliminary Injunction) involving an intra-corporate controversy claiming iption to the new shares through the SRO (stock right offering) cannot be made a jent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote; otherwise, they Prived of their full voting rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings, thus seeking laration of nullity of the Board Resolution indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM (annual khokders' meeting), as well as the Board Resolution approving the SRO. .D: There can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot estimated, an action is considered AIPE, therefore, RTC has jurisdiction. > Dee vs. Application Restraini > Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court (Nippon Express vs. CIR, 2019). > Complaint must be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction (exclusive and original) over the action/case. It can be determined through complaint's allegation. > Correct dockets must be paid, because payment of correct docket fees is jurisdictional (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. Vs. Asuncion, 1989). Exception: plaintiff is declared indigent litigant (Algura vs. Naga City, 2006).TRIAL C UTY UPON REC! COMPLAINT: 17. Motu proprio dismissal of the complaint, but SOLELY on the grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (4) statute of limitations (see Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). NOTE THAT: The trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss a case that did not pass through the required katarungang pambarangay, because KP is not among mentioned in $1 R9 RC (Aquino vs. Aure, 2009). » _ Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter (Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). REASON: Because the only power of the court is to dismiss the case. (Zamora vs. CA, 183 SCRA 279; Katon vs. Palanca, 2004; Nippon Express vs. CIR, 2015; CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, 2015; Mitsubishi vs. Bureau of Customs, 2015 [J. Bemabe]). A decisigrr of the court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is null and void (Laresma vs. Abeliana, > _Litis pendentia, res judicata; and statute of limitations (Section 1, Rule 9, 199% Rules of Civil Procedure). 18. On the ancillary relief prayed for, such as: q > without hearing, issue executive/ex parte TRO (see Rule 58); > issue ex-parte Order of Preliminary Attachment (see Rule 57) > act on receivership application (see Rule 59); replevin g@jeetion (see Rule 60); support Pendente lite application (see Rule 61). 19. Issue summons (see Rule 14). ve 20. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS NOT PLEADED IN TI ISWER ARE DEEMED WAIVED: e 7 > Edron Construction vs. Province of Suri ‘Sur, 2017 [J. Bernabe]: Defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Secti tule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense ghall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the ther proceedings. 24, DEFENSES ADMITTED IN THE ang ‘CONSTITUTE JUDICIAL ADMISSION: > Mactan Rock vs. Germo, plaintiff is not her emy Bernabe]: In the RTC, defendant admitted in the Answer that . hut a mere consultant. Defendant was held liable for damages. Defendant Mactan 18 arguing that LAINLRC, not the RTC has jurisdiction, because plaintiff Germo was ployee. HELD: Admission made in the answer is a judicial admission, which are legally binding on them. Case {pstructs that even if such judicial admissions’ place a party at a disadvantat jon, he may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally and that he must assume’ sequences of such disadvantage, as in this case. This-constitutes a new theory raise first time on appeal. As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory the case is tried and decided by the lower court, will not be permitted to change n appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of F court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these ;not be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 22, ON VENUE: 1. What is the rule as to venue if a document defining a “exclusive venue" is the subject of the nullification action? > When the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, if exclusive venue is not observed, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue (Lantin vs. Judge Lantion, 2006 cited in Briones vs. CA).> When a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself, the plaintiff should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue (Briones vs. CA, 2015). Case: > Briones vs. CA, 2015 [J. Bernabe]: The document that contained the stipulation as the exclusivity of venue of action "Makati", among others, is the subject of Briones’ nullity action Briones filed his nullity action not in “Makati”, but in “Manila”. Improper venue as a ground, defendant moved to dismiss the case, which was eventually denied. CA reversed and dismissed the complaint. Elevated to SC on certiorari 65, and RTC was sustained. HELD: In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to me courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones’ s complaint directly ey the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given thig ejrcuttsfance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as Ns\qgfnpliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant tStwe\general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located. In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of Briones's complaint on the ground of improper venue. 2. Exclusivity of venue: (D > Ley Construction Corporation vs. Sedeno, 2017 [J. Bernabe]: The lease contract provides that "all actions or cases filed in connection with this cal il be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.” Becaus n-payment of rentals, a complaint for collection suit and damages was filed in the RTC lienzuela City. Defendant filed several motions for extension of time to file answer befdkg #e Could finally file his answer. Answer was filed assailing venue issue. ISSUE: Was the filing of the case Valenzuela court, as to venue, proper? HELD: No, because the agreement feque of action, that is, in Pasay City is exclusive. The rule on venue that where the rag i ‘or at the place where the defendant resides at the NN Fetion in dismissing option of the plaintiff shall not ay re the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the excl 1e thereof. In this case, the agreement as to venue, that is constitute as waiver tion the issue of improper venue? HELD: No. That resporttént had filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, or 3 ‘fe interposed a counterclaim or third-party complaint in his answer does not in Pasay City, is oR rs. ISSUE: Was the ike ¢ndant’s several motions for extension of time to file answer necessarily fat he waived the affirmative defense of improper venue. The prevailing rule improper venue is that the same must be raised at the earliest opportunity, as in motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed waived.® Here, respondent timely und of improper venue since it was one of the affirmative defenses raised in his Third-Party Complaint. As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the same. 2 x Js dismissal on the ground of improper venue with or without prejudice, and what is the jedy available is the dismissal order is correct? DB |ELD: The dismissible on the ground of improper venue is without prejudic: UniAlloy vs. UCPB, 2015: Except for cases falling under paragraphs (f)[that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations], (h)[that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished], or {i)[that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the Statute of frauds] of Section1, Rule 16, the dismissal of an action based on the above- enumerated grounds is without prejudice and does not preclude the refiling of the same action. ‘Therefore, the remedy is to re-file the complaint in the court with proper venue and jurisdiction ISSUE: What is the remedy if the dismissal order on the ground of improper venue is incorrect? HELD: The remedy is certiorari 65. UniAllloy vs. UCPB, 2015: Except for cases falling under paragraphs (f), (h), or (i), the dismissal of an action based on the above-enumerated grounds is without prejudice and does not precludethe refiling of the same action. And, under Section |(g) of Rule 41, an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The proper remedy therefrom is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Stated differently, none of the grounds for the dismissal of UniAlloy's Complaint is included in Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Hence, since the dismissal of its Complaint was without prejudice, the remedy then available to UniAlloy was a Rule 65 petition NOTE THAT: But, if the reason for the dismissal is based on paragraphs (f), (h), or (i) (ve., res judicata, prescription, extinguishment of the claim or demand, and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds) the dismissal, under Section 5, of Rule 16, is with prejudice and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal the order granting the motion to dismiss (UniAlloy vs. UCPB, 2015; DBP vs. Judge Carpio, 2017) © 23. EFFECT OF SUPERVENING EVENT TO A PENDING CASE: \, Effect of Supervening Event on Pending Preliminary Injunction: \ the validity of the SRC's Sugar Orders as unconstitutional, PSM filed before a prohibition and injunction case against SRC. However, during the pendency of the case, ander Sugar Order was issued revoking the effectivity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. > Sahar International Trading vs. Warner Lambert Co, [J. Bernabe]: During the pendency of the trial court's issued WPI bought before the CA, af R'M@/dismissed the main case for lack of cause of action HELD (in both cases): A case or issue is considere and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue ee $0 that an adjudication of the case or a > Pefafrancia Sugar Mill vs. Sugar Regulatory Comm., 2014 [J. bea In questioning declaration on the issue would be of no practical value In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled t hich would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdictiorNeve)) such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.« This is because the judgment will not set¥any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cangot be enforced 4 24, REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PLAINTI¢F. RE SERVICE OF SUMMONS, OR AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS BUT BEFORE DI PLEADS: > Amend his complaint, whj latter of right (Section 2, Rule 10). » File Notice of DismissafSecNen 1, Rule 17). Court confirm the dismissal thru an Order. 25. REMEDY AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT UPON RECEIPT OF SUMMONS: v Filing of J? Dismiss under Rule 16, Grounds: > lack iction over: (1) the subject matter; and (2) over the person of the defendant; improper ; Plaintiff's lack of-legal capacity to sue; litis pendentia; res judicata; statute of limit ‘cdMplaint states no cause of action; claim has been extinguished; action is founded on une \le/statute of frauds; and failure of condition precedent (Section 1, Rule 16). Filing a Motion for Bill of Particulars Filing of Answer DECLARATORY RELIEF: REPUBLIC vs. ROQUE, BATHAN, ET AL G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013 Facts: There were two (2) separate petitions for unconstitutionality of Human Security Law of 2007. First, the Hemisphere petition in the SC, and the Second is the Roque petition for declaratory relief filed before RTC 92, QC. Because of the pendency of the Hemisphere petition, OSG, in Roque moved to suspend the proceedings, and was granted. Thereafter, the SC dismissed Hemisphere petition solely onprocedural grounds: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi, and (c) failed to present an actual case or controversy. In short, the High Court in Hemisphere did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. Because of the Hemisphere dismissal, the OSG moved to dismiss Roque petition arguing that the SC, in Hemisphere had already sustained with finality the constitutionality of the law, and the petition failed to satisfy the requirements for declaratory relief. Judge Bathan denied the dismissal motion holding that no definite ruling was rendered by the SC as regards issue of constitutionality, and the requisites of DR were all present. MR was also denied. Certiorari 65 was filed against the judge. Issue/Ruling: Whether or not Judge Bathan gravely abused its discretion when he denied the Republic's motion to dismiss. No. It is because the High Court in Southem Hemisphere, did not make any definitive Mi 300 the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in the (1*) consolidated cases were based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper ners therein lack focus standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual og iroversy, Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion, However, Judge Bathan exceeded its jurisdiction (but not grave in chai when it ruled that the petition had met all the requisites of DR action. Consequently, the denial ‘subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper. Elements of DR: first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a Sy. ‘contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; ‘second, the terms of said documents and the validity re doubtful and require judicial construction; thir here must have been no breach ofthe docurd uestion; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable co fr the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determiMiigA; and ‘sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. ‘The SC observed that while the fir iNand third requirements appear to exist in the case, however, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requir main wanting. As to the fourth requisite, tk ious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one exists in thi Pertinently, a justiciable y refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judi fetermin: e ne that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by “ripening seeds’ it is meant, sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and Violence of a full blowgsbattle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevi i@ation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration. The iled to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain sor injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far interest#a&gitiZens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if rroad gts factual milieu in the Southem Hemisphere cases, Roque only asserted general the ef t of the said law would remain untrammelied. As their petition would disclose, Roque’s fosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to ral public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or Q@ernmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for DR, over which the SC has no orginal jurisdiction, Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double contingency,” fal review for lack of ripeness. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not i to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.Thus, in the same light that the SC dismissed the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed Roque’s petition for DR all the same. “It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required /ocus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct Necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to Corrupt the settled doctrine of focus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by thsgeneral public. As to the fifth requisite for an action for DR, neither can it be inferred that the cont Oe is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed alleg Private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settl question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to pro h a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private fespondents exists in the first place. All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth rae for DR, as weil as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for D#ayoueMhave been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RUC gMwely abused its discretion.” -ELB-